UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS BRIEFING:
UZBEKISTAN: ARE THERE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE?
JULY 25, 2006
COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR
SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)
CHAIRMAN
U.S.
SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS
(R-GA)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD BURR (R-NC)
U.S.
SENATOR DAVID VITTER (R-LA)
U.S. SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
(D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
VACANT
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF (R-VA)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT
B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L. CARDIN (D-MD)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER (D-NY)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE
MCINTYRE (D-NC)
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK
(R-KS), MODERATOR,
CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE
ABDURAHIM POLAT,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BIRLIK PARTY
MUHAMMAD
SALIH,
CHAIRMAN OF THE ERK PARTY
GULAM UMAROV,
SON OF SANJAR UMAROV,
IMPRISONED CHAIRMAN OF THE SUNSHINE COALITION
DR. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT,
SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
The briefing was held at 4:07 p.m. in Room 226 Dirksen Senate Office
Building,
Washington, D.C., Senator Sam Brownback, chairman, Helsinki
Commission, moderating.
[*]
TAFT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
My name is Dorothy Taft, and I serve as the
deputy chief of staff for the
Helsinki Commission.
And on behalf of our chairman, Senator Sam Brownback,
and our co-chairman, Congressman Chris
Smith, I want to welcome each one of
you here today for this briefing that we're having regarding
Uzbekistan that
we have entitled, "Are There Prospects for Change?"
And we appreciate each
of you taking the time to be with us, and we especially appreciate our
presenters today, to be here to help inform us of the situation.
Our purpose
today is to examine whether, after almost 20 years of President Karimov's rule,
that there are any prospects for positive change in Uzbekistan. For many
years, Uzbekistan has been
a repressive, authoritarian state without legal
opposition or any tolerance for dissenting
viewpoints.
But since the
events of Andijan in May of last year, the situation in that long-suffering
country has deteriorated still further. The countryside crackdown on human
rights activists,
religious groups, and members of opposition parties and
movements has continued. Scores of them have
been arrested.
And just
in the last few days, we've learned of the disappearance of Talib Yakubov, the
leader of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan. Helsinki Commission staff,
including myself, have
known him and dealt with him for many years now,
since 1991.
Mr. Yakubov has bravely persevered in his campaign to monitor
rights violations, despite
threats, harassment and continuous intimidation,
not to mention the arrests and beatings of many of
his colleagues, and even
the deaths of some of them. We anxiously await to hear word on his
whereabouts and his well-being.
Given the situation in Uzbekistan, the
timeliness of our briefing today is quite obvious. As
it happens, among our
speakers are individuals who know all too well the mechanics of Uzbek
repression. In 1992, Dr. Abdurahim Polat, leader of Birlik, was almost killed
on a Tashkent street
by thugs. The same year, he had to flee his homeland,
which he has not seen since.
Muhammad Salih, the leader of ERK, was also
forced into exile, where he has remained ever
since. His brothers, however,
were arrested and suffered in Uzbek jails, where two of them remain.
And
Gulam Umarov's father, Sanjay Umarov, the leader of the Sunshine Coalition, is
also today
in prison. And I would say that, when I was in Tashkent in
February, I did observe part of his court
proceedings.
Clearly,
attempting to engage in opposition activity in Uzbekistan is very dangerous.
The
personal experiences of these three witnesses lends their testimony a
special weight and a poignancy.
To round out their viewpoints, we have
also invited once again Dr. Martha Olcott, our
preeminent analyst on Central
Asia. Thankfully, she has managed to study the region for the last
quarter-century in relative safety, though not without many adventures. I am
sure she will give our
discussion a big-picture perspective and the benefit
of comparative analysis.
The Congress, for its part, is working to craft a
U.S. response to the Andijan killings and
the increased repression by the
Uzbek government. In May, Chairman Brownback introduced the Silk
Road
Strategy Act of 2006, which lays out guidelines of how U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan and the
Central Asian countries and the Caucasus should be
crafted in the area of economics, security and
democratization.
Also,
Co-Chairman Smith has introduced the Central Asia Democracy and Human Rights
Promotion
Act, H.R. 5382. And in addition to providing funding for
increased human rights work in the region,
this legislation would place
sanctions on Uzbekistan by creating a visa ban, an arms ban, and an
asset
freeze on President Karimov, other regime leaders and their families. It has
been marked up in
Mr. Smith's subcommittee in the International Relations
Committee in the House, just before the July
4th recess, and we await for
its further consideration by the House.
Again, I want to welcome each of you
here. At the end of the presentations, we will have a
time of questions
that can be presented from the floor to our esteemed panel today.
And to
begin, I will ask Mr. Abdurahim Polat to begin.
POLAT: Thank you.
(OFF-MIKE) read my text. In my text written, Mr. Chairman -- he's not here, but
I will say
Mr. Chairman -- distinguished members of the commission who are
not there, I'm grateful for this
given opportunity to make this speech here
at the United States Congress and participate in
discussion of issues
regarding Uzbekistan.
Of course, I will discuss it as politician, but now
I'm not politician. Right now, I'm
person who's desperately thinking how I
have to squeeze my 15-page speech for two page, in order to
put myself to
your time frame.
TAFT: We appreciate that.
POLAT: So that's why I will
be very short.
So we're going to talk about democratic changes in
Uzbekistan. It's my fourth speech here in
Helsinki Commission. Three
before, I was talking only about Uzbekistan and why criticizing
Uzbekistan,
but now I will touch Uzbekistan minimally, especially power. I will criticize
West,
United States, and by tradition, Party ERK.
So I think, for
changes in Uzbekistan is very important to my mind three factors. But need
the factors much more, but I am talking factors what we can influence, because
factor of Karimov, it
is for us un-influenceable.
So what they are,
three factors. First, the help of USA and West to the Uzbek democrats. Of
course, I cannot influence to United States this, too, but I hope that together
we can influence.
I am skeptical about the help of United States and West.
There are lots of reasons of it. I
think future political scientists will
investigate it in fully and make complete conclusions. But
now I was going
to give some examples, very frustrating for us, examples which are showing that
West
and United States not investigating these problems of Uzbek opposition.
That's why I will not, because of short time, I will not recount all of
these examples. They
are in my speech, in short speech, five pages, and
full in 15 pages. So that's why I will go
immediately to my conclusions.
Analyzing the existing facts, we come to conclusion. And this conclusion we
recently
expressed in the direct (ph) statement regarding this first
anniversary of Andijan events. I will
bring one quotation from over there.
It's very important to lend the support to further democratic forces inside
the country.
However, it's impossible to speak about any appreciable
interest from the West to the problems of
democrats in Uzbekistan.
One
of the reasons, it's written on statement, but I think it's single in main
reasons. It's
an excessive fear of the West from possible rising of Islamic
radicalism in Central Asia if the
existing regime weakens and democracy
develops. If translated, it's very political word to -- we say
"bagar"
(ph), "bagar war," (ph) (OFF-MIKE).
West and United States ready to support
Karimov's regime in order to prevent the weakens of
regime if democrats will
come to the country. And in this case, Islam radicalism will just rise up,
maybe uncontrollably or uncontrolled.
First conclusion about my first point,
so we are not waiting now any reasonable help from
West or then United
States. And, second, so what we have to do? We have to do something, if we are
doing and we will (ph) do.
First, I have to say, in 1992, 1993, in
these years, Uzbek opposition was cracked down, but
beginning in this
century, we've begun to reverse. After September 2001, it's one of the great
events for the world, but it's a little bit useful for us, in opposition where
was the birth (ph)
and, in 2003, the (inaudible) Congress was held in
Tashkent.
For democrat opposition, it's very important, if we are going to
forward by democratic ways,
we have to be (inaudible), we have to
participate in the elections. So we choose two of these
directions for us
as main directions of activity.
And I wrote here about two of our activity,
about fighting for registration, fighting to
participate in election 2004,
where in Uzbekistan parliamentary elections we tried to participate in.
And
I wrote about it and finished each part of my speech by this word. One has to
understand that
we did what's almost impossible in dictatorship Uzbekistan,
but we did it.
It's very boring maybe for somebody -- if who is interesting,
you can read my speech, because
what we did for registration Birlik Party in
order to participate in elections 2004, it was
impossible. All political
parties said it was impossible. That's why they even don't try. But we
try. We did something.
Only Helsinki Commission tried to help us in the
matter of the registration, but kind the
help was? The letter of the
commission was sent to President Karimov. But in spite of my pleading
requests, the letter was not only about Birlik. There were enumerated parties
which didn't even
apply for registration.
In other words, this letter
sent Uzbek authorities wrong signals. First, sender of letter
don't even
know the real situation. And, second, therefore the letter is not serious and
of no
insistence.
I will compare this today's events, today's image.
Now that United States will demand from
Hezbollah to stop hitting by rocket
not only Israel, but Israel and Australia. Can you image? Who
will accept
this kind of demand seriously? It will be signal for Hezbollah to continue to
hit
Israel.
So that's why that letter for commission for Karimov was
signal to Karimov: Don't
registrate. We will not insist.
I am sure, if
that damage (ph) was 2004, relations was between Uzbekistan and United States,
good. I'm sure it will look -- this kind of letter could promote the process
of registration. Maybe
it (inaudible). And the same was in the process of
participating of elections 2004.
The duty (ph) of this elections campaign,
high-level commission delegation from (inaudible)
Uzbekistan, it again begs
them (inaudible) to meet our candidates in Uzbekistan. We know you know
what is Uzbekistan. Karimov officially declared it that Birlik is their
terrorist organization. In
spite of this one, we could nominate 10
candidates from 10 districts, total here 120 districts.
I think it was
impossible. Many people said impossible. Other parties said this is
impossible like we did it. But the delegation of Stabdibergman (ph) were asking
them to officially
meet with our candidates, then meet the (inaudible)
election commission, and I'm sure that you can
promote this process little
bit forward. Many of them will registrate. Even one for us, it is huge
win. But they didn't meet.
So now presidential elections coming in 2007.
And now don't (inaudible) it is bloody regime,
it's a dictatorship country.
In spite of this, we are going to participate. We are trying. We will
try
to participate in elections.
Now, all opposition groups, opposition parties
united in what questions. We have to go to
election with one candidate,
because in our situation to go to elections by several candidate, it
will be
not (inaudible) but it's deadly for us, but only group. It's one small group,
the Party ERK,
leading by Muhammad Salih, is not ready to cooperate with us,
but we will continue this job.
For if we will go to elections, it's more
important to have our mass media, at least
newspapers. Of course, we're not
thinking about TV, radio. Even in Russia they didn't have it,
opposition.
Even newspapers or journals. We have one journal, Harakat (ph). We are
publishing it
10 years, that with helping United States organization. But
circulation is only 3,000. It's nothing
for Uzbekistan, 26 million
population.
And we're asking to little bit rise the circulation to 10,000,
20,000. It's funny how much
it will -- I will even don't say about what
kind of money we need for this one, what kind of
expenses. But the United
States organization didn't give us, and I think they will not give us, in
order to not irritate Karimov's administration, because if we're offer (ph)
20,000, it will actually
irritate for Karimov's administration.
And so I
thought about second factor. Second factor is we are fighting. We will
fighting in
any days (ph) with supporting United States, with supporting the
West, without them. But we need its
support. What we can do, it's not my
force power in order to change in this area.
Third factor, very important
for us, it is internal situation (ph) in opposition. It has
become some
kind of fission (ph), mortar fission (ph), that Uzbek opposition weak, Uzbek
opposition
not united. Of course, Uzbek opposition is democratic
organization. It's Hezbitak Rail (ph) Islamic
movement of Uzbekistan. We
cannot be united with them.
Fourth, we have to say about democratic
opposition. Democratic Uzbek opposition is united.
Yes, there is some
groups inside democratic opposition, they climb their opposition. They use some
democratic phraseology, but they are not democratic.
Many people know
that I several times quoted Mr. Muhammad Salih. He's leader of the one
small groups of ERK. It's actually small, maybe not more 50 peoples in
Uzbekistan. And he was
reading in newspaper, not someone on the street. He
says: We have to rise our youth generation in
that way, that way have to go
to death (ph) without thinking, if order was given by the name of
Allah.
It's not bin Laden. It's Muhammad Salih. Many people knew about this
statement. And I'm
agreeing now with the people, with these people who say
me, "Oh, it was written a long time ago. We
have to live with today's
problems."
I'm agreeing with you, my goal (ph), too. And we have to look
not back, forward. We have to
live with today's problems. So in my hands,
because it's written in my text, so I have to find what
is in my hands. In
my hands, the article is not written 10 years ago; it's article written just 29
days ago.
It's 26 June, 2006. Name the article we need. We need, we
need second part of savior (ph).
We need savior (ph). It's very boring
article. I will not translate all of them. I will give you
two quotations,
very short, and I will finish.
"So the West is going to the end because it's
drowning in the bog of social, moral illnesses.
Their women, West's women,
I mean, cannot give birth to more than two kids. It's not enough to
maintain acts of humanity (ph). China will drown by another reasons. Only
Muslims will survive,
because we are following Hadis (ph) of Prophet
Muhammad who say reproduce. That is why our women has
at least four
children."
"Only Islam conforms (ph) to democracy. Others not. Very soon,
the West will understand it,
that Islam conforms (ph), only Islam. And
we'll let (ph) Islam itself -- the West will let (ph)
Islam. If person, any
person, not a Muslim, if person is perfect, there should be democracy in his
head and Islam in the heart."
The article is very short, but even in this
short article, given the date, time when it will
be done. The West will let
(ph) Islam, and world will be Islamic, 2050, not a long time. In that
time,
we have to have some leader. And leaders already among us, he says about
humanity, that he
already born, but I have to say you we are very hopeful
(ph) people in this room, because he is here,
this person among us in this
room. He is Muhammad Salih, the leader of Party ERK.
I'm sure article is
written by Muhammad Salih but signed not by Muhammad Salih -- very
important
-- by chairman of youth of ERK Party.
You remember my first quotation
about what he say, Muhammad Salih, about youth? We have to
raise our new
population in this direction. They're already raise it.
So I want to say
for people who are supposedly uncomfortable about this unity Uzbek
democratic opposition and want to unite us, I'm saying you, democratic
opposition of Uzbekistan is
united. And it cannot get together with these
fanatical and ignorance of this faction of ERK. We
are indifferent (ph).
Or if somebody wants to read this article in the site of the Party ERK, you
have to do it
immediately. I think they already call and, after several
minutes, it will be removed, of course,
from site.
So we Uzbek democrats
need support of the United States and the West, but as I repeated,
there is
not interest from that side, West, United States to our problems. I hope I was
heard today,
a lot and at least (ph). Why? It's my last speech in the
Helsinki Commission, because I think you
will invite to here bin Laden
itself. Or maybe for the good composition, you can invite me, too.
Thank
you very much.
TAFT: The Helsinki Commission does have a very long and
noble tradition of allowing and
supporting free speech and the right of
people of various political views to have a place to state
their opinion,
and I think that today's panel is shaping up to be just that kind of an
opportunity.
And so we'll have our next presenter today, Mr. Umarov.
UMAROV: Well, thank you for the introduction.
My name is Gulam Umarov, and
I'm the son of Sanjar Umarov, the chairman of Sunshine Coalition
of
Uzbekistan. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank members of the U.S.
Helsinki Commission
for the opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of
my father and the leadership of the Sunshine
Coalition.
My father
himself would be here today to address the commission if he was not currently in
prison, Uzbek prison currently. As a result of his call for social and
economic reforms in
Uzbekistan, during the time given to me I'd like to
provide the commission with some background on
why the Sunshine Coalition
was founded, and how the coalition fits the political landscape of
Uzbekistan, and how the coalition members intend to continue my father's work,
calling for dialogue
and peaceful reforms in Uzbekistan.
Sunshine
Coalition was founded in April of last year by a new generation of businessmen,
artists, and intellectuals who had the prominence after the Republic of
Uzbekistan declared its
independence from the Soviet Union. These
like-minded individuals became increasingly concerned
about (inaudible)
economics, a social and environmental crisis facing Uzbekistan.
They
envisioned Uzbekistan, Sunshine Uzbekistan as a way to engage to all Uzbekistan
stakeholders in a dialogue about how to bring peaceful reform to all of
(inaudible) country. The
coalition's leadership includes many highly
educated individuals who have benefited from the best of
Soviet and Western
educational institutions.
That professional experience includes leading and
development, political organizations,
economic development, and social
reforms. The Sunshine Coalition has always worked for dialogue and
reforms
within the framework of the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and
deplores any
forceful attempts to gain power.
The coalition shares many
of the concerns of the veteran political movements, such as ERK and
Birlik
parties. ERK and Birlik have a long history of deep understanding of social
processes in our
multi-national republic. With regard to freedom of speech,
human rights, and other fundamental
democratic principles, our voice is one
with ERK and Birlik parties.
We stand together against any form of
violence towards civil society. We are as one for
reforms aimed at
improving the life of Uzbekistan citizens. And the Sunshine Coalition applauds
their contribution in redefining our national identity.
But there are
differences. If there were none, then we would all be one party. As mentioned
earlier, ERK and Birlik are veteran opposition movements which were born
during Soviet period of
Gorbachev perestroika. Consequently, their views on
the problems facing Uzbekistan today are rooted
in that era.
However,
the present crises facing Uzbekistan today are very different from those of
Gorbachev era. Our coalition was created as a contemporary response to crises
facing Uzbekistan
today. Our leadership and members understand that we
cannot forget the lessons of the past, but also
understand that we must lead
in the world of today so that we can build a better future for our
children
and grandchildren.
And the only practical to build a better future for our
fellow citizens is engaging the
current regime in a dialogue about reform of
Uzbekistan.
The members of Sunshine Coalition have no illusion about how
difficult it will be to engage
the current regime in dialogue. And by way
of illustration, I would like now to say a few words
about my father, Sanjar
Umarov, the chairman of the coalition.
Dr. Umarov was educated as a
physicist and mathematician and left the academic world for the
business
world in the late '80s. For the first 14 years of Uzbekistan independence, he
participated
in developing several major projects, in agriculture,
telecommunications in (inaudible) sectors.
However, beginning in 2003, he
saw that the private entrepreneurs were being increasingly
stifled by the
corrupt Uzbek democracy -- autocracy (ph), sorry. Therefore, he felt compelled
to
give up private business in order to help create a coalition of
progressive thinkers that would work
on developing and promoting economic
and social reforms in Uzbekistan.
His work bore fruit in April of 2005, with
the founding of the Sunshine Coalition of
Uzbekistan. Subsequent to its
founding, Sanjar Umarov was elected as the chairman. A month after
his
election as the chairman, the government of Uzbekistan undertook the coordinated
and intensive
campaign against him and all those associated with him.
As
a result of this campaign, over 500 people lost their jobs. Hundreds of
individuals were
interrogated, and dozens of criminal cases were opened
against anybody related one way or another
with leadership of the coalition
and its supporters. Despite the great pressure, my father continued
to
express his views that the only suggestion to Uzbekistan's growing social and
economic crisis was
the opening of a dialogue with the government of
Uzbekistan.
Sadly, on October 22nd, Sanjar Umarov was arrested and sentenced
in record time to 10 1/2
years of imprisonment, near the city of Bukarov
(ph). We still remain hopeful that the baseless
charges against my father
will ultimately be dismissed by the supreme court of Uzbekistan. Unlike
most political trials in Uzbekistan, my father's case received wide
international attention.
As an example of how the regime is abusing human
rights and the rule of law, in response to
my father's unfair treatment by
the prosecutorial bureaucracy in early November 2005, the U.S. Senate
unanimously passed a resolution expressing its concern about his detention and
mistreatment. This
resolution was sponsored by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, as well as the
Senate majority leader,
Bill Frist, and Senator John McCain.
In mid-December 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives unanimously passed a common
resolution, sponsored by
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Congresswoman Christopher Smith, and many
others, also expressing concern about the treatment of Sanjar Umarov. The
passage of these
resolutions was significant, as both houses of Congress had
not passed a common resolution concerning
an individual human rights case
since the Mandela prison resolution in 1984.
I would like to take this
opportunity to express our family's deep appreciation for the
actions of the
House and the Senate.
We also thank the U.N. Committee on Human Rights for
their attention and many other human
rights organizations that have spoken
out on my father's behalf.
Despite Sanjar Umarov's continued imprisonment,
the work of the Sunshine Coalition continues
throughout programs like the
International Economic Advisory Council. That council is assisting the
coalition's leadership in defining a concrete set of reform proposals that serve
as a basis for
beginning a dialogue with the current regime.
The
Sunshine Coalition remains optimistic about the potential for reform in
Uzbekistan but,
at the same time, understands how difficult the road ahead
may be. The only way forward for
Uzbekistan is creating a meaningful
dialogue with the current regime, throughout which the citizens
of
Uzbekistan can realize their hopes and dreams.
We ask our Uzbek brothers and
sisters around the world to join our effort to change
Uzbekistan toward
peaceful and constructive dialogue.
Thank you.
TAFT: Thank you.
And
our next presenter, Mr. Salih.
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): Thank you. We
have always been in favor of a dialogue with the
regime of President Islam
Karimov, and we have always welcomed any attempts from the West to
establish
such a dialogue.
This is the case, not only because the West has made
democratic reforms in Uzbekistan the
main priority in that dialogue, but
also because we see that cooperation with the West would create
opportunities for the country's economic development and for strengthening our
sovereignty. However,
President Karimov has dealt a blow to the interests
of the people of Uzbekistan and has turned away
from the Western democracies
and made it clear that democratic transformation is not acceptable for
his
regime.
But today, some advocates of the renewal of dialogue with
Karimov's regime say that it is
still necessary, arguing that the West will
lose a great deal, both politically and economically, if
it's tough on
Karimov's government and isolates it internationally.
I would like to
reassure them: The West has nothing significant to lose in Uzbekistan, as it
never gained anything tangible in the political, economic or military fields.
However, the West has
now lost even those humble gains that were achieved
over the course of 15 years of cooperation with
Tashkent.
Let's take
the political field. The democratic institutions that were created over the
past
15 years of cooperation with the West were always dependent on the
Uzbek president's will. He could
ban them, eliminate them at any moment,
and this is what's happened when the West had called for an
independent
inquiry into the Andijan massacre.
Through 15 years of cooperation with the
Uzbek regime, the West was never able to pressure it
to legalize opposition
parties and to hold fair elections with participation of the opposition and
independent candidates. Not a single political party in opposition to Karimov
regime has been
registered over that period. Two human rights organizations
were granted registration, only to be
banned soon after.
Western
countries and international organizations have made great efforts to support
economic
development, strengthen democratic institutions, and eliminate
poverty. They brought in significant
financial and human resources to
achieve those goals and provide generous humanitarian aid. But all
of these
efforts were, in the end, brought to nothing because of one person: President
Islam
Karimov.
Despite its sincere efforts, the West has not seen
improvements in the human rights record of
Karimov's government. The West's
efforts have included condemnation of torture and persecution based
on
political or religious beliefs. Of course, Western pressure regarding these
problems worked as a
restraining factor, but it was not sufficient enough to
change President Karimov's internal policy.
The same is true with regards to
military cooperation, the fight against terrorism, and
drugs, and the
illegal trade in weapons. The Khanabad air base, though there was a lot of
discussion
surrounding it, failed to become a staging point for U.S. in
NATO's long-term plans in Central Asia.
It was limited to carrying out
tactical tasks rather than strategic ones, and the saddest thing is
that its
fate also depended on the will and caprices of the same Uzbek ruler, President
Islam
Karimov.
The tactical and military aid provided by the West to
Karimov's regime to fight terrorism,
drugs, and illegal arms trade was
instead used by Karimov to suppress opposition and dissidents, and
not only
in Andijan.
Uzbekistan remains a major transit point for drugs from
Afghanistan. This illicit trade is
controlled by Uzbek criminal groups that
closely cooperate with law enforcement and high-ranking
government officials
of Uzbekistan. Part of the money provided to fight terrorism was used to ensure
personal security of the president and his family and inner circle.
The
economic situation looks even worse. During his entire time in office,
President Karimov
failed to create conditions for foreign investment.
Uzbekistan remains a high-risk loan for Western
investment, any business
involving foreign partners, and is controlled personally by the president or
by members of his family and inner circle.
For the handful of foreign
companies that are still working in the country, there is no
guarantee that
their Uzbek partners will fulfill their obligations and will observe terms of
the
contracts that they had signed. The only Western companies that operate
in the country are there
because they have personal guarantees from
President Karimov. All economic decisions depend, again,
on the will of one
person.
A recent example is the government's scrapping of tax breaks for
more than 40 major joint
ventures for foreign capital. Among them are the
gold mining companies, such as Derelshan (ph),
Niemond Mining (ph) based in
Derelshan (ph), Texaco, Nestle and many others. Tax breaks remain in
place
for the Russian companies only, such as Lukoil and Gazprom.
As you can see,
the guarantees of the government and the president himself are not
trustworthy. The same goes for his foreign policy priorities. Yesterday, his
priority was the West;
today, it is Russia. We cannot foresee what it will
be tomorrow.
We can only guess that tomorrow Russian companies may face
the same problems that the Western
ones are facing today, and then one day
no one will be surprised to see that Karimov's bed partner
becomes North
Korea and that the terrorists that he's fighting today ensure his personal
security.
Karimov's unpredictable personality has an impact on the stability
of the country. A leader
with such traits cannot be a guarantor of
security.
I would like to clarify that. Perhaps I was not quite right in
saying that the West had
nothing to lose in Uzbekistan. Indeed, the West
did lose something: The West lost time. Time was
wasted trying to
understand the nature of Central Asian dictator. To understand that, you cannot
rely on a regime with foundation of violence and state-sponsored terror.
We fully agree with President Bush and Putin when they say, in one voice, that
dialogue with
terrorists is impossible. But we do not understand when some
leaders want to hold a sincere dialogue
with a chief architect of state
terror in Central Asia.
Please allow me to sum up, and I have said, with the
following conclusion, there is no state
in all of Central Asia that depends
on the will of just one person like Uzbekistan does.
But on the other
hand, this is what makes a dictatorship so weak. By replacing one person,
you can change not only the situation in Uzbekistan, but indeed the entire
region. As Karimov
himself likes to say, "No man, no problem."
I'm not
calling for a violent overthrow of the Uzbek ruler; I'm saying aloud what could
happen if the international community finally takes real measures to weaken
the Uzbek dictator's
regime.
Wouldn't it be more logical to concentrate
efforts on weakening the unlimited power of one
person, rather than
concentrating efforts on building and developing democratic institutions that
would in any way depend on the will of just one person?
Thank you.
TAFT: Thank you, Mr. Salih.
And for our final analysis, an analysis of
some of the presentations before perhaps, Dr.
Olcott?
OLCOTT: I will
make some general comments. And by implication, we'll be analyzing the
presentations just before me.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak before
you today. It's always a privilege to appear
before this commission,
whether at a hearing or at a briefing. And it's a particular honor today, as
I'm sharing the platform with a number of individuals who have made great
personal sacrifices in the
cause of building democracy in Uzbekistan.
As
each of the proceeding speakers has through their own life story clearly
attested, the
challenge of building democracy in Uzbekistan is a daunting
and frustrating one. Democratic
activists operating inside the country put
themselves and their families at great risk, and the risk
continues for
those who leave their Uzbek homeland to work for this cause abroad.
While
those in the U.S. and other Western-based NGOs working toward the goal of a
democratic
Uzbekistan find it at best a frustrating situation when they try
and set up to work inside the
country, they are worse yet increasingly
finding it effectively impossible to do so. So a
frustrating situation has
become an impossible one.
The situation that the U.S. legislature is working
with this region confront is no less
challenging, as is that found by other
U.S. policymakers and concerned U.S. citizens.
But ways must be found to:
one, keep the aspiration of Uzbek citizens alive, citizens for
democracy
alive; two, increase the capacity of Uzbek elites and citizens alike to make a
smooth
transition to democracy when circumstances make such a transition
more supportable; three, develop
U.S.-funded programs that are able to make
the domestic Uzbek environment more supportive of internal
political change,
programs which, if not supported by the Uzbek government, are able to safely
exist
without the support of the Uzbek government; finally, five, to not
sacrifice U.S. short-, medium-,
and long-term interests in the region and
more general interest in the process.
These are very ambitious goals and
would be difficult even under the very best of
circumstances, even if there
were far more financial resources available to U.S. policymakers to
deploy
in this region that is currently the case.
Regardless of the hard
financial times some looking for money for this region may find
themselves
in, it would improve the effectiveness of U.S. policies if we were able to be
better aware
of the circumstances on the ground in Uzbekistan, as well as
the potential undesired, but in some
cases usually predictable, outcomes of
our policies.
I'd like to make a few general points about the situation on
the ground in Uzbekistan and
what it means to the U.S. and then conclude
with some very brief policy recommendations that I think
are both
politically and financially viable in current circumstances.
Although,
unlike everybody else on the platform, I am not a native to the region, I have
traveled to the region, to Uzbekistan regularly for over 30 years and have
been in some of the more
distant and unacceptable corners of that republic.
OK, first, some comments about Uzbek political opposition within and
outside of Uzbekistan.
First, as we have heard in today's hearing, the
opposition -- and this is one of the understatements,
I apologize -- as we
heard in today's hearing, the opposition in political exile is not united.
Sorry, I wrote this at home. But I do not believe, united or un-united, that
this lack of
unity will play a major role in their success or failure. That
is a more important point.
Secondly, the Uzbeks are not going to import a
political revolution. A successful revolution
of the color type in
Uzbekistan must be made with forces that are almost entirely based within the
country, made with strong internal elite support, as well as a population
willing to go out on the
streets.
Even before Andijan, elite support for
change was largely a parlor phenomenon, although there
was a growing number
of mid- and even senior-level administrators and policymakers who lamented
Karimov's "wrong turns," and I put that in quote, in 1997, '98, and 2003, 2004.
But virtually all of
these did so in private. Now, post-Andijan and with
the dismissals and arrests, as we heard today,
of several politically
prominent individuals, the closet reformers have dug deeper into anonymity,
venting their displeasure in even smaller circles.
Finally, Uzbekistan does
-- and I'm going to talk about this next -- have a small, armed
opposition.
Most of these people in some way is connected to the remnants of a mutated
Islamic
movement of Uzbekistan. And though numerically insignificant -- and
I underline this, numerically
insignificant -- in a weak state like
Uzbekistan, even such a small force can be destructive,
especially if they
enjoy the support of a few individuals found in the security ministries.
Next, I'd like to say a few words about the nature of the Islamic threat, as I
understand it,
the role of Islam in Uzbekistan. That is a point I think
that I do differ with some of those
gathered here.
First, while I do
believe that -- and this is an area where I have spent a lot of time
working
in the last several years -- first, while I do believe that Islamic radicalism
is attractive
to only a narrow band of Uzbek believers and that the majority
of believers and the overwhelming
majority of the older generation of
believers are supportive of traditional Hannasi (ph) Islamic
teachings,
there is also a process of globalization going on among Uzbekistan's believers,
which is
working to the advantage of those advocating more radical forms of
Islam.
These include those advocates of an organization -- these radical
forms such as Hezbutaria
(ph), but also more importantly they include
religious forces that enjoy greater credibility publicly
among believers.
They include clerics who are Salafi in orientation, Salafist in orientation,
much
like the Muslim Brethren.
And they also, even more importantly,
include revisionist Hannasi (ph) clerics who advocate
abandoning traditional
Hannasi (ph) teachings in favor of teachings more akin to that that goes on in
state-sponsored seminaries in a number of gulf states. Most of this last
group of people are
existing fully under the umbrella of state-supported
Islam, and they are changing public attitudes
towards Islam.
There is
nothing that is inherently dangerous in this, but it is important to note that
there
is more dynamism in Uzbekistan's religious establishment than in the
secular political and
educational establishment currently in Uzbekistan.
And that the population who will hopefully be openly courted by advocates of
secular
democratic ideals after a Karimov transition will be fundamentally
different than the community that
ERK and Birlik worked with their founding
days.
Next, and probably most sadly, part of the younger generation of
Uzbeks, the under 25, are
far more globally savvy than we've ever envisioned
15 years ago. Now, that's not the sad part. But
the degradation of
education, health care, and general living standards in the many densely
populated
urban and rural areas goes far beyond what was anticipated, even
by the government in particular,
which means that a growing percentage of
Uzbek youth are experiencing upbringings that isolate them
from the values
of the more privileged minority that we spoke of in the beginning that is being
tied
to global secular tendencies.
Next, I want to make two sets of
comments and then a brief conclusion. The security of the
Karimov regime,
whether we like it or not -- and I assume that the overwhelming, if not everyone
in
the room doesn't like it, Karimov has done a much better job rebuilding
the support structure for his
power post-Andijan than most believed would be
the case a year ago.
He has carried out a purge of his power ministries,
leaving the SMB with clear domination
over the MBD (ph). And the ministry
of defense has reoriented itself towards Russia and its SEO (ph)
partners.
While the economic picture is opaque at best, the situation in some regions
and in some
sectors of society have improved somewhat. High energy prices
and high gold prices clearly have
benefited the Karimov regime ability to
mute, at least temporarily, the economic displeasure of some
groups of the
population.
Next, improved relations with Russia and Kazakhstan provide a
greater opportunity for
trickle-down in new and medium-large-size
investments, as done improved trade with Russia.
A few words now on
international relations of Uzbekistan. I mean, again, this is not a happy
picture from the point of view of many in this room. Karimov has managed to
break out in recent
months. He has managed to break out to a certain degree
of the diplomatic isolation that Europe and,
to a lesser extent, the U.S.
sought to impose.
While Russia and China never provided Karimov with the
broad security guarantees he sought,
they have taken smaller steps to help
Karimov improve his security situation, both in terms of loans
for military
upgrades, greater intelligence-sharing, and opening up the prospect of shared
military
operations. Led by the Germans, some Europeans are rethinking
their ostracism of the Uzbeks.
But at the same time, Karimov has more
focused his anger towards the U.S. than ever before,
making the conditions
for the U.S. embassy, as well as, of course, for U.S. NGOs difficult, if not
impossible. He is effectively behaving like a lover scorned. And Karimov's
anger is at what he saw
as the false promises of the post-9/11 strategic
partnership with the U.S. and also based on his
belief that there are some
elements in the U.S. administration who would be willing to throw their
weight in favor of his ouster in non-military form.
OK, finally, the current
relationship with Uzbekistan has had costs to the U.S. The loss of
the
Karshi-Khanabad base has made the U.S. more dependant upon a weak and at best
incompetent regime
in Kyrgyzstan. Next, U.S. regional economic initiatives,
which are very critical to the long-term
survival of Tajikistan and
Afghanistan, have become more problematic because of Uzbekistan's refusal
to
participate in them, at a time, though, that Uzbekistan is beginning for the
first time to
participate in common Central Asian trade activities and
Russian-oriented trade activities.
The fact that alternative transport
routes that bypass Russia also bypass Uzbekistan really
creates the only
alternative to Russia for Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be very impenetrable
transit
routes through the high mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
It has also strengthened Chinese influence in the region, as transport options
through
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to China are increasing. And that has
worked not just to the detriment of
U.S. interests in the area, but it also
makes long-term projects that depend on transport to India
less likely to
win over those projects that depend on transports for China.
Finally, it has
become harder for the U.S. to directly engage with the next generation of
Uzbeks, and it's become very, very difficult for young Uzbeks to get travel and
study opportunities
in the U.S. This is not a cheerful picture.
Let
me say, in conclusion, obviously none of this is argument for the U.S. to
reverse the
thrust of the post-Andijan policy towards Uzbekistan, a policy
which already has strong support in
Congress due to Uzbekistan's highly
dubious human rights record even before the Andijan events.
But I would
disagree with my honored speaker to the left. I believe that Karimov has found
ways to minimize the damage of U.S. policy to him personally, to his family,
and to his regime, from
the efforts at isolation by the U.S. and by the
Europeans, and that the new investors coming from
Russia and China are
likely to stay in the large energy projects that Western investors eschewed from
the beginning.
Finally, in conclusion, eventually Karimov will leave
office. Even if he runs in 2007, old
age and ill health will eventually
overtake him. But the U.S. faces an enormous challenge in
Uzbekistan until
he does and until there is a political situation on the ground that creates the
opportunity for greater political openness, which Karimov's handoff of power
to a hand-picked
successor need not necessarily produce.
Given this, the
U.S. must find way to engage the Uzbek population, through a variety of
educational and media-based outreaches. Much of the media work can be done
without direct engagement
of the Uzbek government, and maybe some of the
education work can be done through non-U.S. partners.
But unless someone
works with the Uzbeks to get improvements in basic primary and secondary
education, especially in rural areas, the U.S. may succeed in helping develop a
narrow band of
secular Western-trained potential elites, largely trained
abroad, but these individuals will be
wholly alien from the society they
seek to govern.
Thank you.
TAFT: Thank you very much for your
presentation. We do have a few minutes this afternoon to
open the floor up
for questions from the audience, and I would just ask that you come to the
front,
and state your name and your affiliation, and present your question
to a particular member of the
panel.
And as those of you in the
audience are getting your thoughts together on that front, I will
proceed
with a question of my own. When I was in Uzbekistan in February, the government
officials
decided that it would not be in their interest to spend their time
meeting with me.
But I did have some very interesting meetings with a
number of others, private individuals in
the country, and also was able to
go to Andijan and to the Fergana Valley. So I appreciated that
opportunity.
But one of the messages that was fairly consistent was an expressed concern,
which Dr.
Olcott was just referring to, and that is the concern of the
younger generation and a question about
the quality of education that was
being provided to those of academic years.
And I was wondering: How do
you see the prospects for independent thinkers, including those
within the
political opposition or those that desire to be politically active, to integrate
new
ideas, democratic thought and discussion among the younger generation?
UMAROV: Your question is directed to?
TAFT: Mr. Salih, very good.
UMAROV: Maybe one of the ways -- I'm sorry that I'm kind of -- I just have one
comment here
before we can have your comment there. Perhaps one of the ways
the increasing the educational system
can be achieved is -- that way, all of
this is due to the complete economic restructure in
Uzbekistan.
The
economic system is not working, is not efficient at all. And by increasing the
economic
-- by adding economic reforms and improving the economic situation
in Uzbekistan -- the educational
system, will, not eventually, will have to
be improved, as well. Just one small question that I
wanted to add
before...
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): The regime has destroyed or
collapsed, not only politically, but
also the social structure of the
country. That includes education, also. So therefore we need to
look into
the root cause of the problem.
And the Soviet system that had the
education system, the education infrastructure in
Uzbekistan, when it gained
its independence, has exhausted. And the new ideology, that Karimov tried
to restore the ideology of the old, greater ancestors of the Uzbek nation.
So the new program, the new system that Karimov tried to restore, recalling and
bringing back
the old, greater ancestors of Uzbek failed. And that's why I
believe only that the change of the
regime is the right treatment towards
improvement of education system in Uzbekistan.
OLCOTT: I'd like to throw
something in. I think that, actually, Karimov did a much better
job with
the educational system in Uzbekistan than was done in a lot of neighboring
states. There's
a lot of money spent in rural schools; there's a lot of
money put into Uzbek textbooks.
I think the examples of Uzbek history --
certainly, the ones that there was a need -- and the
way there's a strong
politicization going on. But I think that the key, if we're talking about
salvaging a generation, it's to maintain the notion that rural youth get basic
science and math
education.
This is not an area of politicization.
And in the absence of attention to rural education, I
think that Uzbekistan
will face a situation that's analogous to Pakistan, where the only education on
offer is religious education.
That's why I talked at the end about, if
the U.S. government is not going to be able to act
or shouldn't act there,
it should look for partners that are able to act there, because simply
finding ways to assist the Uzbek population, especially the rural population, to
continue to get
quality primary and early secondary education is one of the
only ways that will keep any hope of
building a democracy in the longer run
alive, or else this process of radicalization in another
generation will
have gone a lot further.
The former Soviet Union is the one place where
you find universal literacy, basic primary
education. That is now in
decline. Most of the other places we've dealt with in post-independence
period, they've had a decline in education, but not a dramatic fall in the
percentage of literacy.
Places like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, women in
Tajikistan, all run the risk of creating a next
generation that will not be
literate or will have minimum functional literacy. That is a huge threat
to
long-term democracy building.
Thank you.
TAFT: One more comment, and
then you go ahead.
UMAROV: I would definitely like to agree with both
speakers regarding the comments on the
educational system. Although the
many schools were built in Uzbekistan, we do have many schools who
do have
everything but the teachers themselves. They don't receive good salary; I mean,
the salary
of a teacher is maybe about $20, $30 per month.
On top of
everything else, they have to do renovations in school because everything is
expected of the teachers. When students come to schools, they are expected to
pay additional money
to paint the building, paint the floor, bring your
desk, to do something.
And even though that the children don't have this
money, some families don't have this money.
And if the parents would not
bring the money, the children will not get good grades. And by the
time
since parents are bringing those money, children are thinking, "Why should we
study? We don't
want to study."
And unless the reforms will be
introduced and additional money would be, you know, given to
teachers to
school people, it will not -- I mean, it's going to continue to deteriorate.
And at the
same time, I also agree of your comments, as well. I just wanted
to add this.
TAFT: Thank you.
Yes, please identify yourself.
QUESTION: My name is Magina Molokova (ph). I'm just an observer here today.
But my question goes to Mr. Polat and Mr. Umarov and Mr. Salih. As
representatives of two
parties, Birlik and ERK, or ERK Party and Birlik
movement, and also the new Sunshine Coalition, we're
talking here about
Karimov, about how bad the regime is. And I cannot agree with you more than
that,
you know? We all know what the regime is like.
But what do you
offer as an alternative should the regime leave? Should Karimov step down,
what do you, in particular -- do you have programs? Do you have a way to
implement the reforms? Do
you have reforms to implement, in general?
We are talking here in front of the groups of people, but what do you have to
offer to Uzbek
people in general? Thank you.
TAFT: That's a good
question. I would ask that maybe you mention the top three or four
priorities.
POLAT: That's a question for everybody?
TAFT: Yes.
POLAT: I can begin?
It's very popular question. Everybody, almost
everybody ask about it. Of course, we have
programs. But I cannot explain
all details of these programs here, but I will say the same.
It is not
necessary to open America, which is a Russian proverb. I don't know. Maybe you
are using it, too. It means it's not necessary to find something new,
because even in former Soviet
blocs about 20 countries, socialist countries,
already passed this transition period. At least we
have this experience.
So that's why, using this experience, we have to go from this post-socialism
system,
democratic market economy-based system. So we have this program,
and I recently wrote about it. Now
I put it in English in Russian text, in
general.
But I think there is not any principal difficult. There is
necessary to begin political
reforms in Uzbekistan and then, step by step,
we have to do, by the way, what other republics of the
former Soviet Union
passed now.
Thank you.
UMAROV: As was mentioned during my speech,
Sunshine Coalition is currently working on the
international advisory
council, Economic Advisory Council. Although, unfortunately, our improvements
have not been as active as we wanted to be, due to the imprisonment, but we're
still working on this.
The Economic Advisory Council idea is to create
the economic platform for reforms. There are
several Uzbek -- there was an
Uzbek council of economists created who developed a paper on the
current
situation in Uzbekistan, following -- and this first deliverable (ph) was
already done and
was published on the Sunshine Uzbekistan Web site, if you
all would like to go there and take a look.
Following this first
drift, it's supposed to be reviewed by international advisers, which
will
consist of economists around the world, as United States, Europe, Russia, and
other developing
countries who had passed through this stage, hopefully
adding value to this.
And hopefully, after the international advisory
group, as well as the local Uzbeks,
economists will finish this paper, which
is on the way. We do expect to send this paper to several
movements, at the
same time, at official and who are also in exile, because if just a certain
group
of people will do this and without the input of other movements or
official organizations, it will
not be possible. I mean, there's not going
to be any sense of this paper.
So it is on the way to do it. And first,
the deliverable (ph) is also on the Internet.
Please take a look at the Web
site.
Thank you.
TAFT: Mr. Salih?
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): We
have actually our reforms program available on our Web site,
but let me just
outline three main priorities that I believe must be considered immediately.
I would like to say that the first reforms should be political reforms,
because Karimov
himself has been always saying that there are no economic
reforms without political reforms. In this
maybe he's right, because
without the changes in political structure, without political reforms,
there
wouldn't be success in economic reforms.
Secondly, I must say that
Uzbekistan, we should admit, is a greater agricultural country.
And the
reforms in agricultural sector would have a significant impact. And also the
significance of
medium- and small-sized businesses, entrepreneurship would
also have vital importance in implementing
reforms.
And I must also
say that the social reforms, the social programs that are currently
implemented in Uzbekistan are all Soviet-style reforms, Soviet-style social
programs, and these need
to be changed. And these are the sectors that we
would start working at as priorities.
TAFT: Thank you very much.
For
our next question, I think we'll just -- before you start, I think we'll have
time for
the two of you to ask your questions, and then -- no, ask your
question. He can ask his question,
and then...
QUESTION: I am a
reporter with the Voice of America. I want to specifically address Mr.
Polat and Mr. Salih, because it's been more than a decade since you both left
Uzbekistan, and the
country is not the same. The majority of Uzbek
population are young people whose ages are below 35.
So if you look at it,
the majority of Uzbek population do not know about you or know very
little
about you. What are you doing to reach out to those? And how do you think you
can be
attractive to that generation, a new generation that probably will
vote for you if you get to the
political, you know, stage in Uzbekistan?
OK, thank you.
QUESTION: I think my question dovetails a bit with that.
I'm Peter Sinn (ph) at Columbia
University.
I'm interested in how your
movements are able to interact with the population and to what
degree there
is debate that you are aware of? A few years ago, I spoke with Abdurahim Polat,
and he
told me he was on the phone constantly, in constant contact with
people in his movement, in his
helakat (ph).
And Gulam Umarov, more
than a year ago, I met with Nadira Khidoyatova. And, you know, I was
able
to see the other portions of your movement.
And for Muhammad Salih, you
know, so many members of your movement are now in New York in
political
asylum cases. I mean, we're seeing the effects of the attempt to distribute
materials and
things.
What is the level of debate that you are seeing
from within your movements?
POLAT: I'm very sorry. Somebody can translate
maybe question? Believe me, I'm speaking
English little bit, but I cannot
understand anything, because -- yes, so not you, but somebody who
can
translate it?
(AUDIENCE MEMBER TRANSLATES)
POLAT: OK, I understand.
That's why my English very bad, because I don't have any
communication in
United States. I only come to Washington in order to participate in Helsinki
watch
commission. It's real. And so I'm saying, I'm not living in United
States, just I'm staying.
I'm living actually in Uzbekistan, every day
talking with peoples. Our party is in
Uzbekistan, in a single party, or
only one party. Actually, it's working. Of course, I cannot say
we are
ready today take power by force or something, but it is only one party, is
working (ph) in
Uzbekistan.
And situation, of course (inaudible) but we
have to look to reality. Some peoples, other
parties, because already
(inaudible) here, they have done -- I think they don't have any contact even
with their members, and they are talking here about only bad, bad, bad, bad.
And I'm talking here, it's so bad, it's so terrible, Karimov is killer. Who
will come to
opposition? Who will come? So that's why I say everything.
We have to tell reality.
Now, everybody say, "Oh, bad, bad." They say the
same two years ago, but two years ago and
compare this today, it was
paradise in Uzbekistan. When I talk about it even here, some people say,
"I
cannot believe it (ph)." Other people says, "Oh, you are productive." That
word (ph),
productive. "You are (inaudible) for Karimov." No, (inaudible)
but we have to look reality.
If we will say bad in Uzbekistan, Karimov kill
them, nobody will come to opposition. But if
I remember -- I didn't know
about this. I talked with you. I talk by telephone. I talk if United
States will not do everything for us, they are doing already what?
Before
(inaudible) you know this word, "zakstoy." (ph) It was everything "zakstoy."
What is
"zakstoy" in English? Takemesha (ph), yes. There was not even
wind. If we are on the ocean, and we
have the sheets, and we have sailor,
everything but if not wind, we cannot move. But if they have
wind, by using
system of sails, you can go ever against the wind.
So United States created
winter in Uzbekistan. And absolutely I am not angry with people.
No, now
United States don't have any points of influence in Uzbekistan. It's wrong.
United States
can influence in every way, including China, Russia, Korea.
But they want it or not.
But I talked about it. They are very careful. If
actually I have to understand United
States, too. Now, I told you about
what in Uzbek language, riding (ph) in his sights (ph) about West
is end,
because they are not giving birth kids, only two kids, and even West very soon
will be Islam
country. And here coming, "Oh, I'm for democracy," you will
(inaudible) for us.
That's why my obligation as opposition leader,
democratic opposition leader, set up (ph)
inside democratic opposition. Not
everything is OK, but we're trying to fight even with them, that
they're
liar, they're -- what is it (inaudible) -- two-faced, here saying about
democracy (inaudible)
is saying about West. They want to help about West
(ph), but they say West will be end, not after
1,000 years. In 2050, West
will be Islamic country. And these are words Muhammad Salih.
And here, he's
coming here in Russian say about democracy. So that's why we have to explain
our peoples, and we explain it not only by telephone, by telephone I am talking
with only leaders of
regional organizations. I forgot today I have to bring
show you, because it is very interesting when
you show it, not always
talking.
We publishing in Uzbekistan -- but not in Uzbekistan inside,
outside Uzbekistan publishing
3,000 circulation journal and distributing it
in Uzbekistan. Some people don't believe, but if don't
believe, they have
to go to check it. But we try to reach our peoples, and we don't say that
Karimov
killed, or Karimov bad. We say, "Yes, he is dictatorship country."
Even said department (ph) in his report (ph) say no dictatorship country,
authoritarian
country. But actually, if we're very frankly, I think I may
agree with this. It's not dictatorship
country, but authoritarian.
Dictatorship country, it's Saddam Hussein, Stalin. You can image now
all my
brothers working in universities and some people say, "Oh, he's working the
opposition, but
his brother is working. That's why we don't believe him."
But, no, even one fact you can interpretate truth besides (ph). So many
people says it means
I am not good, but I think, no, it means Karimov little
bit different from Stalin and from Saddam
Hussein. And now we have
opportunity to work over there. And it's not only my imagination.
We now
have 26,000 registered people. So we are working. We are contacting. And I
think,
if United States will help, the West will help, we could reach more
high-level goals. But now we
didn't see about what help (ph), even for what
we have.
I'm not saying give us something 100 percent everything, but
something. But we didn't need
-- have now almost anything (ph).
TAFT:
Mr. Salih?
SALIH (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): I hoped that -- I was thinking we
would be discussing here more
the issues of political change or political
reforms, the political situation in Uzbekistan, not like,
you know,
inter-fractional or inter-group debates, which is the old records, or to score
the old
records. Recently, I came from Uzbekistan where I live and work.
We've been criticizing -- we understand the government, and we've been
criticizing the
government, but there are various approaches of criticizing
it. And the position of the Birlik
leader is criticizing with the
government's view.
We need to concentrate, we need to focus on political
changes, to bring forward the issue of
putting Uzbekistan on a democratic
path. That must be the main agenda of today. That's why it's
important to
define the character or the personality of leaders of opposition, what is their
position, what side their standing for. That's why I didn't want to actually
attend the talk by
Polat, but I did it.
Thank you. I can answer your
questions if you have them.
TAFT: I do believe there are some questions
that are on the table. The question is, if I
remember correctly, what is
the dialogue that's happening with the younger generation? And, as well,
what are the dialogue among the various groups within the country?
And
perhaps Mr. Umarov would like to respond to the questions.
UMAROV: Thank
you.
I try very briefly, as I know everyone is very tired, very briefly to
explain our problems of
communications with Uzbekistan. We do have this
problem communicating. First of all, everyone is
afraid to talk openly.
When you try to speak over the phone, everyone trying not to speak about it
or they're trying to speak about it over some kind of different telephones. So
there's definitely a
problem with communication.
However, the
communication inside Uzbekistan, they do communicate over there, but it's within
Uzbekistan. And the link between us communicating with them is extremely
hard. The only open way to
speak -- I mean, from personal standpoint of
view, from all of our other people that we know that we
are keeping in
contact with, unless it's some kind of form of the Internet or something, where
we try
to direct them to the Internet cafe and try to understand what's
going on from whatever meeting that
they were into, it's very hard.
The
other way of communication is trying to go there as often as possible, which we
do, maybe
not me directly, but some of the people that we know are trying to
go over there directly, come back
with the feedback.
The only person
who's brave enough to talk to us openly over the phone, who is not afraid of
anything, from my personal point of view, not only person, only persons
(inaudible) is Nigara and
Nadira Khidoyatova. With them, we can discuss
whatever topic we want over the phone.
But, of course, there is a problem,
because you're beginning to receive one-sided
information. But this is just
-- I'm telling you the information that we -- I mean, what kind of
problems
that we have. But there is definitely a problem. I hope I answered it
directly.
TAFT: Our time has come to a close. I appreciate everyone coming
today.
I'm not sure if we've answered the question of what are the
prospects for change in
Uzbekistan. Perhaps we've gotten an insight into
the level of dialogue that is happening, such that
it is. And we appreciate
the time to hear from each of our presenters today, and we look forward to
the next time to getting together.
Thank you.
END
[Whereupon the
briefing ended at 05:53 p.m.]
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