%images;]>LCRBMRP-T2502Address of Cuba to the United States.: a machine-readable transcription. Collection: African-American Pamphlets from the Daniel A. P. Murray Collection, 1820-1920; American Memory, Library of Congress. Selected and converted.American Memory, Library of Congress.

Washington, 1994.

Preceding element provides place and date of transcription only.

This transcription intended to be 99.95% accurate.

For more information about this text and this American Memory collection, refer to accompanying matter.

05-017855Daniel Murray Pamphlet Collection, 1860-1920, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Library of Congress. Copyright status not determined.
0001

ADDRESS OF CUBATO THEUNITED STATES.NEW YORK:COMES, LAWRENCE & CO.,STATIONERS AND PRINTERS,9 Maiden Lane.1873.

0002

PREFACE.The publication in the New York Herald of the address of General Quesada, representative of the Cuban Republic in foreign lands, to the President of the United States, having attracted universal attention and generally favorable comment, it has been considered proper to print it in pamphlet form and in full, as it was originally written, certain portions having been omitted in the journals.

This document treats the entire Cuban question in a very comprehensive manner, and presents unanswerable arguments in favor of the recognition of Cuban belligerency by this republic. As is natural, the parties in this country interested in the continuation of slave labor in Cuba, through which they gain their subsistence and wealth, have not been pleased with it. It may be considered equally natural that those who cannot conform themselves to the new condition of freedom to the colored people in this nation will not look favorably upon a cause which seeks to extend this blessing to that people in another, and so the insulting attacks on the Cuban representative which have appeared in a certain New York paper can be easily understood. The most astonishing thing of all, however, is the ground taken by the New York Times on the question, purporting as it does to be the semi-official organ of the administration in New York, and which, as such, ought to be not only in favor of the independence of the island, but in sympathy with the sentiments of abolition proclaimed and carried out by the patriots there. To favor the rule of slave traders is certainly a curious thing for a republican paper. General Quesada in his address, for the first time placed before the American public the identity of interest between a large portion of the American merchants and those representing the slave property in the island of Cuba, and the underground methods, probably, adopted in order to continue the existence of slavery there, and to find it defenders in certain papers and in Washington. It is not credible that such a prominent organ of the ruling national party as the Times, is under the control or influence of the ring whose object is to perpetuate slave labor in Cuba. But it is to be feared that it is, and will be controlled in the treatment of this question, which is a national one and has 00032naught to do with the issues which divide the two great parties in this country in its character as a partisan. Nevertheless this some journal, when the news of the execution of the people taken on board the Virginius first arrived, not only said that there "could be no question about the barbarous haste with which the shooting of the patriot generals was determined on," but that the Cubans ought to make the most of this opportunity to bring the question of Cuban insurgency within the range of international discussion." It is very possible that owing to the semi-official character attributed to this journal General Quesada was influenced by this suggestion to prepare his address, in the hope that it would tend to bring "Cuban insurgency within the range of international discussion." Now, the Times has published a long article in its news columns attempting an answer to the address, the contents of which unfortunately show that the party feeling referred to predominates, as the larger part of the first column is devoted to an attack on Mr. Cox and the Democratic party, prompted by the resolution offered by that gentleman in Congress in favor of Cuban belligerency. The balance of the article is in reality an exposition of the arguments in favor of such belligerency, though the intention was to oppose it. There was once a lawyer of Spain named Maltrana, who being engaged as counsel to defend a man charged with trifling offence, introduced such queer facts in substantiating the innocence of his client that the latter was condemned to death. The author of the article referred to has succeeded equally well with Maltrana in establishing what he desired to controvert. In the first place he states that the fighting season in the island is only from November to May, and asks if the rebels are pushing on today. These two points can be answered satisfactorily. The fighting season he refers to is for the Spaniards. From May to November the Cubans possess every advantage, and the greater part of their victories have been obtained in that interval. The argument, therefore, contained in the statement is against the Spaniards. It being known that the Cubans now at a time most favorable to their enemies are on the offensive, what can be expected when this so called "fighting season" is over? The Diario de la Marina, an official paper in Habana, admits that the Spanish army loses from ten to fifteen thousand 00043men every year, confesses to a want of preparation to meet the exigencies of an active campaign, and adds that the defeat of the Spaniards will follow if this preparation is not made at once. So much for the two points referred to.

The third point is contained in a statement of Mr. Gallenga, an Italian, and correspondent of the London Times, whom ever went to the field in Cuba, as Mr. O"Kelly and Genl. Millen did, and who, writing under the inspiration of the hospitalities extended to him by the Spanish officials in the island, says that the Cuban army is composed of but eight thousand soldiers. As it is stated in the history of the United States that Washington's army in 1776 did not exceed four thousand, though it deserved the respect and received the assistance of a foreign power, the argument may be considered a contra producentem, proving to the contrary of what is designed. The fourth point is found in a translation of what the celebrated Mr. Beach Lawrence has written concerning belligerent rights, and here the Spanish advocate still farther displays his title to be regarded as a worthy successor to the Lawyer Maltrana. The statement refers to the claim presented to the Danish government by the heirs of Paul Jones. Denmark not having recognized the American colonies as a power, and treating only with England as holding sovereignty over this country, surrendered to the British government two prizes brought to a Danish port by the distinguished naval officer mentioned. The claim based on this surrender, made first by Benjamin Franklin and finally considered by Mr. Wheaton, establishes that, according to American principles, the right of a colony, fighting for its independence, to be treated as a belligerent by all nations, is so incontestable that even a power that has not recognized it in any way is obliged to act in accordance, and becomes responsible in damages for not doing so. The other example taken from Mr. Beach Lawrence, is in the case of Greece, which was never, either by land or sea, as strongas Cuba is; Greece, which would have been entirely destroyed by the Turkish fleet and the powerful army under Ibrahim Pasha without the assistance of the allied nations which defeated the former at Navarino and recognized not only the belligerence but the independence of that State; Greece, which was really incapable of sustaining itself against its oppressors. 00054Cuba being thus far victorious against all the efforts of Spain, deserves, a great deal more than did Greece, the recognition of her belligerency. The principle presented by Mr. Strafford Canning is very clear. He says, as quoted by the Times, that "the character of belligerency is not so much a principle as a fact, that a certain degree of force and stability acquired by a mass of population engaged in a war gave to that population the right to be treated as belligerents; and even if the right was contested, it was the well-known interest of all civilized nations to treat them as such." Is not this a Maltrana defense? Another point is found in the sentence of the Tribunal of Commerce, at Marseilles, in favor of a Columbian privateer, the Tribunal declaring that the Columbians in a state of revolt against the legitimate authority of their sovereign only directed their force against the flag of Spain and the property of subject of that power. Another quotation of the Times, and the most important of all, is the answer of Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State, to the Minister of Spain in 1816, which says that the United States insists that is is "conformable to the principles of justice, and to their interest, to receive into their ports the vessels of all countries, to whatever port they may belong, and whatever may be the flag under which they are navigated, provided they be not pirates, * * * without stopping to inquire if there has been a violation, on their part, to the countries to which they belong, of the obedience to which they were held and of the laws by which they were governed, by the adoption of such flag, or by no matter what other act committed by them." We have reasons to believe that this is not a bonafide quotation on the part of the Times, inasmuch as an important portion has been omitted. According to our recollection of the facts Mr. Monroe not only said these things, applying them to the struggle of any colonies against the mother country, but added that the United States was to observe a strict neutrality towards both contending parties, "without stopping to judge of the strength of their forces of the probability of the final result." The other quotations of the Times are equally against the propositions intended to be established, and the fact is that the argument of Genl. Quesada, as contained in the following address, may be considered unanswerable.The Editor.

0006
ADDRESS OF CUBA TO THE UNITED STATES

The Representatives of the Cuban Republic in ForeignLands, to His Excellency the President of the United States.

Your Excellency,--even at a time when, by order of the Spanish Officials in the island of Cuba, the captain, crew and a large portion of the passengers of the American steamer " Virginius," captured, near Jamaica by a Spanish man-of-war, have been executed, and the survivors remain subjected to such treatment as will cause them to envy the milder fate of their companions; when the American people and the whole civilized world stand amazed at the horrors of the transaction, the representative abroad of the Cuban Republic would not break the silence he has so long maintained toward the government over which your Excellency so worthily presides, had not your recent high-minded Message to Congress strengthened the hopes which have been so naturally excited, that the Cuban question was at last to receive the solution demanded by the interest of civilization and the spirit of American institutions. And now he would not intrude himself in the question of the honor of the American people, involved by the outrageous acts of the Spaniards, for he has no right to do so. He can only say that the Cubans, as is their duty, will continue in the sacrifice of their property and lives upon the alter of their country, and when at last the United States shall decide to put a stop to those outrages in the only possible manner, they will proffer for this purpose 100,000 men in ranks and ready to receive those arms which have been so long denied them. Notwithstanding the hopes thus excited he still fears that the time has not arrived when the American nation shall arouse itself to put an end to the crime perpetrated by Spain in this Western Hemisphere. The Spanish residents 00072of Cuba have so often inflicted, with impunity, outrageous offences upon American citizens that it seems difficult to entertain any hope of an attempt at radical and complete redress. For many years they have been in the habit of insulting, plundering and killing American citizens.

The facts might be recalled that the well-known American artist, Mr. Cohner, was assassinated by them in the streets of Habana, in January, 1869; that in the same city and during the same month, others met with a like fate; that in February of that year two American engineers were shot in the district of Holguin, and in Camaguey others suffered in the same manner; that Dr. Houard, a native of the United States, was prosecuted without reasonable grounds, and sent in irons to a Spanish jail; that in February, 1870, the captain of an American steamer was threatened with death in the harbor of Habana, because it was believed he had taken on board of his vessel the man who fought with the Spanish editor, Castanon, and that he owed his life to the protection of a British man-of-war; that Dr. Phillips, Consul of the United States, in Santiago de Cuba, was also attacked by them, and he too owed the preservation of his life to the British flag; that the property of a large number of American citizens has been confiscated by them; that the Department of State in Washington has already issued several volumes, recounting the outrages of the Spaniards, concerning which official action has been taken, and still the measure of the story is not full. But to what purpose? The cases of Mr. Cohner and of the other Americans shot have passed, almost unnoticed. The confiscation of American property has been followed by a dilatory and ruinous procedure, and to a great extent it still remains in the hands of the Spaniards, the published order of its restoration, notwithstanding. It has been stated without contradiction, that the demand on the part of the American government, for the release of Dr. Houard, was withdrawn, and that he owed his liberty to the elemency of the Spanish government, while Dr. Phillips, robbed of his property, in despite of his official character, convinced of the inutility of his efforts to obtain redress, and overwhelmed by the tide of misery which only privileged souls can resist, but recently sought in death the relief 00083he was unable to find elsewhere. What was the motive of his persecution by the slave-holders in Cuba? As an official agent of the United States in Cuba, and in accordance with the orders he received from the Department of State, he sent a truthful report concerning the condition of affairs in that part of the island, and such report having been published by Congress, as is the custom, the so sad result to himself followed. After all these precedents it is not easy to believe that the last assassinations in Santiago de Cuba can fill the measure of American endurance. But if the undersigned does not entertain much hope in the premises, he has some slight expectation that, aided by the eloquent history of the past five years, he may be able, through the reasons he shall set forth, to effect some change in the policy of the United States in the treatment of this question. He will always reject the rumors set afloat by the political enemies of the worthy Minister in charge of the Department of State. He is convinced, and takes pleasure in declaring it, that, as a gentleman and a christian, that honorable statesman has acted in good faith, though, perhaps, looking at the Cuban question from a mistaken point of view.

II.

The gigantic struggle between the two sections of this country and the results which followed, occupied the entire attention of its principal men. This government, after contending from 1774 to 1781 for independence, was compelled to struggle from 1861 to 1865 for the liberty of all, and when the issue was decided, it was in accordance with justice that the destiny of the nation should be confided to the powerful arm which had preserved it, assisted by those associated with him in this work. And yet, influenced by the ardor of the contest, and engaged in reorganizing and reconstructing after so costly a labor, they could not pay much attention to any other questions, or view them, save through the light of those political passions which had been developed in the great conflict. In this struggle the right of secession was maintained by the southern States, and denied by the great majority of the nation. As the war in Cuba broke out in a short time after, the men engaged in the contest here, were perhaps inclined to regard the Cubans as holding the same relations to the Spanish government that the seceding 00094States did to the government of this Union, and looked upon them as rebels to the mother country. To this consideration must be added the representations of a great part of the American merchants resident in the island, or having business relations therewith. Their interests were identical with those of the slave-trading Spaniards who constituted the real Spanish government of Cuba. The commerce of the United States with the Island represents more than $100,000,000 yearly, and many of the Americans engaged in it are the very energetic, though not avowed, defenders of the Spanish power in the island. And, for the reason that such power furnishes for them the slave labor which produces the sugar, coffee and tobacco, the traffic in which makes them rich.

The men in this country who sustain this commerce necessarily exert a great influence, without appearing to mingle in any political questions, and they may have created in Washington a feeling opposed to Cuba, which will prevent the question being seen in its true light.

To all these reasons, and to the diplomatic skill of the Spaniards, must be attributed the persecutions to which the Cubans have been subjected; the aid, in arms and vessels, that has been furnished to the Spaniards; the constant endeavors to belittle the efforts of the Cubans; the absolute denial of all rights, which, in accordance with American principles, belong to them, and the intimate friendship manifested in the Cuban question by this government toward Spain, whether represented by the revolutionary soldiers, Serrano and Prim, by King Amadeus, or by the present ephemeral republican government. Between the interests of certain American merchants and the duty of recognizing Cuban belligerency, the balance was inclined in favor of the former. The undersigned will endeavor to remove the erroneous impressions which are extant in the atmosphere of Washington, and, as the source of these impressions lies in confounding the character and position of the patriots with those of the confederates, he will first consider that point.

He would never presume to reflect upon the heroism, valor and good faith of the men who fought in the cause of the South. They were worthy enemies of the great Northern people. They fell with glory. Unfortunately, their cause was that of slave 00105labor, and their aim to weaken a power which required all its strength in order to accomplish the great mission assigned to it by Providence. The Cubans constituted a colony of Spain, without political rights or rights of any kind; the South belonged to a confederation of free States, bound to submit to the decision of the greater number; the Cubans fight to abolish slavery, the South fought to preserve it; the Cubans desire to be allied to the Union, the South only wished to be separate therefrom. To sum up the whole matter, the South, whether wrong or otherwise, decided to establish, by an appeal to arms, the new principle of the right of a portion of a nation to separate from the main body; the Cubans have the long since admitted right of independence belonging to every oppressed colony, as proclaimed in 1776 by the fathers of this country. They had many times asked political rights from Spain, which had been as often denied them, and when they had lost every hope they took to the field. Whether they are entitled to any credit for the manner they have conducted themselves, is a question not to be treated as idle words, as, it is feared, has been done heretofore.

In Cuba was formed a respectable society, augmented by emigration from Florida, St. Domingo and all Spanish America, and influenced by the fact that a certain market for their productions could be found in the United States. The families who there acquired wealth, not finding an opportunity of educating their sons in a satisfactory manner under Spanish rule, adopted the habit of sending them to foreign lands, and in this way, after many years, there grew up in that country a population--refined and cultured--in opposition to the aims and wishes of the government of Spain. When this population decided to break the ties which bound them to the mother country, propositions were made to inaugurate the movement in April, 1869, at which time it was thought all the arms and necessary supplies could be obtained and properly distributed; but the intention having been discovered by the Spaniards the outbreak was anticipated by several months, and on the 10th of October of the year previous it took place. The Cubans preferred to go to the field without arms rather than remain and be executed in cold blood by the Spaniards. From that moment the only question has 00116been how to obtain arms from abroad. The Spanish government, being well aware that the oppressed people of the great Antille had means enough to arm their forces and to create a navy, confiscated the property of a great part of them. This property amounted to several hundreds of millions of dollars, as can be proved by the official records in Havana. This measure could not, however, prevent the patriots from buying arms, though it diminished to an immense extent the revolutionary resources. By private subscriptions of Cubans only there have been purchased fourteen steamers, sixteen sailing vessels and 40,000 rifles. Unfortunately, as the requisite funds could not be collected rapidly, it was impossible to apply them on as large a scale as necessary to evade the Spanish blockade and not to break in any respect the neutrality laws of this country. The expeditions, sometimes owing to the scarcity of resources and at others to the want of experience--natural under the circumstances--have not always arrived at their destinations. It was essential to employ a greater amount of money at one time than could be obtained from private subscriptions. There were three methods of raising such money--sending to sea to prey upon Spanish commerce; exchanging for funds those products remaining within the extent of the insurgent lines, and to negotiate a foreign loan. To the first was presented the obstacle that the worthy representatives of the Cuban Republic at that time did not dare to assume the responsibility, as they were made aware that the American government would not view favorably the existence of Cuban privateers when it was pressing the Alabama claims. To the second existed the obstacle, that Cuban belligerency not being recognized, it was impossible to excite the spirit of gain to engage in any enterprises the object of which was to run the blockade. The third had for its obstacle that all the European and some American houses disposed to enter upon its negotiation, imposed always as a sine qua non condition the previous recognition of the belligerency by the United States. Consequently the main object of all our diplomatic efforts has been, during a certain time, to bring about such recognition. The Spaniards, on their part, knowing that the immediate loss of the island would result from this recognition, stopped at no means to prevent it accomplishment, 00127and without doubt they have displayed herein great diplomatic sagacity. But if on the field of intrigue they gained the result which they desired, they were not equally fortunate on the field of battle. As was natural, the greater part of the unarmed Cubans and families who were within the theatre of the war were dispersed or sent away in the midst of the military movements. At the same time a regular army was formed, equipped by the arms and materials furnished by the successful expeditions and with those taken from the enemy, which army has during the past five years, been increasing in numbers, morale and strength.

III.

In order to make a proper estimate of the importance of the war, it is sufficient to refer to the official data collected by Mr. Sickles, the American Minister to Madrid, and sent by him to the Department of State. One year ago he stated that the Spanish army in Cuba had lost, during the first four years of the war, 60,000 men, and it was supposed that the Cuban loss had been correspondingly great. As the Spaniards are naturally interested in belittling the importance of the insurrection, it may be concluded these figures are not exaggerated. Admitting that the loss, during the past year, the most bloody of all, has been in proportion equally large, it will be seen that since the beginning of the war 150,000 men have perished.

The loss resulting from the destruction of property is immense.

The value of the productions which could have been controlled by the republican government of Cuba, during the first months of the war is estimated at $10,000,000. These productions were afterwards lost through the military operations which followed. The value of the crops in those districts which constitute the seat of war, and which have been lost, can be estimated at $15,000,000 a year. The stock farms, the sugar plantations destroyed, and the towns reduced to ashes, extending over an immense area, represent an uninsured loss of $500,000,000; for it is impossible to estimate at a less amount the rich and now desolate districts of Santiago de Cuba, Guantanamo, Bayamo, Manzanillo, Holguin, Tunas, Camaguey and a part of Cinco Villas. And what is the most wonderful, notwithstanding all these immense 00138losses of life and property, the non-recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans by the United States and the supreme efforts made to suppress them by Spain, they are now, as no one will deny, stronger than ever, and they have an army which renders nugatory all the efforts of their foes in the field. Their hearts have been tempered until they are injustice proof. They proceed, step by step, but with a firm determination, though lamenting that the protracted task, which they are condemned by the delay in the recognition of their belligerency by this country, will compel the postponement of their independence until the ruin of the Antille is complete. With the slow but inevitable march of the cancer, the liberating army is encroaching upon the Spanish dominion in the island. As time moves on this dominion is constantly growing weaker in the midst of its furious convulsions, while the revolution is constantly spreading, and the ultimate result will be to destroy in America the ignominious power of the nation of Torquemada, Alva and Burriel.

The Cubans, notwithstanding the embargoes and confiscations from which they have suffered, are always enabled to raise funds among themselves, and every effort made by them to give assistance to the liberating army is always succeeded by another, and there is no possibility of a cessation of these efforts. Those who are compelled to remain in the island under the Spanish yoke, whatever may be their position in the estimation of the Spanish government, always contributed something to the treasury of the patriots, evading the vigilance of the oppressors, while those who reside elsewhere continually labor that they may deposit the result upon the altar of their country. And, if it is true that the expeditions sent out are not as formidable as they would be, following the successful negotiation of a loan, they have ever, to some extent, resulted in advancing the cause. The patriots have never been wanting in fighting material, as every man capable of bearing arms has always been inclined to do so. They have done and they do everything alone, entirely alone, notwithstanding the fact that they have been opposed by an army stronger than that which Great Britain sent to this country to suppress the American Revolution, added to the number which Spain herself sent out 00149to suppress the revolts against her power in Mexico and in her South American colonies. There were never forty thousand British soldiers on American soil; there were never forty thousand Spanish soldiers on the continent they lost. In Cuba there were during the first four years of the existing struggle, sixty thousand regular troops, and besides, some thousands of Spanish volunteers, who garrisoned the towns. With all this extraordinary force, with a formidable navy and the best American weapons, the Spanish government has year after year seen its battalions disappear, and it has no resources to-day to replace them.

IV.

To fully appreciate the patriotism and strength of the Cubans, it is well to consider dispassionately the history of those peoples who have achieved their independence. Your Excellency will recall that no one of them has succeeded in breaking the yoke of oppression without extraneous assistance. It is easy to comprehend this fact. When one people subdues another, it takes every precaution to fortify its rule and to prevent the vanquished from obtaining those elements necessary for resistance to its power.

Every Cuban, every progressive man, will always admire the history of this wonderful country, whose noble and intelligent people have changed materially and morally the world with the marvels of electricity, of steam and of liberal institutions. This beloved land of America, this powerful nation, is the natural ally of Cuba. It is the market of Cuba. Its society is that which must be interlaced with the society of Cuba. Its glories reflect upon Cuba, its misfortunes are hers, and she ever prays for its success in all endeavors. The defenders of the island, however, are inclined to believe that their patriotism is not inferior to the patriotism of the fathers of the American revolution. According to some official communications, and to other reports, it would seem that there are high circles in this country in which is entertained a low estimate of Cuban valor. It is possible this misapprehension arises from a comparison between the small numbers in arms in the island and the millions who recently met in fratricidal strife on this continent, and between the weak vessels of Cuba and the navy of a first-class power. The ideas thus expressed would seem to show some forgetfulness of the history of the United States. It is frequently 001510observed that persons of humble origin, suddenly raised to wealth by the favoring breeze of fortune, forgetting their early life, despise the poor who struggle against misery. It would be a source of profound regret should any son of this great republic take into consideration the struggle now going on in Cuba without remembering the early events of American history. It is possible that some, contemplating the immense cities of this country, its increasing population, its industries and its splendor, may imagine these always existed, and that by some supernatural power and without foreign aid this people accomplished at once its present position of eminence. Vanitas vanitatum. Peoples, like individuals, are sometimes intoxicated by the incense of self-love. He was a very wise philosopher, that Roman historian, who made the founder of his country the offspring of a wolf, and who stated that the original settlers of that empire were a set of miserable bandits. It is probable that his intention was to check the vanity of that wonderful people whose glories have never been eclipsed. It is necessary to recall, although it may wound the self-pride of some who do not understand what the real grandeur of a nation is, that the independence of this people had its origin in poverty and weakness. The lesson of the historian is, that without foreign assistance it is probable its first effort for independence would have been suppressed and George Washington died on the scaffold--treated by the British writers as a filibuster; a term applied to-day by an eminent jurist to the men of education and high position in society who have recently sacrificed their lives for the liberty of their country, and among whom the undersigned has the glory to count a son, a youth eighteen years old.

It is known that the American colonies were poor, and when the outbreak against the mother country was first initiated, it did not have the support of the wealthy portion of the population, which constituted the Tory party, and was in favor of continuance of British rule, as Hildreth says in the thirty-eighth chapter of his history. It were well to recall to mind what were the resources which the colonies raised in order to carry on a war with Great Britain. Says the historian referred to:

"1774.--The Congress appointed a Committee of Safety, at the head of which 001611was John Hancock, with power to call out the militia. A committee was also appointed to take measures for the defense of the province and another to procure military stores and provisions, toward which the sum of $20,000-- $66,666 was appropriated."

Sixty-six thousand dollars was all the money which the Congress at Philadelphia was able to raise to meet the War of Independence. Concerning the spirit of the people, Hildreth says:

"1775.--Surrounded with difficulties, the commander-in-chief exhibited a fortitude, assiduity, discrimination and patience, absolutely necessary for the station he held, and amply vindicating the judgment of Congress. In his private correspondence he could not wholly suppress his feelings. He complained bitterly of an egregious want of public spirit and fertility in all the low arts of obtaining advantages."

It should not be forgotten that in that year the British general, Lord Dunmore, landed in Norfolk, which place he burned in January, 1776, and that the country was reduced to such extremity, that in December, 1775, the committee of safety was authorized to imprison all persons guilty of taking up arms against the colonies. To continue the quotations:

"1776.--Adams' (John) position, at the head of the War Department, gave him full sight into the details of affairs, and he complained like Washington of corruption, even in this infant age of our Republic, and of a predominating avarice which threatened the ruin of America. The golden age of pure, disinterested patriotism (adds the same historian) is much like all golden ages--that which seems to be such at a distance will hardly bear a close inspection."

And now it is fitting to look at the military situations as recorded by this author in 1776, and the condition of the cause of American Independence when it was so opportunely assisted by France.

"April, 1776--Including the troops found at New York, Washington's whole army, exclusive of the regiments left in garrison at Boston or sent to the Northern Department, did not exceed 8,000 men, very imperfectly equipped and scantily provided."

Then, by the advice of the noble leader, the greatest efforts were made to rouse the whole country to arms.

"August, 1776--So slowly were the requisitions of Congress complied with, that a month after the arrival of the Howes, Washington's army did not exceed twenty thousand men, of whom a fifth part were sick, and as many were absent on detached duty."

001712

Proceeding to a study of the campaign, it will be seen that every sort of disaster had fallen upon the American troops. In reference to the seizure of New York by the British, Hildreth says:

"1776. September 15.--Howe landed near Kipp's Bay, three miles above the city. The troops posted to guard this landing, panic struck by the late disasters, fled without firing a gun. Two New England brigades, brought up to support them, seized with like panic, ran away in the most shameful manner, leaving Washington, who had come to view the ground, exposed to capture within eighty paces of the enemy. Greatly excited at this dastardly conduct, he threw his hat on the ground exclaiming, 'Are these the men with whom I am to defend America? His attendants turned his horse's head and hurried him from the field."

If at that moment Washington had been taken prisoner what would have been the result of the war?

"1776. October.--By the departure of the militia and the expiration of term of the regulars, the Northern army melted rapidly away. Several regiments, which had yet a short time to serve, marched under Gates to join Washington, who was by this time hardly pressed. * * *

"November.--Washington's army was by this time greatly reduced. The term of service of the militia was fast expiring. The whole flying camp soon claimed their discharge, and no inducement could procure a moment's delay. Some of the New York militia refused to do duty. Howe, they said, offered peace, liberty and safety--so they understood his proclamation--and what more could be asked? The Continentals were enlisting for a year, and their term of service was fast drawing to a close; nor did they always wait to complete it, desertions being very numerous. Exclusive of the divisions of the highlands, and the corps under Lee on the east side of the Hudson, Washington's army did not exceed 4,000 men."

Washington's army did not exceed 4,000 men! Every one knows that the British were victorious everywhere; that everywhere the cause of American independence was fleeing before them. On the 7th of December, 1776, the great man made the memorable retreat, crossing the Delaware. The principal cities of the country were, one after the other, falling into the hands of the enemy. At the expiration of the year the situation of affairs is presented by Hildreth in the following terms:

"The Howes issued a new proclamation. * * * The speedy triumph of the mother country seemed certain, and many persons--those especially of large property, including several who had taken an active part in the revolution--hastened to make the required submission. Turkey, president of the late New Jersey Convention, which had sanctioned the Declaration of Independence and formed the State constitution, now abandoned his country's cause and took a 001813British protection. So did Allen and Galloway, late delegates from Pennsylvania to the Continental Congress. For ten days after the issue of the proclamation 200 or 300 persons came in every day to take the oath."* *

Such was the desperate situation at this critical period.

Again says Hildreth:

"The French, both the court and the merchants, saw with delight the British colonies rising in arms against the mother country. In spite of the remonstrances of the British Ambassador, American privateers found no difficulty in selling their prizes in French ports. Armed vessels, to sail under American commissions, were even allowed to be secretly fitted out."

It is difficult to the humble person who has the honor to address your Excellency to refrain from making an observation at this point. The Americans had this assistance in their struggle afforded them on the seas from the commencement. If the Cubans had been equally favored for one month it would have afforded them sufficient strength to accomplish the purpose for which their revolution was initiated. Now it is to be observed the entire picture shown by the said writer, presenting, as it does, an admirable historical tableau:

"Shortly after the breaking out of hostilities, in consequence of representations made by Arthur Lee to the French Ambassador at London, Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, had sent M. Beaumarchais, well known at Paris as a courtier, a dramatist and a political intriguer, to concert measures with Lee for remitting to America arms and military stores to the value of 1,000,000 livres ($200,000). The French court was not yet prepared for an open breach with England, and to cover up this transaction and to give it a mercantile appearance, those arms were to be remitted by Beaumarchais under the fictitious mercantile firm of Hortales & Co. Before this matter could be finally arranged, Deane had arrived at Paris, not openly in any public capacity, but apparently as a private merchant. He was courteously received by Vergennes, and was presently introduced to Beaumarchais, with whom he completed the arrangements commenced with Lee in London. It was agreed that Hortales & Co. should send the proposed supplies by way of the West Indies, and that Congress should remit tobacco and other produce in payment. Beaumarchais presently despatched three vessels, and others subsequently, with valuable cargoes, including 200 pieces of artillery and a supply of small arms from the King's arsenal, 4,000 tents and clothing for 30,000 men.

But this assistance, so secretly afforded, did not satisfy the French people, and many volunteers, depending upon their own resources, came hither to offer their lives in defense of the independence of this nation, when the news of the loss of New York and the retreat through the Jerseys made most foreigners despair of the American cause, as said Hildreth:

001914

"The Marquis of Lafayette, a youth of nineteen, belonging to one of the most illustrious families of France, who had just arrived in America, and whom Washington now met, in Philadelphia, for the first time * * * Like all other French nobles of that date, he had received a military education, and held a commission in the French Army. In garrison at Metz, he had been present at an entertainment given by the Duke of Gloucester, brother of the British king, and on that occasion, from the Duke's lips he heard, first, the story of the American rebellion. His youthful fancy was fired by the idea of this trans-atlantic struggle for liberty, and, though master of an ample fortune, and married to a wife whom he tenderly loved, he resolved at once to adventure in it. For that purpose, he opened a communication with Deane. His intention becoming known, the French Court, which still kept up the forms of neutrality, forbade him to go. But he secretly purchased a ship, which Deane loaded with military stores, and set sail at a moment when the news of the loss of New York and the retreat through the Jerseys, made most foreigners despair of the American cause."

But all this generous assistance did not yet satisfy the French nation. It was thought necessary to extend the fullest aid to the struggling American people, and France decided to do this without any reservation:

"January 30, 1776.--Two treaties were speedily signed--one of friendship and commerce, the other of defensive alliance--in case Great Britain should declare war against France."

"April, 1777.--The American Commissioners (Lee and Franklin) received from the French government a quarterly allowance, amounting in the whole to about $400,000. and half as much more was advanced on loan by the Farmers-General, to be repaid by remittances of tobacco. This money was principally applied to the purchase of arms and supplies for the troops, and the fitting out of armed vessels, a business left very much in the hands of Deane, who had been bred a merchant, and who still continued to have the chief management of the transactions with Beaumarchais. Of the ships first despatched under that arrangement, two were taken by the enemy; the third arrived with arms for the new regiments, which began at last to fill up."

With the reception of these resources the Americans were enabled to enter upon a new and active campaign which proved one of victories, though with occasional reverses.

"July 6, 1777.--The retreat of the British was none too soon. They had been gone but a few days when the Count D'Estaing arrived off the Delaware, with a French fleet of twelve ships of the line, and four frigates. This fleet, much superior to Lord Howe's, had on board 4,000 French troops." * * *

Is it necessary to continue the quotations? It is not known that at the precise moment when the cause of American independence was in the greatest distress, it received that aid from 002015without which opened the way to success? It is well understood that those very men who, at the commencement, not trained to the hardships and vicissitudes of war, by their actions so disgusted their great leader, who, without the necessary arms and resources, could accomplish so little, subsequently and when these were supplied, were enabled to turn the tide of victory and compel their arrogant and exultant foe to lay down his arms in acknowledgment of the independence of the country. The recollection of these striking events has its origin in the fact that the Cubans are struggling in the same cause which engaged the American colonies, and that in their contest they are not entitled to the less consideration because they have had no foreign minister like Vergennes, no foreign volunteer like Lafayette, no foreign government like the French, to assist them in their glorious struggle.

To sum up the whole matter, it will be seen that in 1776 the campaign was extremely disastrous to the Americans. The English were advancing triumphantly in every direction; that the people were inclined to return to their allegiance, following the example of some who had signed the Declaration of Independence. All was desolation and dismay. The year of 1777 begins, and with it the immense resources from without arrive, and victory smiles upon the just cause. And let it be borne in mind that the aid afforded in arms, men and ships was important; that given money was no less so. With this the Commissioners of the Republic could pay the immediately pressing expenses and could meet the engagements which Congress had incurred in an earlier part of the struggle, and for which drafts had been given upon such Commissioners. So much for the first great example of the necessity for extraneous assistance to a people struggling for their independence.

And now it will be opportune to consider the case of Spain herself in her struggle for independence against Napoleon. Every town and village was held by the French, and king Joseph Bonaparte was seated upon the throne with scarcely any considerable show of opposition to him, organized throughout the peninsula. Then it was that England determined to send effective assistance to the invaded nation. She sent to Spain 80,000 Britain soldiers, commanded by Lord Wellesly, afterwards 002116Duke of Wellington, and at the same time she sent the requisite resources and material of war to place under arms the whole Spanish nation, and thus was preserved Spanish independence. The South American nations also received great assistance from abroad in their war of independence, an assistance composed of supplies of money and men, and of a recognition of their flag, which afforded them the immense advantage of privateers, wherewith to prey on the enemy's commerce.

The Modern Greek, too, as is well known, owes his independence, first to recognition of his belligerent rights by the leading powers of Europe, and, subsequently, to the practical assistance of the same. And lately Lombardy and Venetia owe their independence of Austria to the alliance of Italy and Prussia. It cannot be inferred from this that they were not entitled to their independence, that they did not fight bravely--the Americans, Spaniards, South Americans, Greeks, Lombards and Venetians.

V.

Having shown that no people has acquired its independence without foreign assistance, is it to be assumed that Cuba, which has had no such aid, is to be conquered by the Spanish? No; the immense misfortunes which have fallen upon that unhappy country appear to be a punishment for the horrors and abominations which have been manifested in its fields in order to coin gold from the blood of the slaves. For this great crime both Spaniards and Cubans are responsible, as well as those who in any way foster the productions of slavery. It is true that as soon as the Cubans rose in arms against Spanish domination, they began to cleanse their skirts of the dark spot, declaring freedom to the slaves and making them their equals before the law; but it was necessary that they should expiate the abominations of the slave-trade, of the whip and the anvil block, with sufferings proportionate to them, and the ferocity of the Spaniards in Cuba has cleansed them from all the guilt of this so great crime. The spirit of evil, incarnate in these Spaniards, and extending through the island, has furnished to the Cubans an expiation for the sins of their fathers, and as they have not a single ally on earth, they have the alliance of Providence. This 002217is not a common expression, nor without significance in the sphere of fact. In that splendid island which Columbus pronounced "the most beautiful land that human eye ever dwelt upon," under its clear skies, amid its picturesque seas, among its odorous flowers, its birds of brilliant plumage and its proud forests, Mother Nature has placed a germ of disease, deadly to the European--the malaria.

Again, the complete exhaustion of the Spanish treasury, as has already been said, has rendered it impossible for Spain to send to Cuba the necessary number of troops to maintain her present military position. This leads to the conclusion that if Spain, with all the moral and material assistance of this nation, has not been able to sustain herself victoriously against the Cubans, the latter would easily have conquered, had they, from the beginning, been enabled to introduce into the island the arms they needed. Your Excellency will, may be, answer this, that the high interest of this country would not permit her to take any steps in this matter, and that the wiser and more prudent course was the one which has been adopted. The undersigned respectfully begs leave to examine what this course has been so far as a non-cognizance of the secret facts and policy will permit. About June, 1869, this government sent a Minister to Spain, and it has never been denied that he confidently presented to that government a proposition for the Cubans to buy the island, with a guarantee of payment by the United States. It is known, through public rumor, that to this proposition Serrano and Prim answered that any question concerning the island could not be discussed or entertained until the complete suppression of the insurrectionary movement, for the national honor would not admit of any action which might appear to result from the threatening attitude of a party of rebels. It is not probable that they shut out all hope of the negotiation in the future, and the undersigned has some personal reason for believing that in private General Prim, at one time, expressed himself in favor of such a scheme, and that he lamented that the government could not carry it out without exposing itself to the national susceptibility. He was so much in favor of the proposition that it has been said by men in high position that in his death he was the victim of the Spanish slave traders, who feared that he would be instrumental in in carrying it into 002318effect. The ultimate result was that the government of the United States was assured by Spain that, if given the time, she would very soon put down the insurrection. If she promised to do something in accordance with the wishes of the United States after her triumph, it is not known. If she has made such promise it is probable she has done so, not by any written communication, but by private diplomatic assurances. What is evident is that, as though a natural consequence of such assurances, the efforts of the Cubans in this country to assist their brethren in the field was thenceforward thwarted in every manner possible. Instead of being favored with arms and men, as Deane, Franklin and Arthur Lee were in France, their expeditions were seized; their representatives in this land of the free, instead of being received as the American commissioners in Europe, with enthusiasm and proffers of aid, were put in prison. Meanwhile the Spanish ambassador was an especial favorite in Washington. Nor was this all. In this country was constructed a squadron of gunboats to aid in suppressing the Cuban movement; and from this country, too, were sent the artillery and the Remington rifles used by the Spanish army in Cuba. The record of the aid extended by this great Republic to rivet the chains upon a people struggling to be free will not be complete without referring to the order to American war vessels, cruising along the coast of the island, to receive all deserters from the Cuban forces who might make application to be taken on board--an order which constituted a true armed intervention on the part of this country in the struggle in favor of Spain. That this is so is evident from the fact that Spain, though so punctilious regarding any interference in her affairs from without, has, so far as is known, made no remonstrance--found no fault. In the meantime the government at Madrid was sending thousands upon thousands of soldiers to the island, and, in order to prevent any change of policy on the part of the American government, a change which was demanded by the American people, it resorted to the subterfuge of proclaiming several times the entire pacification of Cuba. This was done by the Captains General, De Rodas and Valmaseda, during 1869, and in 1870 the Spanish Cortes extended a unanimous vote of thanks to the former for his action 002419in bringing about the alleged pacification. Their object, in these deceitful declarations, has been to gain time, and to continue the American government bound to inaction, knowing that the recognition at Washington of the belligerency of the Cubans would be the death-blow to their power in America.

The slave question was also used by them to win the good graces of the American government. Striving to make it appear that they were inspired by a spirit of abolition, they issued laws with bombastic preambles, which, so far from abolishing the criminal institution in the island, only resulted in its continuance. Thus, year after year has passed away without the Cubans obtaining that recognition to which they were entitled. Unquestionably had they been less vigorous they would have succumbed.

VI.

At last the Cuban authorities becoming convinced of the enmity of the American government, withdrew their representatives accredited it, though giving to the undersigned full powers in every respect, including authority to treat with the American government, whenever it should be deemed proper to recognize the Cubans as a people struggling for independence. This action of the modest government, established on the battlefields of Cuba Libre, might perchance seem ridiculous and contemptible were the executive mansion at Washington occupied by a man less high-minded and noble than the one who shook hands with Lee on the banks of the Appomatox. As it is, they will be considered the natural expression of a sad disappointment, and of the dignified feelings of those who think themselves worthy of the independence for which they struggle. What other conviction could the Cuban government have had than that the American Administration was hostile to it? What could it do but recall its minister in this country, seeing he was always repulsed by the authority to which he was accredited? Cuba, conscious of its own inherent strength, accepted with sorrow the apparently undeniable fact of the hostility of the administration at Washington, and determined to continue its struggle for independence, relying solely upon its own resources and convinced of its ultimate triumph. This confidence was incited not alone by the justice of its cause, but by the unanimity of sentiment among the natives, and the fact that 002520every man, no matter what his situation in life, or place of residence, was doing something to advance the interests of the cause.

It may be said that this community of sentiment and effort is not always sufficient to accomplish the independence of a people, as was shown in the cases of Poland and Paraguay; but it should be remembered that both of these had to contend with extremely powerful neighbors, who, by their own weight necessarily overcame them while Spain is poor, weakened by internal convulsions, and is situated far distant from Cuba. Besides this, the Poles and Paraguayans fought for independence only, while the Cubans fight for their lives as well, assured, as they are, that if conquered they will be exterminated, as was the large Moorish population, by fire and sword, after the conquest of Granada.

There was in the Hellenic Archipelago a people called the Phocians, who in preparation for the decisive battle against the enemies of their nationalities, raised a bonfire and gathered around it, together with their treasures, all the non-combatants among them, determined, if their army should be overcome, to throw themselves with their treasures into the flames, and perish rather than be enslaved. The Cubans cannot decide the question, as did the Phocians, in a single battle, as they are without arms and material of war, and they therefore continue the contest for life and independence in that manner, and with those means which are left to them. The statement that their extermination would result from defeat, is not an exaggeration. It is a fact, demonstrated by the history of all Spanish America, that the metropolitan government at Madrid, though it has always been accused of being tyrannical and opposed to all improvements in the colonies, has never been so much so, never as inimical to the best interests of those colonies, and to the happiness and preservation of their people, as have been those Spanish residents coming out from the mother country and settling among them. They have surpassed in reality any conception of the despotic courts of Charges V. and Philip II. It is well known that the Spaniards in Peru, commanded by Gonzalo Pizzaro, arose in rebellion to the Crown because it desired to make the Indians free.

002621

As a general rule the Spaniards, born in the Iberian Peninsula and settled in the American colonies, have been far more despotic and pitiless in their treatment of the descendants of Spaniards born therein, than has the government of Madrid.

The codes embodying the laws of the Indies and the municipal laws were, perhaps, not perfect models of liberalism, but, considering the times in which they were enacted, were calculated to bring about the prosperity of the societies affected by them, had not the Spanish residents always prevented their execution, in order to retain a monopoly of every good thing. In fact, the creole population throughout Spanish America could well have endured the tyranny of the government at Madrid, and been resigned to remain thereunder, but they could not endure the tyranny of the Spanish residents, who condemned them to imbecility, misery and death. And thus it is with Cuba, as is indicated in the recent message of Your Excellency. The Spaniards established in the Island have always bitterly opposed any measures for the improvement of the natives, interested only in the slave trade and in accomplishing the total degradation of the Cubans. Far from composing the aristocratic portion of the people, as has been erroneously reported to Your Excellency, they constitute an uneducated population of bachelors, and careful to create no ties in the country. They are thus left free to indulge in their hatred to the people, which they never relinquish. When the war for independence broke out they formed themselves into militia organizations, called "The Volunteers," more ferocious than the Janizaries and Mamelukes. In order to overawe the native population they have grossly exaggerated their numbers, but there are, nevertheless, as many as 25,000 of them in the island, doing garrison duty in all the towns, the natives thereof being defenceless, as arms are prohibited them. Besides the volunteers and regular troops there are but few Spaniards in the island. It is not easy to estimate the entire population, as the government and the volunteers have always been interested in preventing a reliable census, and they have fixed as they liked the returns. It may be safely assumed that of the 1,500,000--the estimated population--500,000 are colored. Of the latter more than 300,000 are slaves. There are in all 002722100,000 Spaniards in the island. The volunteers being the only armed bodies in the towns, they are enabled to perpetrate their outrages with impunity. They began their murders in January, 1869, in Havana; and, not satisfied with having shot without trial several thousands in Bayamo, Manzanillo, Holguin, Camaguey, Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba, the theatre of the late massacre by Burriel, they have rebelled against every Captain-General who has not obeyed them, and in one way or another they have sent back to Spain Dulce, De Rodas, Ceballos and Pieltain.

The secret of their power can be easily understood. They have the monopoly of the interior commerce and retail trade; they have the slave trade, which still exists, though carried on with the greatest secrecy, and they have the management of the embargoed properties of the Cubans. In fact, they are in league with the Spanish government to appropriate to themselves all the agricultural wealth of the island, resulting from the labors of the natives. Holding as they do the cities, the triumph of the Spanish cause would be the signal for exterminating the Cubans, as has already been done in many of the interior towns.

Since the dethronement of Isabella several efforts have been made by certain Spanish statesmen to give the island a representation in the Cortes; but the volunteers have also prevented the restitution of all the embargoed property decreed by the home government. Their fury has no bounds when they see a victim is likely to be taken from their hands. In addition to the case of the young students, slaughtered in Havana for a boyish offence, and many others in which they have refused the requisite legal formalities, and insisted upon a summary punishment of death, there may be here recalled the important and yet almost forgotten fact that Mr. J. C. Zenea, an American citizen, naturalized in New Orleans in 1854, was sent to Cuba sixteen years after by the Spanish minister at Washington, with a Spanish passport, to present certain propositions for submission to President Cespedes. He was captured and taken to Havana. The Spanish government ordered that he be sent to Spain, but in spite of such an order he was shot.

002823

The Cubans can only expect death from these volunteers. They realize that with the suppression of the insurrection the work of extermination would commence, in one form or another: by immense deportations from the Island, as in the case of the Fernando Po prisoners, so conducted that few, if any, would survive, without for a moment neglecting the easier task of daily shootings. Have they not deified Boet, Castanon Valmaseda and, last of all, Burriel? If the Cubans could for a moment doubt that this is the fate reserved for them in case of their being routed, they would easily be convinced of it by a consideration of the treatment accorded to the blacks in 1844. There existed in the island at that time a numerous and wealthy colored population. The Spaniards determined on a scheme to deprive them of their money. To this end they affected to believe that a conspiracy existed among them, a conspiracy of which no proof has been found after thirty years, and under the lash and by the rifle, they were all exterminated. A great poet, Placido, perished among them. Considering these precedents, demonstrating as they do that the Cubans are fighting for life, it is easy to see how they have been able to neutralize the most energetic efforts of the Spaniards.

VII.

Placed in close proximity to this great Republic, identified in their interests with it, and this nation being the only one which from its character and position was likely to favor them, they have applied to it--not for arms, not for vessels, not for men. They limited themselves to asking a recognition of the fact that a war existed between the colony and the home government, and that in such war the American Union should remain neutral. There is a wide difference between this modest request and the petition of Deane, Franklin, Arthur Lee and John Adams, asking for money, arms, vessels and soldiers. At the same time they showed that if from the efforts made by their forces in the field they were worthy of the consideration which they asked they were entitled to respect for the efforts they were making abroad. Among many vessels, successively purchased and equipped by them, was a man-of-war, fully provided as such in every respect. It would have been very easy to devote this vessel to depredating on Spanish commerce; but, as they had been notified that the government of the 002924United States would be much displeased at this course, they did not adopt it. A storm obliged this vessel to enter the port of Wilmington and there she was seized and disarmed under orders from the American authorities, and so the Cubans were compelled to admit that this nation did not recognize their flag. Consequently, in order to send arms to their forces, they were compelled to adopt slow, disheartening, and not very efficacious methods. They were informed that Spain, not having recognized a state of war in Cuba or declared a perfect blockade of the coasts of the island, had no right to overhaul and search American vessels engaged in carrying arms, and for that reason these vessels could engage in carrying such arms and material of war to Cuba as a legitimate traffic, and that the Spaniards had no further power than to arrest any persons found breaking the municipal laws within their jurisdiction. Relying upon the truth of this theory, which had been advanced and maintained in official notes from the United States government, vessels, loaded with arms--which they had a perfect right to carry as articles of commerce--were sent to the coast of Cuba without any violation of the laws of the United States. As a consequence of this legal action those having them in charge were directed, in order not to compromise the American flag, to make no resistance in case of an attack by the Spaniards outside of Spanish waters, as should they be captured by a Spanish man-of-war on the high seas they would receive the protection of this nation; a protection which on several occasions, had been extended to the Hornet, the Edgar Stuart and the Virginius by American national vessels. It is well to state the fact that if the Virginius was really intended to land arms in Cuba the cause of her surrender without any resistance was the conviction that she was not subject to legal capture outside of Spanish jurisdiction. The world knows the result in the recent slaughter at Santiago. What can be said against the Cubans? They were not permitted men-of-war. They were not allowed to assist their struggling countrymen in any other way. Will it be exacted of them by Americans that they should give over all attempts at such assistance and yield to the inevitable extermination which would follow?

Moreover, when the expenditures which the Cubans have 003025incurred, amounting to many millions of dollars, are considered, the questions naturally suggest themselves. How have they been able to accomplish this in the past and how do they propose to continue it in the future, when, as is well known, the Spaniards have confiscated the property of a great part of them, and the residents in the island are closely watched in order to prevent their sending money to this country to assist the insurrection? The answer is very simple, and it is well to have it borne in mind. The Cubans, placed between a ferocious and tyrannical government like the Spanish, and a liberal and humanitarian one like the United States, became sincere admirers of the latter. From Spain they could expect only evil; from the United States, good. Spain imposes an annual contribution of $32,000,000 upon the island in addition to the municipal exactions and the constant robberies of her rapacious employes. Spain, while imposing a high duty upon the productions of the colony introduced into the peninsula, compels Cuba to receive her productions with scarce any duty. Spanish rule means retrogression, paralyzation, moral death.

The United States purchase the sugar and coffee of the island, and they return to it every class of supplies notwithstanding the immense duties imposed upon them. The United States reflect the light of their high civilization through the interstices of the Spanish dungeons. The United States represent progress, life. It is not strange that, in making their election, the Cubans turn their eyes to the great Republic. It is not strange that they should look with horror upon the banner of red yellow, and with friendship upon the flag of the American constellation.

The United States long since became a resort of all the Cuban families, as could be seen at Saratoga, Newport, and, above all, in the Empire City, and, not satisfied with this yearly trip, they, soon began to purchase real estate and establish their residence in this country, making Cuba their winter resort. Meanwhile all their available means were invested in this country in national securities, railroad bonds, &c. This transfer of property from the Antille to the United States has assumed large proportions since 1865, and, had the outbreak been postponed 003126for three years, there would have remained only a few wealthy Cuban families not established in this country. In the early part of 1869, the decree of confiscation against many of them was issued, but already large numbers naturalized as Americans had a great part of their fortunes in this country.

Thus it can be easily seen from what source are drawn these very very considerable expenditures. Moreover, the assassinations which took place, after the insurection of Yara, in the towns of the island, drove very many of the inhabitants to these hospitable shores. Not all of them were rich, and the poor soon began to employ themselves in a manner profitable to both the country which had received them and to the patriotic cause. They mostly dedicated themselves to the manufacture of cigars, and, according to the statistics, they have increased fivefold the wealth of the nation in this branch of industry since 1868. At least it cannot be denied that during the intervening time large factories have been established in Key West, New Orleans, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York and other places. These honest men, earning from $3 to $5 a day, have contributed constantly to the patriotic fund, reducing as much as possible their personal expenses that they might contribute the more. It is worth while here to mention the middle class--composed of those who could not save their property before the Revolution and those who have adopted professional careers or are devoted to literary and artistic pursuits. By the first of these this mercantile community has been enlarged in wealth and numbers, and by the latter scientific and illustrated papers of a higher order have been established in New York, which propagate the progress and glories of the United States throughout all Spanish America, and, to an extent, in Spain itself. In medical science they have some distinguished representatives in this country, and the musical societies and the picture galleries of this enlightened city are sustained to a large degree by Cubans eminent in their respective fields. All contribute, whether rich or poor, to the patriotic fund, and will continue to do so, and while doing this they also contribute with their blood to bring about the independence of their native country. In every one of the expeditions which have been fitted out--the Henry Burden, Salvador, Peril, Grapeshot, Catharine Whiting, 003227Lilian Anna, Upton, Virginius, Edgar Stuart and many others--it has been necessary to reject applications from Cubans, as the lists were full. As many of them have gone to Cuba as could be provided with means of transportation. Notwithstanding all these well established facts there are those who accuse the Cubans of lack of patriotism, and it is believed that there are here many thousands who do not honorably represent their cause. It is to them a sorrowful matter that, instead of receiving a due appreciation of their efforts and sacrifices, they only meet with misrepresentation and revilement. As these misrepresentations have been so often repeated without refutation, the representative of the Cuban Republic takes advantage of this occasion to make a full statement of the facts. According to the most reliable information, collected and on file in this office, the natives of Cuba resident in the United States, including old people, women and children, do not exceed 5,000. Of those capable of bearing arms only a few remain; the balance are in the field. Of those few many are detained here as being the only support of families. The journals who for sensational purposes make so much of the Cubans in this country ought to realize that the importance attached to them springs rather from their wealth and sacrifices than from their numbers. In order to conclude the matter, it may be added that this emigration, though so small in numbers, may have been more profitable to the country than others which have been very large. They are free from those habits of intemperance which, unfortunately, are so prevalent in some other classes of society. They do not disturb public tranquility with violent demonstrations. The assurance can be made that, with the recognition of belligerency and the consequent facilities for obtaining arms, there will be none left capable of carrying a rifle, and even many of the old men will go. It is to be hoped that, hereafter, they will be regarded in the true light. It is not so easy a matter--as has often been said--to leave home, wealth and every enjoyment to enter upon a fearful campaign. When the glorious contest between the American nation and the slave power took place it was necessary to offer bounties of $100, $200 and finally $1,000 for every man; and, this not sufficing, it was found necessary to set aside a fundamental 003328principle of American legislation and establish the draft. Personal liberty was abolished and compulsory service employed to obtain a triumph. This, however, proves nothing against the patiotism of this great people, which gave it treasures and its blood to preserve the Union. It only showed that the government thought it proper to adopt extreme measures in order to put a successful termination to a war which would otherwise have been much more protracted. But a consideration of these events tends to show the credit to which the Cubans are entitled--not hesitating at any sacrifice to advance their cause.

VIII.

Notwithstanding all these facts, in order to give a color of right to a denial of belligerency, it has been said that this recognition could not be granted--first, because the Cubans had not a constituted government; second, because they are not strong enough in the field; and third, because they have no forts. A rapid examination of these three points will be sufficient to show the futility of the pretext. It is known beyond doubt that when the Cubans arose in arms they established a provisional government, composed of an executive, residing in the eastern part of the island, and a committee, with headquarters in Camaguey, that, on the 10th of April, 1869, duty appointed delegates from the various districts of the country assembled at Guaimaro. Then they promulgated a constitution, by which the government was established, including the executive power and a legislative chamber. An election followed, which resulted in the selection of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a wealthy planter and eminent lawyer, as President. He had figured at the head of the movement since the 10th of October of the year previous. This government has been acting since that time, and is not a single instance have its orders been disobeyed. It appoints the military chiefs and the civil officers as well as the representatives in foreign lands. It is, in fact, the government of the militant Republic of Cuba. The undersigned could present to your Excellency an immense number of documents from that government. If, notwithstanding all this, its existence should be denied, it is only left to take the incredulous to the struggling land, that the truth may be made manifest, as 003429was the presence of the Saviour of mankind to St. Thomas. When a great philosopher denied the existence of motion, the only answer of his opponent was to rise and walk. When the existence of the republican government of Cuba is denied, the only answer must be to show it. The idea of denying the existence of such a government is as absurd as the project of certain priests of France, after the restoration of the Bourbons, to deny the existence of an emperor, known as Napoleon Bonaparte.

The second point--the military strength of the Cubans--can be established by the fact that they hold their positions, and have, as can be demonstrated, successfully combated the Spaniards on numerous occasions; as, for example, the occupation of Holguin and Santa Cruz, and the land blockade which they at present maintain around Manzanillo and Puerto Principe. If these facts are doubted, it is only necessary to read the report of the chief-of-staff of the Spanish army in the official Guzette of Havana, in which it is stated that many attacks have been made upon the Spanish positions in different localities and by thousands of Cubans. If still these reports are doubted, it is well to refer again to the official despatch of Mr. Sickles, already mentioned, stating that during the first four years of the war Spain lost 60,000 men. And if, after all this, the doubt remains, cast a glance over the map of Cuba. Its average width is 48 miles. Let us fancy a body of land between two coasts, placed at less distance than New York is from Philadelphia. In the intervening space, with a length of several hundreds of miles, place as many forests and mountains as may be wished. Would it be possible for an army of several thousand men to operate for five years within this extremely narrow space against 60,000 regular troops and 25,000 volunteers without being in many instances victorious? Is there any one who can suppose that it does not constitute a real force and adequate to contend against, if not to conquer, the army opposing it? And if such is the conclusion when it is supposed that this area is filled with mountains and forests, what must it be when the fact is considered that there is indeed an immense extent of open country like Camaguey, where the predominant 003530and more effective arm of the service is cavalry? Would it be possible to be in constant flight during these five years and not fall into the power of so large a force as the Spaniards have had? No. The narrowness of the country operated over, and the strategetical fortified positions of the Spaniards have rendered necessary an almost daily engagement. The advance guards of the Cubans are always within sight of the advance guards of the Spaniards. The undersigned can furnished the Department of State documents emanating from the government which he has the honor to represent, which are confirmatory of the Spanish reports, mentioning the abandonment of the principal encampments occupied by the Spaniards in the interior of the Eastern State and the State of Camaguey, and the storming by the Cubans of many towns. But, as has been said, the Spanish official reports present evidence of the ever-increasing strength of the liberating army without rendering it necessary to recur to the dispatch of the secretary of the Cuban government. There exist to-day 20,000 patriot troops on a war footing, stationed throughout the Eastern and the Camaguey States and a part of Cinco Villas, under the command of Major-Generals Garcia, Gomez and others, and this army increases in proportion to the number of arms received, while the Spaniards, obliged to garrison the large cities, cannot place an equal number in the field. Let your Excellency compare this enthusiastic and increasing body of men with the 4,000 troops to which the dismayed and disheartened army of Washington was reduced before the great foreign reinforcements and supplies were received, and from this an approximate idea of the strength of the Cubans can be formed. The third point is the last stronghold of those who would deny belligerent rights to the Cubans. This is the non-possession of ports.

It is known by everybody that the Spaniards, having a powerful navy, the Cubans, in order to preserve to themselves any ports which they might take by storm, would have to aid their land operations by a maritime force. The conduct of the United States towards them does not permit of their having such force, and it would be therefore useless for them to attempt to retain in their power the ports they occasionally seize. 003631Now, if the United States government does not allow them to have men-of-war, as has been proved on two occasions, and without the assistance of such men-of-war it is impossible to preserve ports, the demand of the American government that in order to a recognition of their belligerency they must have ports, bears a character of refined cruelty, which cannot be within the intention of those making it. This is like binding a man hand and foot and exacting from him that he should run. The natural answer of the bound man would be, "If you will loosen me, I shall be able to run." The answer of the Cubans is: "Yield us a recognition of belligerency, then we shall have the requisite maritime elements and shall have ports."

IX.

Now, in order to have the character of a belligerent, is it necessary to hold ports? In no treaty--in no work on international law, can there be found any word in favor of this strange theory. History, on the contrary, often shows that the belligerency and the independence of a struggling people have been recognized without their possessing any ports. Greece, in reality, had none when she was assisted against Turkey by the allied nations. It is doubtful if Texas had any when she was recognized as a belligerent by the United States. Mexico undoubtedly had none when the prince Maximilian was in the height of his power and Juares had but a few scores of men near the United States frontier, nor did this prevent the United States from treating Mexico as an independent republic. St. Domingo had none in 1861, when it was recognized as a belligerent by England in its second war of independence against Spain. It would be ridiculous to sustain the proposition that belligerents must have ports. Belligerency results from the existence of an armed force which fights against another force, the ultimate result of the contest remaining in doubt, and this condition certainly exists within the republic of Cuba. The fact is that the question of the recognition of belligerency is not based on any fixed rule and depends upon the will and the interest of the nation having to deal with it. The United States and England recognized the belligerency, and afterwards the independence, of the Spanish American republics, not only because they thought it just, but because it 003732harmonized with their own interest. The allied nations, in their recognition of the belligerency and independence of Greece, were actuated by the same motives. Belgium was recognized as independent in 1830 by the nations of Europe because they considered it in keeping with their own interest. The United States recognized the belligerency and independence of Texas because they considered it to their own interest. The same United States treated Mexico as a republic when she was a de lacto empire because they considered this course to their own interest. Interest, and before everything, interest, has always ruled diplomacy since this modern invention was applied by Louis XI and Ferdinand V. And there is no other conclusion than that, in the disposition of the Cuban question, interest, and only interest, will control the action of this nation.

The principle accepted, the question will, at the end, be reduced to one of dollars and cents. What has been, what is the interest of the United States in this Cuban question? Let us examine this point, placing on one side justice, humanity and duty. First, what has been? When the Spanish American colonies accomplished their independence, Bolivar decided that Spain should be entirely expelled from the New World, and for this purpose he organized a formidable expedition to invade Cuba to act in co-operation with the natives, it being well known that the principal families were engaged in the conspiracies of the Aguila Negra and Sole's de Bolivar. This expedition, fully organized and equipped by Colombia and Mexico, with the squadron in readiness to transport it to the shores of Cuba, was on the point of embarking when the United States notified the powers engaged in it that they would not allow the proposed operations to be carried out, and that they would assist with their military and naval forces Spain to retain under her dominion the island of Cuba. They also notified Spain that she could rely on their assistance, moral and material, in any effort to retain such dominion--a manifestation which was afterwards more than once repeated. Why did the United States thus contribute at that time to rivet the chains of the oppressed Cubans? The notes sent by them to Colombia and Mexico concerning the matter, 003833those which were issued as a consequence of the Panama Congress and some others referring to the Cuban question reveal very clearly what was the purpose and aim. The movement for independence in Spanish America being essentially abolitionist in its character, the American administration of that period could not see, with pleasure, the liberty of the blacks in Cuba brought about; not only because, as these notes indicated, the results would be detrimental to the peace and prosperity of this nation, but, as was carefully concealed, it hoped eventually to bring it within the Union as a slave State. Moreover, the independence of Cuba at that time might have resulted in European protectorate in the Antilles, and perhaps the occupation of the island by England with the assent of the natives. Spain, a weak nation, having no navy, was preferred by the United States to hold temporarily the island, as she would preserve slavery in it, and the expectation was entertained that, at some future day, it would be ceded by her. Such are, in part, the official manifestations as made by the United States on this occasion, and now existing on file in the State Department at Washington. In fact, the administration of the government was then controlled by slave power, and the independence of the island, upon the base of abolition, was not regarded in keeping with its interest, and the preservation of the colony to Spain was preferred. Some years later, form 1848 to 1850 and 1854, the government of the United States, controlled by the slave interest, took some steps in favor of the annexation of the island. The Southern States saw with alarm the growing influence and increasing development of northern principles, and out of this grew this movement for annexation. The Cubans, though they have always been inclined to substitute free labor for slave, accepted the proposition made to them favoring their insurrection, and on the 4th of July, 1851, the most select part of Camaguey took the field; but as their chief, Joaquim Aguero, who a recognized abolitionist, who had scandalously freed all his slaves, the movement was not efficaciously favored by the South, as promised, and it failed, resulting in the execution of many victims. In 1854 another annexation scheme was presented in the slave interest. General Quitman, of Mississippi, was to command a formidable 003934expedition. The conspiracy was discovered, and Pinto and several others were executed by the Spaniards. The interest of the dominant party lay in the acquisition of the Gem of the West Indies, to be divided into three States, to add to the influence of the South; and if this scheme did not succeed it was because France and England intervened in the matter, proposing to the United States the tripartite alliance to guarantee to Spain the possession of Cuba. It is true this nation then declared that it considered the question an American one, and that it would never engage itself to any line of conduct in the future regarding the island. But, nevertheless, it was compelled to postponed its annexation projects, which were at the same time opposed by the republican party. Such has been the interest of the United States in relation to the Cuban question.

Second -- What is now the interest of this nation? When the American civil war brought about as a trophy of victory to the North, the abolition of slavery, the government changed entirely its fundamental basis. It had no further reasons for desiring the preservation of the island in the power of Spain or to accomplish annexation with slave labor. Spain, instead if being a nation without a navy, as it was in 1826, had become a maritime power. Cuba, instead of being, with her slaves, a pleasant picture to the United States, became a monument of their own past ignominy that they could not tolerate at their own doors--and this, even though the island remained faithful to the crown of Spain. The Cubans, as has been so often repeated, in 1868 took to the field to gain their independence. They took possession of a large portion of the islands and from the very beginning declared free all of its inhabitants. The new Republic was in accordance with the regenerated Republic of the northern continent. At this moment this nation was compelled to look to its interest in the question, and it appears the government thought it had found it in the propositions made by Mr. Sickles to the cabinet of Madrid. If it is true that these propositions were for the Cubans to purchase the island from Spain, with the guarantee of the United States, it is to be supposed that they would be 004035advantageous to three contracting parties. But Spain did not accept them, though she employed the diplomatic arts referred to, and such a solution should have been abandoned. Was it the interest of the United States after that to preserve the statu quo, that the horrors of the war should be continued, the natives not being allowed to arm themselves? This was in some respects the interest of Spain, but certainly not that of the United States.

It appears that the United States--abondoning the Cuban question to itself and without reference to justice--thought it was their interest to retain their connection with the slave power in Cuba as long as possible. The recognition of Cuban belligerency would produce a declaration by Spain of the blockade of the island, and, as a consequence, the right of the Spaniards to search American vessels according to the treaty of 1795; this, of course, was a bad prospect for the commerce sustained with the slave power. May be it was considered that the continued arrival of sugar and tobacco from Cuba, paying its high duties, amounting to several millions of dollars, was preferable to any other solution for the present.

It is true that such commerce grew out of slave labor, and that the United States have made it appear that they desire the abolition of such labor in Cuba and everywhere; but the question of slavery could be treated diplomatically, and extended through an indefinite period, the United States meanwhile deriving all the advantage from such traffic and from the duties on such articles. Though the Cubans, notwithstanding the course of the United States, persisted in imitating the founders of the great nation who fought for independence, nothing could be done which would change the relation of the country to such slave power--

The undersigned will not say that this policy has been adopted by this government; but, not knowing its profound views, it would seem to have regarded the best interest of the United States enhanced by it. Be this as it may, the events of the past five years, the horrors of every description witnessed by the civilized world and the oft-repeated insults to Americans and the American flag which have brought this nation to the eve of declaring war against Spain, tend to show that it was not a policy in the interest of the United States.

004136

It were useless to attempt to show that the independence of the island and a close alliance with the United States would increase enormously the wealth and prosperity of this nation. It is true that the income derived from the duties paid on the sugar and tobacco imported into this country from there would cease entirely; but it is also true--as is reported to have been said by the intelligent head of the finance department of the government--that the internal revenue occurring from these articles, especially the tobacco, would more than compensate for this loss.

It is very easy to comprehend, moreover, that, with the abolition of the custom houses in Cuba, or--if, unhappily, this measure should be considered too progressive--the suspension of the export duties on these commodities, and the reduction on the import duties there imposed upon the supplies and machinery required by the planters would result in an immense saving to both these planters and the merchants in the United States. This would more than recompense the former for the losses consequent on passing from slave to free labor, while the latter would find their remuneration in the increased profits on their wares, thus relieved of the onerous duties now imposed upon them. At the same time, Cuba would become a market for a large number of exports from this country which are now shut out from the island by the high duties imposed, in order that they may not compete with the productions of the peninsula. And, in addition, many branches of American industry which, through the retrograde policy of the Spaniards, are now also shut out from the Antilles, would then find there an extensive patronage. Even sugar would be exported from this country to Cuba, coming from there as a raw material, and sent back after the process of refining, so extensively carried on here. That country is peculiarly agricultural one, and all the industrial arts of this republic would, in the changed condition which has been referred to, find in her a liberal and continuous patron. It is not difficult to prove that the United States were immensely benefited by the acquisition of California, and it is safe to say that Cuba, allied to the Republic, would show equal, if not far greater, results. these undeniable facts being borne in mind, it seems the 004237interests of the United States, at the breaking out of the revolution was to favor, at least morally, the Cubans in their efforts to become independent. Moreover, it is not a contemptible matter to accept rather than decline the sympathy and good will of a neighbor proffering them. Those great nations who have been destined by Providence to extend their superior civilization over the lesser states around must appeal to the elements of sympathy and attraction in the performance of their great duty, and not rely only upon the power of arms. It seems that it would have been more easy for the United States to extend its moral support to the Cubans, as the great American people entertained sentiments favorable to them.

X.

The opportunities which the government has had since the outbreak of the war to assume a position favorable to the patriots have been very numerous. In March, 1869, the American brig Mary Lowell was captured at Ragged Island, brought to Habana and condemned as a good prize, having on board a valuable cargo.

This was an act more in contravention of international law than even the seizure of the Virginius. According to the treaty of 1795, the right of search and seizure of American vessels by the Spaniards extended only to the time of war. The infraction of this treaty, in the taking of the Mary Lowell, constituted a just cause for the American government to declare that the Spanish authorities had, by their action, virtually admitted the existence of a war in Cuba. The United States, therefore, should have recognized such war, and declared their neutrality in it. From this would have resulted a rapid termination of the struggle without these immense losses of property which have since occurred, to say nothing of the great destruction of American lives. After this remarkable event, which produced only a lengthy official correspondence, the American steamer Florida was overhauled and searched on two occasions by Spanish men-of-war in 1871. And so well satisfied was the administration at Washington that the action of the Spanish war vessels demonstrated the existence of a war in Cuba, that on the 16th of July, 1869, the honorable Secretary of State, in a protest against the edict of the Captain-General De Rodas, of 004338the 7th of that month, stated the same in unequivocal language: "The United States cannot fail to regard any exercise on the part of Spain of the right of visit and search of American vessels, under color of the treaty of 1795, as involving the logical conclusion of the recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba," is the idea conveyed. Notwithstanding that the government of the United States could not "fail to regard" any exercise on the high seas, near the island of Cuba, by any vessel of war or privateer of Spain, of the right to visit or board any vessel of the United States, under color of the provisions of the treaty of 1795, as involving the logical conclusion of a recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba, it is unhappily true that the American government did fail, when the boarding and search of the Florida occurred. The whole matter can be closed with the expression of a hope that this government will not fail, now, to take the action indicated in the protest referred to. Admitting that the nationality of the Virginius is a matter of doubt, and that her antecedents cannot be justified, this does not effect the question, as in the case of the Florida no such doubt, no such antecedents exist. She had never been to the coast of Cuba, and never carried arms or expeditionists there. The American government has maintained, in an official note, that certain acts involved the logical conclusion of a recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba. Spain has performed such acts, and so it must be concluded such war exists. The recognition of this war by Spain should be followed by the recognition of it by the United States and a declaration of its neutrality therein. This would be sufficient, and only will free America of the ignominious presence of the never-wearying murderers who have established themselves in that wealthy and beautiful island. This would increase the glory and wealth of this great nation.

Allowing that the peace of the republic should not be affected by recent events, it will not be doubted that if a proper course is not pursued, the slave power in Cuba will present, in the future, many other exhibitions of barbarity towards American citizens and Insults To The American Flag.

The only way of averting them is to be at least just toward that people which is fighting for its independence, and which is to be the natural friend and ally of this nation. It is possible 004439to conceive that, after five years of heroic struggle and undeniable heroism on the part of that people, it will be abandoned by the United States for want of a declaration that they really have been fighting for that time? The result of the denial of such recognition must be that, after years of continued struggle, the entire wealth of the island will be destroyed, or another and sadder destiny follow in the entire extermination of the people. For this last sacrifice we are ready, rather than submit to subjugation. The places of the dead will always be filled as long as there remains a patriot capable of bearing arms.

The Cubans await the decisions of the American government at this critical moment. If it is in favor of justice, humanity and freedom, they will bow in gratitude to Providence, acting in conformity to the sacrifices already made. In favor of the maintenance of the present condition of affairs they shall continue to the end in the struggle in which they have so long, and at the cost of so much blood and treasure, been engaged.

Supposing that the impending conflict be averted, the proslavery party--that is to say the native Spaniards established in Cuba--consenting at last to the restitution of the Virginius, the surrender of the surviving passengers and crew, the indemnification demanded and the salute to the American flag, what would be the result of the continuation of the present policy of the United States of not recognizing the state of war existing in the island?

This question must be considered in the light of the facts so clearly stated by your excellency in your message. In that document it is recognized that in Cuba, besides the forces of the government of Spain, there exists what is called the insurrection of Yara and the pro-slavery party, the latter being "an element," says your excellency, "opposed to granting any relief from misrule and abuse, with no aspirations after freedom, commanding no sympathy in generous breasts, aiming to rivet still stronger the shackles of slavery and oppression."Such an element, which "has seized many of the emblems of power in Cuba, is still a power in Madrid, and recognized by the government."

Accepting these premises, based as they are upon facts, it is 004540seen that the government of Madrid is in reality an accomplice of the abominations committed by such power in Cuba. And can a government which is an accomplice of those abominations command the sympathies of the generous breasts of the American people represented by your excellency? According to the words of your excellency, the interest of humanity, civilization and of progress demands that the "evil influence of the slavery party" referred to "may be averted." As this party constitutes an armed organization, which not only controls the Spanish government in Cuba, but in Madrid as well, is it possible to avert it, and speedily--as is hoped by your excellency--without the force of arms? It is not; and, consequently, the only possible way of accomplishing the desired result is to give the native population of the islands, composed of the more enlightened, wealthy and progressive people--a people which, wanting foreign aid, has shown itself stronger than any other people which has struggled for independence--at least recognition of belligerency, which they have been asking for through five years, that they may sweep from the face of the island those men and the government which are soiling it with their crimes. Will the volumes of the secretary of state and his dignified and amicable notes to the government of Madrid upon liberal principles and the abolition of slavery extinguish the power of this element in the island? Certainly not. And there remains no other course than the one demanded by the great American people.

The undersigned, in the name of the government which he has the honor to represent, anticipates the expression of his gratitude to the government of the United States.

For it is impossible to suppose that the high-minded statesmen of the great republic have determined upon a status quo which will leave the Cuban unable to obtain their independence through want of the requisite arms and materials--the Spaniards at the same time unable to suppress their efforts--until both parties become so weakened that the island will fall an easy prey to the government they represent. This would be far more ferocious and cruel than the conduct of the Spanish volunteers of Havana, which is so much deprecated by the civilized world. No Machiavelian policy ever adopted in the 004641history of mankind could be compared with this. No; it would be unjust so to insult the high and Christian members of the American government.

Your excellency's obedient servant,M. QUESADA.New York, December 4, 1873.