U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
SEC Seal
Home | Previous Page
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Division of Corporation Finance:
Manual of Publicly Available
Telephone Interpretations


Fourth Supplement
(Includes Interpretations Issued May 2001, December 2000, and October 2000)

This is the fourth supplement (including interpretations issued May 2001, December 2000, and October 2000) to the Division of Corporation Finance's telephone interpretation manual. Additional supplements are also available on the website. This supplement contains new interpretations issued by members of the staff in response to recent telephone inquiries. These interpretations relate to new Regulation FD and Rule 10b5-1 adopted in the Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading release (33-7881). Regulation FD and Rule 10b5-1 became effective October 23, 2000. Positions expressed may change without notice. Please also see the statement on the first page of the complete manual regarding the non-binding nature of telephone interpretations. The interpretations in this and the other supplements eventually will be integrated with the interpretations in the manual.

 

Interpretations Issued October 2000

Regulation FD

 1. Can an issuer ever confirm selectively a forecast it has previously made to the public without triggering the rule's public reporting requirements?

Yes. In assessing the materiality of an issuer's confirmation of its own forecast, the issuer should consider whether the confirmation conveys any information above and beyond the original forecast and whether that additional information is itself material. That may depend on, among other things, the amount of time that has elapsed between the original forecast and the confirmation (or the amount of time elapsed since the last public confirmation, if applicable). For example, a confirmation of expected quarterly earnings made near the end of a quarter might convey information about how the issuer actually performed. In that respect, the inference a reasonable investor may draw from such a confirmation may differ significantly from the inference he or she may have drawn from the original forecast early in the quarter. The materiality of a confirmation also may depend on, among other things, intervening events. For example, if it is clear that the issuer's forecast is highly dependent on a particular customer and the customer subsequently announces that it is ceasing operations, a confirmation by the issuer of a prior forecast may be material.

We note that a statement by an issuer that it has "not changed," or that it is "still comfortable with," a prior forecast is no different than a confirmation of a prior forecast. Moreover, under certain circumstances, an issuer's reference to a prior forecast may imply that the issuer is confirming the forecast. If, when asked about a prior forecast, the issuer does not want to confirm it, the issuer may simply wish to say "no comment." If an issuer wishes to refer back to the prior estimate without implicitly confirming it, the issuer should make clear that the prior estimate was as of the date it was given and is not being updated as of the time of the subsequent statement.

 2. Does Regulation FD create a duty to update?

No. Regulation FD does not change existing law with respect to any duty to update.

 3. If an issuer wants to make public disclosure of material nonpublic information under Regulation FD by means of a conference call, what information must the issuer provide in the notice and how far in advance should notice be given?

An adequate advance notice under Regulation FD must include the date, time, and call-in information for the conference call.

Issuers also should consider the following non-exclusive factors in determining what constitutes adequate advance notice of a conference call:

  • Timing:  Public notice should be provided a reasonable period of time ahead of the conference call. For example, for a quarterly earnings announcement that the issuer makes on a regular basis, notice of several days would be reasonable. We recognize, however, that the period of notice may be shorter when unexpected events occur and the information is critical or time sensitive.

  • Availability:  If a transcript or re-play of the conference call will be available after it has occurred, for instance via the issuer's website, we encourage issuers to indicate in the notice how, and for how long, such a record will be available to the public.
 4. Can an issuer satisfy Regulation FD's public disclosure requirement by disclosing material nonpublic information at a shareholder meeting that is open to all shareholders, but not to the public?

No. If a shareholder meeting is not accessible by the public, an issuer's selective disclosure of material nonpublic information at the meeting would not satisfy Regulation FD's public disclosure requirement.

 5. Could an Exchange Act filing other than a Form 8-K, such as a Form 10-Q or proxy statement, constitute public disclosure?

Yes. In general, including information in a document publicly filed on EDGAR with the SEC within the time frames that Regulation FD requires would satisfy the rule. In considering whether that disclosure is sufficient, however, companies must take care to bring the disclosure to the attention of readers of the document, must not bury the information, and must not make the disclosure in a piecemeal fashion throughout the filing.

 6. For purposes of Regulation FD, must an issuer wait some period of time after making a filing or furnishing a report on EDGAR that complies with the Exchange Act before making disclosure of the same information to a select audience?

Prior to making disclosure to a select audience, the issuer need only confirm that the filing or furnished report has received a filing date (as determined in accordance with Rules 12 and 13 of Regulation S-T) that is no later than the date of the selective disclosure.

 7. Can an issuer ever review and comment on an analyst's model privately without triggering Regulation FD's disclosure requirements?

Yes. It depends on whether, in so doing, the issuer communicates material nonpublic information. For example, an issuer ordinarily would not be conveying material nonpublic information if it corrected historical facts that were a matter of public record. An issuer also would not be conveying such information if it shared seemingly inconsequential data which, pieced together with public information by a skilled analyst with knowledge of the issuer and the industry, helps form a mosaic that reveals material nonpublic information. It would not violate Regulation FD to reveal this type of data even if, when added to the analyst's own fund of knowledge, it is used to construct his or her ultimate judgments about the issuer. An issuer may not, however, use the discussion of an analyst's model as a vehicle for selectively communicating – either expressly or in code – material nonpublic information.

 8. During a nonpublic meeting with analysts, an issuer's CEO provides material nonpublic information on a subject she had not planned to cover. Although the CEO had not planned to disclose this information when she entered the meeting, after hearing the direction of the discussion, she decided to provide it, knowing that the information was material and nonpublic. Would this be considered an intentional disclosure that violated Regulation FD because no simultaneous public disclosure was made?

Yes. A disclosure is "intentional" under Regulation FD when the person making it either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and nonpublic. In this example, the CEO knew that the information was material and nonpublic, so the disclosure was "intentional" under Regulation FD, even though she did not originally plan to make it.

 9. May an issuer provide material nonpublic information to analysts as long as the analysts expressly agree to maintain confidentiality until the information is public?

Yes.

10. If an issuer gets an agreement to maintain material nonpublic information in confidence, must it also get the additional statement that the recipient agrees not to trade on the information in order to rely on the exclusion in Rule 100(b)(2)(ii) of Regulation FD?

No. An express agreement to maintain the information in confidence is sufficient. If a recipient of material nonpublic information subject to such a confidentiality agreement trades or advises others to trade, he or she could face insider trading liability.

11. If an issuer wishes to rely on the confidentiality agreement exclusion of Regulation FD, is it sufficient to get an acknowledgment that the recipient of the material nonpublic information will not use the information in violation of the federal securities laws?

No. The recipient must expressly agree to keep the information confidential.

12. Must road show materials in connection with a registered public offering be disclosed under Regulation FD?

Any disclosure made "in connection with" a registered public offering of the type excluded from Regulation FD is not subject to Regulation FD. That includes road shows in those offerings. All other road shows are subject to Regulation FD in the absence of another applicable exclusion from Regulation FD. For example, a disclosure in a road show in an unregistered offering is subject to Regulation FD. Also, a disclosure in a road show made while the issuer is not in registration and is not otherwise engaged in a securities offering is subject to Regulation FD. If, however, those who receive road show information expressly agree to keep the material nonpublic information confidential, disclosure to them is not subject to Regulation FD.

13. Can an issuer disclose material nonpublic information to its employees (who may also be shareholders) without making public disclosure of the information?

Yes. Rule 100(b)(1) states that Regulation FD applies to disclosures made to "any person outside the issuer." Regulation FD does not apply to communications of confidential information to employees of the issuer. An issuer's officers, directors, and other employees are subject to duties of trust and confidence and face insider trading liability if they trade or tip.

14. If an issuer has a policy that limits which senior officials are authorized to speak to persons enumerated in Rule 100(b)(1)(i) – (b)(1)(iv), will disclosures by senior officials not authorized to speak under the policy be subject to Regulation FD?

No. Selective disclosures of material nonpublic information by senior officials not authorized to speak to enumerated persons are made in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer and are not covered by Regulation FD. Such disclosures may, however, trigger liability under existing insider trading law.

15. A publicly traded company has decided to conduct a private placement of shares and then subsequently register the resale by those shareholders on a Form S-3 registration statement. The company and its investment bankers conduct mini-road shows over a three-day period during the private placement. Does the resale registration statement filed after completion of the private placement affect whether disclosure at the road shows is covered by Regulation FD?

No. The road shows are made in connection with an offering by the issuer that is not registered (i.e., the private placement), regardless of whether a registration statement is later filed for an offering by those who purchased in the private placement.

 

Additional Interpretations Issued December 2000

16. Does the mere presence of the press at an otherwise non-public meeting attended by persons outside the issuer described in paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 100 under Regulation FD render the meeting public for purposes of Regulation FD?

Regulation FD states that a company can make public disclosure by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K or by disseminating information through another method (or combination of methods) that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public. Some companies may attempt to satisfy the latter method for public dissemination by merely having the press in attendance at a meeting to which the public is not invited or otherwise present. If it is attended by persons outside the issuer described in paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 100 under Regulation FD and if it is not otherwise public, the meeting will not necessarily be deemed public for purposes of Regulation FD by the mere presence of the press at the meeting. Whether or not the meeting would be deemed public would depend, among other things, on when, what and how widely the press reports on the meeting.

17. Is Regulation FD intended to replace the practice of using a press release to disseminate earnings information in advance of a conference call or webcast at which earnings information will be discussed?

No. In adopting Regulation FD, the Commission specifically indicated that it did not intend the regulation to alter or supplant the rules of self-regulatory organizations with respect to the use of press releases to announce material developments. In this regard, the Commission specifically endorsed a model for the planned disclosure of material information, such as earnings, in which the conference call or webcast is preceded by a press release containing the earnings information.

 

Rule 10b5-1

Form 144

 1. On January 1, a person adopts a written plan for selling securities that satisfies the affirmative defense conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c). The first sale of securities under the plan will take place on March 1 in reliance on Rule 144. The person will need to file a Form 144. Does adoption of the Rule 10b5-1 plan change the due date for the Form 144?

No. The Form 144 must be transmitted for filing concurrently with either the placement of a sell order for a brokerage transaction, or the execution of such sale directly with a market maker, as provided in Rule 144(h). The adoption of the plan itself may not be the same as placement of a sell order. The notice on Form 144 is effective for a maximum of three months, so that sales over longer periods will involve multiple requirements of notice under Rule 144(h).

 2. A person who has adopted a written trading plan or given trading instructions to satisfy Rule 10b5-1(c) plans to sell the securities in reliance on Rule 144. Can the person modify the Form 144 to state that the representation regarding the seller's knowledge of material information regarding the issuer is as of the date the Rule 10b5-1 plan was adopted or instructions given, rather than the date the person signs the Form 144?

Yes. The seller should state in the Remarks section of the Form 144 that the sale is being made pursuant to a previously adopted plan or previously given trading instructions intended to comply with Rule 10b5-1(c). The seller should include the date the person adopted the plan or gave the trading instructions and indicate that the representation regarding the seller's knowledge of material information speaks as of that plan adoption or instruction date.

 

Additional Interpretations Issued May 2001

Trusts

 3. At a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person establishes a trust. In establishing the trust, she specifies that the trust shall sell 1,000 shares of issuer stock each quarter. Apart from this specification, she does not have or share any control over the trust's assets. Is a defense available under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) for the quarterly sales by the trust?

Yes. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) contemplates that a person, while not aware of material nonpublic information, may delegate to a third party under a contract, instruction or written trading plan, all subsequent influence over how, when or whether to effect purchases or sales. Reliance on this affirmative defense does not prevent the person from setting some of the terms of the purchases or sales at the creation of the contract, instruction or plan so that no one has subsequent discretion as to those terms.

For example, this defense would be available if, in creating the contract, instruction or plan, the person specifies one or two of the amount, price or date of transactions. Whether or not any terms are set at creation, for a Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) defense to be available, the person is not permitted to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether a transaction occurs. The third party who has been granted discretion must not be aware of material nonpublic information when exercising that discretion.

 4. At a time when he is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person will establish a blind trust to which he will contribute some, but not all, of the issuer securities that he owns. The person intends to delegate investment control over trust assets to the trustee so as to establish a defense under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) for trust transactions. Within the meaning of Rule 144(a)(2), the person and the trust will be a single person.

During any three-month period, sales of issuer securities by the trust will share the Rule 144(e) volume limitation with the person's sales of other issuer securities he owns. Does the manner of allocating the Rule 144(e) volume limitation between sales by the trust and the person's other sales of issuer securities affect whether the person is permitted to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales under the trust within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3)?

Yes. If during the term of the trust the person can control what portion of the Rule 144(e) volume limitation is available for trust sales, the person would be permitted to exercise subsequent influence over trust sales within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3). As a result, the Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) defense would be unavailable.

However, the person would not be permitted to exercise subsequent influence over trust sales if the instrument creating the trust specified either (1) the percentage of the volume limit to be allocated to sales by the trust and other sales by the person, or (2) that the trustee would determine that allocation for each applicable three-month period without consulting the person.

Options

 5. At a time when he is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person buys a put option, giving him the right at any time during the 12-month term of the option to sell 10,000 shares at a fixed exercise price. Two months later, he wishes to exercise the option. If he is aware of material nonpublic information at the time of exercise, can he rely on a Rule 10b5-1(c) defense in exercising the option?

No. The exercise of the option is a separate investment decision from the purchase of the option. See Release 33-7881 at n. 115. For a defense to be available under Rule 10b5-1(c), each of the amount, price and date of the transaction must be specified or determined by formula, or all subsequent discretion over purchases and sales must be delegated to a third party who must not be aware of material nonpublic information when exercising that discretion. The person must make this specification or delegation in good faith before becoming aware of material nonpublic information.

In this example, the person has retained discretion over the timing of the option exercise. Consequently, if he is aware of material nonpublic information at the time of exercise, no defense will be available under Rule 10b5-1(c). The same analysis applies whether the option is a put or a call.

 6. At a time when he is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person purchases a put option. At the same time, the person instructs his broker to exercise the option on its expiration date, June 30, 2001, if the option is in-the-money on that date. Is the exercise of the option covered by a Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1) defense despite the fact that the amount, price and date are not specified by the same method?

Yes. The terms of the option, which is a binding contract within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1), specify the amount of shares to be sold and the price at which they will be sold under the option. The instruction to the broker, which is an instruction to another person within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2), specifies the date of the transaction and imposes a limit on the price, within the meaning of Rule10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(B). Viewed together, the option and the instruction specify the amount of securities, the price and the date of the transaction for purposes of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1). The same analysis applies whether the option is a put or a call.

 7. At a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person writes a call option, giving the option purchaser the right at any time during the life of the option to buy 10,000 shares from her at a fixed exercise price. Two months later, the option writer receives an exercise notice, requiring her to sell the shares to the counterparty at the exercise price. Is the sale pursuant to the option exercise covered by an affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1(c)?

Yes. As long as the terms of the option contract do not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when or whether she sells the shares covered by the option, and she does not in fact influence the timing of the option exercise, a defense would be available under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3).

Loans and Pledges

 8. At a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person obtains a bank loan to invest in real estate, and pledges securities as collateral. She fails to pay the loan as due. The bank proceeds against the stock that was posted as collateral and sells it in the open market. Is the Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) defense available to the person when the bank sells the stock?

No. The sale was not pursuant to a contract, instruction or plan that did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent discretion over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales. First, the person could have exercised discretion not to pay the loan, resulting in default and the transfer of the securities. Also, she may have had the discretion to substitute collateral or provide additional collateral or cash to prevent foreclosure and sale of the stock.

 9. At a time when he is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person obtains a $1 million loan from a brokerage firm and places $2 million of stock in a margin account with the broker. The stock's price falls and the broker issues a margin call. The person does not deposit additional securities in the margin account (although he could have), so the broker sells sufficient margined securities to satisfy the margin call. Is the Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) defense available to the person for the broker's sales?

No. Where the person retains any discretion to substitute or provide additional collateral, or to repay the loan before the pledged securities may be sold, Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) does not provide a defense. This is because the terms of the margin account contract would permit him to exercise subsequent influence over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales.

If the margin account contract did not permit the insider to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or sales, and the broker did not in fact give the person the opportunity to substitute or provide additional collateral or cash, a defense would be available under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) if the broker is not aware of material nonpublic information in selling the margined securities.

Written Trading Plans

 10 At a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person establishes a written trading plan to sell 5,000 shares each month, on a date to be selected by her broker during the second or third week of each month, at or above $20 per share. The person does not communicate any information to the broker that could influence when sales would occur. Does Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) provide a defense for sales under this plan?

Yes, assuming two additional facts are present: (1) the terms of the plan do not permit her to exercise any subsequent influence over the timing of sales under the plan; and (2) the broker is not aware of material nonpublic information when selling securities under the plan.

 11. At a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, a person establishes a written trading plan to sell 10,000 shares each month, at or above $20 per share. To implement the sales, the plan provides that on the last day of each month the person will place a limit order with a broker, valid until the last day of the next month, to sell 10,000 shares at or above $20 per share. The person may be aware of material nonpublic information when she places the limit order.

(a) Do Rules 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3) and (B)(1) provide a defense for sales under this plan if the limit order is non-discretionary (requiring the broker to execute a sale as soon as a buyer is available at or above $20 per share)?

Rules 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3) and (B)(1) could provide a defense if the limit order is non-discretionary. The written trading plan would need to specify the amount, price and dates of the sales. As defined in Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(C), in the case of a limit order, "date" means a day of the year on which the limit order is in force. For Rules 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3) and (B)(1) to provide a defense, the terms of the plan must specify the dates on which the monthly non-discretionary limit orders will be in force.

(b) How does the analysis change if the written trading plan doesn't specify when the non-discretionary limit order will be in force?

If the written trading plan by its terms doesn't specify these dates, the analysis would focus on each transaction, and depend on whether the person is aware of material nonpublic information at each time she places a non-discretionary limit order. A defense would be available under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2) and (B)(1) if: (1) she acts in good faith and is not aware of material nonpublic information at the time she instructs the broker; and (2) in placing a non-discretionary limit order, she specifies the dates on which that limit order will be in force.

(c) Do Rules 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3) and (B)(1) provide a defense for sales under the plan when the limit order is discretionary (where the broker is granted discretion such that the broker is not required to execute a sale as soon as a buyer is available at or above $20 per share)?

If a limit order is discretionary, the discretion granted to the broker over the timing of a sale would require the conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3) to be satisfied for a defense to be available. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1) would not be available.

 12. Assume that the written trading plan described in Q&A 11(a) also includes a provision requiring the number of securities to be sold during each month to be reduced, if necessary, to comply with applicable volume limitation under Rule 144(e). What effect does this have on the availability of a Rule 10b5-1(c) defense?

The analysis depends on the manner in which the adjustment is effected:

(a) First, the written plan could provide for adjustment of the amount of securities to be sold each month based on a written formula specified in the plan within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2). Where a written formula specifies one or more of the price, amount and dates of transactions that are all specified in a contract, instruction or written plan, the Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2) defense would apply.

(b) Alternatively, the written plan could provide for adjustment of the amount of securities to be sold each month based on a delegation of discretion to the broker. In this case, where one or more of the price, amount and dates of transactions under a contract, instruction or written plan are to be determined based on a delegation of discretion to another person, the availability of a defense depends upon satisfaction of the conditions of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3).

 13. During a month when the written trading plan described in Q&A 11(a) is in effect, the person calls the broker to place an order to sell an additional 15,000 shares at the market. How is this transaction analyzed for purposes of Rule 10b5-1(c)?

(a) The written trading plan defense is not available for the market order to sell the 15,000 additional shares. Instead, the analysis would focus on whether the person was aware of material nonpublic information at the time she places the market order.

(b) The market order transaction would not affect the availability of the written trading plan defense for the limit order sales under the written trading plan. The market order does not effect an alteration or deviation of a plan transaction within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) because the 10,000 share limit order under the plan will continue to be executed when the price limit is met. The market order is not a corresponding or hedging transaction within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) because it does not reduce or eliminate the economic consequences of the limit order sales under the written trading plan.

 14. During a month when the written trading plan described in Q&A 11(a) is in effect, the person calls the broker to increase the non-discretionary limit order currently in force from 10,000 shares to 15,000 shares. How is this analyzed for purposes of Rule 10b5-1(c)?

Changing the amount to be sold under a written limit order trading plan currently in force effects an alteration or deviation within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C). Consequently, sales pursuant to the altered limit order would not be pursuant to the existing plan.

Release 33-7881 at n. 111 provides that "a person acting in good faith may modify a prior contract, instruction, or plan before becoming aware of material nonpublic information. In that case, a purchase or sale that complies with the modified contract, instruction, or plan will be considered pursuant to a new contract, instruction, or plan."

 15. After the written trading plan described in Q&A 11(a) has been in effect for several months, the person terminates the selling plan by calling the broker and canceling the limit order.

(a) Does the act of terminating a plan while aware of material nonpublic information result in liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5?

No. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Thus, a purchase or sale of a security must be present for liability to attach. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).

(b) Does termination of a plan affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions? Does canceling one or more plan transactions affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions?

Termination of a plan, or the cancellation of one or more plan transactions, could affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions if it calls into question whether the plan was "entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade" the insider trading rules within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii). The absence of good faith or presence of a scheme to evade would eliminate the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior transactions under the plan.

(c) Does canceling one or more plan transactions affect the availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for future plan transactions?

The cancellation of one or more plan transactions would be an alteration or deviation from the plan, which would terminate that plan. The Rule 10b5-1(c) defense would be available for transactions following the alteration only if the transactions were pursuant to a new contract, instruction or plan that satisfies the requirements of Rule 10b5-1(c). See Release 33-7881 at n. 111 and Answer 14, above.

401(k) Plan Transactions

 16. A person purchases employer stock through her participation in the employer's 401(k) plan. These purchases are made pursuant to bi-weekly payroll deductions. The 401(k) plan also allows employees to transfer the assets in their accounts among funds within the plan (including the employer stock fund) through fund-switching transactions.

(a) Is a Rule 10b5-1(c) defense available for payroll deduction purchases under the 401(k) plan?

If an employee acts in good faith and is not aware of material nonpublic information at the time she provides written or oral instructions as to payroll deduction purchases, a defense would be available for those purchases under Rule 10b5-1(c). See Release 33-7881, text at nn. 117-121.

(b) Is a Rule 10b5-1(c) defense available for fund-switching transactions under the 401(k) plan that result in purchases or sales of employer stock?

If an employee acts in good faith and is not aware of material nonpublic information at the time she provides written or oral instructions as to a fund-switching transaction under the 401(k) plan, a defense would be available for that transaction under Rule 10b5-1(c). See Release 33-7881, text at nn. 117-121.

(c) Could fund-switching transactions under the 401(k) plan be considered "corresponding or hedging transactions" within the meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) with respect to payroll deduction purchases under the 401(k) plan?

Possibly, depending upon the facts and circumstances. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) requires, as a condition to the exemption, that the purchase or sale be pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan. The rule provides that a purchase or sale is not "pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan" if, among other things, the person entered into or altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those securities.

As a general matter, a fund-switching transaction that effects a sale could be a corresponding or hedging transaction under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C) with respect to a payroll deduction purchase under the 401(k) plan. If, however, the person is acting in good faith and provides instructions for the fund-switching transaction at a time when she is not aware of material nonpublic information, the fund-switching transaction would not disturb the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for a payroll deduction purchase under the 401(k) plan.

Contracts

 17. Under applicable state law, an oral agreement would be considered a binding contract. Does the contract nevertheless need to be written to establish a defense under Rule 10b5-1(c)?

No. The rule specifies when a writing is necessary to establish a defense. The rule does not require a binding contract (Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1)) or an instruction to another person (Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2)) to be written. In contrast, the rule requires a plan for trading securities (Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3)) and a formula, algorithm or computer program for determining amounts, prices and dates of transactions (Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2)) to be written.

Institutional Defense

 18. Is the institutional defense provided by Rule 10b5-1(c)(2) available to the issuer of the securities for a repurchase plan?

Yes, assuming the conditions of that rule are satisfied.

http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm


Modified: 06/08/2001