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Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:

October 2003:

AVIATION SAFETY:

Advancements Being Pursued to Improve Airliner Cabin Occupant Safety 
and Health:

GAO-04-33:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-33, a report to the Ranking Democratic Member, 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in 
the United States. Furthermore, there are survivors in the majority of 
airliner crashes, according to the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB). Additionally, more passengers might have survived if 
they had been better protected from the impact of the crash, smoke, or 
fire or better able to evacuate the airliner. As requested, GAO 
addressed (1) the regulatory actions that the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has taken and the technological and operational 
improvements, called advancements, that are available or are being 
developed to address common safety and health issues in large 
commercial airliner cabins and (2) the barriers, if any, that the 
United States faces in implementing such advancements.

What GAO Found:

FAA has taken a number of regulatory actions over the past several 
decades to address safety and health issues faced by passengers and 
flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. GAO identified 
18 completed actions, including those that require safer seats, 
cushions with better fire-blocking properties, better floor emergency 
lighting, and emergency medical kits. GAO also identified 28 
advancements that show potential to further improve cabin safety and 
health. These advancements vary in their readiness for deployment. 
Fourteen are mature, currently available, and used in some airliners. 
Among these are inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the wings 
that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and 
photo-luminescent floor lighting. The other 14 advancements are in 
various stages of research, engineering, and development in the United 
States, Canada, or Europe.
 
Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin 
safety and health advancements. For example, when advancements are 
ready for commercial use, factors that may hinder their implementation 
include the time it takes for (1) FAA to complete the rule-making 
process, (2) U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve 
differences between their respective requirements, and (3) the 
airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has approved their 
use. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because they 
require further research, FAA’s processes for setting research 
priorities and selecting research projects may not ensure that the 
limited federal funding for cabin safety and health research is 
allocated to the most critical and cost-effective projects. In 
particular, FAA does not obtain autopsy and survivor information from 
NTSB after it investigates a crash. This information could help FAA 
identify and target research to the primary causes of death and 
injury. In addition, FAA does not typically perform detailed analyses 
of the costs and effectiveness of potential cabin occupant safety and 
health advancements, which could help it identify and target research 
to the most cost-effective projects. 

What GAO Recommends:

This report contains recommendations to FAA to initiate discussions 
with NTSB to facilitate the exchange of medical information from 
accident investigations and to improve the cost and effectiveness data 
available for setting priorities for research on cabin occupant safety 
and health. FAA generally agreed with the report’s contents and its 
recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-33.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Gerald Dillingham at 
(202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are 
Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health: 

Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety 
and Health Advancements: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Canada and Europe Cabin Occupant Safety and Health 
Responsibilities: 

Canada: 

Europe: 

Appendix III: Summary of Key Actions FAA Has Taken to Improve Airliner 
Cabin Safety and Health Since 1984: 

Appendix IV: Summaries of Potential Impact Safety Advancements: 

Retrofitting All Commercial Aircraft with More Advanced Seats: 

Improving the Ability of Airplane Floors to Hold Seats in an Accident: 

Preventing Overhead Storage Bin Detachment to Protect Passengers in an 
Accident: 

Child Safety Seats: 

Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bags: 

Appendix V: Summaries of Potential Fire Safety Advancements: 

Fuel Tank Inerting: 

Arc Fault Circuit Breaker: 

Multisensor Detectors: 

Water Mist Fire Suppression: 

Fire-Safe Fuels: 

Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials: 

Ultra-Fire-Resistant Polymers: 

Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations: 

Appendix VI: Summaries of Potential Improved Evacuation Safety 
Advancements: 

Passenger Safety Briefings: 

Exit Seat Briefing: 

Photo-luminescent Floor Track Marking: 

Crewmember Safety and Evacuation Training: 

Acoustic Attraction Signals: 

Smoke Hoods: 

Exit Slide Testing: 

Overwing Exit Doors: 

Next Generation Evacuation Equipment and Procedures: 

Personal Flotation Devices: 

Appendix VII: Summaries of General Cabin Occupant Safety and Health 
Advancements: 

Advanced Warnings of Turbulence: 

Preparations for In-flight Medical Emergencies: 

Reducing Health Risks to Passengers with Certain Medical Conditions: 

Improved Awareness of Radiation Exposure: 

Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Flight Attendants: 

Appendix VIII: Application of a Cost Analysis Methodology to Inflatable 
Lap Belts: 

Inflatable Lap Belts: 

Summary of Results: 

Methodology: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables:

Table 1: Regulatory Actions Taken by FAA to Improve Cabin Occupant 
Safety and Health Since 1984: 

Table 2: Advancements with Potential to Improve Cabin Occupant Safety 
and Health: 

Table 3: Status of 10 Significant FAA Rules Pertaining to Airliner Cabin 
Occupants' Safety and Health, Fiscal Year 1995 through September of 
Fiscal Year 2003: 

Table 4: Costs to Equip an Average-sized Airplane in the U.S. Fleet with 
Inflatable Lap Seat Belts, Estimated under Alternative Scenarios (In 
2002 discounted dollars): 

Table 5: Key Assumptions: 

Figures:

Figure 1: Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bag Inflation Sequence: 

Figure 2: Manual "Self Help" and "Swing Out" Over-Wing Exits: 

Figure 3: Funding for Federal Research on Cabin Occupant Safety and 
Health Issues, by Facility, Fiscal Years 2000-2005: 

Figure 4: Allocation of Federal Funding for Aircraft Cabin Occupant 
Safety and Health Research, Fiscal Year 2003: 

Figure 5: Coach Seating and Impact Position in Coach Seating: 

Figure 6: Examples of Child Safety Seats: 

Figure 7: Water Mist Nozzle and Possible Placement: 

Figure 8: Fire Insulation Blankets: 

Figure 9: Flammable Cabin Materials and Small-scale Material Test 
Device: 	

Figure 10: Airport Rescue and Fire Training: 

Figure 11: Airline Briefing to Passengers on Safety Briefing Cards: 

Figure 12: Floor Track Marking Using Photo-luminescent Materials: 

Figure 13: Test Installation of Acoustic Signalling Device: 

Figure 14: An Example of a Commercially Available Smoke Hood: 

Figure 15: Drawing of Possible Emergency Slide Testing of FAA's 747 Test 
Aircraft: 

Figure 16: Airbus' Planned Double Deck Aircraft: 

Abbreviations:

ACRM: Advanced Crew Resource Management:

CAMI: Civil Aerospace Medical Institute:

CRM: Crew Resource Management:

DGAC: Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile:

DOT: Department of Transportation:

DOT IG: Department of Transportation's Inspector General:

DVT: deep vein thrombosis:

EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency:

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:

JAA: European Joint Aviation Authorities:

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

NIOSH: National Institute of Safety and Health:

NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:

OSHA: Occupational Health and Safety Administration:

TRL: Technical Readiness Level:

TSO: Technical Standing Order:

Letter October 3, 2003:

The Honorable James L. Oberstar 
Ranking Democratic Member 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Oberstar:

Airline travel is one of the safest modes of public transportation in 
the United States, in large part because of the Congress's, Federal 
Aviation Administration's (FAA), commercial airlines', aircraft 
manufacturers', and airports' combined efforts to prevent commercial 
airliner accidents. Furthermore, although a few airliner accidents are 
catastrophic, there are survivors in a majority of crashes. According 
to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), passengers survived 
in 19 of the 26 U.S. large commercial airliner accidents that occurred 
from 1982 through 2001, and in these 19 accidents, over 76 percent of 
the passengers (1,523 of 1,988) survived.[Footnote 1] Additionally, 
some of the passengers who died in these accidents might have survived 
if they had been better protected from the impact of the crash or from 
the effects of smoke and fire and had been better able to evacuate the 
airliner. This possibility of survival has led federal safety officials 
to focus their efforts not only on preventing airliner accidents, but 
also on increasing the chances of surviving them.

Over the past several decades, FAA has been taking regulatory actions 
to require the implementation of technological and operational 
improvements in cabin occupant safety and health to help increase 
passengers' chances of surviving large commercial airliner accidents. 
In addition, FAA and the aviation community have been conducting 
research on new technological and operational improvements, which we 
refer to in this report as advancements, whose implementation could 
further increase passengers' chances of survival and improve the safety 
and health of passengers and flight attendants. This report discusses 
regulatory actions that FAA has taken as well as potential advancements 
in cabin occupant safety and health that are (1) currently available 
but not yet implemented or installed, and (2) not yet available and 
subject to additional research to advance the technology or lower 
costs. For implementation of these advancements to occur, FAA often has 
to take regulatory action, that is, issuing regulations or 
airworthiness directives that require the implementation of 
technological and operational improvements in cabin occupant safety and 
health. FAA continues to pursue regulatory initiatives as well as 
conduct research to improve cabin occupant safety and health. The 
aviation community is also attempting to enhance the safety and health 
of those traveling and working in airliner cabins through such measures 
as providing earlier warnings of turbulence and information on the 
potential to develop blood clots on long-distance flights. Besides 
increasing cabin occupants' safety and health, these actions and 
efforts could benefit the airlines by helping to restore passengers' 
confidence in the safety of flight and thereby increasing the demand 
for air travel, which fell sharply after September 11, 2001, and still 
remains below fiscal year 2000 levels.

In response to your request, this report addresses the following 
questions: (1) What regulatory actions has FAA taken, and what key 
advancements are available or being developed by FAA and others to 
address safety and health issues faced by passengers and flight 
attendants in large commercial airliner cabins? (2) What factors, if 
any, slow the implementation of advancements in cabin occupant safety 
and health? In addition, as requested, we identified some factors faced 
by Canada and Europe in their efforts to improve cabin occupant safety 
and health (see app. II).

To identify the regulatory actions FAA has taken and the key 
advancements that are available or being developed to address safety 
and health issues facing passengers and flight attendants (cabin 
occupants), we reviewed the relevant literature, interviewed FAA 
officials, and reviewed FAA's documentation on the regulatory actions 
it has taken to enhance cabin occupant safety and health. As part of 
this effort, FAA officials identified key regulatory actions that had 
been completed in this area. In addition, we interviewed other aviation 
safety experts in government, industry, and academia from the United 
States, Canada, and Europe. (See app. I for additional information.) 
Through our reviews and interviews, we found that FAA's regulatory 
actions and advancements fell into four broad categories--three related 
to safety in the event of a crash and one related to general cabin 
occupant safety and health. The regulatory actions and advancements 
related to safety in the event of a crash are those actions taken to 
(1) minimize injuries from the impact of a crash, (2) prevent fire or 
mitigate its effects, and (3) improve the chances and speed of 
evacuation. In addition, we discuss the regulatory actions and 
advancements FAA has taken to address a fourth category--improving the 
safety and health of cabin occupants. Using the results of our reviews 
and interviews, we identified and categorized 28 advancements that are 
currently available or being developed, including 5 impact 
advancements, 8 fire advancements, 10 evacuation advancements, and 5 
cabin occupant safety and health advancements. For each of these 
advancements, we discuss the background, research, and regulatory 
status.[Footnote 2] We also discuss each advancement's technological 
readiness for use in the existing commercial airliner fleet or in newly 
produced commercial airplanes. To identify factors that have slowed 
implementation of airliner cabin occupant safety and health 
advancements, we interviewed FAA, NTSB, and industry officials. In 
addition, we analyzed documentation from FAA, NTSB, and aviation safety 
experts to identify factors relating to key issues within FAA and the 
aviation community related to prioritizing and funding research, 
choosing advancements for regulatory implementation, and gaining the 
aviation community's acceptance of these advancements.

This report does not address cabin air quality because we are doing 
work in this area for another congressional requester. In addition, 
given the large scope of this review, the report does not focus on 
safety and health issues for flight deck crews (pilots and flight 
engineers) since they face some unique issues not faced by cabin 
occupants. It also does not address aviation security issues, such as 
hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.

We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

FAA has taken a number of key regulatory actions over the past several 
decades to improve the safety and health of passengers and flight 
attendants in large commercial airliner cabins. We identified 18 such 
completed regulatory actions that FAA has taken since 1984. Table 1 
shows the number of such actions by category and provides an example 
for each category of action.

Table 1: Regulatory Actions Taken by FAA to Improve Cabin Occupant 
Safety and Health Since 1984:

Category of regulatory action: Minimize injuries from the impact of a 
crash; Example: Stronger seats; Number of key actions taken: 2.

Category of regulatory action: Prevent fire or mitigate its effects; 
Example: Fire-blocking seat cushions; Number of key actions taken: 7.

Category of regulatory action: Improve the chances and speed of 
evacuation; Example: Emergency floor lighting; Number of key actions 
taken: 6.

Category of regulatory action: Improve the safety and health of cabin 
occupants; Example: Onboard emergency medical kits; Number of key 
actions taken: 3.

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

We also identified 28 advancements that have the potential to increase 
the chances of surviving a commercial airliner crash and to improve the 
safety and health of cabin occupants--both passengers and flight 
attendants. Table 2 shows the number of such advancements by category 
and provides an example for each.

Table 2: Advancements with Potential to Improve Cabin Occupant Safety 
and Health:

Category of advancement: Minimize injuries from the impact of a crash; 
Example: Lap seat belts with inflatable air bags; Number of key 
advancements: 5.

Category of advancement: Prevent fire or mitigate its effects; Example: 
Reduced fuel tank flammability; Number of key advancements: 8.

Category of advancement: Improve the chances and speed of evacuation; 
Example: Improved passenger safety briefings; Number of key 
advancements: 10.

Category of advancement: Improve the safety and health of cabin 
occupants; Example: Advanced warnings of turbulence; Number of key 
advancements: 5.

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

These 28 advancements vary in their readiness for deployment. For 
example, 14 of the technologies are currently available but not yet 
implemented or installed. Two of these, preparation for in-flight 
medical emergencies and improved insulation, were addressed through 
separate regulations. These regulations require airlines to install 
additional emergency medical equipment (automatic external 
defibrillators and enhanced emergency medical kits) by 2004, replace 
flammable insulation (metalized Mylar®) with improved insulation by 
2005, and manufacture new large commercial airliners with improved 
(thermal acoustic) insulation beginning September 2, 2005. Another 
currently available advancement is in FAA's rule-making process--
retrofitting the entire existing fleet with significantly stronger 
seats. These seats, commonly referred to as 16g seats, for example, can 
withstand the force of an impact 16 times a passenger's body weight 
(16g), rather than 9 times (9g), as currently required primarily for 
new generation commercial aircraft.[Footnote 3] For the remaining 11 
currently available advancements, while FAA does not require their use, 
some are being used by selected airlines. For example, some airlines 
have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts, exit doors over the 
wings that swing out on hinges instead of requiring manual removal, and 
photo-luminescent floor lighting.[Footnote 4] In addition, some of 
these advancements are available for purchase by the flying public, 
including smoke hoods and child safety seats certified for use on 
commercial airliners. The remaining 14 advancements are in various 
stages of research, engineering, and development in the United States, 
Canada, or Europe.

Several factors slow the implementation of advancements in cabin 
occupant safety and health, including those that are currently 
available, but have not yet been implemented or installed and those 
that require further research to demonstrate their effectiveness or 
lower their costs before they are ready for implementation. For those 
that are ready, and for which design and certification standards have 
been developed, FAA may undertake the rule-making process to require 
their implementation. As our prior work has shown, this process can 
take years. In addition, FAA and its international counterparts attempt 
to reach agreement on, or harmonize, their requirements for aviation 
procedures and equipment. The authorities' current harmonization 
process has resulted in a backlog, which has slowed the implementation 
of several cabin occupant safety and health advancements. Finally, the 
airlines must implement the advancements. While some advancements, such 
as improved safety briefings, can be implemented quickly and 
economically, others, such as retrofitting commercial aircraft with 
stronger passenger seats, require time-consuming, costly changes. FAA 
may give the airlines several years to retrofit their fleets in order 
to coordinate the change, when possible, with existing maintenance 
schedules and allow the airlines to absorb the associated costs. For 
advancements that require further research before they can be 
considered for use, FAA's multistep process for identifying potential 
cabin occupant safety and health research projects and allocating its 
limited resources to research projects on the advancements is hampered 
by a lack of autopsy and survivor information and cost and 
effectiveness data. According to FAA researchers, they have not had 
adequate access to autopsy reports and certain survivor information 
that NTSB obtains from autopsy reports and interviews with survivors 
during its investigations of commercial airliner accidents. This 
information could help FAA to identify the principal causes of death 
and injury and the major factors affecting survival, and to target 
research to advancements addressing these critical causes and factors. 
NTSB told us that while they provide large amounts of information on 
the causes of death and injury in information they make publicly 
available, they would consider making this additional information 
available to FAA if steps were taken to safeguard the privacy of 
victims and survivors. FAA's multistep process for selecting research 
projects on advancements includes consideration of such factors as 
their potential impact on accident prevention and accident mitigation; 
however, it does not include developing comparable estimates of cost 
and effectiveness for competing advancements to allow direct 
comparisons between them on their potential to reduce injuries and 
deaths. We developed a cost analysis methodology to illustrate how FAA 
could develop comparable cost estimates, to enhance its current 
process. The results of such analyses could be combined with similar 
estimates of effectiveness using data available from a variety of 
sources, including industry and academia. Using comparable cost and 
effectiveness data across the range of advancements could position the 
agency to choose more effectively between competing advancements, 
taking into account estimates of the number of injuries and fatalities 
that each advancement might prevent for the dollars invested. Such cost 
and effectiveness data would provide a valuable supplement to FAA's 
current process for setting research priorities and selecting projects 
for funding.

This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of 
Transportation to direct the FAA Administrator to initiate discussions 
with NTSB to facilitate the exchange of medical information from 
accident investigations. In addition, the report contains a 
recommendation to the FAA Administrator to improve the analyses 
available to decision makers responsible for setting research 
priorities and selecting projects for improving the safety and health 
of cabin occupants by (1) developing comparable cost estimates of 
potential advancements competing for funding and (2) developing or 
collecting data on the effectiveness of each potential advancement to 
reduce injuries or fatalities. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
FAA said that they generally agreed with the report's contents and its 
recommendations.

Background:

The safe travel of U.S. airline passengers is a joint responsibility of 
FAA and the airlines in accordance with the Federal Aviation Act of 
1958, as amended, and the Department of Transportation Act, as amended. 
To carry out its responsibilities under these acts, FAA supports 
research and development; certifies that new technologies and 
procedures are safe; undertakes rule-makings, which when finalized form 
the basis of federal aviation regulations; issues other guidance, such 
as Advisory Circulars; and oversees the industry's compliance with 
standards that aircraft manufacturers and airlines must meet to build 
and operate commercial aircraft. Aircraft manufacturers are responsible 
for designing aircraft that meet FAA's safety standards, and air 
carriers are responsible for operating and maintaining their aircraft 
in accordance with the standards for safety and maintenance established 
in FAA's regulations. FAA, in turn, certifies aircraft designs and 
monitors the industry's compliance with the regulations.

FAA's general process for issuing a regulation, or rule, includes 
several steps. When the regulation would require the implementation of 
a technology or operation, FAA first certifies that the technology or 
operation is safe. Then, FAA publishes a notice of proposed rule-making 
in the Federal Register, which sets forth the terms of the rule and 
establishes a period for the public to comment on it. Next, FAA reviews 
the comments by incorporating changes into the rule that it believes 
are warranted, and, in some instances, it repeats these steps one or 
more times. Finally, FAA publishes a final rule in the Federal 
Register. The final rule includes the date when it will go into effect 
and a time line for compliance.

Within FAA, the Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for 
certifying that technologies are safe, including improvements to cabin 
occupant safety and health, generally through the issuance of new 
regulations, a finding certifying an equivalent level of safety, or a 
special condition when no rule covers the new technology. The 
Certification Service is also responsible for taking enforcement action 
to ensure the continued safety of aircraft by prescribing standards for 
aircraft manufacturers governing the design, production, and 
airworthiness of aeronautical products, such as cabin interiors. The 
Flight Standards Service is primarily responsible for certifying an 
airline's operations (assessing the airline's ability to carry out its 
operations and maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft) and for 
monitoring the operations and maintenance of the airline's fleet.

FAA conducts research on cabin occupant safety and health issues in two 
research facilities, the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center/Civil 
Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the William 
J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The institute 
focuses on the impact of flight operations on human health, while the 
technical center focuses on improvements in aircraft design, operation, 
and maintenance and inspection to prevent accidents and improve 
survivability. For the institute or the technical center to conduct 
research on a project, an internal FAA requester must sponsor the 
project. For example, FAA's Office of Regulation and Certification 
sponsors much of the two facilities' work in support of FAA's rule-
making activities. FAA also cooperates on cabin safety research with 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), academic 
institutions, and private research organizations.

Until recently, NASA conducted research on airplane crashworthiness at 
its Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia. However, because of 
internal budget reallocations and a decision to devote more of its 
funds to aviation security, NASA terminated the Langley Center's 
research on the crashworthiness of commercial aircraft in 2002. NASA 
continues to conduct fire-related research on cabin safety issues at 
its Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio.

NTSB has the authority to investigate civil aviation accidents and 
collects data on the causes of injuries and death for the victims of 
commercial airliner accidents. According to NTSB, the majority of 
fatalities in commercial airliner accidents are attributable to crash 
impact forces and the effects of fire and smoke. Specifically, 306 (66 
percent) of the 465 fatalities in partially survivable U.S. aviation 
accidents from 1983 through 2000 died from impact forces, 131 (28 
percent) died from fire and smoke, and 28 (6 percent) died from other 
causes.[Footnote 5]

Surviving an airplane crash depends on a number of factors. The space 
surrounding a passenger must remain large enough to prevent the 
passenger from being crushed. The force of impact must also be reduced 
to levels that the passenger can withstand, either by spreading the 
impact over a larger part of the body or by increasing the duration of 
the impact through an energy-absorbing seat or fuselage. The passenger 
must be restrained in a seat to avoid striking the interior of the 
airplane, and the seat must not become detached from the floor. Objects 
within the airplane, such as debris, overhead luggage bins, luggage, 
and galley equipment, must not strike the passenger. A fire in the 
cabin must be prevented, or, if one does start, it must burn slowly 
enough and produce low enough levels of toxic gases to allow the 
passenger to escape from the airplane. If there is a fire, the 
passenger must not have sustained injuries that prevent him or her from 
escaping quickly. Finally, if the passenger escapes serious injury from 
impact and fire, he or she must have access to exit doors and slides or 
other means of evacuation.

Regulatory Actions Have Been Taken and Additional Advancements Are 
Under Way to Improve Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health:

Over the past several decades, FAA has taken a number of regulatory 
actions designed to improve the safety and health of airline passengers 
and flight attendants by (1) minimizing injuries from the impact of a 
crash, (2) preventing fire or mitigating its effects, (3) improving the 
chances and speed of evacuation, or (4) improving the safety and health 
of cabin occupants. (See app. III for more information on the 
regulatory actions FAA has taken to improve cabin occupant safety and 
health.) Specifically, we identified 18 completed regulatory actions 
that FAA has taken since 1984. In addition to these past actions, FAA 
and others in the aviation community are pursuing advancements in these 
four areas to improve cabin occupant safety and health in the future. 
We identified and reviewed 28 such advancements--5 to reduce the impact 
of a crash on occupants, 8 to prevent or mitigate fire and its effects, 
10 to facilitate evacuation from aircraft, and 5 to address general 
cabin occupant safety and health issues.

Minimizing Injuries from the Impact of a Crash:

The primary cause of injury and death for cabin occupants in an 
airliner accident is the impact of the crash itself. We identified two 
key regulatory actions that FAA has taken to better protect passengers 
from impact forces. For example, in 1988, FAA required stronger 
passenger seats for newly manufactured commercial airplanes to improve 
protection in:

survivable crashes.[Footnote 6] These new seats are capable, for 
example, of withstanding an impact force that is approximately 16 times 
a passenger's body weight (16g), rather than 9 times (9g), and must be 
tested dynamically (in multiple directions to simulate crash 
conditions), rather than statically (e.g., drop testing to assess the 
damage from the force of the weight alone without motion). In addition, 
in 1992, FAA issued a requirement for corrective action (airworthiness 
directive) for designs found not to meet the existing rules for 
overhead storage bins on certain Boeing aircraft, to improve their 
crashworthiness after bin failures were observed in the 1989 crash of 
an airliner in Kegworth, England, and a 1991 crash near Stockholm, 
Sweden.

We also identified five key advancements that are being pursued to 
provide cabin occupants with greater impact protection in the future. 
These advancements are either under development or currently available. 
Examples include the following:

* Lap seat belts with inflatable air bags: Lap seat belts that contain 
inflatable air bags have been developed by private companies and are 
currently available to provide passengers with added protection during 
a crash. About 1,000 of these lap seat belts have been installed on 
commercial airplanes, primarily in the seats facing wall dividers 
(bulkheads) to prevent passengers from sustaining head injuries during 
a crash. (See fig. 1.):

* Improved seating systems: Seat safety depends on several interrelated 
systems operating properly, and, therefore, an airline seat is most 
accurately discussed as a system. New seating system designs are being 
developed by manufacturers to incorporate new safety and aesthetic 
designs as well as meet FAA's 16g seat regulations to better protect 
passengers from impact forces. These seating systems would help to 
ensure that the seats themselves perform as expected (i.e., they stay 
attached to the floor tracks); the space between the seats remains 
adequate in a crash; and the equipment in the seating area, such as 
phones and video screens, does not increase the impact hazard.

* Child safety seats: Child safety seats could provide small children 
with additional protection in the event of an airliner crash. NTSB and 
others have recommended their use, and FAA has been involved in this 
issue for at least 15 years. While it has used its rule-making process 
to consider requiring their use, FAA decided not to require child 
safety restraints because its analysis found that if passengers were 
required to pay full fare for children under the age of 2, some parents 
would choose to travel by automobile and, statistically, the chances 
would increase that both the children and the adults would be killed. 
FAA is continuing to consider a child safety seat requirement.

Figure 1: Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bag Inflation Sequence:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Appendix IV contains additional information on the impact advancements 
we have identified.

Preventing Fire or Mitigating Its Effect:

Fire prevention and mitigation efforts have given passengers additional 
time to evacuate an airliner following a crash or cabin fire. FAA has 
taken seven key regulatory actions to improve fire detection, eliminate 
potential fire hazards, prevent the spread of fires, and better 
extinguish them. For example, to help prevent the spread of fire and 
give passengers more time to escape, FAA upgraded fire safety standards 
to require that seat cushions have fire-blocking layers, which resulted 
in airlines retrofitting 650,000 seats over a 3-year period. The agency 
also set new low heat/smoke standards for materials used for large 
interior surfaces (e.g., sidewalls, ceilings, and overhead bins), which 
FAA officials told us resulted in a significant improvement in 
postcrash fire survivability. FAA also required smoke detectors to be 
placed in lavatories and automatic fire extinguishers in lavatory waste 
receptacles in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In addition, the agency 
required airlines to retrofit their fleets with fire detection and 
suppression systems in cargo compartments, which according to FAA, 
applied to over 3,700 aircraft at a cost to airlines of $300 million. 
To better extinguish fires when they do start, FAA also required, in 
1985, that commercial airliners carry two Halon fire extinguishers in 
addition to other required extinguishers because of Halon's superior 
fire suppression capabilities.

We also identified 8 key advancements that are currently available and 
awaiting implementation or are under development to provide additional 
fire protection for cabin occupants in the future. Examples include the 
following:

* Reduced flammability of insulation materials: To eliminate a 
potential fire hazard, in May 2000, FAA required that air carriers 
replace insulation blankets covered with a type of insulation known as 
metalized Mylar® on specific aircraft by 2005, after it was found that 
the material had ignited and contributed to the crash of Swiss Air 
Flight 111.[Footnote 7] Over 700 aircraft were affected by this 
requirement. In addition, FAA issued a rule in July 2003 requiring that 
large commercial airplanes manufactured after September 2, 2005, be 
equipped with thermal acoustic insulation designed to an upgraded fire 
test standard that will reduce the incidence and intensity of in-flight 
fires. In addition, after September 2, 2007, newly manufactured 
aircraft must be equipped with thermal acoustic materials designed to 
meet a new standard for burn-through resistance, providing passengers 
more time to escape during a postcrash fire.

* Reduced fuel tank flammability: Flammable vapors in aircraft fuel 
tanks can ignite. However, currently available technology can greatly 
reduce this hazard by "blanketing" the fuel tank with nonexplosive 
nitrogen-enriched air to suppress ("inert") the potential for explosion 
of the tank. The U.S. military has used this technology on selected 
aircraft for 20 years, but U.S. commercial airlines have not adopted 
the technology because of its cost and weight. FAA officials told us 
that the military's technology was also unreliable and designed to meet 
military rather than civilian airplane design requirements. FAA fire 
safety experts have developed a lighter-weight inerting system for 
center fuel tanks, which is simpler than the military system and 
potentially more reliable. Reliability of this technology is a major 
concern for the aviation industry. According to FAA officials, Boeing 
and Airbus began flight testing this technology in July 2003 and August 
2003, respectively.[Footnote 8] In addition, the Air Transport 
Association (ATA) noted that inerting is only one prospective component 
of an ongoing major program for fuel tank safety, and that it has yet 
to be justified as feasible and cost-effective.

* Sensor technology: Sensors are currently being developed to better 
detect overheated or burning materials. According to FAA and the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, many current smoke and 
fire detectors are not reliable. For example, a recent FAA study 
reported at least one false alarm per week in cargo compartment fire 
detection systems. The new detectors are being developed by Airbus and 
others in private industry to reduce the number of false alarms. In 
addition, FAA is developing standards that would be used to approve 
new, reduced false alarm sensors. NASA is also developing new sensors 
and detectors.

* Water mist for extinguishing fires: Technology has been under 
development for over two decades to dispense water mist during a fire 
to protect passengers from heat and smoke and prevent the spread of 
fire in the cabin. The most significant development effort has been 
made by a European public-private consortium, FIREDETEX, with over 5 
million euros of European Community funding and a total project cost of 
over 10 million euros (over 10 million U.S. dollars). The development 
of this system was prompted, in part, by the need to replace Halon, 
when it was determined that this main firefighting agent used in fire 
extinguishers aboard commercial airliners depletes ozone in the 
atmosphere.

Appendix V contains additional information on advancements that address 
fire prevention and mitigation.

Improving the Chances and Speed of Evacuation:

Enabling passengers to evacuate more quickly during an emergency has 
saved lives. Over the past two decades, FAA has completed regulatory 
action on the following six key requirements to help speed evacuations:

* Improve access to certain emergency exits, such as those generally 
smaller exits above the wing, by providing an unobstructed passageway 
to the exit.

* Install public address systems that are independently powered and can 
be used for at least 10 minutes.

* Help to ensure that passengers in the seats next to emergency exits 
are physically and mentally able to operate the exit doors and assist 
other passengers in emergency evacuations.

* Limit the distance between emergency exits to 60 feet.

* Install emergency lighting systems that visually identify the 
emergency escape path and each exit.

* Install fire-resistant emergency evacuation slides.

We also identified 10 advancements that are either currently available 
but awaiting implementation or require additional research that could 
lead to improved aircraft evacuation, including the following:

* Improved passenger safety briefings: Information is available to the 
airlines on how to develop more appealing safety briefings and safety 
briefing cards so that passengers would be more likely to pay attention 
to the briefings and be better prepared to evacuate successfully during 
an emergency. Research has found that passengers often ignore the oral 
briefings and do not familiarize themselves with the safety briefing 
cards. FAA has requested that air carriers explore different ways to 
present safety information to passengers, but FAA regulates only the 
content of briefings. The presentation style of safety briefings is 
left up to air carriers.

* Over-wing exit doors: Exit doors located over the wings of some 
commercial airliners have been redesigned to "swing out" and away from 
the aircraft so that cabin occupants can exit more easily during an 
emergency. Currently, the over-wing exit doors on most U.S. commercial 
airliners are "self help" doors and must be lifted and stowed by a 
passenger, which can impede evacuation. (See fig. 2.) The redesigned 
doors are now used on new-generation B-737 aircraft operated by one 
U.S. and most European airlines. FAA does not currently require the use 
of over-wing exit doors that swing out because the exit doors that are 
removed manually meet the agency's safety standards. However, FAA is 
working with the Europeans to develop common requirements for the use 
of this type of exit door.

* Audio attraction signals: The United Kingdom's Civil Aviation 
Authority and the manufacturer are testing audio attraction signals to 
determine their usefulness to passengers in locating exit doors during 
an evacuation. These signals would be mounted near exits and activated 
during an emergency. The signals would help the passengers find the 
nearest exit even if lighting and exit signs were obscured by smoke.

Figure 2: Manual "Self Help" and "Swing Out" Over-Wing Exits:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Appendix VI contains additional information on advancements to improve 
aircraft emergency evacuations.

Improving the Safety and Health of Cabin Occupants:

Passengers and flight attendants can face a range of safety and health 
effects while aboard commercial airliners. We identified three key 
actions taken by FAA to help maintain the safety and health of 
passengers and the:

cabin crew during normal flight operations.[Footnote 9] For example, to 
prevent passengers from being injured during turbulent conditions, FAA 
initiated the Turbulence Happens campaign in 2000 to increase public 
awareness of the importance of wearing seatbelts. The agency has 
advised the airlines to warn passengers to fasten their seatbelts when 
turbulence is expected, and the airlines generally advise or require 
passengers to keep their seat belts fastened while seated to help avoid 
injuries from unexpected turbulence. FAA has also required the airlines 
to equip their fleets with emergency medical kits since 1986. In 
addition, Congress banned smoking on most domestic flights in 1990.

We also identified five advancements that are either currently 
available but awaiting implementation or require additional research 
that could lead to an improvement in the health of passengers and 
flight attendants in the future.

* Automatic external defibrillators: Automatic external defibrillators 
are currently available for use on some commercial airliners if a 
passenger or crew member requires resuscitation. In 1998, the Congress 
directed FAA to assess the need for the defibrillators on commercial 
airliners. On the basis of its findings, the agency issued a rule 
requiring that U.S. airlines equip their aircraft with automatic 
external defibrillators by 2004. According to ATA, most airlines have 
already done so.

* Enhanced emergency medical kits: In 1998, the Congress directed FAA 
to collect data for 1 year on the types of in-flight medical 
emergencies that occurred to determine if existing medical kits should 
be upgraded. On the basis of the data collected, FAA issued a rule that 
required the contents of existing emergency medical kits to be expanded 
to deal with a broader range of emergencies. U.S. commercial airliners 
are required to carry these enhanced emergency medical kits by 2004. 
Most U.S. airlines have already completed this upgrade, according to 
ATA.

* Advance warning of turbulence: New airborne weather radar and other 
technologies are currently being developed and evaluated to improve the 
detection of turbulence and increase the time available to cabin 
occupants to avert potential injuries. FAA's July 2003 draft strategic 
plan established a performance target of reducing injuries to cabin 
occupants caused by turbulence. To achieve this objective, FAA plans to 
continue evaluating new airborne weather radars and other technologies 
that broadly address weather issues, including turbulence. In addition, 
the draft strategic plan set a performance target of reducing serious 
injuries caused by turbulence by 33 percent by fiscal year 2008--using 
the average for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 of 15 injuries per year 
as the baseline and reducing this average to no more than 10 per year.

* Improve awareness of radiation exposure: Flight attendants and 
passengers who fly frequently can be exposed to higher levels of 
radiation on a cumulative basis than the general public. High levels of 
radiation have been linked to an increased risk of cancer and potential 
harm to fetuses. To help passengers and crew members estimate their 
past and future radiation exposure levels, FAA developed a computer 
model, which is publicly available on its Web site [Hyperlink, http://
www.jag.cami.jccbi.gov/cariprofile.asp] http://www.jag.cami.jccbi.gov/
cariprofile.asp. However, the extent to which flight attendants and 
frequent flyers are aware of cosmic radiation's risks and make use of 
FAA's computer model is unclear. Agency officials told us that they 
plan to install a counter capability on its Civil Aerospace Medical 
Institute Web site to track the number of visits to its aircrew and 
passenger health and safety Web site. FAA also plans to issue an 
Advisory Circular by early next year, which incorporates the findings 
of a just completed FAA report, "What Aircrews Should Know About Their 
Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation." This Advisory Circular 
will include recommended actions for aircrews and information on solar 
flare event notification of aircrews. In contrast, airlines in Europe 
abide by more stringent requirements for helping to ensure that cabin 
and flight crew members do not receive excessive doses of radiation 
from performing their flight duties during a given year. For example, 
in May 1996, the European Union issued a directive for workers, 
including air carrier crew members (cabin and flight crews) and the 
general public, on basic safety and health protections against dangers 
arising from ionizing radiation. This directive set dose limits and 
required air carriers to (1) assess and monitor the exposure of all 
crew members to avoid exceeding exposure limits, (2) work with those 
individuals at risk of high exposure levels to adjust their work or 
flight schedules to reduce those levels, and (3) inform crew members of 
the health risks that their work involves from exposure to radiation. 
It also required airlines to work with female crew members, when they 
announce a pregnancy, to avoid exposing the fetus to harmful levels of 
radiation. This directive was binding for all European Union member 
states and became effective in May 2000.

* Improved awareness of potential health effects related to flying: Air 
travel may exacerbate some medical conditions. Of particular concern is 
a condition known as Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT), or travelers' 
thrombosis, in which blood clots can develop in the deep veins of the 
legs from extended periods of inactivity. In a small percentage of 
cases, the clots can break free and travel to the lungs, with 
potentially fatal results. Although steps can be taken to avoid or 
mitigate some travel-related health effects, no formal awareness 
campaigns have been initiated by FAA to help ensure that this 
information reaches physicians and the traveling public. The Aerospace 
Medical Association's Web site [Hyperlink, http://www.asma.org/
publication.html] http://www.asma.org/publication.html includes 
guidance for physicians to use in advising passengers with preexisting 
medical conditions on the potential risks of flying, as well as 
information for passengers with such conditions to use in assessing 
their own potential risks.

See appendix VII for additional information on health-related advances.

Advancements Vary in Their Readiness for Deployment:

The advancements being pursued to improve the safety and health of 
cabin occupants vary in their readiness for deployment. For example, of 
the 28 advancements we reviewed, 14 are mature and currently available. 
Two of these, preparation for in-flight medical emergencies and the use 
of new insulation, were addressed through regulations. These 
regulations require airlines to install additional emergency medical 
equipment (automatic external defibrillators and enhanced emergency 
medical kits) by 2004, replace flammable insulation covering (metalized 
Mylar®) on specific aircraft by 2005, and manufacture new large 
commercial airliners that use a new type of insulation meeting more 
stringent flammability test standards after September 2, 2005. Another 
advancement is currently in the rule-making process--retrofitting the 
existing fleet with stronger 16g seats. The remaining 11 advancements 
are available, but are not required by FAA. For example, some airlines 
have elected to use inflatable lap seat belts and exit doors over the 
wings that swing out instead of requiring manual removal, and others 
are using photo-luminescent floor lighting in lieu of or in combination 
with traditional electrical lighting. Some of these advancements are 
commercially available to the flying public, including smoke hoods and 
child safety seats certified for use on commercial airliners. The 
remaining 14 advancements are in various stages of research, 
engineering, and development in the United States, Canada, or Europe.

Several Factors Have Slowed the Implementation of Cabin Occupant Safety 
and Health Advancements:

Several factors have slowed the implementation of airliner cabin 
occupant safety and health advancements in the United States. When 
advancements are available for commercial use but not yet implemented 
or installed, their use may be slowed by the time it takes (1) for FAA 
to complete the rule-making process,[Footnote 10] which may be required 
for an advancement to be approved for use but may take many years; (2) 
for U.S. and foreign aviation authorities to resolve differences 
between their respective cabin occupant safety and health requirements; 
and (3) for the airlines to adopt or install advancements after FAA has 
approved their use, including the time required to schedule an 
advancement's installation to coincide with major maintenance cycles 
and thereby minimize the costs associated with taking an airplane out 
of service. When advancements are not ready for commercial use because 
they need further research to develop their technologies or reduce 
their costs, their implementation may be slowed by FAA's multistep 
process for identifying advancements and allocating its limited 
resources to research on potential advancements. FAA's multistep 
process is hampered by a lack of autopsy and survivor information from 
past accidents and by not having cost and effectiveness data as part of 
the decision process. As a result, FAA may not be identifying and 
funding the most critical or cost-effective research projects.

FAA's Rule-making Process to Require Advancements Can Be Lengthy:

Once an advancement has been developed, FAA may require its use, but 
significant time may be required before the rule-making process is 
complete. One factor that contributes to the length of this process is 
a requirement for cost-benefit analyses to be completed. Time is 
particularly important when safety is at stake or when the pace of 
technological development exceeds the pace of rule-making. As a result, 
some rules may need to be developed quickly to address safety issues or 
to guide the use of new technologies. However, rules must also be 
carefully considered before being finalized because they can have a 
significant impact on individuals, industries, the economy, and the 
environment. External pressures--such as political pressure generated 
by highly publicized accidents, recommendations by NTSB, and 
congressional mandates--as well as internal pressures, such as changes 
in management's emphasis, continue to add to and shift the agency's 
priorities.

The rule-making process can be long and complicated and has delayed the 
implementation of some technological and operational safety 
improvements, as we reported in July 2001.[Footnote 11]In that report, 
we reviewed 76 significant rules in FAA's workload for fiscal years 
1995 through 2000--10 of the 76 were directly related to improving the 
safety and health of cabin occupants.[Footnote 12] Table 3 details the 
status or disposition of these 10 rules. The shortest rule-making 
action took 1 year, 11 months (for child restraint systems), and the 
longest took 10 years, 1 month (for the type and number of emergency 
exits). However, one proposed rule was still pending after 15 years, 
while three others were terminated or withdrawn after 9 years or more. 
Of the 76 significant rules we reviewed, FAA completed the rule-making 
process for 29 of them between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 2000, 
in a median time of about 2 ½ years to proceed from formal initiation 
of the rule-making process through publication of the final rule; 
however, FAA took 10 years or more to move from formal initiation of 
the rule-making process through publication of the final rule for 6 of 
these 29 rules.

Table 3: Status of 10 Significant FAA Rules Pertaining to Airliner 
Cabin Occupants' Safety and Health, Fiscal Year 1995 through September 
of Fiscal Year 2003:

Rule title: Flight attendant requirements; Initiation date[A]: 2/04/86; 
Time elapsed: 9 years, 8 months; Status/disposition: 
Terminated/withdrawn 6/06/96.

Rule title: Type and number of passenger emergency exits required in 
transport category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 10/15/86; Time 
elapsed: 10 years, 1 month; Status/disposition: Final rule 
published on 11/08/96.

Rule title: Airworthiness standards; occupant protection standards for 
commuter category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 5/29/87; Time elapsed: 
11 years, 1 month; Status/disposition: Terminated/withdrawn; 
6/30/98.

Rule title: Retrofit of improved seats in air carrier transport 
category airplanes; Initiation date[A]: 1/26/88; Time elapsed: 15 
years, 6 months; Status/disposition: Pending.

Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 5/30/90; Time 
elapsed: 5 years, 9 months; Status/disposition: Terminated/
withdrawn; 2/13/96.

Rule title: Revised access to Type III exits; Initiation date[A]: 10/
30/92; Time elapsed: 9 years, 5 months; Status/disposition: 
Withdrawn; 5/03/02.

Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 7/18/94; Time 
elapsed: 1 year 11 months; Status/disposition: Final rule 
published on 6/04/96.

Rule title: Child restraint systems; Initiation date[A]: 4/07/97; Time 
elapsed: 6 years, 3 months; Status/disposition: Pending.

Rule title: Emergency medical equipment; Initiation date[A]: 10/5/98; 
Time elapsed: 2 years, 8 months; Status/disposition: Final 
rule published on; 6/12/01.

Rule title: Improved flammability standards for thermal acoustic 
insulation materials in transport category aircraft; Initiation 
date[A]: 12/04/98; Time elapsed: 4 years, 7 months; Status/
disposition: Final rule published on July 31, 2003.

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

Note: In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA noted that examining 
the years elapsed from the initiation date of the rule to disposition 
can be unfair to some actions and that many of the delays were not the 
fault of FAA.

[A] Initiation dates were identified in FAA's rule-making information 
system as GAO reported in July 2001. This was the only source for data 
on the agency's internal milestones, including "initiation date.":

[End of table]

Differences in U.S. and Foreign Requirements Can Hamper Adoption of 
Advancements:

FAA and its international counterparts, such as the European Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA), impose a number of requirements to improve 
safety. At times, these requirements differ, and efforts are needed to 
reach agreement on procedures and equipment across country borders. In 
the absence of such agreements, the airlines generally must adopt 
measures to implement whichever requirement is more stringent. In 1992, 
FAA and JAA began harmonizing their requirements for (1) the design, 
manufacture, operation, and maintenance of civil aircraft and related 
product parts; (2) noise and emissions from aircraft; and (3) flight 
crew licensing. Harmonizing the U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations with 
the European Joint Aviation Regulations is viewed by FAA as its most 
comprehensive long-term rule-making effort and is considered critical 
to ensuring common safety standards and minimizing the economic burden 
on the aviation industry that can result from redundant inspection, 
evaluation, and testing requirements.

According to both FAA and JAA, the process they have used to date to 
harmonize their requirements for commercial aircraft has not 
effectively prioritized their joint recommendations for harmonizing 
U.S. and European aviation requirements, and led to many 
recommendations going unpublished for years. This includes a backlog of 
over 130 new rule-making efforts. The slowness of this process led the 
United States and Europe to develop a new rule-making process to 
prioritize safety initiatives, focus the aviation industry's and their 
own limited resources, and establish limitations on rule-making 
capabilities. Accordingly, in March 2003, FAA and JAA developed a draft 
joint "priority" rule-making list; collected and considered industry 
input; and coordinated with FAA's, JAA's, and Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation's management. This effort has resulted in a rule-making list 
of 26 priority projects. In June 2003, at the 20TH Annual JAA/FAA 
International Conference, FAA, JAA, and Transport Canada Civil Aviation 
discussed the need to, among other things, support the joint priority 
rule-making list and to establish a cycle for updating it--to keep it 
current and to provide for "pop-up," or unexpected, rule-making needs. 
FAA and JAA discussed the need to prioritize rule-making efforts to 
efficiently achieve aviation safety goals; that they would work from a 
limited agreed-upon list for future rule-making activities; and that 
FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency, which is gradually 
replacing JAA, should continue with this approach.

In the area of cabin occupant safety and heath, some requirements have 
been harmonized, while others have not. For example, in 1996, JAA 
changed its rule on floor lighting to allow reflective, glow-in-the-
dark material to be used rather than mandating the electrically powered 
lighting that FAA required. The agency subsequently permitted the use 
of this material for floor lighting. In addition, FAA finalized a rule 
in July 2003 to require a new type of insulation designed to delay fire 
burning though the fuselage into the cabin during an accident. JAA 
favors a performance-based standard that would specify a minimum delay 
in burn-through time, but allow the use of different technologies to 
achieve the standard. FAA officials said that the agency would consider 
other technologies besides insulation to achieve burn-through 
protection but that it would be the responsibility of the applicant to 
demonstrate that the technology provided performance equivalent to that 
stipulated in the insulation rule. JAA officials told us that these are 
examples of the types of issues that must be resolved when they work to 
harmonize their requirements with FAA's. These officials added that 
this process is typically very time consuming and has allowed for 
harmonizing about five rules per year.

Significant Time May Be Needed to Implement Advancements Once They Are 
Required, but Some May Enhance Airlines' Competitiveness:

After an advancement has been developed, shown to be beneficial, 
certified, and required by FAA, the airlines or manufacturers need time 
to implement or install the advancement.[Footnote 13] FAA generally 
gives the airlines or manufacturers a window of time to comply with its 
rules. For example, FAA gave air carriers 5 years to replace metalized 
Mylar® insulation on specific aircraft with a less flammable insulation 
type, and FAA's proposed rule-making on 16g seats would give the 
airlines 14 years to install these seats in all existing commercial 
airliners. ATA officials told us that this would require replacement of 
496,000 seats.

The airline industry's recent financial hardships may also delay the 
adoption of advancements. Recently, two major U.S. carriers filed for 
bankruptcy,[Footnote 14] and events such as the war in Iraq have 
reduced passenger demand and airline revenues below levels already 
diminished by the events of September 11, 2001, and the economic 
downturn. Current U.S. demand for air travel remains below fiscal year 
2000 levels. As a result, airlines may ask for exemptions from some 
requirements or extensions of time to install advancements.

While implementing new safety and health advancements can be costly for 
the airlines, making these changes could improve the public's 
confidence in the overall safety of air travel. In addition, some 
aviation experts in Europe told us that health-related cabin 
improvements, particularly improvements in air quality, are of high 
interest to Europeans and would likely be used in the near future by 
some European air carriers to set themselves apart from their 
competitors.

FAA's Multistep Process for Allocating Limited Resources to Research 
Projects Is Hampered by Lack of Autopsy and Survivor Information and 
Cost and Effectiveness Data:

For fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA allocated about $16.2 million to 
cabin occupant safety and health research. FAA's share of this research 
represented $13.1 million, or about 9 percent of the agency's Research, 
Engineering, and Development budget of $148 million for fiscal year 
2003. Given the level of funding allocated to this research effort, it 
is important to ensure that the best research projects are selected. 
However, FAA's processes for setting research priorities and selecting 
projects for further research are hampered by data limitations. In 
particular, FAA lacks certain autopsy and survivor information from 
aircraft crashes that could help it identify and target research to the 
most important causes of death and injury in an airliner crash. In 
addition, for the proposed research projects, the agency does not (1) 
develop comparable cost data for potential advancements or (2) assess 
their potential effectiveness in minimizing injuries or saving lives. 
Such cost and effectiveness data would provide a valuable supplement to 
FAA's current process for setting research priorities and selecting 
projects for funding.

Federal Research on Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety and Health Issues:

Both FAA and NASA conduct research on aircraft cabin occupant safety 
and health issues. The Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) and the 
Hughes Technical Center are FAA's primary facilities for conducting 
research in this area. In addition, two facilities at NASA, the Langley 
and Glenn research centers, have also conducted research in this area. 
As figure 3 shows, federal funding for this research since fiscal year 
2000, reached a high in fiscal year 2002, at about $17 million, and 
fell to about $16.2 million in fiscal year 2003. The administration's 
proposal for fiscal year 2004 calls for a further reduction to $15.9 
million. This funding covers the expenses of researchers at these 
facilities and of the contracts they may have with others to conduct 
research. In addition, NASA recently decided to end its crash research 
at Langley and to close a drop test facility that it operates in 
Hampton, Virginia.

Figure 3: Funding for Federal Research on Cabin Occupant Safety and 
Health Issues, by Facility, Fiscal Years 2000-2005:

[See PDF for image]

Note: FAA Hughes Technical Center data includes work in fire-safe 
fuels, fuel-tank inerting, arc fault circuit breakers, and airport 
rescue and fire-fighting operations.

[End of figure]

In fiscal year 2003, FAA and NASA both supported research projects, 
including aircraft impact, fire, evacuation, and health. As figure 4 
shows, most of the funding for cabin occupant safety and health 
research has gone to fire-related projects.

Figure 4: Allocation of Federal Funding for Aircraft Cabin Occupant 
Safety and Health Research, Fiscal Year 2003:

[See PDF for image]

Note: Sum of bars exceeds $16.2 million due to rounding. FAA Technical 
Center data includes work in fire-safe fuels, fuel-tank inerting, arc 
fault circuit breakers, and airport rescue and fire-fighting 
operations:

[End of figure]

FAA Research Selection Process Hampered by Lack of Autopsy and Survivor 
Information and Cost and Effectiveness Analyses:

To establish research priorities and select projects to fund, FAA uses 
a multistep process. First, within each budget cycle, a number of 
Technical Community Representative Group subcommittees from within FAA 
generate research ideas. Various subcommittees have responsibility for 
identifying potential safety and health projects, including 
subcommittees on crash dynamics, fire safety, structural integrity, 
passenger evacuation, aeromedical, and fuel safety. Each subcommittee 
proposes research projects to review committees, which prioritize the 
projects. The projects are considered and weighted according to the 
extent to which they address (1) accident prevention, (2) accident 
survival, (3) external requests for research, (4) internal requests for 
research, and (5) technology research needs. In addition, the cost of 
the proposed research is considered before arriving at a final list of 
projects. The prioritized list is then considered by the Program 
Planning Team, which reviews the projects from a policy perspective.

Although the primary causes of death and injury in commercial airliner 
crashes are known to be impact, fire, and impediments to evacuation, 
FAA does not have as detailed an understanding as it would like of the 
critical factors affecting survival in a crash. According to FAA 
officials, obtaining a more detailed understanding of these factors 
would assist them in setting research priorities and in evaluating the 
relative importance of competing research proposals. To obtain a more 
detailed understanding of the critical factors affecting survival, FAA 
believes that it needs additional information from passenger autopsies 
and from passengers who survived. With this information, FAA could then 
regulate safety more effectively, airplane and equipment designers 
could build safer aircraft, including cabin interiors, and more 
passengers could survive future accidents as equipment became safer.

While FAA has independent authority to investigate commercial airliner 
crashes, NTSB generally controls access to the accident investigation 
site in pursuit of its primary mission of determining the cause of the 
crash. When NTSB concludes its investigation, it returns the airplane 
to its owner and keeps the records of the investigation, including the 
autopsy reports and the information from survivors that NTSB obtains 
from medical authorities and through interviews or questionnaires. NTSB 
makes summary information on the crashes publicly available on its Web 
site, but according to the FAA researchers, this information is not 
detailed enough for their needs. For example, the researchers would 
like to develop a complete autopsy database that would allow them to 
look for common trends in accidents, among other things. In addition, 
the researchers would like to know where survivors sat on the airplane, 
what routes they took to exit, what problems they encountered, and what 
injuries they sustained. This information would help the researchers 
analyze factors that might have an impact on survival. According to the 
NTSB's Chief of the Survival Factors Division in the Office of Aviation 
Safety, NTSB provides information on the causes of death and a 
description of injuries in the information they make publicly 
available. In addition, although medical records and autopsy reports 
are not made public, interviews with and questionnaires from survivors 
are available from the public docket.

NTSB's Medical Officer was unaware of any formal requests from the FAA 
for the NTSB to provide them with copies of this type of information, 
although the FAA had previously been invited to review such information 
at NTSB headquarters. He added that the Board would likely consider a 
formal request from FAA for copies of autopsy reports and certain 
survivor records, but that it was also likely that the FAA would have 
to assure NTSB that the information would be appropriately safeguarded. 
According to FAA officials, close cooperation between the NTSB and the 
FAA is needed for continued progress in aviation safety.

Besides lacking detailed information on the causes of death and injury, 
FAA does not develop data on the cost to implement advancements that 
are comparable for each, nor does it assess the potential effectiveness 
of each advancement in reducing injuries and saving lives. 
Specifically, FAA does not conduct cost-benefit analyses as part of its 
multistep process for setting research priorities. Making cost 
estimates of competing advancements would allow direct comparisons 
across alternatives, which, when combined with comparable estimates of 
effectiveness, would provide valuable supplemental information to 
decision makers when setting research priorities. FAA considers its 
current process to be appropriate and sufficient. In commenting on a 
draft of this report, FAA noted that it is very difficult to develop 
realistic cost data for advancements during the earliest stages of 
research. The agency cautioned that if too much emphasis is placed on 
cost/benefit analyses, potentially valuable research may not be 
undertaken. Recognizing that it is less difficult to develop cost and 
effectiveness information as research progresses, we are recommending 
that FAA develop and use cost and effectiveness analyses to supplement 
its current process. At later stages in the development process, we 
found that this information can be developed fairly easily through cost 
and effectiveness analyses using currently available data. For example, 
we performed an analysis of the cost to implement inflatable lap seat 
belts using a cost analysis methodology we developed (see app. VIII). 
This analysis allowed us to estimate how much this advancement would 
cost per airplane and per passenger trip. Such cost analyses could be 
combined with similar analyses of effectiveness to identify the most 
cost-effective projects, based on their potential to minimize injuries 
and reduce fatalities. Potential sources of effectiveness data include 
FAA, academia, industry, and other aviation authorities.

Conclusions:

Although FAA and the aviation community are pursuing a number of 
advancements to enhance commercial airliners' cabin occupant safety and 
health, several factors have slowed their implementation. For example, 
for advancements that are currently available but are not yet 
implemented or installed, progress is slowed by the length of time it 
takes for FAA to complete its rule-making process, for the U.S and 
foreign countries to agree on the same requirements, and for the 
airlines to actually install the advancements after FAA has required 
them. In addition, FAA's multistep process for identifying potential 
cabin occupant safety and health research projects and allocating its 
limited research funding is hampered by the lack of autopsy and 
survivor information from airliner crashes and by the lack of cost and 
effectiveness analysis. Given the level of funding allocated to cabin 
occupant safety and health research, it is important for FAA to ensure 
that this funding is targeting the advancements that address the most 
critical needs and show the most promise for improving the safety and 
health of cabin occupants. However, because FAA lacks detailed autopsy 
and survivor information, it is hampered in its ability to identify the 
principal causes of death and survival in commercial airliner crashes. 
Without an agreement with the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) to receive detailed autopsy and survivor information, FAA lacks 
information that could be helpful in understanding the factors that 
contribute to surviving a crash. Furthermore, because FAA does not 
develop comparable estimates of cost and effectiveness of competing 
research projects, it cannot ensure that it is funding those 
technologies with the most promise of saving lives and reducing 
injuries. Such cost and effectiveness data would provide a valuable 
supplement to FAA's current process for setting research priorities and 
selecting projects for funding. To facilitate FAA's development of 
comparable cost data across advancements, we developed a cost analysis 
methodology that could be combined with a similar analysis of 
effectiveness to identify the most cost-effective projects. Using 
comparable cost and effectiveness data across the range of advancements 
would position the agency to choose more effectively between competing 
advancements, taking into account estimates of the number of injuries 
and fatalities that each advancement might prevent for the dollars 
invested. In turn, FAA would have more assurance that the level of 
funding allocated to this effort maximizes the safety and health of the 
traveling public and the cabin crew members who serve them.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To provide FAA decision makers with additional data for use in setting 
priorities for research on cabin occupant safety and health and in 
selecting competing research projects for funding, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to:

* initiate discussions with the National Transportation Safety Board in 
an effort to obtain the autopsy and survivor information needed to more 
fully understand the factors affecting survival in a commercial 
airliner crash and:

* supplement its current process by developing and using comparable 
estimates of cost and effectiveness for each cabin occupant safety and 
health advancement under consideration for research funding.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of 
Transportation for its review and comment. FAA generally agreed with 
the report's contents and its recommendations. The agency provided us 
with oral comments, primarily technical clarifications, which we have 
incorporated as appropriate.

:

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days 
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Transportation; 
the Administrator, FAA; and the Chairman, NTSB. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report is 
also available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://
www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov.

Contacts and staff acknowledgements for this report are included in 
appendix IX. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me 
or Glen Trochelman at (202) 512-2834:

Sincerely yours,


Gerald L. Dillingham 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:

Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

As requested by the Ranking Democratic Member, House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, we addressed the following 
questions: (1) What regulatory actions has the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) taken, and what key advancements are available or 
being developed by FAA and others to address safety and health issues 
faced by passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner 
cabins? (2) What factors, if any, slow the implementation of 
advancements in cabin occupant safety and health? In addition, as 
requested, we identified some factors affecting efforts by Canada and 
Europe to improve cabin occupant safety and health.

The scope of our report includes the cabins of large commercial 
aircraft (those that carry 30 or more passengers) operated by U.S. 
domestic commercial airlines and addresses the safety and health of 
passengers and flight attendants from the time they board the airliner 
until they disembark under normal operational conditions or emergency 
situations. This report identifies cabin occupant safety and health 
advancements (technological or operational improvements) that could be 
implemented, primarily through FAA's rule-making process. Such 
improvements include technological changes designed to increase the 
overall safety of commercial aviation as well as changes to enhance 
operational safety. The report does not include information on the 
flight decks of large commercial airliners or safety and health issues 
affecting flight deck crews (pilots and flight engineers), because they 
face some issues not faced by cabin occupants. It also does not address 
general aviation and corporate aircraft or aviation security issues, 
such as hijackings, sabotage, or terrorist activities.

To identify regulatory actions that FAA has taken to address safety and 
health issues faced by passengers and flight attendants in large 
commercial airliner cabins, we interviewed and collected documentation 
from U.S. federal agency officials on major safety and health efforts 
completed by FAA. The information we obtained included key dates and 
efforts related to cabin occupant safety and health, such as rule-
makings, airworthiness directives, and Advisory Circulars.

To identify key advancements that are available or are being developed 
by FAA and others to address safety and health issues faced by 
passengers and flight attendants in large commercial airliner cabins, 
we consulted experts (1) to help ensure that we had included the 
advancements holding the most promise for improving safety and health; 
and (2) to help us structure an evaluation of selected advancements 
(i.e., confirm that we had included the critical benefits and drawbacks 
of the potential advancements) and develop a descriptive analysis for 
them, where appropriate, including their benefits, costs, technology 
readiness levels, and regulatory status. In addition, we interviewed 
and obtained documentation from federal agency officials and other 
aviation safety experts at the Federal Aviation Administration 
(including its headquarters in Washington, D.C; Transport Airplane 
Directorate in Renton, Washington; William J. Hughes Technical Center 
in Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center/
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma); National 
Transportation Safety Board; National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA); Air Transport Association; Regional Airline 
Association; International Air Transport Association; Aerospace 
Industries Association; Aerospace Medical Association; Flight Safety 
Foundation, Association of Flight Attendants; Boeing Commercial 
Airplane Group; Airbus; Cranfield University, United Kingdom; 
University of Greenwich, United Kingdom; National Aerospace Laboratory, 
Netherlands; Joint Aviation Authorities, Netherlands; Civil Aviation, 
Netherlands; Civil Aviation Authority, United Kingdom; RGW Cherry and 
Associates; Air Accidents Investigations Branch, United Kingdom; 
Syndicat National du Personnel Navigant Commercial (French cabin crew 
union) and ITF Cabin Crew Committee, France; BEA (comparable to the 
U.S. NTSB), France; and the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile 
(DGAC), FAA's French counterpart.

To describe the status of key advancements that are available or under 
development, we used NASA's technology readiness levels (TRL). These 
levels form a system for ranking the maturity of particular 
technologies and are as follows:

* TRL 1: Basic principles observed and reported:

* TRL 2: Technology concept and/or application formulated:

* TRL 3: Analytical and experimental critical function and/or 
characteristic proof-of-concept developed:

* TRL 4: Component validation in laboratory environment:

* TRL 5: Component and/or validation in relevant environment:

* TRL 6: System or subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a 
relevant environment:

* TRL 7: System prototype demonstrated in a space environment:

* TRL 8: Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through test 
and demonstration:

* TRL 9: Actual system "flight proven" through successful mission 
operations:

To determine what factors, if any, slow the implementation of 
advancements in cabin occupant safety and health, we reviewed the 
relevant literature and interviewed and analyzed documentation from the 
U.S. federal officials cited above for the 18 key regulatory actions 
FAA has taken since 1984 to improve the safety and health of cabin 
occupants. We used this same approach to assess the regulatory status 
of the 28 advancements we reviewed that are either currently available, 
but not yet implemented or installed, or require further research to 
demonstrate their effectiveness or lower their costs. In identifying 28 
advancements, GAO is not suggesting that these are the only 
advancements being pursued; rather, these advancements have been 
recognized by aviation safety experts we contacted as offering promise 
for improving the safety and health of cabin occupants. To determine 
how long it generally takes for FAA to issue new rules, in addition to 
speaking with FAA officials, we relied on past GAO work and updated it, 
as necessary. In order to examine the effect of FAA and European 
efforts to harmonize their aviation safety requirements, we interviewed 
and analyzed documentation from aviation safety officials and other 
experts in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Furthermore, to 
examine the factors affecting airlines' ability to implement or install 
advancements after FAA requires them, we interviewed and analyzed 
documentation from aircraft manufacturers, ATA, and FAA officials.

In addition, to determine what factors slow implementation we examined 
FAA's processes for selecting research projects to improve cabin 
occupant safety and health. In examining whether FAA has sufficient 
data upon which to base its research priorities, we interviewed FAA and 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials about autopsy and 
survivor information from commercial airliner accidents. We also 
examined the use of cost and effectiveness data in FAA's research 
selection process for cabin occupant safety and health projects. To 
facilitate FAA's development of such cost estimates, we developed a 
cost analysis methodology to illustrate how the agency could do this. 
Specifically, we developed a cost analysis for inflatable lap belts to 
show how data on key cost variables could be obtained from a variety of 
sources. We selected lap belts because they were being used in limited 
situations and appeared to offer some measure of improved safety. 
Information on installation price, annual maintenance and refurbishment 
costs, and added weight of these belts was obtained from belt 
manufacturers. We obtained information from FAA and the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics on a number 
of cost variables, including historical jet fuel prices, the impact on 
jet fuel consumption of carrying additional weight, the average number 
of hours flown per year, the average number of seats per airplane, the 
number of airplanes in the U.S. fleet, and the number of passenger 
tickets issued per year. To account for variation in the values of 
these cost variables, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation.[Footnote 
15] In this simulation, values were randomly drawn 10,000 times from 
probability distributions characterizing possible values for the number 
of seat belts per airplane, seat installation price, jet fuel price, 
number of passenger tickets, number of airplanes, and hours flown. This 
simulation resulted in forecasts of the life-cycle cost per airplane, 
the annualized cost per airplane, and the cost per ticket. There is 
uncertainty in estimating the number of lives potentially saved and 
their value because accidents occur infrequently and unpredictably. 
Such estimates could be higher or lower, depending on the number and 
severity of accidents during a given analysis period and the value 
placed on a human life.

To identify factors affecting efforts by Canada and Europe to improve 
cabin occupant safety and health we interviewed and collected 
documentation from aviation safety experts in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe.

We provided segments of a draft of this report to selected external 
experts to help ensure its accuracy and completeness. These included 
the Air Transport Association, National Transportation Safety Board, 
Boeing, Airbus, and aviation authorities in the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada and the European Union. We incorporated their comments, as 
appropriate. The European Union did not provide comments.

We conducted our review from January 2002 through September 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Canada and Europe Cabin Occupant Safety and Health 
Responsibilities:

The United States, Canada, and members of the European Community are 
parties to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
established under the Chicago Convention of 1944, which sets minimum 
standards and recommended practices for civil aviation. In turn, 
individual nations implement aviation standards, including those for 
aviation safety. While ICAO's standards and practices are intended to 
keep aircraft, crews, and passengers safe, some also address 
environmental conditions in aircraft cabins that could affect the 
health of passengers and crews. For example, ICAO has standards for 
preventing the spread of disease and for spraying aircraft cabins with 
pesticides to remove disease-carrying insects.

Canada:

In Canada, FAA's counterpart for aviation regulations and oversight is 
Transport Canada Civil Aviation, which sets standards and regulations 
for the safe manufacture, operation, and maintenance of aircraft in 
Canada. In addition, Transport Canada Civil Aviation administers, 
enforces, and promotes the Aviation Occupational Health and Safety 
Program to help ensure the safety and health of crewmembers on board 
aircraft.[Footnote 16] The department also sets the training and 
licensing standards for aviation professionals in Canada, including air 
traffic controllers, pilots, and aircraft maintenance engineers. 
Transport Canada Civil Aviation has more than 800 inspectors working 
with Canadian airline operators, aircraft manufacturers, airport 
operators, and air navigation service providers to maintain the safety 
of Canada's aviation system. These inspectors monitor, inspect, and 
audit Canadian aviation companies to verify their compliance with 
Transport Canada's aviation regulations and standards for pilot 
licensing, aircraft certification, and aircraft operation.

To assess and recommend potential changes to Canada's aviation 
regulations and standards, the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory 
Council was established. This Council is a joint initiative between 
government and the aviation community. The Council supports regulatory 
meetings and technical working groups, which members of the aviation 
community can attend. A number of nongovernmental organizations--
including airline operators, aviation labor organizations, 
manufacturers, industry associations, and groups representing the 
public--are members.

The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada is similar to NTSB in 
the United States. TSB is a federal agency that operates independently 
of Transport Canada Civil Aviation. Its mandate is to advance safety in 
the areas of marine, pipeline, rail, and aviation transportation by:

* conducting independent investigations, including public inquiries 
when necessary, into selected transportation occurrences in order to 
make findings as to their causes and contributing factors;

* identifying safety deficiencies, as evidenced by transportation 
occurrences;

* making recommendations designed to reduce or eliminate any such 
deficiencies; and:

* reporting publicly on their investigations and findings.

Under its mandate to conduct investigations, TSB conducts safety-issue-
related investigations and studies. It also maintains a mandatory 
incident-reporting system for all modes of transportation. TSB and 
Transport Canada Civil Aviation use the statistics derived from this 
information to track potential safety concerns in Canada's 
transportation system.

TSB investigates aircraft accidents that occur in Canada or involve 
aircraft built there. Like NTSB, the Transportation Safety Board can 
recommend air safety improvements to Transport Canada Civil Aviation.

Europe:

Europe supplements the ICAO framework with the European Civil Aviation 
Conference, an informal forum through which 38 European countries 
formulate policy on civil aviation issues, including safety, but do not 
explicitly address passenger health issues. In addition, the European 
Union issues legislation concerning aviation safety, certification, and 
licensing requirements but has not adopted legislation specifically 
related to passenger health. One European directive requires that all 
member states assess and limit crewmembers' exposure to radiation from 
their flight duties and provide them with information on the effects of 
such radiation 
exposure. The European Commission[Footnote 17] is also providing flight 
crewmembers and other mobile workers with free health assessments prior 
to employment, with follow-up health assessments at regular intervals.

Another European supplement to the ICAO framework is the Joint Aviation 
Authorities (JAA), which represents the civil aviation regulatory 
authorities of a number of European states[Footnote 18] that have 
agreed to cooperate in developing and implementing common safety 
regulatory standards and procedures. JAA uses staff of these 
authorities to carry out its responsibilities for making, 
standardizing, and harmonizing aviation rules, including those for 
aviation safety, and for consolidating common standards among member 
counties. In addition, JAA is to cooperate with other regional 
organizations or national European state authorities to reach at least 
JAA's safety level and to foster the worldwide implementation of 
harmonized safety standards and requirements through the conclusion of 
international arrangements.

Membership in JAA is open to members of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference, which currently consists of 41 member countries. Currently, 
37 countries are members or candidate members of JAA. JAA is funded by 
national contributions; income from the sale of publications and 
training; and income from other sources, such as user charges and 
European Union grants. National contributions are based on indexes 
related to the size of each country's aviation industry. The "largest" 
countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) each pay around 16 
percent and the smallest around 0.6 percent of the total contribution 
income. For 2003, JAA's total budget was about 6.6 million euros.

In early 1998, JAA launched the Safety Strategy Initiative to develop a 
focused safety agenda to support the "continuous improvement of its 
effective safety system" and further reduce the annual number of 
accidents and fatalities regardless of the growth of air traffic. Two 
approaches are being used to develop the agenda:

* The "historic approach" is based on analyses of past accidents and 
has led to the identification of seven initial focus areas--controlled 
flight into terrain, approach and landing, loss of control, design 
related, weather, occupant safety and survivability, and runway safety.

* The "predictive approach" or "future hazards approach" is based on an 
identification of changes in the aviation system.

JAA is cooperating in this effort with FAA and other regulatory bodies 
to develop a worldwide safety agenda and avoid duplication of effort. 
FAA has taken the lead in the historic approach, and JAA has taken the 
lead in the future hazards approach.

JAA officials told us that they use a consensus-based process to 
develop rules for aviation safety, including cabin occupant safety and 
health-related issues. Reaching consensus among member states is time 
consuming, but the officials said the time invested was worthwhile. 
Besides making aviation-related decisions, JAA identifies and resolves 
differences in word meanings and subtleties across languages--an effort 
that is critical to reaching consensus. JAA does not have regulatory 
rule-making authority. Once the member states are in agreement, each 
member state's legislative authority must adopt the new requirements. 
Harmonizing new requirements with U.S. and other international aviation 
authorities further adds to the time required to implement new 
requirements.

According to JAA officials, they use expert judgment to identify and 
prioritize research and development efforts for aviation safety, 
including airliner cabin occupant safety and health issues, but JAA 
plans to move toward a more data-driven approach.[Footnote 19] While 
JAA has no funding of its own for research and development, it 
recommends research priorities to its member states. However, JAA 
officials told us that member states' research and development efforts 
are often driven by recent airliner accidents in the member states, 
rather than by JAA's priorities. The planned shift from expert judgment 
to a more data-driven approach will require more coordination of 
aviation research and development across Europe. For example, in 
January 2001, a stakeholder group formed by the European Commissioner 
for Research issued a planning document entitled European Aeronautics: 
A Vision for 2020, which, among other things, characterized European 
aeronautics as a cross-border industry, whose research strategy is 
shaped within national borders, leading to fragmentation rather than 
coherence. The document called for better decision-making and more 
efficient and effective research by the European Union, its member 
states, and aeronautics stakeholders. JAA officials concurred with this 
characterization of European aviation research and development.

Changes lie ahead for JAA and aviation safety in Europe. The European 
Union recently created a European Aviation Safety Agency, which will 
gradually assume responsibility for rule-making, certification, and 
standardization of the application of rules by the national aviation 
authorities. This organization will eventually absorb all of JAA's 
functions and activities. The full transition from JAA to the safety 
agency will take several years--per the regulation,[Footnote 20] the 
European Aviation Safety Agency must begin operations by September 28, 
2003, and transition to full operations by March 2007.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Summary of Key Actions FAA Has Taken to Improve Airliner 
Cabin Safety and Health Since 1984:

Key improvement areas: Impact.

Key improvement areas: Stronger (16g) passenger seats; Action taken: 
Impact: FAA required that seats for newly developed aircraft be 
subjected to more rigorous testing than was previously required. The 
tests subject seats to the forward, downward, and other directional 
movements that can occur in an accident. Likely injuries under various 
conditions are estimated by using instrumented crash test dummies; 
Purpose: Impact: To improve the crashworthiness of airplane seats and 
their ability to prevent or reduce the severity of head, back, and 
femur injuries; Status: Impact: This rule was published on May 17, 
1988, and became effective June 16, 1988. However, only the newest 
generation of airplanes is required to have fully tested and 
certificated 16g seats. FAA proposed a retrofit rule on October 4, 
2002, to phase in 16g seats fleetwide within 14 years after adoption of 
the final rule.

Key improvement areas: Overhead bins; Action taken: Impact: FAA issued 
an airworthiness directive requiring corrective action for overhead bin 
designs found not to meet the existing rules; Purpose: Impact: To 
improve the crashworthiness of some bins after failures were observed 
in a 1989 crash in Kegworth, England; Status: Impact: The 
airworthiness directive to improve bin connectors became effective 
November 20, 1992, and applied to Boeing 737 and 757 aircraft.

Key improvement areas: Fire.

Key improvement areas: More stringent flammability standards for 
interior materials; Action taken: Impact: In 1986, FAA upgraded the 
fire safety standards for cabin interior materials in transport 
airplanes, establishing a new test method to determine the heat release 
from materials exposed to radiant heat and set allowable criteria for 
heat release rates; Purpose: Impact: To give airliner cabin occupants 
more time to evacuate a burning airplane by limiting heat releases and 
smoke emissions when cabin interior materials are exposed to fire; 
Status: Impact: FAA required that all commercial aircraft produced 
after August 20, 1988, have panels that exhibit reduced heat releases 
and smoke emissions to delay the onset of flashover. Although there was 
no retrofit of the existing fleet, FAA is requiring that these improved 
materials be used whenever the cabin is substantially refurbished.

Key improvement areas: "Fire-blocking" seat cushions; Action taken: 
Impact: In 1984, FAA issued a regulation that enhanced flammability 
requirements for seat cushions; Purpose: Impact: To retard burning of 
cabin materials to increase evacuation time; Status: Impact: This rule 
applies to transport category aircraft after November 26, 1987.

Key improvement areas: Halon fire extinguishers; Action taken: Impact: 
In March 1985, FAA issued a rule requiring at least two Halon fire 
extinguishers on all commercial airliners, in addition to other 
required extinguishers; Purpose: Impact: To extinguish in-flight 
fires; Status: Impact: This rule became effective April 29, 1985, and 
required compliance by April 29, 1986.

Key improvement areas: Smoke detectors in lavatories; Action taken: 
Impact: In March 1985, FAA issued a rule requiring air carriers to 
install smoke detectors in lavatories within 18 months; Purpose: 
Impact: To identify and extinguish in-flight fires; Status: Impact: 
This rule became effective on April 29, 1985, and required compliance 
by October 29, 1986.

Key improvement areas: Fire extinguishers built in to lavatory waste 
receptacles; Action taken: Impact: In March 1985, FAA required air 
carriers to install automatic fire extinguishers in the waste paper 
bins in all aircraft lavatories; Purpose: Impact: To identify and 
extinguish prevent in-flight fires; Status: Impact: This rule became 
effective on April 29, 1985; This rule required compliance by April 
29, 1987.

Key improvement areas: Cargo compartment protection; Action taken: 
Impact: In 1986, FAA upgraded the airworthiness standards for ceiling 
and sidewall liner panels used in cargo compartments of transport 
category airplanes; Purpose: Impact: To improve fire safety in the 
cargo and baggage compartment of certain transport airplanes.[A]; 
Status: Impact: This rule required compliance on March 20, 1998.

Key improvement areas: Cargo compartment fire detection and 
suppression; Action taken: Impact: In 1998, FAA required air carriers 
to retrofit the U.S. passenger airliner fleet with fire detection and 
suppression systems in certain cargo compartments. This rule applied to 
over 3,400 airplanes in service and all newly manufactured airplanes; 
Purpose: Impact: To improve fire safety in the cargo and baggage 
compartment of certain transport airplanes.[A]; Status: Impact: This 
rule became effective March 19, 1998, requiring compliance on March 20, 
2001.

Key improvement areas: Evacuation.

Key improvement areas: Access to exits: Type III exits; Action taken: 
Impact: This rule requires improved access to the Type III emergency 
exits (typically smaller, overwing exits) by providing an unobstructed 
passageway to the exit. Transport aircraft with 60 or more passenger 
seats were required to comply with the new standards; Purpose: Impact: 
To help ensure that passengers have an unobstructed passageway to exits 
during an emergency; Status: Impact: This rule became effective June 
3, 1992, requiring changes to be made by December 3, 1992.

Key improvement areas: Public address system: independent power source; 
Action taken: Impact: This rule requires that the public address system 
be independently powered for at least 10 minutes and that at least 5 
minutes of that time is during announcements; Purpose: Impact: To 
eliminate reliance on engine or auxiliary-power-unit operation for 
emergency announcements; Status: Impact: This rule became effective 
November 27, 1989, for air carrier and air taxi airplanes manufactured 
on or after November 27, 1990.

Key improvement areas: Exit row seating; Action taken: Impact: This 
rule requires that persons seated next to emergency exits be physically 
and mentally capable of operating the exit and assisting other 
passengers in emergency evacuations; Purpose: Impact: To improve 
passenger evacuation in an emergency; Status: Impact: This rule became 
effective April 5, 1990, requiring compliance by October 5, 1990.

Key improvement areas: Location of passenger emergency exits; Action 
taken: Impact: Rule issued to limit the distance between adjacent 
emergency exits on transport airplanes to 60 feet; Purpose: Impact: To 
improve passenger evacuation in an emergency; Status: Impact: This 
rule became effective July 24, 1989, imposing requirements on airplanes 
manufactured after October 16, 1987.

Key improvement areas: Floor proximity emergency escape path marking; 
Action taken: Impact: Airplane emergency lighting systems must visually 
identify the emergency escape path and identify each exit from the 
escape path; Purpose: Impact: To improve passenger evacuation when 
smoke obscures overhead lighting; Status: Impact: This rule became 
effective November 26, 1984, requiring implementation for large 
transport airplanes by November 26, 1986.

Key improvement areas: Fire-resistant evacuation slides; Action taken: 
Impact: Emergency evacuation slides manufactured after December 3, 
1984, must be fire resistant and comply with new radiant heat testing 
procedures.[B]; Purpose: Impact: To improve passenger evacuation; 
Status: Impact: This technical standard became effective for all 
evacuation slides manufactured after December 3, 1984.

Key improvement areas: General safety and health.

Key improvement areas: Preparation for in-flight emergencies; Action 
taken: Impact: In 1986, FAA issued a rule requiring commercial airlines 
to carry emergency medical kits; Purpose: Impact: To improve air 
carriers' preparation for in-flight emergencies; Status: Impact: This 
rule became effective August 1, 1986, requiring compliance as of that 
date.

Key improvement areas: Ban on smoking for majority of domestic 
commercial flights; Action taken: Impact: In 1988 and 1989, the 
Congress passed legislation banning smoking on domestic flights of 
varying durations; Purpose: Impact: To limit the impact of poor cabin 
air quality on occupants' health; Status: Impact: These laws became 
effective in 1988, and 1990, respectively.

Key improvement areas: Prevention of in-flight injuries; Action taken: 
Impact: In June 1995, following two serious events involving 
turbulence, FAA issued a public advisory to airlines urging the use of 
seat belts at all times when passengers are seated but concluded that 
existing rules did not require strengthening; ; In May 2000, FAA 
instituted the Turbulence Happens public awareness campaign; Purpose: 
Impact: To prevent passenger injuries from turbulence by increasing 
public awareness of the importance of wearing seatbelts; Status: 
Impact: Information is currently posted on FAA's Web site.

Source: GAO presentation of FAA information.

[A] Technical Class C category cargo compartments are required to have 
built-in extinguishing systems to control fire in lieu of crewmember 
accessibility. Class D category cargo compartments are required to 
completely contain a fire without endangering the safety of the 
airplane occupants.

[B] Standard Order (TSO)-C69B (''Emergency Evacuation Slides, Ramps, 
Ramp/Slides, and Slide/Rafts'') prescribes minimum performance 
standards for emergency evacuation slides, ramps, ramp/slides, and 
slide/rafts, including standards for resistance to radiant heat 
sources.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Summaries of Potential Impact Safety Advancements:

This appendix presents information on the background and status of 
potential advancements in impact safety that we identified, including 
the following:

* retrofitting all commercial aircraft with more advanced seats,

* improving the ability of airplane floors to hold seats in an 
accident,

* preventing overhead luggage bins from becoming detached or opening,

* requiring child safety restraints for children under 40 pounds, and:

* installing lap belts with self-contained inflatable air 
bags.[Footnote 21]

Retrofitting All Commercial Aircraft with More Advanced Seats:

:

:

Background:

In commercial transport airplanes, the ability of a seat to protect a 
passenger from the forces of impact in an accident depends on reducing 
the forces of impact to levels that a person can withstand, either by 
spreading the impact over a larger part of the person's body or by 
decreasing the duration of the impact through the use of energy-
absorbing seats, an energy-absorbing fuselage and floors, or restraints 
such as seat belts or inflatable seat belt air bags adapted from 
automobile technology. In a 1996 study by R.G.W Cherry & Associates, 
enhancing occupant restraint was ranked as the second most important of 
33 potential ways to improve air crash survivability.[Footnote 22] 
Boeing officials noted that the industry generally agrees with this 
view but that FAA and the industry are at odds over the means of 
implementing these changes.

According to an aviation safety expert, seats and restraints should be 
considered as a system that involves:

* the seats themselves,

* seat restraints such as seat belts,

* seat connections to the floor,

* the spacing between seats, and:

* furnishings in the cabin area that occupants could strike in an 
accident.

To protect the occupant, a seat must not only absorb energy well but 
also stay attached to the floor of the aircraft. In other words, the 
"tie-down" chain must remain intact. Although aircraft seat systems are 
designed to withstand about 9 to 16 times the force of gravity, the 
limits of human tolerance to impact substantially exceed the aircraft 
and seat design limits. A number of seat and restraint devices have 
been shown in testing to improve survivability in aviation accidents. 
Several options are to retrofit the entire current fleet with fully 
tested 16g seats, use rearward-facing seats, require three-point auto-
style seat belts with shoulder harnesses, and install auto-style air 
bags.

FAA regulations require seats for newly certified airplane designs to 
pass more extensive tests than were previously required to protect 
occupants from impact forces of up to 16 times the force of normal 
gravity in the forward direction; seat certification standards include 
specific requirements to protect against head, spine, and leg injuries 
(see fig. 5).[Footnote 23] FAA first required 16g seats and tests for 
newly designed, certificated airplanes in 1988; new versions of 
existing designs were not required to carry 16g seats.[Footnote 24] 
Since 1988, however, in anticipation of a fleetwide retrofit rule, 
manufacturers have increasingly equipped new airplanes with "16g-
compatible" seats that have some of the characteristics of fully 
certified 16g seats.[Footnote 25] Certifying a narrow-body airplane 
type to full 16g seat certification standards can cost 
$250,000.[Footnote 26],[Footnote 27]

Figure 5: Coach Seating and Impact Position in Coach Seating:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In 1998 FAA estimated that 16g seats would avoid between about 210 to 
410 fatalities and 220 to 240 serious injuries over the 20-year period 
from 1999 through 2018. A 2000 study funded by FAA and the British 
Civil Aviation Authority estimated that if 16g seats had been installed 
in all airplanes that crashed from 1984 through 1998, between 23 to 51 
fewer U.S. fatalities and 18 to 54 fewer U.S. serious injuries would 
have occurred over the period. A number of accidents analyzed in that 
study showed no benefit from 16g seats because it was assumed that 16g 
seats would have detached from the floor, offering no additional 
benefits compared with older seats.[Footnote 28] Worldwide, the study 
estimated, about 333 fewer fatalities and 354 fewer serious injuries 
would have occurred during the period had the improved seats been 
installed. Moreover, if fire risks had been reduced, the estimated 
benefits of 16g seats might have increased dramatically, as more 
occupants who were assumed to survive the impact but die in the ensuing 
fire would then have survived both the impact and fire.[Footnote 29]

Status:

Seats that meet the 16g certification requirements are currently 
available and have been required on newly certificated aircraft designs 
since 1988. However, newly manufactured airplanes of older 
certification, such as Boeing 737s, 757s, or 767s, were not required to 
be equipped with 16g certified seats. Recently, FAA has negotiated with 
manufacturers to install full 16g seats on new versions of older 
designs, such as all newly produced 737s.[Footnote 30] In October 2002, 
FAA published a new proposal to create a timetable for all airplanes to 
carry fully certified 16g seats within 14 years.[Footnote 31] The 
comment period for the currently proposed rule ended in March 2003. 
Under this proposal, airframe manufacturers would have 4 years to begin 
installing 16g seats in newly manufactured aircraft only, and all 
airplanes would have to be equipped with full 16g seats within 14 years 
or when scheduled for normal seat replacement. FAA estimated that 
upgrading passenger and flight attendant seats to meet full 16g 
requirements would avert approximately 114 fatalities and 133 serious 
injuries over 20 years following the effective date of the rule. This 
includes 36 deaths that would be prevented by improvements to flight 
attendant seats that would permit attendants to survive the impact and 
to assist more passengers in an evacuation.

FAA estimated the costs to avert 114 fatalities and 133 serious 
injuries at $245 million in present-value terms, or $519 million in 
overall costs, which, according to FAA's analysis, would approximate 
the monetary benefits from the seats.[Footnote 32] FAA estimated that 
about 7.5 percent of airplane seats would have to be replaced before 
they would ordinarily be scheduled for replacement. FAA's October 2002 
proposal divides seats into three classes according to their 
approximate performance level. Although FAA does not know how many 
seats of each type seat are in service, it estimates that about 44 
percent of commercial-service aircraft are equipped with full 16g 
seats, 55 percent have 16g-compatible seats, and about 1 percent have 
9g seats. The 16g-compatible or partial 16g seats span a wide range of 
capabilities; some are nearly identical to full 16g seats but have been 
labeled as 16g-compatible to avoid more costly certification, and other 
partial 16g seats offer only minor improvements over the older 
generation of 9g seats. To determine whether these seats have the same 
performance characteristics as full 16g seats, it may be sufficient, in 
some cases, to review the company's certification paperwork; in other 
cases, however, full crash testing of actual 16g seats may be necessary 
to determine the level of protection provided.

FAA is currently considering the comments it received on its October 
2002 proposal. Industry comments raised concerns about general costs, 
the costs of retrofitting flight attendant seats, and the possibility 
that older airplanes designed for 9g seats might require structural 
changes to accommodate full 16g seats. One comment expressed the desire 
to give some credit for and "grandfather" in at least some partial 16g 
seats.

Improving the Ability of Airplane Floors to Hold Seats in an Accident:

:

:

:

Background:

In an accident, a passenger's chances of survival depend on how well 
the passenger cabin maintains "living space" and the passenger is "tied 
down" within that space. Many experts and reports have noted floor 
retention--the ability of the aircraft cabin floor to remain intact and 
hold the passenger's seat and restraint system during a crash--as 
critical to increasing the passenger's chances of survival. Floor 
design concepts developed during the late 1940s and 1950s form the 
basis for the cabin floors found in today's modern airplanes.

Accident investigations have documented failures of the floor system in 
crashes.[Footnote 33] New 16g seat requirements were developed in the 
1980s. 16g seats were intended to be retrofitted on aircraft with 
traditional 9g floors and were designed to maximize the capabilities of 
existing floor strength. While 16g seats might be strong, they could 
also be inflexible and thus fail if the floor deformed in a crash. 
Under the current 16g requirement, the seats must remain attached to a 
deformed seat track and floor structure representative of that used in 
the airplane.[Footnote 34] To meet these requirements, the seat was 
expected to permanently deform to absorb and limit impact forces even 
if the 16g test conditions were exceeded during a crash.

A major accident related to floor deformation occurred at Kegworth, 
England, in 1989. A Boeing 737-400 airplane flew into an embankment on 
approach to landing. In total, only 21 of the 52 triple seats--all 
"16g-compatible" --remained fully attached to the cabin floor; 14 of 
those that remained attached were in the area where the wing passes 
through the cabin and the area is stronger than other areas to support 
the wing.[Footnote 35] In this section of the airplane, the occupants 
generally survived, even though they were exposed to an estimated peak 
level of 26gs. The front part of the airplane was destroyed, including 
the floor; most of these seats separated from the airplane, killing or 
seriously injuring the occupants. An FAA expert noted that the impact 
was too severe for the airplane to maintain its structural integrity 
and that 16g seats were not designed for an accident of that severity. 
The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch noted that fewer 
injuries occurred in the accident than would probably have been the 
case with earlier-generation seats. However, the Branch also noted that 
"relatively minor engineering changes could significantly improve the 
resilience and toughness of cabin floors . . . and take fuller 
advantage of the improved passenger seats." The Branch reported that 
where failures occurred, it was generally the seat track along the 
floor that failed, and not the seat, and that the rear attachments 
generally remained engaged with the floor, "at least partially due to 
the articulated joint built into the rear attachment, an innovation 
largely stemming from the FAA dynamic test requirements." The Branch 
concluded that "seats designed to these dynamic requirements will 
certainly increase survivability" but "do not necessarily represent an 
optimum for the long term . . . if matched with cabin floors of 
improved strength and toughness."[Footnote 36]

Status:

Several reports have recommended structural improvements to floors. A 
case study of 11 major accidents for which detailed information was 
available found floor issues to be a major cause of injury or 
fatalities in 4 accidents and a minor cause in 1 accident. Another 
study estimated the past benefits of 16g seats in U.S. accidents 
between 1984 and 1998 and found no hypothetical benefit from 16g seats 
in a number of accidents because the floor was extensively disrupted 
during impact.[Footnote 37] In other words, unless the accidents had 
been less severe or the floor and seat tracks had been improved beyond 
the 9g standard on both new and old jets, newer 16g seats would not 
have offered additional benefits compared with the older seats that 
were actually on the airplane during the accidents under study.

A research program on seat and floor strength was recently conducted by 
the French civil aviation authority, the Direction Générale de 
l'Aviation Civile. Initial findings of the research program on seat-
floor attachments have not shown dramatic results and showed no rupture 
or plastic deformation of any cabin floor parts during a 16g test. 
However, French officials noted that they plan to perform additional 
tests with more rigid seats. Because many factors are involved it is 
difficult to identify the interrelated issues and interactions between 
seats and floors. A possible area for future research, according to 
French officials, is to examine dynamic floor warping during a crash to 
improve impact performance.

FAA officials said they have no plans to change floor strength 
requirements. FAA regulations require floors to meet impact forces 
likely to occur in "emergency landing conditions," or generally about 
9gs of longitudinal static force. According to several experts, 
stronger floors could improve the performance of 16g seats. In 
addition, further improvement in seats beyond the 16g standard would 
likely require improved floors.

Preventing Overhead Storage Bin Detachment to Protect Passengers in an 
Accident:


Background:

In an airplane crash, overhead luggage bins in the cabin sometimes 
detach from their mountings along the ceiling and sidewalls and can 
fall completely or allow pieces of luggage to fall on passengers' heads 
(See fig. 6.). While only a few cases have been reported in which the 
impact from dislodged overhead bins was the direct cause of a crash 
fatality or injury, a study for the British Civil Aviation Authority 
that attempted to identify the specific characteristics of each 
fatality in 42 fatal accidents estimated that the integrity of overhead 
bin stowage was the 17th most important of 32 factors used to predict 
passenger survivability.[Footnote 38] Maintaining the integrity of bins 
may also help speed evacuation after a crash.

Safer bins have been designed since bin problems were observed in a 
Boeing 737 accident in Kegworth, England, in 1989, when nearly all the 
bins failed and fell on passengers. FAA tested bins in response to that 
accident. The Kegworth bins were certified to the current FAA 9g 
longitudinal static loading standards, among others. When FAA 
subsequently conducted longitudinal dynamic loading tests on the types 
of Boeing bins involved, the bins failed. Several FAA experts said that 
the overhead bins on 737s had a design flaw. FAA then issued an 
airworthiness directive that called for modifying all bins on Boeing 
737 and 757 aircraft. The connectors for the bins were strengthened in 
accordance with the airworthiness directive, and the new bins passed 
FAA's tests.

The British Air Accidents Investigation Branch recommended in 1990 that 
the performance of both bins and latches be tested more rigorously, 
including the performance of bins "when subjected to dynamic crash 
pulses substantially beyond the static load factors currently 
required." NTSB has made similar recommendations.

Turbulence reportedly injures at least 15 U.S. cabin occupants a year, 
and possibly over 100. Most of these injuries are to flight attendants 
who are unrestrained. Some injuries are caused by luggage falling from 
bins that open in severe turbulence. Estimates of total U.S. airline 
injuries from bin-related falling luggage range from 1,200 to 4,500 
annually, most of which occur during cruising rather than during 
boarding or disembarking.[Footnote 39]

The study for the British Civil Aviation Authority noted above found 
that as many as 70 percent of impact-related accidents involve overhead 
bins that become detached. However, according to the report, bin 
detachment does not appear to be a major factor in occupants' survival 
and data are insufficient to support a specific determination about the 
mechanism of failure. FAA has conducted several longitudinal and drop 
tests since the Kegworth accident, including drops of airplane fuselage 
sections with overhead storage bins installed. A 1993 dynamic vertical 
drop test showed some varying bin performance problems at about 36gs of 
downward force. An FAA longitudinal test in 1999 tested two types of 
bins at 6g, at the 9g FAA certification requirement, and at the 16g 
level; in the 16g longitudinal test, one of the two bins broke free 
from its support mountings.

Status:

In addition to the requirement that they withstand forward 
(longitudinal) loads of slightly more than 9gs, luggage bins must meet 
other directional loading requirements.[Footnote 40] Bin standards are 
part of the general certification requirements for all onboard objects 
of mass. FAA officials said that overhead bins no longer present a 
problem, appear to function as designed, and meet standards. An FAA 
official told us that problems such as those identified at Kegworth 
have not appeared in later crashes. Another FAA official said that 
while Boeing has had some record of bin problems, the problems are 
occasional and quickly rectified through design changes. Boeing 
officials told us that the evidence that bins currently have latch 
problems is anecdotal.

Suggestions for making bins safer in an accident include adding 
features to absorb impact forces and keep bins attached and closed 
during structural deformation; using dynamic 16g longitudinal impact 
testing standards similar to those for seats; and storing baggage in 
alternative compartments in the main cabin, elsewhere in the aircraft, 
or under seats raised for that purpose.

Child Safety Seats:

:

Background:

Using a correctly-designed child safety seat that is strapped in an 
airplane seat offers protection to a child in an accident or turbulence 
(see fig. 6). By contrast, according to many experts, holding a child 
under two years old on an adult's lap, which is permitted, is unsafe 
for both the child and for other occupants who could be struck by the 
child in an accident. Requiring child safety seats for infants and 
small children on airplanes is one of NTSB's "most wanted" 
transportation safety improvements. The British Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch made similar recommendations, as did a 1997 White 
House Commission report on aviation.

Figure 6: Examples of Child Safety Seats:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

:

An FAA analysis of survivable accidents from 1978 through 1994 found 
that 9 deaths, 4 major injuries, and 8 minor injuries to children 
occurred. The analysis also found that the use of child safety seats 
would have prevented 5 deaths, all the major injuries, and 4 to 6 of 
the minor injuries. Child safety advocates have pointed to several 
survivable accidents in which children died--a 1994 Charlotte, North 
Carolina, crash; a 1990 Cove Neck, New York, accident; and a 1987 
Denver, Colorado, accident--as evidence of the need for regulation.

A 1992 FAA rule required airlines to allow child restraint systems, but 
FAA has opposed mandatory child safety seats on the basis of studies 
showing that requiring adults to pay for children's seats would induce 
more car travel, which the study said was more dangerous for children 
than airplane travel. One study published in 1995 by DOT estimated that 
if families were charged full fares for children's seats, 20 percent 
would choose other modes of transportation, resulting in a net increase 
of 82 deaths among children and adults over 10 years.

If child safety seats are required, airlines may require adults wishing 
to use child safety seats to purchase an extra seat for the child's 
safety seat. FAA officials told us that they could not require that the 
seat next to a parent be kept open for a nonpaying child. However, NTSB 
has testified that the scenarios for passengers taking other modes of 
transportation are flawed because FAA assumed that airlines would 
charge full fares for infants currently traveling free. NTSB noted in 
1996 that airlines would offer various discounts and free seats for 
infants in order to retain $6 billion in revenue that would otherwise 
be lost to auto travel. Airlines have already responded to parents who 
choose to use child restraint systems with scheduling flexibility, and 
many major airlines offer a 50 percent discount off any fare for a 
child under 2 to travel in an approved child safety seat. The 1995 DOT 
study, however, estimated that even if a child's seat on an airplane 
were discounted 75 percent, some families would still choose car travel 
and that the choice by those families to drive instead of fly would 
result in a net increase of 17 child and adult deaths over 10 years.

In FAA tests, some but not all commercially available automobile child 
restraint systems have provided adequate protection in tests simulating 
airplane accidents. Prices range from less than $100 for a child safety 
seat marketed for use in both automobiles and airplanes to as much as 
$1,300 for a child safety seat developed specifically for use in 
airplanes.

A drawback to having parents, rather than airlines, provide child 
safety seats for air travel is that some models may be more difficult 
to fit into airplane seat belts, making a proper fit more challenging. 
While the performance of standardized airline-provided seats may be 
better than that of varied FAA-certified auto-airplane seats, one 
airline said that providing seats could present logistical problems for 
them. However, Virgin Atlantic Airlines supplies its own specially 
developed seats and prohibits parents from using their own child seats. 
Because turbulence can be a more frequent danger to unrestrained 
children than accidents, one expert told us that a compromise solution 
might include allowing some type of alternative in-flight restraint.

Status:

Child safety seats are currently available for use on aircraft. The 
technical issues involved in designing and manufacturing safe seats for 
children to use in both cars and airplanes have largely been solved, 
according to FAA policy officials and FAA researchers. Federal 
regulations establish requirements for child safety seats designed for 
use in both highway vehicles and aircraft by children weighing up to 50 
pounds. FAA officials explained that regulations requiring child safety 
seats have been delayed, in part, because of public policy concerns 
that parents would drive rather than fly if they were required to buy 
seats for their children. On February 18, 1998, FAA asked for comments 
on an advanced notice of proposed rule-making to require the use of 
child safety seats for children under the age of 2. FAA sponsored a 
conference in December 1999 to examine child restraint systems. At that 
conference, the FAA Administrator said the agency would mandate child 
safety seats in aircraft and provide children with the same level of 
safety as adults. FAA officials told us that they are still considering 
requiring the use of child safety seats but have not made a final 
decision to do so. If FAA does decide to provide "one level of safety" 
for adults and children, as NTSB advocates, parents may opt to drive to 
their destinations to avoid higher travel costs, thereby statistically 
exposing themselves and their children to more danger. In addition, FAA 
will have to decide whether the parents or airlines will provide the 
seats.

If FAA decides to require child safety seats, it will need to harmonize 
its requirements with those of other countries where requirements 
differ, as the regulations on child restraint systems vary. In Canada, 
as in the United States, child safety seats are not mandatory on 
registered aircraft. In Europe, the regulations vary from country to 
country, but no country requires their use. Australia's policy permits 
belly belts but discourages their use. An Australian official said in 
1999 that Australia was waiting for the United States to develop a 
policy in this area and would probably follow that policy.

Inflatable Lap Belt Air Bags:

:

Background:

Lap belts with inflatable air bags are designed to reduce the injuries 
or death that may result when a passenger's head strikes the airplane 
interior. These inflatable seat belts adapt advanced automobile air bag 
technology to airplane seats in the form of seat belts with embedded 
air bags. If a passenger loses consciousness because of a head injury 
in an accident, even a minor, nonfatal concussion can cause death if 
the airplane is burning and the passenger cannot evacuate quickly. 
Slowing the duration of the impact with an air bag lessens its 
lethality. According to a manufacturer's tests using airplane seats on 
crash sleds, lap belts with air bags can likely reduce some impact 
injuries to survivable levels.[Footnote 41]

FAA does not require seats to be tested in sled tests for head impact 
protection when there would be "no impact" with another seat row or 
bulkhead wall, such as when spacing is increased to 42 inches from the 
more typical 35 inches. While more closely spaced economy class seat 
rows can provide head impact protection through energy-absorbing seat 
backs, seats in no impact positions have tested poorly in head injury 
experiments, resulting in severe head strikes against the occupants' 
legs or the floor, according to the manufacturer. This no impact 
exemption from FAA's head injury criteria can include exit rows, 
business class seats, and seats behind bulkhead walls and could permit 
as many as 30 percent of seats in some airplanes to be exempt from the 
head impact safety criteria that row-to-row seats must meet.

Status:

According to the manufacturer, 13 airlines have installed about 1,000 
of the devices in commercial airliners, mainly at bulkhead seats; about 
200 of these are installed in the U.S. fleet. All of the orders and 
installations so far have been done to meet FAA's seat safety 
regulations rather than for marketing reasons, according to the 
manufacturer.

The airlines would appear to benefit from using the devices in bulkhead 
seats if that would allow them to install additional rows of seats. 
While the amount of additional revenue would depend on the airplane 
design and class of seating, two additional seats may produce more net 
revenue per year than the cost for the devices to be installed 
throughout an aircraft.[Footnote 42] Economic constraints are 
acquisition costs, maintenance costs, and increased fuel costs due to 
weight. The units currently weigh about 3 pounds per seat, or 2 pounds 
more than current seat belts. According to the manufacturer, the air 
bag lap belts currently cost $950 to $1,100, including maintenance. The 
manufacturer estimated that if 5 percent of all U.S. seat positions 
were equipped with the devices (about 50,000 seats per year), the cost 
would drop to about $300 to $600 per seat, including 
installation.[Footnote 43]

Lap belt air bags have been commercially available for only a few 
years. FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute assisted the developers 
of the devices; manufacturers for both passenger and military use 
(primarily helicopter) are conducting ongoing research. FAA and other 
regulatory bodies have no plans to require their installation, but 
airlines are allowed to use them. The extent to which these devices are 
installed will depend on each airline's analysis of the cost and 
benefits.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Summaries of Potential Fire Safety Advancements:

This appendix presents information on the background and status of 
potential advancements in fire safety that we identified, including the 
following:

* preventing fuel tank explosions with fuel tank inerting;

* preventing in-flight fires with arc fault circuit breakers;

* identifying in-flight fires with multisensor fire and smoke 
detectors;

* suppressing in-flight and postcrash fires by using water mist fire 
suppression systems;

* mitigating postcrash damage and injury by using less flammable fuels;

* mitigating in-flight and postcrash fires by using fire-resistant 
thermal acoustic insulation;

* mitigating fire-related deaths and injuries by using ultra-fire-
resistant polymers; and:

* mitigating fire deaths and injuries with sufficient airport rescue 
and fire fighting.

Fuel Tank Inerting:

:

Background:

Fuel tank inerting involves pumping nitrogen-enriched air into an 
airliner's fuel tanks to reduce the concentration of oxygen to a level 
that will not support combustion. Nitrogen gas makes a fuel tank safer 
by serving as a fire suppressant. The process can be performed with 
both ground-based and onboard systems, and it significantly reduces the 
flammability of the center wing tanks, thereby lowering the likelihood 
of a fuel tank explosion.

Following the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, in which 230 people 
died, NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was an 
explosion in the center wing fuel tank. The explosion resulted from the 
ignition of flammable fuel vapors in this tank, which is located in the 
fuselage in the space between the wing junctions. NTSB subsequently 
placed the improvement of fuel tank design on its list of "Most Wanted 
Safety Improvements" and recommended that fuel tank inerting be 
considered an option to eliminate the likelihood of fuel tank 
explosions.

FAA issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88[Footnote 44] to 
eliminate or minimize the likelihood of ignition sources by revisiting 
the fuel tank's design. Issued in 2001, the regulation consists of a 
series of FAA regulatory actions aimed at preventing the failure of 
fuel pumps and pump motors, fuel gauges, and electrical power wires 
inside these fuel tanks. In late 2002, FAA amended the regulation to 
allow for an "equivalent level of safety" and the use of inerting as 
part of an alternate means of compliance.

In a 2001 report, an Aviation Rule-making Advisory Committee tasked 
with evaluating the benefits of inerting the center wing fuel tank 
estimated these benefits in terms of lives saved. After projecting 
possible in-flight and ground fuel tank explosions and postcrash fires 
from 2005 through 2020, the committee estimated that 132 lives might be 
saved from a ground-based system and 253 lives might be saved from an 
onboard system.[Footnote 45]

Status:

Neither of the two major types of fuel tank inerting--ground-based and 
onboard--is currently available for use on commercial airliners because 
additional development is needed.[Footnote 46] Both types offer 
benefits and drawbacks.

* A ground-based system sends a small amount of nitrogen into the 
center wing tank before departure. Its benefits include that (1) it 
requires no new technology development for installation, (2) the tank 
can be inerted in 20 minutes, and (3) it carries a lesser weight 
penalty. Its drawbacks include that it is unable to inert for descent, 
landing, and taxiing to the destination gate, and nitrogen supply 
systems are needed at each terminal gate and remote parking area at 
every airport.

* An onboard system generates nitrogen by transferring some of the 
engine bleed air - air extracted from the jet engines to supply the 
cabin pressurization system in normal flight--through a module that 
separates air into oxygen and nitrogen and discharges the nitrogen 
enriched air into the fuel tank. Its benefits include that (1) it is 
self-reliant and (2) it significantly reduces an airplane's 
vulnerability to lightning, static electricity, and incendiary 
projectiles throughout the flight's duration.[Footnote 47] Its 
drawbacks include that it (1) weighs more, (2) increases the aircraft's 
operating costs, and (3) may decrease the aircraft's 
reliability.[Footnote 48]

According to FAA, its fire safety experts' efforts to develop a 
lighter-weight system for center wing tank inerting have significantly 
increased the industry's involvement. Boeing and Airbus are working on 
programs to test inerting systems in flight. For example, Boeing has 
recently completed a flight test program with a prototype system on a 
747.

None of the U.S. commercial fleet is equipped with either ground-based 
or onboard inerting systems, though onboard systems are in use in U.S. 
and European military aircraft. Companies working in this field are 
focused on developing new inerting technologies or modifying existing 
ones. A European consortium is developing a system that combines 
onboard center wing fuel tank inerting with sensors and a water-mist-
plus-nitrogen fire suppression system for commercial airplanes.

In late 2002, FAA researchers successfully ground-tested a prototype 
onboard inerting system using current technology on a Boeing 747SP. New 
research also enabled the agency to ease a design requirement, making 
the inerting technology more cost-effective. This new research showed 
that reducing the oxygen level in the fuel tank to 12 percent--rather 
than 9 percent, as was previously thought--is sufficient to prevent 
fuel tank explosions in civilian aircraft.[Footnote 49] FAA also 
developed a system that did not need the compressors that some had 
considered necessary. Together, these findings allowed for reductions 
in the size and power demands of the system.

FAA plans to focus further development on the more practical and cost-
effective onboard fuel tank inerting systems. For example, to further 
improve their cost-effectiveness, the systems could be designed both to 
suppress in-flight cargo fires, thereby allowing them to replace Halon 
extinguishing agents, and to generate oxygen for emergency 
depressurizations, thereby allowing them to replace stored oxygen or 
chemical oxygen generators.

NASA is also conducting longer-term research on advanced technology 
onboard inert gas-generating systems and onboard oxygen-generating 
systems. Its research is intended (1) to develop the technology to 
improve its efficiency, weight, and reliability and (2) to make the 
technology practical for commercial air transport. NASA will fund the 
development of emerging technologies for ground-based technology 
demonstration in fiscal year 2004. NASA is also considering the 
extension of civilian transport inerting technology to all fuel tanks 
to help protect airplanes against terrorist acts during approaches and 
departures.

The cost of the system, its corresponding weight, and its unknown 
reliability are the most significant factors affecting the potential 
use of center wing fuel tank inerting. New cost and weight estimates 
are anticipated in 2003.

* In 2001, FAA estimated total costs to equip the worldwide fleet at 
$9.9 billion for ground-based, and $20.8 billion for onboard, inerting 
systems.[Footnote 50]

* In 2002, FAA officials developed an onboard system for B-747 flight-
testing. The estimated cost was $460,000. The officials estimated that 
each system after that would cost about $200,000. The weight of the FAA 
prototype system is 160 pounds.[Footnote 51] A year earlier, NASA 
estimated the weight for a B-777 system with technology in use in 
military aircraft at about 550 pounds.[Footnote 52]

Arc Fault Circuit Breaker:

:

Background:

Arcing faults in wiring may provide an ignition source that can start 
fires. Electrical wiring that is sufficiently damaged might cause 
arcing or direct shorting resulting in smoking, overheating, or 
ignition of neighboring materials. A review of data produced by FAA, 
the Airline Pilots Association, and Boeing showed that electrical 
systems have been a factor in approximately 50 percent of all aircraft 
occurrences involving smoke or fire and that wiring has been implicated 
in about 10 percent of those occurrences. In addition, faulty or 
malfunctioning wiring has been a factor in at least 15 accidents or 
incidents investigated by NTSB since 1983. Properly selecting, routing, 
clamping, tying, replacing, marking, separating, and cleaning around 
wiring areas and proper maintenance all help mitigate the potential for 
wire system failures, such as arcing, that could lead to smoke, fire 
and loss of function. Chemical degradation, age induced cracking, and 
damage due to maintenance may all create a scenario which could lead to 
arcing. Arcing can occur between a wire and structure or between 
different wire types. Wire chafing is a sign of degradation; chafing 
happens when the insulation around one wire rubs against a component 
tougher than itself (such as structure or control cable) exposing the 
wire conductor. This condition can lead to arcing. When arcing wires 
are too close to flammable materials or are flammable themselves, fires 
can occur.

In general, wiring and wiring insulation degrade for a variety of 
reasons, including age, inadequate maintenance, chemical 
contamination, improper installation or repair, and mechanical damage. 
Vibration, moisture, and heat can contribute to and accelerate 
degradation. Consequences of wire systems failures include loss of 
function, smoke, and fire. Since most wiring is bundled and located in 
hidden or inaccessible areas, it is difficult to monitor the health of 
an aircraft's wiring system during scheduled maintenance using existing 
equipment and procedures. Failure occurrences have been documented in 
wiring running to the fuel tank, in the electronics equipment 
compartment, in the cockpit, in the ceiling of the cabin, and in other 
locations.

To address the concerns with arcing, arc fault circuit breakers for 
aircraft use are being developed. The arc fault circuit breaker cuts 
power off as it senses a wire beginning to arc. It is intended to 
prevent significant damage before a failure develops into a full-blown 
arc, which can produce extremely localized heat, char insulation, and 
generally create problems in the wire bundles. Arc fault circuit 
protection devices would mitigate arcing events, but will not identify 
the wire breaches and degradation that typically lead up to these 
events.

Status:

FAA, the Navy, and the Air Force are jointly developing arc fault 
circuit breaker technology. Boeing is also developing a monitoring 
system to detect the status of and changes in wiring; and power shuts 
down when arcing is detected. This system may be able to protect wiring 
against both electrical overheating and arcing and is considered more 
advanced than the government's circuit breaker technology.

FAA developed a plan called the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for 
Airplane Systems to address wiring problems, which includes development 
of arc fault circuit breaker technology and installation guidance along 
with proposals of new regulations. The plan provides means for 
enhancing safety in the areas of wire system design, certification, 
maintenance, research and development, reporting, and information 
sharing and outreach. FAA also tasked an Aging Transport Systems Rule-
making Advisory Committee to provide data, recommendations, and 
evaluation specifically on aging wiring systems. The new regulations 
being considered are entitled the Enhanced Airworthiness Program for 
Airplane Systems Rule and are expected by late-2005. Under this rule-
making package, inspections would evaluate the health of wiring and all 
of its components for operation, such as connectors and clamps. Part of 
the system includes visual inspections of all wiring within arm's 
reach, enhanced by the use of hand-held mirrors. This improvement is 
expected to catch more wiring flaws than current visual inspection 
practices. Where visual inspections can not be assumed to detect 
damage, detailed inspections will be required. The logic process to 
establish proper inspections is called the Enhanced Zonal Analysis 
Procedure, which will be issued as an Advisory Circular. This procedure 
is specifically directed towards enhancing the maintenance programs for 
aircraft whose current program does not include tasks derived from a 
process that specifically considers wiring in all zones as the 
potential source of ignition of a fire.

Additional development and testing will be required before advanced arc 
fault circuit breakers will be available for use on aircraft. The FAA 
currently is in the midst of a prototype program where arc fault 
circuit breakers are installed in an anticollision light system on a 
major air carrier's Boeing 737. The FAA and the Navy are currently 
analyzing tests of the circuit breakers to assess their reliability. 
The Society of Automotive Engineers is in the final stages of 
developing a Minimum Operating Performance Specification for the arc 
fault circuit breaker.

Multisensor Detectors:

:

Background:

Multisensor detectors, or "electronic noses," could combine one or more 
standard smoke detector technologies; a variety of sensors for 
detecting such gases as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, or 
hydrocarbon; and a thermal sensor to more accurately detect and locate 
overheated or burning materials. The sensors could improve existing 
fire detection by discovering and locating potential or actual fires 
sooner and reducing the incidence of false alarms. These "smart" 
sensors would ignore the "nuisance sources":

:

such as dirt, dust, and condensation that are often responsible for 
triggering false alarms in existing systems.[Footnote 53]

According to studies by FAA and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, many current smoke and fire detection systems are not 
reliable. A 2000 FAA study indicated that cargo compartment detection 
systems, for example, resulted in at least one false alarm per week 
from 1988 through 1990 and a 200:1 ratio of false alarms to actual 
fires in the cargo compartment from 1995 through 1999. [Footnote 54] 
FAA has since estimated a 100:1 cargo compartment false alarm ratio, 
partly because reported actual incidents have increased According to 
FAA's Service Difficulty Report database,[Footnote 55] about 990 actual 
smoke and fire events were reported for 2001.[Footnote 56]

Multisensor detectors could be wired or wireless and linked to a 
suppression system. One or several sensor signals or indicators could 
cause the crew to activate fire extinguishers in a small area or zone, 
a larger area, or an entire compartment, resulting in a more 
appropriate and accurate use of the fire suppressant. For example, in 
areas such as the avionics compartment, materials that can burn are 
relatively well-defined. Multisensor detectors the size of a postage 
stamp could be designed to detect smoldering fires in cables or 
insulation or in overheated equipment in that area. Placing the 
detectors elsewhere in the airplane could improve the crew's ability to 
respond to smoke or fire, including occurrences in hidden or 
inaccessible areas.

Improved sensor detection technologies would both enhance safety by 
increasing crews' confidence in the reliability of alarms and reduce 
costs by avoiding the need to divert aircraft in response to false 
alarms. One study estimated the average cost of a diversion at $50,000 
for a wide-body airplane and $30,000 for a narrow-body airplane. A 
diversion can also present safety concerns because of the possible 
increased risk of an accident and injuries to passengers and crew if 
there is (1) an emergency evacuation, (2) a landing at an unfamiliar 
airport, (3) a change to air traffic patterns, (4) a shorter runway, 
(5) inferior fire-fighting capability, (6) a loss of cargo load, or (7) 
inferior navigation aids. In 2002, 258 unscheduled landings due to 
smoke, fire, or fumes occurred. In addition, 342 flights were 
interrupted; some of these flights had to return to the gate or abort a 
takeoff.

FAA established basic detector performance requirements in 1965 and 
1980. Detectors were to be made and installed in a manner that ensured 
their ability to resist, without failure, all vibration, inertia, and 
other loads to which they might normally be subjected; they also had to 
be unaffected by exposure to fumes, oil, water, or other fluids. 
Regulations in 1986 and 1998 further defined basic location and 
performance requirements for detectors in different areas of the cargo 
compartment. In 1998, FAA issued a requirement for detection and 
extinguishment systems for one class of cargo compartments, which 
relied on oxygen starvation to control fires. This requirement 
significantly increased the number of detectors in use.

Status:

Multisenor detectors are not currently available because additional 
research is needed. Although they have been demonstrated in the 
laboratory and on the ground, they have not been flight-tested. FAA and 
NASA have multisensor detector research and development efforts under 
way and are working to develop "smart" sensors and criteria for their 
approval. FAA will also finish revising an Advisory Circular that 
establishes test criteria for detection systems, designed to ensure 
that they respond to fires, but not to nonfire sources. In addition, 
several companies currently market "smart" detectors, mostly for 
nonaviation applications. For example, thermal detection systems sense 
and count certain particles that initially boil off the surface of 
smoldering or burning material.

A European consortium has been developing a system, FIREDETEX, that 
combines the use of multisensor detectors, onboard fuel tank inerting, 
and water-mist-plus-nitrogen fire suppression systems for commercial 
airplanes. This program and associated studies are still ongoing and 
flight testing is planned for the last quarter of calendar year 2003. 
The results of tests on this system are expected to be made public in 
early 2004, and will help to clarify the possible costs, benefits, and 
drawbacks of the combined system.

Additional research, development, and testing will be required before 
multisensor technology is ready for use in commercial aviation. NASA, 
FAA, and private companies are pursuing various approaches. Some 
experts believe that some forms of multisensor technology could be in 
use in 5 years. When these units become available, questions may arise 
about where their use will be required. For example, the Canadian 
Transportation Safety Board has recommended that some areas in addition 
to those currently designated as fire zones may need to be equipped 
with detectors.[Footnote 57] These include the electronics and 
equipment bay (typically below the floor beneath the cockpit and in 
front of the passenger cabin), areas behind interior wall panels in the 
cockpit and cabin areas, and areas behind circuit breaker and other 
electronic panels.

Water Mist Fire Suppression:

:

Background:

For over two decades, the aviation industry has evaluated the use of 
systems that spray water mist to suppress fires in airliner cabins, 
cargo compartments, and engine casings (see fig. 7). This effort was 
prompted, in part, by a need to identify an alternative to Halon, the 
primary chemical used to extinguish fires aboard airliners. With few 
exceptions, Halon is the sole fire suppressant installed in today's 
aircraft fire suppression systems. However, the production of Halon was 
banned under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, and its use in many noncritical sectors has been phased 
out. Significant reserves of Halon remain, and its use is still allowed 
in certain "critical use" applications, such as aerospace,[Footnote 58] 
because no immediate viable replacement agent exists. To enable the 
testing and further development of suitable alternatives to and 
substitutes for Halon, FAA has drafted detailed standards for 
replacements in the cargo and engine compartments. These standards 
typically require replacement systems to provide the same level of 
safety as the currently used Halon extinguishing system.

Figure 7: Water Mist Nozzle and Possible Placement:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

According to FAA and others in the aviation industry, successful water 
mist systems could provide benefits against an in-flight or postcrash 
fire, including:

* cooling the passengers, cabin surfaces, furnishings and overall cabin 
temperatures;

* decreasing toxic smoke and irritant gases; and:

* delaying or preventing "flashover" fires from occurring.[Footnote 59]

In addition, a 1996 study prepared for the British Civil Aviation 
Authority examined 42 accidents and 32 survivability factors and found 
that cabin water spray was the factor that showed the greatest 
potential for reducing fatality and injury rates.[Footnote 60] In the 
early 1990s, a joint FAA and Civil Aviation Authority study found that 
cabin water mist systems would be highly effective in improving 
survivability during a postcrash fire.[Footnote 61] However, the cost 
of using these systems outweighed the benefits, largely because of the 
weight of the water that airliners would be required to carry to 
operate them. In the mid-and late-1990s, FAA and others began examining 
water mist systems in airliner cargo compartments to help offset the 
cost of a cabin water mist system because the water could be used or 
shared by both the cargo compartment and the cabin. European and U.S. 
researchers also designed systems that required much less water because 
they targeted specific zones within an aircraft to suppress fires 
rather than spraying water throughout the cabin or the cargo 
compartment.

In 2000, Navy researchers found a twin-fluid system to be highly 
reliable and maintenance-free.[Footnote 62] Moreover, this system's 
delivery nozzles could be installed without otherwise changing cabin 
interiors. The Navy researchers' report recommended that FAA and NTSB 
perform follow-up testing leading to the final design and certification 
of an interior water mist fire suppression system for all passenger and 
cargo transport aircraft. Also in 2000, a European consortium began a 
collaborative research project 
called FIREDETEX, which combines multisensor fire detectors, water 
mist, and onboard fuel tank inerting into one fire detection and 
suppression system.[Footnote 63]

In 2001 and 2002, FAA tested experimental mist systems to determine 
what could meet its preliminary minimum performance standards for cargo 
compartment suppression systems. A system that combines water mist with 
nitrogen met these minimum standards. In this system, water and 
nitrogen "knock down" the initial fire, and nitrogen suppresses any 
deep-seated residual fire by inerting the entire compartment.[Footnote 
64] In cargo compartment testing, this system maintained cooler 
temperatures than had either a plain water mist system or a Halon-based 
system.

Status:

Additional research and testing are needed before water mist technology 
can be considered for commercial aircraft. For example, the weight and 
relative effectiveness of any water mist system would need to be 
considered and evaluated. In addition, before it could be used in 
aircraft, the consequences of using water will need to be further 
evaluated. For example, Boeing officials noted that using a water mist 
fire suppression system in the cabin in a post crash fire might 
actually reduce passenger safety if the mist or fog creates confusion 
among the passengers, leading to longer evacuation times. Further, of 
concern is the possible shorting of electrical wiring and equipment and 
damage to aircraft interiors (e.g., seats, entertainment equipment, and 
insulation). Water cleanup could also be difficult and require special 
drying equipment.

Fire-Safe Fuels:

:

Background:

Burning fuel typically dominates and often overwhelms postcrash fire 
scenarios and causes even the most fire-resistant materials to 
burn.[Footnote 65] Fuel spilled from tanks ruptured upon crash impact 
often forms an easily ignitable fuel-air mixture. A more frequent fuel-
related problem is the fuel tank explosion, in which a volatile fuel-
air mixture inside the fuel tank is ignited, often by an unknown 
source. For example, it is believed that fuel tank explosions destroyed 
a Philippines Air 737 in 1990, TWA Flight 800 in 1996, and a Thai Air 
737 in 2001. Therefore, reducing the flammability of fuel could improve 
survivability in postcrash fires as well as reduce the occurrence of 
fuel tank explosions.

Reducing fuel flammability involves limiting the volatility[Footnote 
66] of fuel and the rate at which it vaporizes.[Footnote 67] Liquid 
fuel can burn only when enough fuel vapor is mixed with air. If the 
fuel cannot vaporize, a fire cannot occur. This principle is behind the 
development of higher-flashpoint fuel, whose use can decrease the 
likelihood of a fuel tank explosion. The flash point is the lowest 
temperature at which a liquid fuel produces enough vapor to ignite in 
the presence of a source of ignition--the lower the flash point, the 
greater the risk of fire. If the fuel is volatile enough, however, and 
air is sucked into the fuel tank area upon crash impact, limiting the 
fuel's vaporization can prevent a burnable mixture from forming. This 
principle supports the use of additives that modify the viscosity of 
fuel to limit postcrash fires; for example, antimisting kerosene 
contains such additives. According to FAA and NASA, however, these 
additives do nothing to prevent fuel tank explosions.

From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, FAA conducted research on fuel 
safety. The Aviation Safety Act of 1988 required that FAA undertake 
research on low-flammability aircraft fuels, and, in 1993, FAA 
developed plans for fuel safety research. In 1996, a National Research 
Council experts' workshop on aviation fuel summarized existing fuel 
safety research efforts. The participants concluded that although 
postcrash fuel-fed aircraft fires had been researched, limited progress 
had been achieved and little work had been published.

As part of FAA's research, fuels have been modified with thickening 
polymer additives to slow down vaporization in crashes. Participants in 
the 1996 National Research Council workshop identified several long-
term research goals for consideration in developing modified fuels and 
fuel additives to improve fire safety. They also agreed that a 
combination of effective fire-safe fuel additives could probably be 
either selected or designed, provided that fuel performance 
requirements were identified in advance. In addition, they agreed that 
existing aircraft designs that reduce the chance of fuel igniting do 
not present major barriers to the implementation of a fire-safe fuel.

A 1996 European Transport Safety Council report suggested that 
antimisting kerosene be at least partially tested on regular military 
transport flights (e.g., in one tank, feeding one engine) to 
demonstrate its operational compatibility. The report also recommended 
the consideration of a study comparing the costs of the current 
principal commercial fuel and the special, higher-flashpoint fuel used 
by the Navy. According to NASA and FAA fire-safe fuels experts, 
military fuel is much harder to burn in storage or to ignite in a pan 
because of its lower volatility; however, it is just as flammable as 
aviation fuel when it is sprayed into an engine combustor.

Status:

Fire-safe fuels are not currently available and are in the early stages 
of research and development. In January 2002, NASA opened a fire-safe 
fuels research branch at its Glenn Research Center in Ohio. NASA-Glenn 
is conducting aviation fuel research that evaluates fuel vapor 
flammability in conjunction with FAA's fuel tank inerting program, 
including the measurement of fuel "flash points." NASA is examining the 
effects of 
surfactants, gelling agents, and chemical composition changes on the 
vaporization and pressure characteristics of jet fuel.[Footnote 68]

In addition to FAA's and NASA's research, some university and industry 
researchers have made progress in developing fire-safe fuels. Many use 
advanced analytical, computational modeling technologies to inform 
their research. A council of producers and users of fuels is also 
coordinating research on ways to use such fuels. NASA fuel experts 
remain optimistic that small changes in fuel technologies can have a 
big impact on fuel safety.

Developing fire-safe fuels will require much more research and testing. 
There are significant technical difficulties associated with creating a 
fuel that meets aviation requirements while meaningfully decreasing the 
flammability of the fuel.

Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials:

:

Background:

To keep an airplane quieter and warmer, a layer of thermal acoustic 
insulation material is connected to paneling and walls throughout the 
aircraft. This insulation, if properly designed, can also prevent or 
limit the spread of an in-flight fire. In addition, thermal acoustic 
insulation provides a barrier against a fire burning through the cabin 
from outside the airplane's fuselage (See fig. 8.). Such a fire, often 
called a postcrash fire, may occur when fuel is spilled on the ground 
after a crash or an impact.

Figure 8: Fire Insulation Blankets:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

While this thermal acoustic insulation material could help prevent the 
spread of fire, some of the insulation materials that have been used in 
the past have contributed to fires. For example, FAA indicated that an 
insulation material, called metallized Mylar®, contributed to at least 
six in-flight fires. Airlines have stopped using this material and are 
removing it from existing aircraft.

FAA's two main efforts in this area are directed toward preventing 
fatal in-flight fire and improving postcrash fire survivability.

* Since 1998, FAA has been developing test standards for preventing in-
flight fires in response to findings that fire spread on some thermal 
acoustic insulation blanket materials. In 2000, FAA issued a notice of 
proposed rule-making that outlined new flammability test criteria for 
in-flight fires. FAA's in-flight test standards require thermal 
acoustic insulation materials to protect passengers. According to the 
standards, insulation materials installed in airplanes will not 
propagate a fire if ignition occurs.

* FAA is also developing more stringent burnthrough test standards for 
postcrash fires. FAA has been studying the penetration of the fuselage 
by an external fire--known as fuselage burnthrough--since the late 
1980s and believes that improving the fire resistance of thermal 
acoustic insulation could delay fuselage burnthrough. In laboratory 
tests conducted from 1999 through 2002, an FAA-led working group 
determined that insulation is the most potentially effective and 
practical means of delaying the spread of fire or creating a barrier to 
burnthrough. In 2002, FAA completed draft burnthrough standards 
outlining a proposed methodology for testing thermal acoustic 
insulation. The burnthrough standards would protect passengers and 
crews by extending by at least 4 minutes the time available for 
evacuation in a postcrash fire.

Various studies have estimated the potential benefits from both test 
standards:

* A 1999 study of worldwide aviation accidents from 1966 through 1993 
estimated that about 10 lives per year would have been saved if 
protection had provided an additional 4 minutes for occupants to exit 
the airplane.

* A 2000 FAA study estimated that about 37 U.S. fatalities would be 
avoided between 2000 and 2019 through the implementation of both 
proposed standards.[Footnote 69]

* A 2002 study by the British Civil Aviation Authority of worldwide 
aviation accidents from 1991 through 2000 estimated that at least 34 
lives per year would have been saved if insulation had met both 
proposed standards.

Status:

Insulation designed to replace metallized Mylar® is currently 
available. A 2000 FAA airworthiness directive gave the airlines 5 years 
to remove and replace metallized Mylar® insulation in 719 affected 
airplanes. Replacement insulation is required to meet the in-flight 
standard and will be installed in these airplanes by mid-2005. In that 
airworthiness directive, FAA indicated that it did not consider other 
currently installed insulation to constitute an unsafe condition.

Thermal acoustic insulation is currently available for installation on 
commercial airliners. This insulation has been demonstrated to reduce 
the chance of fatal in-flight fires and to improve postcrash fire 
survivability. On July 31, 2003, FAA issued a final rule requiring that 
after September 2, 2005, all newly manufactured airplanes having a 
seating capacity of more than 20 passengers or over 6,000 pounds must 
use thermal acoustic insulation that meets more stringent standards for 
how quickly flames can spread.[Footnote 70] In addition, for aircraft 
of this size manufactured before September 2, 2003, replacement 
insulation in the fuselage must also meet the new, higher standard.

Research is continuing to develop thermal acoustic insulation that 
provides better in-flight and burnthrough protection. Even when this 
material is available, the high cost of retrofitting airplanes may 
limit its use to newly manufactured aircraft. For example, FAA 
estimates that the metallized Mylar® retrofit alone will cost a total 
of $368.4 million, discounted to present value terms, for the 719 
affected airplanes. Because thermal acoustic insulation is installed 
throughout the pressurized section of the airplane for the life of its 
service, retrofitting the entire fleet would cost several billion 
dollars.

Ultra-Fire-Resistant Polymers:

:

Background:

Polymers are used in aircraft in the form of lightweight plastics and 
composites and are selected on the basis of their estimated installed 
cost, weight, strength, and durability. Most of the aircraft cabin is 
made of polymeric material. In the event of an in-flight or a postcrash 
fire, the use of polymeric materials with reduced flammability could 
give passengers and crew more time to evacuate by delaying the rate at 
which the fire spreads through the cabin.

FAA researchers are developing better techniques to measure the 
flammability of polymers and to make polymers that are ultra fire 
resistant. Developing these materials is the long-term goal of FAA's 
Fire Research Program, which, if successful, will "eliminate burning 
cabin materials as a cause of death in aircraft accidents." Materials 
being improved include composite and adhesive resins, textile fibers, 
rubber for seat cushions, and plastics for molded parts used in seats 
and passenger electronics. (See fig. 9.):

Figure 9: Flammable Cabin Materials and Small-scale Material Test 
Device:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Adding flame-retardant substances to existing materials is one way to 
decrease their flammability. For example, some manufacturers add 
substances that release water when they reach a high temperature. When 
a material, such as wiring insulation, is heated or burns, the water 
acts to absorb the heat and cools down the fire. Other materials are 
designed to become surface-scorched on exposure to fire, causing a 
layer of char to protect the rest of the material from burning. Lastly, 
adding a type of clay can have a flame-retardant effect. In general, 
these fire-retardant polymers are formulated to pass an ignition test 
but do not meet FAA's criterion for ultra fire resistance, which is a 
90 percent reduction in the rate at which the untreated material would 
burn. To meet this strict requirement, FAA is developing new "smart" 
polymers that are typical plastics under normal conditions but convert 
to ultra-fire-resistant materials when exposed to an ignition source or 
fire.

FAA has adopted a number of flammability standards over the last 30 
years. In 1984, FAA passed a retrofit rule that replaced 650,000 seat 
cushions with flame-retardant seat cushions at a total cost of about 
$75 million. The replacement seat cushions were found to delay cabin 
flashover by 40 to 60 seconds. Fire-retardant seat cushions can also 
prevent ramp and in-flight fires that originate at a seat and would 
otherwise burn out of control if left unattended. In 1986 and 1988, FAA 
set maximum allowable levels of heat and smoke from burning interior 
materials to decrease the amount of smoke that they would release in a 
postcrash fire. These standards affected paneling in all newly 
manufactured aircraft. Airlines and airframe manufacturers invested 
several hundred million dollars to develop these new panels.

Status:

Ultra-fireresistant polymers are not currently available for use on 
commercial airliners. These polymers are still in the early stages of 
research and development. To reduce the cost and simplify the testing 
of new materials, FAA is employing a new technique to characterize the 
flammability and thermal decomposition of new products; this technique 
requires only a milligram of sample material. The result has been the 
discovery of several new compositions of matter (including "smart" 
polymers). The test identifies key thermal and combustion properties 
that allow rapid screening of new materials.[Footnote 71] From these 
materials, FAA plans to select the most promising and work with 
industry to make enough of the new polymers to fabricate full-scale 
cabin components like sidewalls and stowage bins for fire testing.

FAA's phased research program includes the selection in 2003 of a small 
number of resins, plastics, rubbers, and fibers on the basis of their 
functionality, cost, and potential to meet fire performance guidelines. 
In 2005, FAA plans to fabricate decorative panels, molded parts, seat 
cushions, and textiles for testing from 2007 through 2010. Full-scale 
testing is scheduled for 2011 but is contingent upon the availability 
of program funds and commercial interest from the private sector.

Research continues on ultra-fire-resistant polymers that will increase 
protection against in-flight fires and cabin burnthrough. According to 
an FAA fire research expert, issues facing this research include (1) 
the current high cost of ultra-fire-resistant polymers; (2) 
difficulties in producing ultra-fire-resistant polymers with low to 
moderate processing temperatures, good strength and toughness, and 
colorability and colorfastness; and (3) gaps in understanding the 
relationship between material properties and fire performance and 
between chemical composition and fire performance, scaling 
relationships, and fundamental fire-resistance mechanisms. In 
addition, once the materials are developed and tested, getting them 
produced economically and installed in aircraft will become an issue. 
It is expected that such new materials with ultra fire resistance would 
be more expensive to produce and that the market for such materials 
would be uncertain.

Airport Rescue and Fire-Fighting Operations:

:

Background:

Because of the fire danger following a commercial airplane crash, 
having airport rescue and fire-fighting operations available can 
improve the chances of survival for the people involved. Most airplane 
accidents occur during takeoff or landing at the airport or in the 
surrounding community. A fire outside the airplane, with its tremendous 
heat, may take only a few minutes to burn through the airplane's 
outside shell. According to FAA, firefighters are responsible for 
creating an escape path by spraying water and chemicals on the fire to 
allow the passengers and crew to evacuate the airplane. Firefighters 
use one or more trucks to extinguish external fires, often at great 
personal risk, and use hand-held attack lines when attempting to put 
out fires within the airplane fuselage. (See fig. 10). Fires within the 
fuselage are considered difficult to control with existing equipment 
and procedures because they involve complex conditions, such as smoke-
laden toxic gases and high temperatures in the passenger cabin. FAA has 
taken actions to control both internal and external postcrash fires, 
including requiring major airports to have airport rescue and fire-
fighting operations.

Figure 10: Airport Rescue and Fire Training:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In 1972, FAA first proposed regulations to ensure that major airports 
have a minimal level of airport rescue and fire-fighting operations. 
Some changes to these regulations were made in 1988. The regulations 
establish, among other things, equipment standards, annual testing 
requirements for response times, and operating procedures. The 
requirements depend on both the size of the airport and the resources 
the locality has agreed to make available as needed.

In 1997, FAA compared airport rescue and fire-fighting missions and 
standards for civilian airports with DOD's for defense installations 
and reported that DOD's requirements were not applicable to civilian 
airports. In 1988, and again in 1998, Transport Canada Civil Aviation 
also studied its rescue and fire-fighting operations and concluded that 
the expenditure of resources for such unlikely occurrences was 
difficult to justify from a benefit-cost perspective. This conclusion 
highlighted the conflict between safety and cost in attempting to 
define rescue and fire-fighting requirements.

A coalition of union organizations and others concerned about aviation 
safety released a report critical of FAA's standards and operational 
regulations in 1999. According to the report, FAA's airport rescue and 
fire-fighting regulations were outdated and inadequate.

Status:

In 2002, FAA incorporated measures recommended by NTSB into FAA's 
Aeronautical Information Manual Official Guide to Basic Flight 
Information and Air Traffic Control Procedures.[Footnote 72] These 
measures (1) designate a radio frequency at most major airports to 
allow direct communication between airport rescue and fire-fighting 
personnel and flight crewmembers in the event of an emergency and (2) 
specify a universal set of hand signals for use when radio 
communication is lost.

In March 2001, FAA responded to the reports criticizing its airport 
rescue and fire-fighting standards by tasking its Aviation Regulatory 
Advisory Committee to review the agency's rescue and fire-fighting 
requirements to identify measures that could be added, modified, or 
deleted. In 2003, the committee is expected to propose requirements for 
the number of trucks, the amount of fire extinguishing agent, vehicle 
response times, and staffing at airports and to publish its findings in 
a notice of proposed rule-making. Depending on the results of this FAA 
review, additional resources may be needed at some airports. The 
overall cost of improving airport rescue and fire-fighting response 
capabilities could be a significant barrier to the further development 
of regulations. For example, some in the aviation industry are 
concerned about the costs of extending requirements to smaller airports 
and of appropriately equipping all airports with resources. According 
to FAA, extending federal safety requirements to some smaller airports 
would cost at least $2 million at each airport initially and $1 million 
annually thereafter.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Summaries of Potential Improved Evacuation Safety 
Advancements:

This appendix presents information on the background and status of 
potential advancements in evacuation safety that we identified, 
including the following:

* improved passenger safety briefings;

* exit seat briefings;

* photo-luminescent floor track marking;

* crewmember safety and evacuation training;

* acoustic attraction signals;

* smoke hoods;

* exit slide testing;

* overwing exit doors;

* evacuation procedures for very large transport aircraft; and:

* personal flotation devices.

Passenger Safety Briefings:

:

Background:

Federal regulations require that passengers receive an oral briefing 
prior to takeoff on safety aspects of the upcoming flight. FAA also 
requires that oral briefings be supplemented with printed safety 
briefing cards that pertain only to that make and model of airplane and 
are consistent with the air carrier's procedures. These two safety 
measures must include information on smoking, the location and 
operation of emergency exits, seat belts, compliance with signs, and 
the location and use of flotation devices. In addition, if the flight 
operates above 25,000 feet mean sea level, the briefing and cards must 
include information on the emergency use of oxygen.

FAA published an Advisory Circular in March 1991 to guide air carriers' 
development of oral safety briefings and cards. Primarily, the circular 
defines the material that must be covered and suggests material that 
FAA believes should be covered. The circular also discusses the 
difficulty in motivating passengers to attend to the safety information 
and suggests making the oral briefing and safety cards as attractive 
and interesting as possible to increase passengers' attention. The 
Advisory Circular suggests, for example, that flight attendants be 
animated, speak clearly and slowly, and maintain eye contact with the 
passengers. Multicolored safety cards with pictures and drawings should 
be used over black and white cards. Finally, the circular suggests the 
use of a recorded videotape briefing because it ensures a complete 
briefing with good diction and allows for additional visual information 
to be presented to the passengers. (See fig. 11.):

Figure 11: Airline Briefing to Passengers on Safety Briefing Cards:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Status:

Despite efforts to improve passengers' attention to safety information, 
a large percentage of passengers continue to ignore preflight safety 
briefings and safety cards, according to a study NTSB conducted in 
1999. Of 457 passengers polled, 54 percent (247) reported that they had 
not watched the entire briefing because they had seen it before. An 
additional 70 passengers indicated that the briefing provided common 
knowledge and therefore there was no need to watch it. Of 431 
passengers who answered a question about whether they had read the 
safety card, 68 percent (293) indicated that they had not, many of them 
stating that they had read safety cards on previous flights.

Safety briefings and cards serve an important safety purpose for both 
passengers and crew. They are intended to prepare passengers for an 
emergency by providing them with information about the location and 
operation of exits and emergency equipment that they may have to 
operate--and whose location and operation may differ from one airplane 
to the next. Well-briefed passengers will be better prepared in an 
emergency, thereby increasing their chances of surviving and lessening 
their dependence on the crew for assistance.

In its emergency evacuation study, NTSB recommended that FAA instruct 
airlines to "conduct research and explore creative and effective 
methods that use state-of-the-art technology to convey safety 
information to passengers."[Footnote 73] NTSB further recommended "the 
presented information include a demonstration of all emergency 
evacuation procedures, such as how to open the emergency exits and exit 
the aircraft, including how to use the slides." That research found 
that passengers often view safety briefings and cards as uninteresting 
and the information as intuitive. FAA has requested that commercial 
carriers explore different ways to present the materials to their 
passengers, adding that more should be done to educate passengers about 
what to do after an accident has occurred.

Exit Seat Briefing:

:

Background:

Passengers seated in an exit row may be called on to assist in an 
evacuation. Upon a crewmember's command or a personal assessment of 
danger, these passengers must decide if their exit is safe to use and 
then open their exit hatch or door for use during an evacuation. In 
October 1990, FAA required airlines to actively screen passengers 
occupying exit seats for "suitability" and to administer one-on-one 
briefings on their responsibilities. This rule does not require 
specific training for exit seat occupants, but it does require that the 
occupants be duly informed of their distinct obligations.

Status:

According to NTSB, preflight briefings of passengers in exit rows could 
contribute positively to a passenger evacuation. In a 1999 study, NTSB 
found that the individual briefings given to passengers who occupy exit 
seats have a positive effect on the outcome of an aircraft evacuation. 
The studies also found that as a result of the individualized 
briefings, flight attendants were better able to assess the suitability 
of the passengers seated in the exit seats.

According to FAA's Flight Standards Handbook Bulletin for Air 
Transportation, several U.S. airlines have identified specific cabin 
crewmembers to perform "structured personal conversations or 
briefings," designed to equip and prepare passengers in exit seats 
beyond the general passenger briefing. Also, the majority of air 
carriers have procedures to assist crewmembers with screening 
passengers seated in exit rows.

FAA's 1990 rule requires that passengers seated in exit rows be 
provided with information cards that detail the actions to be taken in 
the case of an emergency. However, individual exit row briefings, such 
as those recommended by NTSB, are not required. Also included on the 
information cards are provisions for a passenger who does not wish to 
be seated in the exit row to be reseated. Additionally, carriers are 
required to assess the exit row passenger's ability to carry out the 
required functions. The extent of discussion with exit row passengers 
depends on each airline's policy.

Photo-luminescent Floor Track Marking:

:

Background:

In June 1983, an Air Canada DC-9 flight from Dallas to Toronto was 
cruising at 33,000 feet when the crew reported a lavatory fire. An 
emergency was declared, and the aircraft made a successful emergency 
landing at the Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International Airport. The 
crew initiated an evacuation, but only half of the 46 persons aboard 
were able to escape before becoming overcome by smoke and fire. In its 
investigation of this accident, NTSB learned that many of the 23 
passengers who died might have benefited from floor tracking lighting. 
As a result, NTSB recommended that airlines be equipped with floor-
level escape markings. FAA determined that floor lighting could improve 
the evacuation rate by 20 percent under certain conditions, and FAA now 
requires all airliners to have a row of lights along the floor to guide 
passengers to the exit should visibility be reduced by smoke.

On transport category aircraft, these escape markings, called floor 
proximity marking systems, typically consist primarily of small 
electric lights spaced at intervals on the floor or mounted on the seat 
assemblies, along the aisle. The requirement for electricity to power 
these systems has made them vulnerable to a variety of problems, 
including battery and wiring failures, burned-out light bulbs, and 
physical disruption caused by vibration, passenger traffic, galley cart 
strikes, and hull breakage in accidents. Attempts to overcome these 
problems have led to the proposal that nonelectric, photo-luminescent 
(glow-in-the-dark) materials be used in the construction of floor 
proximity marking systems. The elements of these new systems are 
"charged" by the normal airplane passenger cabin lighting, including 
the sunlight that enters the cabin when the window shades are open 
during daylight hours. (See fig. 12.):

Figure 12: Floor Track Marking Using Photo-luminescent Materials:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Status:

Floor track marking using photo-luminescent materials is currently 
available but not required for U.S. commercial airliners. Performance 
demonstrations of photo-luminescent technology have found that 
strontium aluminate photo-luminescent marking systems can be effective 
in providing the guidance for egress that floor proximity marking 
systems are intended to achieve. According to industry and government 
officials, such photo-luminescent marking systems are also cheaper to 
install than electric light systems and require little to no 
maintenance. Moreover, photo-luminescent technology weighs about 15 to 
20 pounds less than electric light systems and, unlike the electric 
systems, illuminates both sides of the aisle, creating a pathway to the 
exits.

Photo-luminescent floor track marking technology is mature and is 
currently being used by a small number of operators, mostly in Europe. 
In the United States, Southwest Airlines has equipped its entire fleet 
with the photo-luminescent system. However, the light emitted from 
photo-luminescent materials is not as bright as the light from 
electrically operated systems. Additionally, the photo-luminescent 
materials are not as effective when they have not been exposed to light 
for an extended period of time, as after a long overseas nighttime 
flight. The estimated retail price of an entire system, not including 
the installation costs, is $5,000 per airplane.

Crewmember Safety and Evacuation Training:

:

Background:

FAA requires crewmembers to attend annual training to demonstrate their 
competency in emergency procedures. They have to be knowledgeable and 
efficient while exercising good judgment. Crewmembers must know their 
own duties and responsibilities during an evacuation and be familiar 
with those of their fellow workers so that they can take over for 
others if necessary.

The requirements for emergency evacuation training and demonstrations 
were first established in 1965. Operators were required to conduct 
full-scale evacuation demonstrations, include crewmembers in the 
demonstrations, and complete the demonstrations in 2 minutes using 50 
percent of the exits. The purpose of the demonstrations was to test the 
crewmembers' ability to execute established emergency evacuation 
procedures and to ensure the realistic assignment of functions to the 
crew. A full-scale demonstration was required for each type and model 
of airplane when it first started passenger-carrying operations, 
increased its passenger seating capacity by 5 percent or more, or 
underwent a major change in the cabin interior that would affect an 
emergency evacuation. Subsequently, the time allowed to evacuate the 
cabin during these tests was reduced to 90 seconds.

The aviation community took steps in the 1990s to develop a program 
called Crew Resource Management that focuses on overall improvements in 
crewmembers' performance and flight safety strategies, including those 
for evacuation. FAA officials told us that they plan to emphasize the 
importance of effective communication between crewmembers and are 
considering updating a related Advisory Circular. Effective 
communication between cockpit and cabin crew are particularly important 
with the added security precautions being taken after September 11, 
2001, including the locking the cockpit door during flight.

Status:

The traditional training initiative now has an advanced curriculum, 
Advanced Crew Resource Management. According to FAA, this comprehensive 
implementation package includes crew resource management procedures, 
training for instructors and evaluators, training for crewmembers, a 
standardized assessment of the crew's performance, and an ongoing 
implementation process. This advanced training was designed and 
developed through a collaborative effort between the airline and 
research communities. FAA considers training to be an ongoing 
development process that provides airlines with unique crew resource 
management solutions tailored to their operational demands. The design 
of crew resource management procedures is based on principles that 
require an emphasis on the airline's specific operational environment. 
The procedures were developed to emphasize these crew resource 
management elements by incorporating them into standard operating 
procedures for normal as well as abnormal and emergency flight 
situations.

Because commercial airliner accidents are rare, crewmembers must rely 
on their initial and recurrent training to guide their actions during 
an emergency. Even in light of advances and initiatives in evacuation 
technology, such as slides and slide life rafts, crewmembers must still 
assume a critical role in ensuring the safe evacuation of their 
passengers. Airline operators have indicated that it is very costly for 
them to pull large numbers of crewmembers off-line to participate in 
training sessions.

FAA officials told us that improving flight and cabin crew 
communication holds promise for ensuring the evacuation of passengers 
during an emergency. To improve this communication and coordination 
between flight and cabin crew, FAA plans to update the related Advisory 
Circular, oversee training, and charge FAA inspectors with monitoring 
air carriers during flights to see that improvements are being 
implemented. In addition, FAA is enhancing its guidance to air carriers 
on preflight briefings for flight crews to sharpen their responses to 
emergency situations and mitigate passengers' confusion. FAA expects 
this guidance to bolster the use and quality of preflight briefings 
between pilots and flight attendants on security, communication, and 
emergency procedures. According to FAA, these briefings have been shown 
to greatly improve the flight crew's safety mind-set and to enhance 
communication.

Acoustic Attraction Signals:

:

Background:

Acoustic attraction signals make sounds to help people locate the doors 
in smoke, darkness, or when lights and exit signs are obscured. When 
activated, the devices are intended to help people to determine the 
direction and approximate distance of the sound--and of the door. 
Examples of audio attraction signals include recorded speech sounds, 
broadband multifrequency sounds ("white noise"), or alarm bells.

Research to determine if acoustic attraction signals can be useful in 
aircraft evacuation has included, for example, FAA's Civil Aeromedical 
Institute testing of recorded speech sounds in varying pitches, using 
phrases such as "This way out," "This way," and "Exit here." 
Researchers at the University of Leeds developed Localizer Directional 
Sound beacons, which combine broadband, multifrequency "white noise" of 
between 40Hz and 20kHz with an alerting sound of at least one other 
frequency, according to the inventor (see fig. 13).

Figure 13: Test Installation of Acoustic Signalling Device:

[See PDF for image]

Note: Acoustic signaling device is of the type used near building 
exits.

[End of figure]

The FAA study noted above of acoustic attraction signals found that in 
the absence of recorded speech signals, the majority of participants 
evacuating a low-light-level, vision-obscured cabin will head for the 
front exit or will follow their neighbors. In contrast, participants 
exposed to recorded speech sounds will select additional exits, even 
those in the rear of the airplane. During aircraft trials conducted by 
Cranfield University and University of Greenwich researchers, tests of 
directional sound beacons found that under cabin smoke conditions, 
exits were used most efficiently when the cabin crew gave directions 
and the directional sound beacons were activated. With this 
combination, the distribution of passengers to the available exits was 
better than with cabin crew directions alone, sound beacons alone, no 
cabin crew directions, or no sound beacons. Researchers found that 
passengers were able to identify and move toward the closest sound 
source inside the airplane cabin and to distinguish between two closely 
spaced loudspeakers. However, in 2001, Airbus conducted several 
evacuation test trials of audio attraction signals using an A340 
aircraft. According to Airbus, the acoustic attraction signals did not 
enhance passengers' orientation, and, overall, did not contribute to 
passengers' safety.

Status:

While acoustic attraction signals are currently available, further 
research is needed to determine if their use is warranted on commercial 
airliners. FAA, Transport Canada Civil Aviation, and the British 
Civilian Aviation Authority do not currently mandate the use of 
acoustic attraction signals. The United Kingdom's Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch made a recommendation after the fatal Boeing 737 
accident at Manchester International Airport in 1985 that research be 
undertaken to assess the viability of audio attraction signals and 
other evacuation techniques to assist passengers impaired by smoke and 
toxic or irritant gases. The Civilian Aviation Authority accepted the 
recommendation and sponsored research at Cranfield University; however, 
it concluded from the research results that the likely benefit of the 
technology would be so small that no further action should be taken, 
and the recommendation was closed in 1992.

The French Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile funded aircraft 
evacuation trials using directional sound beacons in November 2002, 
with oversight by the European Joint Aviation Authorities. The trials 
were conducted at Cranfield University's evacuation simulator with 
British Airways cabin crew and examined eight trial evacuations by two 
groups of 'passengers.' The study surveyed the participants' views on 
various aspects of their evacuation experience and measured the overall 
time to evacuate. The speed of evacuation was found to be biased by the 
knowledge passengers' gained in the four successive trials, and by 
variations in the number of passengers participating on the 2 days (155 
and 181). The four trials by each of the two groups of passengers also 
involved different combinations of crew and sound in each. The study 
concluded that the insufficient number of test sessions further 
contributed to bias in the results, and that further research would be 
needed to determine whether the devices help to speed overall 
evacuation.

Further research and testing are needed before acoustic attraction 
signals can be considered for widespread airline use. The signals may 
have drawbacks that would need to be addressed. For example, the Civil 
Aviation Authority found that placing an audio signal in the bulkhead 
might disorient or confuse the first few passengers who have to pass 
and then move away from the sound source to reach the exit. Such 
hesitation slowed passengers' evacuation during testing. The 
researchers at Cranfield University trials in 1990 concluded that an 
acoustic sound signal did not improve evacuation times by a 
statistically significant amount, suggesting that the device might not 
be cost-effective.

Smoke Hoods:

:

Background:

Smoke hoods are designed to provide the user with breathable, filtered 
air in an environment of smoke and toxic gases that would otherwise be 
incapacitating. More people die from smoke and toxic gases than from 
fire after an air crash. Because only a few breaths of the dense, toxic 
smoke typically found in aircraft fires can render passengers 
unconscious and prevent their evacuation, the wider use of smoke hoods 
has been investigated as a means of preventing passengers from being 
overcome by smoke and of giving them enough breathable air to evacuate. 
However, some studies have found that smoke hoods are only effective in 
certain types of fires and in some cases may slow the evacuation of 
cabin occupants.

As shown in figure 14, a filter smoke hood can be a transparent bag 
worn over the head that fits snugly at the neck and is coated with 
fire-retardant material; it has a filter but no independent oxygen 
source and can provide breathable air by removing some toxic 
contaminants from the air for a period ranging from several minutes to 
15 minutes, depending on the severity and type of air contamination. 
The hood has a filter to remove carbon monoxide--a main direct cause of 
death in fire-related commercial airplane accidents, as well as 
hydrogen cyanide--another common cause of death, sometimes from 
incapacitation that can prevent evacuation. Hoods also filter carbon 
dioxide, chlorine, ammonia, acid gases such as hydrogen chloride and 
hydrogen sulfide, and various hydrocarbons, alcohols, and other 
solvents. Some hoods also include a filter to block particulate matter. 
One challenge is where to place the hoods in a highly accessible 
location near each seat.

Figure 14: An Example of a Commercially Available Smoke Hood:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Certain smoke hoods have been shown to filter out many contaminants 
typically found in smoke from an airplane cabin fire and to provide 
some temporary head protection from the heat of fire. In a full-scale 
FAA test of cabin burnthrough, toxic gases became the driving factor 
determining survivability in the forward cabin, reaching lethal levels 
minutes before the smoke and temperature rose to unsurvivable levels.

A collaborative effort to estimate the potential benefits of smoke 
hoods was undertaken in 1986 by the British Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA), the Federal Aviation Administration, the Direction Générale de 
l'Aviation Civile (France) and Transport Canada Civil Aviation. The 
resulting 1987 study examined the 20 accidents where sufficient data 
was available out of 74 fire-related accidents worldwide from 1966 to 
1985. The results were sensitive to assumptions regarding extent of use 
and delays due to putting on smoke hoods. The study concluded that 
smoke hoods could significantly extend the time available to evacuate 
an aircraft and would have saved approximately 179 lives in the 20 
accidents studied, assuming no delay in donning smoke hoods. Assuming a 
10 percent reduction in the evacuation rate due to smoke hood use would 
have resulted in an estimated 145 lives saved in the 20 accidents with 
adequate data. A 15 second delay in donning the hoods would have saved 
an estimated 97 lives in the 20 accidents.[Footnote 74] When the 
likelihood of use of smoke hoods was included in the analysis for each 
accident, the total net benefit was estimated at 134 lives saved in the 
20 accidents. The study also estimated that an additional 228 lives 
would have been saved in the 54 accidents where less data was 
available, assuming no delay in evacuation.[Footnote 75]

The U.S. Air Force and a major manufacturer are developing a drop-down 
smoke hood with oxygen. Because current oxygen masks in airplanes are 
not airtight around the mouth, they provide little protection from 
toxic gases and smoke in an in-flight fire. To provide protection from 
these hazards, as well as from decompression and postcrash fire and 
smoke, the Air Force's drop-down smoke hood with oxygen uses the 
airplane's existing oxygen system and can fit into the overhead bin of 
a commercial airliner where the oxygen mask is normally stowed. This 
smoke hood is intended to replace current oxygen masks but also be 
potentially separated from the oxygen source in a crash to provide time 
to evacuate.

Status:

Smoke hoods are currently available and produced by several 
manufacturers; however, not all smoke hoods filter carbon monoxide. 
They are in use on many military and private aircraft, as well as in 
buildings. An individually-purchased filter smoke hood costs about $70 
or more, but according to one manufacturer bulk order costs have 
declined to about $40 per hood. In addition, they estimated that hoods 
cost about $2 a year to install and $5 a year to maintain. They weigh 
about a pound or less and have to be replaced about every 5 years. 
Furthermore, airlines could incur additional replacement costs due to 
theft if smoke hoods were placed near passenger seats in commercial 
aircraft.

Neither the British CAA, the FAA, the DGAC, nor Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation has chosen to require smoke hoods. The British Air Accident 
Investigations Branch recommended that smoke hoods be considered for 
aircraft after the 1985 Manchester accident, in which 48 of 55 
passengers died on a runway from an engine fire before takeoff, mainly 
from smoke inhalation and the effects of hydrogen cyanide. 
Additionally, a U.K. parliamentary committee recommended research into 
smoke hoods in 1999, and the European Transport Safety Council, an 
international nongovernmental organization whose mission is to provide 
impartial advice on transportation safety to the European Commission 
and Parliaments, recommended in 1997 that smoke hoods be provided in 
all commercial aircraft. Canada's Transportation Safety Board has taken 
no official position on smoke hoods, but has noted a deficiency in 
cabin safety in this area and recommended further evaluation of 
voluntary passenger use.

Although smoke hoods are currently available, they remain 
controversial. Passengers are allowed to bring filter type smoke hoods 
on an airplane, but FAA is not considering requiring airlines to 
provide smoke hoods for passengers. The debate over whether smoke hoods 
should be installed in aircraft revolves mainly around regulatory 
concerns that passengers will not be able to put smoke hoods on quickly 
in an emergency; that hoods might hinder visibility, and that any delay 
in putting on smoke hoods would slow down an evacuation. FAA's and 
CAA's evacuation experiments--to determine how long it takes for 
passengers to unpack and don smoke hoods and whether an evacuation 
would be slowed by their use--have reached opposite conclusions about 
the effects of smoke hoods on evacuation rates. The CAA has noted that 
delays in putting on smoke hoods by only one or two people could 
jeopardize the whole evacuation. An opposite view by some experts is 
that the gas and smoke-induced incapacitation of one or two passengers 
could also delay an evacuation.

FAA believes that an evacuation might be hampered by passengers' 
inability to quickly and effectively access and don smoke hoods, by 
competitive passenger behavior, and by a lack of passenger 
attentiveness during pre-flight safety briefings. FAA noted that smoke 
hoods can be difficult to access and use even by trained individuals. 
However, other experts have noted that smoke hoods might reduce panic 
and help make evacuations more orderly, that competitive behavior 
already occurs in seeking access to exits in a fire, and that 
passengers could learn smoke hood safety procedures in the pre-flight 
safety briefings in the same way they learn to use drop-down oxygen 
masks or flotation devices.

The usefulness of smoke hoods varies across fire scenarios depending on 
assumptions about how fast hoods could be put on and how much time 
would be available to evacuate. One expert told us that the time needed 
to put on a smoke hood might not be important in several fire 
scenarios, such as an in-flight fire in which passengers are seeking 
temporary protection from smoke until the airplane lands and an 
evacuation can begin. In other scenarios--a ground evacuation or 
postcrash evacuation --some experts argue that passengers in back rows 
or far from an exit may have their exit path temporarily blocked as 
other passengers exit and, because of the delay in their evacuation, 
may have a greater need and more time available to don smoke hoods than 
passengers seated near usable exits.

Exit Slide Testing:

:

Background:

Exit slide systems are rarely used during their operational life span. 
However, when such a system is used, it may be under adverse crash 
conditions that make it important for the system to work as designed. 
To prevent injury to passengers and crew escaping through floor-level 
exits located more than 6 feet above the ground, assist devices (i.e., 
slides or slide-raft systems) are used. (See fig. 15.):

Figure 15: Drawing of Possible Emergency Slide Testing of FAA's 747 
Test Aircraft:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The rapid deployment, inflation, and stability of evacuation slides are 
important to the effectiveness of an aircraft's evacuation system, as 
was illustrated in the fatal ground collision of a Northwest Airlines 
DC-9 and a Northwest Airlines 727 in Romulus, Michigan, in December 
1990. As a result of the collision, the DC-9 caught fire, but there 
were several slide problems that slowed the evacuation. For example, 
NTSB later found that the internal tailcone exit release handle was 
broken, thereby preventing the tailcone from releasing and the slide 
from deploying.

Because of concerns about the operability of exit slides, NTSB 
recommended in 1974 that FAA improve its maintenance checks of exit 
slide operations. In 1983, FAA revised its exit slide requirements to 
specify criteria for resistance to water penetration and absorption, 
puncture strength, radiant heat resistance, and deployment as flotation 
platforms after ditching.

Status:

All U.S. air carriers have an FAA-approved maintenance program for each 
type of airplane that they operate. These programs require that the 
components of an airplane's emergency evacuation system, which includes 
the exit slides, be periodically inspected and serviced. An FAA 
principal maintenance inspector approves the air carrier's maintenance 
program. According to NTSB, although most air carriers' maintenance 
programs require that a percentage of emergency evacuation slides or 
slide rafts be tested for deployment, the percentage of required on-
airplane deployments is generally very small. For example, NTSB found 
that American Airlines' FAA-approved maintenance program for the A300 
requires an on-airplane operational check of four slides or slide rafts 
per year. Delta Air Lines' FAA-approved maintenance program for the L-
1011 requires that Delta activate a full set of emergency exits and 
evacuation slides or slide rafts every 24 months. Under an FAA-approved 
waiver for its maintenance program, United is not required to deploy 
any slide on its 737 airplanes.

NTSB also found that FAA allows American Airlines to include 
inadvertent and emergency evacuation deployments toward the 
accomplishment of its maintenance program; therefore, it is possible 
that American would not purposely deploy any slides or slide rafts on 
an A300 to comply with the deployment requirement during any given 
year. In addition, NTSB found that FAA also allows Delta Air Lines to 
include inadvertent and emergency evacuation deployments toward the 
accomplishment of its maintenance program.

NTSB holds that because inadvertent and emergency deployments do not 
occur in a controlled environment, problems with, or failures in, the 
system may be more difficult to identify and record, and personnel 
qualified to detect such failures may not be present. For example, in 
an inadvertent or emergency slide or slide raft deployment, 
observations on the amount of time it takes to inflate the slide or 
slide raft, and the pressure level of the slide or slide raft are not 
likely to be documented. For these reasons, a 1999 NTSB report said 
that FAA's allowing these practices could potentially leave out 
significant details about the interaction of the slide or slide raft 
with the door or how well the crew follows its training mock-up 
procedures. Accordingly, in 1999, NTSB recommended that FAA stop 
allowing air carriers to count inadvertent and emergency deployments 
toward meeting their maintenance program requirement because conditions 
are not controlled and important information (on, for example, the 
interface between the airplane and the evacuation slide system, timing, 
durability, and stability) is not collected. The recommendation 
continues to be open at the NTSB. NTSB officials said they would be 
meeting to discuss this recommendation with FAA in the near future.

Additionally, NTSB recommended that FAA, for a 12-month period, require 
that all operators of transport-category aircraft demonstrate the on-
airplane operation of all emergency evacuation systems (including the 
door-opening assist mechanisms and slide or slide raft deployment) on 
10 percent of each type of airplane (at least one airplane per type) in 
their fleets. NTSB said that these demonstrations should be conducted 
on an airplane in a controlled environment so that qualified personnel 
can properly evaluate the entire evacuation system. NTSB indicated that 
the results of the demonstrations (including an explanation of the 
reasons for any failures) should be documented for each component of 
the system and should be reported to FAA.[Footnote 76]

Overwing Exit Doors:

:

Background:

Prompted by a tragedy in which 57 of the 137 people on board a British 
Airtours B-737 were killed because passengers found exit doors 
difficult to access and operate, the British Civil Aviation Authority 
initiated a research program to explore changes to the design of the 
overwing exit (Type III) door.

Trained crewmembers are expected to operate most of the emergency 
equipment on an airplane, including most floor-level exit doors. But 
overwing exit doors, termed "self-help exits," are expected to be and 
will primarily be opened by passengers without formal 
training.[Footnote 77] NTSB reported that even when flight attendants 
are responsible for opening the overwing exit doors, passengers are 
likely to make the first attempt to open the overwing exit hatches 
because the flight attendants are not physically located near the 
overwing exits.

There are now two basic types of overwing exit doors--the "self-help" 
doors that are manually removed inward and then stowed and the newer 
"swing out" doors that open outward on a hinge.

According to NTSB, passengers continue to have problems removing the 
inward-opening exit door and stowing it properly. The manner in which 
the overwing exit is opened and how and where the hatch should be 
stowed is not intuitively obvious to passengers, nor is it easily or 
consistently depicted graphically. NTSB recently recommended to FAA 
that Type III overwing exits on newly manufactured aircraft be easy and 
intuitive to 
open and have automatic stowage out of the egress path.[Footnote 78] 
NTSB has indicated that the semiautomatic, fast-opening, Type III 
overwing exit hatch could give passengers additional evacuation time.

Status:

Over-wing exit doors that "swing out" on hinges rather than requiring 
manual removal are currently available. The European Joint Aviation 
Authorities (JAA) has approved the installation of these outward-
opening hinged doors on new-production aircraft in Europe. In addition, 
Boeing has redesigned the overwing exit door for its next-generation 
737 series. This redesigned, hinged door has pressurized springs so 
that it essentially pops up and outward, out of the way, once its lever 
is pulled. The exit door handle was also redesigned and tested to 
ensure that anyone could operate the door using either single or double 
handgrips. Approximately 200 people who were unfamiliar with the new 
design and had never operated an overwing exit tested the outward-
opening exit door. These tests found that the average adult could 
operate the door in an emergency. The design eliminates the problem of 
where to stow the exit hatch because the door moves up and out of the 
egress route.

While the new swing-out doors are available, it will take some time for 
them to be widely used. Because of structural difficulties and cost, 
the new doors are not being considered for the existing fleet. For new-
production airplanes, their use is mixed because JAA requires them in 
Europe for some newer Boeing 737s, but FAA does not require them in the 
United States. However, FAA will allow their use. As a result, some 
airlines are including the new doors on their new aircraft, while 
others are not. For example, Southwest Airlines has the new doors on 
its Boeing 737s. The extent to which other airlines and aircraft models 
will have the new doors installed remains to be seen and will likely 
depend on the cost of installation, the European market for the 
aircraft, and any additional costs to train flight attendants in its 
use.

Next Generation Evacuation Equipment and Procedures:

:

Background:

Airbus, a leading aircraft manufacturer, has begun building a family of 
A380 aircraft, also called Large Transport Aircraft (see fig. 16). 
Early versions of the A380, which is scheduled to begin flight tests in 
2005 and enter commercial service in 2006, will have 482 to 524 seats. 
The A380-800 standard layout references 555 seats. Later larger 
configurations could accommodate up to 850 passengers. The A380 is 
designed to have 16 emergency doors and require 16 escape slides, 
compared with the 747, which requires 12. Later models of the A380 
could have 18 emergency exits and escape slides.

Figure 16: Airbus' Planned Double Deck Aircraft:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Status:

The advent of this type of Large Transport Aircraft is raising 
questions about how passengers will exit the aircraft in an emergency. 
The upper deck doorsill of the A380 will be approximately 30 feet above 
the ground, depending on the position (attitude) of the aircraft. 
According to an Airbus official responsible for exit slide design and 
operations, evacuation slides have to reach the ground at a safe angle 
even if the aircraft is tipped up; however, extra slide length is 
undesirable if the sill height is normal. Previously, regulations would 
have required slides only to touch the ground in the tip-up case, even 
if that meant introduction of relatively steep sliding surfaces. 
However, because of the sill height, passengers may hesitate before 
jumping and their hesitation may extend the total evacuation time. 
Because some passengers may be reluctant to leap onto the slide when 
they can see how far it is to the ground, the design concept of the 
A380 evacuation slides includes blinder walls at the exit and a curve 
in the slide to mask the distance to the ground.

A next-generation evacuation system developed by Airbus and Goodrich 
called the "intelligent slide" is a possible solution to the problem of 
the Large Transport Aircraft's slide length. The technology is not a 
part of the slide, but is connected to the slide through what is called 
a door management system composed of sensors. The "brains" of the 
technology will be located inside the forward exit door of the cabin, 
and the technology is designed to adjust the length of the slide 
according to the fuselage's tipping angle to the ground. The longest 
upper-deck slide for an A380 could exceed 50 feet.

The A380 slides are made of a nylon-based fabric that is coated with 
urethane or neoprene, and they are 10 percent lighter than most other 
slides on the market. They have to be packed tightly into small bundles 
at the foot of emergency exit doors and are required to be fully 
inflated in 6 seconds. Officials at Airbus noted that the slides are 
designed to withstand the radiant heat of a postimpact fire for 180 
seconds, compared with the 90 seconds required by regulators.

According to a Goodrich official, FAA will require Goodrich to conduct 
between 2,000 and 2,500 tests on the A380 slides to make sure they can 
accommodate a large number of passengers quickly and withstand wind, 
rain, and other weather conditions. The upper-level slides, which are 
wide enough for two people, have to enable the evacuation of 140 people 
per minute, according to Airbus officials. An issue to be resolved is 
whether a full-scale demonstration test will be required or whether a 
partial test using a certain number of passengers, supplemented by a 
computer simulation of an evacuation of 555 passengers, can effectively 
demonstrate an evacuation from this type of aircraft. Airbus officials 
told us that a full-scale demonstration could result in undesirable 
injuries to the participants and is therefore not the preferred choice.

Officials at the Association of Flight Attendants have expressed 
concern that there has not been a full-scale evacuation demonstration 
involving the A380. They are concerned that computer modeling might not 
really match the human experience of jumping onto a slide from that 
height. In addition, they are concerned that other systems involved in 
emergency exiting, such as the communication systems, need to be tested 
under controlled conditions. As a result, they believe a full-scale 
demonstration under the current 90-second standard is necessary.

Personal Flotation Devices:

:

Background:

All commercial aircraft that fly over water more than 50 nautical miles 
from the nearest shore are required to be equipped with flotation 
devices for each occupant of the airplane. According to FAA, 44 of the 
50 busiest U.S. airports are located within 5 miles of a significant 
body of water. In addition, life vests, seat cushions, life rafts, and 
exit slides may be used as flotation devices for water emergencies.

FAA policies dictate that if personal flotation devices are installed 
beneath the passenger seats of an aircraft, the devices must be easily 
retrievable. Determinations of compliance with this requirement are 
based on the judgment of FAA as the certifying authority.

Status:

FAA is conducting research and testing on the location and types of 
flotation devices used in aircraft. When it has completed this work, it 
is likely to provide additional guidance to ensure that the devices are 
easily retrievable and usable. FAA's research is designed to analyze 
human performance factors, such as how much time passengers need to 
retrieve their vests, whether and how the cabin environment physically 
interferes with their efforts, and how physically capable passengers 
are of reaching their vests while seated and belted. FAA is reviewing 
four different life vest installation methods and has conducted tests 
on 137 human subjects. According to an early analysis of the data, 
certain physical installation features significantly affect both the 
ability of a typical passenger to retrieve an underseat life vest and 
the ease of retrieval. This work may lead to additonal guidance on the 
location of personal flotation devices.

FAA's research may also indicate a need for additional guidance on the 
use of personal flotation devices. In a 1998 report on ditching 
aircraft and water survival, FAA found that airlines differed in their 
instructions to passengers on how to use personal flotation 
devices.[Footnote 79] For example, some airlines advise that passengers 
hold the cushions in front of their bodies, rest their chins on the 
cushions, wrap their arms around the cushions with their hands grasping 
the outside loops, and float vertically in the water. Other airlines 
suggest that passengers lie forward on the cushions, grasp and hold the 
loops beneath them, and float horizontally. FAA also reported that 
airlines' flight attendant training programs differed in their 
instructions on how to don life vests and when to inflate them.

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Summaries of General Cabin Occupant Safety and Health 
Advancements:

This appendix presents information on the background and status of 
potential advancements in general cabin occupant safety and health that 
we identified, including the following:

* advanced warnings of turbulence;

* preparations for in-flight medical emergencies;

* reductions in health risks to passengers with certain medical 
conditions, including deep vein thrombosis; and:

* improved awareness of radiation exposure.

This appendix also discusses occupational safety and health standards 
for the flight attendant workforce.

Advanced Warnings of Turbulence:

:

Background:

According to FAA, the leading cause of in-flight injuries for cabin 
occupants is turbulence. In June 1995, following two serious events 
involving turbulence, FAA issued a public advisory to airlines urging 
the use of seat belts at all times when passengers are seated, but 
concluded that the existing rules did not require strengthening. In May 
2000, FAA instituted a public awareness campaign, called Turbulence 
Happens, to stress the importance of wearing safety belts to the flying 
public.

Because of the potential for injury from unexpected turbulence, ongoing 
research is attempting to find ways to better identify areas of 
turbulence so that pilots can take corrective action to avoid it. In 
addition, FAA's July 2003 draft strategic plan targets a 33 percent 
reduction in the number of turbulence injuries to cabin occupants by 
2008--from an annual average of 15 injuries per year for fiscal years 
2000 through 2002 to no more than 10 injuries per year.

Status:

FAA is currently evaluating new airborne weather radar and other 
technologies to improve the timeliness of warnings to passengers and 
flight attendants about impending turbulence. For example, the 
Turbulence Product Development Team, within FAA's Aviation Weather 
Research Program, has developed a system to measure turbulence and 
downlink the information in real time from commercial air carriers. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization has approved this system as 
an international standard. Ongoing research includes (1) detecting 
turbulence in flight and reporting its intensity to augment pilots' 
reports, (2) detecting turbulence remotely from the ground or in the 
air using radar, (3) detecting turbulence remotely using LIDAR[Footnote 
80] or the Global Positioning System's constellation of satellites, and 
(4) forecasting the likelihood of turbulence over the continental 
United States during the next 12 hours. Prototypes of the in-flight 
detection system have been installed on 100 737-300s operated by United 
Airlines, and two other domestic air carriers have expressed an 
interest in using the prototype. FAA also plans to improve (1) training 
on standard operating procedures to reduce injuries from turbulence, 
(2) the dissemination of pilots' reports of turbulence, and (3) the 
timeliness of weather forecasts to identify turbulent areas. 
Furthermore, FAA encourages and some airlines require passengers to 
keep their seatbelts fastened when seated to help avoid injuries from 
unexpected turbulence.

Currently, pilots rely primarily on other pilots to report when and 
where (e.g., specific altitudes and routes) they have encountered 
turbulent conditions en route to their destinations; however, these 
reports do not accurately identify the location, time, and intensity of 
the turbulence. Further research and testing will be required to 
develop technology to accurately identify turbulence and to make the 
technology affordable to the airlines, which would ultimately bear the 
cost of upgrading their aircraft fleets.

Preparations for In-flight Medical Emergencies:

:

Background:

The Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998 directed FAA to determine 
whether the current minimum requirements for air carriers' emergency 
medical equipment and crewmember emergency medical training should be 
modified. In accordance with the act, FAA collected data for a year on 
in-flight deaths and near deaths and concluded that enhancements to 
medical kits and a requirement for airlines to carry automatic external 
defibrillators were warranted. Specifically, the agency found that 
these improvements would allow cabin crewmembers to deal with a broader 
range of in-flight emergencies.

Status:

On April 12, 2001, FAA issued a final rule requiring air carriers to 
equip their aircraft with enhanced emergency medical kits and automatic 
external defibrillators by May 12, 2004. Most U.S. airlines have 
installed this equipment in advance of the deadline.

In the future, new larger aircraft may require additional improvements 
to meet passengers' medical needs. For example, new large transport 
aircraft, such as the Airbus A-380, will have the capacity to carry 
about 555 people on long-distance flights. Some aviation safety experts 
are concerned that with the large number of passengers on these 
aircraft, the number of in-flight medical emergencies will increase and 
additional precautions for in-flight medical emergencies (e.g., 
dedicating an area for passengers who experience medical emergencies in 
flight) should be considered. Airbus has proposed a medical room in the 
cabin of its A-380 as an option for its customers.

Reducing Health Risks to Passengers with Certain Medical Conditions:

:

Background:

Passengers with certain medical conditions (e.g., heart and lung 
diseases) can be at higher risk of health-related complications from 
air travel than the general population. For example, passengers who 
have limited heart or lung function or have recently had surgery or a 
leg injury can be at greater risk of developing a condition known as 
deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or travelers' thrombosis, in which blood 
clots can develop in the deep veins of the legs from extended periods 
of inactivity. Air travel has not been linked definitively to the 
development of DVT, but remaining seated for extended periods of time, 
whether in one's home or on a long-distance flight, can cause blood to 
pool in the legs and increase the chances of developing DVT. In a small 
percentage of cases, the clots can break free and travel to the lungs, 
with fatal results.

In addition, the reduced levels of oxygen available to passengers in-
flight can have detrimental health effects on passengers with heart, 
circulatory, and respiratory disorders because lower levels of oxygen 
in the air produce lower levels of oxygen in the body--a condition 
known as hypoxia. Furthermore, changes in cabin pressure (primarily 
when the aircraft ascends and descends) can negatively affect ear, 
nose, and throat conditions and pose problems for those flying after 
certain types of surgery (e.g., abdominal, cardiac, and eye surgery).

Status:

Information on the potential effects of air travel on passengers with 
certain medical conditions is available; however, additional research, 
such as on the potential relationship between DVT and air travel, is 
ongoing. The National Research Council, in a 2001 report on airliner 
cabin air quality, recommended, among other things, that FAA increase 
efforts to provide information on health issues related to air travel 
to crewmembers, passengers, and health professionals. According to 
FAA's Federal Air Surgeon, since this recommendation was received, the 
agency has redoubled its efforts to make information and 
recommendations on air travel and medical issues available through its 
Web site [Hyperlink, www.cami.jccbi.gov/aam-400/PassengerHandS.htm] 
www.cami.jccbi.gov/aam-400/PassengerHandS.htm. This site also includes 
links to the Web sites of other organizations with safety and health 
information for air travelers, such as the Aerospace Medical 
Association, the American Family Physician (Medical Advice for 
Commercial Air Travelers), and the Sinus Care Center (Ears, Altitude, 
and Airplane Travel), and videos on safety and health issues for pilots 
and air travelers. The Aerospace Medical Association's Web site, 
[Hyperlink, http://www.asma.org/publication.html] http://www.asma.org/
publication.html, includes guidance for physicians to use in advising 
passengers about the potential risks of flying based on their medical 
conditions, as well as information for passengers to use in determining 
whether air travel is advisable given their medical conditions. 
Furthermore, some airlines currently encourage passengers to do 
exercises while seated, to get up and walk around during long flights, 
or to do both to improve blood circulation; however, walking around the 
airplane can also put passengers at risk of injuries from unexpected 
turbulence. In addition, a prototype of a seat has been designed with 
imbedded sensors, which record the movement of a passenger and send 
this information to the cabin crew for monitoring. The crew would then 
be able to track passengers seated for a long time and could suggest 
that these passengers exercise in their seats or walk in the cabin 
aisles to enhance circulation.

While FAA's Web site on passenger and pilot safety and health provides 
links to related Web sites and videos (e.g., cabin occupant safety and 
health issues), historically, the agency has not tracked who uses its 
Web site or how frequently it is used to monitor the traveling public's 
awareness and use of this site. Agency officials told us that they plan 
to install a counter capability on its Civil Aerospace Medical 
Institute Web site by the end of August 2003 to track the number of 
visits to its aircrew and passenger health and safety Web site. The 
World Health Organization has initiated a study to help determine if a 
linkage exists between DVT and air travel. Further, FAA developed a 
brochure on DVT that has been distributed to aviation medical examiners 
and cited in the Federal Air Surgeon's Bulletin. The brochure is aimed 
at passengers rather than airlines and suggests exercises that can be 
done to promote circulation.

Improved Awareness of Radiation Exposure:

:

Background:

Pilots, flight attendants, and passengers who fly frequently are 
exposed to cosmic radiation at higher levels (on a cumulative basis) 
than the average airline passenger and the general public living at or 
near sea level. This is because they routinely fly at high altitudes, 
which places them closer to outer space, which is the primary source of 
this radiation. High levels of radiation have been linked to an 
increased risk of cancer and potential harm to fetuses. The amount of 
radiation that flight attendants and frequent fliers are exposed to--
referred to as the dose--depends on four primary factors: (1) the 
amount of time spent in flight; (2) the latitude of the flight--
exposure increases at higher latitudes; for example, at the same 
altitude, radiation levels at the poles are about twice those at the 
equator; (3) the altitude of the flight--exposure is greater at high 
altitudes because the layer of protective atmosphere becomes thinner; 
and (4) solar activity--exposure is higher when solar activity 
increases, as it does every 11 years or so. Peak periods of solar 
activity, which can increase exposure to radiation by 10 to 20 times, 
are sometimes called solar storms or solar flares.

Status:

FAA's Web site currently makes available guidance on radiation exposure 
levels and risks for flight and cabin crewmembers, as well as a system 
for calculating radiation doses from flying specific routes and 
specific altitudes. To increase crewmembers' awareness of in-flight 
radiation exposure, FAA issued two Advisory Circulars for crewmembers. 
The first Advisory Circular, issued in 1990, provided information on 
(1) cosmic radiation and air shipments of radioactive material as 
sources of radiation exposure during air travel; (2) guidelines for 
exposure to radiation; (3) estimates of the amounts of radiation 
received on air carriers' flights on various routes to and from, or 
within, the contiguous United States; and (4) examples of calculations 
for estimating health risks from exposure to radiation. The second 
Advisory Circular, issued in 1994, recommended training for crewmembers 
to inform them about in-flight radiation exposure and known associated 
health risks and to assist them in making informed decisions about 
their work on commercial air carriers. The circular provided a possible 
outline of courses, but left it to air carriers to gather the subject 
matter materials. To facilitate the monitoring of radiation exposure 
levels by airliner crewmembers and the public (e.g., frequent fliers), 
FAA has developed a computer model, which is publicly available via the 
agency's Web site. This Web site also provides guidance and 
recommendations on limiting radiation exposure. However, it is unclear 
to what extent flight attendants, flight crews, and frequent fliers are 
aware of and use FAA's Web site to track the radiation exposure levels 
they accrue from flying. Agency officials told us that they plan to 
install a counter capability its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute Web 
site by the end of August 2003, to track the number of visits to its 
aircrew and passenger health and safety Web site. FAA also plans to 
issue an Advisory Circular by early next year, which incorporates the 
findings of a just completed FAA report, "What Aircrews Should Know 
About Their Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation." This Advisory 
Circular will include recommended actions for aircrew and information 
on solar flare event notification of aircrew. While FAA provides 
guidance and recommendations on limiting the levels of cosmic radiation 
that flight attendants and pilots are exposed to, it has not developed 
any regulations.

In contrast, the European Union issued a directive for workers in May 
1996, including air carrier crewmembers (cabin and flight crews) and 
the general public, on basic safety and health protections against 
dangers arising from ionizing radiation. This directive set dose limits 
and required air carriers to (1) assess and monitor the exposure of all 
crewmembers to avoid exceeding exposure limits, (2) work with those 
individuals at risk of high exposure levels to adjust their work or 
flight schedules to reduce those levels, and (3) inform crewmembers of 
the health risks that their work involves from exposure to radiation. 
It also required airlines to work with female crewmembers, when they 
announce a pregnancy, to avoid exposing the fetus to harmful levels of 
radiation. This directive was binding for all European Union member 
states and became effective in May 2000. According to European safety 
officials, pregnant crewmembers are often given the option of an 
alternative job with the airline on the ground to avoid radiation 
exposure to their fetuses. Furthermore, when flight attendants and 
pilots reach recommended exposure limits, European air carriers work 
with crewmembers to limits or change their subsequent flights and 
destinations to minimize exposure levels for the balance of the year. 
Some air carriers ground crewmembers when they reach annual exposure 
limits or change their subsequent flights and destinations to minimize 
exposure levels for the balance of the year.

Occupational Safety and Health Standards for Flight Attendants:

:

Background:

In 1975, FAA assumed responsibility from the Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration (OSHA) for establishing safety and health 
standards for flight attendants. However, FAA has only recently begun 
to take action to provide this workforce with OSHA-like protections. 
For example, in August 2000, FAA and OSHA entered into a memorandum of 
understanding and issued a joint report in December 2000, which 
identified safety and health concerns for the flight attendant 
workforce and the extent to which OSHA-type standards could be used 
without compromising aviation safety. On September 29, 2001, the DOT 
Office of the Inspector General (DOT IG) reported that FAA had made 
little progress toward providing flight attendants with workplace 
protections and urged FAA to address the recommendations in the 
December 2000 report and move forward with setting safety and health 
standards for the flight attendant workforce. In April 2002, the DOT IG 
reported that FAA and OSHA had made no progress since it issued its 
report in September 2001. According to FAA officials, the joint FAA and 
OSHA effort was put on hold because of other priorities that arose in 
response to the events of September 11, 2001.

Status:

FAA has not yet established occupational safety and health standards to 
protect the flight attendant workforce. FAA is conducting research and 
collecting data on flight attendants' injuries and illnesses.

On March 4, 2003, FAA announced the creation of a voluntary program for 
air carriers, called the Aviation Safety and Health Partnership 
Program. Through this program, the agency intends to enter into 
partnership agreements with participating air carriers, which will, at 
a minimum, make data on their employees' injuries and illnesses 
available to FAA for collection and analysis. FAA will then establish 
an Aviation Safety and Health Program Aviation Rule-Making Committee to 
provide advice and recommendations to:

* develop the scope and core elements of the partnership program 
agreement;

* review and analyze the data on employees' injuries and illnesses;

* identify the scope and extent of systematic trends in employees' 
injuries and illnesses;

* recommend remedies to FAA that use all current FAA protocols, 
including rule-making activities if warranted, to abate hazards to 
employees; and:

* create any other advisory and oversight functions that FAA deems 
necessary.

FAA plans to select members to provide a balance of viewpoints, 
interests, and expertise. The program preserves FAA's complete and 
exclusive responsibility for determining whether proposed abatements of 
safety and health hazards would compromise or negatively affect 
aviation safety.

FAA is also funding research through the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to, among other things, 
determine the effects of flying on the reproductive health of flight 
attendants, much of:

which has been completed.[Footnote 81] FAA plans to monitor cabin air 
quality on a selected number of flights, which will help it set 
standards for the flight attendant workforce.

The Association of Flight Attendants has collected a large body of data 
on flight attendants' injuries and illnesses, which it considers 
sufficient for use in establishing safety and health standards for its 
workforce. Officials from the association do not believe that FAA needs 
to collect additional data before starting the standard-setting 
process.

The European Union has occupational safety and health standards in 
place to protect flight attendants, including standards for monitoring 
their levels of radiation exposure. An official from an international 
association of flight attendants told us that while flight attendants 
in Europe have concerns similar to those of flight attendants in the 
United States (e.g., concerns about air quality in airliner cabins), 
the European Union places a heavier emphasis on worker safety and 
health, including safety and health protections for flight attendants.

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: Application of a Cost Analysis Methodology to Inflatable 
Lap Belts:

The following illustrates how a cost analysis might be conducted on 
each of the potential advancements discussed in this report. Costs 
estimated through this analysis could then be weighed against the 
potential lives saved and injuries avoided from implementing the 
advancements. This methodology would allow advancements to be compared 
using comparable cost data that when combined with similar analyses of 
effectiveness to help decisionmakers determine which advancements would 
be most effective in saving lives and avoiding injuries, taking into 
account their costs. The methodology provides for developing a cost 
estimate despite significant uncertainties by making use of historical 
data (e.g, historical variations in fuel prices) and best engineering 
judgments (e.g., how much weight an advancement will add and how much 
it will cost to install, operate, and maintain). The methodology 
formally takes into account the major sources of uncertainty and from 
that information develops a range of cost estimates, including a most 
likely cost estimate. Through a common approach for analyzing costs, 
the methodology facilitates the development of comparable estimates. 
This methodology can be applied to advancements in various stages of 
development.

Inflatable Lap Belts:

Inflatable lap belts are designed to protect passengers from a fatal 
impact with the interior of the airplane, the most common cause of 
death in survivable accidents. Inflatable seat belts adapt advanced 
automobile technology to airplane seats in the form of seat belts with 
air bags embedded in them. Several hundred of these seatbelt airbags 
have been installed in commercial airliners in bulkhead rows.

Summary of Results:

We calculated that requiring these belts on an average-sized airplane 
in the U.S. passenger fleet would be likely to cost from $98,000 to 
$198,000 and to average about $140,000 over the life of the airplane. 
On an annual basis, the cost would be likely to range from $8,000 to 
$17,000 and to average $12,000.

We considered several factors to explain this range of possible costs. 
The installation price of these belts is subject to uncertainty because 
of their limited production to date. In addition, these belts add 
weight to an aircraft, resulting in additional fuel costs. Fuel costs 
depend on the price of jet fuel and on how many hours the average 
airplane operates, both subject to uncertainty. Table 5 lists the 
results of our cost analysis for an average-sized airplane in the U.S. 
fleet.

Table 4: Costs to Equip an Average-sized Airplane in the U.S. Fleet 
with Inflatable Lap Seat Belts, Estimated under Alternative Scenarios 
(In 2002 discounted dollars):

Cost: Life-cycle; Cost scenario: Low: $98,000; Cost scenario: 
Average: $140,000; Cost scenario: High: $198,000; Cost scenario: 95 
percentile[A]: $186,000.

Cost: Annualized; Cost scenario: Low: $8,000; Cost scenario: 
Average: $12,000; Cost scenario: High: $17,000; Cost scenario: 95 
percentile[A]: $16,000.

Cost: Per ticket[B]; Cost scenario: Low: $0.08; Cost scenario: 
Average: $0.13; Cost scenario: High: $0.19; Cost scenario: 95 
percentile[A]: $0.18.

Source: GAO analysis.

[A] For example, a 95 percentile estimate means that there is a 95 
percent probability that the total life-cycle costs per airplane will 
be $186,000 or less.

[B] Cost rounded to the nearest cent.

[End of table]

According to our analysis, the life-cycle and annualized cost estimates 
in table 5 are influenced most by variations in jet fuel prices, 
followed by the average number of hours flown per year and the 
installation price of the belts. The cost per ticket is influenced most 
by variations in jet fuel prices, followed by the average number of 
hours flown per year, the number of aircraft in the U.S. fleet, and the 
number of passenger tickets issued.

Methodology:

To analyze the cost of inflatable lap belts, we collected data on key 
cost variables from a variety of sources. Information on the belts' 
installation price, annual maintenance and refurbishment costs, and 
added weight was obtained from belt manufacturers. Historical 
information on jet fuel prices, extra gallons of jet fuel consumed by a 
heavier airplane, average hours flown per year, average number of seats 
per airplane, number of airplanes in the U.S. fleet, and number of 
passenger tickets issued per year was obtained from FAA and DOT's 
Office of Aviation Statistics.

To account for variation in the values of these cost variables, we 
performed a Monte Carlo simulation.[Footnote 82] In this simulation, 
values were randomly drawn 10,000 times from probability distributions 
characterizing possible values for the number of seat belts per 
airplane, seat belt installation price, jet fuel price, number of 
passenger tickets, number of airplanes, and hours flown.[Footnote 83] 
This simulation resulted in forecasts of the life-cycle cost per 
airplane, the annualized cost per airplane, and the cost per ticket.

Major assumptions in the cost analysis are described by probability 
distributions selected for these cost variables. For jet fuel prices, 
average number of hours flown per year, and average number of seats per 
airplane, historical data were matched against possible probability 
distributions.[Footnote 84] Mathematical tests were performed to find 
the best fit between each probability distribution and the data set's 
distribution. For the installation price, number of passenger tickets, 
and number of airplanes, less information was available.[Footnote 85] 
For these variables, we selected probability distributions that are 
widely used by researchers. Table 6 lists the type of probability 
distribution and the relevant parameters of each distribution for the 
cost variables.

Table 5: Key Assumptions:

Cost variable: Fuel price; Type of distribution: lognormal; Mean or 
average: $0.93; Standard deviation: $0.33.

Cost variable: Seats; Type of distribution: lognormal; Mean or average: 
161; Standard deviation: 8.

Cost variable: Installation price; Minimum: $300; 
Maximum: $600; Likeliest: $450.

Cost variable: Hours; Type of distribution: extreme value; Mean or 
average: 2,353; Mode: 2,643; Scale: 539.

Cost variable: Airplanes; Type of distribution: normal; Mean or 
average: 4,438; Standard deviation: 399.

Cost variable: Tickets; Type of distribution: normal; Mean or average: 
419; Standard deviation: 35.

Source: GAO analysis.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts: 

Gerald L. Dillingham (202) 512-2834 Glen Trochelman (202) 512-2834 
Beverly Norwood 	 (202) 512-2834:

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those named above, Chuck Bausell, Helen Chung, Elizabeth 
Eisenstadt, David Ehrlich, Bert Japikse, Sarah Lynch, Sara Ann 
Moessbauer, and Anthony Patterson made key contributions to this 
report.

(540017):

FOOTNOTES

[1] Large, or 'transport category' commercial aircraft are defined as 
those with a capacity of 30 or more passengers or a load of 7,500 
pounds or more.

[2] In identifying 28 advancements, we are not suggesting that these 
are the only advancements being pursued, rather that these advancements 
have been recognized by aviation safety experts we contacted as 
offering promise for improving the safety and health of cabin 
occupants.

[3] A separate rule-making effort in 1988 required that newly 
manufactured aircraft be equipped with stronger, 16g seats; however, it 
did not require that the existing U.S. fleet of commercial aircraft be 
retrofitted with these seats.

[4] FAA officials told us that using photo-luminescent lighting is a 
different way to meet an existing standard and, therefore, should not 
be considered an advancement in safety. However, because photo-
luminescent floor lighting differs from standard floor lighting in that 
it works without electricity, some in the aviation community consider 
it a safety advancement.

[5] NTSB, Survivability of Accidents Involving Part 121 U.S. Air 
Carrier Operations, 1983 Through 2000, NTSB/SR-01/01.

[6] FAA subsequently proposed, in October 2002, that the 16g seats be 
put into the entire existing fleet for both passengers and flight 
attendants within 14 years to better protect passengers from impact 
forces. We included this proposal in our list of advancements.

[7] Affected aircraft included Boeing MD-80, MD-88, MD-90, DC-10, and 
MD-11.

[8] According to FAA, Boeing is flight testing a system similar to the 
FAA design, and Airbus is flight testing the FAA system in an A320. 
Boeing announced that it would begin installing inerting systems 
similar to the FAA design in their 747s in 2005.

[9] As noted, actions taken to improve cabin air quality will be 
discussed in another report.

[10] ATA noted that, for those technologies that are ready, FAA must 
develop design and certification standards before undertaking the rule-
making process to require their implementation.

[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Rule-making: Further 
Reform Is Needed to Address Long-standing Problems, GAO-01-821 
(Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001).

[12] Under Executive Order 12866, federal agencies and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) categorize proposed and final rules in 
terms of their potential impact on the economy and the industry 
affected. The Order defines a regulatory action as "significant" if it, 
among other things, has an annual impact on the economy of $100 million 
or more and adversely affects the economy in a material way. To measure 
the overall impact of the 1998-rule-making reforms, through discussions 
with FAA officials, we created a database of 76 significant rules. 
These rules constituted the majority (about 83 percent) of FAA's 
significant rule workload from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 
2000.

[13] According to ATA, even if a technology is available in the 
marketplace, it may not be adopted by the airlines until it has been 
certified by FAA--ensuring that "improvements" do not inadvertently 
compromise overall safety of the aircraft.

[14] One of these U.S. carriers is no longer in bankruptcy.

[15] A Monte Carlo simulation is a widely used computational method for 
generating probability distributions of variables that depend on other 
variables or parameters represented as probability distributions.

[16] The Headquarters Division of Transport Canada provides guidance 
and assistance to Regional Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors -
Occupational Health and Safety who conduct inspections, investigations, 
and promotional visits to ensure that airline operators are committed 
to the safety and health of their employees.

[17] The European Union, previously known as the European Community, is 
an institutional framework for the construction of a united Europe. The 
European Commission is a governing body that proposes policies and 
legislation.

[18] JAA currently has 26 full members and 11 candidate members.

[19] According to officials from the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation 
Authority, a JAA member, a limited benefit analysis has been developed 
to provide guidance, but this document has not yet been published. 

[20] On July 15, 2002, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union (E.U.) adopted Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 establishing 
common rules for the E.U. in the field of civil aviation and 
establishing a new European Aviation Safety Agency.

[21] Officials with the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority 
commented that inflatable airbags are but one solution for providing 
upper torso restraint. These officials cited a European Union funded 
"Going Safe" seat, which through an energy-absorbing device enables a 
lap and diagonal belt system to be fitted to an unmodified seat rail.

[22] R.G.W. Cherry & Associates, Analysis of Structural Factors 
Influencing the Survivability of Occupants in Aeroplane Accidents, 
Civil Aviation Authority, Paper 96011 (London: December 1996). 

[23] The 1988 seat dynamic performance standards changed seat standards 
and testing. The new standards expanded seat testing to include 
potential injuries caused by head strikes on the back of seats and on 
stationary bulkheads, as well as criteria limiting lumbar and femur 
loads. These limits, if exceeded, could cause injuries that could 
prevent evacuation. Seats must be tested for forces in several 
directions to account for forward, downward, and other directional 
movements such as may occur in an accident. Previous FAA regulations 
required seats to be tested in only one primary direction at 9gs of 
force. The 16g level was adopted rather than a higher standard because 
the floor tracks of many of the airplanes in use in 1988 would break 
away upon an impact of more than 16gs. 

[24] The initial proposed rule, Retrofit of Improved Seats in Air 
Carrier Transport-Category Airplanes, 53 Fed. Reg. 17650 (1988) 
proposed requiring compliance with improved crashworthiness standards 
for all seats of transport-category airplanes used under part 121 and 
part 135 and prohibiting the operation of these airplanes unless all 
seats met the crashworthiness performance standards required by 
Improved Seat Safety Standards, 53 Fed. Reg. 17640 (1988).

[25] In general, most 16g-compatible seats meet the structural 
requirements of the 16g seat rule but do not need to meet the head 
injury criteria. 

[26] Each aircraft type typically has 8 to 10 different types of seats, 
each of which must be certified; a typical economy class seat costs 
about $1,800. For marketing reasons, airlines usually choose their own 
distinctive seats, which must be certified for each type of airplane 
they fly. 

[27] According to a Boeing Official, one cost estimate compiled by ATA 
and the Aerospace Industries Association in response to NPRM 88-8 
presented in December 1988 showed the recurring per program cost [was 
listed] at $440,000.

[28] R.G.W. Cherry & Associates, Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16-g 
Dynamic Seats, DOT/FAA/AR-00/13 (Washington, D.C.: April 2000). This 
study examined 25 large commercial airplane accidents that occurred 
from 1984 and through 1998 and possibly involved seat-related 
fatalities or injuries. 

[29] In commenting on the proposed 16g seat retrofit rule, Boeing noted 
that there were fundamental, fatal flaws in both the analysis of 
benefits and the analysis of costs of implementing this rule. 

[30] Until recently, FAA generally did not require a manufacturer to 
meet new, higher safety standards that are put in place after the date 
the manufacturer applies for a type certificate unless FAA can 
demonstrate that an unsafe condition exists. FAA's changed product rule 
requires manufacturers to comply with the latest airworthiness 
standards when significant design changes are proposed for a derivative 
aircraft that will be certificated under an amended or supplemental 
type certificate. 65 Fed. Reg. 36244 (2002).

[31] Improved Seats in Air Carrier Transport Category Airplanes, 67 
Fed. Reg. 62294 (2002).

[32] FAA assumed benefits of $3 million for an averted fatality and 
$0.5 million for an averted serious injury. 

[33] A study of survivable accidents that took place from 1970 through 
1978 indicated that floor deformation during a crash was a primary 
cause of seat failure in 60 percent of the accidents. (Chandler, et 
al., DOT/FAA/CT-82-118)

[34] In the dynamic 16g seat test with a deformed floor, one floor 
track must be pitched 10 degrees (up or down) relative to the other 
floor track, which must in turn be rolled 10 degrees. 

[35] Some 16g-compatible seats were manufactured to meet 16g dynamic 
testing standards but did not complete FAA's certification process for 
floor deformation on representative floors and seat tracks and 
technically met only the 9g seat certification requirements. 

[36] Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME near Kegworth, 
Leicestershire, on 8 January 1989, Aircraft Accident Report 4/90, AAIB, 
DOT, London, HMSO; "Recommendations for Injury Prevention in Transport 
Aviation Accidents," prepared for NASA, Langley Research Center, by 
Simula Technologies, Inc., February 2, 2000, TR-99112, S97324. 

[37] "Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 16-g Dynamic Seats," Final Report, 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT/FAA/AR-00/13) and U.K Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA Paper 99003).

[38] R.G.W. Cherry & Associates, Analysis of Structural Factors 
Influencing the Survivability of Occupants in Aeroplane Accidents, 
Civil Aviation Authority, Paper 96011 (London: December 1996). 

[39] Flight Safety Foundation, "Increased Amount and Types of Carry-On 
Baggage Bring New Industry Responses," November-December 1997, Vol. 32, 
No. 6, p. 6.

[40] Bins are required to withstand 9g forward (longitudinal), 3g 
upward, 6g downward, and other load requirements.

[41] One manufacturer's testing shows that the inflatable lap belts can 
reduce head injury criteria scores from about 2,000 to 200-300 in a 16g 
impact. A score of 1,000 implies a skull fracture, possible loss of 
consciousness, and a 16 percent risk of life-threatening brain injury.

[42] At an annual life-cycle cost of approximately $12,000 to outfit an 
average airliner with lap belt air bags on all seats of the U.S. fleet, 
assuming an installation cost of $450 per seat position not including 
maintenance and replacement costs. A GAO analysis of the 2002 Annual 
Report of Southwest Airlines, which has relatively low passenger 
revenue per available seat mile compared with other airlines, found 
that each seat produced an annual net revenue of about $10,000. See 
appendix VIII for our analysis of the costs associated with lap belts. 

[43] According to the manufacturer, the installation of the most common 
design requires maintenance of one minute per seat position for a 
diagnostic test every 1,900 flight hours, and the devices must be 
refurbished about once every 7 years at about a third of the initial 
price.

[44] ATA noted that more than 80 fuel tank Airworthiness Directives 
have been adopted since the crash of TWA Flight 800 and that a similar 
number of directives are currently under development.

[45] The committee also estimated, on the basis of data on nitrogen 
exposure from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, that from 24 to 
81 lives could be lost over the same period, depending on the degree of 
oxygen depletion. The report did not specifically indicate whether this 
forecast was for a ground-based, onboard, hybrid, or any other inerting 
system.

[46] By using more general terminology, this terminology excludes 
hybrid and liquid nitrogen inerting systems, also considered by the 
Aviation Rule-making Advisory Committees for their 1998 and 2001 
reports.

[47] According to an FAA safety expert, FAA is addressing only the 
center wing tank because of its significantly higher flammability 
exposure and the low risk of an explosion in the wing tanks.

[48] A current controversial issue is whether inerting technology will 
be considered flight-critical hardware--and therefore will be required 
to function properly for the aircraft to fly. If it is deemed flight 
critical, its reliability may affect the dispatch rate of the aircraft. 
For example, if the technology experiences operational problems, the 
aircraft may be allowed to fly only 25 times a week, even if it is 
scheduled to fly 30 times a week. This problem reduces revenue to the 
airline and is a greater concern for civilian than for military 
aviation, because there are usually replacements for military aircraft.

[49] FAA fuel tank safety experts conducted tests under high 
temperatures and found that a tank with an oxygen level of 12 percent 
was inert against internal threats, such as sparks and hot surfaces. 
According to one FAA expert, the system provides a "below 12 percent" 
inert tank under all conditions except for a brief time during descent 
when local pockets in the tank may approach 16 percent oxygen. The 
expert said that at this time, the tank is generally cool enough to be 
nonflammable even with normal air (21 percent oxygen) in the tank. If 
the tank is cool enough, internal threats will not ignite the fuel air 
mixture. He said the probability of explosions is very low in the wing 
tanks because they are not heated by other airplane systems.

[50] These estimates included the costs for modifying aircraft that are 
currently in service, in production, and being designed, and they 
assumed a predicted reduction in the accident rate of 75 percent.

[51] This system does not have the capability to inert the cargo 
compartment, bay, and wheel well, and it dumps oxygen as effluent 
rather than using it for an emergency passenger oxygen system.

[52] A 2001 NASA study indicated that two liquid nitrogen systems were 
the only ones that appeared capable of inerting all fuel tanks of a 
commercial aircraft full time.

[53] One type of smart sensor would analyze the light-scattering 
properties of the particles in the air to differentiate between smoke 
particles and nuisance sources.

[54] Aircraft Cargo Compartment Smoke Detector Alarm Incidents on U.S.-
Registered Aircraft, 1974-1999, DOT/FAA/AR-TN00/29 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 2000). The study indicated a generally increasing number of false 
alarms as the size of the fleet grew.

[55] Operating requirements for all aircraft have been amended by a 
2000 final rule, whose deadline was recently extended for the third 
time, to report the occurrence or detection of failures, malfunctions, 
or defects concerning fire warning systems and false warnings of fire 
or smoke in the entire U.S. fleet.

[56] According to FAA fire safety experts, most of these are 
contaminated air or smoke events in the cabin, detected by people, not 
by detectors.

[57] This recommendation was one of several resulting from the Canadian 
Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the Swissair Flight 111 
crash.

[58] A use is considered "critical" when a need exists to protect 
against fire or explosion risks in areas that would result in a serious 
threat to essential services or pose an unacceptable threat to life, 
the environment, or national security. Typical critical users are 
aerospace, certain petrochemical production processors, certain marine 
applications, and national defense.

[59] Flashover can occur in an airplane cabin fire when all exposed 
combustible surfaces reach ignition temperature more or less 
simultaneously. It is characterized by rapid increases in temperature, 
with smoke, toxic gases, and oxygen depletion creating a largely 
nonsurvivable environment.

[60] R.G.W. Cherry & Associates, Analysis of Structural Factors 
Influencing the Survivability of Occupants in Aeroplane Accidents, 
Civil Aviation Authority, Paper 96011 (London: December 1996).

[61] Increasing the Survival Rate in Aircraft Accidents: Impact 
Protection, Fire Survivability, and Evacuation, European Transport 
Safety Council (December 1996).

[62] Twin-fluid systems use air, nitrogen, or another gas in 
combination with water. They require lower water supply pressure and 
bigger nozzle orifices.

[63] Inerting involves reducing flammability in fuel tanks, which is 
discussed separately in this report.

[64] Boeing commented that this more recent system would not pass the 
original cargo minimum performance standard, and Boeing disagrees with 
FAA's relaxing of the original standard.

[65] An average widebody aircraft carries 50,000 gallons of aviation 
fuel at takeoff.

[66] Fuels function by releasing combustible gases. Indicators of 
volatility include a fuel's boiling point (the higher the boiling 
point, the less volatile the fuel) and vapor pressure (the higher the 
vapor pressure, the more volatile the fuel). Therefore, raising the 
temperature can increase volatility. A highly volatile fuel is more 
likely to form a flammable or explosive mixture with air than a 
nonvolatile fuel. By definition, gases are volatile. Liquid fuels 
either are sufficiently volatile at room temperature to produce 
combustible vapor (ethanol, petrol) or they produce sufficient 
combustible vapors when heated (kerosene).

[67] The fuel vaporization rate is the minimum temperature to which the 
pure liquid fuel must be heated so that the vapor pressure is high 
enough for an explosive mixture to be formed with air--then the liquid 
is allowed to evaporate and is brought into contact with a flame, 
spark, or hot filament. Flash points are lower than ignition 
temperatures.

[68] A surfactant, or surface-active agent, is a soluble compound that 
reduces the surface tension of liquids, or reduces interfacial tension 
between two liquids or a liquid and a solid. A gelling agent is a fuel 
"thickener."

[69] FAA's benefit estimate, based on $2.7 million per life saved, 
ranges from $37.7 million to $231.5 million, discounted to present 
value, based partially on 37.2 deaths avoided from its 2000 study. FAA 
could not quantify benefits from flame propagation requirements, but 
indicated that avoiding an accident with 169 passenger fatalities would 
avert a $231.5 million loss (not including the cost of the plane).

[70] Improved Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic Insulation 
Materials Used in Transport Category Airplanes; Final Rule, FAA/DOT (14 
C.F.R. parts 25, 91, et al.).

[71] These methods test the heat release rate, total heat of combustion 
of the volatiles, thermal stability, char yield, decomposition process, 
and rate of decomposition.

[72] This manual is designed to provide the aviation community with 
basic flight information and air traffic control procedures for use in 
the National Airspace System of the United States.

[73] NTSB, Safety Study: Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airlines, 
[A-00-86] (Washington, D.C.: 2001).

[74] These estimates assume 100 percent smoke hood use. The net 97 
lives saved with a 15 second delay assumes that smoke hoods would have 
saved lives in six accidents and cost lives in four; the net 145 lives 
saved with a 10 percent reduction in the evacuation rate assumes that 
smoke hoods would have saved lives in six accidents and cost lives in 
two.

[75] "Smoke Hoods: Net Safety Benefit Analysis," a collaborative effort 
by the Civil Aviation Authority, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile, and Transport Canada, London, 
November 1987, CAA Paper 87017.

[76] NTSB, Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes, 2001, [A-00-
76] (Washington, D.C.:2000).

[77] The overwing exit hatch can weigh as much as 65 pounds and be 20 
inches wide and 36 inches high.

[78] NTSB, Emergency Evacuation of Commercial Airplanes, [A-00-76] 
(Washington, D.C., 2000).

[79] LB & M Associates, Inc., and Garnet A. McLean, Analysis of 
Ditching and Water Survival Training Programs of Major Airframe 
Manufacturers and Airlines, CAMI [DOT/FAA/AM-98/19], (Washington, 
D.C.).

[80] LIDAR (LIght Detection And Ranging) is a technology that can 
measure the distance, speed, rotation, and chemical composition and 
concentration of a remote target, such as turbulence. 

[81] NIOSH is also conducting research on airliner cabin environmental 
quality, respiratory symptoms of flight attendants, and disease 
transmission.

[82] "Monte Carlo simulation is a widely used computational method for 
generating probability distributions of variables that depend on other 
variables or parameters represented as probability distributions. Monte 
Carlo methods are to be contrasted with the deterministic methods used 
to generate specific single number or point estimates." Susan Poulter, 
"Monte Carlo Simulation in Environmental Risk Assessment - Science, 
Policy And Legal Issues," 9 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 7 
[Winter 1998]. 

[83] A probability distribution is a set of all possible events and 
their associated probabilities. Probability refers to the likelihood of 
an event.

[84] Historical data from 1975 through 2001 were available for the 
number of seats per plane, and from 1977 through 2002 for jet fuel 
prices. Aircraft utilization data for 2001 were available for annual 
hours per aircraft. 

[85] Historical data from 1995 through 2001 were available for the 
number of planes and tickets.

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