[Federal Register: October 16, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 201)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 61511-61557]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr16oc08-19]
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Part IV
Department of Transportation
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Federal Railroad Administration
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49 CFR Part 232
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems; Final Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 232
[Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, Notice No. 4]
RIN 2130-AB84
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic Brake Systems
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions to the regulations governing freight
power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart addressing
electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake systems. The revisions
are designed to provide for and encourage the safe implementation and
use of ECP brake system technologies. These revisions contains specific
requirements relating to design, interoperability, training,
inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and periodic
maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The final rule also
identifies provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where
FRA is proposing to provide flexibility to facilitate the voluntary
adoption of this advanced brake system technology.
DATES: This final rule is effective December 15, 2008. Petitions for
reconsideration must be received on or before December 15, 2008.
Petitions received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expenses or delays. The
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule
is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of December 15,
2008.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration: Any petitions for
reconsideration related to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175, may be submitted
by any of the following methods:
Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for
submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., W12-140, Washington, DC
20590.
Hand Delivery: Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the
West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all petitions received will be posted without
change to http://www.regulations.gov including any personal
information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary
Information section of this document for Privacy Act information
related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or to Room W12-140
on the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, Motive Power and Equipment Division, RRS-14,
Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue,
SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6259); or Jason
Schlosberg, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6032).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Since the inception of automatic air brakes by George Westinghouse
in the 1870s, brake signal propagation has been limited by the nature
of air and the speed of sound. Other adjustments have sought to
alleviate this deficiency, but have left the basic system unaltered. As
early as 1990, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) began
investigating more advanced braking concepts for freight railroads,
including ECP brake systems, which promise to radically improve brake
propagation by using electrical transmissions of the braking signal
through the train while still using air pressure in the brake cylinder
to apply the force of the brake shoe against the wheel. During the past
15 years, ECP brake technology has progressed rapidly and has been
field tested and used on trains operating in revenue service by various
railroads.
FRA has been an active and consistent advocate of ECP brake system
implementation. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR initiative to
develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded, through
Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a Failure Modes, Effects, and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of ECP brake systems based on the AAR
standards. FRA also took part in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems.
To further assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S.
rail freight industry, FRA contracted Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) in 2005
to conduct a study. BAH engaged an expert panel consisting of principle
stakeholders in ECP brake technology conversion to participate in the
study. The expert panel made various conclusions relating to
technological standards, safety, and efficiency. In addition, the final
BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and comparison of ECP and
conventional air brake systems. On August 17, 2006, FRA announced in a
press release its intention to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to
revise the federal brake safety standards to encourage railroads to
invest in and deploy ECP brake technology. In the press release, FRA
encouraged railroads to submit ECP brake implementation plans before
the proposed rule changes were completed.
In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
two railroads--the BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and the Norfolk Southern
Corporation (NS)--jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in
parts 229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP
brake pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. FRA held a public
fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions and granted a conditional waiver on
March 21, 2007. See id.
On September 4, 2007, FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) containing proposed revisions to the power brake regulation. See
72 FR 50820. In the NPRM, FRA proposed revisions to the regulations
governing freight power brakes and equipment by adding a new subpart
addressing ECP brake systems. The proposed revisions were designed to
provide for and encourage the safe implementation and use of ECP brake
system technologies. The proposed revisions contained specific
requirements relating to design, interoperability, training,
inspection, testing, handling defective equipment, and periodic
maintenance related to ECP brake systems. The proposed rule also
identified provisions of the existing regulations and statutes where
FRA believed flexibility to facilitate the introduction of this
advanced brake system technology was necessary.
Following publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register, FRA held
a public
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hearing in Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and a public hearing in
conjunction with a public technical roundtable in the Chicago, IL area
on October 19, 2007. The purpose of the hearings was to receive oral
comments regarding the specific provisions contained in the proposed
rule and to receive evidence and to develop findings to determine
whether FRA should invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C.
20306 to provide a limited exemption from Sec. 20303 for freight
trains and freight cars operating with ECP brake systems. Section 20303
requires operators to transport rail vehicles with defective or
insecure equipment ``from the place at which the defect or insecurity
was first discovered to the nearest available place at which the
repairs can be made'' to avoid incurring civil penalties related to
such movement.
The hearings were attended by numerous railroads, organizations
representing railroads, labor organizations, and brake manufacturers.
Although the comment period officially closed November 5, 2007, FRA
continued to receive comments on the NPRM into January 2008. FRA
received substantial oral and written testimony at the hearings and
written comments to the NPRM from the following organizations,
railroads, and brake manufacturers, listed in alphabetical order:
American Association for Justice (AAJ).
Association of American Railroads (AAR).
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET).
Brotherhood Railway Carmen Division, Transportation-
Communications International Union (BRC).
General Electric Transportation and General Rail Services
(collectively, GE).
New York Airbrake (NYAB).
Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS).
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (TWU).
Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP).
United Transportation Union (UTU).
Wabtec Railway Electronics (Wabtec).
UTU supports and incorporates by reference the comments submitted
by BLET, TCU, TWU, and its other labor representatives.
FRA carefully considered all the information, data and proposals
submitted in relation to Docket No. FRA-2006-26175 when developing this
final rule. In addition to the preceding information, FRA's knowledge
and experience with enforcing the existing power brake regulations were
also relied upon when developing this final rule. FRA will address and
summarize all comments in the section-by-section analysis below and
elsewhere as appropriate or necessary.
Based on the oral and written comments submitted at the hearing and
in the docket to this proceeding, FRA makes the following findings: (1)
Safety is not compromised by allowing a train operating with ECP brakes
and having a minimal number of ineffective or inoperative defective
brakes to travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, without
any additional intermediate brake inspections; (2) the safety hazards
caused by placing cars equipped with ECP brakes into a train with an
incompatible brake system are no different than the hazards caused by
placing a car equipped with conventional brakes with ineffective or
inoperative brakes into a train operated with conventional brakes; (3)
safety is not compromised by allowing a train operated with ECP brakes
with at least 85 percent effective and operative brakes to haul a car
with defective non-brake safety appliances to the nearest or nearest
forward repair location; and (4) requiring strict compliance with the
movement for repair provision contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 would
constitute a significant disincentive to the implementation and use of
ECP brake technologies. Based on these findings, FRA has elected to
utilize its discretionary authority provided under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to
provide a limited exemption for freight trains and freight cars
operating with ECP brake systems from the requirements contained in 49
U.S.C. 20303.
Subsequent to the close of the comment period in this proceeding,
AAR modified two of its existing ECP brake standards, S-4200 and S-
4210, and continued to develop standards regarding hardware and
software configuration management issues for ECP brake systems. AAR
sought comments from its members concerning a proposed standard S-4270
addressing the configuration management issues. As FRA is interested in
incorporating by reference the most current standards into the final
rule, FRA reopened the comment period on April 18, 2008, for an
additional fifteen (15) days for the limited purpose of receiving
comments on revised standards S-4200 and S-4210 and newly developed
draft S-4270. FRA continues to believe that reopening the comment
period was the most efficient method of ensuring that the most current
industry standards were included in this final rule.
The NPRM and this subsequent notice indicated that FRA intended to
include S-4270 in the final rule if it was finalized by AAR with
sufficient time for inclusion and if its final version remained
substantially similar to the draft standard reference in the notice
reopening the comment periods. Ultimately, AAR adopted S-4270 without
any changes.
II. Conventional Brake Operations
While the basic operational concept of the automatic air brake
system, originally conceived by George Westinghouse in the 1870s,
remains the same, it has seen continuous improvement in practice. An
air compressor in the locomotive charges a main reservoir to about 140
pounds per square inch (psi). With controls located in the locomotive,
the locomotive engineer uses the main reservoir to charge the brake
pipe--a 1\1/4\ inch diameter pipe--that runs the length of the train
and is connected between cars with hoses. The brake pipe's compressed
air--used as the communication medium to signal brake operations and
the power source for braking action--then charges each car's two-
compartment reservoir to a pressure of 90 psi. Braking occurs through a
reduction of air pressure in the brake pipe, which signals the valves
on each car to direct compressed air from the reservoir on each car to
its respective brake cylinder for an application of brakes. When air
pressure is supplied to the brake cylinder--which is connected to a
series of rods and levers that apply and release the brakes--the
resulting force presses the brake shoes against the wheel, retarding
the car's speed.
While brake applications were initially directed by George
Westinghouse's triple valve, modern applications use a control valve,
which directs air from the brake pipe into the air reservoir when air
pressure is rising in the brake pipe in order to charge the auxiliary
and emergency reservoir and be ready for a brake application. To
perform a brake application, the locomotive automatic brake valve
reduces air pressure in the brake pipe by exhausting air, causing the
car's control valve to direct air from the auxiliary reservoir into the
brake cylinder. The increase in air pressure to the brake cylinder is
approximately 2\1/2\ times the drop in brake pipe pressure. A 26 psi
reduction in brake pipe pressure is equal to a full service brake
application on a fully charged brake pipe, and should result in a brake
cylinder pressure adequate to achieve a full service braking effort
(brake force). While the control valve is directing air
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into the brake cylinder, or holding air in the brake cylinder, it is
unable to recharge the auxiliary reservoir on each car. The engineer
can apply the brakes in increments, of a few psi at a time, go directly
to a full service application, or initiate an emergency application of
the brakes.
Unlike a brake application, the incremental release of brakes on a
typical freight train operating in direct release cannot be
accomplished. Brakes can only be fully released, called a direct
release, and only with the brakes released can the auxiliary reservoirs
then begin to recharge. Brake applications are possible, but are more
complicated, from undercharged brake pipe and air reservoirs.
Recharging takes more time for a longer train, because the air has to
be sent down the length of the train's brake pipe--which can be up to a
mile and a half. In addition, on extremely long trains, it is often
difficult to fully charge the brake pipe due to small air leaks
throughout the brake pipe and cold weather.
Brake pipe pressure can be measured by an end-of-train (EOT)
device, which is pneumatically connected to the rear of a train
equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes and sends signals (EOT
Beacon) via radio indicating the brake pipe pressure to the lead
locomotive. Current Federal regulations specify the design and
performance standards for both one-way and two-way EOT devices. See
Part 232, subpart E. Both EOT device designs comprise of a rear unit
pneumatically connected to the rear of the train's last car that
transmits an EOT Beacon to a an EOT Head End Unit--a device located in
the cab of the lead locomotive displaying the brake pipe pressure of
the rear car to the locomotive engineer. The two-way EOT device also
has the capability to transmit an electronic signal from the locomotive
to the rear end unit to initiate an emergency brake application by
venting brake pipe pressure to atmosphere at the rear end unit.
An emergency brake application can be initiated in several ways.
The locomotive engineer can initiate the application by moving the
brake handle to the emergency position, which depletes brake pipe
pressure to zero at a faster rate than the service application by
exhausting brake pipe air pressure at the locomotive. Emergency brake
applications can also be initiated by opening the conductor's valve,
located in the cab of the locomotive, or by a break-in-two, where the
train separates between cars and the brake pipe hoses separate, thereby
venting brake pipe pressure to zero. While performing an emergency
brake application from the locomotive, a locomotive engineer can also
use the two-way EOT device to initiate an emergency brake application
at the rear of the train. This permits the emergency application to be
simultaneously initiated from both the front and rear of the trains and
ensures that the brakes on the cars at the rear of the train apply in
the event a brake pipe blockage occurs.
III. ECP Brake Operations
As early as 1990, AAR began investigating a more advanced braking
concept for freight railroads, the ECP brake system. The ECP brake
system radically improves the operation of the automatic air brake by
using electrical transmissions to signal the application and release of
brakes on each car in a train while still using compressed air to
supply the air reservoirs on each car, which will be used to pressurize
the brake cylinders to apply the force of the brake shoes against the
wheels. ECP brakes also greatly simplify the brake system by
eliminating multiple pneumatic valves used by conventional brakes and
replacing them with printed circuit boards, each with a microprocessor,
one electrically activated application valve, and one electrically
activated release valve, with feedback on brake cylinder pressure for
uniform control.
ECP brake technology requires equipping locomotives and cars with
special valves and electronic equipment that are unique to the
operation of ECP brakes. While this system still requires a brake pipe
to supply compressed air from the locomotive to each car's reservoir in
a train, there are currently two known methods to send the electronic
signal for ECP brake operations from the locomotive to each car in the
train. These methods include using a hard wire electrical cable running
the length of the train or a radio-based technology requiring a
transmitter and a receiver installed on the cars and locomotives. At
this time, it appears that the railroad industry has chosen to use a
cable-based system for ECP brake operation.
ECP brake systems still employ the automatic air brake system's
basic concept where the locomotive supplies compressed air to each
car's reservoir via the conventional brake pipe. Each car's brake valve
reacts to a signal to apply the brakes by directing compressed air from
the car's reservoir to the brake cylinder or to release the brakes by
releasing air from the brake cylinder. The similarities between the
conventional pneumatic and ECP brake systems end here. Instead of
utilizing reductions and increases of the brake pipe pressure to convey
application and release signals to each car in the train, ECP brake
technology uses electronic signals, resulting in an almost
instantaneous application and release of brakes on each car in the
entire train. Since the brake pipe pressure no longer serves as the
communication medium in ECP braked trains, the brake pipe is constantly
being supplied or charged with compressed air from the locomotive
regardless of whether the brakes are applied or released. In addition,
ECP brake-equipped trains offer graduated release, where a partial
brake release command provides a partial, proportional brake release.
The basic ECP brake system is controlled from the Head End Unit
(HEU) and each car is equipped with a Car Control Device (CCD), an
electronic control device that replaces the function of the
conventional pneumatic control valve. The CCD acknowledges and
interprets the electronic signals from the HEU and controls the car's
service and emergency braking functions. The CCD controls charging the
car's air reservoir and also has diagnostic capabilities to send a
warning signal to the locomotive in the event any component fails to
appropriately respond to a braking command. Each CCD has a unique
electronic address located in the Car ID Module, which is keyed to a
car's reporting mark and number.
Each car connects to the locomotive via special connectors and
junction boxes. More specifically, an ECP brake-equipped train's train
line cable--a two-conductor electric cable (8 A-WG and a
shield)--connects the locomotive and cars and carries train line power
to operate all CCDs and the ECP brake system's end-of-train (ECP-EOT)
device and communicates network signals via the power voltage. A Power
Supply Controller (PSC)--mounted within the locomotive and providing
230 VDC of electricity--interfaces with the train line cable's
communication network, provides power to all connected CCDs and ECP-EOT
devices, and controls the train line power supply as commanded by the
HEU. Under the AAR standards, a single power supply shall be capable of
supplying power to an ECP brake-equipped train consisting of at least
160 CCDs and an ECP-EOT device.
Under the existing regulations, the conventional pneumatic brake
system's EOT device can lose communication for 16 minutes and 30
seconds before the locomotive engineer is alerted. See 49 CFR
232.407(g). After the message is displayed, the engineer must restrict
the speed of the train to 30 mph or stop the train if a defined heavy
grade is involved. Per the regulations, railroads
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must calibrate each conventional two-way EOT device every 365 days and
incur additional maintenance and cost expenses while replacing its
batteries.
By contrast, an ECP-EOT device uniquely monitors both brake pipe
pressure and operating voltages and sends an EOT Beacon every second
from its rear unit to its HEU on the controlling locomotive. The HEU
will initiate a full service brake application should brake pipe
pressure fall below 50 psi or initiate an emergency brake application
should a communication loss occur for five consecutive seconds or if
there is a break in the train line electrical cable. An ECP-EOT device
does not require calibration and its battery, only a back-up for the
computer, is charged by the train line cable and is much lighter in
weight than the conventional EOT device battery. Physically the last
network node in the train, the ECP-EOT device also contains an
electronic train line cable circuit--a 50 ohm resistor in series with
0.47 micro-farad capacitor--and must be connected to the network and
transmit status messages to the HEU before the train line cable can be
initially powered.
ECP brake systems have the great advantage of real-time monitoring
of the brake system's health. In normal operation, the HEU transmits a
message/status down the train line cable to each car. If an individual
car's brakes do not respond properly to the HEU's brake command, or if
air pressures are not within the specified limits for operation, a
message indicating the problem and the applicable car number is sent
back to the HEU, which in turn notifies the locomotive engineer of the
problem. The ECP brake system can identify various faults, including,
but not limited to: low brake pipe pressure; low reservoir pressure;
low train line cable voltage; low battery charge; incorrect brake
cylinder pressure; and offline or inoperative CCDs.
Emergency or full service brake applications automatically occur
when the ECP brake system's software detects certain faults. For
instance, if the HEU detects that the percentage of operative brakes
falls below 85 percent, a full service brake application will
automatically occur. In addition, the brakes will automatically apply
when the following occurs: (1) Two CCD's or the ECP-EOT report a
``Critical Loss'' within 5 seconds; (2) the train line cable indicates
low voltage with less than 90 percent operative brakes; (3) the ECP-EOT
reports a low battery charge; (4) the train moves during set-up; (5)
the train line cable becomes disconnected; or (6) the train exceeds 20
mph in Switch Mode. Under the AAR standards, the ECP brake system shall
also have a pneumatic back-up system on each car for an emergency brake
application in the event of a vented brake pipe or a train separation.
These features preserve and exceed the fail safe features of
conventional pneumatic brake systems.
IV. Interoperability
Due to control methodology differences, ECP brake systems are not
functionally compatible with conventional pneumatic air brake systems.
For instance, while conventional pneumatic air brake systems command a
brake application by reducing the air pressure in the brake pipe, ECP
brake systems command a brake application through a digital
communications link transmitted on the electrical train line cable.
Manufacturers have developed application strategies to address
issues relating to car and locomotive fleet interchangeability. In
particular, they have proposed three major schemes of ECP brake design:
stand-alone systems using only ECP brakes; overlay (dual mode) systems
capable of operating in either conventional or ECP brake mode; and
emulation systems, also capable of operating in either conventional or
ECP brake mode.
Since cars with stand-alone ECP brake systems do not include a
fully pneumatic brake control valve, they are incompatible with
conventionally braked cars and must be operated in train sets depending
solely upon ECP brakes. Cars using stand-alone ECP brake systems cannot
intermix in the same train with cars using conventional pneumatic
brakes unless (1) the train uses ECP brakes and those cars using
conventional pneumatic brakes are transported as cars with inoperative
brakes or (2) the train uses conventional pneumatic brakes and the cars
using ECP brakes are transported as cars with inoperative brakes. While
the stand-alone ECP brake system is the least expensive alternative of
the three design types, its incompatibility with conventional pneumatic
brake systems requires train segregation, potentially posing
significant operational problems until the entire car fleet is
converted to ECP brakes.
Overlay configurations--cars equipped with both ECP CCDs and
conventional pneumatic control valve portions--allow cars to operate
with either ECP or conventional pneumatic brakes. To operate in ECP
brake mode, compatible ECP equipment must be installed on the
locomotive as well as on the freight car. While an overlay system's
dual mode capability provides significant flexibility, railroad
operators must purchase, install, and maintain equipment to support
both types of brake systems for as long as dual mode capability is
required.
Emulation configurations use a CCD capable of operating in either
ECP or conventional mode without requiring conventional pneumatic
controls. One manufacturer has provided an emulation ECP brake valve
that monitors both the digital communications cable and the brake pipe
for a brake command. If an electrical signal is present, the ECP brake
valve operates in ECP brake mode. If the electrical brake command
signal is not present, then the valve will monitor the changes in the
brake pipe pressure like a conventional pneumatic control valve and the
CCD will use a software program to emulate the function and response of
a conventional pneumatic valve. An emulation ECP brake system can be
operated in any train with any mix of emulation ECP and conventional
brake systems. In a mixed train, the emulation ECP brake system will
monitor the brake pipe for pressure changes and set up brake cylinder
pressure like a conventional pneumatic valve.
In the NPRM, FRA did not propose any rules uniquely regulating
trains or cars equipped with emulation ECP brake systems, but sought
comments on whether or how it should regulate such systems differently
than what was proposed. According to NYAB and Wabtec (collectively, the
brake manufacturers), the current AAR standards do not require a
pneumatic emulation mode, and this function should not be subject to
FRA regulation. In the event future releases of the S-4200
specifications add pneumatic emulation as a requirement, the brake
manufacturers suggest that the need for FRA regulation can be addressed
at that time. FRA concurs and the final rule does not include
regulations uniquely affecting emulation ECP brake systems.
Manufacturers have also addressed ECP brake compatibility with
locomotives equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes, which must be
equipped with an HEU unit to operate the brakes on cars equipped with
ECP brakes. For instance, one manufacturer has developed a portable
unit that will allow a locomotive lacking an ECP brake HEU to operate a
train equipped with ECP brakes by converting the air pressure changes
in the brake pipe to digital command signals that are transmitted to
the freight cars through the electrical train line cable. The
locomotive engineer operates the brakes with the conventional automatic
brake valve in the control cab. The brakes,
[[Page 61516]]
however, will respond instantaneously and provide all of the benefits
of an ECP brake system. While FRA recognizes that the technology for
such a portable unit is in development and may provide a possible
solution to the technological transition, it is not addressed or
authorized by this final rule and the incorporated AAR standards.
V. Advantages of ECP Brakes Over Conventional Pneumatic Brakes
ECP brake technology overcomes many of the physical limitations
inherent in conventional pneumatic brake technology. Field testing of
AAR compliant ECP brake systems over the past decade has not revealed
any indication of a catastrophic event that could be caused by an ECP
brake system malfunctioning. With a high level of confidence, the ECP
brake stake holders support the implementation of ECP brake systems on
the Nation's railroads. FRA concludes that the advantages of ECP brake
technology will significantly improve the safety and the performance of
train operations. Examples of such benefits include better train
handling through simultaneous brake applications, continuous brake pipe
charging, and graduated brake operation. Derailments are expected to
decline significantly. ECP brake benefits also include electronic train
management, improved performance, and real time diagnostics of the
train's brake system.
A. Simultaneous Brake Application
The conventional pneumatic brake system uses compressed air as the
source for braking power and as the medium for communicating brake
application and release commands and communicates the brake commands by
changing brake pipe pressure through the use of the locomotive's
automatic brake valve. These commands begin at the front of the train
and propagate to the rear of the train at the speed of the air pressure
moving from car to car. This slow propagation of the brake command
contributes to uneven braking, excessive in-train and run-in forces,
train handling challenges, longer stopping distances, safety risks of
prematurely depleting air brake reservoirs, and a corresponding low
brake rate until all cars in the train receive and fully respond to the
brake command. FRA recognizes that the slow application and release of
brakes in a train, causes excessive in-train forces, which have the
potential to cause derailments when they occur in curves, cross-overs,
or when heavier cars are placed at the rear of the train or after empty
cars. When the brakes on the rear of the train release much more slowly
than the brakes on the front of the train, the potential for a
``string-line'' derailment--where the train stretches out until one or
more wheels are lifted off the inside rail of a curve--increases.
The ECP brake system reduces these problems by enabling cars to
brake simultaneously at the command of an electronic signal. The
electronic signal's speed ensures an instantaneous, simultaneous, and
even activation of each car's brake valves, significantly reducing
braking distances--40 to 60 percent for the longest trains--and
minimizing the consequences of collisions or derailments by reducing
the collision speed and slowing the non-derailed portion of the train.
B. Continuous Brake Pipe Charging
Propagating a brake command signal through the reduction or
increase of air pressure in the brake pipe represents a significant
limitation of conventional pneumatic brakes. The same brake pipe air
used to propagate brake commands also charges reservoirs on each
freight car. As a result, the brake pipe must be fully charged to
restore full braking capacity to depleted reservoirs. Partially
depleted air from the brake pipe, which occurs during the initial stage
of braking, prohibits repeat applications of brakes until the brake
pipe can be recharged. A brake pipe can only be recharged once the
brakes have been fully released. This characteristic of conventional
pneumatic brakes contributes to the risk of run-away trains caused by
prematurely depleted brake pipe pressure, particularly on steep grades.
The ECP brake system reduces this risk by continuously charging the
brake pipe. Since ECP brakes do not use the brake pipe as a brake
command medium, the brake pipe is constantly being charged, allowing
the locomotive engineer to operate the brake system more aggressively.
With ECP brake systems, it is unnecessary to apply hand brakes on steep
grades to recharge the brake pipe after the train stops on the grade.
C. Graduated Brake Application and Release
The conventional pneumatic brake system's inability to operate
freight trains in graduated release has long hampered train operations
and has increased fuel consumption. The conventional pneumatic brake
system can only operate in direct release, preventing locomotive
engineers from reducing the braking effort without completely releasing
and resetting the brakes. In other words, after a direct release brake
application with a conventional pneumatic brake system, braking effort
can be increased but not decreased without fully releasing the brakes.
In many cases, direct release leads to unnecessary train stops or
insufficient initial brake applications. ECP brake systems overcome
this deficiency by operating in graduated release, which enables the
operator to reduce braking effort to a lower level after making a brake
application without fully releasing the brakes. As a result, the
operator can accurately adjust the braking level as each situation
requires, eliminating the stops required to recharge and reset the
brakes after excessive brake applications and prior to negotiating
hills and valleys.
D. Train Management
The use of a train line cable allows real-time self-diagnostic
functions to be incorporated in the brake system. The initial check of
brake system conditions on each car and continuous monitoring of each
car's braking functions provides immediate communication to the
locomotive engineer of certain brake failures. The continuous
monitoring of each car's braking functions and real-time diagnostics of
the train's brake system is a significant advantage to the locomotive
engineer for the operation of the train. These technical benefits also
justify elimination of some of the currently required physical
inspections of the train's brake system and support regulatory change
to operate cars with non-functioning brakes out of the initial
terminal. When the ECP brake system diagnostics detect a serious
problem, including when the brake pipe pressure falls below 50 psi, the
ECP brake system will automatically command a penalty brake
application. ECP brake systems also eliminate the conventional
pneumatic brake system's inability to apply all brakes in the train
when there is a blockage in the brake pipe, which is handled through
the use of a two-way EOT telemetry device not required by all trains.
This failure will not affect brake applications in ECP brake systems,
because each car is provided a braking command through a train line
cable, not solely through the reduction of brake pipe pressure, which
would not be propagated through the consist if the brake pipe is
blocked. Therefore, ECP brake systems incorporate features that make
them inherently safer than conventional pneumatic brakes. Using sensor-
based technology to maintain a continuous feedback loop on train
condition for the crew and any centralized monitoring, the electrical
communication cable network can also serve as a platform for the
gradual
[[Page 61517]]
addition of other train performance monitoring and management controls,
including distributed power locomotive control, hand brake on/off
detection system, automatic activation and release of hand brakes, hot
bearing detection, and truck oscillation and vibration. These and other
train management features will increase the reliability and overall
safety of train operations.
E. Improved Performance
Ultimately, ECP brake technology also provides improved
performance, which will contribute to safer train operations and
significant cost savings over time. Since trains operated with ECP
brakes can operate in graduated release, instead of direct release,
fuel will not be wasted while pulling trains against a heavy brake
application. Further, because all of the cars' ECP brakes release
simultaneously, fuel will not be wasted on initial start-ups and power-
ups after a brake release.
Operations utilizing ECP brake systems also promise increased
average train speeds and decreased trip times. ECP brake systems allow
the locomotive engineer to modulate the brake applications in
territories with descending grades, thus increasing overall trip
average speeds and reaching destinations sooner. While the slow release
of the rear cars' brakes on conventional pneumatic braked trains cause
drag, the brakes on ECP brake-equipped trains release simultaneously,
improving start-up and acceleration times. Further, due to their
shorter stopping distances, trains equipped solely with ECP brake
systems may potentially permit higher train speeds within existing
signal spacing, which will increase average system velocity, or permit
use of shorter ``blocks'' between signals, facilitating greater system
capacity.
The instantaneous application and release of ECP brakes will result
in more uniform braking, thus improving wheel wear and increasing brake
shoe life. In a conventional pneumatically braked train, the brake pipe
gradient and slower response time causes the first third of the train's
cars to provide the majority of the braking action, thus applying
additional pressure and heat on those cars' wheels. Since ECP brake
systems provide instantaneous braking on all cars, such pressure will
be more uniformly distributed along the train, thus eliminating the
uneven braking force on the wheels of those leading cars. The ECP brake
system also self-monitors each car's brake cylinder pressure and
maintains the prescribed pressure, thus reducing the potential for
creating shelling and flat spots on wheels.
Due to minimized wheel defects, and their accompanying vibrations,
freight cars and brake components will enjoy increased life. Further,
instantaneous braking will also prevent draft gear assemblies from
receiving the constant pressure caused by trains equipped with
conventional pneumatic brake systems and will reduce lading damage by
eliminating slack action and in-train forces caused by uneven braking.
ECP brake systems will also reduce the number of brake parts and rubber
diaphragms required by conventional pneumatic brake systems.
VI. Standards, Approval, and Testing
During the past 18 years, FRA has monitored the progression of ECP
brake technology and has observed field testing on various revenue
trains, both freight and passenger. In 1997, FRA participated in an AAR
initiative to develop ECP brake standards and in 1999, FRA funded,
through the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a FMECA of the ECP
brake system based on AAR's Standards and Recommended Practices, S-4200
Series. FRA also participated in programs to develop and enhance
advanced components for ECP brake systems. After all of these efforts,
FRA has determined that the AAR S-4200 Series of standards are
appropriate substantively and legally for incorporation by reference in
this rule and that the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee is an
appropriate vehicle to rely upon in the implementation of ECP brake
technology for this rule. FRA acknowledges that ECP brakes are an
attractive, viable, and enabling technology with the potential to
substantially improve the operational efficiency of trains and that by
complying with AAR Standard S-4200, ECP braked trains offer significant
safety and efficiency benefits in freight train handling, car
maintenance, fuel savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, and fail-
safe operation.
AAR administers the existing industry ECP brake standards through
its Air Brake Systems Committee--consisting of representatives from the
major railroads, brake manufacturers, and FRA--which requires
demonstrated proof of compatibility, safety, and reliability of air
brake systems to receive AAR approval. FRA is satisfied that the
existing AAR S-4200 Series specifications, AAR approval procedures, and
continuing oversight by the AAR Air Brake Systems Committee will best
ensure the safety and reliability of ECP brake systems. An ECP brake
monitoring system complying with AAR Standard S-4200 Series increases
safety by communicating information on the location and quantity of
defective equipment and by providing for the safe movement of equipment
over longer distances and periods of time.
A. AAR Standards and Approval Process
In order to assure the safety and the interoperability of ECP brake
system designs, AAR developed the S-4200 Series of standards. The first
five standards (S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, and S-4250)--issued in
1999 and updated in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007--specify the functional,
operational, and interface requirements for cable-based ECP brake
systems. AAR issued two additional standards in January 2007,
specifying ECP brake equipment approval procedures (S-4240) and
interoperability testing requirements (S-4260). In April 2008, AAR
issued a standard for hardware and software configuration management
plans (S-4270). At this time, AAR has not completed specifications for
radio-based ECP brakes, which it considers technically immature and
unsuitable. The purposes of the standards are to ensure that AAR-
approved electronic brake systems are interoperable between different
manufacturers and meet high standards of safety and reliability. The
analysis of the S-4200 Series of standards indicates that the
performance specifications for the cable-based ECP brake concept are
complete.
The AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices (MSRP)
contain the following standards for cable-based ECP brake systems:
S-4200, ECP Cable-Based Brake Systems--Performance
requirements;
S-4210, ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors,
and Junctions Boxes--Performance Specifications;
S-4220, ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply--Performance
Specification;
S-4230, Intratrain Communication Specification for Cable-
Based Freight Train Control System;
S-4240, ECP Brake Equipment--Approval Procedure;
S-4250, Performance Requirements for ITC Controlled Cable-
Based Distributed Power Systems;
S-4260, ECP Brake and Wire Distributed Power
Interoperability Test Procedures; and
S-4270, ECP Brake System Configuration Management.
Standard S-4200 ensures that the functionality and performance of
freight ECP brake systems are uniform and
[[Page 61518]]
consistent among equipment from different manufacturers, that cars
equipped with AAR-approved ECP brake systems from different
manufacturers are interoperable, and that AAR-approved electronic brake
systems meet a high standard of safety and reliability. This standard
defines ECP brake system elements, specifies their functionality in
different implementation schemes--such as stand-alone, overlays, and
emulators--and sets the requirements for all system functions. It
covers all primary functions of ECP brakes, including graduated brake
application and releases, continuous reservoir charging, adjustment of
braking level to car load, continuous fault detection, equipment status
monitoring, and pneumatic backup. It also specifies requirements for
all modes of train operation and provides an extensive description of
fault response and recovery functions for all possible faults of the
system components. The standard also establishes environmental
requirements for the designed systems, in-service testing, and rigorous
approval procedures for the certification process of new ECP brake
equipment.
Other standards in the AAR S-4200 Series contain requirements for
critical ECP brake system components and communication protocols.
Standard S-4210 contains the performance specifications and
qualification test procedures for ECP brake system cables, connectors,
and end-of-car junction boxes. The required testing verifies that the
designed components have high reliability, will withstand harsh
environmental conditions, and will have at least an 8-year operating
life.
Standard S-4220 contains performance specifications for the DC
power supply system through the hard-wired train line cable for ECP
brake controllers and other electronic freight car components. Since a
DC power supply conductor will also send communication control commands
between a locomotive and its attached cars, the standard requires
reliable separation and absence of interference between the DC power
supply and the communication circuits.
Standard S-4230 contains the requirements related to intra-train
communication systems on freight equipment used in revenue interchange
service. The standard facilitates interoperability between freight cars
and locomotives without limiting the proprietary design approaches used
by individual suppliers. The communication protocol was developed for
control of ECP brakes and multiple remote units, including distributed
power locomotives, and for safety reporting of various car and
locomotive components.
Standard S-4250 contains the methodology and communication flow
requirements for controlling the operation of multiple locomotives in a
freight consist through the intra-train communication network that is
shared with ECP brake system. The locomotive control through the intra-
train communication line is an alternative method of locomotive
control, which was not available before the introduction of ECP brake
system technology. The controlled locomotives can either trail a lead
locomotive or be distributed (i.e., separated by cars) in a train. The
standard establishes protocols for different types of locomotive
controls through the intra-train line cable, depending on the location
of the consist's multiple locomotives. While the current means of
controlling ``distributed power'' is performed through radio control--
which is susceptible to a loss of communication and is not ``fail
safe'' in operation--locomotives operated with ECP brake systems can be
relied upon to function as commanded in real time and automatically
apply the brakes in the event of a communication loss.
Standard S-4260 contains the test procedures that must be completed
by ECP brake manufacturers to establish interoperability baselines
among ECP brake and wire distributed power (WDP) systems in compliance
with the S-4200 standards series. The test procedures validate the
functional interoperability of ECP brake and WDP systems developed by
different manufacturers.
Standard S-4270 defines the procedures for managing the software
and hardware configuration for AAR-approved ECP brake systems.
The AAR approval process and the work of the Air Brake Systems
Committee has been the primary method of ensuring the safety and
reliability of railroad brake systems and components for decades.
Through its participation on the Air Brake Systems Committee, FRA can
monitor any safety or reliability issues that may develop with ECP
brake systems. In the event of a serious safety issue with a supplier's
ECP brake system, FRA can appropriately respond by invoking its
authority to intervene with additional rulemaking or an emergency
order. FRA does not expect to use this authority, because the AAR Air
Brake Systems Committee already has the authority to rescind AAR
approval for brake systems that do not perform safely or reliably.
Standard S-4240 contains the acceptance procedure for seeking AAR
approval of ECP brake equipment. The standard requires a manufacturer
to apply for approval by submitting certain information under
Administrative Standard S-060. Following review and approval of the
initial application data and test plan by the AAR Air Brake Systems
Committee, a manufacturer maintains the burden of establishing
compliance with Standards S-4200, S-4210, S-4220, S-4230, S-4250, S-
4260, and S-4270 to obtain conditional approval.
For laboratory testing, an AAR representative will select 150 CCDs
from a lot of 200 and will select HEUs, train power supplying units
(TPSs), and ECP-EOTs from lots of four each. The testing will be
performed on a 150-car test rack configured in accordance with AAR
specifications. The manufacturer will provide for AAR evaluation of the
test results, which shall include a requirements traceability and
compliance matrix for each AAR standard and all necessary test reports,
and then conduct interoperability laboratory testing between new ECP
brake equipment and AAR-approved ECP brake equipment in accordance with
standard S-4260.
Upon satisfactory completion of the aforementioned laboratory
tests, AAR will consider conditional approval for field testing of ECP
brake equipment. If conditional approval is granted, 150 ECP brake CCDs
shall be selected from a production lot of 200 test-approved CCDs, and
100 of those selected, plus at least two ECP brake-equipped locomotives
and one ECP-EOT device, must be placed in railroad service for 24
months. Under conditional approval, at least 1,000 cars must be
allotted for use. Within those 24 months, all in-service tests must be
conducted. After those 24 months, the Air Brake Systems Committee
continues to monitor the product for reliability and safety concerns.
If a problem with any brake component is discovered, the Committee will
discuss the issue and may either demand further tests or withdraw AAR
approval.
Full AAR approval shall be provided after 4 years if during that
time a manufacturer furnishes AAR at specified intervals various
service reports, which must include accurate ECP brake equipment
malfunction records. FRA agrees with AAR's assessment that 4 years are
needed to collect a history of reliable data with minimum failures. In
addition, the manufacturer must provide to AAR a semiannual report
containing any repair material for the test ECP brake equipment. Under
the standard, AAR reserves the right to withdraw
[[Page 61519]]
conditional test approval if it determines that safety is impaired,
reliability degrades, or incompatibility of ECP brake operation
develops, and may require any additional testing or performance
evaluations it deems necessary. Standard S-4240 also contains specific
procedures that must be followed when a manufacturer intends to change
certain ECP brake equipment physical characteristics, software, or
electronics.
FRA supports this effort as a timely measure for AAR to strengthen
the regulatory package for ECP brake systems. Overall, FRA considers
AAR approval a valuable step to ensure the reliability and safety of
ECP brake systems and a minimum requirement for initial application of
ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads. However, FRA fully intends
to monitor the application and safety of ECP and may, at its
discretion, require additional safety analysis to be performed to
confirm the safety of ECP brake systems installed and operating in
revenue service. FRA reserves the right to witness the AAR approval
testing of the product.
B. FMECA
AAR Standard S-4200 Series was developed to support the design of a
safer, more reliable ECP braking system when compared with conventional
air brakes. Once the standard was created, the railroad industry
identified the need to perform a safety and reliability assessment of
an ECP brake system built in accordance with this standard. Since
actual S-4200 Series compliant ECP brake systems did not yet exist, the
industry decided to conduct a FMECA for a hypothetical ECP brake system
that satisfied all the requirements of the standard. At FRA's
insistence, the FMECA on AAR Standard S-4200 was performed in 1999 by
DEL Engineering with participation of AAR, FRA and a number of experts
with significant experience in the development and application of ECP
brake systems.
The FMECA team began the analysis by identifying all major ECP
brake system components and their intended functions. The analysis
examined each component and function and identified associated failure
modes and effects. The failure modes were analyzed to determine
severity, frequency of occurrence, and effectiveness of detection. The
FMECA team created a numeric ranking criterion and determined and
prioritized the level of risk posed by each failure mode. High-risk
failure modes were identified and appropriate mitigation strategies
were developed to decrease the risk.
The FMECA team analyzed the failure modes of all ECP brake
components, including: CCDs with the battery; HEUs on the head
locomotive; ECP-EOT devices; train line cables, communication and power
supplies; power supply controllers; head end line terminators; car ID
modules; locomotive ID modules; and operative brakes. The analysis
included different types of ECP brake systems, including stand alone,
overlay (dual mode), and emulator and all system functional
requirements and operating modes, including Initialization, Switch,
Run, and Cut-out. The FMECA failure log contained about 1,500 failure
modes. For each high-risk failure mode, the FMECA team identified
action items and offered recommendations on how to mitigate the
consequences of component failures or system functional failures. The
team primarily examined single-point failures but also identified and
evaluated some cases of combined failures that had significant safety
consequences.
The FMECA results confirmed that the ECP brake concept offers the
potential for improved performance, reliability, and safety over that
of conventional pneumatic brake systems. The FMECA concluded that no
failure mode of an AAR-compliant ECP brake system exists that can cause
a catastrophic accident due to single-point failure of the system
itself. The AAR standards, as written, eliminate or mitigate critical
outcomes of single-point failure of ECP brake systems.
The FMECA team encouraged manufacturers to pursue ECP brake
technology, because the potential safety and efficiency benefits will
far outweigh any disadvantages. If designed and maintained properly,
ECP brakes will be substantially safer and more reliable than the
conventional pneumatic brake system they are intended to replace. AAR
and the brake manufacturers indicated that they were completely
satisfied that ECP brake systems are significantly safer than
conventional pneumatic systems. They accepted the results of the FMECA
and concluded that no modifications were necessary to the AAR standards
related to ECP brake systems.
VII. Market Maturity and Implementation
The U.S. market for ECP brake systems is mature enough to begin
implementation of ECP brake technology. The equipment manufacturers
have made a significant investment in the technology and have completed
the preliminary design work and field testing of ECP brakes. For
instance, they have provided technical solutions for different ECP
brake implementation strategies, enabling non-ECP and ECP brake-
equipped cars to run in combined trains and, in some cases, allowing
ECP brake-equipped freight cars to run in ECP brake mode using
locomotives with conventional pneumatic brake systems. In addition,
they are ready to supply fully operational stand-alone ECP brake
systems, overlays, and emulators for the U.S. market, easing the
industry's migration process. A commitment by the railroad industry to
change over to ECP brakes is necessary to inspire additional
technological initiatives by the manufacturers.
ECP brake systems from the main U.S. manufacturers--all in
different stages of AAR approval and testing in revenue service--have
been built with the intention of complying with the AAR S-4200 Series
of standards, proven safe through field testing, designed using fail-
safe principles, and accommodated the industry's need for different
implementation schemes. The AAR S-4200 Series standards are intended to
assure the necessary level of safety, reliability, interoperability,
and ultimately the applicability of this equipment in the U.S. market.
The equipment of existing ECP brake manufacturers incorporates the
conventional pneumatic emergency brake system as a backup in case of
failure of the ECP brake control. In most cases, ECP brake systems will
support enhanced safety even if the electronics fail, because
continuous recharging of the brake pipe will ensure availability of an
emergency application. Therefore, the ECP brake system reduces the risk
caused by depleted air in the case of an emergency. There is no
instance or record of a malfunctioning ECP brake system that resulted
in a catastrophic or critical event.
To assess the benefits and costs of ECP brakes for the U.S. rail
freight industry, FRA contracted with BAH in 2005 to conduct a study.
An ECP brake expert panel of principal stakeholders in the conversion
of the U.S. freight car fleet to ECP brake technology, including
suppliers, railroads, private car owners, AAR, and FRA was assembled to
participate in the study. The expert panel supported the conclusion
that the AAR standards are sufficient for the ECP brake system designer
to achieve a system safety level adequate for a safety-critical system.
In particular, an AAR-compliant system, while providing a significant
increase in safety and efficiency, does not introduce extra risks
associated with single-point failure of the ECP system itself.
[[Page 61520]]
The final BAH report provided a comprehensive analysis and
comparison of ECP and conventional air brake systems. BAH acknowledged
that while trains with ECP brake systems have been operated in North
America, South Africa, and Australia, U.S. implementation has been
stalled due to the absence of an acceptable implementation plan for
conversion and hard data to support a sound economic analysis, limited
interoperability with traditionally braked trains, and insufficient
capital investment required for conversion. It concluded that although
the barriers to implementation are formidable, ECP brake systems are
economically and technically ripe for adoption and should be
implemented in phases. BAH suggests that implementing ECP brakes on
2,800 locomotives and 80,000 cars in the Powder River Basin (PRB) would
cost the industry approximately $432 million. However, according to
BAH, the annual $157 million in anticipated benefits--resulting from
saved fuel, improved wheel and brake shoe life, and a reduction in
necessary brake inspections--will allow railroads to recover those
costs in less than three years. To justify the investment, the BAH
report says, conversion must be focused first on the high-mileage,
unit-train-type services that would most benefit from its use.
FRA acknowledges that BAH's fuel cost estimates are underestimated
due to subsequently rising prices. It is notable that BAH did not
attempt to quantify potential savings relating to capacity increases or
emissions decreases due to the difficulty in arriving at acceptable
values. Accordingly, the report's estimated internal rate of return
should be viewed as conservative.
VIII. Related Proceeding
In a petition dated November 15, 2006, and filed November 21, 2006,
BNSF and NS jointly requested that FRA waive various sections in parts
229 and 232 as it relates to those railroads' operation of ECP brake
pilot trains. See Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. The FRA Safety Board held
a fact-finding hearing on this matter on January 16, 2007, featuring
testimony from representatives of the petitioners, air brake
manufacturers, and labor unions. On March 21, 2007, the Safety Board
granted the petitioners' request, in part, subject to various
conditions designed to ensure that ECP brake equipped trains subject to
the waiver will be as safe as trains equipped with conventional brakes
and operated under the existing rules. See id.
IX. Legal Impediments and Proposed Relief
ECP brake operation provides for continuous electronic monitoring
of the condition of air brake system components and brake pipe
pressure, potentially limiting the need for certain physical brake
inspections currently required under part 232. Accordingly, this final
rule modifies, relaxes, and removes certain requirements, including
intermediate terminal inspections (Sec. Sec. 232.207, 232.209, and
232.211), single-car air brake tests (Sec. 232.305), and the required
percent of operable brakes at initial terminal departure (Sec.
232.103(d)), as they apply to trains operating in ECP brake mode. The
rail industry's implementation of ECP brakes is frustrated by such
inapplicable and inefficient statutory and regulatory requirements.
Without a large-scale proliferation and implementation of ECP brake
technologies, the industry will not be able to enjoy economies of scale
and to overcome the industry-wide limits caused by interoperability
problems. FRA seeks to improve market efficiency by providing reliable
and suitable standards and procedures that will support investments in
ECP brake technology.
The current statutory and regulatory requirements, however--
including those concerning brake inspections and the operation of
trains with defective equipment--may reduce or eliminate incentives for
railroads to implement new ECP brake technology and take advantage of
its operational and safety benefits. For example, 49 U.S.C. 20303
presents an obstacle to cost-saving, safe, and efficient long hauls
promised by ECP brakes. To avoid incurring civil penalties, operators
are required under 49 U.S.C. 20303 to transport rail vehicles with
defective or insecure equipment ``from the place at which the defect or
insecurity was first discovered to the nearest available place at which
the repairs can be made.''
The design and operation of ECP brakes renders strict application
of the existing statutory movement for repair provision unnecessary as
it will reduce efficiencies and may actually reduce the safety of such
operations. When the defective equipment is an ECP brake, stopping for
immediate repairs is not necessary. If more than 15 percent of the
train's AAR approved ECP brakes become inoperable, the train
automatically stops. It should be noted that a train with 85 percent
operative ECP brakes will still have shorter stopping distances than a
train equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes that are 100 percent
operative. Considering the technology's continuous self-monitoring and
constant communication with the engineer, it is highly unlikely that a
train equipped with ECP brakes will ever reach such a level of
inoperability. Further, FRA continues to believe that a freight train
operated with ECP brakes may travel non-stop to its destination, not to
exceed 3,500 miles, without intermediate brake inspections, because
foundation brake rigging and brake shoes will safely operate this
distance and redundant intermediate brake inspections within that
distance do not increase ECP brake system safety. As an added benefit,
the increased mileage allowance would provide for coast-to-coast
travel. In the related proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, FRA's
Safety Board granted the request of BNSF and NS to allow the non-stop
movement of an ECP brake operated train to its destination, each not to
exceed 3,500 miles.
Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. 20303 requires trains with defective safety
appliances, including brakes, to travel to the nearest location where
the necessary repairs can be made. If the nearest available location is
in a direction other than that in which the train is traveling, the
train with defective equipment may be required to switch the defective
car out of the train and add it to another train traveling in the
direction of the nearest repair location, referred to as a
``backhaul.'' ECP brake implementation has been complicated by the ECP
brakes system's technological incompatibility with conventional
pneumatic brake systems. To switch a car equipped with ECP brakes into
a technologically incompatible train operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes will create additional safety concerns for that train.
The potential risks involved in combining cars with incompatible
braking systems coupled with the hazards normally associated in
switching cars in the field, outweigh the potential harm of keeping the
defective car in its existing ECP braked train and traveling to a
repair location that is significantly further away. In circumstances
where the defective safety appliance is a non-brake defect, it will
often be safer and is certainly more efficient to allow ECP brake-
equipped trains with non-brake defective equipment to travel to the
nearest forward repair station. Moreover, due to the ability of ECP
brake systems to continuously monitor the brakes on each car in a train
and to provide specific information to the locomotive engineer
regarding the location of any car with inoperative brakes and the
[[Page 61521]]
design of such systems to prohibit operation with less than 85 percent
operative brakes in certain situations, the need to immediately set-out
and handle cars with defective brakes for repair is unnecessary. There
is also no safety need to require a railroad to incur the expense and
delay involved with cutting the defective car out of the train or to
run the safety risk of doing so. Currently, freight cars with defective
mechanical conditions are permitted to be hauled long distances for
repair. See 49 CFR 215.9. In light of the technological advances
provided by ECP brake systems, it appears logical and necessary to
permit more flexibility in moving equipment with defective brakes when
equipped with ECP brakes and hauled in a train operating in ECP brake
mode. However, the language of 49 U.S.C. 20303 prevents FRA from
providing this flexibility.
When drafting the proposed rule in this proceeding, FRA recognized
that the aforementioned statutory requirements governing conventional
pneumatic braked trains may offset the increased safety and efficiency
benefits afforded by ECP brakes, thus eliminating the incentives for
rail operators to implement ECP brake technologies. To encourage
implementation without hindering safety, FRA proposed to invoke its
discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt ECP brake-
equipped trains from the specific statutory requirements contained in
49 U.S.C. 20303. The requirements for moving defective equipment were
created over a century ago, during the infancy of pneumatic brakes and
before all cars were equipped with power brakes. With many more reasons
to stop train operation along tracks with frequent repair shops and
exponentially more employees, the legislative drafters of that time
could not have envisioned the type of safer and more efficient
technologies available today.
Recognizing the importance of upgrading rail technologies, Congress
in 1980 passed the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee
Assistance Act (the ``Rock Island Act''), which, inter alia, provides
statutory relief for the implementation of new technologies. More
specifically, when certain statutory requirements preclude the
development or implementation of more efficient railroad transportation
equipment or other transportation innovations, the applicable section
of the Rock Island Act, currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 20306, provides
the Secretary of Transportation with the authority to grant an
exemption to those requirements based on evidence received and findings
developed at a hearing.
According to Senate Report No. 96-614, ``This section fosters rail
technological improvements by giving the Federal Railroad
Administration discretionary authority to grant exemptions from the
Safety Appliance Acts' mandatory requirements when those requirements
preclude the development or implementation of new rail technology.''
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. Rep. No. 96-
614, at 8-9 (Mar. 4, 1980) (emphases added). The House version of the
bill includes no similar provision, but the Conference substitute adds
that the authority granted FRA in this section must be exercised after
a hearing, absent an agreement between labor representatives and the
developers or operators of the new equipment or technology. Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. Conf. Rep. No.
96-1041, Sec. 117, at 30 (May 20, 1980).
Under 49 CFR 1.49(v), the Federal Railroad Administrator is
delegated authority to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary
by the Rock Island Act. Under this authority, FRA held two public oral
hearings in Washington, DC on October 4, 2007, and near Chicago, IL, on
October 19, 2007, to receive evidence and develop findings to determine
whether FRA should invoke 49 U.S.C. 20306. While FRA solicited any
information that would bear on this decision, it also asked a series of
questions in the NPRM and at the hearing designed to invoke discussion
and gather information regarding the safety of moving defective
equipment as proposed and to determine whether existing statutory
provisions impede the implementation of the technology.
At the hearing, the labor unions commented on the limitations of
the ECP brake system's self-monitoring capabilities. According to the
labor unions, since the technology cannot monitor a variety of brake
defects, it should not be relied upon to allow a train to operate 3,500
miles without any intermediate brake inspections. On the other hand,
the railroads support the increase in the allowable distance of 3,500
miles between brake inspections, believing the safety level of trains
operating with ECP brakes that distance should equal or exceed the
safety level of trains operating with conventional brakes over 1,000
miles. For the same reasons, some railroads even suggested that ECP
brake operated trains be allowed to move 5,000 miles between Class I
brake inspections.
The labor unions and railroads agree that a conventional freight
car with the brakes cut out is no different than an ECP brake-equipped
car with the brakes cut out and that switching a defective ECP brake-
equipped car into a conventionally braked train will not increase
current safety concerns. However, the railroads and the labor unions
disagree when the defect is a non-brake safety appliance on a car
equipped with ECP brakes. According to the labor unions, if a non-brake
defect requires the car to be set out, there is no difference between a
train operated with conventional brakes and a train operated with ECP
brakes; the car should be set out for repair on site or moved under
special circumstances to the nearest repair point. The railroads
believe that such cars should be left in the train operated with ECP
brakes for forward movement to a location where ECP brake repairs can
be made instead of being switched out and hauled in a different
direction. Any switching, says the railroads, causes the switching and
pick-up crews more risk exposure.
The labor unions assert that the regulations proposed in this
proceeding provide sufficient incentives for the implementation of ECP
brake systems and that the restrictions within 49 U.S.C. 20303 do not
provide a disincentive for such implementation. The railroads, on the
other hand, assert that strict application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 provides
a disincentive for the implementation and use of ECP brake
technologies. According to the railroads, they are required under
section 20303 to handle cars with defective equipment more times than
necessary, resulting in lost time and revenue. The resulting undue and
unreasonable financial burden and significantly negative financial
impact on rail operations, say the railroads, provides no relief from
the added expense of equipping rail cars with ECP brakes and is a
strong disincentive for ECP brake system implementation. The railroads
claim that eliminating the requirements under 49 U.S.C. 20303 would
provide a necessary and significant economic incentive to the
widespread adoption of ECP braking technology in the U.S.
Based on the comments and information submitted at those hearings,
FRA has decided to invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C.
20306 to exempt application of 49 U.S.C. 20303 as it applies to the
operation of ECP brake operated freight trains and freight cars. FRA
believes that application of section 20303 will clearly provide a
disincentive towards the implementation of ECP brake systems, a
[[Page 61522]]
technology that promises safer operation of trains throughout the U.S.
FRA is confident that this initiative is consistent with improving
railroad safety. As further discussed below, through oversight of
present train operations, including extended haul operations, FRA has
observed that properly inspected trains can proceed for extended
distances without loss of braking effort due to wear or damage to
foundation brake rigging. FRA further notes that hauling of cars with
defective safety appliances to the next forward point where repairs can
be accomplished poses virtually no incremental risk to employees,
particularly if defects have been identified and communicated to the
crew of the train. In the great majority of cases, damaged or insecure
safety appliances pose a risk only during switching operations, not
during line haul movements. Indeed, back hauling of safety appliances
introduces additional risk, as the car is first removed from one road
train and then added to another for the reverse movement.
X. Additional Issues
A. Part 229
In the ECP brake waiver proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, BNSF
and NS sought relief from various provisions of parts 229 and 232. In
relation to part 229, BNSF and NS sought relief from the requirements
relating to daily locomotive inspections and electronic record keeping.
FRA sought comments and information whether this final rule should
include any exceptions to part 229 for operations using ECP brake
systems.
No commenting party supported or suggested any exceptions to part
229. On the contrary, UTU and BLET agreed with the FRA's proposal not
to modify part 229 in this rulemaking. According to BLET, there is no
basis for relief from the daily inspection or recordkeeping
requirements of Part 229. FRA continues to believe that there is
insufficient information available to consider any exceptions to part
229 for operations using ECP brake systems. Thus, under this
rulemaking, part 229 remains unaffected.
In its comments, Wabtec lists a number of minimum requirements that
it proposes should be added to existing event recorder parameters,
applicable to the lead locomotive when in ECP brake operation. BLET
filed a supplemental response in which it responded to this particular
filing, stating that it ``cannot serve as a basis for FRA requirements
pertaining to event recording of ECP data because of [an] omission
[relating to the `ECP train brake source' parameter described in UP's
comments].'' The scope of this proceeding does not include information
relating to event recorder data. The NPRM did not discuss or seek
comments on this issue. Accordingly, FRA will not include in this final
rule any modifications to the regulations governing event recorders,
since many parties interested in event recorders would not have been
put on notice that the issue was being raised. FRA believes that these
issues would best be resolved in a separate proceeding concerning part
229.
B. Dynamic Brake Requirements
At the public hearing conducted in relation to the waiver
proceeding, BNSF requested relief from some of the dynamic brake
requirements contained in 49 CFR part 232. On this issue, FRA only
received comments from BLET, which indicated that relief relating to
dynamic brake requirement is not necessary as it applies to ECP brake
systems. According to BLET, it would be unwise and unsafe to further
erode braking capacity by diluting the existing dynamic brake
requirements.
FRA remains unsure of what specific relief BNSF requested regarding
dynamic brakes. Section 232.109 provides for the continued operation of
a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes for a period of up
to 30 calendar days. It appears that railroads will continue to require
locomotive engineers to rely on extended range dynamic brakes where
they sufficiently control the braking effort without introducing
excessive buff forces. Locomotive engineers will need to know what
level of braking effort is available, particularly in extreme cases
operating over territory with significantly descending grades.
Otherwise, an engineer may lose control of the train due to brake fade
when the speed precludes a timely application of the automatic brake
due to insufficient dynamic brake capacity. FRA recognizes that this
scenario is much less likely to occur with availability of ECP braking,
but that does not mean it could not occur. FRA continues to believe
that more flexibility in this area is not necessary and declines to
make any such modifications in this final rule.
C. Single Car Air Brake Test Approval Procedures and Single Car Air
Brake Tests
The NPRM included a provision requiring the submission and approval
of single car air brake test procedures for cars with ECP brake systems
in accordance with the special approval procedures in Sec. 232.17. FRA
also reserved the right to modify Sec. 232.17 to make clear the
applicability of proposed subpart G, including, but not limited to,
adding cross-references.
Section 232.305(a) provides that a single car air brake test may be
performed partially in accordance with ``Section 4.0, `Special Tests,'
of the Association of American Railroads Standard S-486-01, `Code of
Air Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1,
2001).'' That standard has since been amended and FRA has approved the
use of the new Standard S-486-04 as the procedure to use when
performing a single car air brake test. Accordingly, FRA proposed to
amend Sec. 232.305(a) by replacing the directly preceding quoted text
with the following: ``Section 4.0, `Special Tests,' of the Association
of American Railroads Standard S-486-04, `Code of Air Brake System
Tests for Freight Equipment,' contained in the AAR Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1, 2004).''
BLET submitted comments supporting FRA's proposed amendments to
sections 232.17 and 232.305(a). No other comments were filed on these
issues. Consequently, the final rule amends Sec. Sec. 232.17 and
232.305(a).
D. Train Handling Information
Section 232.111 requires railroads to adopt and comply with written
procedures ensuring that railroad train crews receiving trains are
provided accurate information concerning each train's condition. The
continuous monitoring capabilities of ECP brake systems provide
information regarding the location of equipment with inoperative or cut
out brakes. BLET commented that none of the information provided by the
ECP brake system appears to satisfy the requirements of 232.111(b) and
that it agrees with FRA that there is no reason for excepting any
portion of or provision contained in Sec. 232.111.
FRA continues to see no reason to excepting any portion of or
provision contained in Sec. 232.111. FRA continues to believe that, if
anything, ECP brake systems' continuous monitoring capabilities will
assist railroads in complying with the train handling information rules
in Sec. 232.111 by monitoring defects and potentially allowing for the
manual input of defects not monitored electronically and then
[[Page 61523]]
electronically providing such information to subsequent train crews.
E. Piston Travel Limits
For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake
cylinders receiving either a Class I brake test or a periodic
inspection while on a shop or repair track, Sec. Sec. 232.205(c)(5)
and 232.303(c) currently limit piston travel to 7 to 9 inches. An
industry-wide waiver currently in effect, however, permits piston
travel limits to range from 6 to 9 inches on these types of cylinders.
In the NPRM, FRA proposed the incorporation of that waiver into the
rules by amending Sec. Sec. 232.205(c)(5) and 232.303(c) accordingly.
BLET, Wabtec, and NYAB concur with FRA's proposal to incorporate
the current, industry-wide waiver permitting piston travel limits to
range from 6 to 9 inches by amending sections 232.205(c)(5) and
232.303(c). Similarly, AAR states that there is no reason to refrain
from incorporating the industry-wide waiver in the regulations.
Consequently, this final rule amends sections 232.205(c)(5) and
232.303(c) by revising the piston travel range limit of 7 to 9 inches
to a range limit of 6 to 9 inches.
F. Extended Haul Trains
Section 232.213(a)(6) requires inbound inspections for extended
haul trains and states that, ``After April 1, 2007, the inbound
inspection described in this paragraph shall not be required unless FRA
provides notification to the industry extending the requirement to
perform inbound inspections on extended haul trains.'' Section
232.213(a)(7) requires railroads to maintain a record of all defective,
inoperative, or ineffective brakes and all conditions not in compliance
with parts 215 and 231 discovered during train movement. In addition,
that section says that, ``After April 1, 2007, the records described in
this paragraph need not be maintained unless FRA provides the
notification required in paragraph (a)(6) of this section extending the
requirement to conduct inbound inspections on extended haul trains.''
In the NPRM, FRA proposed to amend Part 232 by deleting Sec. Sec.
232.213(a)(6) and (a)(7) from the regulations. These regulations
``sunsetted'' on April 1, 2007, without further FRA action. Since this
proposal remains uncontested and the ``sunsetted'' provisions serve no
purpose by remaining in the CFR, the final rule deletes Sec.
232.213(a)(6) and (a)(7).
G. Part 238
Amtrak informally expressed interest in potentially using ECP brake
system technology for its Auto Train that runs from Lorton, Virginia to
Sanford, Florida. Amtrak previously employed overlay ECP braking on
that train, and presumably would benefit from some additional
flexibility with respect to the conduct of intermediate inspections.
However, since FRA does not currently have sufficient information
regarding the use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains and
passenger equipment, FRA did not propose any amendment to 49 CFR part
238. FRA continues to believe that the functions of freight and
passenger trains and cars, evidenced by the varied rules applicable to
each, are too disparate to provide a one-size-fits-all solution for ECP
brake integration and use.
In the NPRM, FRA stated that it may consider Part 238's
applicability to ECP brake systems in another rulemaking or in other
proceedings and would consider requests for waivers relating to the
regulation of freight trains and freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems for passenger trains on a case-by-case basis. BLET agrees that
the issue of ECP brakes and Part 238 should be addressed in a separate
rulemaking. For this reason, BLET does not believe that it is
appropriate for FRA to regulate ECP brakes on passenger trains via the
waiver process or on a case-by-case basis.
FRA continues to believe that any regulations affecting the
implementation and use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains are
better left for a separate rulemaking proceeding relating to Part 238.
FRA will also consider requests for waivers for such implementation and
use on passenger trains. Although BLET expresses its opinion that a
rulemaking would be a better venue for permitting the implementation
and use of ECP brake systems on passenger trains, it provides no
reasons why it would not be prudent to allow for the use of waivers to
achieve similar goals.
XI. Section-by-Section Analysis
49 CFR Part 232
Unless otherwise noted, all section references below refer to
sections in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FRA
sought comments on all proposals made in the NPRM to this proceeding.
Subpart A--General
This subpart contains amendments to the definitions listed in
subpart A of part 232.
Section 232.5 Definitions
In the NPRM, FRA proposed the amendment of section 232.5 by adding
an extensive set of definitions to introduce the regulatory relief and
regulations applicable to ECP brake systems. FRA worded these
definitions to mirror, to the extent possible, the definitions provided
in existing AAR standards. FRA intends these definitions to clarify the
meaning of important terms that are used in the text of the proposed
rule. The definitions are carefully worded in an attempt to minimize
the potential for misinterpretation of the rule. Some of the
definitions introduce new concepts or new technologies.
These new definitions acknowledge the two general types of ECP
brake systems--dual mode and stand-alone. The definition of a dual mode
ECP brake system, which means a brake system that can work either as a
conventional pneumatic brake system or an ECP brake system, intends to
cover both an overlay ECP brake system and an ECP brake system equipped
with an emulator CCD. The definition of CCD is intended to describe an
important and necessary part of ECP brake system technology.
FRA did not receive any comments on the proposed definitions.
Consequently, except for reasons set forth below, the final rule
retains the definitions as proposed.
Subpart G--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking Systems
FRA is adding a new subpart G to part 232. The new subpart contains
various design and operational requirements that provide both
regulatory relief and regulatory modification to allow implementation
of ECP brake systems on the Nation's railroads and to ensure the safety
of such operations.
Section 232.601 Scope
This section contains a formal statement of the final rule's
purpose and scope. The final rule contains specific requirements
relating to the operation of freight trains and freight cars equipped
with ECP brake systems and operating in ECP brake mode. The final rule
also provides specific exceptions from various requirements contained
in part 232 for ECP brake-equipped freight trains and freight cars.
Section 232.602 Applicability
As a general matter, this section makes clear that these rules
apply to all railroads that operate freight trains or freight cars
equipped with ECP brakes on track which is part of the general railroad
system of transportation. The final rule applies to freight trains
[[Page 61524]]
operating in ECP brake mode, freight cars equipped with ECP brake
systems, and conventionally braked freight trains and freight cars when
operated in conjunction with ECP brake equipment.
The regulatory relief provided in the final rule and the need to
ensure the safe operation of trains and vehicles equipped with this
advanced technology requires that exception of certain existing part
232 provisions be afforded. Many of the provisions that the final rule
excepts either apply awkwardly or should otherwise not apply to ECP
brake systems due to the new technology's design or additional safety
benefits. Similarly, the addition of various requirements directly
related to ECP brake systems is necessary to ensure that the equipment
is properly designed, inspected, tested, maintained, and safe to
operate.
To fulfill these goals and to avoid an excess of confusing cross-
references, this final rule excepts specific provisions and an entire
subpart of part 232 from application to ECP brake systems. Each section
of subpart G contains specific exceptions from various provisions
contained in other portions of part 232 or contain appropriately
rewritten provisions directly applicable to ECP brake systems. Those
portions and sections of part 232 not specifically excepted by this
final rule remain applicable to ECP brake-equipped freight trains and
freight cars.
Section 232.603 Design, Interoperability, and Configuration Management
Requirements
In order to ensure the safety and interoperability of ECP brake
systems, this section incorporates by reference the existing AAR
standards and approval procedures for ECP brake systems. The AAR, its
member railroads, and various brake manufacturers have invested
considerable time and effort in developing the identified industry
standards addressing the design, performance, and interoperability of
ECP brake systems. FRA has reviewed the industry standards it intended
to incorporate by reference in this final rule and has determined that
the standards effectively address and ensure the safe and proper
operation of the brake system technology. As noted previously in this
preamble, FRA funded a FMECA, which validated the safety and
applicability of AAR's ECP brake system standards for freight
railroads.
FRA believes that compliance with the AAR standards identified in
paragraph (a) will ensure the safety and efficiency of freight trains
and freight cars equipped with ECP brakes. Implementation of ECP
braking systems complying with these standards will bring benefits and
efficiencies encompassing train handling, car maintenance, fuel
savings, network capacity, self-monitoring, fail-safe operation,
accurate and instantaneous brake commands throughout the train, and
continuous, real-time self-diagnostics. Paragraph (a) requires all
manufacturers to meet existing AAR standards when developing and
installing ECP brake systems.
Paragraph (a) incorporates the most recent AAR standards related to
ECP brake systems. FRA recognizes that ECP brake systems are a growing
technology and realizes that the existing AAR standards may need to
change as the technology advances. Accordingly, this final rule
includes two methods by which the incorporated industry standards may
be changed. Paragraph (a) permits the submission of an alternate
standard under the special approval procedures contained in Sec.
232.17. In addition, paragraph (f) permits the AAR or other authorized
representative of the railroad industry to seek modification of the
approved industry standards through the modification procedures
contained in Sec. 232.307. Only the party that initially submits a
standard approved by FRA pursuant to paragraph (a) may subsequently
seek modification of that standard under paragraph (f). For instance,
only AAR may seek modification of its own AAR S-4200 Series Standards
already incorporated by reference into this final rule. If another
authorized representative of the railroad industry submits an
alternative standard under paragraph (a) and pursuant to Sec. 232.17,
then only that representative may seek modification of their alternate
standard under paragraph (f).
The modification procedures in Sec. 232.307 were developed to
permit modification of the other incorporated AAR standards and FRA
believes that the procedures are equally applicable to the regulations
contained in this final rule. The industry has successfully utilized
both these methods to change or modify industry standards incorporated
in part 232 and FRA believes it is appropriate and necessary to provide
this latitude for the standards related to ECP brake systems and
components.
BLET filed comments supporting Sec. 232.603(a) and (f) to utilize
the alternate standards of Sec. 232.17 and the modification procedures
of Sec. 232.307, respectively. GE requests that an exception be
granted to certain stand-alone ECP brake systems in Sec.
232.603(a)(1)-(6). We will address GE's comments below when providing
analysis of Sec. 232.603(e).
FRA recognizes that while most of the S-4200 Series apply technical
standards concerning the mechanical attributes and capabilities of ECP
brake systems, S-4240 and S-4270 delegate additional responsibilities
to those manufacturing, implementing, and using ECP brakes and have
been the subject of various comments filed in this proceeding. Thus,
FRA believes they require further discussion.
FRA has reviewed the approval procedures contained in AAR Standard
S-4240 and believes that they provide an appropriate review process to
ensure the safe and proper operation of ECP brake systems. FRA believes
that AAR is in the best position to approve those ECP brake systems
that will be used by its member railroads and, over time, other non-
member railroads interchanging traffic on the general rail system. FRA
does not intend this section to necessarily preclude the introduction
and acceptance of alterative standards subsequently approved in
accordance with the rules.
FRA recognizes, however, that enforcement of S-4240 against the
railroads would be difficult without additional regulatory language.
Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires that all ECP brake systems
developed under the AAR standards incorporated by reference in
paragraph (a) receive conditional or final approval under AAR Standard
S-4240 prior to use and that they maintain such approval while in use.
In this paragraph, FRA prohibits the use of ECP brake systems developed
under the AAR standards incorporated in paragraph (a) that do not
receive conditional or final AAR approval or that cease to comply with
the incorporated AAR standards relating to ECP brake systems.
BLET filed comments stating that it does not oppose paragraph (b).
However, BLET believes that FRA's Railroad Safety Board should review
petitions for conditional approval via the waiver process. FRA does not
believe this level of scrutiny is necessary at this time. Under
232.103(l), all conventional brake systems must comply with AAR
Standard S-469-47. Compliance with this standard is determined by the
AAR brake committee, subject to FRA technical oversight. There are no
more specific FRA requirements for these systems. For similar reasons,
FRA is incorporating into the final rule the appropriate ECP brake
standards. FRA has successfully relied on AAR for approving
[[Page 61525]]
conventional brake standards and there is nothing suggesting why FRA
should perform a materially different approval process oversight role
for the ECP brake standards. For the purposes of this rulemaking, FRA
has closely reviewed and scrutinized the ECP brake design standards
adopted by AAR. FRA also funded and participated in a FMECA analysis of
the S-4200 series standards. We feel confident relying on AAR's
approval process. Just like FRA enforces Standard S-469-47 after a
system is introduced into service, FRA will equally enforce the S-4200
series standards on trains in service with ECP brake systems.
In paragraph (a), FRA also requires that all ECP brake systems meet
the configuration management requirements contained in an industry
recognized, FRA approved standard such as AAR Standard S-4270. FRA
believes that configuration management of ECP brake system hardware and
software components is an absolute requirement to ensure the
interchangeability, interoperability, compatibility and continued
proper and safe operation of ECP brake systems. Compatibility of ECP
hardware and software will have a direct affect on the safety and
reliability of ECP brake systems running on the Nation's railroads.
In the NPRM, FRA cautioned that the limited configuration
management plan requirements in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of AAR Standard S-
4240 may not have been sufficiently robust to adequately control ECP
brake system components. The more recently developed AAR Standard S-
4270 eliminates this shortcoming by adequately addressing issues
relating to configuration management, including a sufficient set of
requirements that properly allocate the responsible party and necessary
procedures to be followed by this party to assure proper management of
ECP brake system software and hardware configurations.
The AAR approval process and Air Brake Systems Committee requires
various procedures to ensure the interoperability and
interchangeability of AAR-approved ECP brake systems and their
components. These same requirements and procedures have been used for
many years to successfully manage the configuration of conventional
pneumatic AAR approved air brake valves. Therefore, FRA believes that
responsibility for the configuration management of AAR-approved brake
systems and their components should continue to reside with AAR and its
Air Brake Systems Committee.
As discussed above, FRA has reviewed and approved AAR Standard S-
4270 and has determined that the standard should be incorporated by
reference into this final rule. In a notice issued on April 18, 2008,
FRA sought comments and concerns on AAR Standard S-4270, which at that
time was in draft form, and indicated that it would consider inclusion
of the final draft if it was timely adopted with no substantial
changes. 73 FR 21092, 94 (Apr. 18, 2008). AAR adopted and implemented
Standard S-4270 on April 30, 2008, without any changes from the draft
referenced in FRA's public notice dated April 18, 2008, and placed in
the docket to this proceeding on April 21, 2008.
Since the NPRM was issued prior to the development of an acceptable
configuration management plan standard, paragraph (c) as proposed
included language delineating minimum requirements for acceptance of a
subsequently submitted configuration management plan standard. Since
paragraph (a) incorporates by reference AAR Standard S-4270 and
provides for the submission of alternative standards under Sec.
232.17, the extraneous text of proposed paragraph (c) has been removed
from the final rule. However, FRA continues to believe that alternative
configuration management plans must maintain the same minimum
standards. More specifically, to receive approval in accordance with
Sec. 232.17, a configuration management plan must be structured in
accordance with accepted configuration management standards and define
all of the purposes, procedures, organizational responsibilities, and
tools to be used for ECP brake system hardware and software
configuration management including: The purpose and scope of the
application; control activities to be performed; responsibilities and
authorities for accomplishing the activities; implementation schedules;
tools and resources for executing the plan; and periodic updating of
the plan to maintain currency.
In the NPRM, FRA suggested that any submitted alternate
configuration management plan be structured in accordance with accepted
configuration management standards such as IEEE Std 28-1990, IEEE
Standard for Software Configuration Management Plans, American National
Standards Institute, 1990; or IEEE Std 1042-1987, IEEE Guide to
Software Configuration Management, American National Standards
Institute, 1987. The brake manufacturers, however, argue that these
IEEE standards are not considered appropriate or necessary for
achieving adequate configuration management control for ECP brake
systems. Despite their promise to recommend alternatives, nothing on
this issue was subsequently filed.
The NPRM's references to the various aforementioned IEEE standards
were provided for use by the railroads in the event that AAR did not
develop its own configuration management standard. As previously
mentioned, AAR issued a configuration management standard, S-4270,
subsequent to the initial comment period in this proceeding. FRA
understands the brake manufacturers to mean that some items specified
in the IEEE standards may not be applicable because they are superseded
by the more restrictive standards and processes developed by the brake
manufacturers. While FRA concedes that this may be true, it does not
speak to the overall applicability of the IEEE standards to any
alternate configuration management plan that might be submitted by any
other party. FRA expects all configuration management plans to be
tailored to the requirements of accepted IEEE standards or a more
restrictive, proprietary, or industry-specific standard has been
developed and implemented. FRA believes AAR Standard S-4270 complies
with the latter expectation.
FRA continues to believe that any ECP brake configuration
management plan should consider issues beyond initial approval. For
instance, use of improper or out-of-date software versions for
microprocessor controlled systems has been an issue in a variety of
industries. Therefore, FRA continues to caution that any alternate
configuration management plan should be sufficiently robust to
adequately control ECP brake system components, especially as more
manufacturers apply for AAR approval of ECP brake systems. Further,
safety or reliability issues may dictate that hardware or software
configurations be changed once ECP brake systems are put in service on
a large scale in the U.S. FRA continues to encourage AAR, railroads,
and manufacturers to ensure their ability to continually monitor and
respond to hardware and software issues affecting ECP brake systems
after initial approval.
FRA continues to believe that AAR is capable of setting appropriate
configuration management standards and related approval procedures and
FRA intends to rely on AAR to monitor ECP brake component approval,
configuration and compatibility for systems designed and approved under
its standards incorporated herein. However, FRA, in its federal
oversight
[[Page 61526]]
role, will continue to monitor the activities of the Air Brake Systems
Committee and the AAR ECP brake approval process to ensure that any
safety or reliability issues that may emerge are addressed promptly and
comprehensively. FRA will also issue additional configuration
management requirements for the operation of ECP brake systems if, in
the sole opinion of the FRA, the oversight of the AAR and the AAR Air
Brake Systems Committee proves inadequate for the continued safe
operation of ECP brake systems. In this case, FRA may take a variety of
approaches including requiring railroads and car owners to develop
their own configuration management plans for monitoring ECP brake
system interchangeability, interoperability and compatibility.
In relation to the issue of ECP brake system configuration
management plans, FRA received comments from BLET at the public hearing
and written comments in response to FRA's notice seeking comment on AAR
Standard S-4270. At the hearing, BLET stated that configuration
management plans must conform to the requirements of part 236, subpart
H. According to BLET, ``There is a strong likelihood that the majority
of the routes over which ECP will be deployed also will see the
implementation of positive train control (`PTC'). Given the manner in
which PTC will enforce speeds and authorities, the ECP head-end unit
and its associated appurtenances will become a core element of the PTC
system.'' In its written comments, BLET added, ``We continue to believe
that--to the extent ECP-equipped trains operate on routes where PTC has
been or will be installed--the ECP technology is a processor-based
train control system. Braking algorithms for speed and authority
enforcement for ECP-equipped trains will differ significantly from
those utilized for conventionally-braked trains.''
FRA understands BLET's contention to be that, if an ECP brake
system ``is considered a core element of PTC system'' or ``is
considered a train control system,'' then it must comply with the
configuration management requirements contained in Part 236, Subpart H,
905(b)(4). While FRA acknowledges the importance of configuration
management, it does not agree that ECP brake systems must conform to
the requirements of part 236, subpart H. Although ECP brakes may have a
significant impact on the safety case prepared under subpart H of part
236 for train control systems, FRA does not consider the brake system,
standing alone, to constitute a train control system.
The current implementation of ECP brake technology and processor
based train control technology are two independent industry
initiatives. FRA recognizes the potential for the future use of both
technologies onboard a single locomotive and FRA looks forward to such
integration. Of course, operations that contemplate using both PTC and
ECP brakes in a common operation must include the ECP brake system as
an integral part of the Product Safety Plan for the train control
system. While the ECP brake system itself is not subject to subpart H
of part 236, ECP brakes may not be utilized with processor based train
control systems until the impact on their use has been included in the
required analysis of the train control system under subpart H of part
236 and that analysis has been approved by FRA. Given the superior
characteristics of ECP brake systems, and assuming straightforward
integration with new train control systems, the use of ECP braking
should be helpful in the formulation of persuasive safety case
documents.
FRA acknowledges BLET's concern that ``AAR's proposed S-4270
Standard is materially inferior to the other S-4200 standards,'' and
their strong recommendation to FRA to insist on ``(1) the use of
identified, scientifically-proven configuration management plans, and
(2) the delineation of `bright line' triggers governing the urgency
with which hardware and/or software changes must be made.'' FRA further
acknowledges BLET's concern regarding ``[delegation] to AAR's Air Brake
System Committee oversight of [ECP brake] product approval,
implementation, and operations.''
In the NPRM, FRA recommended the use of acceptable IEEE software
configuration management standards such as IEEE-828 and IEEE-1042 for
the development of ECP brake system configuration management plans. 72
FR 50820, 50831 (Sept. 4, 2007). As BLET notes, neither of these
standards are referenced in the proposed AAR S-4270 standard, and the
proposed standard passes the responsibility to develop and maintain the
configuration management plan for the ECP brake product to the
manufacturers. FRA, however, does not believe that such actions are
inconsistent with either IEEE-828 or IEEE-1042, since both standards
provide for and encourage tailoring appropriate to individual products
and the system developers' operational needs. For example, IEEE-828
makes the following provisions:
This standard permits significant flexibility in preparing an
SCM Plan. A successful Plan reflects its project environment. It
should be written in terms familiar to its users and should be
consistent with the development and procurement processes of the
project. To conform to the requirements set forth in other
applicable standards or to accommodate local practices, a Plan may
be tailored upward, to add information, or tailored to use a
specified format. The Plan may also be tailored downward, omitting
information required by this standard, when specific standard
requirements are identified as not applicable to this project. * * *
The information may be presented in the Plan in any sequence or
presentation style deemed suitable for the Plans users.
Similarly, IEEE-1042 states:
The application (and thus the planning) of SCM is very sensitive
to the context of the project and the organization being served. If
SCM is applied as a corporate policy, it must not be done blindly,
but rather should be done in such a way that the details of a
particular SCM application are reexamined for each project (or phase
for very large projects). It must take into consideration the size,
complexity, and criticality of the software system being managed,
and the number of individuals, amount of personnel turnover, and
organizational form and structure that have to interface during the
life of the software system being managed.
The AAR S-4720 standard, particularly in Sec. 3.3.2, outlines the main
requirements to the ECP brake system configuration management plan that
are common to the requirements of the IEEE and other standards
referenced in the NPRM. Section 3.3.2 additionally requires that ``the
manufacturer shall maintain a readily retrievable record of all
software and hardware changes and make that record available to the AAR
and FRA at any time.'' In any event, the NPRM merely stated that FRA
expected any configuration management plan to conform to an accepted
standard; the IEEE standards referenced were simply provided as
acceptable examples.
FRA would also like to address BLET's concern regarding the
``delineation of `triggers' governing the urgency of the software/
hardware changes implementation.'' FRA has reviewed industry practice
regarding software changes and has determined that the levels contained
in AAR Standard S-4270 are consistent with the IEEE 1044 and 1044.1.
These standards differentiate the urgency of software and hardware
implementation schedules in order to assure gradual implementation
without significantly affecting operations. FRA considers the use of
the three levels of software and hardware implementation strategy given
in Sec. 3.6 of S-4270 as reasonable and practically justified.
[[Page 61527]]
To further assure and enforce compliance of the ECP brake
manufacturers' configuration management plans with the final rule and
appropriate standards, FRA makes vendor and railroad compliance with S-
4270 a regulatory mandate subject to regulatory oversight in paragraph
(c) of this section in the final rule. AAR Standard S-4270 places the
responsibility for configuration management on the brake manufacturers.
Paragraph (c) of this section, however, requires the railroads
implementing and using ECP brake technology to ensure that the brake
manufacturers' configuration management plans comply with the existing
applicable standards. FRA believes that the users of rail technologies
are ultimately responsible for their safe use.
Paragraph (c) also provides for regulatory oversight of
configuration management plans, which could include a review of the
manufacturer's commitment and adherence to the general requirements of
accepted or scientifically proven configuration management plans. Based
on the allowances for customization of the configuration management
standards to support a specific vendor's mode of operation, and the
inclusion of FRA regulatory oversight to ensure that vendor's standards
are appropriate, FRA considers the content of S-4270 standard
sufficient to be incorporated by reference in this final rule.
Paragraph (d), of this section excepts a freight car or freight
train equipped with ECP brakes from certain existing provisions
contained in part 232. FRA recognizes that part 232 requires compliance
with other AAR standards not applicable to ECP brake systems. For
instance, section 232.103(l) requires compliance with AAR Standard S-
469-47 (``Performance Specification for Freight Brakes''), which
specifies a train's air brakes must respond to the decrease and
increase of brake pipe pressure. However, ECP brake systems respond to
an electronic signal, not brake pipe pressure, rendering S-469-47
inapplicable to ECP brake systems. Accordingly, paragraph (d) excepts
ECP brake systems from the requirements of AAR Standard S-469-47.
In addition, GE requests that an exception be granted to certain
stand-alone ECP brake systems to the AAR standards referenced in Sec.
232.603(a)(1)-(6), where a suitable justification is provided. To this
end, GE supplied proposed language to be inserted in a new paragraph of
the final rule. While FRA agrees that the rules should provide for
alternative standards, such flexibility is already provided in the
introductory text to paragraph (a) of this section. If GE or any other
potential brake manufacturer seeks to enter the marketplace with ECP
brakes relying on standards other than AAR's, then it may submit
alternative standards for FRA approval pursuant to Sec. 232.17.
Accordingly, a new paragraph providing for exception from the
incorporated AAR standards under suitable justification is unnecessary.
Moreover, paragraph (e), provides further flexibility for the
introduction of new technologies by providing for the possible
exceptions from the requirements of subpart F of this part. BLET
objects to exempting railroad operators from the requirements of
subpart F. According to BLET, the pre-revenue service acceptance
testing plan requirements set forth in subpart F provide data and other
information that is necessary in order to safely regulate the
technology. BLET also asserts that ``FRA does not propose that an
exception be granted if testing or demonstration is conducted pursuant
to an AAR standard that has been incorporated by reference after being
subject to public review and comment. Rather, FRA proposes a lower
requirement, that the testing/demonstration standard only be FRA-
recognized.'' (Emphasis removed.)
Subpart F of part 232 contains general requirements for introducing
new brake system technologies. More specifically, it requires a pre-
revenue acceptance testing plan. As FRA views existing ECP brake system
technology to be a fully mature and well-tested technology, FRA
disagrees with BLET on this issue and does not believe the provisions
contained in subpart F are applicable to this existing technology. When
subpart F was originally added to part 232, ECP brake technology was
just beginning to gain prominence. Since that time, experience with the
technology is far more developed and the technology is being used on
many different trains around the world. Moreover, FRA believes that
requiring ECP brake systems to initially and continually comply with a
FRA approved standard and to be approved in accordance with AAR's
approval procedures prior to being placed in service obviates the need
for existing ECP brake system technology to comply with the
requirements under subpart F. Accordingly, paragraph (d)(2) provides
for an exception from the requirements contained in subpart F freight
trains and freight cars equipped with existing ECP brake system
technology that has been conditionally or finally approved by AAR in
accordance with its approval procedures prior to the effective date of
the final rule in this proceeding. FRA has limited the exception to ECP
brake system technologies approved by AAR as of the effective date of a
final rule to provide an incentive to the industry to move the
introduction of the technology along in a timely fashion.
In anticipation of future ECP brake technologies not currently
contemplated within the scope of the incorporated AAR standards or not
approved by AAR prior to the effective date of a final rule in this
proceeding, paragraph (e) provides a procedure for introducing such
technologies without going through the pre-revenue testing procedures
contained in subpart F. Paragraph (e) permits a party interested in
using new ECP brake system technologies or using an ECP brake system
technology not approved by AAR prior to the effective date of the final
rule in this matter to file a written request with the FRA seeking an
exception from subpart F. FRA would expect any such request to include
a comprehensive narrative statement and any evidence or facts
justifying the exception of the new ECP brake technology from the
testing and demonstration requirements of subpart F. The material
should fully explain the testing or demonstration that will be
conducted pursuant to an FRA-recognized industry standard and ensure
that FRA is able to monitor such testing or demonstration. FRA's
Associate Administrator may revoke the exception in writing for any
reason after providing an opportunity for the affected party or parties
to respond.
GE supports the adoption of proposed Sec. 232.603(e), but
recommends that ``FRA clarify that `new technology' does not include
functionally equivalent replacement components, consistent with past
practice.'' To this end, GE suggests adding a ``new technology''
definition to part 232, clarifying this interpretation in the preamble
to the final rule, or including some additional clarifying language to
paragraph (e), indicating that in lieu of an FRA recognized industry
standard, testing or demonstration of new technologies should be
performed in an environment with a safety equivalent to that in
paragraph (a).
Subpart F, as indicated in Sec. 232.501, already addresses the
issue of new technology. FRA intends subpart F to continue to apply to
the introduction of new ECP brake technologies. However, as previously
mentioned, the purpose of paragraph (e) is to provide a more liberal
alternative to subpart F for the demonstration and testing of new ECP
brake technologies subject to the
[[Page 61528]]
discretion of the Associate Administrator on a case-by-case basis.
GE's suggestion that the final rule include language requiring some
type of adherence to an FRA approved ECP brake design standard misses
the mark, since demonstration and testing may occur before any
determination on design standards. Chronologically speaking, new ECP
brake technologies can be tested and demonstrated under paragraph (e)
``right out of the box.'' Then, if the testing or demonstration results
in an ECP brake technology worthy of use in revenue service, the
manufacturer of that technology may need to apply for FRA approval of
that technology's new design standard under paragraph (a) or (f). It
appears that GE may have mixed apples (testing and demonstration) with
oranges (subsequently seeking FRA approval or new alternative design
standards). During the testing and demonstration phase, design
standards may not even be contemplated.
Section 232.605 Training Requirements
The general training requirements for railroad and contractor
employees performing the inspection, testing, and maintenance on brake
systems under this part are contained in Sec. 232.203. Paragraph (a)
of this section makes clear that all of the training requirements
contained in Sec. 232.203 are applicable to ECP brake system
operations and requires that all railroads operating ECP brake-equipped
trains update their training, qualification, and designation programs
to include provisions for these operations. Accordingly, FRA expects
that railroad and contract personnel responsible for performing brake
system inspections, tests, and maintenance on ECP brake systems be
trained, tested, and designated in accordance with the requirements
contained in Sec. 232.203 on the ECP brake systems they will be
required to inspect, test, and maintain.
Section 232.203(c) contains general requirements or elements which
must be part of any training and qualification plan adopted by a
railroad or contractor. FRA continues to believe that the elements
contained in this section are specific enough to ensure high-quality
training and broad enough to permit a railroad or contractor to adopt a
training plan that is best suited to its particular operation. FRA
continues to believe that the required training must provide employees
with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the
tasks required for the various types of brake systems the individual
employee will be required to inspect, test, or maintain. Since FRA
expects only a limited number of employees will be involved initially
with ECP brake operations, a railroad or contractor may tailor its
training programs only for those individuals involved with ECP brake
systems, based on the tasks that employee will be required to perform
on those specific systems.
Section 232.203(e) contains recordkeeping requirements, the
cornerstone for training requirements accountability. FRA continues to
believe that such records should be kept for employees inspecting,
testing, and maintaining ECP brake-equipped freight cars and freight
trains. Such documentation will allow FRA to judge the effectiveness of
the training provided and will provide FRA with the ability to
independently assess whether the training provided to a specific
individual adequately addresses the skills and knowledge required to
perform the tasks that the person is deemed qualified to perform.
Moreover, requiring these records will deter railroads and contractors
from circumventing the training requirements and discourage them from
attempting to utilize insufficiently trained personnel to perform the
inspections and tests required by this rule. The required records may
be maintained either electronically or on paper in the same manner as
required under section 232.203.
Paragraph (a) of this section also requires ECP brake operations to
comply with Sec. 232.203(f), which requires that each railroad or
contractor adopt and comply with a plan to periodically assess the
effectiveness of its training program. To ensure that affected
employees receive timely, effective training relating to ECP brake
technology, UTU encourages FRA to audit the training functions that are
required under Sec. 232.605. BLET agrees with UTU that FRA should
reserve the right to audit such training programs and also proposes
that training programs should be submitted to FRA for approval. AAR
argues that the regulations should not require FRA approval of railroad
training programs, since it would delay any changes that railroads
might want to make.
FRA currently performs audits on the training provided to railroad
employees and contractors under Sec. 232.203. These audits examine the
course content, learning objectives, testing methods, refresher
training, and methods for ensuring the effectiveness of the training.
FRA intends to continue to audit these training programs, including
those for transportation and mechanical employees working with ECP
brake operations. FRA does not require submission of training programs
relating to conventional brake operations for FRA approval and does not
see a need to require a submission of training programs relating to ECP
brake operations. Accordingly, paragraph (a) extends this requirement
to employees and contractors utilizing ECP brake operations.
In addition, FRA continues to believe that railroads and
contractors should periodically assess the effectiveness of their
training programs that would include an assessment of the training
related to ECP brake systems. FRA continues to believe that periodic
assessments may be conducted through a number of different means and
each railroad or contractor may have a need to conduct the assessment
in a different manner. By referencing the requirements contained in
Sec. 232.203, paragraph (a) requires that a railroad or contractor
institute a plan to periodically assess its training program regarding
ECP brake systems and permits the use of efficiency tests or periodic
review of employee performance as methods for conducting such review.
While FRA continues to believe that many railroads are capable of
assessing the quality of the training their employees receive by
conducting periodic supervisory spot checks or efficiency tests of
their employees' performance, FRA also believes that on larger
railroads the periodic assessment of a training program should involve
all segments of the workforce involved in the training.
Paragraph (b) of this section requires each railroad to
appropriately amend or modify its operating rules to include safe train
handling procedures when utilizing ECP braking systems. The developed
operating rules should address the equipment and territory operated by
the railroad. FRA insists that training on proper train handling
procedures is essential to ensuring that locomotive engineers can
properly handle their trains with or without ECP braking systems. FRA
also continues to believe that it should not specify the specific
knowledge, skill, and ability criteria that a railroad must adopt into
its locomotive engineer training program. Given the considerable
differences among railroads, FRA believes that each railroad is in the
best position to determine what these criteria should be and what
training is necessary to provide that knowledge, skill, and ability to
its employees operating ECP brake-equipped trains. However, to ensure
that the railroads and contractors provide and complete training,
paragraph (c) of this section
[[Page 61529]]
requires each to adopt and comply with such criteria and training
procedures and to incorporate them into its locomotive engineer
certification program required by 49 CFR part 240. In the final rule,
the text of paragraph (c) has been modified from the proposed text for
clarification purposes.
Section 232.607 Inspection and Testing Requirements
Except for transfer trains, the existing part 232 regulations
require that each train operating with conventional brake systems
receive a Class I brake test at its initial terminal and when certain
events occur en route, a Class IA brake test every 1,000 miles, and
Class III brake tests when the train consist continuity is interrupted.
When operating as an extended haul train, the existing regulations
require that a Class I brake test be performed at the train's initial
terminal and at the train's 1,500-mile location, if operating further
than 1,500 miles. In addition, under certain circumstances, cars and
solid blocks of cars are required to receive either a Class I or a
Class II brake test when they are added to a train. Each of these
inspections is expensive and time-consuming.
An ECP brake system's self-monitoring capabilities, fail-safe
operation, and enhanced safety and performance provide railroads the
ability to reduce the number of physical inspections on a train. In a
letter dated January 26, 2007, filed in the related ECP brake waiver
proceeding, BNSF and NS assert that ``[t]his performance-based
technology supercedes [sic] the need for a scheduled inspection based
on the amount of mileage that can be accumulated within the boundaries
of the U.S. rail system.'' Docket No. FRA-2006-26435. Similarly, in the
same docket, two ECP brake manufacturers, NYAB and Wabtec, state that
when an ECP brake system enters ``Run'' mode, it provides diagnostics,
continuous monitoring, and fault reporting to the locomotive display.
According to the manufacturers, ECP brakes provide to the locomotive
monitoring and feedback of the most important brake data and ``while it
is not economically practical to monitor for all potential brake system
failures, the increased level of monitoring and data reporting should
allow safely extending the distance between inspection points, coupled
with revised railroad procedures.'' Letter dated January 29, 2007, in
Docket No. FRA-2006-26435.
FRA is convinced that if a train is properly and thoroughly
inspected, with all of the defective conditions being eliminated, then
the train is capable of traveling distances much greater than 1,000
miles between brake inspections. FRA's experience with extended haul
trains over the last four years has established that trains with
conventional pneumatic brake systems that are inspected by highly
qualified individuals can safely operate up to 1,500 miles between
brake inspections. FRA is not aware of any significant incident or
derailment related to a brake or mechanical component failure on an
extended haul train. Accordingly, in paragraph (h) of this section, FRA
excepts trains operating exclusively in ECP brake mode from the Class
IA and Class II brake inspections currently required under Sec. Sec.
232.207 and 232.209. Paragraph (h) also excepts such trains from en
route Class I inspections required under Sec. 232.205(a) and (b).
Various comments were submitted relating to these exceptions of en
route brake inspections. Since the exceptions in paragraph (h)
substantially relate to the other paragraphs of section 232.607, we
will discuss them as appropriate below.
Paragraph (a) requires continued compliance with Sec. 232.205(c)--
which describes the tasks and requirements of a Class I brake test--for
an ECP brake-equipped train at its initial terminal. To offset safety
concerns regarding the exceptions to intermediate inspections, FRA
requires that Class I brake tests performed at initial terminals on ECP
brake-operated freight trains be performed by a qualified mechanical
inspector (QMI). FRA continues to believe that a Class I brake test
performed on a train at its initial terminal needs to be as in-depth
and comprehensive as possible and, thus, should be performed by an
individual possessing the knowledge not only to identify and detect a
defective condition in all of the brake equipment required to be
inspected, but also to recognize the interrelated workings of the
equipment and the ability to trouble-shoot and repair the equipment.
Similarly, FRA will require that all of the mechanical inspections
required to be performed on a train at its initial terminal be
conducted by an inspector designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 in order
to ensure that all mechanical components are in proper condition prior
to the train's departure.
FRA believes that the regulatory relief provided by paragraph (h)
of this section is justified by the increased level of safety provided
by ECP brake technologies and the requirement under paragraph (a) that
a Class I brake test of car equipped with ECP brakes be performed by a
QMI at its initial terminal. The exceptions provided in paragraph (h),
in conjunction with the requirements of paragraph (a), would allow most
trains equipped and operated with ECP brakes to travel to their
destinations without stopping for any required intermediate
inspections. The regulatory relief provided by this elimination of
intermediate brake tests will significantly reduce operating and train
delay costs.
In its comments, UP argues that it is not necessary to utilize a
QMI to perform a Class I brake inspection for movements up to 3,500
miles. UP instead proposes that a qualified person (QP) perform Class 1
inspections for movements up to 3,500 miles and that a QMI be required
to perform inspections for longer movements. UP also notes that some
trains operated with ECP brakes may originate at a point where a QMI is
not present and where train crews containing a QP may perform the
inspections. AAR also objects to the requirement in paragraph (a) that
Class I inspections on ECP brake operated trains be performed by a QMI.
AAR asserts that the QMI requirement is more stringent than the
existing inspection requirements for trains equipped with conventional
brakes. According to AAR, since a QMI is not present at all initial
terminals, requiring a QMI to perform Class I brake inspections would
discourage railroads from implementing ECP brake systems.
BRC supports paragraph (a), stating that a QMI will help ensure the
proper condition of ECP brake systems prior to departure. According to
BRC, the leeway requested by AAR and the carriers to designate any
person as qualified is premature and should not be considered until
data can be provided showing that inspections by a QMI are unnecessary.
BLET wholeheartedly concurs that each Class I brake test at an initial
terminal should be performed by a QMI. According to BLET, the
industry's objection is without merit and its two-standard proposal
will produce an oversight nightmare.
FRA agrees that, at this time, a two-tiered approach requiring a
QMI for only some Class I inspections of ECP brake operations would
result in significant monitoring and enforcement difficulties. In any
event, as discussed in more detail below, the final rule will only
allow freight trains and freight cars operated with ECP brakes to
operate to their destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, or up to 3,500
miles for unit or cycle trains, before receiving an additional Class I
brake inspection. Accordingly, there will be no ``longer movements''
between Class I brake
[[Page 61530]]
inspections that would allow for such a two-tiered approach.
FRA also believes that the railroads' concerns relating to QMIs are
without merit. FRA is not mandating the railroads to operate with ECP
brake systems. Thus, if the railroads opt to implement such systems,
they will need to adjust their operations accordingly. FRA already
requires that a QMI perform Class I brake inspections on extended haul
operations, which are limited to 1,500 miles between such inspections.
By more than doubling the allowable distance, FRA insists that there is
an even greater need to require that a QMI perform the Class I brake
tests on operations traveling further than the currently allowed
distances. Moreover, the railroads' concerns are further mitigated by
the reduction of the number of Class I brake inspections required en
route. Since a QMI is required for extended haul operations at only
1,500 miles, it is unclear why AAR asserts that requiring the use of a
QMI for ECP brake operations at 3,500 miles would be more stringent.
In light of the significant benefits provided by the extension of
allowable distance between Class I inspections to 3,500 miles, FRA does
not believe that requiring a QMI to perform a Class I brake test on for
an ECP brake operation would discourage implementation of this
technology. The railroads have had little difficulty in ensuring QMI
placement at facilities where Class I inspections are required on
extended haul trains. Since the number of Class I inspections for an
ECP brake operation will be less than those for a conventional brake
operation in extended haul status, FRA does not foresee this
requirement becoming sufficiently burdensome to effectively discourage
the implementation of ECP brake system technology.
In paragraph (b), FRA permits a train operating in ECP brake mode
to travel up to 3,500 miles or to its destination, whichever is less,
without any additional brake inspections. FRA believes that 3,500 miles
allows virtually all ECP brake operated trains to travel to their
respective destinations and provides for coast-to-coast travel. FRA
also bases this mileage amount on the fact that foundation brake
rigging and brake shoes will safety operate this distance and redundant
intermediate inspections will not necessarily increase ECP brake system
safety. Because many unit or cycle trains operate in a continuous loop
with multiple loading and unloading locations, FRA has not included the
destination of the train as a limiting factor for them. FRA is
specifically making this distinction in order to prevent
misinterpretation of the final rule as it relates to unit or cycle
trains. As these trains may have multiple destinations, a strict
application of destination could result in Class I brake tests being
performed more frequently than intended by this final rule. Thus, in
paragraph (b)(2), FRA treats unit and cycle trains differently by only
requiring them to receive Class I brake inspections by qualified
mechanical inspectors at least once every 3,500 miles. To be clear,
under the final rule, no freight car or freight train equipped with ECP
brakes would be allowed to travel more than 3,500 miles without
receiving an additional Class I brake inspection by a qualified
mechanical inspector.
UTU encourages FRA to continue to consistently regulate the need
for mechanical inspections and repairs. UTU asserts that the self-
monitoring feature of ECP brake equipment will have no effect on
monitoring the mechanical functions of the freight car involved.
According to UTU, ECP brake equipment will not monitor the condition of
draft gear, brake shoes and hangers, coupling devices, safety
appliances and grab irons, sill steps, springs, hopper doors, and the
multitude of items a normal mechanical inspection is designed to check.
UTU also asserts that a well trained and qualified mechanical inspector
must not be removed from the safety equation because of advanced brake
equipment that is only designed to improve the braking functions.
BLET agrees, asserting that continuous monitoring capability is not
quite as robust as FRA claims. According to AAR Standard S-4260, Sec.
3.5.4.2, ``CCDs with a low or missing battery are counted as
inoperable, but may not be displayed as inoperable until the total
inoperable reaches less than 90% with trainline power OFF, or less than
85% with trainline power ON, at which time a penalty brake application
will be commanded.''
TWU similarly argues that ECP braking does not have capabilities to
perform the safety critical inspections indicated in FRA Technical
Bulletin MP&E 98-59. In contrast, says TWU, ECP brake systems, as
designed today, while having the ability to monitor certain aspects of
the braking system, are not designed or equipped to monitor or detect
defects on most equipment of a train braking system, in particular the
complex brake rigging systems on the various types of equipment.
According to TWU, 122 of the potential 127 brake-related defects (96%)
are not detectable by ECP brake monitoring, making clear that the
advantages of real-time monitoring are both overstated and misleading.
BRC asserts that the ECP brake system technology cannot detect 65
defects. Moreover, TWU states that FRA accident data indicates that the
highest percentage of accidents are caused by brake-related mechanical
defects not monitored by ECP brake systems.
TWU further asserts that, in addition to a serious decrease in the
level of safety based on brake system considerations, the reduction in
inspection frequency will seriously decrease the level of safety as it
relates to other mechanical systems and components. ``There should be
no question that reducing the number of inspections will reduce
opportunities to detect defective equipment. The reduction in frequency
of inspections will also reduce opportunities for detecting bent,
broken, loose, or missing safety appliances.'' TWU points out that FRA
previously noted that ``railroads have not conducted the excellent
initial terminal inspections that were contemplated in 1982, when FRA
extended the 500-mile inspection interval to 1,000 miles.'' (Citing 66
FR 4113 (Jan. 17, 2001)). TWU also claims that from January 2005 to
July 2007, FRA accident data includes 24 derailments, 2 collisions, and
3 other type of accidents resulting from mechanical defects, including
``Tiedowns, doors, etc.'' TWU asserts that a comprehensive mechanical
inspection is critically important, citing FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E
98-57, which states, ``In order to conduct a proper Freight Car Safety
Standards inspection, both sides of a car must be inspected.''
AAR counters by questioning the significance of the brake rigging
issue. According to AAR, from 1990 to 2006, ``the industry averaged
five mainline accidents attributable to brake rigging down and
dragging,'' identified by FRA cause code E07C. In addition, says AAR,
U.S. railroads have 2,415 dragging equipment detectors placed across
the country, which provide immediate radio feedback to train crews.
FRA understands the concerns relating to the ECP brake system's
self-monitoring limitations. FRA acknowledges that the ECP brake system
developed under the applicable AAR design standards does not monitor a
number of brake components. However, FRA believes that the labor
unions' concerns, while relevant, do not take into account a number of
factors. By requiring a QMI to perform a Class I brake inspection at
initial terminal on an ECP brake operated freight train, FRA expects a
reduction in all en route brake
[[Page 61531]]
defects. While performing a Class I brake inspection every 1,000 miles
would provide more opportunities to detect defective equipment, FRA
believes that such detection is limited to only obvious en route
defects and that an inspection by a QMI at initial terminal will
significantly reduce those defects. Based on its experience with
extended haul operations, FRA feels that a good, quality inspection
conducted by a QMI at the initial terminal will ensure that the items
not monitored by the ECP brake system computer will safely travel a
distance of 3,500 miles.
For instance, in FRA's experience, en route Class IA brake
inspections performed subsequent to Class I brake inspections performed
at initial terminals by QPs have significantly higher defect ratios
than those found at en route Class I brake inspections performed on
extended haul operations that received an earlier Class I brake
inspection performed by a QMI. As indicated in Technical Bulletin MP&E
07-01, issued on April 3, 2007, in addition to the numerous regular
inspections of extended haul operations, FRA performed several formal
week-long audits at various locations to determine the railroads'
compliance with the regulations and whether the quality of the
inspections and tests would justify allowing the inbound inspections
and record-keeping requirements to sunset in April of 2007. Most of the
non-compliance identified during the audits included the railroads'
inability to create, maintain, and produce the required records of
defects found during the inbound inspections. It was also noted that
the railroads occasionally failed to perform the necessary inspections
on cars picked-up or set-out of extended haul trains on certain
corridors. Actual defective conditions found at inbound inspections
were minimal.
FRA further believes that any remaining concerns relating to en
route defects are offset by the ECP brake system's other significant
safety benefits, including increased train control, a reduction of in-
train forces, shorter stopping distances, and its self-monitoring
capabilities. Moreover, while some commenters provided data on what
portion of brake parts remain unmonitored by the ECP brake system, they
did not establish the relationship between those parts and the quantity
and significance of defects found and derailments caused. FRA continues
to believe that the ECP brake system monitors the more crucial aspects
of the brake system.
FRA believes that TWU's references to freight car inspection
standards and guidance are misplaced. Although freight car defects may
be incidentally detected during a Class I brake inspection, part 232
does not govern such issues. Freight car defects should still be found
when cars are added to a train en route and when they are otherwise
required to receive a freight car inspection under part 215.
FRA also continues to believe that ECP brake system self-monitoring
is sufficiently robust. BLET's citation of Sec. 3.5.4.2 of AAR
Standard S-4260 is misplaced. Section 3.5.4.2 sets the limit for the
number of CCDs that report a low or missing battery. This does not
reference or mean inoperable CCDs. All CCDs may remain operable when
reporting low or missing batteries. The ECP brake system is powered by
the train line and Sec. 3.5.4.2 only indicates that a back-up battery
is necessary to cover for a temporary loss of power. Accordingly, to
have a battery malfunction is not critical to train brake system
operation. The purpose of the limitation in Sec. 3.5.4.2 is to
eliminate the possibility of train line power disappearing when back-up
battery power is unavailable.
FRA recognizes and appreciates the use of additional wayside
detection equipment, which AAR claims should reduce concerns relating
to brake rigging malfunctions. However, FRA has not had an opportunity
to review that equipment with respect to key attributes such as network
coverage, sensitivity, and availability, and does not require use of
that equipment. Accordingly, FRA does not feel comfortable relying on
such unreviewed technology, which can be removed or modified at any
time. However, FRA does recognize that the combination of on-board and
wayside monitoring does provide an additional layer of safety for all
train operations and that the use of such technologies may offer
opportunities for further liberalization of visual inspections
requirements in the future, given proper safeguards.
UP believes that the allowable distance between brake inspections
using ECP brake technology should be extended to 5,000 miles, instead
of the 3,500 miles proposed by the FRA, in order to provide a
significant incentive for the railroad industry to implement ECP
braking in high-mileage services. For example, says UP, an intermodal
train with ECP braking could be operated round-trip between Chicago and
any of the west coast ports within such a 5,000 mile limit. According
to UP, a 5,000 mile limit for ECP brake operated trains between Class I
brake inspections with no intermediate inspections would enable the
operation of sets of intermodal equipment in very high-mileage, high-
utilization, rapid turnaround service.
To support its request, UP points to the success of a previous
operation. In April 2004, UP operated a round-trip test train 4,400
miles at a maximum speed of 74 MPH between Chicago and East Los
Angeles. Based on that test's findings, UP and CSX jointly operated one
pair of high-speed trailer on flat car (``TOFC'') trains for UPS
between Kearney, New Jersey and East Los Angeles, California, a trip
that took 59 hours. While there was some economic penalty involved in
this dedication of equipment, UP says that it proved that locomotives
and cars could be selected, maintained and operated in high-speed,
high-mileage transcontinental freight service. In addition to the Class
I inspections performed at Kearney and East Los Angeles, three Class 1A
inspections occurred en route. UP asserts that a 3,500 mile limit would
have been extremely valid and useful. According to UP, the elimination
of 3 intermediate brake inspections of 40 minutes each could have
potentially reduced overall one-way transit time by 120 minutes or 2
hours. An ECP brake operated train resulting in the same running time
as a conventional brake operated train would require a lower operating
speed and would have reduced fuel consumption and exhaust emissions.
AAR also supports a higher limit of 5,000 miles between Class I
inspections, asserting that it would be more consistent with FRA's
objective in this proceeding to facilitate conversion to ECP brake
technology and provide regulatory relief without adversely affecting
safety. According to AAR, a 5,000 mile limit would facilitate the
efficient operation of intermodal trains in high-mileage, rapid turn-
around service. AAR claims that there is no technical justification for
setting the limit at 3,500 miles instead of 5,000 miles given the
capability of ECP systems to monitor the critical functions of the air
brakes.
BRC supports paragraph (b), stating that the proposed distance of
3,500 miles is ``more than generous.'' According to BRC, AAR and the
carriers have not provided real evidence that the safety benefits
offered by ECP brake technologies will offset any of the numerous
safety risks that the technologies cannot detect over long distances.
BRC asserts that without such data, the railroads' request for a 5,000
mile allowable distance between Class I
[[Page 61532]]
brake inspections should not be considered at this time.
After consideration of all the comments provided and based upon
existing information available to the agency, FRA is not convinced that
the allowable distance for ECP brake operations should exceed 3,500
miles between Class I brake inspections. FRA believes that an extension
of the allowable distance to 3,500 miles is justified by the increased
safety promised by ECP brake technology and provides a suitable
incentive for railroads to implement and use ECP brake technology.
While FRA supports the railroads' interest in operational and fuel
efficiency, FRA believes the extension to 3,500 miles provides such
efficiency. Moreover, based on its experience and the lack of safety
data supporting a 5,000 mile allowable distance between Class I brake
inspections for ECP brake operations, FRA does not feel comfortable
further extending the allowable distance limit at this time. The only
example provided by UP was a 4,400 mile joint operation with CSX that
received three Class 1A brake inspections while en route. Although such
demonstrations, with proper documentation, are helpful, acquisition of
further experience will be needed to achieve confidence in less
restricted longer hauls.
AAR and UP also commented on FRA concerns relating to brake shoe
wear. AAR claims that brake shoe wear should not be a concern in ECP
brake operations moving with up to 5,000 miles between brake
inspections. According to AAR, ECP brakes reduce brake shoe wear and
the AAR condemning thickness of 3/8'' provides an ample safety margin
over a 5,000 mile run. UP stated that it would consider establishing
its own minimum brake shoe criteria to properly configure the train for
the entire round trip.
FRA appreciates UP's offer to consider establishing its own minimum
brake shoe criteria for trips involving more than 3,500 miles between
Class I inspections. However, FRA cannot rely on that voluntary offer,
which would apply only to one railroad and could be withdrawn at any
time. In any event, FRA continues to find cars with brake shoes that
are well past the brake shoe replacement condemning limits for trains
equipped with conventional brakes. On some trains not permitted to
travel beyond 1,500 miles between Class I brake inspections, brake
shoes have been found worn into the backing plate. Accordingly, FRA
does not feel comfortable at this time permitting trains to operate
more than 3,500 miles between comprehensive brake inspections until
more data can be obtained to support such an initiative.
Currently, no extended haul train is permitted to travel more than
1,500 miles without receiving another comprehensive brake inspection.
For trains equipped with ECP brakes, FRA more than doubles the
currently allowed distance to 3,500 miles. FRA acknowledges that in the
related proceeding, Docket No. FRA-2006-26435, the Safety Board
provided for the movement of trains equipped with ECP brakes up to
3,500 miles. During the pendency of this rulemaking, FRA closely
monitored those trains' operations and collected information on the
equipment operated in those trains. FRA reserved the right to make
appropriate modifications in the final rule based on any further data
then available. Since cars equipped with ECP brakes have only operated
for a limited time since the recent issuance of the waiver under Docket
FRA-2006-26435 and are not typical of those in the general fleet with
respect to the age of components, FRA has not received any data
convincing it to modify the rule as proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly,
paragraph (b) provides for a train operated with ECP brakes to travel
to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles, between brake
inspections.
FRA acknowledges, however, that notwithstanding the proposed
allowance of a train equipped and operated with ECP brakes to travel up
to 3,500 miles without an additional brake inspection, instances exist
where certain trains would require the performance of a Class I brake
inspection en route. For instance, the regulations governing operations
utilizing conventional brake systems require that certain tests be
performed when a car is off a source of compressed air for more than 4
hours. FRA acknowledges that an ECP brake-equipped train's on board
diagnostics reduce concerns relating to cars remaining off air for
extended periods of time. Accordingly, in this proceeding's NPRM, FRA
proposed to extend the allowable off-air period to 24 hours. For the
purposes of organizational clarity, the final rule includes the off-air
requirement in paragraph (b).
BLET opposes the 24-hour off-air limitation. According to BLET, the
allowable off-air period should remain at 4 hours and the Class I brake
inspections required on ECP brake operated trains after an off-air
period exceeding 4 hours should be performed by a QMI, not a qualified
person.
AAR, UP, NYAB, and Wabtec all assert that the allowable off-air
period should be extended to 120 hours (five days). According to UP,
providing for a 120 hour off-air period will be especially relevant for
equipment such as grain hoppers and coal cars in unit train operations
serving grain elevators or electrical generating plants, where intact
train sets may be parked for several days awaiting either loading or
unloading. UP further asserts that the self-diagnostic capability of
ECP braking systems, with results displayed in the locomotive cab upon
powering-up the ECP train line cable, will enable this to occur without
compromising safety. Moreover, being off-air for up to 120 hours should
not result in any measurable or visually identifiable deterioration of
the non-ECP brake components in the braking system. The ECP brake
manufacturers see no technical or safety issues with extending the
allowable off-air period to 120 hours and state that, when the ECP
brake system initializes, self testing will verify the car is ready for
service, including the battery charge status.
FRA believes that an expansion of the time allowed off-air for ECP
brake operations is justified based on the capabilities of ECP brake
systems or the combination of those capabilities and protection against
vandalism. Accordingly, FRA will require under paragraph (b) that an en
route Class I brake inspection be performed by a qualified person if a
train operating in ECP brake mode is off air for more than 24 hours.
However, if such a train is located within an ``extended-off-air
facility,'' as more fully described below, the time limit is extended
to 80 hours. FRA continues to believe that dangers, although reduced,
remain when an ECP brake-equipped train remains off air for too long.
Thus, the final rule retains the proposed off-air time limit of 24
hours since cars moving in service generally have a dwell time of 24
hours or less and this limit provides sufficient flexibility while
allowing the industry to move equipment without impacting timely
inspections and maintaining an acceptable level of safety.
In light of the comments filed in this proceeding and upon further
internal deliberation, FRA believes that extending the off air
requirement to 80 hours for trains left in extended-off-air facilities
effectively ensures the safe operation of ECP brake systems while
providing suitable flexibility for certain operations. FRA recognizes
that additional flexibility may be reasonable when a freight train or
freight car operated with ECP brakes is left at a protected location
controlled by the shipper or consignee and not accessible to the
railroad or potential vandals. For instance, a train or car equipped
with ECP brakes may be dropped off at a
[[Page 61533]]
consignee's plant on one morning and will be inaccessible to the
railroad for several days, such as over the weekend or a holiday.
Since railroads may not be able to pick up the equipment from the
extended-off-air facility immediately when it opens, FRA believes that
some additional operational flexibility should be provided during this
time. FRA also recognizes that providing a limited number of hours
after the opening of the facility on a given day may result in
enforcement issues when attempting to determine the actual number of
hours the train may have been off air or in the facility.
Accordingly, the final rule provides for the retrieval of the
equipment up until the close of business on the fourth day it is at the
facility. Assuming the extended-off-air facility maintains an 8-hour
work day, this would provide a time span of up to 80 hours in that
facility. For instance, FRA believes that the 80-hour time differential
between the facility opening on Friday morning and closing on the
directly subsequent Monday provides suitable flexibility for such
operations.
From a safety standpoint, FRA believes that an 80-hour off-air
limitation is justified if the train is left in an extended-off-air
facility. FRA previously expressed its belief that in certain
circumstances the length of time that equipment is removed from a
source of compressed air can impact the integrity and operation of the
brake system on a vehicle or train. Particularly, FRA indicated that
the potential for vandalism may be high due to the location where
equipment is left standing. See 66 FR 4122 (Jan. 17, 2001). While a
train remains off air for any period of time, it may be unattended,
providing an opportunity for vandalism. FRA continues to believe that
the potential for vandalism is one of various factors justifying an
off-air limitation.
If steps are taken to substantially reduce the potential for
vandalism, however, FRA believes additional flexibility is justified.
Thus, if a freight train or freight car operated with ECP brakes is at
an extended-off-air facility and is not accessible to the carrier or
potential vandals, FRA believes an 80-hour off-air limitation is
warranted. For the purposes of this final rule, an extended-off-air
facility is a private location controlled and access-restricted by a
sole shipper or consignee. The location must be suitably designed to
effectively and significantly reduce the possibility of vandalism. For
instance, a suitably fenced-in power plant with sufficient entry-
prohibitive security would suffice.
Also for the purposes of this final rule, the times the equipment
enters and departs the extended-off-air facility shall presumptively be
when the off-air time period begins and ends, respectively. Otherwise,
enforcement would be difficult, since FRA would be unable to ascertain
when a train or car went off and on air within the restricted area.
This presumption, however, may be rebutted with evidence showing when
the equipment actually went off air and when it was reconnected to an
air source.
For trains operating in ECP brake mode and off air for more than 24
hours, the Class I brake inspection may be performed by a qualified
person. FRA acknowledges that while a qualified mechanical inspector
must be stationed at each route's initial terminal, it is not
reasonable or feasible at this time to require one at each location a
train operating in ECP brake mode is off air for more than 24 hours,
because many of those locations will be unpredictable. Requiring a
qualified mechanical inspector at each point a train is off air for
more than 24 hours would likely result in a significant disincentive
for a railroad to equip its trains with ECP brake systems.
FRA also intends for these requirements to apply to trains
operating in ECP brake mode, located at their initial terminals, and
off air for more than 24 hours without the train consist being changed.
In other words, under paragraph (b), if a qualified mechanical
inspector performs a Class I brake test on a train operating in ECP
brake mode at the train's initial terminal and that train then goes off
air for more than 24 hours before departing from the initial terminal,
another Class I brake test must be performed prior to departure.
However, FRA believes that requiring a qualified mechanical inspector
at an initial terminal to perform a Class I brake test twice on the
same train with unmodified consist would be unnecessary and possibly
too onerous. FRA does not expect this situation to occur often, since
trains rarely sit off air for more than 24 hours after receiving a
Class I brake test. The train will not have traveled at all, but if the
same train spent 24 hours off air after traveling 500 miles, a Class I
brake test by a qualified person would suffice. Thus, the second Class
I brake test may be performed by a qualified person.
While FRA recognizes that additional experience with ECP brakes may
show that brake tests are no longer needed after being off air, FRA
does not believe the evidence suffices to prove that proposition today.
FRA's intent in providing these narrow expansions of the existing 4
hour rule is not to alter the tenet that equipment should be retested
when it is removed from a source of compressed air for any lengthy
period of time. The 24 and 80 hour off-air requirements apply to any
ECP brake operated train, regardless of whether it is a unit or cycle
train, and replace the 4 hour off-air requirement under Sec.
232.205(a), which is excepted under paragraph (h), as previously
indicated. The 24 hour allowance gives railroads the flexibility to
perform switching operations while ECP brake-equipped trains are en
route and provide flexibility to efficiently move cars from one ECP
brake-equipped train to another when necessary, yet retain the concept
that such cars or trains be retested when left disconnected from a
source of compressed air for longer periods of time. The 24 and 80 hour
time frames are also consistent with the general dwell time that cars
experience while en route and while in extended-off-air facilities. FRA
further believes that a limitation on the amount of time that such
equipment may be off air is necessary for ensuring that such equipment
is inspected in a timely and predictable manner. If no time limit were
imposed or if too much time was permitted, an ECP brake-equipped car
could lawfully sit for days or weeks at various locations while en
route to its destination and be switched in and out of numerous trains
without ever being reinspected. Such an approach would drastically
reduce the number of times that the brake systems on such equipment
would ever be given a visual inspection from what is currently required
and, in FRA's view, would seriously degrade the safety of the trains
operating with such equipment in their consists.
Furthermore, if an ECP brake-equipped train was allowed to be off-
air for an excessive amount of time, it would be virtually impossible
for FRA to ensure that equipment is being properly retested as it would
be extremely difficult for FRA to determine how long a particular piece
of equipment was disconnected from a source of compressed air. In order
to make such a determination, FRA would have to maintain observation of
the equipment for days at a time. Consequently, a 24-hour limit on the
amount of time equipment can be disconnected from a source of
compressed air as it maintains current levels of safety and provides an
enforceable and verifiable time limit that FRA believes provides the
railroads some additional benefit over what is currently required both
in terms of
[[Page 61534]]
operational efficiency and cost savings. An FRA inspector could monitor
a 24 hour off-air period by merely returning to the same accessible
location the very next day. FRA believes that a limited extension to 80
hours off air at extended-off-air locations provides for further
flexibility where the safe custodianship of the equipment is ensured
and where the amount of off-air hours can be easily determined.
In paragraph (c), the final rule retains the proposed requirement
that a Class I brake test be performed by a qualified person on each
ECP brake-equipped car added en route to a train operating in ECP brake
mode. However, FRA believes that this requirement may not be necessary
if other safety precautions are taken. Thus, the final rule will not
require a Class I brake test on such cars when being added to a train
operating in ECP brake mode if the car had previously received a timely
and proper Class I brake test by a QMI, the train crew is provided
documentation of that test, the car has not been off air for more than
what is allowed under the final rule, and a proper visual inspection is
performed prior to use or departure.
Accordingly, if an ECP brake-equipped car has received a Class I
brake test by a qualified mechanical inspector within the last 3,500
miles, documentation of that test is provided to the train crew, the
car has not been off air for more than the amount of time allowed by
this final rule, and a proper visual inspection is conducted when the
car is added to the train, FRA believes that it would be unnecessary to
require an additional Class I brake test when that car is added to an
en route train operating in ECP brake mode. However, to account for
those cars that have not received a Class I brake test by a qualified
mechanical inspector within the last 3,500 miles and that will be added
to a train operating in ECP brake mode, paragraph (c) requires a new
Class I brake test under those circumstances. Paragraph (c) is
necessary in light of paragraph (h) excepting compliance with section
232.205(b). Unless a car operating in ECP brake mode is off air for
more than the allowable time frame under this final rule, it would not
require a Class I brake test when it is added to a new train, since the
rules contemplate that the car would have already received a Class I
brake test within the previous 3,500 miles or at its initial terminal.
The documentation would be required to ensure that a Class I brake test
by a qualified mechanical inspector will be performed every 3,500
miles. Under paragraph (c), any ECP brake-equipped car being added to a
train operating in ECP brake mode would require a Class I brake test
when the car has been off air for more than the allowable amount of
time for the same reasons stated above concerning paragraph (c).
FRA believes that a visual inspection of the car's brake components
is a suitable replacement for an additional Class I brake test when the
car or cars added in these circumstances have received a Class I brake
test by a qualified mechanical inspector within the last 3,500 miles.
The visual inspection required by paragraph (c) could be performed
while the car is off air and in conjunction with the mechanical
inspection required under part 215 whenever a car is added to a train.
Thus, FRA believes that the visual inspection required by paragraph (c)
does not impose any significant burden on the railroads as they are
already required to visually inspect the mechanical components on any
car added to a train under part 215. FRA also acknowledges that the
brake systems on cars not equipped with ECP brakes would be inoperative
after being added to a train operating in ECP brake mode. To ensure the
safe operation of such equipment and trains, paragraph (c)(2) of the
final rule requires that cars equipped solely with conventional brake
systems and placed into trains operating in ECP brake mode also be
given a visual inspection to ensure their safe operation and to ensure
compliance with Sec. 232.15 when added to the train.
In the event that a car would be required to receive a Class I
brake test when added to an en route train, the final rule requires
that the Class I brake test be performed by a qualified person for the
same reasons stated in the above analysis. To be clear, although any
car added to a train en route may receive a Class I inspection by a
qualified person, the entire train's travel distance is limited to its
destination or the distance remaining until the train or any individual
car picked up en route has traveled 3,500 miles since its last Class I
brake inspection performed by a qualified mechanical inspector,
whichever is less. A Class I brake inspection by a qualified person
does not reset the mileage clock for the entire train.
FRA also sought comments on the application of a Class III brake
test to an ECP brake system. NS expressed its concern that the
specifications outlined under Sec. 232.211(c) cannot be met. According
to NS, that section relates to the increase and decrease of brake pipe
pressure as indicated by a rear end gauge or electronic telemetry
device. ECP braking systems provide for the constant charge of the
brake pipe and this rear end value will not reflect the air pressure
differential currently experienced with conventional braking systems.
NS asserts that since those brake reductions will be made
electronically rather than pneumatically from the locomotive, the end
of train device will not display a change in brake pipe pressure to
indicate a brake application.
A freight train operating with conventional brakes receives a Class
III brake test at the location where its configuration is changed in
order to ensure the integrity of the train line. Basically, a Class III
brake test ensures that the train brake pipe is properly delivering air
to the rear of the train. Upon further review and consideration of the
comments, FRA recognizes that for an ECP brake system, a traditional
Class III test may not be completely applicable.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) requires a Class III brake test for ECP
brake operated trains with certain modifications. Paragraph (d)(1)
includes the locations and events that require the performance of a
Class III brake test on an ECP brake operated train. Accordingly, Sec.
232.211(a) is being excepted under paragraph (h). Paragraph (d)(2)
recognizes that the Class III brake test requirements relating to using
EOT devices to observe brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of the
train is not practical with ECP brake operations. The diagnostic
capabilities of ECP brake systems will identify defective brake
conditions on all of the train's cars, including the rear car. Under
the applicable AAR standards, this information should automatically
appear on the ECP brake system monitor.
Paragraph (e) includes requirements relating to the sequential
initialization of ECP brake operated trains. The applicable AAR
standards--as defined in Sec. 4.2.3 and its subsections in AAR
Standard S-4200 and in Sec. 5.2 of AAR Standard S-4230--provide
procedures for the initialization of the ECP brake system. The
standards provide for the ECP brake system's initialization to occur by
car either randomly or sequentially. FRA believes that the sequential
initialization of an ECP brake system provides the train crew with the
exact placement of the cars in the train, which can help satisfy the
consist comparison requirements also under this paragraph. An
electronic version of the train consist displayed on the locomotive
cab's ECP brake system monitor can also help during emergencies and
when identifying the exact location of cars with brake problems.
[[Page 61535]]
Due to the possibility of an ECP brake system not recognizing the
inclusion of cars not equipped with ECP brake systems, paragraph (e)
requires the train crew compare the total number of cars indicated by
the train consist documentation with the total number of cars
identified by the ECP brake system.
Under the existing regulations, tests and inspections include brake
pipe service reductions and designate specific psi specifications. In
the NPRM, FRA indicated that modifications to the brake pipe reduction
standard are appropriate to reflect the technological differences
between ECP brakes and conventional pneumatic brakes. Brake pipe
pressure in ECP brake-equipped trains remains important, since these
trains still employ a pneumatic emergency brake application for safety
back-up purposes and rely on the pneumatic parts when used in an
overlay system. Accordingly, for trains equipped with ECP brake
systems, FRA proposed to replace the existing brake pipe service
reductions and increases with an alternative requirement for an
electronic signal that provides an equivalent application or release of
the brakes. FRA indicated that any alternative test procedures must
include, at a minimum, either the electronic equivalent to each
existing test's brake pipe reduction requirements or the equivalent of
a full service brake pipe reduction initiated by an electronic signal.
FRA sought comments on this proposal, including the appropriate
type of alternative test. In light of how the brake pipe's use in an
ECP brake train will be limited to charging brake air reservoirs, FRA
sought comments on how the existing regulatory brake pipe leakage
limits should be modified, if at all, for ECP brakes and whether
changes in the leakage requirements will affect the pneumatic backup
capability of the ECP brake system. In addition, FRA indicated that
comments should address the need to include the specific electronic
reduction that is to be made on ECP equipped trains during the required
brake tests and what type of electronic signals would be suitable
equivalents to the currently mandated 20-psi and 15-psi brake
reductions.
NS asserts that compliance with the brake pipe service reduction
requirements cannot be met with ECP brake operations. For instance, NS
notes that Sec. 232.211(c) relates to the increase and decrease of
brake pipe pressure as indicated by a rear end gauge or electronic
telemetry device. According to NS, ECP braking systems provide for the
constant charge of brake pipe and this rear end valve will not reflect
the air pressure differential currently experienced with conventional
braking. Since those brake reductions will be made electronically
rather than pneumatically from the locomotive, NS says that the ECP EOT
device will not display a change in brake pipe pressure to indicate a
brake application.
On the other hand, BLET believes that there is a need to include
both the specific electronic reduction that is to be made on ECP brake-
equipped trains during the required brake tests and a determination of
what type of electronic signals would be suitable equivalents to 20-psi
and 15-psi brake reductions mandated in part 232. BLET believes that
the appropriate alternative would be one that correlates a particular
psi reduction with its digital percentage equivalent. According to
BLET, assuming that the train brake command scale is relatively linear,
a 20 psi reduction represents approximately 77 percent of a full
service reduction and a 15 psi reduction represents approximately 58
percent of a full service reduction. Regarding brake pipe leakage, BLET
urges FRA to retain current regulatory limits, since overlay and
emulator systems permit conventional pneumatic operations. Furthermore,
AAR Standard S-4200, Sec. 3.8, states that a ``pneumatic backup (PB)
system shall be required on each car to apply emergency brake cylinder
pressure in the event of a vented brake pipe.'' Establishing different
brake pipe leakage limits, says BLET, is a prescription for confusion
and unnecessary risk.
AAR supports retaining the existing brake pipe leakage limits. NYAB
and Wabtec also commented, suggesting that, in order to maintain the
same functionality as with conventional brakes, an ECP train brake
command should be applied in the range of 80 to 85 percent to address
both the 15 and 20 psi reduction. According to the brake manufacturers,
the brake pipe continuity can be verified by a procedure that requires
watching the end of train brake pipe pressure as reported to the
locomotive.
FRA believes that an electronic or digital equivalent of the
current brake pipe reduction test should apply during a Class I brake
test on ECP brake operations. Since the brake manufacturers are in the
best position to determine that equivalent metric, FRA will rely on the
percentages proposed by NYAB and Wabtec. Accordingly, paragraph (f)(1)
will remain as proposed with the understanding that the electronic
equivalents of 80 percent and 85 percent ECP train brake command shall
replace the 15 and 20 psi reductions, respectively, when conducting
brake tests on ECP brake systems.
Further recognizing the disparity between the requirements of part
232 and the reality of ECP brake technology, paragraph (f) addresses
piston travel requirements as they apply to ECP brake operations.
Paragraph (f) modifies certain regulatory requirements related to
piston travel limits and adjustments during applicable brake
inspections under part 232. For instance, under Sec. 232.205(c)(5) a
person performing a Class I brake test must ensure that piston travel
be adjusted to specific distances. Although FRA believes that ECP brake
operations require specific piston travel limits, FRA recognizes that
the piston travel limits contained in Sec. 232.205(c)(5) may not be
fully applicable to ECP brake systems. Since the ECP brake system
precisely measures and maintains the amount of brake cylinder pressure
for each specified brake application, piston travel tolerances for ECP
brakes may not require the level of specificity as those for
conventional pneumatic brake operations. Further, FRA acknowledges that
a ``one-size-fits-all'' requirement for ECP brake system piston travel
may not be ideal or applicable. AAR and BLET support paragraph (f)(1).
BLET believes that paragraph (f) adequately addresses the subject of
nominal piston travel and AAR believes that manufacturers should be
permitted to establish alternative minimum piston travel ranges.
Accordingly, paragraph (f) provides flexibility for the piston
travel limits in Sec. 232.205(c)(5) as they apply to ECP brake
systems. While FRA limited this flexibility in the proposed rule to
minimum piston travel limits, the final rule provides this flexibility
to all piston travel limits in part 232 as applicable to ECP brake
operations. FRA anticipates that recommended piston travel limits for
each ECP brake system will be determined by the car's design, weight,
and engineered brake ratio.
The final rule requires that such limits be stenciled or marked on
the car or badge plate in the same fashion FRA requires for systems and
equipment subject to Sec. 232.103(g). FRA believes that requiring the
affixation of a legible decal, stencil, or sticker or the equipping of
a badge plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder pistol travel
ranges will effectively communicate the acceptable ranges to train crew
members and will ensure the proper operation of a car's brakes after
being inspected. FRA believes that this information is essential in
order for a person to properly perform the required brake inspections.
Ultimately, all
[[Page 61536]]
modifications provided under paragraph (f) apply to part 232 as it
relates to ECP brake operations.
In the preamble to the NPRM, FRA anticipated that placing a car
equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes into an ECP brake-equipped
train may be awkward at best, requiring use of an electrical ``run
around cable'' and manual inputs into the locomotive control system. In
a letter dated February 5, 2007, which is part of the docket to this
proceeding, AAR provided a list of recommended ``enhancements and
modifications'' to Part 232 to facilitate the use of ECP brakes. In
that communication, the AAR stated that railroads ``do not plan to
commingle non-ECP equipment in stand-alone ECP trains.'' However, FRA
expressed its belief that foreseeable--though rare--circumstances
should be considered in this rulemaking to the extent possible.
Accordingly, FRA sought comments and information on what requirements
may be necessary to safely allow the addition of cars equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes into a train equipped with ECP brakes,
including, but not limited to, the placement and securement of cables
along cars equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes to preserve
their continuity between non-consecutive cars equipped with ECP brakes
and the appropriate placement in the consist of cars equipped with
conventional pneumatic brakes.
AAR asserts that the railroads can wrap ECP brake cables around the
conventionally braked cars. BLET urges FRA to adopt a standard similar
to that set forth in Sec. 229.89(a), which requires that jumpers and
cable connections between locomotives shall be located and guarded to
provide sufficient vertical clearance.
In response to the comments provided, FRA has added paragraph (g)
to ensure the safe handling of train line cables for the same reasons
Sec. 229.89 addresses jumpers and cables. Considering the unique
logistical and operational issues relating to train line cables--
including their placement between and throughout cars and the potential
need to somehow bypass cars equipped with only conventional brakes--FRA
has added additional requirements. For instance, the final rule intends
to ensure that the train line cable does not drag, catch, or snag and
does not interfere with any human or train movements. Paragraph (g)
also provides the same electrical related protections provided under
Sec. 229.89(a).
Section 232.609 Handling of Defective Equipment With ECP Brake Systems
In Sec. 232.609, FRA modifies certain part 232 requirements as
they apply to freight cars and freight trains equipped with ECP brake
systems and hauling defective equipment. In particular, for such trains
and cars, paragraph (k) excepts certain existing requirements and
paragraphs (a) through (j) provide alternative requirements.
Under Sec. 232.15 and 49 U.S.C. 20303, railroads may be immune to
civil penalty liability if a car or train with certain inoperative or
defective equipment is hauled under certain conditions. Section
232.15(a) contains various parameters that must exist in order for a
railroad to be deemed to be hauling a piece of equipment with defective
brakes for repairs without civil penalty liability. The vast majority
of the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15(a) are a codification of
the existing statutory requirements contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 and
are based on the voluminous case law interpreting those provisions. The
statutory provisions require hauling defective equipment only to the
nearest place where necessary repairs can be made and require 100
percent operative brakes from any location where such repairs can be
effectuated. Thus, because many locations where trains are initiated
with any frequency are also locations where brake system repairs can be
effectuated, the statutory provisions essentially require 100 percent
operative brakes from a train's initial terminal. FRA continues to
believe that the proposed requirements relating to the movement of
equipment with defective ECP brakes are generally consistent with the
statutory requirements, ensure the safe and proper movement of
defective equipment, and clarify the duties imposed on a railroad when
moving such equipment.
As indicated above, in light of the increased safety levels
produced by ECP brake systems, FRA has decided to use its discretionary
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to provide an exception from the rigid
statutory provisions and modify the regulations governing the movement
of defective equipment concomitant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Under certain
circumstances, the statute and related regulations provide immunity
from civil penalty when a train with defective equipment is hauled to
the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made,
regardless of direction. Since a train equipped with an ECP brake
system and operating in ECP brake mode with a minimum percentage of
cars with defective ECP brakes is capable of traveling safely for long
distances, the final rule permits the operation of such a train and any
cars with defective ECP brakes to its destination, not to exceed 3,500
miles, for repair without incurring a civil penalty.
While FRA believes that a train operating in ECP brake mode with
some ineffective or inoperative ECP brakes may continue to travel
safely, concerns remain if such a train includes cars with defective
non-brake or conventional pneumatic brake equipment. ECP brake systems
do not monitor that equipment and do not otherwise reduce the danger of
traveling with such defects. FRA is cognizant of the need for
logistical flexibility to efficiently accomplish repairs during the
transition from conventional pneumatic to ECP brake operations.
Furthermore, requiring strict adherence to the statutory requirements
related to moving defective equipment ignores the safety features
provided by ECP brake system technology and could potentially stifle
the industry's ability and desire to implement the technology. The
final rule invokes this statutory and regulatory relief in paragraph
(k) of this document, by excepting application of Sec. Sec.
232.15(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), and 232.103(d)-(e) as
applied to ECP brake operated trains.
Under Sec. 232.103(d), no train may depart a location where a
Class I brake test is required to be performed on the entire train with
any inoperative or ineffective brakes. FRA recognizes that some trains
operated with ECP brakes may need to include cars equipped with
conventional brakes, especially while a fleet makes the transition to
ECP brake technology. Under such and similar circumstances, FRA
believes that some leeway needs to be provided for trains operating in
ECP brake mode. To provide for such flexibility, and in light of ECP
brake operations' higher levels of safety, including shorter stopping
distances and constant real-time monitoring of the brake system, FRA
believes that a train operated with ECP brakes may depart its initial
terminal with less than 100% operative brakes. However, FRA also
acknowledges that allowing a car to depart an initial terminal with
inoperative or ineffective brakes may permit such equipment to move
indefinitely without receiving the proper repairs. For this and other
reasons noted below, FRA believes there needs to be a limit on the
types and number of cars that may depart in a train operating in ECP
brake mode from a location where the train is required to receive a
Class I brake test.
[[Page 61537]]
Per paragraph (k), a train operating in ECP brake mode is excepted
from Sec. 232.103(d), which requires that one-hundred percent of the
brakes on a train shall be effective and operative prior to use or
departure from any location where a Class I brake test is required to
be performed on the train pursuant to Sec. 232.205. For ECP brake-
equipped trains, this requirement is replaced by the ninety-five
percent effective and operative brake requirement contained in
paragraph (a). FRA believes that this provides flexibility from the
rules governing conventional pneumatic braking systems while rendering
a sufficient brake failure buffer between departing an initial terminal
with ninety-five percent effective and operative brakes and
experiencing a penalty stop upon reaching eighty-five percent effective
and operative brakes, as required under paragraph (d) of the final
rule.
The one-hundred percent effective and operative brake requirement
contained in Sec. 232.103(d) is based on FRA's long-standing
interpretation and application of AAR's inspection and testing
standards as they existed in 1958 as well as the statutory provisions
related to the use of power brakes and the movement of equipment with
defective safety appliances. See 66 FR 4104, 4124, 4128 (Jan. 7, 2001).
However, the design, operation, and safety benefits derived from the
use of ECP brake systems dictate a need to modify this long-standing
requirement. Under the AAR standards, if at any time the ECP brakes on
a train become less than eighty-five percent operative, the train will
automatically stop via a computer induced penalty brake application. In
addition, it has been determined that a train with eighty-five percent
operative ECP brakes will still have better stopping distances than a
conventional pneumatic braked train with one-hundred percent operative
brakes. Moreover, ECP brake system technology provides the ability to
continuously monitor the real-time status of the braking system on each
car in a train. This allows a locomotive engineer to always know the
exact status of his train's braking system. In light of this increased
level of safety, FRA believes that a partial reduction in the
percentage of operative brakes is justified. Accordingly, for ECP brake
operations, FRA hereby modifies the requirement to 95 percent effective
and operative brakes, which it believes strikes a balance between the
current regulation and the need to allow for in-transit failures that
could compromise the operation of the train or otherwise automatically
shut it down when it reaches 85 percent effective or operative brakes.
Under paragraph (a), a train can only leave its initial terminal if
a Class I brake test is performed by a qualified mechanical inspector
and all ECP braked cars that are known to have arrived at the location
with ineffective or inoperative brakes are repaired or handled
accordingly. The final rule intends to ensure that at least 95 percent
of the cars equipped with ECP brakes have effective and operative
brakes prior to departure from an initial terminal and that cars are
repaired in a timely fashion. The purpose of the 95 percent threshold
is to prevent the delay or disassembly of a train for the removal or
repair of a very small percentage of cars that are discovered to be
defective for the first time while the railroad is conducting its in-
depth inspections required at a train's initial terminal. The 95
percent requirement also acknowledges that some initial terminals may
not initially have the capabilities of repairing ineffective or
inoperative ECP braking systems. Accordingly, paragraph (b) allows for
the movement of cars with such defects known to exist upon arrival at
its destination to be moved only to the nearest forward location where
repairs may be performed and restricts the car from being loaded or
unloaded while being so moved. However, to ensure the safe operation of
trains operating in ECP brake mode, operators are reminded that, under
the final rule, the inclusion of such defective cars cannot make the
train have less than ninety-five percent effective or operative brakes.
TWU asserts that the widely recognized cornerstone of train brake
system safety is a comprehensive train brake inspection and test at the
initial terminal, which requires 100 percent effective brakes.
According to TWU, there is no valid basis for extending inspection
intervals to 3,500 miles and permitting trains to operate out of an
initial terminal without 100 percent effective brakes. BLET is also
strongly opposed to paragraph (a). According to BLET, AAR Standard S-
4260, Sec. 3.5.4.2, indicates that the exact status is not always
known. Thus, says BLET, a HEU display of 95 percent operable brakes may
not reflect all the brakes in the train that are inoperable, meaning
that the locomotive engineer does not always know the exact status of
the braking system. FRA notes that BLET's concern was based on a
misunderstanding of ECP brake system design, as discussed previously
during the analysis of Sec. 232.607(b).
UTU contends that the overall braking capacity of each freight car
has not changed with the introduction of ECP brake technology.
According to UTU, when the number of operable brakes on an ECP brake-
equipped train is reduced by 5 percent, the train has lost 5 percent of
its total braking capacity. Thus, says UTU, an ECP brake operated train
with only 95 percent operative brakes is less safe than a conventional
brake operated train with 100 percent operable brakes. UTU also asserts
that the issue of allowing ECP brake-equipped trains ``to operate in
and out of terminals, from one Class IA brake test to another with only
95 percent of the brakes operable is also a significant degradation to
safety.'' If these trains depart an initial terminal, says UTU, an
additional brake failure en route may occur in potentially unsafe
territory and not in a yard's controlled environment.
On the contrary, UP believes that FRA's proposed limitation to not
allow less than 95 percent effective ECP brakes per train is too
restrictive. The current regulations allow a conventionally braked
train to depart after a Class I brake inspection with 100 percent
operative brakes, with a cumulative failure of up to 15 percent of the
brakes, equivalent to operating a train with 85 percent operative
brakes. Therefore, says UP, there is no logical reason to establish a
more stringent requirement on an ECP braked train. AAR agrees, adding
that FRA has determined that a train can safely operate with 85 percent
operative brakes and that an ECP brake operated train with fewer than
85% operative brakes will engage in a penalty brake application.
According to AAR, no adverse safety consequences would flow from such
an event. Since the train will automatically engage in a penalty brake
application when it reaches that 85 percent threshold, the railroads
assert the minimum amount of effective or operative brakes at departure
should be a business or operational decision by the railroad.
BRC supports paragraph (a) and objects to the railroads' proposal,
arguing that an 85 percent operating rule ``goes against all the claims
of operating efficiency, convenience, and incentive for the railroad
industry to employ ECP brakes.'' According to BRC, this is especially a
concern for ECP equipped trains traveling long distances without
intermediate inspections. If these trains are allowed to leave the
initial terminal at 85 percent operating capacity, the likelihood that
these trains will have to stop and make repairs or set outs at
intermediate locations significantly increases. UTU adds that,
[[Page 61538]]
if these trains depart an initial terminal, an additional brake failure
en route may occur in potentially unsafe territory and not in a yard's
controlled environment.
FRA is not persuaded that it should modify paragraph (a) from that
proposed in the NPRM. The purpose of paragraph (a) is to provide
operators flexibility in an environment of technological change.
Although FRA understands TWU's and UTU's concerns about ensuring 100
percent effective and operative brakes on trains departing from initial
terminals, FRA believes that the ECP brake system's self-monitoring
system and significant increase in braking capabilities provides a
level of comfort to maintain such flexibility without compromising
safety. That comfort level is also increased by requiring only limited
movement of that train for the purpose of repair.
UTU also seems to misunderstand paragraph (a) when it asserts that
the issue of allowing ECP brake-equipped trains ``to operate in and out
of terminals, from one Class IA brake test to another with only 95% of
the brakes operable is also a significant degradation to safety.'' The
final rule does not require Class IA brake tests on trains operated
with ECP brakes. In any event, paragraph (b), further discussed below,
requires that each car equipped with ECP brakes, and known to have
arrived at a location of a train's initial terminal or at a location
where a Class I brake test is required, shall not depart that location
with ineffective or inoperative brakes in a train operating in ECP
brake mode, except when that initial terminal does not have facilities
capable of repairing defective ECP brakes. Paragraph (b), however, also
requires the entire train to stop at the nearest forward repair
location, causing further delays. Thus, FRA expects paragraph (b) to
provide an incentive for the operator to repair the defective brakes or
set out those cars at the initial terminal. For these reasons, FRA
expects the railroads to quickly ensure that all initial terminals and
locations where Class I brake tests are otherwise performed are fully
equipped with ECP brake repair facilities and that most repairs would
be made at those locations so that trains will depart with 100 percent
effective and operative ECP brakes.
FRA intends that the only exceptions are ECP brake-equipped cars
whose brake defects were found after arrival at the initial terminal
and conventional brake-equipped cars. For instance, if defects to a
car's ECP brake system were found during a pre-departure Class I brake
inspection, the ECP brake operated train may depart and travel to
destination. While paragraph (a) and (b) imply this as a possibility,
paragraph (e) makes it clear.
FRA believes that the railroads misinterpret the existing
regulations under subpart C and this final rule's paragraph (a) as they
relate to the minimum number of effective and operative brakes on a
train departing from its initial terminal. Under Sec. Sec. 232.103(d)
and (f), trains operated with conventional brakes cannot move with any
ineffective or inoperative brakes except under the safe harbor
provisions provided under Sec. 232.15. Even moving with the immunities
afforded under Sec. 232.15, however, Sec. 232.103(e) absolutely
prevents such trains from moving if the level of operative or effective
brakes reaches 85 percent. Accordingly, FRA is not increasing the 85
percent limitation up to 95 percent, but is decreasing the 100 percent
limitation to 95 percent.
In any event, FRA believes that the 95 percent limitation at
initial terminals provides sufficient flexibility for the
implementation of new technology and does not feel comfortable further
reducing that amount at this time. While the railroads contend that the
buffer between departure and the ECP brake system's potential penalty
brake application (i.e., an automatic and immediate emergency or full
brake application made by the ECP brake system in accordance with the
current AAR standards) at 85 percent should be a market or operational
decision since it is much safer than conventional brake operations at
that level, FRA believes that the railroads fail to appreciate the
aforementioned reasons for the 95 percent limitation and the effects no
limitation may have. By further reducing or eliminating the limitation,
the potential for an automatic application of the brakes at 85 percent
effective and operative brakes increases. In such an event, the stopped
train may delay other trains, potentially causing a serious domino
effect of non-movement. Safety concerns also remain. FRA is certainly
sensitive to UTU's concern that such an event may occur in unsafe
territory, putting the train and its crew at risk. Accordingly, FRA
does not think it reasonable to allow an ECP brake operated train to
depart its initial terminal with as little as 85 percent effective and
operative brakes.
Paragraph (b)(4) also requires that a car with ineffective or
inoperative ECP brakes be tagged in accordance with Sec. 232.15(b).
FRA believes that Sec. 232.15(b) should equally apply to trains
operating in ECP brake mode and should be a prerequisite for the
movement from the initial terminal of any car with defective brakes.
Section 232.15(b) contains the specific requirements regarding the
tagging of equipment found with defective brake components and
recognizes that the industry may attempt to develop some type of
automated tracking system capable of retaining the information required
by that section and tracking defective equipment electronically. Thus,
paragraph (b)(4), through Sec. 232.15(b), proposes to permit the use
of an automated tracking system in lieu of directly tagging the
equipment if the automated system is approved for use by FRA. FRA
continues to believe that these provisions are necessary to ensure the
agency's ability to monitor such systems and potentially prohibit the
use of the system if it is found deficient. The proposed rule makes
clear that, by ensuring application of Sec. 232.15(b) to ECP brake
systems, an automated tracking system approved for use by FRA would be
capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time. This
paragraph also notifies the railroads that FRA reserves the right to
prohibit the use of a previously approved automated tracking system if
FRA subsequently finds it to be insecure, inaccessible, or inadequate.
Such a determination would have to be in writing and include the basis
for taking such action.
Paragraph (c) permits, with certain limitations, trains operating
in ECP brake mode to move cars equipped with conventional pneumatic
brakes. If a freight car equipped with only conventional pneumatic
brakes would have effective and operable brakes in a train equipped
with a ``stand-alone'' conventional pneumatic brake system, the final
rule permits a freight train operating in ECP brake mode to move such a
car. If a car has defective conventional pneumatic brakes--which would
be ineffective or inoperative in a train with a ``stand-alone''
conventional pneumatic brake system--the final rule permits its
movement by a freight train operating in ECP brake mode, but only if
the movement is made in accordance with Sec. 232.15. By referring to
Sec. 232.15, paragraph (c) intends to, amongst other things, include
the exceptions delineated in paragraph (k) and limit the movement of
such cars to the nearest location where repairs can be made. Paragraph
(c) also reminds regulated parties to comply with the tagging
requirements of Sec. 232.15(b) for the same reasons as paragraph (b).
FRA notes that the inclusion of cars with defective or non-defective
conventional pneumatic brakes into a train operating in ECP brake mode
shall not cause the train to
[[Page 61539]]
have less than ninety-five percent effective and operative brakes in
accordance with paragraph (a). FRA believes that permitting a limited
inclusion of cars equipped with conventional pneumatic brakes will
provide some flexibility as operators transition their fleets from
conventional pneumatic to ECP brake systems while ensuring a
satisfactory level of safety.
BLET believes that Sec. 232.15(e) should apply with respect to
placement of cars equipped with conventional brakes in trains operated
with ECP brakes. As previously stated, FRA expects that, except for the
sections and paragraphs specifically excepted and the limitations
modified by the final rule, subpart C continues to be fully applicable
and enforceable for trains and cars equipped with ECP brakes. Since the
final rule does not except or modify Sec. 232.15(e), FRA intends its
continued application and enforcement. While the final rule may remind
the regulated parties that certain specific existing paragraphs in
subpart C continue to apply (e.g., paragraphs (b)(4) and (c)
referencing Sec. 232.15(b)), this does not imply that sections and
paragraphs not referenced do not apply. References to more specific
paragraphs may exist for the purposes of clarity. FRA recognizes that
mixing technology may confuse application of the existing law. For
instance, while it may be clear to most how Sec. 232.15 may apply to
conventionally braked cars even in trains operated with ECP brakes, FRA
foresees confusion when applying Sec. 232.15 to ECP braked cars in
trains operated with conventional brakes. Thus, the final rule includes
specific paragraph references when regulating the latter under
paragraph (g).
Once an ECP brake system detects that the train has less than
eighty-five percent operative brakes, AAR standard S-4200 requires an
automatic and immediate full service brake application. Paragraph (d)
mirrors S-4200 by requiring a train operating in ECP brake mode to
cease moving once less than eighty-five percent of the train's cars
have effective and operative brakes. In other words, under paragraph
(d), no train shall move with more than fifteen percent of its brakes
being defective or otherwise inoperative or ineffective until certain
conditions are met. Recognizing, however, that foundation brake rigging
defects may not be detected by the electronic system, and that
calculation of the percentage may require an accurate manual entry of
the total cars in the train by the train crew, FRA proposes paragraph
(d) to continually ensure the safe operation of trains operating in ECP
brake mode with ineffective or inoperative brakes.
Although there is no explicit statutory limit regarding the number
of cars with inoperative brake equipment that may be hauled in a train,
the fifteen percent limitation is a longstanding industry and agency
interpretation of the hauling-for-repair provision currently codified
at 49 U.S.C. 20303, and has withstood the test of time. This
interpretation is extrapolated from another statutory requirement which
permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the
vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the
engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on
all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those
vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted
in 1903, section 20302, also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC
issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49
CFR 232.103(e), which codifies the ICC order. FRA believes that if the
rule is read in its entirety, there should be no confusion as to the
movement of defective equipment, and that this provision merely sets an
outside limit on the percentage of cars that may be hauled in any train
with inoperative brakes. Consequently, FRA will continue to require
that equipment with inoperative air brakes make up no more than 15
percent of any train.
FRA acknowledges that Sec. 232.103(e) already prevents a train's
movement ``if less than 85 percent of the cars in that train have
effective and operative brakes.'' However, FRA has also stated that
Sec. 232.103(e) ``contains a clear and absolute prohibition on train
movement if more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have their
brakes cut out or have otherwise inoperative brakes.'' Because ECP
brake systems are designed to automatically stop the train whenever and
wherever the brake system has less than 15 percent operative brakes,
FRA recognizes that some flexibility is needed to ensure that such
trains are not stranded on the main track. To provide flexibility in
those rare instances where a train experiences a penalty brake
application as a result of having less than 85 percent operative
brakes, paragraph (d) includes requirements to ensure the safe movement
of such trains. FRA recognizes the need for some trains operating in
ECP brake mode to continue to an appropriate repair facility or nearest
siding after experiencing a penalty brake application. Since ECP brake
implementation is in its infant stages, FRA acknowledges that a
railroad may not initially have a significant number of repair
facilities beyond the initial terminals of ECP equipped cars.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) permits limited movement of such trains for
repair or consist modification purposes. In any event, in light of the
Class I inspection required under Sec. 232.607, the minimum number of
ineffective or inoperative brakes allowed under Sec. 232.609, and an
ECP brake system's continuous monitoring and diagnostics functions, FRA
believes that trains operating in ECP brake mode will rarely, if ever,
reach fifteen percent inoperative or ineffective brakes. However, FRA
believes that paragraph (d)--in an abundance of caution and in
anticipation of such a possibility occurring--will ensure safe and
efficient operations. In order to move a train operating in ECP brake
mode that experiences a penalty brake application due to having less
than 85 percent effective and operative brakes, paragraph (d) requires
the train crew to perform a visual inspection of the entire train,
ensure the safe operation of the train, and determine that it is safe
to move the train.
Under the current regulations, visual inspections are generally
performed when moving defective equipment since a ``qualified person''
must determine that the car is safe to move. It is FRA's understanding
that most, if not all, railroads require a crew member to make a visual
inspection of a car when a problem occurs en route. A proper visual
inspection ensures that the brakes are cut out on a faulty car and
eliminates the possibility of dragging or stuck brakes. A dragging or
loose part or piece of equipment can find its way under a wheel,
causing a derailment. A brake that will not release--due to bent or
fouled brake rigging or a problematic control valve--will cause the
wheel to slide. A sliding wheel will not properly traverse a switch or
cross-over, setting up a potential derailment. A sliding wheel may also
cause a severe flat spot to occur on the wheel, which can also lead to
a derailment and stress on the rail. By requiring that the train crew
ensure the safe operation of the train and determine that it is safe to
move the train, FRA intends to make clear that it is the railroad's
responsibility, through its crew, to do whatever is necessary to ensure
safe train operation under the flexibility provided by paragraph (d).
Any deviation from the requirements under paragraph (d) while moving a
train with less than eighty-five percent
[[Page 61540]]
effective brakes would pose a significant safety hazard and violate the
rule.
In addition, under paragraph (d), the train's subsequent movement
must be made in a restricted ECP brake Switch Mode to the nearest or
nearest forward location where necessary repairs or changes to the
consist can be made. Under AAR Standard S-4200 Sec. 4.2.6.2.2, the
speed of an ECP brake-equipped train in Switch Mode shall not exceed 20
mph. The purpose of the 20 mph limitation, among Switch Mode's other
restrictions, is to ensure the safe movement of the train with less
than ideal brake operations while allowing the train to operate to a
location where defective braking systems can be repaired or where cars
can be added or removed from the train so that it will have at least
eighty-five percent effective and operative brakes.
BLET notes that paragraph (d)(4), as proposed in the NPRM, appeared
to prohibit a railroad from opting to move an ECP brake operated train
with less than 85% operative brakes in Switch Mode to the nearest
rearward repair location. If FRA intended to prohibit a backhaul, BLET
expressed interest in FRA's rationale. The proposed rule provided for
the movement of defective equipment to the ``nearest forward'' repair
location and did not intend to prohibit a backhaul of equipment when
appropriate. The purpose of FRA invoking its discretionary authority
under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to partially except application of 49 U.S.C.
20303 to ECP brake operations was to remove a disincentive towards ECP
brake implementation by providing operational flexibility when hauling
defective equipment for the purposes of repair. FRA intends to allow
the railroads to move defective equipment to the first suitable
location for repairs in either direction it so chooses. Accordingly,
FRA has clarified the final rule to provide for such movement to the
``nearest or nearest forward repair location.'' Paragraph (e) permits
trains operating in ECP brake mode with defective ECP brakes to be used
or hauled without civil penalty liability under part 232 to its
destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles. Such defects must be found for
the first time during a Class I brake test or en route. As previously
mentioned, FRA believes that a train operating in ECP brake mode can
safely continue to its destination with some ineffective or inoperative
brakes. Accordingly, paragraph (e) proposes that all such trains be
permitted to travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles,
without incurring civil penalty liability in relation to the use of
those brakes. Paragraph (e) also proposes that this civil penalty
immunity be extended to such trains with ECP brake defects found at the
initial terminal. If such defects are found after a train is put
together in preparation for its next departure, it may be overly
burdensome to require that the train be taken apart for repair. If a
brake repair may be performed without taking the train apart, FRA
acknowledges that the repair may cause undue delay. If the ECP brake
defect is found at the location where a Class I inspection is
performed, FRA believes that such burdens and delays may be avoided in
light of the increased safety afforded by ECP brake systems.
FRA believes that this flexibility needs to be afforded differently
to defects that are known to exist upon a car's arrival at its
destination or at a location where a Class I brake test will be
required on the train than to defects found for the first time at the
location where a Class I brake test is performed. If a freight car
equipped with an ECP brake system is known to have arrived with
ineffective or inoperative brakes at the location of a train's initial
terminal or at a location where a Class I brake test is required under
Sec. 232.607(b), that car is subject to the limitations in paragraph
(b), not paragraph (e). Paragraph (b) intends to ensure that known
defects are repaired before continued use and to prevent trains
operating in ECP brake mode from traveling indefinitely without
repairing their defective ECP brakes. On the other hand, by retaining
paragraph (e) as proposed, FRA recognizes the burden placed on
operators to comply with such a rule when it discovers the defect when
it is in the process of putting a train together or after a train is
already put together and inspected. Paragraph (e) recognizes that
burden by treating the train similarly to a train that detects a
defective ECP brake while it is en route.
Paragraph (f) provides limited flexibility for trains operating in
ECP brake mode with a non-brake safety appliance defect on a car
equipped with ECP brakes. To enjoy such flexibility under paragraph
(f), the car may only be used or hauled to the nearest or nearest
forward location for repairs. As noted above, in light of the increased
safety levels afforded by ECP brake system technologies, the final rule
allows trains operating in ECP brake mode with defective ECP brakes to
travel to its destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles. FRA does not
believe it prudent to provide the same level of flexibility to cars
operating in ECP brake-equipped trains with non-brake safety appliance
defects, since an ECP brake system's increased safety level does not
reduce the dangers of such defects. However, FRA does believe that
flexibility should be afforded to permit the direct hauling of such
equipment to the nearest or nearest forward repair location. To require
the hauling of ECP brake equipment to the nearest location where
necessary repairs can be effectuated, rather than allowing such to the
nearest forward location, could create unnecessary safety hazards. As
there initially will only be a limited number of ECP brake-equipped
trains in operation at any given time, the ability to switch cars from
one ECP train to another, merely for the purposes of getting the car to
a closer repair facility, will be severely limited. Rather than
requiring cars equipped with ECP brakes to be hauled in non-ECP braked
trains, where their brakes will be inoperative, FRA believes it is
safer to permit the car to continue in the train equipped with ECP
brakes to the next forward location where the necessary non-brake
safety appliance repairs can be made.
In the event trains must include cars equipped with brake systems
not compatible with the train's brake system, the final rule includes
requirements to ensure the safe operation of such trains. Paragraph (g)
allows a train operating with a conventional pneumatic brake system-
regardless of whether it is a train with ``stand-alone'' conventional
pneumatic brakes or an ECP brake-equipped train operating in
conventional pneumatic brake mode--to include cars with stand-alone ECP
brake systems. To maintain an acceptable level of safety, however,
paragraph (g) requires that such trains must have at least 95 percent
effective and operative brakes at the conclusion of a Class I brake
test, inclusive of all cars regardless of braking systems. Further, to
meet the same level of safety intended by 49 CFR 232.103(d), paragraph
(g) also requires that the train have 100 percent effective and
operative conventional pneumatic brakes at the Class I brake test site
when operating in conventional pneumatic mode.
Accordingly, paragraph (g) allows trains equipped with a
conventional pneumatic brake system--or with ECP brake systems and
operating in conventional pneumatic brake mode--to operate with freight
cars equipped with stand-alone ECP brake systems under limited
circumstances. Under paragraph (g), any such train not in compliance
with those circumstances shall not be operated. The purpose of these
limitations is to ensure the safe operation of such trains that contain
cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP brake systems. FRA understands
that
[[Page 61541]]
some trains operating with conventional pneumatic brakes may need to
carry cars with incompatible stand-alone ECP brake systems, especially
when the implementation of ECP brake system technology is in its infant
stages. For instance, FRA anticipates that a need may arise to move a
new ECP brake-equipped car in a train operating with conventional
pneumatic brakes from the car manufacturer's facility or a repair shop
to a location where the railroad operates trains equipped with ECP
brakes. FRA also anticipates that a dual mode ECP brake system
operating in ECP brake mode may incur a malfunction--such as a broken
train line cable or locomotive controller--forcing the operator to
switch the train's operation to conventional pneumatic brake mode. As
long as the train's total number of cars with ineffective or
inoperative brakes does not fall below the threshold percentage
contained in paragraph (g)--via reference to paragraph (d)--FRA
believes that the train may safely include cars with incompatible
stand-alone ECP brake systems.
Paragraph (g) includes requirements for the subject train and each
of its stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars. For such a train to
operate, it must comply with the minimum percentage of operative brakes
required by paragraph (h) when at an initial terminal--which will be
discussed below--or paragraph (d) when en route for the same reasons
discussed in paragraph (d). Under paragraph (g), a stand-alone ECP
brake-equipped car in a train operating with conventional pneumatic
brakes can only be moved for delivery to a railroad receiving the
equipment or to a location where the car may be added to a train
operating in ECP brake mode. Otherwise, the movement of the car is
restricted to the nearest available location where necessary repairs
can be effectuated. In addition, such cars must be tagged in accordance
with Sec. 232.15(b) for the same reasons as stated for the analysis of
paragraph (b) and placed in the train in accordance with Sec.
232.15(e). Section 232.15(e) contains the requirements regarding the
placement of cars in a train that have inoperative brakes. The
requirements contained in that paragraph are consistent with the
current industry practice and are part of almost every major railroad's
operating rules. By incorporating Sec. 232.15(e) by reference,
paragraph (g) prohibits the placing of a vehicle with inoperative
brakes at the rear of the train and the consecutive placing of more
than two vehicles with inoperative brakes, as test track demonstrations
have indicated that when three consecutive cars in a train operating
with conventional pneumatic brakes have their brakes cut-out, it is not
always possible to obtain an emergency brake application on trailing
cars. To remain consistent with existing industry practice, paragraph
(g), by referencing Sec. 232.15(e), requires that such equipment shall
not be placed in a train if it has more than two consecutive individual
control valves cut out or if the brakes controlled by the valve are
inoperative.
NS is concerned that Sec. 232.609 does not adequately allow for
the handling of defective equipment with ECP brake systems. NS notes
that Sec. 232.609(g)(2)(iii) requires compliance with Sec.
232.15(e)(2), which states that ``no more than two freight cars with
either inoperative brakes or not equipped with power brakes shall be
consecutively placed in the train.'' Due to the efficiencies gained in
stopping and the drastically reduced slack action, says NS, for ECP
trains this should be increased to ``no more than five freight cars
with defective air brakes to being cut out electronically.'' NS
supports that no more than five cars that are electronically cut out
shall be placed consecutively within the train, two of which may be
pneumatically cut out. ECP brake-equipped cars that have the brakes
electronically cut out, says NS, will retain the same rapid venting of
brake pipe in order to produce a pneumatic emergency with no adverse
effects on the braking system. NYAB and Wabtec make the same proposal.
FRA sees the merit in the proposal of NS, NYAB, and Wabtec and
continues to believe that Sec. 232.15(e)(1) should apply to the
placement of cars equipped with ECP brakes in trains operated with ECP
brakes, since it is always dangerous when the last car in the train is
without braking capacity. FRA also continues to believe that no more
than two consecutive cars should be placed in a train with their brakes
pneumatically cut out, since the train's pneumatic brake application
should remain available in emergency situations, especially in trains
operating with ECP overlay systems. FRA recognizes that a train
operated with ECP brakes may safely initiate an emergency brake
application with up to five ECP brake-equipped cars electronically cut
out via the car's CCD. Pneumatically cut out brakes will increase the
length of the brake pipe, which may slow the rapid venting of brake
pipe pressure to the point where an emergency brake application cannot
be made. However, all effective and operative ECP brakes should be able
to apply in an ECP brake operated train, since the train line cable
continues to carry the emergency transmission with equal strength and
speed throughout the entire train. Accordingly, any increase in
consecutive cars equipped with ECP brakes with ineffective or
inoperative brakes may only affect train handling, not train line
braking communications.
FRA recognizes that a railroad may be more familiar with each
territory it traverses and may be in a better position to determine how
many consecutive cars with electronically cut out brakes may be allowed
without causing safety issues. However, in the interests of public
safety, and in light of the comments made by the brake manufacturers
and railroads, FRA believes that the performance characteristics of the
ECP brake system will safely allow for up to five consecutive cars to
be electronically cut out in a train.
FRA further recognizes that a one-to-one CCD-to-car ratio does not
exist for all cars. Intermodal cars, for example, have more platforms
than CCDs and control valves. Accordingly, for the same reasons
provided above, the final rule prevents more than five consecutive
platforms with electronically cut out brakes on intermodal trains.
Thus, to ensure sufficient train handling safety, the final rule also
requires that the sets of consecutive cars with electronically cut out
brakes be sufficiently spaced. FRA expects the number of cars with
operative brakes buffering between these sets to differ depending upon
a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the length of the
train, the weight of the train and certain cars, the types of cars, and
the territory. The sufficiency of buffer cars, therefore, must be
determined by each railroad and enforced by FRA on a case-by-case
basis.
Paragraph (h) includes additional requirements for freight trains
equipped and operating with conventional pneumatic brakes when
departing an initial terminal with stand-alone ECP brake-equipped
freight cars. On such trains, paragraph (h) allows the train to depart
its initial terminal with at least ninety-five percent effective and
operative brakes and up to five percent of the cars to be equipped with
ECP brakes. However, each car equipped with conventional pneumatic
brake systems must have effective and operative brakes and each car
equipped with dual mode ECP brake systems must operate in conventional
pneumatic brake mode and have effective and operative conventional
pneumatic brakes. The five percent of cars with
[[Page 61542]]
potentially defective brakes may only be cars equipped with stand-alone
ECP brake systems.
Paragraph (i) provides for the electronic tagging of defective ECP
brake equipment when being moved in a train operating in ECP brake
mode. FRA recognizes that Sec. 232.15(b) already provides requirements
for electronic tagging of defective equipment. However, in view of the
ECP brake system's unique characteristics, it is not entirely clear how
Sec. 232.15(b) would appropriately apply to electronic records
developed, retained, and maintained by ECP brake systems. Accordingly,
paragraph (i) contains the criteria necessary to determine whether an
ECP brake system complies with Sec. 232.15(b).
In the NPRM, FRA stated that, in order for an ECP brake system to
provide electronic tagging of equipment with defective safety
appliances, the ECP brake system must provide appropriate, constant,
and accurate information to the crew via a display in the cab of the
lead locomotive, and ensure that the information is securely stored and
is accessible to FRA and appropriate operating and inspection
personnel. To ensure the integrity of electronic tagging, FRA asserted,
the ECP brake system must securely store the information. FRA sought
comments on how secure a system must be.
BLET and AAR responded to this proposal with concerns relating to
the secure storage of information requirement. According to BLET, any
resolution of electronic recordkeeping issues should consider the
solutions provided by the RSAC Locomotive Safety Standards Working
Group. AAR does not believe it likely that an employee would seek to
override the ECP software. In any event, AAR points out that since
there is no information security requirement for paper records, there
is no reason to require information security for electronic records.
FRA agrees with BLET and AAR on this issue and has not included the
information security requirement in the final rule. However, the
remainder of the proposal has been retained in the final rule. FRA
continues to believe that the electronic tag information must be
accessible for safety and oversight purposes. Paragraph (i) makes clear
that an automated tracking system approved for use by FRA must be
capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time. The
information should also be accessible to subsequent train crews that
require notification of defects.
In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that some railroads may also desire
to use the ECP brake system to electronically tag defective non-ECP
brake equipment. FRA anticipates that such electronic tagging would
have to be manually entered into the system, since safety appliances
are not monitored by the ECP brake system. FRA sought comments on
whether the rule should include provisions allowing for the manual
input of non-ECP brake defects into ECP brake systems for electronic
tagging purposes. FRA also sought comments on what requirements and
allowances should be made in consideration of that interest, including
means to associate or merge ECP brake system information with
information not monitored electronically by the ECP brake system. No
comments were received on this issue. Accordingly, FRA has not provided
for such electronic tagging capabilities in the final rule. This does
not mean that a railroad is prevented from bringing an electronic
tagging program to FRA for its approval under Sec. 232.15(b) when it
pertains to non-ECP brake defects and utilizes the ECP brake technology
to electronically tag and track such equipment.
In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged that locomotive engineers may be
distracted or subjected to information overload by multiple monitors or
displays in the locomotive cab, thus potentially endangering the safe
operation of the train. FRA sought comments and information on this
issue. In Wabtec's and NYAB's experience, the additional display has
not been an issue with the operators. In the event that an additional
display is added, say the brake manufacturers, the information
displayed is minimal and straight forward. In the case where ECP brake
system information is integrated into the existing displays, ECP
information replaces air brake information. BLET states that Appendix E
to Part 236 addresses the issue of human-machine interface design where
positive train control technology is implemented. Otherwise, says BLET,
this issue is not ripe for resolution in the final rule. AAR agrees,
stating that information overload caused by multiple monitors or
displays in the locomotive cab is better suited for a separate
proceeding. In light of the comments, the final rule does not include
any requirements relating to ECP brake system monitors and displays.
Paragraph (j) requires that the railroads adopt and comply with
written procedures governing the movement of defective equipment. The
procedures must comply with the related regulatory requirements,
including those in the final rule. FRA expects each railroad to develop
appropriate procedures regarding its handling and repair of defective
equipment containing ECP brake systems or hauled in trains operating in
ECP brake mode. FRA acknowledges that many railroads may already have
such procedures in place. FRA believes that the establishment of these
procedures is the most effective means by which to minimize the
possibility of future accidents caused by the movement of defective
equipment on cars and trains equipped with ECP brake systems or
operating in ECP brake mode. Given the introduction of new technology
and its partial incompatibility with existing systems, FRA believes the
need for adoption and compliance with such procedures is critical for
continued safety in the rail industry.
BLET suggests that the procedures governed by paragraph (j) should
be filed with, rather than merely be made available to, FRA. FRA has
placed the burden on the railroads to be custodians of the information
referenced in paragraph (j)(1). FRA only needs access to the
information in certain situations and does not require ownership or
custodianship. Accordingly, FRA sees no need to expend its resources on
receiving and maintaining such files.
In contrast, however, the information required in paragraph (j)(2)
must be filed with FRA for continual enforcement purposes. FRA cannot
be expected to enforce its rules relating to the handling of defective
equipment without this information instantly and continually available.
To ensure compliance with the requirements concerning the performance
of ECP brake system repairs, paragraph (j)(2) requires railroads to
submit to FRA, prior to operating ECP brake systems in revenue service,
a list identifying locations where such repairs may be made. FRA
believes that the list should encompass a sufficient number of
locations to ensure that Class I brake tests are performed at
appropriate intervals and that trains equipped with ECP brake systems
do not travel further than their destination or 3,500 miles without
being inspected and repaired at Class I brake test locations and repair
facilities. If a railroad adds or removes any repair facility from its
system, paragraph (j)(2) requires that the railroad amend or modify
that list by timely notifying FRA of those changes at least 15 days in
advance.
Paragraph (k) explicitly excepts other portions of part 232 as they
apply to ECP brake systems. For instance, paragraph (k) excepts
application of Sec. 232.15(a)(2) and (a)(5) through (a)(7), which
generally require that equipment with defective safety appliances be
[[Page 61543]]
repaired at the location where they are first discovered to be
defective or that they be moved only to the nearest available location
where necessary repairs can be performed. As noted above, FRA believes
that freight cars equipped with ECP brakes and freight trains operating
in ECP brake mode need to be provided some flexibility in being handled
for repair and when moving equipment with defective safety appliances.
The provisions contained in Sec. 232.15(a), if applied, would
frequently frustrate the purpose of FRA's proposal and ignore the
safety advances provided by ECP braking systems.
Paragraph (k) also excepts Sec. 232.15(a)(8), which prohibits the
movement of a defective car or locomotive in a train required to
receive a Class I brake test at that location. As discussed in detail
above, paragraph (a) allows a train operated with ECP brakes to leave
its initial terminal with only ninety-five percent operative brakes
after a Class I brake test. By doing so, paragraph (a) implicitly
excepts trains operating in ECP brake mode from Sec. 232.103(d), which
prohibits a train from departing from its initial terminal with any
inoperative or ineffective brakes. Nevertheless, paragraph (k) intends
to clearly and explicitly except Sec. 232.103(d). An explicit
exception in this rule does not imply that there are no independent and
implicit exceptions elsewhere. Finally, Sec. 232.103(e) ``contains a
clear and absolute prohibition on train movement if more than 15
percent of the cars in a train have their brakes cut out or have
otherwise inoperative brakes,'' thus preventing a train's movement ``if
less than 85 percent of the cars in that train have effective and
operative brakes.'' Due to relief proposed by this section, however,
the strict limits imposed by Sec. 232.103(e) would no longer be
applicable to trains regulated under these proposed rules. Accordingly,
paragraph (k) excepts Sec. 232.103(e).
BLET does not support 232.609(k) and does not believe that FRA
should invoke its discretionary authority under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20306
to exempt railroads from the requirements of 20303. As noted above in
the discussion contained in Section IX of this document, FRA has
considered BLET's concerns and has decided to invoke its discretionary
authority.
Section 232.611 Periodic Maintenance
FRA intends that all unexcepted and unmodified rules under part 232
apply to ECP brake operations. For the purposes of further clarity,
however, paragraph (a) of Sec. 232.611 reminds the operators of
equipment with ECP brake systems to comply with the maintenance
requirements contained in Sec. 232.303(b) through (d), which require
the performance of certain tests and inspections whenever a car is on a
shop or repair track. FRA continues to believe that a repair or shop
track provides an ideal setting for railroads to conduct an
individualized inspection on a car's brake system to ensure its proper
operation. FRA also continues to believe that such inspections are
necessary to reduce the potential of overlooking cars with excessive
piston travel during the performance of ordinary brake inspections. If
any problems are detected at that location, the personnel needed to
make any necessary corrections are already present. Furthermore,
performing these inspections at this time ensures proper operation of
the cars' brakes and eliminates the potential of having to cut cars out
of an assembled train and, thus, should reduce inspection times and
make for more efficient operations.
FRA continues to believe that Sec. 232.303(b) and (c) should apply
to all operations, including those with ECP brake systems. Section
232.303(b) requires testing of each car on a shop or repair track to
determine that its air brakes apply and remain applied until a release
is initiated. If the brakes fail to apply or to remain applied until a
release is initiated, the car must be repaired and retested. Section
Sec. 232.303(c) requires piston travel to be inspected and, if
necessary, adjusted. FRA intends for this to be accomplished in
accordance with the stencil or badge plate on cars equipped with ECP
brakes in accordance with Sec. 232.607(f)(2).
FRA also continues to believe that Sec. 232.303(d) should apply to
all operations, including those with ECP brake systems. Section
232.303(d) lists brake system components requiring inspection prior to
releasing a car from a shop or repair track. This section requires
inspection of a car's hand brakes, angle cocks to ensure proper
positioning to allow maximum air flow, and brake indicators, if
equipped, to ensure their accuracy and proper operation. A periodic
inspection is an ideal time for the railroad to inspect these items
while imposing the least burden on the railroad's inspection and repair
forces.
In addition to requiring continued compliance with Sec. 232.303(b)
through (d), paragraph (a) requires further inspection of freight cars
equipped with ECP brake systems prior to release from a shop or repair
track. These additional requirements afford the inspector the
opportunity to look at each car more thoroughly and take into
consideration an ECP brake system's unique characteristics. For
instance, while Sec. 232.303(d) requires inspectors to ensure that
brake pipes are securely clamped, paragraph (a) provides the equivalent
for ECP brake systems by requiring the secured clamping of ECP brake
system wires. Accordingly, paragraph (a) requires inspectors to check
the ECP brake system's wiring and brackets, electrical connections,
electrical grounds, and any car mounted ECP brake system component.
During such inspections, inspectors must look for problems such as
frayed wiring, loose or damaged brackets, and wires that have become
loose due to a fallen bracket. FRA believes that a missing bracket may
be overlooked during a regular train yard inspection or Class I brake
test and the final rule requires shop or repair track inspections of
such ECP brake related components to ensure their safe operation.
Paragraph (a)(3) as proposed required the testing of the train line
cable's electrical grounds and impedance. NYAB and Wabtec asserted that
paragraph (a)(3) as proposed should be removed entirely. According to
these brake manufacturers, train line integrity tests, which should be
performed subsequent to repairs or replacement of the ECP brake-
equipped train line or as part of a single car air brake test, do not
require impedance testing, since they can be performed via resistance
and grounds tests using commonly available measurements tools. AAR
concurs with the brake manufacturers' submission, asserting that an
impedance test is unnecessary. One of the labor representatives
disagrees with the manufacturers, urging FRA to retain impedance
testing of train line cables in the final rule.
FRA believes that the main purpose of cable impedance testing is
checking the integrity of the train line electrical cable to assure
that there is no electrical shortage between the wires and electrical
current leakage through the ground connections. Since the current
leakage testing of train line cable is a routine single car air brake
test procedure and the ECP brake system continuously monitors the
integrity of the train line cable, the additional impedance testing of
train line cable wires is redundant and therefore unnecessary. FRA also
believes that independently testing for grounds (i.e., check for the
legitimate presence of cable shield connections to the car frame) is
not necessary since paragraph (a)(2) already requires that a single car
air brake test include a review and repair of the ECP brake system
electrical connections. FRA continues to believe
[[Page 61544]]
that the brake manufacturers are in the best position to determine the
level of testing that can be integrated into a single car air brake
test. Accordingly, the proposal that periodic testing include
electrical impedance and grounds testing is not being included in the
final rule.
Paragraph (b) requires railroads to submit periodic single car air
brake test procedures to FRA for approval and paragraph (c) requires
railroads to comply with such submitted and approved procedures
whenever they perform a single car air brake test. FRA must be given an
opportunity to review and comment on any revision of the procedures by
which these tests are performed to ensure that there is no degradation
in safety resulting from any such modification and to ensure
consistency in how the tests are performed. FRA notes that the review
and approval required by paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent
railroads from making unilateral changes to the test procedures.
Paragraph (b) requires the industry to follow the special approval
process contained in Sec. 232.17 in order to initially submit the
procedures to FRA for approval.
Paragraph (c) requires the performance of a single car air brake
test on a car equipped with ECP brakes upon the occurrence of most of
the events identified in Sec. 232.305. Except for the exceptions
provided herein, FRA continues to believe that Sec. 232.305 adequately
covers the parameters and timeliness of single car air brake tests.
Paragraph (f), however, excepts application to a car equipped with
stand-alone ECP brakes of Sec. 232.305(b)(2), which requires a car
that is on a shop or repair track to receive a single car air brake
test if one has not been performed on the car within the previous 12
months. FRA believes that since the car's CCD performs a self-
diagnostic of the brake system each time the car is initialized and
used in a train, there is no need to perform a single car air brake
test on a car that has not received such a test within the last 12
months.
FRA acknowledges that railroads may retrofit ECP brake systems on
existing cars equipped with conventional pneumatic brake systems. While
Sec. 232.305(e) requires a single car air brake test on each new or
rebuilt car prior to placing or using it in revenue service, it is
unclear whether this rule applies to cars retrofitted with ECP brake
systems. Accordingly, to ensure the proper and safe operation of cars
with newly installed ECP brake systems, paragraph (d) requires the
performance of a single car air brake test prior to placing the car in
revenue service. FRA believes that it is essential for retrofitted cars
to receive this test prior to returning to revenue service in order to
ensure the proper operation of the vehicle's new brake system. Since
this is a requirement when installing a new brake system, the cost of
this requirement is minimal and merely incorporates the industry's
current practices.
FRA acknowledges that, after receiving approval of the single car
air brake test standard from FRA in accordance with paragraph (b), a
railroad or an industry representative may--through its experience--
subsequently determine better procedures applicable to single car air
brake tests of cars equipped with ECP brake systems. Accordingly, FRA
recognizes that the industry may find it necessary to modify the single
car air brake test procedures from time to time. Section 232.307
provides regulatory procedures for those seeking modification of an
approved single car air brake test procedure. Paragraph (b) extends the
application of Sec. 232.307 to single car air brake test procedures
for cars equipped with ECP brake systems.
FRA believes that Sec. 232.307 provides the industry with a quick
and efficient procedure to seek modification of an incorporated or
approved testing procedure and provides both FRA and other interested
parties an opportunity to review potential changes prior to their
becoming effective. The process under Sec. 232.307 permits the
industry to modify the single car air brake test procedures and permits
those modifications to become effective 75 days from the date that FRA
publishes the requested modification in the Federal Register, if no
objection to the requested modification is raised by either FRA or any
other interested party. The process allows FRA and other interested
parties 60 days to review and raise objections to any proposed
modification requested by the industry and submitted to FRA. FRA
believes the process established in Sec. 232.307 will meet the needs
of AAR and the industry to expeditiously modify the single car air
brake test procedures required by and approved under paragraph (b).
FRA continues to believe that, for the process to work at optimum
efficiency, AAR and the industry would be best served if they ensure
that there is open communication regarding any modifications with both
FRA and the representatives of affected employees prior to requesting
any modification of the procedures. This will ensure that interested
parties are fully informed of any potential modification and their
concerns are addressed or allayed before a request for modification is
submitted to FRA. This information and dialogue will eliminate the
potential for objections being submitted when the requested
modification is officially sought.
As previously noted, for ECP brake-equipped freight cars, the final
rule contemplates replacing application of the single car air brake
test in Sec. 232.305(a) with a new single car air brake test submitted
and approved under Sec. 232.611(b). To make this clear, paragraph (f)
excepts application of Sec. 232.305(a) as it applies to all cars
equipped with ECP brakes, regardless of whether they are dual mode or
stand-alone. To preserve the requirement of using a qualified person to
perform single car air brake tests on cars equipped with ECP brakes,
however, the final rule includes appropriate language in paragraphs (c)
and (d).
FRA acknowledges that the self-monitoring capabilities of ECP brake
systems may eliminate the need to perform single car air brake tests on
a time-specific basis. Accordingly, paragraph (f) also excepts Sec.
232.305(b)(2) as it applies to single car air brake tests for cars with
stand-alone ECP brake systems. Since cars with dual mode ECP brake
systems include all of the components of a conventional pneumatic brake
system and may be operated in conventional pneumatic brake mode at any
time, paragraph (f) does not intend to provide those cars relief from
section 232.305(b)(2).
BLET asserts that there should be no exception from Sec.
232.305(b)(2). According to BLET, the FMECA recommends the continuation
of periodic single car testing to assure power brake functionality. UP
states that it disagrees with the FRA proposal to require a single car
air brake test whenever an ECP braked car is shopped for a non-braking
defect. Under current AAR rules, says UP, a conventionally braked
freight car is only subject to a single car air brake test when the
braking system itself is service or repaired, or if 5 years have passed
since the last such test or if 8 years had passed since the equipment
was built.
UP apparently misunderstands the existing rule and the proposed
rule. In addition to the requirements under Sec. 232.305(c) and (d)
that cars must be tested every 5 or 8 years, Sec. 232.305(b)(2)
requires a single air brake test when the car is found on a repair
track ``for any reason'' and it has not received a single car air brake
test within the previous 12-month period. Since this rule was enacted,
it has always applied to all freight cars. The single car air brake
test
[[Page 61545]]
is critical to ensuring the safe and proper operation of the brake
equipment on the Nation's fleet of freight cars. When FRA issued Sec.
232.305(b)(2), the single car air brake test was the sole method by
which air brake equipment on freight cars is periodically tested to
identify potential problems before they result in a brake becoming
inoperative. It will now also apply to dual mode ECP brake-equipped
freight cars.
However, stand-alone ECP brake-equipped freight cars will be exempt
from Sec. 232.305(b)(2) pursuant to paragraph (f). Accordingly, each
stand-alone ECP brake-equipped car will not require a single car air
brake test each time it is on a repair track. FRA believes that a
reduction in the frequency of single car air brake tests is justified
for stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars in light of the ECP brake
system's self-monitoring capabilities. However, the final rule
maintains most of the requirements under Sec. 232.305. FRA agrees with
BLET and the FMECA that such periodic testing should continue and FRA
continues to believe that insufficient information exists at this time
to completely eliminate the need to conduct periodic single car air
brake tests on ECP brake-equipped cars.
Section 232.305(f) was initially enacted to allow the continued
operation of cars already in service that had received a single car air
brake test before a more formal standard was adopted by the 2001 final
power brake rule. While paragraph (f) of Sec. 232.611 as proposed also
excepted the application of Sec. 232.305(f), FRA believes that Sec.
232.305(f) should actually be removed from the rules in its entirety,
since it no longer applies to any car, regardless of its brake system
technology. Accordingly, Sec. 232.305(f) is hereby deleted.
With the need for the submission and adoption of a new single car
air brake test for ECP brake systems, FRA recognizes that the same
flexibility initially afforded by Sec. 232.305(f) may be necessary to
allow for the continued operation of ECP brake-equipped cars currently
in service under the existing waivers. New paragraph (g) intends to
provide for such flexibility by considering the last single car air
brake test performed on any ECP brake-equipped car prior to June 15,
2009, pursuant to the then existing standards, to be considered the
last single car air brake test for that car. Accordingly, each such car
would not require an additional single car air brake test in accordance
with Sec. 232.305(e) and 232.611(d).
Under paragraph (b), no car should be in service if it has not
received a single car air brake test under a procedural standard
submitted to and approved by FRA. Since no such standard has yet been
submitted and approved, all trains under the existing waiver would be
required to be taken out of service upon the publication of this rule.
To avoid this unintended consequence and to provide flexibility for ECP
brake-equipped cars already in service, paragraph (g) provides more
time for the submission and approval of a single car air brake test
standard submitted pursuant to paragraph (b) and Sec. 232.17.
FRA understands that AAR has formed a group, which includes AAR
Brake Committee members, the ECP brake manufacturers, and FRA, for the
purpose of developing single car air brake test procedures for freight
cars equipped with ECP brakes. FRA expects these procedures will become
part of the AAR Standards and Recommended Practices once they are
developed and adopted by the AAR. Accordingly, for the same reasons FRA
implemented Sec. 232.305(f) (2001), the date that all cars equipped
with ECP brakes will receive a single car air brake test under the
existing standard prior to June 15, 2009, shall be considered the date
for the last single car air brake test for that car.
Section 232.613 End-of-Train Devices
Current FRA regulations specify design and performance standards
for one-way and two-way EOT telemetry devices, which, at a minimum,
have the capability of determining rear-of-train brake pipe pressure
and of transmitting this information by radio to a receiving unit in
the controlling locomotive. Most EOT units in service are battery
operated and also incorporate a rear end marker required under 49 CFR
part 221. Optional features include transmission of information
regarding rear end motion and battery status. Most units operate on the
same ultra high frequency (UHF), but each rear unit has a discrete
identification code which must be recognized by the HEU before the
message is acknowledged. The more modern two-way EOT device, in
addition to the features of the one-way EOT device, has the ability of
activating the emergency air valve at the rear of the train upon
receiving an emergency brake application command from the HEU. This is
a desirable feature in event of a blockage in the brake pipe that would
prevent the pneumatic transmission of the emergency brake application
throughout the entire train.
Provisions governing the use of one-way EOT telemetry devices were
initially incorporated into the power brake regulations in 1986.
Pursuant to the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act, Public Law 102-
365 (Sept. 3, 1992), which amends the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) of
1970 (45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq.), FRA held rulemakings to amend the
power brake regulations, including those concerning one-way and two-way
EOTs. 62 FR 278 (Jan. 2, 1997); 66 FR 4104 (Jan. 17, 2001). The
resulting regulations, contained in subpart E of part 232, specify the
requirements related to the performance, operation, and testing of EOT
devices for conventional pneumatic braking.
The new ECP-EOT devices--which must comply with AAR standards such
as S-4200 and S-4220--will provide many of the same functions that
conventional two-way EOT devices use on trains with conventional
pneumatic brakes. In addition to serving as the final node on the ECP
brake system's train line cable termination circuit and as the system's
``heart beat'' monitoring and confirming train, brake pipe, power
supply line, and digital communications cable continuity, the ECP-EOT
device transmits to the HEU a status message that includes the brake
pipe pressure, the train line cable's voltage, and the ECP-EOT device's
battery power level. Since the ECP-EOT device--unlike a conventional
EOT device--will communicate with the HEU exclusively through the
digital communications cable and not via a radio signal, it does not
need to perform the function of venting the brake pipe to atmospheric
pressure to engage an emergency brake application. However, ECP-EOT
devices do verify the integrity of the train line cable and provide a
means of monitoring the brake pipe pressure and gradient, providing the
basis for an automatic- rather than engineer-commanded-response if the
system is not adequately charged. In the case of ECP brakes, the brake
pipe becomes a redundant- rather than primary-path for sending
emergency brake application commands. Under certain communication break
downs between the ECP-EOT device, the HEU, and any number of CCDs, the
system will self-initiate an emergency brake application.
FRA acknowledges that ECP-EOT devices, with their additional and
changed features, may not comply with the rules under subpart E.
Accordingly, paragraph (d) excepts trains operating in ECP brake mode
from having to comply with subpart E of part 232 and the remainder of
section 232.613 provides alternative requirements. Paragraph (a)
provides for the minimum requirements under which an ECP-EOT device
must operate. Paragraph (b) requires that each ECP brake operated
includes a properly connected ECP-EOT device that
[[Page 61546]]
comports with the requirements under paragraph (a).
AAR and NS noted that, similarly to trains operating with
conventional air brake systems, a train operated with ECP brakes may
include a locomotive as the train's rear vehicle performing the same
function as an EOT device. According to AAR, a locomotive at the rear
of a train can perform all the functions performed by an EOT device.
BLET concurs with AAR and NS and proposes that Sec. 232.613(c) be
redrafted to permit the use of a locomotive in lieu of an ECP-EOT
device. FRA agrees because a locomotive equipped with ECP brakes
functions the same as an ECP-EOT device. They both provide the same
feedback loop between the HEU and end of the train. Accordingly,
paragraph (c) provides for a locomotive equipped with ECP brakes to be
used in lieu of an ECP-EOT device in a train operated with ECP brakes.
NYAB and Wabtec state that a conventional EOT unit is subject to
annual calibration to address issues relating to its radio and BP
pressure transducer. However, since an ECP-EOT device does not require
a radio and the ECP brake system continuously monitors the brake pipe
pressure transducer, the brake manufacturers contend, it does not
require annual calibration.
FRA agrees with the brake manufacturers' comments regarding annual
ECP-EOT device calibration. Unlike conventional EOT units, ECP-EOT
devices do not require radios. Annual calibration of the brake pipe
pressure transducer is not necessary in light of the ECP brake system's
brake pipe pressure readings at each individual ECP brake operated car
and ability to confirm train line integrity. Accordingly, the final
rule does not require annual calibration and testing.
XII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures, and determined to be significant under both
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034;
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in Docket No. FRA-2006-
26175 a Regulatory Analysis addressing the economic impact of this
final rule. Document inspection and copying facilities are available at
the DOT Central Docket Management Facility located in Room W12-140 on
the Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Access to the docket may also be obtained
electronically through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://
www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a
written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel,
Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
For purposes of analysis, FRA has assumed that this final rule will
support business decisions by Class I railroads to convert unit train
service, such as coal and intermodal, to ECP brake operations over a
10-year period. This type of service is characterized by intensive
utilization of assets and is reasonably discrete in terms of
operational requirements. Although carload service is dispersed over
the national rail network, unit train service tends to be concentrated
in certain corridors. Locomotives are or could be dedicated to this
service (e.g., as in the extensive use of high traction alternating
current (AC) locomotives in coal service). FRA believes that, as costs
and benefits are validated and the technology's market enjoys economies
of scale, additional markets will benefit from ECP brake technology.
The benefits of voluntarily implementing and using ECP brakes under
this rule substantially exceed the costs. If the industry were to
implement ECP brakes to the extent estimated in this final rule, it
would cost it approximately $1.7 billion (discounted at 7%). The
largest portion of these voluntary costs, $1.2 billion, would be the
cost to convert freight cars to ECP brakes and the remaining costs
relate to locomotive conversion and training. The total benefits of the
final rule would total approximately $9.7 billion (discounted at 7%),
if ECP brakes are adopted as estimated. Of those benefits, the $1
billion in regulatory relief and the $1.2 billion in fuel savings
together exceed the costs. The remaining benefits include accident risk
reduction, environmental cleanup savings, track out-of-service time
reduction, wheel replacement savings, and network velocity
improvements. The expected benefits of ECP braking technology appear to
justify the investment, provided that the conversion is focused first
on the high-mileage, unit and unit-like train services that would most
benefit from its use.
As presented in the following tables, FRA estimates that the
present value (PV), discounted at 7 percent of the total 20-year
benefits and costs which the industry would be expected to incur if it
elected to comply with the alternative requirements contained in this
rule is $9.7 billion and $1.7 billion, respectively:
Total 20-Year Benefits and Discounted Benefits
[At 3% and 7%]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits 3% Discount 7% Discount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Highway-Rail Accident Risk Reduction...................... $25,802,114 $17,897,484 $11,513,191
Rail Equipment Accident Risk Reduction.................... 286,687,494 198,859,081 127,923,151
Environmental Cleanup Savings............................. 113,296,427 78,587,395 50,554,127
Track Out-of-Service Time for Accidents................... 10,825,104,763 7,508,769,780 4,830,282,231
Regulatory Relief......................................... 2,283,662,829 1,586,425,219 1,022,855,259
Fuel Savings.............................................. 2,745,000,000 1,904,052,986 1,224,849,552
Wheel Replacement Savings................................. 1,601,250,000 1,110,697,575 714,495,572
Network Velocity Improvement of 1 mph..................... 2,500,000,000 2,101,494,145 1,698,459,555
-----------------------------------------------------
Total Benefits........................................ 20,380,803,627 14,506,783,665 9,680,932,638
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 61547]]
Total 20-Year Costs and Discounted Costs
[at 3% and 7%]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs 3% Discount 7% Discount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freight Car Costs......................................... $1,746,326,400 $1,467,957,882 $1,186,425,904
Locomotive Costs.......................................... 582,624,000 489,752,370 395,825,320
Employee Training......................................... 231,470,835 165,421,968 111,016,540
-----------------------------------------------------
Total Costs........................................... 2,560,421,235 2,123,132,221 1,693,267,763
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive
Order 13272 require a review of proposed and final rules to assess
their impact on small entities. FRA has prepared and placed in Docket
No. FRA-2006-26175 an Analysis of Impact on Small Entities (AISE) that
assesses the small entity impact of this rule. Document inspection and
copying facilities are available at the Department of Transportation
Central Docket Management Facility located in Room W12-140 on the
Ground level of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Docket material is also available on the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov. Photocopies may also
be obtained by submitting a written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at
Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601 as a small business
concern that is independently owned and operated, and is not dominant
in its field of operation. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA)
has authority to regulate issues related to small businesses, and
stipulates in its size standards that a ``small entity'' in the
railroad industry is a railroad business ``line-haul operation'' that
has fewer than 1,500 employees and a ``switching and terminal''
establishment with fewer than 500 employees. SBA's ``size standards''
may be altered by Federal agencies, in consultation with SBA and in
conjunction with public comment.
Pursuant to that authority FRA has published a final statement of
agency policy that formally establishes ``small entities'' as being
railroads that meet the line-haulage revenue requirements of a Class
III railroad. See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003). Currently, the revenue
requirements are $20 million or less in annual operating revenue. The
$20 million limit is based on the Surface Transportation Board's
threshold of a Class III railroad carrier, which is adjusted by
applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment (49 CFR part 1201).
The same dollar limit on revenues is established to determine whether a
railroad, shipper, or contractor is a small entity. FRA uses this
alternative definition of ``small entity'' for this rulemaking.
For this rulemaking, there are approximately 523 small railroads
that could potentially receive regulatory relief. However, railroads
are not mandated to convert to ECP brake technology. Regulatory relief
provides an incentive for most long-haul services to convert. Smaller
railroads do not operate over 1,000 miles or 1,500 miles and would not
benefit economically by converting to this technology. Hence, FRA does
not expect this regulation to impact any small railroads.
The small entity segment of the railroad industry faces little in
the way of intramodal competition. Small railroads generally serve as
``feeders'' to the larger railroads, collecting carloads in smaller
numbers and at lower densities than would be economical for the larger
railroads. Smaller railroads that carry unit and unit-like commodities
often operate the train with the locomotives and cars without ownership
of the equipment. They transport those cars over relatively short
distances and then turn them over to the larger systems, which
transport them relatively long distances to their ultimate destination,
or for handoff back to a smaller railroad for final delivery. Although
there are situations in which the relative interests of large and small
railroads may not always coincide, the relationships between the large
and small entity segments of the railroad industry are more supportive
and co-dependent than competitive.
It is also extremely rare for small railroads to compete with each
other. As mentioned above, small railroads generally serve smaller,
lower density markets and customers. They exist, and often thrive,
doing business in markets where there is not enough traffic to attract
the larger carriers that are designed to handle large volumes over
distance at a profit. As there is usually not enough traffic to attract
service by a large carrier, there is also not enough traffic to sustain
more than one smaller carrier. There are also significant barriers to
entry in the railroad industry, including the need to own rights-of-
way, build track, purchase fleets. Thus, even to the extent that the
rule may have an economic impact, it should have no impact on the
intramodal competitive position of small railroads.
The AISE developed in connection with this final rule concludes
that this final rule will only likely impact four Class I railroads
that voluntarily choose to implement ECP brakes in their operations and
therefore should not have any economic impact on small entities.
Smaller railroads that carry unit and unit-like commodities often
operate and transport trains owned by other parties over relatively
short distances and turn them over to larger systems that, in turn,
transport those trains relatively long distances to their ultimate
destination or to another small railroad for final delivery. FRA
recognizes that small entities may, in some cases, be involved in
specific route segments for trains that originate or terminate on a
Class I railroad. In these cases, the cars involved are more likely to
be owned or provided by shippers or a Class I railroad. Mutual support
arrangements and shared power practices are likely to ensure that the
smaller railroad will not require trains equipped with ECP brakes for
this service. Further, FRA anticipates that train operations using ECP
brakes will be limited to long hauls of commodities such as intermodal,
coal, ore, non-metallic minerals, motor vehicle parts, and grain for
many years. Since small railroads do not handle such commodities, they
will not likely receive large blocks of cars equipped with ECP brakes
from Class I railroads.
Since FRA does not expect small railroads to convert to ECP brake
technology within the period of the analysis, this final rule is not
anticipated to affect any small entities. Thus, FRA certifies that this
final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities under the
[[Page 61548]]
Regulatory Flexibility Act or Executive Order 13272.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection requirements in this final rule have
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent Total annual Average time per Total annual
CFR section universe responses response burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests............ 30,000 locomotives 30,000 tests...... 15 minutes........ 7,500 hours.
232.3--Applicability--Export, 559 railroads..... 8 cards........... 10 minutes........ 1 hour.
industrial, & other cars not
owned by railroads-
identification.
232.7--Waivers.................. 559 railroads..... 20 petitions...... 40 hours.......... 800 hours.
232.11--Penalties--Knowingly 559 railroads..... 1 falsified recd/ 10 minutes........ .17 hour.
falsifying a record/report. rpt.
232.15--Movement of Defective
Equipment:
--Tags...................... 1,620,000 cars.... 128,400 tags...... 2.5 minutes....... 5,350 hours.
--Written Notification...... 1,620,000 cars.... 25,000 notices.... 3 minutes......... 1,250 hours.
232.17--Special Approval
Procedure:
--Petitions for special 559 railroads..... 4 petitions....... 100 hours......... 400 hours.
approval of safety-critical
revision.
--Petitions for special 559 railroads..... 2 petitions....... 100 hours......... 200 hours.
approval of pre-revenue
service acceptance plan.
--Service of petitions...... 559 railroads..... 4 petitions....... 40 hours.......... 160 hours.
--Statement of interest..... Public/railroads.. 14 statements..... 8 hours........... 112 hours.
--Comment................... Public/railroads.. 13 comments....... 4 hours........... 52 hours.
232.103--Gen'l requirements--all 114,000 cars...... 70,000 stickers... 10 minutes........ 11,667 hours.
train brake systems.
232.105--Gen'l requirements for 30,000 locomotives 30,000 forms...... 5 minutes......... 2,500 hours.
locomotives--Inspection.
232.107--Air source requirements 10 new railroads.. 1 plan............ 40 hours.......... 40 hours.
and cold weather operations--
Monitoring Plan (Subsequent
Years).
--Amendments to Plan........ 50 railroads/plans 10 amendments..... 20 hours.......... 200 hours.
--Recordkeeping............. 50 railroads/plans 1,150 records..... 20 hours.......... 23,000 hours.
232.109--Dynamic brake 559 railroads..... 1,656,000 records. 4 minutes......... 110,400 hours.
requirements--status.
--Inoperative dynamic brakes 30,000 locomotives 6,358 records..... 4 minutes......... 424 hours.
--Tag bearing words 30,000 locomotives 6,358 tags........ 30 seconds........ 53 hours.
``inoperative dynamic
brakes''.
--Deactivated dynamic brakes 8,000 locomotives. 10 stencilings.... 5 minutes......... 1 hour.
(Sub. Yrs.).
--Operating rules 5 new railroads... 5 op. rules....... 4 hours........... 20 hours.
(Subsequent Years).
--Amendments................ 559 railroads..... 15 amendments..... 1 hour............ 15 hours.
--Requests to increase 5 mph 559 railroads..... 5 requests........ 30 min/20 hrs..... 103 hours.
overspeed restriction.
--Knowledge criteria-- 5 new railroads... 5 amendments...... 16 hours.......... 80 hours.
locomotive engineers--Sub
Yrs.
232.111--Train information 5 new railroads... 5 procedures...... 40 hours.......... 200 hours.
handling.
--Sub. Yrs.--Amendments..... 100 railroads..... 100 amendments.... 20 hours.......... 2,000 hours.
--Report requirements to 559 railroads..... 2,112,000 reports. 10 minutes........ 352,000 hours.
train crew.
232.203--Training requirements--
Tr. Prog.:
--Sub Yr.................... 15 railroads...... 5 programs........ 100 hours......... 500 hours.
--Amendments to written 559 railroads..... 559 amendments.... 8 hours........... 4,472 hours.
program.
--Training records.......... 559 railroads..... 67,000 records.... 8 minutes......... 8,933 hours.
--Training notifications.... 559 railroads..... 67,000 notific.... 3 minutes......... 3,350 hours.
--Audit program............. 559 railroads..... 1 plan/559 cop.... 40 hours/1 min.... 49 hours.
--Amendments to validation/ 559 railroads..... 50 amendments..... 20 hours.......... 1,000 hours.
assessment program.
232.205--Class 1 brake test-- 559 railroads..... 1,646,000 records. 45 seconds........ 20,575 hours.
Notifications/Records.
232.207--Class 1A brake tests-- 559 railroads..... 5 des. Lists...... 1 hour............ 5 hours.
Subsequent Years.
--Notification.............. 559 railroads..... 5 amendments...... 1 hour............ 5 hours.
232.209--Class II brake tests-- 559 railroads..... 1,597,400 commun.. 3 seconds......... 1,331 hours.
intermediate inspection.
232.213--Extended haul trains... 83,000 long dist. 100 letters....... 15 minutes........ 25 hours.
movements.
--Record of all defective/ N/A............... N/A............... N/A............... N/A.
inoperative brakes.
232.303--Gen'l requirements-- 1,600,000 frgt. 5,600 tags........ 5 minutes......... 467 hours.
single car test. cars.
[[Page 61549]]
--Last repair track brake 1,600,000 frgt. 320,000 stncl..... 5 minutes......... 26,667 hours.
test/single car test. cars.
232.305--Single Car tests....... 1,600,000 frgt. 320,00 tests/ 45 minutes........ 240,000 hours.
cars. records.
232.307--Modification of Single AAR............... 1 req. + 3 copies. 4 hrs. + 5 min.... 4 hours.
Car Air Brake Test Procedures
(Old Rqmnt)--Req.
--Affirmation Statement on AAR............... 1 statement + 4 30 min. + 5 min... 1 hour.
Mod. Req. to Employee copies.
Representatives.
--Comments on Modification Public/Int. 2 comments........ 60 minutes........ 2 hours.
Request. Parties.
232.309--Repair track brake test 640 shops......... 5,000 tests....... 30 minutes........ 2,500 hours.
232.403--Unique Code............ 245 railroads..... 12 requests....... 5 minutes......... 1 hour.
232.407--Operations requiring 2- 245 railroads..... 50,000 comm....... 30 seconds........ 417 hours.
way EOTs.
232.409--Insp. and Testing of 245 railroads..... 447,500 comm...... 30 seconds........ 3,729 hours.
EOTs.
--Telemetry Equipment-- 245 railroads..... 32,708 mar. units. 1 minute.......... 545 hours.
Testing and Calibration.
232.503--Process to introduce 559 railroads..... 1 letter.......... 1 hour............ 1 hour.
new brake technology.
--Special approval.......... 559 railroads..... 1 request......... 3 hours........... 3 hours.
232.505--Pre-revenue svc accept. 559 railroads..... 1 procedure....... 160 hours......... 160 hours.
test plan--Sub Yr.
--Amendments................ 559 railroads..... 1 procedure....... 40 hours.......... 40 hours.
--Design description........ 559 railroads..... 1 petition........ 67 hours.......... 67 hours.
--Report to FRA Assoc. 559 railroads..... 1 report.......... 13 hours.......... 13 hours.
Admin. for Safety.
--Brake system technology 559 railroads..... 5 descriptions.... 40 hours.......... 200 hours.
testing.
232.603--Configuration
Management--New Requirements.
--Configuration Management 4 railroads....... 1 plan............ 160 hours......... 160 hours.
Plan Submitted to FRA.
--Subsequent Years.......... 4 railroads....... 1 plan............ 60 hours.......... 60 hours.
--Modification of Standards. 4 railroads....... 1 request + 2 8 hours + 5 min... 8 hours.
copies.
--Affirmative statement + 4 railroads....... 4 statements + 24 1 hour + 5 min.... 6 hours.
statement copies re: copies.
modification request.
--Comments on requested Public/Int. 4 comments........ 2 hours........... 8 hours.
modification. Parties.
232.605--ECP Brakes: Training-- 4 railroads....... 4 programs........ 100 hours......... 400 hours.
New Requirements.
--Adopt/Developing an ECP 4 railroads....... 2 programs........ 100 hours......... 200 hours.
Training Prog.--Yr. One.
--Subsequent Years..........
--ECP Brakes Training of 4 railroads....... 6,409 tr. Empl.... 8 hrs/24 hrs...... 105,512 hours.
Employees--Yr. One.
--ECP Brakes Training of 4 railroads....... 6,409 tr. Empl.... 1 hour/8 hours.... 30,264 hours.
Employees--Sub. Yrs.
--ECP Training Records--Yr. 4 railroads....... 6,409 records..... 8 minutes......... 855 hours.
One.
--ECP Training Records-- 4 railroads....... 6,409 records..... 4 minutes......... 428 hours.
Subsequent Years.
--Assessment of ECP Training 4 railroads....... 4 plans........... 40 hours.......... 160 hours.
Plan.
--Adopt Operating Rules for 4 railroads....... 4 Op. Rules....... 24 hours.......... 96 hours.
ECP Brakes.
--Loco. Engineers--ECP 4 railroads....... 4 amended Programs 40 hours.......... 160 hours.
Brakes Systems: Criteria
For Certification.
232.607--ECP Inspection and
Testing--New Requirements:
--Initial Terminal-- 4 railroads....... 10,000 insp. + 90 min. + 45 sec.. 15,125 hours.
Inspections and 10,000 notific.
Notification of Class I
Brake Tests.
--Cars added or removed en 4 railroads....... 1,000 insp. + 500 60 min. + 45 sec.. 1,006 hours.
route--Class I Br. Test. notific.
--Non-ECP cars added to ECP 200 Cars.......... 200 insp. + 400 5 min. + 2.5 min.. 34 hours.
Trains--Inspections and tags/rcds.
Tags for Defective Cars.
232.609--Handling of Defective
Equipment with ECP Brake
Systems--New Requirements:
--Freight Car w/defective 25 Cars........... 50 tags........... 2.5 minutes....... 2 hours.
conventional brakes moved
in train operating in ECP
brake mode.
--Inspections/Tagging for 20 Cars........... 20 Insp. + 40 tags/ 5 min. + 2.5 min.. 3 hours.
ECP Train moving w/less records.
than 85 percent operative/
effective brakes.
[[Page 61550]]
232.609--Freight Car with ECP 75 Cars........... 150 tags.......... 2.5 minutes....... 6 hours.
brake system found with
defective non-brake safety
appliance--Tagging.
--Conventional Train with 500 Cars.......... 1,000 tags........ 2.5 minutes....... 42 hours.
stand-alone ECP brake
equipped cars--Tagging.
--Procedures for handling 4 railroads....... 4 procedures...... 24 hours.......... 96 hours.
ECP brake system repairs
and designation of repair
locations.
--List of repair locations.. 4 railroads....... 4 lists........... 8 hours........... 32 hours.
--Notification to FRA Safety 4 railroads....... 1 notification.... 1 hour............ 1 hour.
Administrator regarding
change to repair location
list.
232.611--Periodic Maintenance--
New Requirements:
--Inspections before being 500 fr. Cars...... 500 insp. & 10 minutes........ 83 hours.
released from repair Shop. records.
--Procedures for ECP Single 1 Railroad Rep.... 1 procedure + 2 24 hours + 5 min.. 24 hours.
Car Tests. copies.
--Single Car Air Brake 2,500 fr. Cars.... 2,500 tests/rcd... 45 minutes........ 1,875 hours.
Tests--Records.
--Modification of Single Car 1 Railroad Rep.... 1 mod. Proc....... 40 hours.......... 40 hours.
Test Standards.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the
paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan,
Information Clearance Officer, at 202-493-6292, or contact Ms. Nakia
Jackson at 202-493-6073; or via e-mail at robert.brogan@dot.gov or
nakia.jackson@dot.gov.
OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. Comments to OMB may
be sent by mail to: The Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th St.,
NW., Washington, DC 20503, attn: FRA Desk Officer. Comments may also be
sent to OMB at the following address: oira_submissions@omb.eop.gov.
FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of this final rule.
The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate
notice in the Federal Register.
D. Federalism Implications
Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999),
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency
may not issue a regulation with Federalism implications that imposes
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local
governments, or the agency consults with State and local government
officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation.
Where a regulation has Federalism implications and preempts State law,
the agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the
process of developing the regulation.
In the NPRM, FRA stated that this proposed rule has preemptive
effect. Subject to a limited exception for essentially local safety or
security hazards, FRA stated that its requirements will establish a
uniform Federal safety standard that must be met, and state
requirements covering the same subject are displaced, whether those
standards are in the form of state statutes, regulations, local
ordinances, or other forms of state law, including state common law.
Section 20106 of Title 49 of the United States Code, FRA said, provides
that all regulations prescribed by the Secretary related to railroad
safety preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same
subject matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. This is consistent with past practice at FRA and
within the Department of Transportation. In particular, the notice of
proposed rulemaking did not change the preemption provision of part
232; this final rule amends the preemption provision, Sec. 232.13, to
conform to the recent clarifying amendments to 49 U.S.C. 20106.
AAJ filed comments expressing its belief that FRA should revise the
``Federalism Implications'' section of the preamble to reflect
Congress's intention that federal rail safety regulations do not
preempt an individual's right to pursue a state tort law claim against
a railroad company. According to AAJ, section 1528 of the
``Implementing Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' (the
9/11 Act) clarifies that 49 U.S.C. 20106 does not preempt State law
causes of action. AAR disagrees, stating that, by its plain language,
section 1528 ``is intended solely to reject a preemption
[[Page 61551]]
defense where the defendant has violated the federal standard of care
embodied in a federal regulation or a plan created pursuant to a
federal regulation.'' According to AAR, section 1528 does not eliminate
preemption of common law claims, but reaffirms that state law is
preempted whenever the Secretaries of Transportation and Homeland
Security issue a regulation or order covering the applicable subject
matter, unless the local safety or security hazard exception applies.
Normal State negligence standards apply where there is no Federal
action covering the subject matter. In Section 1528 of Public Law 110-
53, Congress clarified the availability of State law causes of action
under section 20106 where there is Federal action covering the subject
matter. As amended, 49 U.S.C. 20106 provides that issuance of these
regulations preempts any State law, regulation, or order covering the
same subject matter, except an additional or more stringent law,
regulation, or order that is necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local railroad safety or railroad security hazard; that is
not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States
Government; and that does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
Section 20106 permits State tort actions arising from events or
activities occurring on or after January 18, 2002, for the following:
(a) A violation of the Federal standard of care established by
regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with
respect to railroad safety, such as these regulations) or the Secretary
of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security); (b) a party's
violation of, or failure to comply with, its own plan, rule, or
standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or order issued by
either of the two Secretaries; and (c) a party's violation of a State
standard that is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local
safety or security hazard, is not incompatible with a law, regulation,
or order of the United States Government, and does not unreasonably
burden interstate commerce. Nothing in Section 20106 creates a Federal
cause of action on behalf of an injured party or confers Federal
question jurisdiction for such State law causes of action.
While this recent amendment has altered the preemptive reach of
Section 20106, it is important to note that there are limits to this
exception allowing state tort actions under this statute. For example,
Congress provided an exception only for an action in State court
seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage. The
statute does not provide for the recovery of punitive damages in the
permitted common law tort actions. In addition, the statute permits
actions for violation of an internal plan, rule, or standard only when
such internal plan, rule, or standard is created pursuant to a Federal
regulation or order issued by DOT or DHS. While parties are encouraged
to go beyond the minimum regulatory standard in establishing internal
safety and security standards, such standards that exceed the
requirements of Federal regulation or order are not created pursuant to
Federal regulation or order. Accordingly, there is no clear
authorization of a common law tort action alleging a violation of those
aspects of such an internal plan, rule, or standard related to the
subject matter of this regulation that exceed the minimum required by
the Federal regulation or order.
FRA has analyzed this final rule in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. This final rule will
not have a substantial effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among various levels of government. FRA
concludes that this final rule will not impose any direct compliance
costs on State and local governments and has no federalism
implications, other than the preemption of state laws covering the
subject matter of this final rule, which occurs by operation of law
under 49 U.S.C. 20106 whenever FRA issues a rule or order. Elements of
the final rule dealing with safety appliances affect an area of safety
that has been pervasively regulated at the Federal level for over a
century. Accordingly, the final rule amendments in that area will
involve no impacts on Federal relationships.
E. Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures)
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes,
Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA has
determined that this final rule is not a major FRA action (requiring
the preparation of an environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment) because it is categorically excluded from detailed
environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures.
See 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Section 4(c)(20) reads as follows: (c)
Actions categorically excluded. Certain classes of FRA actions have
been determined to be categorically excluded from the requirements of
these Procedures as they do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment. * * * The following
classes of FRA actions are categorically excluded: * * * (20)
Promulgation of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not
result in significantly increased emissions or air or water pollutants
or noise or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation.
In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the
agency has further concluded that no extraordinary circumstances exist
with respect to this regulation that might trigger the need for a more
detailed environmental review. As a result, FRA finds that this final
rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $132,000,000 or more in any 1
year, and before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice
of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a
written statement'' detailing the effect on State, local, and tribal
governments and the private sector. This final rule may result in the
expenditure, in the aggregate, of $132,000,000 or more in any one year.
However, those expenses are not mandated and would only be incurred by
the private sector if it wishes to take advantage of the regulatory
relief provided by this final rule. Although the preparation of such a
statement is not required, the analytical requirements under Executive
Order 12866 are similar to the analytical requirements under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and, thus, the same analysis
complies with both analytical requirements.
[[Page 61552]]
G. Energy Impact
Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' 66
FR 28355 ( May 22, 2001). Under the Executive Order, a ``significant
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to
lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including
notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices
of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant regulatory action
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy
action. FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with Executive
Order 13211. FRA has determined that this final rule is not likely to
have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use
of energy. Consequently, FRA has determined that this regulatory action
is not a ``significant energy action'' within the meaning of Executive
Order 13211.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 232
Electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, Incorporation by
reference, Penalties, Railroad power brakes, Railroad safety, Two-way
end-of-train devices.
The Rule
0
In consideration of the foregoing, FRA amends chapter II, subtitle B of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 232--BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY STANDARDS FOR FREIGHT AND OTHER NON-
PASSENGER TRAINS AND EQUIPMENT; END OF TRAIN DEVICES
0
1. The authority citation for Part 232 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20301-
20303, 20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 CFR
1.49.
0
2. Section 232.5 is amended by adding definitions car control device
(CCD), dual mode ECP brake system, ECP, ECP brake mode, ECP brake
system, ECP-EOT device, emulator CCD, overlay ECP brake system, stand-
alone CCD, stand-alone ECP brake system, switch mode, and train line
cable; by revising the definition train, unit or train, cycle and
adding the definition yard limits as follows in alphabetical order:
Sec. 232.5 Definitions.
* * * * *
Car control device (CCD) means an electronic control device that
replaces the function of the conventional pneumatic service and
emergency portions of a car's air brake control valve during electronic
braking and provides for electronically controlled service and
emergency brake applications.
Dual mode ECP brake system means an ECP brake system that is
equipped with either an emulator CCD or an overlay ECP brake system on
each car which can be operated in either ECP brake mode or conventional
pneumatic brake mode.
ECP means ``electronically controlled pneumatic'' when applied to a
brake or brakes.
ECP brake mode means operating a car or an entire train using an
ECP brake system.
ECP brake system means a train power braking system actuated by
compressed air and controlled by electronic signals from the locomotive
or an ECP-EOT to the cars in the consist for service and emergency
applications in which the brake pipe is used to provide a constant
supply of compressed air to the reservoirs on each car but does not
convey braking signals to the car. ECP brake systems include dual mode
and stand-alone ECP brake systems.
ECP-EOT device means an end-of-train device for an ECP brake system
that is physically the last network node in the train, pneumatically
and electrically connected at the end of the train to the train line
cable operating with an ECP brake system.
* * * * *
Emulator CCD means a CCD that is capable of optionally emulating
the function of the pneumatic control valve while in a conventionally
braked train.
* * * * *
Overlay ECP brake system means a brake system that has both
conventional pneumatic brake valves and ECP brake components, making it
capable of operating as either a conventional pneumatic brake system or
an ECP brake system. This brake system can operate in either a
conventionally braked train using the conventional pneumatic control
valve or in an ECP braked train using the ECP brake system's CCD.
* * * * *
Stand-alone CCD means a CCD that can operate properly only in a
train operating in ECP brake mode and cannot operate in a conventional
pneumatically braked train.
Stand-alone ECP brake system means a brake system equipped with a
CCD that can only operate the brakes on the car in ECP brake mode.
* * * * *
Switch Mode means a mode of operation of the ECP brake system that
allows operation of that train at 20 miles per hour or less when the
train's ECP-EOT device is not communicating with the lead locomotive's
HEU, the train is separated during road switching operations, or the
ECP brake system has stopped the train because the percentage of
operative brakes fell below 85%. Many of the ECP brake system's fault
detection/response procedures are suspended during Switch Mode.
* * * * *
Train line cable is a two-conductor electric wire spanning the
train and carrying both electrical power to operate all CCDs and ECP-
EOT devices and communications network signals.
Train, unit or train, cycle means a train that, except for the
changing of locomotive power or for the removal or replacement of
defective equipment, remains coupled as a consist and operates in a
continuous loop or continuous loops without destination.
* * * * *
Yard limits means a system of tracks, not including main tracks and
sidings, used for classifying cars, making-up and inspecting trains, or
storing cars and equipment.
* * * * *
0
3. Section 232.13 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:
Sec. 232.13 Preemptive effect.
(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order or standard covering
the same subject matter, except for a provision necessary to eliminate
or reduce a local safety hazard if that provision is not incompatible
with this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate
commerce. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to preempt an
action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or
property damage alleging that a party has failed to comply with the
Federal standard of care established by this part, has failed to comply
with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to this
part, or has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order
that is not incompatible with the first sentence of this paragraph.
* * * * *
0
4. Section 232.17 is amended by revising paragraphs (a) and (b) to read
as follows:
[[Page 61553]]
Sec. 232.17 Special approval procedure.
(a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and
action upon requests for special approval of a plan under Sec.
232.15(g); an alternative standard under Sec. 232.305, Sec. 232.603,
or a single car test procedure under Sec. 232.611; and pre-revenue
service acceptance testing plans under subpart F of this part.
(b) Petitions for special approval of an alternative standard or
test procedure. Each petition for special approval of a plan under
Sec. 232.15(g); an alternative standard under Sec. 232.305 or Sec.
232.603; or a single car test procedure under Sec. 232.611 shall
contain:
(1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
(2) The plan, alternative standard, or test procedure proposed, in
detail, to be submitted for or to meet the particular requirement of
this part;
(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, for FRA to consider in
determining whether the plan, alternative standard, or test procedure,
will be consistent with the guidance under Sec. 232.15(f), if
applicable, and will provide at least an equivalent level of safety or
otherwise meet the requirements contained in this part; and
(4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
* * * * *
0
5. Section 232.103 is amended by revising paragraph (f) to read as
follows:
Sec. 232.103 General requirements for all train brake systems.
* * * * *
(f) Each car in a train shall have its air brakes in effective
operating condition unless the car is being moved for repairs in
accordance with Sec. Sec. 232.15 and 232.609. The air brakes on a car
are not in effective operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or
otherwise inoperative or if the piston travel exceeds:
(1) 10 1/2 inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke
brake cylinders; or
(2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or
badge plate for the brake cylinder with which the car is equipped.
* * * * *
0
6. Section 232.205 is amended by revising the first two sentences of
paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 232.205 Class I brake test-initial terminal inspection.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(5) For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake
cylinders, piston travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If piston
travel is found to be less than 6 inches or more than 9 inches, it must
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. * * *
* * * * *
Sec. 232.213 [Amended]
0
7. Section 232.213 is amended by removing paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7)
and redsignating paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) as (a)(6) and (a)(7)
respectively.
0
8. Section 232.303 is amended by revising the first three sentences of
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 232.303 General requirements.
* * * * *
(c) A car on a shop or repair track shall have its piston travel
inspected. For cars equipped with 8\1/2\-inch or 10-inch diameter brake
cylinders, piston travel shall be within 6 to 9 inches. If piston
travel is found to be less than 6 inches or more than 9 inches, it must
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches. * * *
* * * * *
0
9. Section 232.305 is amended by revising the first sentence of
paragraph (a) and removing paragraph (f); the revision reads as
follows:
Sec. 232.305 Single car air brake tests.
(a) Single car air brake tests shall be performed by a qualified
person in accordance with either Section 3.0, ``Tests-Standard Freight
Brake Equipment,'' and Section 4.0, ``Special Tests,'' of the
Association of American Railroads Standard S-486-04, ``Code of Air
Brake System Tests for Freight Equipment,'' contained in the AAR Manual
of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (January 1, 2004); an
alternative procedure approved by FRA pursuant to Sec. 232.17; or a
modified procedure approved in accordance with the provisions contained
in Sec. 232.307. * * *
* * * * *
0
10. Part 232 is amended by adding a new subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Braking
Systems
Sec.
232.601 Scope.
232.602 Applicability.
232.603 Design, interoperability, and configuration management
requirements.
232.605 Training requirements.
232.607 Inspection and testing requirements.
232.609 Handling of defective equipment with ECP brake systems.
232.611 Periodic maintenance.
232.613 End-of-train devices.
Sec. 232.601 Scope.
This subpart contains specific requirements applicable to freight
trains and freight cars equipped with ECP brake systems. This subpart
also contains specific exceptions from various requirements contained
in this part for freight trains and freight cars equipped with ECP
brake systems.
Sec. 232.602 Applicability.
This subpart applies to all railroads that operate a freight car or
freight train governed by this part and equipped with an ECP brake
system. Unless specifically excepted or modified in this section, all
of the other requirements contained in this part are applicable to a
freight car or freight train equipped with an ECP brake system.
Sec. 232.603 Design, interoperability, and configuration management
requirements.
(a) General. A freight car or freight train equipped with an ECP
brake system shall, at a minimum, meet the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) standards contained in the AAR Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices related to ECP brake systems listed below; an
alternate standard approved by FRA pursuant to Sec. 232.17; or a
modified standard approved in accordance with the provisions contained
in paragraph (f) of this section. The incorporation by reference of the
AAR standards identified in this section was approved by the Director
of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. Copies of the incorporated documents may be obtained from the
Association of American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC
20001, 202-639-2100, www.aar.org. You may inspect a copy at the Federal
Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC,
202-493-6300 or at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA,
call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html. The applicable
standards, which are incorporated into this regulation by reference,
include the following:
(1) AAR S-4200, ``Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Cable-
Based Brake Systems--Performance Requirements,'' (Adopted 1999;
Revised: 2002, 2004, 2008);
[[Page 61554]]
(2) AAR S-4210, ``ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors,
and Junction Boxes--Performance Specifications,'' (Adopted: 1999;
Revised 2002, 2007);
(3) AAR S-4220, ``ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply--
Performance Specification,'' Version 2.0 (Adopted: 1999; Revised:
2002);
(4) AAR S-4230, ``Intratrain Communication (ITC) Specification for
Cable-Based Freight Train Control System,'' Version 3.0 (Adopted: 1999;
Revised: 2002, 2004);
(5) AAR S-4240, ``ECP Brake Equipment--Approval Procedure''
(Adopted: 2007);
(6) AAR S-4250, ``Performance Requirements for ITC Controlled
Cable-Based Distributed Power Systems,'' Version 2.0 (Adopted: 2003;
Revised: 2004);
(7) AAR S-4260, ``ECP Brake and Wire Distributed Power
Interoperability Test Procedures'' (Adopted: 2007); and
(8) AAR S-4270, ``ECP Brake System Configuration Management''
(Adopted: 2008).
(b) Approval. A freight train or freight car equipped with an ECP
brake system and equipment covered by the AAR standards incorporated by
reference in this section shall not be used without conditional or
final approval by AAR in accordance with AAR Standard S-4240, ``ECP
Brake Equipment--Approval Procedures'' (2007).
(c) Configuration management. A railroad operating a freight train
or freight car equipped with ECP brake systems shall adopt and comply
with the configuration management plan developed in accordance with the
AAR standards incorporated by reference in this section. FRA reserves
the right to audit a manufacturer's configuration management plan at
any time.
(d) Exceptions. (1) A freight car or freight train equipped with a
stand-alone ECP brake system shall be excepted from the requirement in
Sec. 232.103(l) referencing AAR Standard S-469-47, ``Performance
Specification for Freight Brakes.''
(2) The provisions addressing the introduction of new brake system
technology contained in subpart F of this part are not applicable to a
freight car or freight train equipped with an ECP brake system approved
by AAR in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, conditionally
or otherwise, as of the effective date of this rule.
(e) New technology. Upon written request supported by suitable
justification and submitted pursuant to the special approval procedures
in Sec. 232.17, the Associate Administrator may except from the
requirements of subpart F of this part the testing of new ECP brake
technology, demonstration of new ECP brake technology, or both, where
testing or demonstration, or both, will be conducted pursuant to an
FRA-recognized industry standard and FRA is invited to monitor the
testing or demonstration, or both.
(f) Modification of standards. The AAR or other authorized
representative of the railroad industry may seek modification of the
industry standards identified in or approved pursuant to paragraph (a)
of this section. The request for modification will be handled and shall
be submitted in accordance with the modification procedures contained
in Sec. 232.307.
Sec. 232.605 Training requirements.
(a) Inspection, testing and maintenance. A railroad that operates a
freight car or freight train equipped with an ECP brake system and each
contractor that performs inspection, testing, or maintenance on a
freight car or freight train equipped with an ECP brake system shall
adopt and comply with a training, qualification, and designation
program for its employees that perform inspection, testing or
maintenance of ECP brake systems. The training program required by this
section shall meet the requirements in Sec. Sec. 232.203(a), (b), (e),
and (f).
(b) Operating rules. A railroad operating a freight train or
freight car equipped with an ECP brake system shall amend its operating
rules to govern safe train handling procedures related to ECP brake
systems and equipment under all operating conditions and shall tailor
its operating rules to the specific equipment and territory of the
railroad.
(c) Locomotive engineers. A railroad operating a freight car or
freight train equipped with an ECP brake system shall adopt and use in
its training program under part 240 specific knowledge, skill, and
ability criteria to ensure that its locomotive engineers are fully
trained with the operating rules governing safe train handling
procedures related to ECP brake systems and equipment under all
operating conditions and tailored to the specific equipment and
territory of the railroad.
Sec. 232.607 Inspection and testing requirements.
(a) Trains at initial terminal. A freight train operating in ECP
brake mode shall receive the following inspections at its point of
origin (initial terminal):
(1) A Class I brake test as described in Sec. 232.205(c) by a
qualified mechanical inspector (QMI); and
(2) A pre-departure inspection pursuant to part 215 of this chapter
by an inspector designated under Sec. 215.11 of this chapter.
(b) Trains en route. (1) Except for a unit or cycle train, a train
operating in ECP brake mode shall not operate a distance that exceeds
its destination or 3,500 miles, whichever is less, unless inspections
meeting the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section are performed
on the train.
(2) A unit or cycle train operating in ECP brake mode shall receive
the inspections required in paragraph (a) of this section at least
every 3,500 miles.
(3) The greatest distance that any car in a train has traveled
since receiving a Class I brake test by a qualified mechanical
inspector will determine the distance that the train has traveled.
(4) A freight train operating in ECP brake mode shall receive a
Class I brake test as described in Sec. 232.205(c) by a qualified
person at a location where the train is off air for a period of more
than:
(i) 24 hours, or
(ii) 80 hours, if the train remains inaccessible to the railroad
and in an extended-off-air facility. For the purpose of this section,
an extended-off-air facility means a location controlled by a sole
shipper or consignee which restricts access to the train and provides
sufficient security to deter vandalism.
(c) Cars added en route. (1) Each freight car equipped with an ECP
brake system that is added to a freight train operating in ECP brake
mode shall receive a Class I brake test as described in Sec.
232.205(c) by a qualified person, unless all of the following are met:
(i) The car has received a Class I brake test by a qualified
mechanical inspector within the last 3,500 miles;
(ii) Information identified in Sec. 232.205(e) relating to the
performance of the previously received Class I brake test is provided
to the train crew;
(iii) The car has not been off air for more than 24 hours or for
more than 80 hours, if that train remains in an extended-off-air
facility; and
(iv) A visual inspection of the car's brake systems is conducted to
ensure that the brake equipment is intact and properly secured. This
may be accomplished as part of the inspection required under Sec.
215.13 of this chapter and may be conducted while the car is off air.
(2) Each car and each solid block of cars not equipped with an ECP
brake system that is added to a train operating in ECP brake mode shall
receive a visual inspection to ensure it is properly placed in the
train and safe to operate and shall be moved and tagged in
[[Page 61555]]
accordance with the provisions contained in Sec. 232.15.
(d) Class III brake test (1) A Class III brake test shall be
performed on a freight train operating in ECP brake mode by a qualified
person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, to test the train's brake system
whenever the continuity of the brake pipe or electrical connection is
broken or interrupted.
(2) In lieu of observing the brake pipe changes at the rear of a
freight train with the end-of-train telemetry device referred to in
Sec. Sec. 232.211(c) and (d), the operator shall verify that the
brakes applied and released on the rear car of the freight train by
observing the ECP brake system's display in the locomotive cab.
(e) Initialization. (1) A freight train operating in ECP brake mode
shall be initialized as described in paragraph (e)(2) whenever the
following occurs:
(i) Class I brake test.
(ii) Class III brake test.
(iii) Whenever the ECP brake system is powered on.
(2) Initialization shall, at a minimum:
(i) initialize the ECP brake system pursuant to AAR Series Standard
S-4200; and
(ii) be performed in the sequential order of the vehicles in the
train.
(3) Whenever an ECP brake system is initialized pursuant to this
paragraph, the train crew must ensure that the total number of cars
indicated by the ECP brake system is the same as the total number of
cars indicated on the train consist.
(f) Modifications to existing brake inspections. (1) In lieu of the
specific brake pipe service reductions and increases required in this
part, an electronic signal that provides an equivalent application and
release of the brakes shall be utilized when conducting any required
inspection or test on a freight car or freight train equipped with an
ECP brake system and operating in ECP brake mode.
(2) In lieu of the specific piston travel ranges contained in this
part, the piston travel on freight cars equipped with ECP brake systems
shall be within the piston travel limits stenciled or marked on the car
or badge plate consistent with the manufacturers recommended limits, if
so stenciled or marked.
(g) ECP brake system train line cable. Each ECP brake system train
line cable shall:
(1) be located and guarded to provide sufficient vertical
clearance;
(2) not cause any tripping hazards;
(3) not hang with one end free whenever the equipment is used in a
train movement;
(4) not be positioned to interfere with the use of any safety
appliance; or
(5) not have any of the following conditions:
(i) Badly chafed or broken insulation.
(ii) Broken plugs, receptacles or terminals.
(iii) Broken or protruding strands of wire.
(h) Exceptions. A freight car or a freight train shall be exempt
from the requirements contained in Sec. Sec. 232.205(a) and (b),
232.207, 232.209, and 232.211(a) when it is equipped with an ECP brake
system and operating in ECP brake mode.
Sec. 232.609 Handling of defective equipment with ECP brake systems.
(a) Ninety-five percent of the cars in a train operating in ECP
brake mode shall have effective and operative brakes prior to use or
departure from the train's initial terminal or any location where a
Class I brake test is required to be performed on the entire train by a
qualified mechanical inspector pursuant to Sec. 232.607.
(b) A freight car equipped with an ECP brake system that is known
to have arrived with ineffective or inoperative brakes at initial
terminal of the next train which the car is to be included or at a
location where a Class I brake test is required under Sec. Sec.
232.607(b)(1) through (b)(3) shall not depart that location with
ineffective or inoperative brakes in a train operating in ECP brake
mode unless:
(1) The location does not have the ability to conduct the necessary
repairs;
(2) The car is hauled only for the purpose of repair to the nearest
forward location where the necessary repairs can be performed
consistent with the guidance contained in Sec. 232.15(f);
(3) The car is not being placed for loading or unloading while
being moved for repair unless unloading is necessary for the safe
repair of the car; and
(4) The car is properly tagged in accordance with Sec. 232.15(b).
(c) A freight car equipped with only conventional pneumatic brakes
shall not move in a freight train operating in ECP brake mode unless it
would otherwise have effective and operative brakes if it were part of
a conventional pneumatic brake-equipped train or could be moved from
the location in defective condition under the provisions contained in,
and tagged in accordance with, Sec. 232.15.
(d) A freight train operating in ECP brake mode shall not move if
less than 85 percent of the cars in the train have operative and
effective brakes. However, after experiencing a penalty stop for having
less than 85 percent operative and effective brakes, a freight train
operating in ECP brake mode may be moved if all of the following are
met:
(1) The train is visually inspected;
(2) Appropriate measures are taken to ensure that the train is
safely operated to the location where necessary repairs or changes to
the consist can be made;
(3) A qualified person determines that it is safe to move the
train; and
(4) The train is moved in ECP brake Switch Mode to the nearest or
nearest forward location where necessary repairs or changes to the
consist can be made.
(e) A freight car or locomotive equipped with an ECP brake system
that is found with inoperative or ineffective brakes for the first time
during the performance of a Class I brake test or while en route may be
used or hauled without civil penalty liability under this part to its
destination, not to exceed 3,500 miles; provided, all applicable
provisions of this section are met and the defective car or locomotive
is hauled in a train operating in ECP brake mode.
(f) A freight car equipped with an ECP brake system that is part of
a train operating in ECP brake mode:
(1) that is found with a defective non-brake safety appliance may
be used or hauled without civil penalty under this part to the nearest
or nearest forward location where the necessary repairs can be
performed consistent with the guidelines contained in Sec. 232.15(f).
(2) that is found with an ineffective or inoperative brake shall be
hauled in accordance with the following:
(i) Sec. 232.15(e)(1).
(ii) No more than two freight cars with brakes pneumatically cut
out or five freight cars or five units in a multi-unit articulated
piece of equipment with brakes electronically cut out shall be
consecutively placed in the same train.
(g) A train operating with conventional pneumatic brakes shall not
operate with freight cars equipped with stand-alone ECP brake systems
unless:
(1) The train has at least the minimum percentage of operative
brakes required by paragraph (h) of this section when at an initial
terminal or paragraph (d) of this section when en route; and
(2) The stand-alone ECP brake-equipped cars are:
(i) Moved for the purpose of delivery to a railroad receiving the
equipment or to a location for placement in a train operating in ECP
brake mode or being moved for repair to the nearest available location
where the necessary repairs can be made in accordance with Sec. Sec.
232.15(a)(7) and (f);
(ii) Tagged in accordance with Sec. 232.15(b); and
(iii) Placed in the train in accordance with Sec. 232.15(e).
(h) A train equipped and operated with conventional pneumatic
brakes
[[Page 61556]]
may depart an initial terminal with freight cars that are equipped with
stand-alone ECP brake systems provided all of the following are met:
(1) The train has 100 percent effective and operative brakes on all
cars equipped with conventional pneumatic brake systems;
(2) The train has at least 95 percent effective and operative
brakes when including the freight cars equipped with stand-alone ECP
brake systems; and
(3) The requirements contained in paragraph (g) of this section are
met.
(i) Tagging of defective equipment. A freight car equipped with an
ECP brake system that is found with ineffective or inoperative brakes
will be considered electronically tagged under Sec. 232.15(b)(1) and
(b)(5) if the car is used or hauled in a train operating in ECP brake
mode and the ECP brake system meets the following:
(1) The ECP brake system is able to display information in the cab
of the lead locomotive regarding the location and identification of the
car with defective brakes;
(2) The information is stored or downloaded and is accessible to
FRA and appropriate operating and inspection personnel; and
(3) An electronic or written record of the stored or downloaded
information is retained and maintained in accordance with Sec.
232.15(b)(3).
(j) Procedures for handling ECP brake system repairs and
designation of repair locations. (1) Each railroad operating freight
cars equipped with ECP brake systems shall adopt and comply with
specific procedures developed in accordance with the requirements
related to the movement of defective equipment contained in this
subpart. These procedures shall be made available to FRA upon request.
(2) Each railroad operating freight trains in ECP brake mode shall
submit to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety a list of locations
on its system where ECP brake system repairs will be performed. A
railroad shall notify FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety in
writing 30 days prior to any change in the locations designated for
such repairs. A sufficient number of locations shall be identified to
ensure compliance with the requirements related to the handling of
defective equipment contained in this part.
(k) Exceptions: All freight cars and trains that are specifically
identified, operated, and handled in accordance with this section are
excepted from the movement of defective equipment requirements
contained in Sec. 232.15(a)(2), (a)(5) through (a)(8), and 232.103(d)
and (e).
Sec. 232.611 Periodic maintenance.
(a) In addition to the maintenance requirements contained in Sec.
232.303(b) through (d), a freight car equipped with an ECP brake system
shall be inspected and repaired before being released from a shop or
repair track to ensure the proper and safe condition of the following:
(1) ECP brake system wiring and brackets;
(2) ECP brake system electrical connections; and
(3) Car mounted ECP brake system components.
(b) Single car air brake test procedures. Prior to placing a
freight car equipped with an ECP brake system into revenue service, a
railroad or a duly authorized representative of the railroad industry
shall submit a procedure for conducting periodic single car air brake
tests to FRA for its approval pursuant to Sec. 232.17.
(c) Except as provided in Sec. 232.303(e), a single car air brake
test conducted in accordance with the procedure submitted and approved
in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section shall be performed by
a qualified person on a freight car equipped with an ECP brake system
whenever any of the events identified in Sec. 232.305 occur, except
for those paragraphs identified in paragraph (f) of this section.
(d) A single car air brake test conducted in accordance with the
procedure submitted and approved in accordance with paragraph (b) of
this section shall be performed by a qualified person on each freight
car retrofitted with a newly installed ECP brake system prior to
placing or using the car in revenue service.
(e) Modification of single car test standard. A railroad or a duly
authorized representative of the railroad industry may seek
modification of the single car test standard approved in accordance
with paragraph (b) of this section. The request for modification will
be handled and shall be submitted in accordance with the modification
procedures contained in Sec. 232.307.
(f) Exceptions. A freight car equipped with a stand-alone or dual
mode ECP brake system is excepted from the single car air brake test
procedures contained in Sec. 232.305(a). A freight car equipped with a
stand-alone ECP brake system is excepted from the single car test
requirements contained in Sec. 232.305(b)(2).
(g) For purposes of paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, if a
single car air brake test is conducted on a car prior to June 15, 2009,
pursuant to the then existing AAR standards, it shall be considered the
last single car air brake test for that car, if necessary.
Sec. 232.613 End-of-train devices.
(a) An ECP-EOT device shall, at a minimum, serve as the final node
on the ECP brake circuit, provide a cable terminal circuit, and
monitor, confirm, and report train, brake pipe, and train line cable
continuity, cable voltage, brake pipe pressure, and the status of the
ECP-EOT device battery charge. The ECP-EOT device shall transmit a
status message (EOT Beacon) at least once per second, contain a means
of communicating with the HEU, and be equipped with a brake pipe
pressure transducer and a battery that charges from the train line
cable.
(b) A railroad shall not move or use a freight train equipped with
an ECP brake system unless that train is equipped with a functioning
ECP-EOT device designed and operated in accordance with this subpart.
The ECP-EOT device must be properly connected to the network and to the
train line cable at the rear of the train.
(c) A locomotive equipped with ECP brakes can be used in lieu of an
ECP-EOT device, provided it is capable of performing all of the
functions of a functioning ECP-EOT device.
(d) Exception. A freight train operating in ECP brake mode is
excepted from the end-of-train device requirements contained in subpart
E of this part, provided that it is equipped with an ECP-EOT device
complying with this section.
0
11. Appendix A to part 232 is amended by revising footnote 1 and by
adding an entry for subpart G to the end of the table to read as
follows:
Appendix A to Part 232--Schedule of Civil Penalties \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a
willful violation. Generally when two or more violations of these
regulations are discovered with respect to a single unit of
equipment that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the
appropriate penalties set forth above are aggregated up to a maximum
of $11,000 per day. An exception to this rule is the $15,000 penalty
for willful violation of Sec. 232.503 (failure to get FRA approval
before introducing new technology) with respect to a single unit of
equipment; if the unit has additional violative conditions, the
penalty may routinely be aggregated to $15,000. Although the
penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and
tests under Sec. 232.205 through Sec. 232.209 may be assessed for
each train that is not properly inspected, failure to perform any of
the inspections and tests required under those sections will be
treated as a violation separate and distinct from, and in addition
to, any substantive violative conditions found on the equipment
contained in the train consist. Moreover, the Administrator reserves
the right to assess a penalty of up to $27,000 for any violation
where circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.
[[Page 61557]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Willful
Section Violation violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
Subpart G--Electronically Controlled Pneumatic
(ECP) Braking Systems
232.603 Design, interoperability, and
configuration management requirements:
(a) Failure to meet minimum standards..... 7,500 11,000
(b) Using ECP brake equipment without 7,500 11,000
approval.................................
(c) Failure to adopt and comply with a 7,500 11,000
proper configuration management plan.....
232.605 Training Requirements:
(a) Failure to adopt and comply with a (\1\) (\1\)
proper training, qualification, and
designation program for employees that
perform inspection, testing or
maintenance..............................
(b) Failure to amend operating rules...... 12,500 16,000
(c) Failure to adopt and comply with 12,500 16,000
proper training criteria for locomotive
engineers................................
232.607 Inspection and testing requirements:
(a)(1), (b), (c)(1) Complete or partial (\1\) (\1\)
failure to perform inspection............
(a)(2) Complete or partial failure to 7,500 11,000
perform pre-departure inspection.........
(c)(1)(iv), (c)(2) Failure to perform 4,500 6,500
visual inspection on a car added en route
(d) Failure to perform inspection......... (\1\) (\1\)
(e)(1), (2) Failure to properly initialize 7,500 11,000
the train................................
(e)(3) Failure to ensure identical consist 7,500 11,000
and system information...................
(f)(1) Failure to apply a proper brake (\1\) (\1\)
pipe service reduction...................
(f)(2) Failure to properly adhere to the (\1\) (\1\)
proper piston travel ranges..............
(g)(1)-(4) Improperly located and guarded 7,500 11,000
cable....................................
(g)(5) Condition of cable and connections. 7,500 11,000
232.609 Handling of defective equipment with
ECP brake systems:
(a) Failure to have proper percentage of (\1\) (\1\)
operative brakes from Class I brake test.
(b) Failure to prevent a car known to 7,500 11,000
arrive with defective brakes to depart
location where a Class I brake test is
required.................................
(c) Improper movement of a car equipped 7,500 11,000
with conventional pneumatic brakes.......
(d) Operating with less than 85 percent (\1\) (\1\)
operative brakes.........................
(f)(2)(i) Improper placement of defective (\1\) (\1\)
conventional brake equipment.............
(f)(2)(ii) Improper placement of defective 7,500 11,000
ECP brake equipment......................
(g) Improper movement of defective stand- (\1\) (\1\)
alone ECP brake equipment in a train
operating with conventional pneumatic
brakes...................................
(h) Improper movement from initial (\1\) (\1\)
terminal of stand-alone ECP brake
equipment in a conventional brake
operated train...........................
(i) Failure to tag equipment.............. (\1\) (\1\)
(j)(1) Failure to adopt and comply with 7,500 11,000
procedures for the movement of defective
equipment................................
(j)(2) Failure to submit list of ECP brake 7,500 11,000
system repair locations..................
232.611 Periodic maintenance:
(a) Failure to ensure the proper and safe 7,500 11,000
condition of car.........................
(b)-(d) Failure to perform test........... 7,500 11,000
232.613 End-of-train devices:
(a) Failure to meet design standards for 7,500 11,000
ECP-EOT devices..........................
(b) Moving with an improper or improperly 9,500 13,000
connected ECP-EOT device.................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective
equipment set forth in Sec. 232.15(a) will deprive the railroad of
the benefit of the movement-for-repair provision and make the
railroad and any responsible individuals liable for penalty under
the particular regulatory section(s) concerning the substantive
defect(s) present on the equipment at the time of movement.
Failure to provide any of the records or plans required by this
part pursuant to Sec. 232.19 will be considered a failure to
maintain or develop the record or plan and will make the railroad
liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s)
concerning the retention or creation of the document involved.
Failure to properly perform any of the inspections specifically
referenced in Sec. 232.209, Sec. 232.213, Sec. 232.217, and
subpart G may be assessed under each section of this part or this
chapter, or both, that contains the requirements for performing the
referenced inspection.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 19, 2008.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. E8-22549 Filed 10-15-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P