“The
Future of U.S.-Syrian Relations”
Testimony
before
House
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Sub-Committee
on Middle East and South Asia
by
Martin
Indyk
Director
Saban
Center for Middle East Policy
at
Brookings
April
24, 2008
Mr.
Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to address the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Middle East and South Asia.
For
the past seven years relations between the United States and Syria have been
fraught – the product of intense disagreement over policy toward Iraq, Lebanon,
and Israel. The dominant view of Syria that has developed in Washington during
this period is that of a country ruled by an unreliable leader, with ruthless
ambitions to dominate its smaller Lebanese neighbor, harboring Palestinian
terrorists and Iraqi insurgents, and maintaining an alliance with Iran - a
strategic adversary of the United States.
In
these circumstances, Syria’s opposition to American interests has provided
ample justification for a policy of containment and isolation. Consequently, Syria remains on the State
Department’s Terrorism List, our ambassador has been recalled, and Congress has
imposed a range of additional, unilateral sanctions on the Assad regime.
The
results of this policy are mixed, at best. On one side, Syria has managed to
prevent the election of a new Lebanese president and has thereby stymied
Lebanese politics, advantaging its local allies (Hezbollah and some Christian
factions). It has facilitated the rearming of Hezbollah to pre-2006 war levels. It continues to provide safe-haven and succor
to Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestinian terrorist groups that
violently oppose the Annapolis peace process. And it suppresses all political
dissent inside Syria.
On the
other side, Syria for the time being is cooperating with the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon. It has attenuated its support for Iraqi insurgents. President
Assad continues to assert his interest in making peace with Israel and sent an
official delegation to the Annapolis peace conference. He is also careful not
to provoke conflict with Israel, or even retaliate for Israel’s strike on what
appears to have been a clandestine Syrian nuclear facility.
In
short, Syria fits the category of a “rogue regime” but is doing just enough to
avoid making itself the target of a regime change policy from the Bush
Administration.
With a
new American president on the horizon, it is worth considering whether a
different approach to Syria would produce a more productive relationship, one
that could help graduate it from “rogue” status. A review is in order for two
reasons:
i) The
Government of Israel is keenly interested in engaging Syria in peace
negotiations but President Assad will only agree to do so if the United States
participates too.
ii) Syria
provides the conduit for Iranian influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian
territories. Restricting that pipeline would constitute a strategic setback to
Iran, which has become America’s main regional adversary.
An
Israeli-Syrian peace holds considerable advantage for U.S. interests in the
Middle East. It would remove the last of
Israel’s neighboring Arab states from the conflict, helping to stabilize the
region and enhancing America’s reputation as peacemaker at a time when Iran is
arguing that violence and terrorism is the answer to the region’s
afflictions. It would also provide
important political cover for other Arab states to normalize their relations
with Israel. And it would create a wedge
between Syria and Iran that has the potential for shifting the balance of
regional power back in our favor after our ill-fated Iraq adventure managed to
tilt it in Iran’s.
As I
understand it, the Bush Administration is unwilling to encourage Israeli-Syrian
peace negotiations out of concern that this would reduce Syria’s isolation and
result in the sacrificing of Lebanon’s independence on the altar of an
Israeli-Syrian peace. But this puts the U.S. in the unprecedented and invidious
position of opposing an opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking even when our
ally Israel is keen to pursue it.
My own
experience in the Clinton Administration, where I advocated a “Syria first”
strategy to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace, has made me supremely
conscious of the likelihood that the Syrian regime seeks a peace “process”
rather than to end to its conflict with Israel. Such a process would
significantly reduce its isolation, which is a major reason for its insistence
on America’s involvement in the negotiations.
Nevertheless, there could be considerable advantages to the United
States in pursuing such a process, even if it does not lead to a peace
agreement in the short term.
First,
the U.S. could use its agreement to participate as a way of protecting and
promoting Lebanon’s independence. Indeed, one of the greatest dangers in the
Bush Administration’s stance is that Israel and Syria may go ahead and
negotiate without Washington’s involvement. This would surely lead to an
undermining of Lebanon’s independence since Israel has only one interest in
Lebanon these days: the disarming of Hezbollah.
If Syria were to promise to do that, Israel would have reason to accept
its re-intervention in Lebanon in order to make Damascus responsible for
curbing Hezbollah.
Conversely,
were the U.S. to agree to sponsor Israeli-Syrian negotiations, it could make
its involvement conditional on Lebanon being off the table and, in the course
of the negotiations, it could guarantee that Lebanon’s interests are not
sacrificed. The U.S. could also join Israel in insisting in the course of the
negotiations that Syria prevent arms flowing into Lebanon from Syrian
territory.
In
addition, the launching of Israel-Syria negotiations would create the necessary
conditions for launching Lebanon’s own negotiations with Israel, in which the disarming
of Hezbollah could be treated as a sovereign decision of the Lebanese
government in the context of resolving the Sheba’a Farms issue.
Second,
an Israeli-Syrian negotiating process could facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations in several indirect ways: Hamas and PIJ would feel under far
greater pressure to go along with the negotiations if they felt their Syrian
patron was about to make a deal with Israel and shut down their Damascus
headquarters; the Palestinian negotiators would have greater political cover in
the Arab world; and the U.S. could take advantage of the competition between
the two tracks to advance progress on both.
Third, and
perhaps most importantly given our broader strategic interests, an
Israeli-Syrian negotiating process under U.S. auspices would spook the
Iranians. I do not believe that it is possible simply to “flip” Syria out of
its alliance with Iran. This is a multi-faceted strategic relationship that
will take time and a considerable effort to break. However, on the subject of
what to do about Israel there is a deep divergence between these two allies,
captured in the fact that at the same time as Iran’s president was threatening
to wipe Israel off the map, Syria’s president was offering to make peace with
it. Thus negotiations with Israel will inevitably generate tensions and
friction between Damascus and Teheran.
This was quite evident in the 1990s when Israel and Syria were engaged
in American-sponsored peace negotiations, captured in a statement by then Iranian
Foreign Minister Velayati: “The more a country gets close to the usurper regime
[i.e. Israel], the more it will distance itself from us.”
Iran’s
position in the Middle East heartland is now so much more robust than it was
back then precisely because it has been able to exploit the Arab-Israeli
conflict to enhance its influence both in Lebanon and in the Palestinian
arena. Iran will therefore be loathe to see any reduction in tensions between Israel and Syria
and will be particularly concerned about any constriction of its pipeline
through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
I
would hasten to emphasize that I am not now advocating a return to the “Syria
First” policy pursued by the Clinton Administration. I believe that it is now much more urgent to
make progress on the Palestinian track.
But there is no inconsistency between making that a priority and
launching negotiations on the Syrian track.
Indeed they can be mutually reinforcing.
One of the lessons of our experience back then is that the U.S. is more
likely to achieve a breakthrough on the Syrian track if we focus our energies
and attention on the Palestinian track.
It is one of the multiple ironies of the Middle East that when the U.S.
pushes hard on one door, another one may open instead.
Moreover,
sponsoring Israeli-Syrian negotiations does not require the U.S. to drop any of
its other concerns, from maintaining the independence of Lebanon, to ensuring
the effectiveness of the Special Tribunal, to pressing Damascus to end its
human rights abuses and its sponsorship of terrorist organizations. Indeed, if the next president goes down this
road toward a more constructive engagement with Syria, the United States would
be able more effectively to pursue each of these issues.
There
is one caveat that the next president would need to be mindful of should he/she
decide to pursue this option of engaging Syria via peace negotiations. Just
about every leader that has attempted to deal with President Bashar al-Assad
has come away frustrated. The list includes Colin Powell, Tony Blair, Nicholas
Sarkozy, Hosni Mubarak and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah. The cause of their
frustration is the disconnect between Assad’s
reasonableness in personal meetings and his regime’s inability or unwillingness
to follow through on understandings reached there. It is unclear whether this
is because of a lack of will or a lack of ability to control the levers of
power. Either way, it raises questions
about the utility of a policy of engagement.
In my
view, however, the Bush Administration has managed through its policy of
isolation to get Assad’s attention.
Given the other advantages of pursuing engagement, it is at least an
idea worth testing by the next president provided he/she enters the bazaar with
clear eyes, a wariness about buying faulty goods at too high a price, and a
willingness to walk away if the merchant does not live up to his side of the
bargain.