Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee
Statement by the Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte to the Senate Armed Services Committee
28 February 2006
Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Levin,
Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the Intelligence
Community's assessment of the threats, challenges, and opportunities for the
United States in today's world. I am pleased to be joined today by my colleague,
DIA Director LTG Michael Maples.
Let me begin with a straightforward
statement of preoccupation: terrorism is the preeminent threat to our citizens,
Homeland, interests, and friends. The War on Terror is our first priority and
driving concern as we press ahead with a major transformation of the
Intelligence Community we represent.
We live in a world that is full of
conflict, contradictions, and accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective
of the Director of National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the
exponential increase in the number of targets we must identify, track, and
analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are focusing on
terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated communities, charismatic
individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in certain respects, but more dangerous in others.
Globalization, particularly of technologies that can be used to produce WMD,
political instability around the world, the rise of emerging powers like China,
the spread of the jihadist movement, and of course, the horrific events of
September 11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our Intelligence Community.
Today, I will discuss:
Global jihadists, their fanatical
ideology, and the civilized world's efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy
their networks;
The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan
people to assert their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism;
WMD-related proliferation and two
states of particular concern, Iran and North Korea;
Issues of political instability and
governance in all regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and
advance our interests; and
Globalization, emerging powers, and
such transnational challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking,
and possible pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we all must
be mindful of the old dictum: forewarned is forearmed. Our policymakers,
warfighters, and law enforcement officers need the best intelligence and
analytic insight humanly and technically possible to help them peer into the
onrushing shadow of the future and make the decisions that will protect American
lives and interests. This has never been more true than now with US and
Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan--and the citizens and fledgling
governments they help to protect--under attack. Addressing threats to their
safety and providing the critical intelligence on a myriad of tactical and
strategic issues must be--and is--a top priority for our Intelligence Community.
But in discussing all the many dangers
the 21 st century poses, it should be emphasized that they
do not befall America alone. The issues we consider today confront responsible
leaders everywhere. That is the true nature of the 21st century: accelerating change affecting and challenging us all.
THE GLOBAL JIHADIST THREAT
Collaboration with our friends and
allies around the world has helped us achieve some notable successes against the
global jihadist threat. In fact, most of al-Qa'ida's setbacks last year were the
result of our allies' efforts, either independently or with our assistance. And
since 9/11, examples of the high level of counterterrorism efforts around the
world are many. Pakistan's commitment has enabled some of the most important
captures to date. Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter the spread of terrorism has
increased. Our relationship with Spain has strengthened since the March 2004
Madrid train bombings. The British have long been our closest counterterrorism
partners--the seamless cooperation in the aftermath of the July attacks in
London reflected that commitment--while Australia, Canada, France and many other
nations remain stout allies. Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle is
far from over.
Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they
regard as “apostate” and to eliminate US influence in the Muslim world. They
attack Americans when they can, but most of their targets and victims are fellow
Muslims. Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and political change in
most Muslim majority nations are among the factors that continue to fuel a
global jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse and subsumes three quite
different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al Qa'ida, a
battered but resourceful organization;
Second, other Sunni jihadist groups,
some affiliated with al-Qa'ida, some not;
Third, networks and cells that are the
self-generating progeny of al-Qa'ida.
Al-Qa'ida Remains Our Top Concern.
We have eliminated much of the leadership that presided over al-Qa'ida in
2001, and US-led counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue to disrupt its
operations, take out its leaders and deplete its cadre. But the organization's
core elements still plot and make preparations for terrorist strikes against the
Homeland and other targets from bases in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area;
they also have gained added reach through their merger with the Iraq-based
network of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which has broadened al-Qa'ida's appeal within
the jihadist community and potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence
operations, we know a great deal about al Qa'ida's vision. Zawahiri, al Qa'ida's
number two, is candid in his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays the jihad
in Iraq as a stepping-stone in the march toward a global caliphate, with the
focus on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and
Israel. Zawahiri stresses the importance of having a secure base in Iraq from
which to launch attacks elsewhere, including in the US Homeland.
In Bin Ladin's audio tape of late
January 2005, al-Qa'ida's top leader reaffirms the group's commitment to attack
our Homeland and attempts to reassure supporters by claiming that the reason
there has been no attack on the US since 2001 is that he chose not to do so. The
subsequent statement by Zawahiri is another indication that the group's
leadership is not completely cutoff and can continue to get its message out to
followers. The quick turnaround time and the frequency of Zawahiri statements in
the past year underscore the high priority al-Qa'ida places on propaganda from
its most senior leaders.
Attacking the US Homeland, US interests
overseas, and US allies--in that order--are al-Qa'ida's top operational
priorities. The group will attempt high-impact attacks for as long as its
central command structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests, because even modest operational capabilities can yield
a deadly and damaging attack. Although an attack using conventional explosives
continues to be the most probable scenario, al-Qa'ida remains interested in
acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons
to attack the United States, US troops, and US interests worldwide.
Indeed, today, we are more likely to see
an attack from terrorists using weapons or agents of mass destruction than
states, although terrorists' capabilities would be much more limited. In fact,
intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist organizations,
insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Many are
capable of conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such as poisonings, or using
improvised chemical devices.
Al-Qa'ida Inspires Other Sunni
Jihadists. The global jihad ist movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist
organizations, allied with or inspired by al-Qa'ida's global anti-Western
agenda. These groups pose less danger to the US Homeland than does al-Qa'ida,
but they increasingly threaten our allies and interests abroad and are working
to expand their reach and capabilities to conduct multiple and/or mass-casualty
attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a
well-organized group responsible for dozens of attacks killing hundreds of
people in Southeast Asia. The threat of a JI attack against US interests is
greatest in Southeast Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to helping
al-Qa'ida with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),
which has allied itself with al-Qa'ida, operates in Central Asia and was
responsible for the July 2004 attacks against the US and Israeli Embassies in
Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG) was formed to establish an Islamic state in Libya, but since the late
1990s it has expanded its goals to include anti-Western jihad alongside
al-Qa'ida. LIFG has called on Muslims everywhere to fight the US In Iraq.
Pakistani militant
groups--primarily focused on the Kashmir conflict-- represent a persistent
threat to regional stability and US interests in South Asia and the Near East.
They also pose a potential threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists
convicted in Virginia in 2003 of providing material support to terrorism trained
with a Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, before 9/11.
New Jihadist Networks and Cells.
An important part of al-Qa'ida's strategy is to encourage a grassroots
uprising of Muslims against the West. Emerging new networks and cells
--the third element of the global jihadist threat--reflect aggressive
jihadist efforts to exploit feelings of frustration and powerlessness in some
Muslim communities, and to fuel the perception that the US is anti-Islamic .
Their rationale for using terrorism against the US and establishing strict
Islamic practices resonates with a small subset of Muslims. This has led to the
emergence of a decentralized and diffused movement, with minimal centralized
guidance or control, and numerous individuals and small cells--like those who
conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the March 2004 bombings in Spain, and
the July 2005 bombings in the UK. Members of these groups have drawn inspiration
from al-Qa'ida but appear to operate on their own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups
and cells represent a different threat than that of a defined organization. They
are harder to spot and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the
threat of such “homegrown” jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in
Lodi, California, for example, maintained connections with Pakistani militant
groups, recruited US citizens for training at radical Karachi madrassas,
sponsored Pakistani citizens for travel to the US to work at mosques and
madrassas, and according to FBI information, allegedly raised funds for
international jihadist groups. In addition, prisons continue to be fertile
recruitment ground for extremists who try to exploit converts to Islam.
Impact of Iraq on Global Jihad.
Should the Iraqi people prevail in establishing a stable political and
security environment, the jihadists will be perceived to have failed and fewer
jihadists will leave Iraq determined to carry on the fight elsewhere. But, we
assess that should the jihadists thwart the Iraqis' efforts to establish a
stable political and security environment, they could secure an operational base
in Iraq and inspire sympathizers elsewhere to move beyond rhetoric to attempt
attacks against neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Europe, and even the United
States. The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi. His capture would deprive the
movement of a notorious leader, whereas his continued acts of terror could
enable him to expand his following beyond his organization in Iraq much as Bin
Ladin expanded al-Qa'ida in the 1990s.
Impact of the Islamic Debate. The
debate between Muslim extremists and moderates also will influence the future
terrorist environment, the domestic stability of key US partners, and the
foreign policies of governments throughout the Muslim world. The violent actions
of global jihadists are adding urgency to the debate within Islam over how
religion should shape government. Growing internal demands for reform around the
world--and in many Muslim countries--further stimulate this debate. In general,
Muslims are becoming more aware of their Islamic identity, leading to growing
political activism; but this doesnot necessarily signal a trend toward radicalization. Most
Muslims reject the extremist message and violent agendas of the global
jihadists. Indeed , as people of all backgrounds endorse democratic principles
of freedom, equality, and the rule of law, they will be able to couple these
principles with their religious beliefs--whatever they may be--to build better
futures for their communities. In the Islamic world, increased freedoms will
serve as a counterweight to a jihadist movement that only promises more
authoritarianism, isolation, and economic stagnation.
EXTREMISM AND CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE
GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
The threat from extremism and
anti-Western militancy is especially acute in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
discussing Iraq, I'd like to offer a “balance sheet” to give a sense of where I
see things today and what I see as the trends in 2006. Bold, inclusive
leadership will be the critical factor in establishing an Iraqi
constitutional democracy that is both viable as a nation-state and responsive to
the diversity of Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these
encouraging developments before turning to the challenges:
The insurgents have not been able to
establish any lasting territorial control; were unable to disrupt either of the
two national elections held last year or the Constitutional referendum; have not
developed a political strategy to attract popular support beyond their Sunni
Arab base; and have not shown the ability to coordinate nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on
more demanding missions, making incremental progress toward operational
independence, and becoming more capable of providing the kind of stability
Iraqis deserve and the economy needs in order to grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme
Sunni jihadists and Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while so far
still localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The jihadists' heavy-handed
activities in Sunni areas in western Iraq have caused tribal and nationalist
elements in the insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the
last elections has provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for
the insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among Sunnis to explore the
potential benefits of political participation.
But numerous challenges remain.
The Insurgency and Iraqi Security
Forces
Iraqi Sunni Arab disaffection is the
primary enabler of the insurgency and is likely to remain high in 2006. Even if
a broad, inclusive national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency. Insurgents continue
to demonstrate the ability to recruit, supply, and attack Coalition and Iraqi
Security Forces, and their leaders continue to exploit Islamic themes,
nationalism, and personal grievances to fuel opposition to the government and to
recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such
as those fighting with Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack
Iraqis and Coalition forces.
These extreme Sunni jihadist elements, a
subset of which are foreign fighters, constitute a small minority of the overall
insurgency, but their use of high-profile suicide attacks gives them a
disproportionate impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), and the IED makers' adaptiveness to Coalition
countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-day threat to Coalition
forces, and a complex challenge for the Intelligence Community.
Iraqi Security Forces require better
command and control mechanisms to improve their effectiveness and are
experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their
units and personnel.
Sunni Political Participation
A key to establishing effective
governance and security over the next three to five years is enhanced Sunni Arab
political participation and a growing perception among Sunnis that the political
process is addressing their interests. Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what
they consider their demographically appropriate share of leadership positions in
the new government--especially on the Constitutional Review Commission. Debates
over federalism, central versus local control, and division of resources are
likely to be complex. Success in satisfactorily resolving them will be key to
advancing stability and prospects for a unified country. Although the Kurds and
Shia were accommodating to the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to
protect core interests--such as regional autonomy and de-Ba'thification--could
make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December
elections, virtually all of the Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based
government, but all want it to be formed on their terms. The Shia and the Kurds
will be the foundation of any governing coalition, but it is not yet clear to us
whether they will include the main Sunni factions, particularly the Iraqi
Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker secular groups, such as
Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List. The Sunni parties have significant
expectations for concessions from the Shia and Kurds in order to justify their
participation and avoid provoking more insurgent violence directed against Sunni
political leaders.
Governance and Reconstruction
During the coming year, Iraq's newly
elected leadership will face a daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of
a new, permanent government and the review of the Constitution by early summer
will offer opportunities to find common ground and improve the effectiveness and
legit imacy of the central government. There is a danger, however, that
political negotiations and dealmaking will prove divisive. This could obstruct
efforts to improve government performance, extend Baghdad's reach throughout the
country, and build confidence in the democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the
economy. Restoration of basic services and the creation of jobs are critical to
the well-being of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of the new government, and,
indirectly, to eroding support for the insurgency. At this point, prospects for
economic development in 2006 are constrained by the unstable security situation,
insufficient commitment to economic reform, and corruption. Iraq is dependent on
oil revenues to fund the government, so insurgents continue to disrupt oil
infrastructure, despite the fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it.
Insurgents also are targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key
role to play in combating threats to pipelines, electric power grids, and
personal safety.
Afghanistan
Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a fragile new
democracy struggling to overcome deep-seated social divisions, decades of
repression, and acts of terrorism directed against ordinary citizens, officials,
foreign aid workers, and Coalition forces. These and other threats to the Karzai
government also threaten important American interests--ranging from the defeat
of terrorists who find haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the
suppression of opium production.
Afghan leaders face four crit ical
challenges: containing the insurgency, building central government capacity and
extending its authority, further containing warlordism, and confronting
pervasive drug criminality. Intelligence is needed to assist, monitor, and
protect Afghan, Coalit ion, and NATO efforts in all four endeavors.
The volume and geographic scope of
attacks increased last year, but the Taliban and other militants have not been
able to stop the democratic process or expand their support base beyond Pashtun
areas of the south and east. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, slow economic development, and limit progress in
counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency
will depend heavily on continued international aid ; effective Coalition, NATO,
and Afghan government security operations to prevent the insurgency from gaining
a stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and the success of the government's
reconciliation initiatives.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
STATES OF KEY CONCERN: IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
The ongoing development of dangerous
weapons and delivery systems constitutes the second major threat to the safety
of our nation, our deployed troops, and our allies. We are most concerned about
the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We are also
concerned about the threat from biological agents--or even chemical agents,
which would have psychological and possibly political effects far greater than
their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still be constrained by the
logic of deterrence and international control regimes, but these constraints may
be of little utility in preventing the use of mass effect weapons by rogue
regimes or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had
monopolies over the most dangerous technologies has been over for many years.
Moreover, our adversaries have more access to acquire and more opportunities to
deliver such weapons than in the past. Technologies, often dual-use, move freely
in our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them. So it
is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those components and
production technologies that are so widely available. The potential dangers of
proliferation are so grave that we must do everything possible to discover and
disrupt attempts by those who seek to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries
that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to improve their
capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. We also are
focused on the potential acquisition of such nuclear, chemical, and/or
biological weapons--or the production technologies and materials necessary to
produce them--by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al-Qa'ida and by criminal organizations, alone or via
middlemen.
We are working with other elements of
the US Government regarding the safety and security of nuclear weapons and
fissile material, pathogens, and chemical weapons in select countries.
Iran and North Korea: States of
Highest Concern
Our concerns about Iran are shared by
many nations, by the IAEA, and of course, Iran's neighbors.
Iran conducted a clandestine uranium
enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards
agreement, and despite its claims to the contrary, we assess that Iran seeks
nuclear weapons. We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear
weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fis sile
material. Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon and the
ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran already possesses is a
reason for immediate concern. Iran already has the largest inventory of
ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and Tehran views its ballistic missiles
as an integral part of its strategy to deter--and if necessary retaliate
against--forces in the region, including US forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the
center of a vital--and volatile-- region, has strained relations with its
neighbors, and is hostile to the United States, our friends, and our values.
President Ahmadi-Nejad has made numerous unacceptable statements since his
election, hard-liners have control of all the major branches and institutions of
government, and the government has become more effective and efficient at
repressing the nascent shoots of personal freedom that had emerged in the late
1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more
confident and assertive than it has been since the early days of the Islamic
Republic. Several factors work in favor of the clerical regime's continued hold
on power. Record oil and other revenue is permitting generous public spending,
fueling strong economic growth, and swelling financial reserves. At the same
time, Iran is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share of Iran's
trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40-percent share. Tehran sees
diversification as a buffer against external efforts to isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability
is unlikely, ingredients for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary of
the political progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ahmadi-Nejad's rhetorical recklessness and his inexperience on the national and
international stage also increase the risk of a misstep that could spur popular
opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot rein in his
excesses. Over time, Ahmadi-Nejad's populist economic policies could--if
enacted--deplete the government's financial resources and weaken a structurally
flawed economy. For now, however, Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping
conservative fissures in check by balancing the various factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its
activities there represent a particular concern. Iran seeks a Shia-dominated and
unified Iraq but also wants the US to experience continued setbacks in our
efforts to promote democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups and weapons and training to
Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Tehran has been
responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition
attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build IEDs with
explosively formed projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese
Hizballah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on
the United States in Iraq has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving
Washington an excuse to attack it, the clerical leadership's general
satisfaction with trends in Iraq, and Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its
borders.
Iranian conventional military power
constitutes the greatest potential threat to Persian Gulf states and a challenge
to US interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military
power--primarily with missiles--in order to threaten to disrupt the operations
and reinforcement of US forces based in the region--potentially intimidating
regional allies into withholding support for US policy toward Iran--and raising
the costs of our regional presence for us and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a
number of terrorist groups, viewing this capability as a critical regime
safeguard by deterring US and Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel,
and enhancing Iran's regional influence through intimidation. Lebanese Hizballah
is Iran's main terrorist ally, which--although focused on its agenda in Lebanon
and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terroris ts--has a worldwide support
network and is capable of attacks against US interests if it feels its Iranian
patron is threatened. Tehran also supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other
groups in the Persian Gulf, Central and South Asia, and elsewhere.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea claims to have nuclear
weapons--a claim that we assess is probably true--and has threatened to
proliferate these weapons abroad. Thus, like Iran, North Korea threatens
international security and is located in a historically volatile region. Its
aggressive deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and US troops
on the peninsula. Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several Middle Eastern
countries, further destabilizing regions already embroiled in conflict. And it
produces and smuggles abroad counterfeit US currency, as well as narcotics, and
other contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the
best way to deter superior US and South Korean forces, to ensure regime
security, as a lever for economic gain, and as a source of prestige.
Accordingly, the North remains a major challenge to the global nuclear
nonproliferation regimes.
GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY,
AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Good governance and, over the long term,
progress toward democratization are crucial factors in navigating through the
period of international turmoil and transition that commenced with the end of
the Cold War and that will continue well into the future. In the absence of
effective governance and reform, political instability often compromises our
security interests while threatening new democracies and pushing flailing states
into failure.
I will now review those states of
greatest concern to the United States, framing my discussion within the context
of trends and developments in their respective regions.
MIDDLE EAST and SOUTH ASIA
Middle East. The tensions between
autocratic regimes, extremism, and democratic forces extend well beyond our
earlier discussion about Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to other countries in the
Middle East. Emerging political competition and the energizing of public debate
on the role of democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening of
political systems and development of civic institutions, providing a possible
bulwark against extremism. But the path to change is far from assured. Forces
for change are vulnerable to fragmentation and longstanding regimes are
increasingly adept at using both repression and limited reforms to moderate
political pressures to assure their survival.
We continue to watch closely events in
Syria, a pivotal--but generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region.
Despite the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus still
meddles in its internal affairs, seeks to undercut prospects for an Arab-Israeli
peace, and has failed to crackdown consistently on militant infiltration into
Iraq. By aligning itself with Iran, the Bashar al-Asad regime is signaling its
rejection of the Western world. Over the coming year, the Syrian regime could
face internal challenges as various pressures--especially the fallout of the UN
investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister--
raise questions about President Bashar al-Asad's judgment and leadership
capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has
created political opportunities in Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially
the sense among Shia that they are underrepresented in the government--and
Damascus's meddling persist. Bombings since March targeting anti-Syria
politicians and journalists have fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held presidential and
legislative elections for the first time with multiple presidential candidates
in response to internal and external pressures for democratization. The Egyptian
public, however, remains discontented by economic conditions, the Arab-Israeli
problem, the US presence in Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on
al-Qa'ida has prevented major terrorist attacks in the Kingdom for more than a
year and degraded the remnants of the terror network's Saudi-based leadership,
manpower, access to weapons, and operational capability. These developments, the
Kingdom's smooth leadership transition and high oil prices have eased, but not
eliminated, concerns about stability.
HAMAS's recent electoral
performance ushered in a period of great uncertainty as President Abbas, the
Israelis, and the rest of the world determine how to deal with a majority party
in the Palestinian Legislative Council that conducts and supports terrorism and
refuses to recognize or negotiate with Israel. The election, however, does not
necessarily mean that the search for peace between Israel and the Palestinians
is halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by HAMAS may have been cast more
against the Fatah government than for the HAMAS program of
rejecting Israel. In any case, HAMAS now must contend with Palestinian public
opinion that has over the years has supported the two-state solution.
SOUTH ASIA
Many of our most important interests
intersect in Pakistan. The nation is at the frontline in the war on
terror, having captured several al-Qa'ida leaders, but also remains a major
source of extremism that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the US, and to
neighboring India and Afghanistan. Musharraf faces few political challenges in
his dual role as President and Chief of Army Staff, but has made only limited
progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan retains a nuclear force
outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and not subject
to full-scope IAEA safeguards and has been both recipient and source--via A.Q.
Khan's proliferation activities--of nuclear weapons-related technologies.
Pakistan's national elections scheduled for 2007 will be a key benchmark to
determine whether the country is continuing to make progress in its democratic
transition.
Since India and Pakistan
approached the brink of war in 2002, their peace process has lessened tensions
and both appear committed to improving the bilateral relationship. A number of
confidence-building measures, including new transportation links, have helped
sustain the momentum. Still, the fact that both have nuclear weapons and
missiles to deliver them entails obvio us and dangerous risks of escalation.
EURASIA
In Russia , President Putin's
drive to centralize power and assert control over civil society, growing state
control over strategic sectors of the economy, and the persistence of widespread
corruption raise questions about the country's direction. Russia could become a
more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States over the
next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas and perceived
policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the
United States on shared interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics,
and counterproliferation. However, growing suspicions about Western intentions
and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence and defend its own interests
may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on areas of concern to the United
States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of
post-Soviet Eurasia where the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are
led by autocratic, corrupt, clan-based regimes whose political stability is
based on different levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we have seen in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan the emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by
political stagnation and repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and
widening socio-economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture nascent
radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible case, central
authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival clans or
regions vie for power--opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and
criminal activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when it was
under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
LATIN AMERICA
A gradual consolidation and improvement
of democratic institutions is the dominant trend in much of Latin America. By
the year's end, ten countries will have held presidential elections and none is
more important to US interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico has
taken advantage of NAFTA and its economy has become increasingly integrated with
the US and Canada. Committed democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are
promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. And despite battling
persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces with considerable success, Colombia
remains committed to keeping on a democratic path. Nonetheless, radical populist
figures in some countries advocate statist economic policies and show little
respect for democratic institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez,
if he wins reelection later this year, appears ready to use his control of the
legislature and other institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, reduce
press freedom, and entrench himself through measures that are technically legal,
but which nonetheless constrict democracy. We expect Chavez to deepen his
relationship with Castro (Venezuela provides roughly two-thirds of that island's
oil needs on preferential credit terms). He also is seeking closer economic,
military, and diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled back
counternarcotics cooperation with the US.
Increased oil revenues have allowed
Chavez to embark on an activist foreign policy in Latin America that includes
providing oil at favorable repayment rates to gain allies, using newly created
media outlets to generate support for his Bolivarian goals, and meddling in the
internal affairs of his neighbors by backing particular candidates for elective
office.
In Bolivia, South America's
poorest country with the hemisphere's highest proportion of indigenous people,
the victory of Evo Morales reflects the public's lack of faith in traditional
political parties and institutions. Since his election he appears to have
moderated his earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and
cease coca eradication. But his administration continues to send mixed signals
regarding its intentions.
Haiti's newly elected government
has substantial popular support but will face a wide variety of immediate
challenges, including reaching out to opponents who question the legitimacy of
the electoral process. President-elect Preval's strong backing among the urban
poor may improve his chances for reducing the unchecked violence of slum gangs,
and the recent renewal for six months of the mandate for the UN Stabilization
Mission will give his administration some breathing room. The perception among
would-be migrants that the US migration policy is tough will continue to be the
most important factor in deterring Haitians from fleeing their country.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia includes vibrant,
diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the United States as a source of
stability, wealth, and leadership. But it is also home to terrorism, separatist
aspirations, crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. Burma
remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on democracy
and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is particularly at risk from
avian flu, which I will address later at greater length. Al-Qa'ida-affiliated
and other extremist groups are present in many countries, although effective
government policies have limited their growth and impact.
The prospects for democratic
consolidation are relatively bright inIndonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim
population. President Yudhoyono is moving forward to crack down on corruption,
professionalize the military, bring peace to the long-troubled province of Aceh,
and implement economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side, Indonesian
authorities have detained or killed significant elements of Jemaah Islamiya
(JI), the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group, but JI remains a tough foe.
The Philippines remains committed
to democracy despite political turbulence over alleged cheating in the 2004
election and repeated rumors of coup plots. Meanwhile, Manila continues to
struggle with the thirty-five year old Islamic and Communist rebellions, and
faces growing concerns over the presence of JI terrorists in the south.
Thailand is searching for a formula to
contain violence instigated by ethnic-Malay Muslim separatist groups in the far
southern provinces. In 2005, the separatists showed signs of stronger
organization and more lethal and brutal tactics targeting the government and
Buddhist population in the south.
AFRICA
Some good news is coming out of Africa.
The continent is enjoying real economic growth after a decade of declining per
capita income. The past decade has also witnessed a definite, albeit gradual,
trend toward greater democracy, openness, and multiparty elections. In
Liberia, the inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as President,
following a hotly contested multi-party election, was a positive harbinger of a
return to democratic rule in a battered nation.
Yet, in much of the continent,
humanitarian crises, instability, and conflict persist. Overlaying these
enduring threats are the potential spread of jihadist ideology among disaffected
Muslim populations and the region's growing importance as a source of energy. We
are most concerned about Sudan and Nigeria.
The signing of a Comprehensive Peace
Agreement in Sudan last year was a major achievement, but the new
Government of National Unity is being tested by the continuing conflict in
Darfur, and instability in Chad is spilling over into western Sudan, further
endangering humanitarian aid workers and assistance supply lines. Gains in
stabilizing and improving the conditions in Darfur could be reversed if the new
instability goes unchecked.
The most important election on the
African horizon will be held in spring 2007 in Nigeria , the continent's
most populous country and largest oil producer. The vote has the potential to
reinforce a democratic trend away from military rule--or it could lead to major
disruption in a nation suffering frequent ethno-religious violence, criminal
activity, and rampant corruption. Speculation that President Obasanjo will try
to change the constitution so he can seek a third term in office is raising
political tensions and, if proven true, threatens to unleash major turmoil and
conflict. Such chaos in Nigeria could lead to disruption of oil supply,
secessionist moves by regional governments, major refugee flows, and instability
elsewhere in West Africa.
GLOBALIZATION AND RISING ACTORS
To one degree or another, all nations
are affected by the phenomenon known as globalization. Many see the United
States as globalization's primary beneficiary, but the developments subsumed
under its rubric operate largely beyond the control of all countries. Small,
medium, and large states are both gaining and losing through technological and
economic developments at a rate of speed unheard of in human history.
Such recalibrations in regional and
global standing usually emerge in the wake of war. But globalization isn't a
war, even though its underside-- fierce competition for global energy reserves,
discrepancies between rich and poor, criminal networks that create and feed
black markets in drugs and even human beings, and the rapid transmission of
disease--has the look of a silent but titanic global struggle.
One major recalibration of the global
order enabled by globalization is the shift of world economic momentum and
energy to greater Asia--led principally by explosive economic growth in China
and the growing concentration of world manufacturing activity in and around it.
India, too, is emerging as a new pole of greater Asia's surging economic and
political power. These two Asian giants comprise fully a third of the world's
population--a huge labor force eager for modern work, supported by significant
scientific and technological capabilities, and an army of new claimants on the
world's natural resources and capital.
CHINA
China is a rapidly rising power with
steadily expanding global reach that may become a peer competitor to the United
States at some point. Consistent high rates of economic growth, driven by
exploding foreign trade, have increased Beijing's political influence abroad and
fueled a military modernization program that has steadily increased Beijing's
force projection capabilities.
Chinese foreign policy is currently
focused on the country's immediate periphery, including Southeast and Central
Asia, where Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, increase political
influence, and prevent a backlash against its rise. Its rhetoric toward Taiwan
has been less inflammatory since Beijing passed its “anti-secession” law last
spring. China has been reaching out to the opposition parties on Taiwan and
making economic overtures designed to win favor with the Taiwan public--although
Beijing still refuses to deal with the elected leader in Taipei.
Beijing also has expanded diplomatic and
economic interaction with other major powers--especially Russia and the EU--and
begun to increase its presence in Africa and Latin America.
China's military is vigorously pursuing
a modernization program: a full suite of modern weapons and hardware for a large
proportion of its overall force structure; designs for a more effective
operational doctrine at the tactical and theater level; training reforms; and
wide-ranging improvements in logistics, administration, financial management,
mobilization, and other critical support functions.
Beijing's biggest challenge is to
sustain growth sufficient to keep unemployment and rural discontent from rising
to destabilizing levels and to maintain increases in living standards. To do
this, China must solve a number of difficult economic and legal problems,
improve the education system, reduce environmental degradation, and improve
governance by combating corruption.
Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by
systemic problems and the Communist Party's resistance to the demands for
political participation that economic growth generates. Beijing's determination
to repress real or perceived challenges--from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations--could lead to serious instability at home and less effective
policies abroad.
INDIA
Rapid economic growth and increasing
technological competence are securing India's leading role in South Asia, while
helping India to realize its longstanding ambition to become a global power.
India's growing confidence on the world stage as a result of its increasingly
globalized business activity will make New Delhi a more effective partner for
the United States, but also a more formidable player on issues such as those
before the WTO.
New Delhi seeks to play a key role in
fostering democracy in the region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will
continue to be a reliable ally against global terrorism, in part because India
has been a frequent target for Islamic terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India
seeks better relations with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China--recognizing
that its regional disputes with them are hampering its larger goals on the world
stage. Nevertheless, like China, India is using its newfound wealth and
technical capabilities to extend its military reach.
On the economic front, as Indian
multinationals become more prevalent, they will offer competition and
cooperation with the United States in fields such as energy, steel, and
pharmaceuticals. New Delhi's pursuit of energy to fuel its rapidly growing economy adds
to pressure on world prices and increases the likelihood that it will
seek to augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and petroleum
exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the Nonproliferation Treaty.
THREATS TO GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY
World energy markets seem certain to
remain tight for the foreseeable future. Robust global economic expansion is
pushing strong energy demand growth and--combined with instability in several
oil producing regions--is increasing the geopolitical leverage of key energy
producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela. At the same
time, the pursuit of secure energy supplies has become a much more significant
driver of foreign policy in countries where energy demand growth is
surging--particularly China and India.
The changing global oil and gas market
has encouraged Russia's assertiveness with Ukraine and Georgia, Iran's nuclear
brinksmanship, and the populist “petro-diplomacy” of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
Russia's recent but short-lived curtailment of natural gas deliveries to Ukraine
temporarily reduced gas supplies to much of Europe and is an example of how
energy can be used as both a political and economic tool. The gas disruption
alarmed Europeans--reminding them of their dependence on Russian gas--and
refocused debate on alternative energy sources.
Foreign policy frictions, driven by
energy security concerns, are likely to be fed by continued global efforts of
Chinese and Indian firms to ink new oilfield development deals and to purchase
stakes in foreign oil and gas properties. Although some of these moves may
incrementally increase oil sector investment and global supplies, others may
bolster countries such as Iran, Syria, and Sudan that pose signif icant US
national security risks or foreign policy challenges. For example, in
Venezuela, Chavez is attempting to diversify oil exports away from the
US.
THE SECURITY THREAT FROM NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING
In addition to the central US national
security interest in stemming the flow of drugs to this country, there are two
international threats related to narcotics: first, the potential threat from an
intersection of narcotics and extremism; and second, the threat from the impact
of drugs on those ineffective and unreliable nation states about which we are so
concerned.
Although the worldwide
trafficking-terrorist relationship is limited, the scope of these ties has grown
modestly in recent years. A small number of terrorist groups engage the services
of or accept donations from criminals, including narcotics traffickers, to help
raise operational funds. While the revenue realized by extremists appears small
when compared to that of the dedicated trafficking organizations, even small
amounts of income can finance destructive acts of terror.
The tie between drug trafficking and
extremism is strongest in Colombia and Afghanistan. Both of Colombia's
insurgencies and most of its paramilitary groups reap substantial benefits from
cocaine transactions. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbudin
gain at least some of their financial support from their ties to local opiates
traffickers. Ties between trafficking and extremists elsewhere are less robust
and profitable. North African extremists involved in the 2004 Madrid train
bombings reportedly used drug income to buy their explosives.
Most major international organized crime
groups have kept terrorists at arm's length, although some regional criminal
gangs have supplied fraudulent or altered travel documents, moved illicit
earnings, or provided other criminal services to members of insurgent or
terrorist groups for a fee.
Narcotics traffickers--and other
organized criminals--typically do not want to see governments toppled but thrive
in states where governments are weak, vulnerable to or seeking out corruption,
and unable--or unwilling--to consistently enforce the rule of law. Nonetheless,
a vicious cycle can develop in which a weakened government enables criminals to
dangerously undercut the state's credibility and authority with the consequence
that the investment climate suffers, economic growth withers, black market
activity rises, and fewer resources are available for civil infrastructure and
governance.
THE THREAT FROM PANDEMICS AND
EPIDEMICS
In the 21st century, our Intelligence Community has expanded the definition of
bio-threats to the US beyond weapons to naturally occurring pandemics. The most
pressing infectious disease challenge facing the US is the potential emergence
of a new and deadly avian influenza strain, which could cause a worldwide
outbreak, or pandemic. International health experts worry that avian influenza
could become transmissible among humans, threatening the health and lives of
millions of people around the globe. There are many unknowns about avian flu,
but even the specter of an outbreak could have significant effects on the
international economy, whole societies, military operations, critical
infrastructure, and diplomatic relations.
Avian flu is not something we can fight
alone. An effective response to it is highly dependent on the openness of
affected nations in reporting outbreaks where and when they occur. But for
internal political reasons, a lack of response capability, or disinclination to
regard avian influenza as a significant threat, some countries are not
forthcoming. In close coordination with the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Intelligence Community therefore is tracking a number of key
countries that are--or could be--especially prone to avian influenza outbreaks
and where we cannot be confident that adequate information will be available
through open sources. The IC also coordinates closely with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and provides input to the national Bio Surveillance
Integration System at DHS.
Conclusion
Each of the major intelligence
challenges I have discussed today is affected by the accelerating change and
transnational interplay that are the hallmarks of 21st century globalization. As a direct result, collecting, analyzing, and
acting on solid intelligence have become increasingly difficult. To meet these
new and reconfigured challenges, we need to work hand-in-hand with other
responsible nations. Fortunately, the vast majority of governments in the world
are responsible and responsive, but those that are not are neither few in
numbers nor lacking in material resources and geopolitical influence.
The powerful critiques of the 9/11
Commission and the WMD Commission, framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and taken to heart by the dedicated
professionals of our Intelligence Community, have helped make us better prepared
and more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in September 2001. But from
an intelligence perspective, we cannot rest. We must transform our intelligence
capabilities and cultures by fully integrating them from local law enforcement
through national authorities in Washington to combatant commanders overseas. The
more thoroughly we do that, the more clearly we will be able to see the threats
lurking in the shadow of the future and ward them off.
Thank you very much.
