CHARLIE WAYNE ROSE, APPELLANT V. BARBARA ANN MCNEIL ROSE AND STATE OF TENNESSEE No. 85-1206 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Division Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Interest of the United States Statement Summary of argument Argument: A. The federal statutory scheme precludes state jurisdiction over veterans disability benefits B. This Court's decisions establish that state courts are without authority to reduce the amount of disability benefits available to the veteran Conclusion QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2) deprives a state court of jurisdiction to order child support payments to be paid out of federal veterans' disability benefits. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES The issue in this case is whether state courts may allocate portions of a veteran's federal disability benefits for the support of his children. The power asserted by the state courts would interfere with the authority of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to apportion disability benefits. The United States has a substantial interest in maintaining federal control over the veterans' disability benefit program, which serves not only to provide for the veteran disabled in federal military service, but also to support current military personnel needs. The Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States at the jurisdictional state of this case. STATEMENT Appellant is a totally disabled Vietnam veteran whose only income derives from disability benefits he receives from the Veterans Administration and the Social Security Administration. His Social Security disability benefits amount to $281 a month (J.S. App. 8a). He also receives, on his own behalf, $3,323 a month in veteran's disability benefits. /1/ These benefits are based on the fact that appellant is a triple amputee who is blind in one eye (J.S. App. 2a) and therefore, because of these wartime injuries, meets the statutory standard of being so nearly helpless as to be in need of regular aid and attendance (38 U.S.C. 502(b)). /2/ In addition, he receives $99 a month from the Veterans Administration on behalf of his two minor children, pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. 315(1)(C) (West Supp. 1986). They receive $94 a month from the Social Security Administration (J.S. App. 7a). See 42 U.S.C. 402(d). Appellant and appellee Barbara Ann McNeil Rose were divorced in October 1983; the divorce decree ordered appellant to pay $800 a month in child support (J.S. App. 7a, 1a-2a, 17a). In 1984, appellant refused to continue the payments (J.S. App. 7a), and the district court held him in contempt (J.S. App. 11a). /3/ Appellant appealed this ruling to the state court of appeals, arguing that neither his Social Security nor his VA disability benefits are subject to state court support orders. /4/ The court of appeals rejected this argument (J.S. App. 1a-5a), and the state supreme court denied permission to appeal (J.S. App. 22a). This Court noted probable jurisdiction on June 30, 1986. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In 38 U.S.C. 314, Congress has specified in great detail the precise sums to be paid as monthly benefits to veterans disabled in active wartime military service. The payments are based entirely on the degree of disability, and provide an additional supplement to those who, like appellant, are so nearly helpless that they need regular assistance to perform essential personal functions. To assure that the disabled veteran himself receives the benefit of these sums, 38 U.S.C. 3101 broadly exempts these benefits from taxation, from creditors' claims, and from "seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt" by the veteran. Both the specificity with which the Congress has determined the amounts necessary for the disabled veteran's support and the anti-attachment provision are inconsistent with the state's assertion of authority to reweigh the respective needs of the veteran and his children for these federally-provided funds. In addition, such an assertion of authority is inconsistent with 38 U.S.C. 211(a), which provides that the decisions of the Administrator on matters relating to veterans' benefits are not subject to judicial review. Although that Section in terms bars only review in federal courts, state court actions preempting the Administrator's benefit determinations are inconsistent with the statutory purpose of achieving uniformity of administration reflected in that Section. The federal statute does recognize that a disabled veteran's children who are not in his custody may have a legitimate claim to some part of his benefits, but it vests the evaluation of such claims in the Adminsitrator of Veterans Affairs. Not having availed herself of the statutorily-prescribed procedures, appellee Barbara Rose is in no position to assert, either in the state courts or in this Court, that the subsistence needs of her children are not adequately satisfied by the federal benefits that they are currently receiving. Such contentions should be made to the Administrator in a claim for apportionment of appellant's disability benefits. This Court's decisions support our position. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the anti-attachment provision in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. 231m, which closely parallels 38 U.S.C. 3101, was held to preempt a state court award of an interest in federal retirement benefits (community property under state law) as part of a property settlement in a divorce proceeding. The Court's analysis, which recognized that the state court award reduced the amounts Congress provided to the former employee in order to achieve the statutory purposes, applies with at least equal force here. Indeed, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the Court followed Hisquierdo in holding military retirement pay immune from division as community property in a divorce settlement. The same result is required a fortiori here, where the federal payments reflect the special needs of the seriously disabled veteran. The garnishment provision enacted in the Social Security Act amendments of 1975 and 1977 (42 U.S.C. 659, 662(f)), relied upon by the Court in Hisquierdo and McCarty, similarly supports the result we urge here. That provisions specifically excepts settlements at issue in those cases, but also the veteran's disability benefits at issue here. Thus, in deciding that federal payments that constitute remuneration for employment should generally be subject to garnishment for child support, Congress focussed on veterans' disability payments and again confirmed that (except as otherwise provided in the federal program) they should be reserved for the use of the veteran. ARGUMENT A. THE FEDERAL STATUTORY SCHEME PRECLUDES STATE JURISDICTION OVER VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS There is a clear national obligation to provide for those disabled in military service to their country. In addition, the provision of military disability benefits furthers current military personnel needs and general social goals. /5/ Congress has therefore, since the Revolutionary War period, provided for disability pensions for veterans injured in active military service in wartime (McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 212-213 (1981)). See generally Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Dual Compensation Paid to Retired Uniformed Services' Personnel in Federal Civilian Positions 18-20 (Comm. Print 1978). 1. The current disability benefit provisions, contained in 38 U.S.C.A. 314 (West Supp. 1986), are based entirely on the degree of disability, without regard to military rank or length of service. Indeed, 38 U.S.C. 314 is remarkable for the specificity with which it details the precise amount to be paid for each degree of disability, with particular attention to certain types of injuries (see 38 U.S.C.A. 314(k)-(p)) (West Supp. 1986). In addition, recognizing that some veterans, like appellant, will be so nearly helpless that they require constant assistance in performing essential personal functions, the statute provides for the payment of a monthly aid and attendance allowance of $998, or -- where the veteran needs a "higher level of care" -- of $1,487 (38 U.S.C.A. 314(r)) (West Supp. 1986). The very specificity with which Congress has defined the sums to be provided for the support of the disabled veteran strongly suggests that it did not intend to permit those sums to be reduced by the states. See pages 14-16, infra. Nor is that conclusion left only to implication. Congress took explicit care to assure that the sums it has so carefully specified are preserved for the support of the disabled veteran himself. Thus, 38 U.S.C. 3101 restricts the extent to which the benefits may be assigned, exempts them from taxation and from the claims of creditors, and broadly provides that such benefits "shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." /6/ That provision is controlling here. Its comprehensive language refutes appellee Tennessee's contention (Mot. to Dis. or Aff. 5) that it should not be applied to child support claims because "the obligation to support dependents is not a debt in the usual sense." The federal statutory exemption on its face encompasses far more than conventional debts. Moreover, the exemption "should be liberally construed * * * to protect funds granted by the Congress for the maintenance and support of the beneficiaries thereof" (Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962)). /7/ 2. Veterans' disability benefits are funded by annual appropriations. In contrast to the employee covered by the Social Security system, the service member makes no contribution to the veterans' benefit retirement system during the period of his active service. /8/ Congress is under no legal compulsion to appropriate these funds; the courts have repeatedly recognized that veterans' pension benefits are "gratutities and establish no vested rights in the recipients so that they may be withdrawn by Congress at any time and under such conditions as Congress may impose." Milliken v. Gleason, 332 F.2d 122, 123 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1002 (1965); deRodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1257-1258 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (collecting cases). One such condition is contained in 38 U.S.C. 211(a), which makes the decision of the Administrator final on "any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors." /9/ In Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-374 (1974), the Court refused to interpret the ban on judicial review as extending to constitutional claims, but it nowhere suggested any doubt about the propreity of such a ban on judicial review of "those decisions of law or fact that arise in the administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans" (415 U.S. at 367 (emphasis in original)). Section 211(a) explicitly bars only any "other official or any court of the United States" from reviewing the Administrator's benefit decisions. In light of the desire for uniformity of administration upon which the provision is substantially based (Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. at 369-373, summarizing relevant legislative history), it is clear, however, that Congress could not have intended to permit review of the Administrator's decision in state courts. Even more inconsistent with this underlying congressional desire for uniformity of administration is the decision of the court below. That decision permits a state court to allocate a veteran's disability benefits in conformance with state policies, wholly without regard to any determination by the Administrator. 3. Such state interference in the federal regulatory scheme is not justified by any gap in the federal system. Congress has recognized that apportionment of a veteran's benefits may sometimes be appropriate to provide for his children when they are not in his custody. Rather than leaving such apportionment decisions to the varied policies and procedures of the state courts, however, Congress preferred to rely on the expert case-by-case judgment of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs. Accordingly, in 38 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 3107, Congress specifically provided for the apportionment of benefits by the Administrator: (a) All or any part of the compensation, pension, or emergency officers' retirement pay payable on account of any veteran may -- * * * (2) if the veteran is not living with the veteran's spouse, or if the veteran's children are not in the custody of the veteran, be apportioned as may be prescribed by the Administrator. Implementing regulations promulgated by the Veterans Administrtion permit apportionment of all or any part of disability benefits if a claim is filed seeking such apportionment when "the veteran is not residing with his or her spouse, or (when) the veteran's children are not residing with the veteran and the veteran is not reasonably discharging his or her responsibility for the spouse's or children's support." 38 C.F.R. 3.450(a)(1)(i). /10/ The statute and regulations thus clearly indicate that the decision concerning the appropriateness of any apportionment of a veteran's disability benefits is one that Congress has placed entirely within the discretion of the Administrator, /11/ and that he has established procedures under which he exercises that discretion on a case-by-case basis. /12/ We are informed by the Veterans Administration that no claim for apportionment of appellant's disability benefits to provide for the support of his minor children has been received to date, so the Administrator has not had the opportunity to exercise his discretion in this case. Appellee Barbara Rose's preference for the state forum in which to press her child support claims, however, affords no adequate basis for refusing to require compliance with the procedures established pursuant to the mandate of Congress. Since she has not utilized those procedures, she should not be heard to claim in this Court that the federal benefits currently received by the minor children are insufficient. Such claims must be made to the Administrator in an application for apportionment of appellant's disability benefits. /13/ B. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS ESTABLISH THAT STATE COURTS ARE WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO THE VETERAN 1. It has long been recognized that domestic relations law is generally within state control. As this Court stated in In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890), "(t)he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of the States and not to the laws of the United States." Even when it is alleged that state law conflicts with a federal statute, this Court has limited its review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination of whether Congress "positively required by direct enactment" that state law be preempted. Westmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). As this Court stated in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979), a "mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand the state law be overridden" (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). Nevertheless, this Court in Hisquierdo itself, and on several other occasions, has held that under the Supremacy Clause federal law did indeed override conflicting state domestic relations law. /14/ This case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Hisquierdo and its progeny. Accordingly, the same conclusion is appropriate here. In Hisquierdo, the Court concluded that a federal statutory provision barring assignment, garnishment or attachment of railroad retirement benefits preempted a state court award of an interest in those benefits (considered community property under state law) as part of a property settlement in a divorce proceeding. In analyzing the anti-attachment provision of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. 231m, the Court noted (439 U.S. at 584) that it "pre-empts all state law that stands in its way." /15/ The Court observed that Congress had provided the precise amount it considered appropriate for an employee's retirement, and that this amount was designed to encourage an eligible employee to retire. As the Court explained, reducing the former employee's retirement pay by assigning part of it to a divorced spouse in a property settlement would reduce the incentive to retire and to that extent would frustrate the congressional purpose in enacting the retirement program (439 U.S. at 585). Similarly, in the instant case, Congress has provided compensation designed to meet both the requirements of disabled veterans and the personnel needs of the military. In 38 U.S.C. 314, Congress established the precise amount of disability benefits to be paid to a veteran as seriously injured as appellant; it further protected the veteran from the dissipation of those funds by providing that those benefits should be entirely exempt from the claims of creditors and from "attachment, levy or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever" (38 U.S.C. 3101(a)). If the state court order were allowed to redirect a portion of this benefit to the veteran's dependents, the disabled veteran, like the former railroad employee in Hisquierdo, would receive less than Congress had deemed necessary to achieve the dual statutory purposes. /16/ Moreover, as in Hisquierdo, the exercise of such state authority is also inconsistent with the applicable federal anti-attachment provision, which "prevents the vagaries of state law from disrupting the national scheme, and guarantees a national uniformity that enhances the effectiveness of congressional policy" (439 U.S. at 584). In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the Court considered the relationship of a federal statutory bar on attachment and a state court order treating military retirement pay as community property in a divorce settlement. Applying the Hisquierdo analysis (see 439 U.S. at 583), the Court first determined that there was a conflict between the federal retirement provisions and the community property right asserted; it then analyzed that conflict to decide whether the application of community property principles would threaten serious harm to "clear and substantial" federal interests (453 U.S. at 232). The Court found that the community property right asserted would "'diminish that portion of the benefit Congress has said should go to the retired (service member) alone'" (453 U.S. at 233 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590)). In addition, military personnel management would be disrupted because allowing community property rights to take precedence would diminish the value of retired pay as an inducement for enlistment or reenlistment and would lessen the incentive to retire. This would hinder the congressional objective of maintaining a competent, youthful military (453 U.S. at 234-235). Similarly, in the instant case, federal law must take precedence in order to insure that disabled service members will receive adequate income and therefore are encouraged to retire rather than conceal disability, and to maintain the incentive for military service provided by disability programs. Here, as in McCarty, "(s)tate courts are not free to reduce the amounts that Congress has determined are necessary for the retired member" (453 U.S. at 233). /17/ 2. In both Hisquierdo (439 U.S. at 586-587) and McCarty (453 U.S. at 230-232), the Court relied in its analysis on the 1975 and 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act. In these amendments, Congress provided that, notwithstanding any contrary law, federal benefits may be reached by garnishment to satisfy a child support or alimony obligation (42 U.S.C. 659). Congress however, specifically excepted from the definition of alimony "transfer(s) of property * * * in compliance with any community property settlement" (42 U.S.C. 662(c)). Thus Congress had demonstrated its intent that community property claims should not be allowed to "deflect( ) other federal benefit programs from their intended goals" (Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 587; see McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230). Accordingly, the Court held that a state court order reflecting a community property settlement in a divorce proceeding could not be allowed to override this express congressional enactment. The garnishment statute similarly demonstrates congressional intent regarding veterans' disability benefits. It provides that federal benefits may be garnished for child support if they are "moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States" (42 U.S.C. 659(a)). As we explained, pages 6, 8, supra, veterans' disability benefits are not remuneration for employment. Moreover, a definitional provision specifically excludes "any payments by the Veterans' Administration as compensation for a service-connected disability or death." /18/ 42 U.S.C. 662(f)(2). /19/ As in Hisquierdo and McCarty, therefore, Congress has made clear its intent. While Congress believed that the need to provide financial support for a family could justify garnishment of some federal benefits, it specifically determined that the veterans' disability benefit program is not to be subject to garnishment. /20/ It has, indeed, specifically insulated disability payments under the program from "attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary" (38 J.S.C. 3101(a)); and it has vested exclusive authority to apportion such benefits in the Administrator of Veterans Affairs (see pages 10-12, supra). Just as in Hisquierdo and McCarty, therefore, a state court order in a divorce proceeding may not take precedence over what Congress has ordained. CONCLUSION The decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General LAWRENCE G. WALLACE Deputy Solicitor General HARRIET S. SHAPIRO Assistant to the Solicitor General MICHAEL JAY SINGER CHRISTINE R. WHITTAKER Attorneys AUGUST 1986 /1/ The figures given represent current benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. 314 (West Supp. 1986); the figures in J.S. App. 8a are those received under the superseded statute. /2/ Pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. 314(o), (p) and (r) (West Supp. 1986), a veteran who is totally disabled is entitled to a monthly disability benefit not to exceed $2.325, plus a monthly attendance allowance of up to $1,487 if he is so nearly helpless as to require the regular attendance of another person (38 U.S.C. 502). See 38 C.F.R. 3.352, defining criteria for determining permanent need for regular aid and attendance. /3/ The court concluded that the children's Social Security benefits were in addition to the $800 a month support order, but set off the children's VA benefits (then $90) against the $800 (J.S. App. 7a). The appellate court agreed (J.S. App. 4a). /4/ In this Court, appellant does not contest the award insofar as it requires him to use his Social Security benefits to pay child support (J.S. 16). He also has apparently been turning the children's VA benefits over to them (see J.S. App. 7a), and does not contest his obligation to do so. /5/ Disability payments help maintain a fit military force by encouraging those eligible for benefits to retire, rather than to conceal their disability and continue in active service for economic reasons. They also, like other fringe benefits, facilitate recruitment, helping to attract competent personnel. Furthermore, adequate disability benefits avoid the possibility that the support of disabled veterans will be a burden on local communities. /6/ Congress has included a provision protecting military benefits against attachment or garnishment since 1873, when it stated that a military pension "shall inure wholly to the benefit of (the) pensioner." Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, Section 33, 17 Stat. 575-576. In subsequent reenactments, Congress has continued to make clear and reaffirm that its purpose is to exempt veterans' benefits from creditor actions as well as from taxation. See Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933); Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1962). /7/ This Court held in Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, that veterans' benefit funds retain their exempt status after being deposited in the veteran's savings and loan account. The federal government retained sufficient interest in the funds, even after they passed into the veteran's possession, to protect them from creditors. See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1961), upholding the constitutionality of federal statute asserting federal right to property of intestate veterans who die without heirs in government facilities, against claim by state under its escheat laws. The Court in Oregon relied on the congressional power to raise armies and the consequent power "to pay pensions and to build hospitals and homes for veterans" (id. at 648). The same powers that extend to requiring the property of the veteran "wards" of the federal government (id. at 649) to pass to the federal, rather than the state, government also justify protecting that property in the veteran's hands against the claims of creditors, including the state. /8/ Military personnel, however, have been required since 1957 to contribute to the Social Security system (Servicemen's and Veterans' Survivor Benefits Act, ch. 837, Section 402, 70 Stat. 870). See 42 U.S.C. 410(l) and (m). A service member who, like appellant, meets that Act's eligibility requirements is entitled to Social Security disability benefits. /9/ Section 211(a) provides in pertinent part: the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veteran's Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise. /10/ The Veterans Administration Manual M-21-1 (ch. 26, Paragraph 26.01) (Aug. 1, 1979) further regulates the apportionment of disability awards. It provides in pertinent part: Apportionment of a competent veteran's benefits may be made only upon receipt of a claim therefor (emphasis in original) * * * : (1) To an estranged spouse and child or children in the spouse's custody. (2) To a child or children (not living with) the veteran (and to whom the veteran is not reasonably contributing); except that a claim for apportionment on their behalf should be invited when consistent with the equities. /11/ There is no merit to appellee Tennessee's suggestion (Mot. to Dis. or Aff. 7) that the Administrator's apportionment authority is not exclusive because Section 3107 provides that he "may," not that he "shall," order apportionment. Clearly, the statutory term reflects the fact that the Administrator is under no obligation to apportion in all cases that meet the statutory criteria: he is to exercise his discretion. There is no suggestion in the statute that this discretion can be superseded by state court determinations. /12/ The records of the Veterans Administration reflect that the July 1986 disability benefits of 27,263 veterans were apportioned. /13/ The statutory restriction extends only to the apportionment of the VA benefits themselves. It does not affect the state court's power to consider the veteran's total income, including his VA benefits, in determining the amount of child support to be paid from any other income he may have. Thus, in this case, the state court could appropriately have ordered appellant to pay any sum up to $281 a month -- the total amount of his Social Security disability payments -- for child support, in addition to the amounts the children receive directly from the VA and Social Security. See n.18, infra. It would then also be appropriate for the Administrator to consider that state court order in deciding how much, if any, of the appellant's VA disability benefits should be apportioned to his children. /14/ In a number of instances prior to Hisquierdo this Court had held that under the Supremacy Clause federal law overrode state family law. In McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905), federal homestead law, which allowed a widow to establish title to federal land settled by her husband, overrode a state law that would have allowed the daughter to inherit her father's expectation that the title would issue to him. In three cases, survivorship rules in federal savings bond and military life insurance systems prevailed over state community property law. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950). And see United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (federal statute providing for devolution of veteran's property overrides state intestacy law). /15/ That provision does not differ in any significant way from 38 U.S.C. 3101(a). Indeed, Section 3101(a) is, if anything, more sweeping. /16/ Because policies that maximize the fitness of the nation's active duty military personnel have a higher national priority than those that have the same effect on railroad employees, the considerations requiring federal preemption are even stronger in this case than in Hisquierdo. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981). Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. at 649. /17/ Accepting the Court's invitation in McCarty, 453 U.S. at 235-236, Congress considered the "plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service member" and enacted, in the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, Tit. X, 96 Stat. 730 et seq., a new section, 10 U.S.C. 1408, to permit state courts to allocate military retired pay in divorce proceedings. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 97-749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1982). Significantly, however, the statute specifically excludes from its provisions the "retired pay of a member retired for disability" (10 U.S.C. 1408(a)(4)). /18/ In contrast, Social Security disability payments -- "payments * * * under the insurance system established by subchapter II of this chapter" -- are subject to garnishment by virtue of the 42 U.S.C. 662(f)(2) definition. /19/ VA disability payments may, however, be garnished if paid to "a former member of the Armed Forces who is in receipt of retired or retainer pay if such former member has waived a portion of his retired pay in order to receive such compensation" (42 U.S.C. 662(f)(2)). Appellees do not claim that appellant is such a person. /20/ The power of Congress to bar the garnishment of veterans' benefits is based on sovereign immunity. See Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846); Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388 (1918). In passing the Social Security amendments, Congress intended partially to waive sovereign immunity in order to permit garnishment of the pay of federal employees who might otherwise fail to make alimony or child support payments. See S. Rep. 93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1974). See also Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); Young v. Young, 547 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Meadows v. Meadows, 619 P.2d 598 (Okla. 1980). While Congress made the United States subject to certain garnishment proceedings, principles of sovereign immunity require that the the statutory provisions be strictly construed. In any event, as we have shown, veterans' disability benefits are explicitly excluded from the waiver of immunity. Of course, this case, like Hisquierdo and McCarty, involves no direct attempt to garnish federal benefits, nor any other state court order requiring the federal agency to make payment directly to the federal beneficiary's dependents. That circumstance did not deter the Court from analyzing the practical effects of the state court orders in Hisquierdo and McCarty; the same analysis is appropriate here. See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. at 648-649.