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MOTION TO VACATE DENIED: June 5, 2008
CBCA 105-R
HEDLUND CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Respondent.
Jon E. Cushman of Cushman Law
Offices, P.S., Olympia, WA, counsel for Appellant.
Mary E. Sajna, Office of the
General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, Portland, OR, counsel for
Respondent.
Before Board Judges GOODMAN, McCANN, and
DRUMMOND.
McCANN,
Board Judge.
The parties have jointly moved
to vacate the Board=s decision pursuant to a settlement agreement. We deny the motion.
Background
On February 19, 2008, the
Board issued its decision in this case.
That decision held that Hedlund was entitled to $377,979.24 out of its
claimed $466,825.58. On May 12, 2008,
the parties filed a joint request for amended decision, withdrawal of Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fee application, and stipulation for the entry
of judgment. In that request the parties
asked that the Board replace the decision in its entirety with the an amended
decision. The amended decision indicated
that appellant was to recover $399,999 from the Government as full and final
payment. Presumably, this payment
included attorney fees.
On May 19, 2008, respondent
filed its supplemental memorandum in support of the joint request for amended
decision. In this memorandum respondent
asserts that the decision is both problematic for respondent and incorrect in a
number of ways. In its response dated
May 20, 2008, appellant indicated simply that it did not agree with respondent=s memorandum, and that its only interest in this
matter was to bring the case to a rapid conclusion and to receive the
settlement amount agreed upon by the parties.
Discussion
From a review of respondent=s supplemental memorandum, it would appear that
respondent is arguing more for reconsideration or amendment of the decision
than for a vacatur. Pursuant to Board
Rule 26, parties have only thirty days after the decision to file a motion for
reconsideration or a motion to amend the decision. That time is long since past. We do not consider the motion one for
reconsideration or for amendment of the decision.
We do, however, consider the
motion as one for vacatur. Even so,
neither party has briefed the reasons why vacatur would be appropriate under
the circumstances of this case. Although
no specific rule of the Board covers vacatur, it is clear that there is
precedent for vacatur at the Board under the appropriate circumstances. Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Products
Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The issue then is whether the
circumstances of this case support vacatur.
It seems clear that in this case respondent wants the decision vacated
because it wishes to expunge the precedential effect the decision may have. On the other hand, appellant only wants
vacatur to end the litigation by settlement without further appeal, thus
expediting payment of the money to which it is entitled. Presumably, both parties would like to forgo
the cost and time involved in an appeal.
We do not know whether the Department of Agriculture or the Department
of Justice would agree to proceed with an appeal.
In U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994), the Supreme Court expressed its view
on vacatur of decisions through settlement.
It stated:
Where mootness results from settlement, however, the
losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary
processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the
equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment
is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice. The denial of vacatur is merely one
application of the principle that A[a]
suitor=s conduct in relation to the matter at hand may
disentitle him to the relief he seeks.@ [Citations
omitted.]
The Supreme Court in Bancorp
further explained why vacatur is disfavored.
It opined that Congress set forth the primary route of appeal through
which parties may seek relief, and that vacatur after decision would allow for
a collateral attack upon the orderly operation of the judicial system. 513 U.S. at 27. The Court indicated that it had granted
relief in the form of vacatur when orderly procedure could not be honored. Id. (citing United States v.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950)).
Conversely, the Court felt that Athe
public interest requires those demands [of orderly procedure] to be honored
when they can.@ Id.
In further discussing the
appropriateness of vacatur, the Court indicated:
[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not justify
vacatur of a judgment under review. This
is not to say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is produced in
that fashion. As we have described, the
determination is an equitable one, and exceptional circumstances may
conceivably counsel in favor of such a course.
It should be clear from our discussion, however, that those exceptional
circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement
provides for vacatur -- which neither diminishes the voluntariness of the
abandonment of review nor alters any of the policy considerations we have
discussed.
513 U.S. at 29.
In this case, respondent was
the losing party and is voluntarily forfeiting its legal remedy of appeal. Accordingly, its conduct disentitles it to
the vacatur it seeks. Appellant,
on the other hand, is not really seeking vacatur; it only wants to be paid its
money as soon as possible. Vacatur in
these circumstances is an unacceptable collateral attack on orderly procedure
without good reason. Further, the record
in this case fails to reveal the existence of any Aexceptional circumstances@ sufficient to support vacatur.
Decision
The motion is DENIED.
_____________________________
R. ANTHONY McCANN
Board Judge
We concur:
_________________________________ ______________________________
ALLAN H. GOODMAN JEROME
M. DRUMMOND
Board Judge Board
Judge