"CPAs and CEOs: A Relationship at Risk" Remarks by Arthur Levitt, Chairman U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission The Economic Club Of Detroit Detroit, Michigan May 19, 1997 Since ancient times, it's been a practice of soldiers to carry a flag bearing the emblem of their company into battle. If the person carrying the emblem falls, another picks it up and keeps it moving forward. The flag acts as a marker for all to see, and a rallying-point for the troops. To plant it in the field of battle is to state, "Here we stand. From this point we will not retreat." That flag is known as a "standard" -- in fact that's the origin of the word. I've come to Detroit today to talk to you about the importance of standards. I realize that in doing so, I'm preaching to the converted. Few industries have pursued high standards as aggressively and successfully as the American automotive industry during the present decade. In the battlefield of international business, standards establish our framework for interaction, facilitating communication, encouraging entrepreneurial development, and guaranteeing levels of quality. How many of us, when traveling in Europe, have cursed the lack of standardization for electric outlets as we try to recharge a laptop computer? And you know better than I do the difficulties in redesigning left-hand drive cars for right-hand drive markets -- because the world does not agree on a standard side of the road to drive on. The standards you set -- whether it's requiring ISO 9000 certification for your suppliers, or striving for a "six sigma" standard for defect control in manufacturing -- are central to managing and improving your business. Well, my business is capital markets -- and high quality ACCOUNTING standards are a key part of my strategy for assuring that US markets retain their preeminent position in the 21st century. If anyone doubts the huge difference that accounting standards can make, let's recall the experience of Daimler-Benz, which in 1993 became the first German company to register securities in the US. Under German accounting standards, Daimler had reported a profit of 168 million Deutschmarks for the first six months of 1993; under US standards, the company reported a loss of almost a billion Deutschmarks for the same period. But over the years, some have thought our accounting standards too high. A number of corporate leaders, many from the financial sector, have been publicly and privately critical of accounting's highest authority: the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB, a private-sector body that sets standards for companies that report to the SEC. Consider some of the following headlines: "The First Thing We Do is Kill All the Accountants" -- that came from Business Week. "Can FASB Be Considered Antibusiness?" -- from The Wall Street Journal. "FASB Faces Siege by Business Leaders" -- also from The Wall Street Journal. "No Fans of FASB" -- from Institutional Investor. And the latest: "Corporate America Is Fed Up with FASB" -- in a recent issue of Business Week. What is FASB's great sin? It has asked companies to tell investors the whole truth about their financial performance, including exposure from their own investments. Now I did not come here today to tell you that FASB is perfect. Like any organization, FASB needs to consider how it can improve its processes and its products. One might debate, for example, whether the FASB asks for too much detail; or whether it imposes too many costs; or whether it takes too long to issue rules; or whether a given proposal will really help investors. But that is not what's been happening here. The effort has not been to fix FASB, but to weaken or even eliminate it. In 1996, for example, the Financial Executives Institute, a group of senior corporate financial officers, made a series of recommendations that would have reduced the size of FASB and made other changes that would have effectively hobbled it. I think it is only fair to acknowledge that many of those recommendations were quickly dismissed as extreme. Nevertheless, to guard against any such threat in the future, the SEC fought to have greater public representation on the FASB's oversight board. It's my belief that high-quality accounting standards can best be developed by a public-private partnership -- and you don't sustain a partnership by undermining your partner. While that particular attack was beaten back, a second front was opened. Its most visible aspect was a stream of overblown rhetoric that attempted to tar the FASB as "anti-business" -- which is a little bit like calling the College of Cardinals "anti- Catholic." In fact, this rhetorical strategy has backfired. Complaints about FASB have been so overstated that I think we've all learned to discount them. I've now seen this process from both sides. During a lifetime in the private sector, I sometimes fought off attempts at government intrusion with the statement, "This will hurt business." The result was rarely as bad as I'd imagined it, and often much better. The debate over accounting standards has been characterized by hyperbole. In 1990, for example, the FASB required companies to record retirement health benefits as liabilities. An article opposing the measure opened with this statement: "Imagine an accounting rule that will cripple the competitiveness of thousands of American companies, put untold billions of dollars in business loans into default, send stock prices skidding, and deprive many workers of health care benefits after retirement. This may sound like a plot for a bad novel, but it's actually something that the Financial Accounting Standards Board is actively promoting." Thankfully, the writer was wrong -- I suppose it was the plot for a bad novel, after all. The new accounting was not without pain, as some of you in this room know -- total shareholders' equity at General Motors, for example, went from $27 billion to $6 billion. But I think that, with the benefit of hindsight, most executives today would admit that this was the right move on the FASB's part. And it has provided CEOs with valuable information that helps them run their businesses. A more intense firestorm broke out in 1993, after the FASB proposed to count compensation paid in stock options as an expense. The SEC was swamped with phone calls from CEOs and CFOs warning that the end of Western civilization was nigh. Expensing the fair value of stock options would reduce earnings, the argument went, causing stock prices to fall, and driving the cost of capital up. In deference to concern about a potentially heavy burden on business, the FASB allowed companies to disclose the estimated cost of stock options -- not in the financial statements themselves, but in a footnote. It's interesting that a recent study by the Harvard Business School found that top executives in companies that complained about the FASB proposal were paid more in options than those in companies that did not complain. Business Week described the study's conclusions this way: "The concerns expressed about the impact of expensing options on stock prices and borrowing costs seem to have been a smoke screen to avoid publicizing bosses' high pay." Although I wouldn't endorse that characterization, it reflects a broad skepticism about why some corporate leaders would fight high standards. A recent article in Fortune suggests a desire to manage earnings may be an answer -- especially when compensation plans are increasingly tied to earnings targets and stock prices. Standards that promote comparability and transparency limit the ability to manage earnings. Again, I'm not endorsing that conclusion, but there's an impression out there that some companies are unwilling to be as forthcoming as they should be. The latest skirmish in the accounting wars was set off when the FASB proposed that companies account for their derivatives exposure. This is an issue that has particular poignancy for me. We all remember the events of 1994. Americans saw millions of their investment dollars go up in smoke as major derivatives positions went sour at such well-known companies as Eastman Kodak, Gibson Greetings, and Procter & Gamble. The problem was not just the losses, but the fact that they took investors and analysts by surprise. The risks companies took in derivatives were not described in annual reports and other disclosure documents. Obviously, there were serious shortcomings in the guidelines for derivatives accounting and disclosure. Derivatives were propelled into the headlines. Each new loss brought forth calls for restrictions on their use -- including several from the halls of Congress. The New York Times advocated intervention. But the SEC resisted calls for more regulation, and chose instead to study how to ensure that derivatives and their potential risks could be better communicated to American investors. After three years of inquiry, the Commission adopted derivatives disclosure rules that will provide a reasonable amount of information to investors at a reasonable cost to companies. At the same time, the FASB proposed a framework for derivatives ACCOUNTING, which has come under heavy fire. Of course, the substance of any criticisms must be assessed and weighed carefully. But we are in a situation today in which the notional amount of derivatives outstanding has reached some $70 trillion. Accounting has simply failed to keep pace with this exponential growth. The FASB believes that "the truest and most relevant picture of a company's derivatives position is fair value -- which is certainly not zero, although that is how many derivatives are reported today." That strikes me as an eminently reasonable position. The way criticisms are being put forward is also alarming. Critics are focusing too much on lobbying the decision-making process, and not enough on thoughtful, substantive input INTO that process. The FASB has spent 7 months analyzing the more than 200 comment letters it received on its draft proposal. As a result, the Board has debated a number of changes to address concerns raised in those letters. But, unfortunately, those changes are now being held out by opponents as reasons for further delay -- and with some success. A few critics have suggested that further study is necessary before the FASB races ahead with its proposal -- a proposal that comes AFTER 10 YEARS OF STUDY AND DEBATE. These delaying tactics are inconsistent with the way the standard- setting process should be conducted. Another disappointing trend has been an increase in attempts to circumvent the accepted framework for standard setting. Our current standard setting process is designed to provide opportunities for all stakeholders to express their views, and to have those views considered. The attempts to prompt Congressional override of the FASB's stock compensation proposals were alarming; only slightly less troubling are current suggestions that the SEC should intervene to soften or delay the FASB's derivatives accounting project. There is much more at stake here than derivatives accounting -- it is the process by which the private sector sets accounting standards in the United States. This public-private partnership has been at the core of our financial reporting framework for more than 60 years. We must interfere in it only with the greatest reluctance, for each intervention erodes the independence of the process and undermines confidence in the impartiality and fairness of new standards. I am determined not to let that happen. Indeed, in an era of global securities markets, it has never been MORE important for the U.S. to have a strong and independent body standing guard over our accounting standards. As you may know, the International Accounting Standards Committee, or IASC, currently is working to establish a core set of accounting standards to help capital flow across borders more easily. Certainly, it would be much easier to integrate separate markets if they all spoke in the same language -- the same way it is easier to network a group of computers if they all use the same software. But this project will not provide benefits if it becomes merely a search for the lowest common denominator, or an excuse to weaken demanding but effective national standards. Our work with the IASC is a cooperative effort. For our part, we have pledged to support that effort; to encourage the FASB's thoughtful participation; to be willing to challenge and question our own standards; and to provide criticism that is both timely and tough. In return, we expect the IASC to conduct its dialogue in the most open way possible; to value the quality of the result over the speed of the process; to expose and resolve differences of opinion, not gloss over them; and, most importantly, to hold the interests of investors supreme in every rule and every interpretation. Commission acceptance of international standards is not a foregone conclusion. It bears repeating that while harmonization is a desireable goal for the U.S., our standards are already accepted in capital markets throughout the world, and their quality is unmatched. We can only accept a framework that will enhance, rather than diminish, the strength and stability of U.S. capital markets. Some have predicted, perhaps wishfully, that international standards will diminish the role of the FASB. I strongly disagree. Who is better qualified to set high U.S. standards, and protect, preserve, and defend them, than the FASB? This is a crucial time for the FASB. Its trustees are about to choose a successor to Denny Beresford, its chairman of the last 10 years. This selection is an enormous responsibility. The new chairman will lead the FASB into the millennium. It is in the highest interest of our capital markets for the FASB's trustees to find a person of extraordinary talent to face the extraordinary challenges ahead. We need someone who is knowledgeable, tough and fair -- someone with a vision for the future -- someone who can balance the interests of those who provide capital with the interests of those who seek capital -- someone who will help U.S. markets remain pre-eminent. Our markets are the deepest, most liquid in the world, not because God made them so, but because no other nation has as broad a base of investors as we do. Accounting standards are a cornerstone of that broad public involvement. People feel more comfortable about investing when they're confident that financial statements aren't pulling any punches. That's why we can't sacrifice quality. Detroit learned many years ago the hard lesson of what happens when you reduce quality in the face of competition. Let's not make the same painful mistake in our capital markets. Instead of sacrificing quality, we should COMPETE on it. We should remind all our constituents that the highest standards yield the lowest cost of capital. The number of foreign issuers we have here is proof that we don't need to dilute our standards to compete with foreign markets. We shouldn't be looking at ways to lower our standards -- we should be looking at ways to IMPROVE them. And in the end, that's what this entire debate is about: standards. Standards are like a house that we raise over our heads. They protect us. They define an area within which a person, family, business, or community can function. Without them, civilized life is not possible. We live by the standards we set, and we dismantle them at our peril -- as we know from the broader experience of our society: * Compromise educational standards, and you get high school graduates who don't know where Russia is; * Reduce the standards of public discourse, and violence and obscenity creep into the media; * Lower the standards of political debate, and see attack ads proliferate; *Ignore monetary standards, and the result is inflation -- and so on. I hope I've shed some light on the importance of standards -- in the securities markets as well as anywhere else. More than that, I hope you will join in our effort to keep U.S. standards high, and capital costs low. For me, it would be unthinkable to take standard setting out of the private sector; unthinkable to replace government oversight with government control; unthinkable to bring the independence, quality, and fairness of accounting standards into question by politicizing the process that creates them. I know most of my colleagues in the business community share these beliefs. And I hope that those few who may not, will at least hear me out, and work with me to find ways to improve the standard-setting process. The FASB has planted the flag, and the Commission has rallied to its support. But it is corporate America that has the most to gain or lose in this struggle. We did not become the economic miracle of the 20th century by compromising on the quality of our standards -- let's bear that in mind as we enter the 21st. # # #