

ASRS Database Report Set

Air Carrier (FAR 121) Flight Crew Fatigue Reports

Report Set Description	A sampling of reports referencing air carrier (FAR 121) flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods.
Update Number	11
Date of Update.....	January 9, 2009
Number of Records in Report Set	50
Number of New Records in Report Set.....	41
Type of Records in Report Set	For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Report Synopses

ACN: 803874 (1 of 50)

Synopsis

B777 RELIEF PLT WAS SENT OUT OF BASE TO FLY ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK BECAUSE TWO OTHER PLTS HAD CALLED IN FATIGUED.

ACN: 803788 (2 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757-200 CAPT FAILED TO SET THE BRAKES PRIOR TO ENG START AND HE MENTIONED FATIGUE AS A FACTOR.

ACN: 803734 (3 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW REPORTS RECEIVING NO DOCUMENTATION OF MAINT REQUIRED BEING PERFORMED ON THEIR ACFT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

ACN: 803279 (4 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR FO REPORTED ACCIDENTALLY LEAVING AN ENG RUNNING AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE. HE CITES FATIGUE AND DISTRACTION AS FACTORS IN THE INCIDENT.

ACN: 802573 (5 of 50)

Synopsis

DISPATCHED WITH ONLY A SINGLE MCDU ERJ-175 FLT CREW IS STYMIED WHEN IT BECOMES DYSFUNCTIONAL. MUST LAND AT A DIVERSION ARPT ACCOUNT UNABLE TO CHANGE COM FREQUENCIES.

ACN: 797804 (6 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 CAPT REPORTS FIRE ALARMS AT LAYOVER HOTEL RESULTING IN INSUFFICIENT REST. LOW MORALE AND LACK OF SUPPORT FROM MANAGEMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE GROUPS IS ALSO DESCRIBED IN THIS FATIGUE RPT.

ACN: 797800 (7 of 50)

Synopsis

FO DESCRIBES FATIGUE AND FAMILY ISSUES LEADING UP TO A SICK CALL.

ACN: 797491 (8 of 50)

Synopsis

A B747 CREW SET THE ALTIMETERS TO 29.96 HG INSTEAD OF 996 HP AND WERE 400 FT LOW ON APCH. THE CREW WAS EXTREMELY FATIGUED.

ACN: 797420 (9 of 50)

Synopsis

BESET BY FATIGUE, DISTRS AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE, PROBATIONARY FO OF CARJ RESPONDS INCORRECTLY TO TCAS RA, CLBING INSTEAD OF DSNDING AS DIRECTED.

ACN: 796357 (10 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR B737 PILOT REPORTED CALLING IN FATIGUED FOR HIS FLIGHT BECAUSE OF LACK OF SLEEP DUE TO STRESS OVER IMPENDING JOB LOSS.

ACN: 796355 (11 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757-200 FLT CREW FAILED TO MAKE A CROSS RESTR ON THE ELDEE ARR INTO DCA.

ACN: 796347 (12 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT DESCRIBES THE FATIGUE FROM ATTEMPTING TO SLEEP IN FOUR TIMES ZONES IN 48 HOURS. THE PLT CALLED IN FATIGUED ON DAY FIVE OF A FIVE DAY TRIP.

ACN: 796116 (13 of 50)

Synopsis

ACR FLT CREW HAS TXWY INCURSION AT ORD WHILE ASSESSING RWY LENGTH REQUIRED FOR ACFT WEIGHT.

ACN: 795886 (14 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A319'S ADR #2 WAS MEL'ED AFTER A MECH INCORRECTLY MEL'ED ADIRS #2. MEL'ING EITHER SYSTEM REQUIRED PULLING SPECIFIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THE CREW BELIEVED THE MECH ERRED. THE CREW'S CIRCUIT BREAKER CONFIGURATION MAY HAVE BEEN INCORRECT ALSO.

ACN: 795855 (15 of 50)

Synopsis

CAPT AND DISPATCHER NAME BFI AS AN ALTERNATE FOR ACFT INBOUND TO SEA. FAIL TO NOTE THE INTENDED, LONGER, RWY IS NOTAMED CLOSED.

ACN: 795806 *(16 of 50)***Synopsis**

B737 FO FACING PENDING FURLOUGH AND PERSONAL ISSUES REQUESTS TO BE RELEASED DUE TO FATIGUE.

ACN: 795582 *(17 of 50)***Synopsis**

A B737 FO DESCRIBES FATIGUE FROM FIVE DAYS OF MIXED EARLY AND LATE FLYING, PHYSICAL ILLNESS, AND AN INABILITY TO SLEEP AT SOME HOTELS.

ACN: 795571 *(18 of 50)***Synopsis**

AN INT'L B757 PILOT REPORTS ERRORS CAUSED BY VERY SIMILAR INT'L FLT CALL SIGNS WHEN SPEAKING WITH BOTH ACCENTED FOREIGN CTLR AND US CTLRS.

ACN: 795495 *(19 of 50)***Synopsis**

FATIGUED AND RUSHED, CAPT OF E190 PUSHES WRONG SWITCH TO COMPLY WITH MEL REQUIREMENTS.

ACN: 795489 *(20 of 50)***Synopsis**

B737 FLT CREW DIVERTS TO IAD AFTER RAIN AND INOPERATIVE COMPONENTS MAKE LANDING AT DCA DICEY.

ACN: 795470 *(21 of 50)***Synopsis**

A B767 EXECUTED A GAR ON A CAT III APCH AFTER THE ACFT EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY DOWNGRADED TO CAT 1. THE FLT DIVERTED TO AN ALTERNATE.

ACN: 795365 *(22 of 50)***Synopsis**

A DASH 8 FLT CREW RPTD THAT AFTER A POOR NIGHT'S SLEEP IN A NOISY HOTEL THEY INADVERTENTLY FLEW A ONE HOUR LEG WITH THE GEAR DOWN.

ACN: 795258 (23 of 50)

Synopsis

AN OCEANIC ACR CREW REPORTS A CPDLC CLB CLRNC WITH A SPECIFIC TIME TO START THE CLB. THE CREW CLBED EARLY BECAUSE THEY SAW THE CLRNC BUT MISSED THE TIME CONSTRAINT.

ACN: 794743 (24 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 PILOT REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES FATIGUE CONTRIBUTED TO MAINT CONTROL DEFERRING THE #1 ENG IDG FAULT LIGHT AS INOP, WHEN IN FACT THE #2 ENG IDG FAULT LIGHT WAS INOP. PREVIOUS FLT CREWS ALSO MISSED ITEM.

ACN: 794271 (25 of 50)

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW REPORTS HUNG START WITH HIGH EGT AND ENGINE IS SHUT DOWN AND RESTARTED. DURING DEPARTURE ENGINE VIBRATION IS HIGH AND COMPRESSOR STALLS WHEN THROTTLE IS RETARDED. EMER IS DECLARED AND FLT CREW RETURNS.

ACN: 793915 (26 of 50)

Synopsis

A CRJ200 CAPT REPORTS BEING SO FATIGUED AFTER A 6 DAY 29 HR 33 MIN TRIP THAT HE FAILED TO REMOVED ELECTRICAL POWER AND SECURE THE ACFT BEFORE GOING HOME.

ACN: 793908 (27 of 50)

Synopsis

A B757-200 CAPT REPORTS MISSING AN APCH LIGHT INOP NOTAM NOTICE AND FLYING AN ILS TO CAT I MINIMUMS WHEN INOP APCH LIGHTS REQUIRED A HIGHER MINIMUM.

ACN: 793579 (28 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 PILOT FAILED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR UNTIL 1000 FT. A GAR WAS EXECUTED. FATIGUE WAS AN ISSUE, THIS WAS THE END OF AN 8 FLT HR DAY WITH TSTMS.

ACN: 793535 (29 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT DESCRIBES THE FATIGUE AND RESULTING ERROR AFTER THE FIRST LEG OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIP AT THE DESTINATION.

ACN: 793442 (30 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS TOO FATIGUED TO WORK AFTER A 4 DAY TRIP AND WAS TOLD BY HIS ACR THAT HE WILL BE CONSIDERED RESTED IN 14 HOURS. HE IS THREATENED AFTER REFUSING TO COMMIT BECAUSE HE MAY NEED MORE RECOVERY TIME.

ACN: 793064 (31 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS HIS ACR DENIED HIM COMPENSATORY REST FOLLOWING 14:20 HOURS ON DUTY DAY WITH 9+37 ACTUAL FLT TIME. THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY MADE ACCURATE FAA REST REQUIREMENT DETERMINATIONS DIFFICULT.

ACN: 792763 (32 of 50)

Synopsis

DISTRACTED BY NEW CLRNCs, WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH SINGLE ENGINE TAXI AND A CHANGED DEP RWY, A320 FLT CREW FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF ACTIVE RWY AS CLRED. ACFT ON FINAL MUST GAR.

ACN: 792575 (33 of 50)

Synopsis

A B737 CREW DEPARTING DFW MISSED A PDC CLRNC CHANGE ASSIGNING A SID. BOTH PILOTS HAD EXAMINED THE PDC CAREFULLY. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR.

ACN: 792446 (34 of 50)

Synopsis

UNDER EXTRAORDINARY DURESS FROM PAX BEING DEPORTED ENGAGING IN PHYSICAL CONFRONTATIONS WITH THEIR GUARDS, DC10 CAPTAIN DISREGARDS COMPANY POLICY BY DIRECTING THE FLT AND CABIN CREWS TO DEPART THE ACFT WHILE THE VIOLENT DEPLANING PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 792421 (35 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 CREW WAS LATE BEGINNING THE DSCNT AND MISSED TWO INTXN CROSSINGS. ATC ASKED WHY AND CREW REPLIED FATIGUE AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT.

ACN: 792318 (36 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS EXCEEDING 250 KTS ON THE GORMAN (GMN) FOUR DEP PRIOR TO ATC'S NORMAL SPEED CLRNC. RPTR STATES THAT CHART FORMAT AND FATIGUE WERE FACTORS.

ACN: 791989 (37 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR FLT CREW RPTS THAT, FATIGUED AFTER A LONG DAY, THE CAPT WAS TAXIING TO THE GATE INCORRECTLY AND CONVINCED OF HIS ROUTING DID NOT TAKE THE FO'S INPUT.

ACN: 791355 (38 of 50)

Synopsis

CRJ-200 FLT CREW BEGINS TAXI BEFORE GND CREW SALUTE, STRIKE TOW BAR AND INJURE CABIN ATTENDANT.

ACN: 790967 (39 of 50)

Synopsis

AN ACR PLT DESCRIBES A STATE OF FATIGUE SO DEEP AND INSIDIOUS THAT HE DID NOT REALIZE UNTIL AFTER REST HOW DANGEROUS A SITUATION THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS.

ACN: 790741 (40 of 50)

Synopsis

A CAPT AND DISPATCHER REPORT MISSING A MEL FOR ONE GEAR DOOR REMOVAL WHEN MAINT ACTUALLY REMOVED BOTH DOORS. THE CAPT CITES FATIGUE.

ACN: 790682 (41 of 50)

Synopsis

FATIGUED, RUSHED, BEHIND DUE TO LACK OF RECENT OCEANIC EXPERIENCE, B767-300 FO PROVIDES TKOF V SPEEDS BASED ON 100,000 POUNDS LESS THAN ACTUAL TOGW OF 370K. EVENTUAL RECOGNITION AND ENOUGH RWY ALLOW RECOVERY.

ACN: 790298 (42 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW CITES RWY CHANGE AND FATIGUING SCHEDULE AS DISTR CAUSING 300 KTS PASSING 9000 FT.

ACN: 785313 (43 of 50)

Synopsis

A FATIGUED B757 CREW ON THE LAX SEAVU RWY 25L ARR WAS CHANGED TO RWY 24R BUT DUE TO A FMC PROGRAMMING ERROR NEEDED VECTORS TO THE ARPT.

ACN: 785150 (44 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 REPORTS CROSSING THE REVUE WAYPOINT ON THE DCA ELDEE ARR LOW. THE WORKLOAD IS HIGH AND THE NUMBER OF CHANGES TO THE ARRIVAL CONFUSING.

ACN: 784547 (45 of 50)

Synopsis

A FATIGUED A319 CREW LANDING ORD RWY 28 LINED UP FOR RWY 22L AFTER THE FO MISREAD THE ARPT CHART WHERE RWY 28 NUMBERS APPEAR NEAR RWY 22L PICTURE.

ACN: 781691 (46 of 50)

Synopsis

A310 FLT CREW MISSED A TURN ISSUED BY ATC WHILE TAXIING IN. THIS RESULTED IN PROCEEDING DOWN A TXWY WHICH APPARENTLY IS WEIGHT RESTRICTED. NEITHER CHARTS NOR NOTAMS INDICATE THIS RESTRICTION.

ACN: 781596 (47 of 50)

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW DEPARTING LAX FAILS TO NOTE DEPARTURE CHANGE IN AMENDED SECTION OF PDC. ATC ISSUES VECTOR TO NEXT FIX.

ACN: 776885 (48 of 50)

Synopsis

AN A320 ON AN LAX ARR WAS CHANGED FROM 25L TO 24R AT 12000 FT. WHILE SELECTING THE NEW RWY, THE ACFT DSNDDED TO 8000 FT AT 300 KT MISSING THE 9000 FT CONSTRAINT.

ACN: 772021 (49 of 50)

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS MISUNDERSTANDING CONTROLLER ISSUING NEW RWY ASSIGNMENT AND NEW ALTITUDE. FLT CREW SETS QNH PRIOR TO DESCENDING BELOW TRANSITION LEVEL.

ACN: 771204 *(50 of 50)*

Synopsis

A WDB FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED SPEED ON ARR INTO SBGR.

Report Narratives

ACN: 803874

Time / Day

Date : 200809

Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport

State Reference : FO

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B777-200

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

ASRS Report : 803874

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS NOTIFIED BY SCHEDULING THAT I WAS JUNIOR MAN TO FLY A 4 DAY TRIP OUT OF BASE. THE SCHEDULER SAID 2 JUNIOR FO'S CALLED IN SICK. SHE SAID IT WAS AN INTL DEST TRIP WITH A DEADHEAD. AS I HAD OVER 2 HRS BEFORE I HAD TO LEAVE HOME, I CLEANED UP THE WORK I WAS DOING IN THE GARAGE, CAME IN, PACKED AND SHOWERED. THEN I WENT TO THE COMPUTER TO CHK THE FLT. UP TO THIS TIME, I HAD ASSUMED THE INTL DEST TRIP WAS FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY. AS IT TURNED OUT, IT WAS FOR THAT NIGHT, AND THE 2 JUNIOR PLTS HAD NOT CALLED IN SICK BUT FATIGUED. SINCE IT WAS GETTING LATE, I JUST WENT TO THE ARPT FOR THE TRIP. I WAS IN COACH FOR DEADHEAD AND COULD NOT GET A NAP. I ARRIVED FOR THE INTL DEST FLT 30 MINS AFTER DEP TIME AND DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE FLT, SO I SUGGESTED THAT THE RELIEF PLT AND I CHANGE PLACES. DURING MY 2 1/2 HR CREW BREAK, I TRIED TO NAP BUT WAS UNABLE DUE TO TURB. WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR DSCNT AND LNDG, I WAS HAVING SUCH A HARD TIME STAYING ALERT, I ONCE AGAIN TRADED PLACES WITH THE RELIEF PLT AND HAD HIM SIT IN THE FO POS. AT LNDG, I HAD BEEN UP FOR OVER 24 HRS. LOOKING BACK, I SHOULD NEVER HAVE

ACCEPTED THIS ASSIGNMENT AS IT WAS INEVITABLE I WOULD BE FATIGUED BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED. USING OUT-OF-BASE PLTS TO COVER BACK-SIDE-OF-THE-CLOCK FLTS IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS. I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT MY FAMILY ON AN INTL FLT WITH A PLT WHO WAS ON DUTY FOR 24 HRS.

Synopsis

B777 RELIEF PLT WAS SENT OUT OF BASE TO FLY ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK BECAUSE TWO OTHER PLTS HAD CALLED IN FATIGUED.

ACN: 803788

Time / Day

Date : 200809
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Pushback

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 803788

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel : Vehicle Driver

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER ENG START THE MECH SAID TO ME OVER THE INTERPHONE, 'CHK BRAKES.'
I FOUND THE PARKING BRAKE WAS OFF AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED THE BRAKES
AS THE ACFT HAD ROLLED A FOOT OR TWO. I ASKED THE MECH IF EVERYONE ON
THE GND WAS OK AND HE SAID YES. I APOLOGIZED AND WAS UNSURE WHAT
HAD HAPPENED. THE FO AND I LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND I ASKED WHAT WE
MISSED. WE BOTH THEN REALIZED THAT WE HAD MISSED THE BEFORE START

CHKLIST. WE HAD COMPLETED THE BELOW THE LINE PART OF THE CHKLIST BUT MUST HAVE FORGOTTEN THE ABOVE THE LINE PART. IN REFLECTION WHEN THE MECH CAME TO THE ACFT FOR STARTING I LOOKED AT THE EICAS PANEL AND FOUND THAT THE MAIN CARGO LIGHT WAS ON. I HAD FORGOTTEN TO PRESS THE PRESSURIZING SWITCH TO OFF. I WENT BACK TO TURN IT OFF AND WHEN I RETURNED, I TOLD HIM THE DOOR LIGHTS WERE OUT AND MECHANICALLY SAID THAT THE BRAKES WERE SET AND THE REST OF THE BRIEF TO HIM. I BELIEVE THAT THIS DISTR ME. I WAS SO GLAD THAT I HAD CAUGHT THE DOOR LIGHT I FORGOT TO CALL FOR THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. FATIGUE WAS ALSO A FACTOR AS IT WAS XA00 AM LCL AND DUE TO THE WAY THE TRIP IS BUILT, 24 HRS OFF IN LAYOVER, WE HAD BOTH BEEN UP FOR OVER 17 HRS AT THIS POINT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL.

Synopsis

A B757-200 CAPT FAILED TO SET THE BRAKES PRIOR TO ENG START AND HE MENTIONED FATIGUE AS A FACTOR.

ACN: 803734

Time / Day

Date : 200809
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DEN.Airport
State Reference : CO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14600
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 500
ASRS Report : 803734

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1600
ASRS Report : 804092

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

DURING THE COCKPIT CHKS I NOTICED THAT THE R MAIN GEAR DOOR WAS IN THE DOWN POS. THE FO RETURNED AND TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR HYD LEAK IN THE STARBOARD WHEEL WELL. A MECH CAME ON BOARD AND TOLD US THAT THERE WAS A LARGE LEAK AND IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 1 HR TO FIX. WE DISCONTINUED BOARDING OF PAX AND INFORMED THE GATE AGENT OF THE DELAY. I CALLED OUR DISPATCHER AND INFORMED HIM OF THE PROB. HE SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO FINDING ANOTHER ACFT IF THIS ONE WAS GOING TO BE MORE DELAYED THAN IT CURRENTLY WAS. SEVERAL MINS LATER THE GATE AGENT CAME DOWN THE JETWAY AND INFORMED US THAT THEY HAD SWAPPED ACFT AND WERE MOVING ALL OF THE PAX TO GATE Y. I CALLED DISPATCH TO CONFIRM THE ACFT SWAP. BEFORE LEAVING THE ACFT, THE FO ATTEMPTED TO SEND IN 2 ADDITIONAL WRITE-UPS THAT WE HAD DISCOVERED ON THE WALKAROUND (THE CAPT'S CHKLIST WAS TORN IN HALF AND PAINT WAS DELAMINATING FROM THE CAPT'S PRIMARY STATIC PORTS WITHIN THE RVSM AREA). THE FO AND I LEFT THE ACFT AND WENT TO THE PLANNING ROOM TO PRINT THE PAPERWORK FOR THE NEW PLANE. AFTER THE PAPERS HAD PRINTED I TRIED TO SIGN FOR THE RELEASE AND WAS UNABLE. I CALLED THE DISPATCHER TO SEE WHAT THE PROB WAS. HE SAID THE PREVIOUS ACFT HAD BEEN FIXED AND HAD BEEN REASSIGNED BACK TO US. I REQUESTED A NEW RELEASE FOR THE PLANE CHANGE. WHEN WE PRINTED THE MAINT PAPERWORK FOR RELEASE 3, FOR THE ORIGINAL ACFT, WE NOTICED THAT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY MAINT HAVING BEEN INITIATED OR PERFORMED ON THE PLANE. I FOUND THIS ODD. WE PROCEEDED BACK TO THE ORIGINAL PLANE STILL PARKED AT GATE X. I WENT DOWN ON TO THE RAMP AND ASKED ONE OF THE MECHS WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. HE SAID THEY HAD HAD REPLACED AN 'O' RING IN A HYD DISTRIBUTION BLOCK (MY DESCRIPTION) LOCATED ON THE AFT BULKHEAD OF THE STARBOARD WHEEL WELL. I ASKED HIM IF THEY HAD WORKED OFF THE OTHER 2 PROBLEMS WE HAD WRITTEN UP. HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THEM. I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND ATTEMPTED TO CALL MAINT ON THEIR VHF FREQ. THERE WAS NO REPLY. WE THEN WERE INFORMED THAT THE MAINT FREQ WAS UNMANNED THIS LATE AT NIGHT AND EARLY IN THE MORNING. I RELAYED TO MAINT OUR ADDITIONAL 2 WRITE-UPS AND SAID WE WOULD PUT THEM BACK INTO ACARS. AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE MAINT RELEASE. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY WORK HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON THE ACFT. WE TRIED TO INSERT THE ADDITIONAL 2 WRITE-UPS INTO ACARS. WE NEVER GOT AN ACARS MESSAGE THAT THE WRITE-UPS HAD BEEN RECEIVED OR THAT THE MAINT RELEASE WAS NOW INVALID. WE CALLED MAINT AND ASKED THEM TO HAVE SOMEONE COME TO THE ACFT. THE LEAD MECH CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND TOOK THE TORN CHKLIST AND COPIED DOWN OUR WRITE-UP ON THE PAINT INSIDE THE CAPT'S STATIC PORT RVSM AREA. WHEN HE RETURNED HE HAD TAPED THE CHKLIST TOGETHER WITH CLR TAPE BECAUSE HE COULDN'T FIND A PART NUMBER FOR THE A320 QRC AND DEFERRED THE PAINT. I ASKED HIM WHY THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY WORK HAVING BEEN DONE TO THE ACFT. HE STATED BECAUSE THE WRITE-UPS WERE INITIATED BY THE MECHS, THEY WOULD NOT APPEAR ON THE MAINT RELEASE. I ASKED ABOUT THE CHKLIST AND THE PAINT ISSUE. HE SAID THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THEY HAD ENTERED THE ISSUES INTO THE COMPUTER WE WOULD NOT SEE THEM AND THE MAINT RELEASE WE HAD WAS VALID. IT HAD BEEN A LONG DAY, I WAS TIRED AND I WAS NOT INCLINED TO ARGUE. ON THE WAY OVER TO ZZZ1 IT DIDN'T SEEM

RIGHT THAT THE FLT CREW WAS NOT ABLE TO SEE ALL WORK THAT HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON THE MAINT RELEASE ESPECIALLY SOMETHING AS IMPORTANT AS AN AIRBUS HYD SYS. THUS, THE REASON FOR MY REPORT.

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW REPORTS RECEIVING NO DOCUMENTATION OF MAINT REQUIRED BEING PERFORMED ON THEIR ACFT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

ACN: 803279

Time / Day

Date : 200809
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 270
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 5491
ASRS Report : 803279

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel : Ramp Guidance

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE AND COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. AFTER THE PAX DEPLANED, THE CAPT WENT INTO THE TERMINAL AND I REMAINED ON BOARD. THE GND CREW MAN CALLED ON THE INTERPHONE TO TELL ME THE GND PWR WAS CONNECTED. I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE USING IT AND THANKED HIM. I GOT UP TO TALK TO THE PURSER FOR A COUPLE MINS, THEN RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND STARTED LOADING THE FMGC. THE GND CREW MAN

CALLED AGAIN AND ASKED WHEN WE WERE GOING TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. I LOOKED OVER AND, TO MY AMAZEMENT, IT WAS STILL RUNNING! I THANKED HIM AGAIN AND SHUT IT DOWN. I CAN'T REMEMBER THE LAST TIME I DID SOMETHING SO MORONIC. I THINK THERE ARE 4 FACTORS THAT CAUSED ME TO MISS THIS IMPORTANT ITEM. FIRST, CHRONIC FATIGUE. MOST PLTS I HAVE TALKED TO AGREE THAT AT THIS POINT IN THE PROGRAM, A FEW DAYS OFF AT HOME GETS YOU RESTED ENOUGH TO FLY, BUT NOT UP TO 100% ALL THE TIME. ONLY EXTENDED TIME AWAY WILL DO THAT, AND IT'S ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE ANYMORE TO GET A TRIP DROP BTWN TWICE A YR VACATIONS. SECONDLY, ACUTE FATIGUE. ALL LAST MONTH I FLEW LATE TRIPS, GETTING UP LATE AND FINISHING LATE. AFTER A FEW DAYS OFF, I AM FLYING AN EARLY TRIP WITH AN XA30 BRAIN-TIME WAKE-UP. EVEN THOUGH I SLEPT OK, I THINK THAT IT DOESN'T TAKE AS MUCH AS IT NORMALLY DOES TO BECOME TIRED AGAIN. I DIDN'T REALLY FEEL TIRED, BUT PERFORMANCE SUFFERS BEFORE YOU REALLY NOTICE IT. THIRDLY, DISTR. THIS WAS THE SECOND DAY THAT WE FLEW THIS PARTICULAR AIRPLANE THAT HAD A RECURRING WRITE-UP OF BOTH ACARS LOCKING UP. AFTER EVERY FLT, MINE SEEMED TO LOCK UP AS THE CABIN DOOR WAS OPENED SO I COULD NOT SEND THE 'IN' RPT. I CAN'T SPECIFICALLY REMEMBER THE SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS, BUT I DO REMEMBER SCREWING WITH THE ACARS TRYING TO SEND THE 'IN' RPT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS SHUTTING DOWN. I SUSPECT THAT I LOST MY SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS, TRIED TO FIX THE ACARS AND THEN FORGOT ABOUT THE ENG. LASTLY, COMPLACENCY. WE DO THE CHKLIST MULTIPLE TIMES A DAY, MULTIPLE DAYS A MONTH AND CAN DO IT ROTE WHILE SLEEPING. I HAVE ALWAYS MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO ACTUALLY LOOK AT THE ITEMS AS THE CAPT RESPONDS, SO I WAS BLOWN AWAY THAT I ACTUALLY MISSED THE ENG MASTER SWITCH ON AND THE ACTUAL FUEL FLOW. I GUESS IT WAS A CASE OF SEEING IT AND NOT REALIZING WHAT I WAS SEEING, AS I 'SAW' WHAT I EXPECTED TO SEE. THAT THE SAME THING HAPPENED TO THE CAPT AT THE SAME TIME IS REALLY SCARY. WHAT ARE THE ODDS? I FEEL COMPLETELY EMBARRASSED THAT I COULD DO THIS AND AM JUST GLAD NO ONE GOT HURT. YOU CAN NEVER BE TOO CAREFUL NO MATTER HOW CAREFUL YOU THINK YOU ARE BEING.

Synopsis

AN ACR FO REPORTED ACCIDENTALLY LEAVING AN ENG RUNNING AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE. HE CITES FATIGUE AND DISTRACTION AS FACTORS IN THE INCIDENT.

ACN: 802573

Time / Day

Date : 200808

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 170/175 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Communication Systems

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 802573

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : CDU Scratch Pad Message
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Provided Flight Assist
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Consequence.Other : Company Review
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Narrative

MCDU #2 WOULD NOT COME ON LINE. WORKING WITH MAINT CTL WE TRIED EVERYTHING WE COULD THINK OF PWRING THE ACFT UP SEVERAL TIMES.

CONTRACT MAINT WAS CALLED AND WE WERE UNDER WAY 2 HRS LATE. AS PER THE MEL, #1 COULD BE INOP BUT NOT #2, SO MAINT SWAPPED THEM LEAVING US WITH ONLY 1 FUNCTIONAL MCDU. I AMENDED THE RELEASE AND PUSHED BACK. WE WERE CRUISING AT FL340 AND I ACARS'ED DISPATCH WITH THE DELAY CODE. WHEN I TRIED TO RETURN TO THE RADIO PAGE, IT GAVE ME A MESSAGE ON THE SCRATCH PAD 'RADIO TIMEOUT,' LOCKING ME OUT OF THE RADIO PAGE. THAT SECTOR OF ZZZ WOULD ONLY HAVE ME FOR ANOTHER 25 NM AND WE WERE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. I ATTEMPTED TO TRY TO 'HARD TUNE' THE RADIOS VIA BOTH OF THE CCD'S ON THE RESPECTIVE PFD WITH NO SUCCESS. I INFORMED ATC OF OUR SITUATION AND ASKED FOR VECTORS THAT WOULD KEEP US IN COM WHILE WE TRIED TO FIGURE A SOLUTION OUT WITH COMPANY. AFTER EXHAUSTING ALL ATTEMPTS, ZZZ SAID THAT WE WERE LEFT WITH NO OTHER CHOICE THAN TO DECLARE AN EMER, AND OFFERED ME 4 ARPTS TO CHOOSE FROM TO LAND. THE ONLY LOGICAL CHOICE WAS ZZZ1 WITH GATES AND MAINT. WX WAS VMC, I BRIEFED OUR FLT ATTENDANTS ON OUR PLAN, EXPLAINED EVERYTHING TO OUR PAX, AND WE (MYSELF AND MY FO) DISCUSSED ANY AND ALL POSSIBLE ACTIONS NEEDED. I THEN INFORMED ZZZ THAT WE WERE READY FOR VECTORS AND INITIATED OUR DSCNT CHKLIST TO MINIMIZE ANY DISTRS AS WE CAME IN RANGE. DISPATCH HAD ALREADY OBTAINED A GATE AND GND CREW WAS WAITING. ZZZ APCH AND TWR SYNCHRONIZED THEIR FREQ AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SHORTLY AFTER PARKING, MAINT ARRIVED, RESET THE BREAKER. THE GATE AGENT COMPLETED THE PAPER TRAIL. WE REFUELED AND PROCEEDED TO ZZZ2.

Synopsis

DISPATCHED WITH ONLY A SINGLE MCDU ERJ-175 FLT CREW IS STYMIED WHEN IT BECOMES DYSFUNCTIONAL. MUST LAND AT A DIVERSION ARPT ACCOUNT UNABLE TO CHANGE COM FREQUENCIES.

ACN: 797804

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-500

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000

ASRS Report : 797804

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TRIP INCLUDED A LONG LAYOVER WITH AN EARLY MORNING DEP FROM THE HOTEL AT XA50 PDT. WITH AN XA00 WAKE-UP, BOTH THE FO AND I WENT TO BED EARLY AROUND XQ00. HOWEVER, THE HOTEL FIRE ALARM SYS WENT OFF REPEATEDLY FROM AROUND XR00 XU00, AWAKENING ME AND RESULTING IN ME GETTING LESS THAN 4 HRS OF UNINTERRUPTED REST. WHEN I WORK UP AT XA00 I WAS TIRED BUT FELT THAT I COULD PWR MY WAY THROUGH DAY 4 OF THIS

TRIP. THE 1ST LEG OF THE DAY, WAS UNEVENTFUL. ON-TIME DEP, ON-TIME ARR, IN ISSUES, NO PROBS (I DID THE WALKAROUND). PRIOR TO THE 2ND LEG OF THE DAY, THE FO DISCOVERED SEVERAL MINOR MAINT WRITE-UPS (MISSING OR LOOSE AIRFRAME SCREWS AND A DAMAGED/ILLEGIBLE FUEL VENT PLACARD) THAT I HAD MISSED DURING MY WALKAROUND PRIOR TO THE FIRST FLT. WE LOGGED THE WRITE-UPS VIA ACARS AND CALLED MAINT ON THE RADIO. WHEN THE MECH ARRIVED, HE CALLED US ON THE GND-TO-COCKPIT INTERPHONE AND ASKED TO BE SHOWN EXACTLY WHERE THE SCREWS WERE LOCATED. THE FO WENT DOWN THE JETWAY STAIRS AND SHOWED THE MECH. WHEN THE FO RETURNED HE WAS VISIBLY UPSET (ANGRY AND PISSED-OFF). THE MECH HAD PROCEEDED TO OVER-TORQUE AND STRIP THE SCREWS INTO THE METAL (THE SCREWS WERE STILL LOOSE AND HOLDING NOTHING) AND THEN THE MECH TOLD THE FO, 'IT'S JUST A (EXPLICIT) PLACARD, WHO CARES IF IT'S THERE?' IN THE MEANTIME, NO LESS THAN 4 SUPVRS WERE WATCHING EVERYONE'S MOVES AND GLARING MENACINGLY AT US. THE SVC REP KEPT ASKING US WHEN WE'D BE READY TO GO AND WE TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE WERE WAITING ON THE MECH, ASSUMING HE WAS REPLACING THE PLACARD. WE FINALLY ALLOWED THE SVC REP TO CLOSE THE DOOR AND THEN THE MECH TOOK THAT OPPORTUNITY TO PENCIL-WHIP THE MAINT REQUEST, CLAIMING THE FUEL VENT PLACARD WAS DAMAGED BUT LEGIBLE (IT WAS NOT). THE FO AND I WEREN'T ALL THAT CONCERNED ABOUT THE PLACARD, BUT WE WERE STILL A LITTLE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE SCREW-STRIPPING. WE ELECTED TO FLY THE ACFT ANYWAY BECAUSE THE MECH HAD APPROVED AND SIGNED OFF THE REPAIR AND WE DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO A PISSING CONTEST WITH THE MECH, THE 4 SUPVRS OR GET PERSONALLY SUED BY THE ACR FOR A JOB ACTION DELAYING THE FLT. AFTER THAT FIASCO, OUR FATIGUE KICKED IN AND WE STARTED MAKING MISTAKES BY THE NUMBERS. I MISSED NO LESS THAN 10 RADIO CALLS, WE DIDN'T IMMEDIATELY ACCELERATE TO CLB SPD (280 KTS) CLBING OUT OF 10000 FOR WHICH WE WERE REPEATEDLY CHASTISED BY THE CTR CTLR. I ASKED THE CTLR SEVERAL TIMES WHAT SPD HE NEEDED AND HE DEMANDED THAT I TELL HIM DURING THE CLBOUT WHAT MY EXPECTED CRUISING SPD AT ALT WOULD BE IN KIAS (KTS IAS), AS OPPOSED TO PLANNED MACH NUMBER (% OF MACH). IT'S BEEN A WHILE SINCE I'VE DONE AN ICET (INDICATED-CALIBRATED-EQUIVALENT-TRUE) AIRSPD PROB AND SO WE INFORMED HIM WE WERE PLANNING MACH .73 WHICH WOULD BE AROUND 250 KIAS. AGAIN, I ASKED HIM WHAT SPD HE NEEDED, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN HAPPY TO OBLIGE. WE'RE GETTING DUMPED ON BY MECHS AND SUPVRS FOR MAKING LEGITIMATE WRITE-UPS, WE'RE GETTING DUMPED ON BY ATC FOR FLYING LEGITIMATE AIRSPDS AND WE'RE TIRED FROM LACK OF SLEEP DUE TO FIRE ALARMS AT THE HOTEL. OBVIOUSLY, THE FO AND I WERE A DANGER TO THE NATL AIRSPACE SYS. SO, IMMEDIATELY AFTER LNDG, TAXI-IN AND SHUT DOWN OF THE ACFT, WE CALLED IN FATIGUED FOR THE BAL OF THE TRIP. 'WHAT PART OF, THE SYS IS BROKEN, THERE ARE NOT ADEQUATE SAFETY BUFFERS AND SOMEONE'S GOING TO CRASH AN AIRPLANE, SO LET'S BLAME IT ON A JOB ACTION BY UNIONS AND THE PLTS. DOESN'T ACR OR THE FAA GET ?' ACR AND ATC MAY DRIVE SOMEBODY ELSE INTO THE GND, BUT IT AIN'T GONNA BE ME! HAVE A NICE DAY.

Synopsis

B737 CAPT REPORTS FIRE ALARMS AT LAYOVER HOTEL RESULTING IN INSUFFICIENT REST. LOW MORALE AND LACK OF SUPPORT FROM MANAGEMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE GROUPS IS ALSO DESCRIBED IN THIS FATIGUE RPT.

ACN: 797800

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5500

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800

ASRS Report : 797800

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY AT XA45 LCL. THE NIGHT PRIOR, I HAD NOT SLEPT WELL DUE TO A LONG AND EMOTIONAL DISCUSSION WITH MY WIFE REGARDING OUR FUTURE. WE HAVE A STRONG RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER THE ENVIRONMENT AT ACR HAS PUT MORE STRESS ON AN ALREADY STRESSFUL YEAR, BOTH FINANCIALLY AND PERSONALLY. THE IMPENDING NOTIFICATION OF MY SECOND FURLOUGH HAS CAUSED MUCH ANXIETY AND STRESS IN OUR HOME. THE MORNING OF MY FLT, I DID NOT FEEL AS THOUGH THE ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED, EITHER WITH MY WIFE, OR MYSELF, TO THE POINT THAT I COULD LEAVE WITH A CLEAR MIND ON A 4-ON, 1-OFF, 4-ON, 1-OFF, 3-ON, SCHEDULED LINE. THE LACK OF SLEEP THE NIGHTS BEFORE HAD LEFT ME CONGESTED WITH A RUNNY NOSE, AND AN OVERALL FEELING OF LISTLESSNESS, FATIGUE, AND EXCESSIVE STRESS. BASED ON THESE SYMPTOMS, I ELECTED TO CALL IN SICK

FOR MY TRIP THAT AFTERNOON. I DID NOT FEEL THAT I COULD OPERATE AT MY OPTIMUM LEVEL. I SPENT THE NEXT 2 DAYS SORTING OUT OUR OPTIONS AND DEALING WITH THE EMOTIONAL ASPECTS AND FEELINGS THAT MY CHOSEN CAREER HAS BECOME A PERSONAL FAILURE TO MYSELF AND MY FAMILY. I CONTACTED A REPRESENTATIVE, AND DISCUSSED MY SITUATION. I FELT THAT SOME SORT OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION WOULD BE WAITING FOR ME, FOR CALLING IN SICK. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO GET A DR'S NOTE AND HAVE IT AVAILABLE FOR THE FLT OFFICE. MY EXPERIENCE GETTING THE DR'S NOTE WAS DIFFICULT, AS THEY DIDN'T FULLY UNDERSTAND WHY I NEEDED A NOTE, IF I FELT WELL ENOUGH TO WORK 3 DAYS AFTER THE INITIAL SICK CALL. I AM WRITING THIS REPORT TO IDENTIFY THAT STRESS AND EMOTIONAL ISSUES ARE AMPLIFIED BY THE ON-GOING FATIGUING SCHEDULE, AND THAT THE PRESSURE WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE FROM THE COMPANY SERVES ONLY TO MAKE THINGS WORSE. THE COMPANY AUTOMATICALLY ASSUMED THAT THERE WAS A 'JOB ACTION,' BUT NOBODY BOTHERED TO ASK US HOW WE WERE FEELING, KNOWING THAT WE WOULD BE LOSING OUR JOBS IN THE COMING MONTHS. AS A PLT WHO FACES FURLOUGH AGAIN, STRESS AND EMOTIONALLY UPSETTING PROBS RESULTING FROM EMPLOYMENT, FAMILY ISSUES, AND OTHER PERSONAL ISSUES, MAKE ME WISH THE COMPANY WOULD DO MORE TO SUPPORT US AND OUR PROBS, RATHER THAN CRACKING THE WHIP AND TELLING US TO WORK HARDER.

Synopsis

FO DESCRIBES FATIGUE AND FAMILY ISSUES LEADING UP TO A SICK CALL.

ACN: 797491

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4500

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Altimeter

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 15
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 20000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 300
ASRS Report : 797491

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7200
ASRS Report : 797490

Person : 3

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 80
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3200
ASRS Report : 797492

Person : 4

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Relief Pilot
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 100
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 797495

Person : 5

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 5
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE APCH AND LNDG IN ZZZZ WE WERE INFORMED BY THE ZZZZ APCH CTLR THAT WE WERE BELOW THE CLRED ALT. THE CTLR RESTATED THE ALTIMETER SETTING AND DIRECTED OUR FLT TO CLB TO THE ASSIGNED ALT. AFTER SOME CONFUSION WE REALIZED THAT BOTH THE CAPT'S AND THE FO'S ALTIMETERS WERE STILL SET TO INCHES, WHICH RESULTED IN A DSCNT BELOW THE CLRED ALT. THE FLT DSNDDED 400 FT BELOW THE CLRED ALT BEFORE THE ALTIMETERS WERE RESET TO HECTOPASCALS AND THE CLB WAS INITIATED. FORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NO TFC OR TERRAIN CONFLICT EXPERIENCED. REVIEWING THE EVENT, FATIGUE AND MY NOT HAVING FLOWN FOR ALMOST 3 MONTHS DEFINITELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SITUATION, BUT, I BELIEVE THE OVERALL CAUSE WAS AN OVERALL 'COMPLACENCY' IN PERFORMING SOP DUTIES BY THE ENTIRE CREW. SEVERAL TIMES, INCLUDING DURING THE COMPLETION OF THE APCH DSCNT CHKLIST, WE ALL STATED AND CONFIRMED ALTIMETERS SET '996.' AT NO TIME DID WE ACTUALLY STATE OR CONFIRM 'ALTIMETERS SET 996 HECTOPASCALS.' NOT ONE OF US CAUGHT THIS ERROR. I HAVE OVER 10 YRS OF EXPERIENCE FLYING INTERNATIONALLY, AND THE REST OF THE CREW IS EXTREMELY EXPERIENCED IN INTL OPS, SO A LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH INTL FLYING AND ALTIMETER PROCS IS NOT THE ISSUE. THIS EVENT SERVED TO REMIND ME OF HOW ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL IT IS TO MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ATTN AND THOROUGHNESS TO DUTIES AND PROCS THAT CAN BECOME ROUTINE OVER TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 797490: THE CAPT WAS FLYING. I WAS FO. ALL OF THE CREW WERE VERY TIRED. THE ATIS INFO WAS RECEIVED OVER THE COCKPIT PRINTER. THE PRINTOUT SAID THAT THE

ALTIMETER WAS 996 HP. APPARENTLY THE CAPT READ IT INCORRECTLY AS 29.96 INCHES. I HAD SET MY ALTIMETER TO 996 HP. DURING THE ARR I LOOKED AT THE CAPT'S ALTIMETERS AND SAW THAT HE HAD SET 29.96 INCHES. I INCORRECTLY DECIDED THAT I MUST HAVE SET THE WRONG ALTIMETER SETTING AND CHANGED MINE TO MATCH THE CAPT'S. NEITHER RELIEF PLT NOTICED THE ALTIMETER ERRORS. JUST OUTSIDE THE FAF, ATC QUERIED WHETHER THE ACFT WAS LOW WHICH CAUSED MOMENTARY CONFUSION. THEN ATC ASKED WHETHER WE WERE USING 996 HP OR 29.96 INCHES -- THEY STATED THAT THE CORRECT ALTIMETER WAS 996 HP AND THAT WE SEEMED ABOUT 400 FT LOW. THE CAPT TOOK SEVERAL SECONDS TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS WRONG AND ONE OF THE RELIEF PLTS RESTATED THAT OUR ALTIMETERS WERE SET INCORRECTLY AND THAT WE NEEDED TO CLB IMMEDIATELY. THE CAPT THEN DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND QUICKLY CLBED TO THE CORRECT ALT WHILE SETTING THE ALTIMETERS TO 996 HP. ATC DID NOT MENTION THE EVENT AGAIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED US FOR THE APCH. THE ERRORS WHICH TOOK PLACE WERE SIGNIFICANTLY DUE TO MY FATIGUE AND THE FATIGUE OF THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS. THE CAPT AND I HAD JUST BEEN AWAKENED FROM A DEEP SLEEP ABOUT 1 HR AND 15 MINS EARLIER. THE RELIEF PLTS HAD BEEN AWAKE FOR APPROX 7 OR 8 HRS AND WERE BOTH UNABLE TO GET MUCH REAL SLEEP ON THEIR BREAK. THERE WERE NO TCAS NOR ANY TERRAIN PROX WARNINGS DURING THE FLT. SOME INTL ARPTS STATE ALTIMETER SETTINGS IN BOTH HP AND INCHES OF MERCURY WHICH LIKELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONFUSION AND ALTIMETER SETTING ERRORS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 797492: THE CAPT AND FO HAD BEEN AWAKENED AND TOOK THEIR CREW POS ABOUT 1 HR EARLIER. THE RELIEF PLTS HAD BEEN UP ABOUT 20 HRS AND BOTH ONLY MANAGED TO SLEEP ABOUT 2 HRS ON THEIR BREAK WHICH TOOK PLACE ABOUT 7 HRS EARLIER. NO TCAS OR TERRAIN PROX WARNINGS OR ALERTS OCCURRED DURING THE FLT.

Synopsis

A B747 CREW SET THE ALTIMETERS TO 29.96 HG INSTEAD OF 996 HP AND WERE 400 FT LOW ON APCH. THE CREW WAS EXTREMELY FATIGUED.

ACN: 797420

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower : 9500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 12000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm
Weather Elements : Turbulence

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 700 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : ZZZ.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Pilot Seat

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 1700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 219
ASRS Report : 797420

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Exited Adverse Environment
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THERE WAS A B757 TAKING OFF IN FRONT OF US AND MY CAPT ADVISED THAT HE WAS CANCELING OUR FLEX THRUST SETTING AND WE WERE GOING TO USE MAX THRUST ON TKOF TO STAY WAY ABOVE THE B757'S WAKE TURB ON THE CLBOUT AND DEP. OUR TKOF WT WAS APPROX 62500 LBS. WE USED TKOF DISTANCE AND TKOF SPD DATA FROM THE 63000 LB FLIP CARD. OUR MAX TKOF WT IS 75000 LBS. AS A RESULT OF OUR LIGHT WT AND MAX THRUST CONFIGN, THE TKOF ROLL WAS VERY SHORT. WE HIT 80 KTS BEFORE WE USED 1000 FT OF RWY. THE ACCELERATION CAUSED MY SEAT TO SLIDE BACK 1 NOTCH ON THE ADJUSTMENT RAILS. AS I ROTATED AT V1, THE CAPT TOLD ME TO PULL IT RIGHT UP INTO THE COMMAND BARS WHICH WERE, ABOUT 13 DEGS UP PITCH, TO STAY ABOVE THE B757'S FLT PATH. I FOLLOWED MY CAPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. UPON ROTATION, I PULLED THE ACFT UP INTO THE COMMAND BARS AND ESTABLISHED A VERY FAST POSITIVE RATE OF CLB, I THEN CALLED FOR THE GEAR TO BE RETRACTED AND THE SELECTION OF 'CLB MODE' ON THE ACP. AS A RESULT, OUR VSI RAPIDLY INCREASED TO OVER 3500 FPM. THIS CAUSED MY SEAT TO COMPRESS DOWN ABOUT 1 INCH. THIS COMBINATION OF MY SEAT SLIDING BACK AND DOWN CAUSED MY VIEW OF THE LOWER 1 INCH OF MY PFD TO BECOME OBSCURED BY THE YOKE. AT 400 FT I CALLED FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE NAV MODE ON THE ACP. AT 600 FT I CALLED 'AUTOPLT ON.' AT 1500 FT THE CAPT CALLED 'ACCELERATION ALT.' I THEN SELECTED 200 KTS ON THE SPD BUTTON. BY THE TIME WE HIT 200 KTS, I HAD THE FLAPS AND SLATS FULLY RETRACTED. I THEN SELECTED 240 KTS ON THE SPD BUTTON (SID SPD LIMIT). AT 220 KTS, I PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS BACK OUT OF THE TOGA DETENT INTO THE CLB THRUST MODE. AT 240 KTS IN CLB THRUST WE WERE STILL CLBING AT OVER 2800 FPM. AT 7000 FT MSL I PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS OUT OF CLB THRUST AND INTO CRUISE TO SLOW DOWN OUR VSI. I WAS THEN AT A POINT ON THE SID WHERE I COULD INCREASE SPD TO 250 KTS, WHICH I DID. AT 9300 FT I BEGAN REDUCING MY THRUST SO THAT I WOULD NOT OVERSHOOT MY ALT OR SPD LIMIT. AT ABOUT

THE SAME TIME I RECEIVED AN RA FROM MY TCAS. I SAW AN ACFT ON THE RADAR AT 11000 FT RANGE 5 MI CONVERGING FROM MY 2 O'CLOCK POS. I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND SAW AN MD80 IN THE SAME POS. AT THIS POINT THE TCAS BEGAN TO TELL ME OVER AND OVER AGAIN, 'CHANGE VERT SPD.' I COULD NOT SEE THE BOTTOM OF MY VSI -- ONLY THE TOP. THE TOP WAS RED. I THEN DID EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE. I PUSHED THE THRUST LEVERS UP INTO TOGA AND BEGAN TO PITCH UP TO A VSI OF OVER 3800 FPM. ABOUT 10-15 SECONDS LATER, MY CAPT ASKED, 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' I TOLD HIM, 'RESPONDING TO AN RA SIR.' HE THEN CALLED, 'MY AIRPLANE!' HE THEN WENT TO THRUST IDLE AND BEGAN TO DSND THE ACFT. AT THE TIME OF THE CAPT CALLING MY AIRPLANE, OUR ALT WAS APPROX 12000 FT MSL. OUR CLRNC WAS ONLY TO 10000 FT. WE ENDED UP GOING RIGHT OVER THE TOP OF THE MD80'S FLT PATH BY 1000 FT AND WE REMAINED ABOUT 1 MI IN FRONT OF HIM. I THEN ASSUMED THE PNF DUTIES AND TOLD TRACON THAT WE HAD CLBED ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO AN RA AND THAT WE WERE DSNDING BACK TO 10000 FT NOW. THE CTLR THANKED ME FOR THE ADVISEMENT AND THEN TOLD ME THAT WHEN WE WERE CLR FROM OUR TCAS MANEUVER WE WERE TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 17000 FT. I SET 17000 FT IN THE ALT SELECT ON THE ACP AND CALLED IT OUT FOR THE CAPT. MY CAPT AND I DEBRIEFED THE INCIDENT. HE THEN ASKED ME IF I LEARNED ANYTHING. I SAID 'YES.' HE THEN ASKED ME IF I WAS GOING TO DO THAT AGAIN. I SAID 'NO SIR!' HE THEN SMILED AT ME AND SAID, 'WELL, YOU ARE READY TO TAKE US TO ZZZ?' I SAID 'YES SIR' AND HE TURNED THE PLANE OVER TO ME. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I ATTRIBUTE THIS INCIDENT TO A COMBINATION OF HUMAN FACTORS. THE FIRST WAS FATIGUE. WE GOT INTO ZZZ1 THE NIGHT BEFORE AT XA30. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XM50. I GOT UP AT XK30. I TRIED TO GO TO SLEEP EARLY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO FALL ASLEEP BEFORE XG50, WHICH RESULTED IN 3.5 HRS OF SLEEP. BEING A PROBATIONARY FO, I WAS AFRAID TO CALL IN FATIGUED AFTER GETTING A 12 HR OVERNIGHT AND HAVING A 'SICK' CALL OR 'MA' NOTE IN MY FILE. I RATIONALIZED THAT SINCE WE WOULD BE DONE BEFORE XS00, I COULD DRINK SOME COFFEE, 'MAN-UP' AND BE 'OK.' I UNDERESTIMATED THE EFFECTS OF ONLY GETTING 3.5 HRS OF SLEEP. MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS VERY GREATLY DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF MY FATIGUE. MY ABILITY TO THINK CLEARLY THROUGH ALL THE DISTRS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WAS ALSO GREATLY DIMINISHED DUE TO FATIGUE. SECOND WAS DISTR DUE TO THE HIGH PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE WE WERE OPERATING THE CRJ IN. WITH MY LACK OF CRJ EXPERIENCE, ONLY 200 HRS, I AM NOT USED TO OPERATING CRJ UNDER THAT LIGHT OF WT AND HIGH THRUST SETTINGS IN A VERY BUSY CLASS B ENVIRONMENT. IT CAUSED ME TO FALL BEHIND THE AIRPLANE A LITTLE BIT. THIRD WAS MY SEAT SLIDING BACK AND DOWN DURING TKOF AND ROTATION CAUSING ME TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE BOTTOM OF MY PFD. I SHOULD HAVE TURNED THE ACFT OVER TO MY CAPT, READJUSTED MY SEAT, AND THEN RESUMED MY FLYING DUTIES.

Synopsis

BESET BY FATIGUE, DISTRS AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE, PROBATIONARY FO OF CARJ RESPONDS INCORRECTLY TO TCAS RA, CLBING INSTEAD OF DSNDING AS DIRECTED.

ACN: 796357

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 230
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1700
ASRS Report : 796357

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AT APPROX XA30Z ON JUL/XA/08, NOTIFIED THE CREW DESK THAT I WAS FATIGUED FOR FLT TO YYZ. THE CREW DESK ASKED HOW MUCH TIME I WOULD NEED AND I GUESSED 8 OR 9 HRS. THE CREW DESK BEGAN TO REASSIGN ME TO A FLT LATER IN THE DAY AND I SAID AGAIN THAT I WAS GUESSING THAT IT WOULD TAKE 8 OR 9 HRS. THE CREW DESK THEN ASKED ME IF I WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK MY NEXT TRIP ON JUN/XD/08 AND I SAID YES. I BELIEVE THE SCHEDULING OF A 4-DAY TRIP FOLLOWED BY 1 DAY OFF AND THEN THIS 3-DAY TRIP STARTED THIS PROB. MY WAKE-UP TIME FOR THIS STRETCH OF 8 DAYS RANGED FROM XB00-XC00 WITH THE EARLIER WAKE-UP AT XA30 YESTERDAY

MORNING. I WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY RECOVERING FROM THIS ACUTE FATIGUE AND I BELIEVE I WAS CHRONICALLY FATIGUED. WHAT DID NOT HELP LAST NIGHT WAS MY INTERRUPTED REST FROM HEARING MY HOTEL NEIGHBOR SWITCH ON AND OFF THEIR WALL LAMP AND HEARING A CELL PHONE RING MULTIPLE TIMES ON BOTH. CONTRIBUTING TO MY FATIGUE WAS THE STRESS OF PROPER NUTRITION (EXAMPLE: HAIR FOUND IN MY BREAKFAST ON FLT), EMOTIONAL PRESSURE (EXAMPLE: IMPENDING JOB LOSS AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES), WORK PRESSURE (SCHEDULED PLUS ACTUAL FLYING APPROXIMATING 29.5 HRS THE LAST FEW DAYS) AND LACK OF SLEEP. ON FLT TODAY, I BELIEVE MY ALERTNESS AND PERFORMANCE WAS STARTING TO FALL OFF. THE CAPT PULLED UP THE PAPERS FOR FLT TO YYZ AND WE DISCUSSED THE FORECAST AND RWY CONDITIONS. WITH THE TEMPO AND PROB30 INDICATING MODERATE TO HVY RAIN AND VISIBILITIES DOWN TO 1.5 MI MIXED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF FLYING A LOC ONLY APCH WITH 1.5 MI LIMITS INTO YYZ DUE TO CONSTRUCTION, I VOICED MY CONCERNS TO BE HAZARDOUS AND NOTIFIED THE CREW DESK.

Synopsis

AN ACR B737 PILOT REPORTED CALLING IN FATIGUED FOR HIS FLIGHT BECAUSE OF LACK OF SLEEP DUE TO STRESS OVER IMPENDING JOB LOSS.

ACN: 796355

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : PCT.TRACON
State Reference : VA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : PCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : ELDEE

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 175
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 18000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 7400
ASRS Report : 796355

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Approach

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

DURING PREFLT, SPECIAL ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO MAKING NOTAM CHANGES TO ELDEE 3 ARR INTO THE FMC. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL POTOMAC APCH TOLD US TO CROSS DRUZZ AT 15000 FT AND DSND VIA THE ELDEE 3 ARR. AFTER PASSING DRUZZ AT 15000 FT, A DSCNT WAS BEGUN. APPARENTLY, THE FMC HAD DROPPED THE HARD ALTITUDE RESTR AT REVUE DURING THE PROGRAMMING TO CROSS DRUZZ AT 15000 FT. POTOMAC APCH TOLD US TO RECHECK OUR ALTITUDE AND COMPLY WITH THE ELDEE 3 RESTRS. THE REST OF THE STAR WAS COMPLIED WITH AND THE FLT TERMINATED NORMALLY. THE ELDEE 3 ARR HAS A HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE DIFFICULTIES AS EVIDENCED BY THE LENGTHY NOTAMS REGARDING ALTITUDE CHANGES TO THE PUBLISHED STAR ARR. THESE CHANGES HAVE NOT BEEN PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC DATABASE FOR AT LEAST 3 MONTHS THAT I KNOW OF. THERE WERE PLENTY OF DISTRS ON THE DSCNT. WX, IMC CONDITIONS, AND REPROGRAMMING OF THE FMC TO MEET CTLR INDUCED ALTITUDE RESTRS TO MENTION A FEW. BOTH PLTS MISSED THE FACT THAT THE FMC DID NOT REFLECT THE HARD CROSSING ALTITUDE AT REVUE. FATIGUE MAY HAVE ALSO BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AS I HAD BEEN AWAKE SINCE XA15 CST.

Synopsis

A B757-200 FLT CREW FAILED TO MAKE A CROSS RESTR ON THE ELDEE ARR INTO DCA.

ACN: 796347

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2800
ASRS Report : 796347

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

FATIGUING ASSIGNMENT. AFTER LNDG IN ZZZ I WENT TO SLEEP AT XA00 ZZZ1 TIME. MY PRE ALL-NIGHTER NAP WAS AT XN00 ZZZ1 TIME. MY POST ALL-NIGHTER REST WAS AT XD00 ZZZ1 TIME AND MY REST BEFORE AN XA00 LAX DEP WAS AT XD00 ZZZ1 TIME. THAT'S 4 DIFFERENT SLEEP TIMES IN LESS THAN 48 HRS. UPON LNDG IN ZZZ1 I WAS EXPECTED TO DO 2 MORE LEGS WITH 2 HR BREAKS FOR A 12+ HR DUTY DAY ON DAY 5! THIS WOULD HAVE BECOME UNSAFE AND I CALLED IN 'FATIGUED.'

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT DESCRIBES THE FATIGUE FROM ATTEMPTING TO SLEEP IN FOUR TIMES ZONES IN 48 HOURS. THE PLT CALLED IN FATIGUED ON DAY FIVE OF A FIVE DAY TRIP.

ACN: 796116

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ORD.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 796116

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report : 796266

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

IN SHORT, I ENTERED A TXWY WITHOUT CLRNC. WE WERE DEPARTING THE GATE AT ORD. IT IS A PWR OFF THE GATE WITH A HARD R TURN WITH VERY LITTLE DISTANCE TO THE INNER TXWY. I BEGAN TO TAXI OFF THE GATE ANTICIPATING A HDGF FROM METERING TO GND WITH A QUICK CLRNC TO TAXI OUT TO OUR DEP RWY. HOWEVER, METERING KEPT QUESTIONING US ABOUT WHICH RWY WE WANTED FOR TKOF. WE WERE PLANNING A VERY HVY TKOF WT WITH TAILWINDS SO WE WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY TRYING TO DETERMINE A LEGAL AND SAFE RWY FOR HIM. THIS DISTR ME ENOUGH THAT I ENTERED THE INNER TXWY BEFORE RECEIVING CLRNC FROM GND. GND WAS TALKING TO OTHER ACFT SO WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTACT HIM RIGHT AWAY. AT THIS POINT I SAW NO ACFT COMING AROUND THE INNER SO I THOUGHT I COULD MAKE A QUICK R TURN ONTO THE RAMP TO CLR THE INNER, BUT AS I BEGAN THIS MOVEMENT A COUPLE OF REGIONAL JETS STARTED INTO AND OUT OF THE RAMP AHEAD OF ME. AT THIS POINT AN ACFT CAME UP BEHIND US ON THE INNER AND GND CTL THEN ASKED WHO WE WERE. WE IDENTED OURSELVES AND HE GAVE US TAXI CLRNC TO OUR RWY. I HAVE THOUGHT BACK ABOUT HOW I COULD HAVE ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET CAUGHT IN THIS SIT. WE WERE RUNNING LATE SO I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE RUSHED AND I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BE DISTR WITH RWY CALCULATIONS. ALSO, WHEN I REALIZED I WAS ON THE INNER I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT STOPPING BECAUSE I WAS WORRIED ABOUT JET BLAST TO PERSONNEL AND EQUIP JUST BEHIND US. I ALSO KNOW THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE PWRED OFF THE GATE BEFORE RECEIVING CLRNC FROM GND. THE ONLY EXPLANATION I CAN THINK OF IS THAT WE WERE BOTH FATIGUED. WE JUST HAD A VERY LONG DAY FOLLOWED BY A VERY SHORT NIGHT FOLLOWED BY THE CURRENT LONG DAY. I DON'T THINK WE WERE FUNCTIONING NORMAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 796266: WE WERE PARKED AT THE GATE AT ORD. I HAD REVIEWED THE PROCS FOR GATE DEP FROM THE GATE IN MY CHICAGO COMPANY PAGES, ABOUT COORD WITH RAMP, METERING, AND GND CTL. I CALLED RAMP, AND WAS TOLD WE WERE CLRED TO PUSH WITH A SHORT PUSH. WE DID THAT. THE ACFT WAS HVY, ATIS WAS ADVERTISING A TAILWIND FOR RWY 32L. WE GOT THE CLOSE-OUT DURING THE PUSHBACK, AND WHILE IT WAS BETTER THAN EXECUTED, IT WAS STILL A HVY WT TKOF. WE SAT FOR A BIT DISCUSSING OUR OPTIONS ON WHICH RWY TO ASK FOR FROM METERING. I ASKED METERING FOR RWY 32R, AND WAS TOLD IT WAS ONLY 8700 FT IN LENGTH. I WAS LOOKING UP THE INTXN DATA FOR RWY 32L FROM TXWY M TO ENTER THAT INTO THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER. SOMEWHERE IN THERE, METERING TOLD US TO GO TO GND, AND HE'D PASS ALONG OUR REQUEST TO GND. I FLIPPED THE SWITCH TO GND, STARTED TYPING AND THE NEXT THING I KNEW, GND CTL IS ASKING US OUR POS. I LOOKED UP, AND SAW WE WERE ON TXWY A. GND WAS NOT HAPPY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. FATIGUE. I SHOULD HAVE NOT GONE HEADS DOWN UNTIL AFTER WE GOT SQUARED AWAY ON THE TXWY. I NEEDED HOWEVER TO KNOW WHICH RWY WE WERE HDG TO BEFORE TALKING TO GND CTL.

Synopsis

ACR FLT CREW HAS TXWY INCURSION AT ORD WHILE ASSESSING RWY LENGTH REQUIRED FOR ACFT WEIGHT.

ACN: 795886

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 85
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5100
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 390
ASRS Report : 795886

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 800
ASRS Report : 796158

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

UPON ARR AT THE ACFT A MECH WAS IN THE COCKPIT AND STATED HE WAS WORKING AN ALTIMETER PROB FROM PREVIOUS FLT. WE STARTED OUR PREFLT DUTIES WHILE HE KEPT WORKING. EVENTUALLY THE MECH STATED HE FIGURED OUT THE PROB AND GOT THE APPROPRIATE DEFERRAL AND MEL REF NUMBER AND WOULD SEND US A COPY OF THE NEW MAINT RELEASE DOCUMENT. HE POSITIONED THE COCKPIT SWITCHES TO COMPLY WITH THE MEL. ONCE WE REALIZED WE WERE UNABLE TO ENTER RVSM AIRSPACE WE CONTACTED DISPATCH AND GOT A NEW FLT PLAN AND ADDED SOME MORE FUEL FOR THE LOWER ALT. ONCE I RECEIVED THE NEW MAINT RELEASE DOCUMENT I LOOKED IT OVER TO MAKE SURE THE APPROPRIATE ITEMS WERE TAKEN CARE OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEASE. THE MECH FORGOT TO SWITCH OUR CAT 3 PLACARD TO CAT 2 ONLY, WHICH WASN'T MENTIONED ON THE PAPERWORK BUT I REALIZED IT NEEDED TO BE DONE AND CHANGED IT MYSELF. THE FIRST RELEASE HE SENT US CONTAINED MEL REF #XXXXX. IT TURNED OUT TO BE THE WRONG MEL IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MEL REF #XXXXY. THE MECH HAD TO COME BACK ON THE ACFT AND PULL SOME CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND MOVE MORE SWITCHES AROUND. HE SAID HE SCREWED UP AND THIS WAS THE CORRECT MEL AND LEFT. I AGAIN READ THE MEL AND FOUND ANOTHER INCORRECTLY POSITIONED SWITCH (ATT HDG SELECTOR WAS POSITIONED IN FO 3) ACCORDING TO THE OLD MEL #XXXXX. ONCE I MADE SURE ALL SWITCHES AND CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE CORRECTLY POSITIONED AND I HAD A NEW FLT PLAN WE RAN THE CHKLISTS AND PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE LANDED SAFELY IN ZZZ1. THE NEXT MORNING I WAS DEADHEADING ON THE SAME ACFT TO ZZZ2. THE NEW CAPT WAS COMPLAINING ABOUT THE STATE OF THE ACFT AND THAT SOME CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE PULLED THAT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN. HE TOLD ME UPON ARR IN ZZZ2 THAT HE WAS REFUSING THE ACFT FOR THE NEXT LEG AND THAT HE WAS FILING AN ASAP BECAUSE OF SHABBY MAINT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 796158: THE MECH WAS NOT PAYING ATTN AND TURNING KNOBS WITHOUT LOOKING. THIS MISTAKE WILL COST US ANOTHER 10 MINS DELAY WAITING FOR A REALIGNMENT. BY THE WAY, BECAUSE OF THE CURFEW AT ZZZ1, WE DID HAVE A TIME PRESSURE BECAUSE WE HAD TO BE THERE BY XA19 OR DIVERT TO ZZZ3. THE CAPT AND I WERE SATISFIED ALL WAS IN ORDER AND REQUESTED PUSHBACK. RAMP THEN TOLD US TO HOLD THE PUSH AND MAINT WAS COMING BACK. THE MECH RETURNED AND SAID HE HAD THE WRONG MEL, THE CORRECT DEFERRAL WAS ADR #2 NOT THE ADIRS. NOW WE HAD TO TURN TO ADIRS #2 AGAIN AND WAIT FOR ANOTHER ALIGNMENT. THE DEMEANOR OF THE MECH WAS NOT VERY ASSURING TO THE CAPT AND MYSELF SINCE HE SEEMED TO NOT BE CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT HE WAS DOING. FOR EXAMPLE: SHUTTING OFF THE WRONG SYS, DEFERRING THE WRONG ITEM. HIS SYS KNOWLEDGE APPEARED TO ME TO BE LACKING. TIME WAS REALLY CRITICAL NOW AND THE CAPT REVIEWED THIS NEW MEL. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PUSHED AND COMPLETED THE FLT WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE NEXT DAY I RECEIVED AN E-NOTE FROM THE CAPT TELLING ME THAT HE DEADHEADED ON THAT SAME AIRPLANE THE NEXT MORNING. THE CAPT OF THAT FLT TOLD MY CAPT THAT SOME CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE PULLED THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN. I FIND THIS PUZZLING BECAUSE WE WERE CAREFUL TO COMPLY WITH ALL MEL REQUIREMENTS. I THINK THIS COULD ONLY HAVE HAPPENED IF THE NEW MEL HAD A DIFFERENT CIRCUIT BREAKER REQUIREMENT AND THIS WAS MISSED, THE 2 MEL'S WERE ALMOST

IDENTICAL. IT'S POSSIBLE WE MAY HAVE MISSED THIS, BUT I WAS RELYING ON THE CAPT'S REF OF THE MRD. WE HAD IT IN FRONT OF HIM AND WAS CHKING ITEMS OFF VERY CAREFULLY. I ALSO THINK FATIGUE MAY HAVE PLAYED A PART IN THIS. THIS TOOK PLACE THE EVENING AFTER A REDEYE THAT GOT IN THAT MORNING. I GOT ABOUT 5 HRS OF SLEEP DURING THE DAY, BUT THAT WAS ALL I COULD GET. WHEN WE WERE TRYING TO LEAVE ZZZ4, I JUST WANTED TO GET HOME.

Synopsis

AN A319'S ADR #2 WAS MEL'ED AFTER A MECH INCORRECTLY MEL'ED ADIRS #2. MEL'ING EITHER SYSTEM REQUIRED PULLING SPECIFIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THE CREW BELIEVED THE MECH ERRED. THE CREW'S CIRCUIT BREAKER CONFIGURATION MAY HAVE BEEN INCORRECT ALSO.

ACN: 795855

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 795855

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Other Personnel : Dispatcher
Qualification.Other : Dispatcher
ASRS Report : 795857

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Resolatory Action.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ACCEPTED UNSUITABLE ALTERNATE ON DISPATCH RELEASE. THE WX FORECAST IN SEATTLE DID NOT REQUIRE AN ALTERNATE. THE OBSERVATION AT XA53 IN

SEATTLE WAS AS FOLLOWS: 5 MILES VIS IN MIST WITH SCATTERED CLOUDS AT 100 FT AND OVERCAST AT 4000 FT. BFI WAS LISTED AS ALTERNATE 1. I CHECKED THE WX, WHICH WAS ADEQUATE FOR AN ALTERNATE. I GLANCED AT THE NOTAMS; HOWEVER, I MISSED THE NOTAM STATING THAT BFI'S LONG RWY WAS CLOSED. DURING THE FLT TO SEATTLE I RECHECKED THE NOTAMS, AND NOTED THE NOTAM STATING THAT THE LONG RWY WAS CLOSED. I COULD NOT CONFIRM OUR ABILITY TO USE THE SHORT RWY, SO I CALLED DISPATCH. WE DISCUSSED THE PERFORMANCE ISSUES, AND DISCUSSED OTHER ALTERNATES. FORTUNATELY, I CARRIED EXTRA FUEL, AND AFTER CHECKING THE WX, WE AMENDED THE RELEASE TO SHOW PAINE FIELD AS ALT 1. BY THE TIME WE LANDED AT SEA, THEY WERE CONDUCTING VISUAL APCHES. EVEN THOUGH AT NO TIME WAS AN ALTERNATE REQUIRED LEGALLY, MISSING THAT CRITICAL NOTAM DURING MY PREFLT CAUSED ME CONCERN. I WASN'T EXCEPTIONALLY TIRED DURING THIS PARTICULAR DAY. WE HAD FLOW BACK TO SEATTLE. WE WERE UNCERTAIN ABOUT OUR SLOT TIME, SO WE WERE HURRYING TO GET OUT ON TIME. THERE WERE APPROX 50 NOTAMS FOR SEA AND BFI, AND MULTIPLE PAGES OF FDC NOTAMS AND AREA WX. NOTAMS ARE ORGANIZED BY NUMBER AND NOT BY TYPE. THE PARTICULAR NOTAM OF RWY CLOSURE WAS ABOUT HALF WAY DOWN THE LIST. LACK OF ARPT DIAGRAMS AND INFORMATION: ALL THE BFI RWY INFORMATION IS IN THE BRICK.

Synopsis

CAPT AND DISPATCHER NAME BFI AS AN ALTERNATE FOR ACFT INBOUND TO SEA. FAIL TO NOTE THE INTENDED, LONGER, RWY IS NOTAMED CLOSED.

ACN: 795806

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-500
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report : 795806

Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Company Review
Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

I NOTIFIED THE CREW DESK OF MY DESIRE TO BE RELEASED DUE TO FATIGUE, AND WAS GRANTED THIS REQUEST WITHOUT BEING ASKED TO SPEAK TO MGMNT. MY FATIGUE WAS PRIMARILY ATTRIBUTABLE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT SLEEP IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE CURRENT TRIP. THE STRESS INDUCED SLEEP DEPRIVATION WAS DUE TO CONCERN OVER MY IMPENDING FURLOUGH AND THE BEGINNING OF CHEMOTHERAPY OF AN IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBER. I BELIEVE THE SECONDARY CAUSE IS DUE TO THE RELENTLESS SCHEDULING OF MAX DUTY FOR B737 FO'S. FOR EXAMPLE, I WAS EXTENDED TWICE IN 6 DUTY DAYS OVER THE LAST WK CULMINATING BEING ON DUTY INTO A 7TH DAY ARRIVING AT MY HOME DOMICILE AT XA00 ON A SCHEDULED DAY OFF. THE CREW DESK STAFF ROUTING SCHEDULES PLTS FOR DUTY PERIODS WITH NO ROOM TO ABSORB IRREGULAR OPS FORCING THESE TYPE OF GROSS DEVS AND CONSTANT

INTERRUPTIONS TO REGULAR SLEEPING HABITS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CREW
DESK ASSIGNED ME ADDITIONAL DUTY ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THIS FATIGUE
CALL 2 HRS AFTER ARRIVING AT THE GATE IN DOMICILE DUE TO LACK OF
AVAILABLE RESERVES ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.

Synopsis

B737 FO FACING PENDING FURLOUGH AND PERSONAL ISSUES REQUESTS TO BE
RELEASED DUE TO FATIGUE.

ACN: 795582

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-500
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1100
ASRS Report : 795582

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

FATIGUE CALL: FIRST OF ALL I WAS ASSIGNED A 3 DAY TRIP WITH ONLY 6 LEGS. MY FIRST DAY WAS SUPPOSED TO BE REALLY EASY -- AN XA35 DEP FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 AND THEN ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. BECAUSE THE DAY WAS SO EASY, I WOKE UP EARLY, WORKED OUT THAT MORNING AND COMPLETED MY ERRANDS. MY FLT TO

ZZZ1 WAS DELAYED AND EVENTUALLY CANCELED. SCHEDULING DECIDED TO DEADHEAD ME ON ANOTHER FLT TO ZZZ1 AND THEN FLY TO ZZZ3. MY FLT TO ZZZ1 DID NOT EVEN LEAVE UNTIL XC27 ARRIVING AT XD13. I RAN TO MY FLT TO ZZZ3 AND THERE WASN'T AN ACFT SO WE WERE DELAYED UNTIL XB28 CDT, JUST BARELY MAKING ME LEGAL ON A 14 HR DUTY DAY (NOT INCLUDING MY BUSY MORNING!) WE FLEW AS FAST AS WE COULD AND BLOCKED IN UNDER MY EXPECTED 13:56 DUTY DAY TO ZZZ3 ARRIVING AT XE03. THE NEXT DAY I COULD NOT EVEN REMEMBER FLYING INTO ZZZ3 BECAUSE I WAS SO TIRED, I DON'T EVEN REMEMBER COMPLETING ANY OF THE CHKLISTS, AND I'M NOT EVEN SURE IF I DID DO MY JOB PROPERLY. AT ONE POINT IN CRUISE I FELL COMPLETELY SOUND ASLEEP. MY CAPT HAD TOLD ME TO CALL IN FATIGUED BEFORE WE STARTED, BUT SEEING ALL OF THE WAITING PAX BROKE MY HEART. IMAGINE IF OUR CEO CARED ABOUT ANOTHER HUMAN BEING! I WANTED TO GET THEM TO ZZZ3, THAT IS MY JOB. IT WAS XD30 AND MORNING TO ME WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE HOTEL IN ZZZ3 SO I COULD NOT FALL ASLEEP. I FINALLY DOZED OFF EARLY MORNING. 2 HRS LATER FULL CONSTRUCTION AT OUR HOTEL BEGAN. I COULD NOT SLEEP AT ALL AND JUST GOT UP AND WORKED OUT TO AT LEAST GET MY HEAD CLR AND BOOST MY ENERGY. THAT WAS DAY 1 AND 2. DAY 2 I DEADHEADED TO ZZZ1. I REALLY WANTED TO SLEEP BUT THEIR EXTREMELY POOR SVC WOKE ME UP EVERY SINGLE TIME I DOZED OFF. THE FLT ATTENDANT KEPT MAKING LOUD ANNOUNCEMENTS EVERY 10 MINS, THE AIRPLANE WAS COLD AND NOISY AND UNCOMFORTABLE. THEN I FLEW ANOTHER LEG. AGAIN THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CALL IN FATIGUED SINCE WE WERE AGAIN DELAYED 2+ HRS AND NOW MY EYES WERE SUNKEN INTO MY HEAD. MY BEST SAVING GRACE WAS THE JUMPSEATER WHO IS A CAPT I'VE FLOWN WITH BEFORE AND HE KEPT CATCHING MY MISTAKES. WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ4 AT XB43. WE HAD THE MINIMUM LAYOVER IN ZZZ5 AND I SLEPT HARD, BUT NOT NEARLY ENOUGH. AGAIN, I WAS SO EXHAUSTED ON MY WAY TO WORK AND MY SECOND REASSIGNMENT. I WAS REASSIGNED TO LAYOVER IN ZZZ6 FOR 19 HRS. I DECIDED NOT TO CALL IN FATIGUED AGAIN SINCE I COULD GET SOME REST IN ZZZ6. A CONVENTION IN MY HOTEL KEPT ME AWAKE ALL NIGHT LONG! I WAS VERY SICK ALL LAST WK, AND AT THIS POINT I WAS STARTING TO RUN DOWN AGAIN WITH A VERY UPSET STOMACH. MY WHOLE 4TH AND 5TH DAYS WERE MISERABLE BECAUSE MY STOMACH WAS BOTHERING ME SO MUCH. I WAS NOT SICK, BUT SUFFERING THE PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS OF FATIGUE, YET MY CONSTANT VISITS TO THE LAVATORY WERE ALSO A DISRUPTION TO OUR FLYING. DAY 4 ARRIVED AND I WAS SO TIRED FROM THE PREVIOUS DAYS, THAT CAPT #3 ALSO TOLD ME TO CALL IN FATIGUED. I STAYED ON SINCE IT WAS ONLY 1 LEG. THE LONG, ROLLING DELAY IN THE HEAT MADE IT EVEN LONGER. ON OUR ARR INTO ZZZ7 ON DAY 4, WE HIT MODERATE TURB AND HURT 2 OF OUR 3 FLT ATTENDANTS BY NOT SEATING THEM IN ADEQUATE TIME. DO YOU SEE WHERE I'M GOING HERE? SAFETY IS BEING COMPROMISED DUE TO MY FATIGUE. 2 OF THE 3 WENT TO THE EMER ROOM. WE THEN WAITED FOR NEW FLT ATTENDANTS TO DEADHEAD IN. IT TOOK LATE PHONE CALLS AND INTERRUPTED SLEEP TO FINALLY ESTABLISH OUR DEP TIME FOR THE EARLY AM. THE MOST DIFFICULT PART FOR ME WAS TO GO FROM LATE ARRS TO AN XF30 DEP THAT DELAYED UNTIL XG18. DAY 5 WE FLEW 3 LEGS, AND ON MY LAST LEG BACK TO ZZZ1 I ASKED THE CREW DESK IF I COULD GO HOME. THEY SAID 'NO,' THEY 'HAD MORE FLYING FOR ME.' AT THAT POINT I SENT AN ACARS BACK THAT I WAS EXHAUSTED AND I WOULD BE CALLING IN FATIGUED WHEN I LANDED. OVER 3 MORE MESSAGES, THEY TOLD ME TO STAY IN ZZZ1. TWICE THEY ASKED WHEN I WOULD BE READY TO FLY AGAIN, AND THE LAST MESSAGE SAID I NEEDED TO CALL THE FLT OPS DUTY MGR. THE STRESS IN THE COCKPIT WHILE ON APCH TO ZZZ1 ON RWY 28 (I WAS FLYING) WHILE RECEIVING

THESE MESSAGES WAS COMPLETELY UNNECESSARY AND AGAIN, UNSAFE. I REALLY DO NOT LIKE TO BE HARASSED FOR MAKING A DECISION TO BE A SAFE PLT, AND AT A TIME WHEN I'M TRYING TO FLY SAFELY WITH A FULL FLT OF PAX ONBOARD. THEN AFTER I HAD LANDED I SPOKE TO THE FLT OPS DUTY MGR AND HAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AGAIN ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT I WAS ACTUALLY FATIGUED. I TOLD HIM ALL 3 CAPTS HAD TOLD ME TO CALL IN AND I WAS ONLY FEELING WORSE AT THIS POINT, SO IT WAS DEFINITELY TIME TO CALL IN FATIGUED. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY THE FIRST TIME I'VE EVER CALLED IN FATIGUED. I HAVE WORKED VERY HARD TO ACCOMMODATE OUR PAX, BUT AT THIS POINT I AM DANGEROUS. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MY LIFE I FEEL COMPLETELY UNSAFE TO FLY ANY PAX IN MY AIRPLANE AND IN MY STATE OF MIND. I AM PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY EXHAUSTED. I NEVER FELT THIS WAY WORKING AT A REGIONAL AIRLINE AND CERTAINLY NEVER FELT THIS WAY AT THIS COMPANY IN THE PAST. PLEASE CHANGE THIS! ONE MORE THING: MY LAST FLT ATTENDANTS ON ZZZ1-ZZZ8 AGREED THAT I SHOULD CALL IN FATIGUED. THEY ALL COULD SEE HOW EXHAUSTED I WAS.

Synopsis

A B737 FO DESCRIBES FATIGUE FROM FIVE DAYS OF MIXED EARLY AND LATE FLYING, PHYSICAL ILLNESS, AND AN INABILITY TO SLEEP AT SOME HOTELS.

ACN: 795571

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 33000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 795571

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 796541

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WOKE UP 2 HRS EARLY AT XA30 AM LCL, UNABLE TO GO BACK TO SLEEP, AND I GOT READY TO DEPART. WE HAD A NORMAL TKOF WITH A LINE CHK PLT ON JUMPSEAT, THE IRO WAS IN THE FIRST CLASS CREW REST SEAT SINCE WE ONLY HAD 1 JUMPSEAT. WE CLBED TO FL330 WITH FRENCH CTLRS WITH STRONG ACCENTS. AT CRUISE FL330, I STARTED THE INFLT ACCURACY AND IRS RANKING PAPERWORK PRIOR TO XING THE N ATLANTIC WHEN ATC SAID 'ACR X CLB FL340 DIRECT TAKAS.' I ANSWERED THE ATC CLRNC AND THE FO CHALLENGED ME SAYING IT WAS NOT FOR US. I SAID I'LL CHK AGAIN AND HE INSERTED IT INTO THE FMC AND BEGAN A SLOW CLB. I CALLED ATC 4 MORE TIMES TO CONFIRM THE CLRNC BEFORE THEY FINALLY ANSWERED AND THEY SAID 'NO MAINTAIN FL330, THAT WAS FOR ACR X.' BY NOW, WE WERE FL335 AND WE DSNDED BACK TO FL330 WITH NO ACFT OR TCAS ALERTS IN OUR AREA. THEN ACR Y CHKED ONTO OUR FREQ. DSNDDING INTO ZZZ AT FL200, ATC GAVE US A CLRNC 'ACR X CROSS XXXXX 14000 FT.' ACR X WAS RIGHT BEHIND US AND ANSWERED OUR CLRNC AND STARTED TO DSNDD. I CALLED ATC AND ADVISED THEM ACR X COPIED OUR CLRNC, HE TOLD THEM TO MAINTAIN FL200. WE READ BACK OUR CLRNC AND DSNDED TO 14000 FT. TWICE IN 1 FLT THE CALL SIGNS WERE MISUNDERSTOOD. OUR ACR CHANGED ALL OUR INTL FLT NUMBERS TO NUMBERS THAT ARE ALL VERY SIMILAR. THIS SHOULD HAVE NEVER BEEN ALLOWED AND WE SHOULD RETURN TO OUR ORIGINAL DISCRETE NUMBERING SYS. EVEN ACR Y HAD A SIMILAR CALL SIGN, THIS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BY US ATC AND THE FLT NUMBERS WOULD HAVE BEEN CHANGED PRIOR TO FLT. INTL ATC SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT, ESPECIALLY WITH HVY FRENCH ACCENTS THAT ARE USUALLY HARD TO UNDERSTAND ANYWAY. WITH NO IRO ONBOARD, I HAD TO ASSUME HIS PAPERWORK DUTIES IN ADDITION TO MY OWN, DUE TO ONLY 1 JUMPSEAT. IF A CHK PLT IS ONBOARD DISPLACING AN IRO ON DUTY, HE SHOULD ASSUME THE DUTIES OF THE IRO TO SHARE THE WORKLOAD.

Synopsis

AN INT'L B757 PILOT REPORTS ERRORS CAUSED BY VERY SIMILAR INT'L FLT CALL SIGNS WHEN SPEAKING WITH BOTH ACCENTED FOREIGN CTLR AND US CTLRS.

ACN: 795495

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CLT.Airport
State Reference : NC
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CLT.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 190/195 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Switch

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 795495

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment.Other Aircraft Equipment : EICAS
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON OUR FLT, OUR EMBRAER 190 HAD AN MEL FOR THE INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK WHICH REQUIRED US TO TURN OFF THE INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK GUARDED PUSH BUTTON BEFORE WE LANDED. ON SHORT FINAL I PRESSED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK BUTTON AND A WHITE LIGHT WAS OBSERVED ILLUMINATED IN THE PUSH BUTTON TELLING ME THAT THE INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK WAS TURNED OFF. WHAT I ACTUALLY PUSHED WAS THE PITCH TRIM SYS 2 CUTOUT GUARDED SWITCH AND A WHITE LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN THE SWITCH. THIS SWITCH LOOKS IDENTICAL TO THE INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK PUSH BUTTON EXCEPT IT IS LOCATED APPROX 1 INCH FORWARD ON THE CTL PEDESTAL. NO EICAS MESSAGE ALERTED ME THAT I HAD DISABLED PITCH TRIM CHANNEL 2 UNTIL WE WERE ON THE GND ROLLOUT PHASE OF FLT WHEN A CAUTION FLT CTL NO DISPATCH MESSAGE APPEARED ON THE EICAS. ONCE THE ACFT WAS AT THE GATE, I REALIZED THAT I HAD TURNED OFF THE INCORRECT SWITCH. THIS WAS THE THIRD FLT IN THIS ACFT FOR THE DAY ON THE FIRST DAY OF A 2 DAY TRIP. I HAD PREVIOUSLY TURNED OFF AND ON THE CORRECT INFLT ENTERTAINMENT ELECTRONICS RACK GUARDED SWITCH EARLIER IN THE DAY AND WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE MEL. FACTORS THAT I THINK CONTRIBUTED TO ME INCORRECTLY PUSHING THE WRONG PUSH BUTTON ARE: 1) FATIGUE -- WE HAD A VERY EARLY FLT TIME AND I HAD TO GET UP AT XA00 IN ORDER TO BE AT THE ARPT FOR MY RPT TIME. BEFORE THIS FLT, I HAD BEEN ON A LATE NIGHT SCHEDULE FOR THE PREVIOUS 4 WKS SO IT WAS HARD TO GO TO SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE OUR RPT TIME AND I HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SLEEP WELL BECAUSE OF THIS. 2) ON APCH, WE HAD BEEN JUST SLIGHTLY LATE TO CONFIGURE AND WE WERE CLOSE TO NOT BEING STABLE, DEFINED BY OUR AIRLINE FOM, SO I FELT RUSHED AND A LITTLE DISTR AND OUT OF RHYTHM BECAUSE I WAS FOCUSING ON IF WE WERE GOING TO BE STABLE. WE WERE STABLE BY 1000 FT AGL. 3) THE CLOSE PROX AND SAME APPEARANCE OF SWITCHES MADE IT EASY FOR ME TO PRESS THE WRONG ONE.

Synopsis

FATIGUED AND RUSHED, CAPT OF E190 PUSHES WRONG SWITCH TO COMPLY WITH MEL REQUIREMENTS.

ACN: 795489

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport

State Reference : DC

Environment

Weather Elements : Rain

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : DCA.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B737-800

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Spoiler System

Component : 2

Aircraft Component : Thrust Reverser Control

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

ASRS Report : 795489

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Alternate

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

I WAS THE CAPT ON FLT XXXXX ON JUL/XX/08 AND PF FROM ZZZ-DCA. ON ARR AT DCA, RAIN SHOWERS HAD CONTINUED TO AFFECT THE STATION AND THE TWR RPTED THE RWY AS BRAG (RJ 2 MINS EARLIER) WITH A WET RWY. RWY 1 AT DCA IS 6869 FT AND THE RWY REQUIRED FOR US AT 135000 LBS ACCORDING TO OUR LNDG DISTANCE CARD IS 5785 FT. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAD 2 MEL'S THAT AFFECTED LNDG DISTANCE, INOP #1 THRUST REVERSER (ROUNDED UP TO 200 FT FROM PERFORMANCE, LNDG) AND THE AUTO SPD BRAKE SYS OPTION #2, MEL 27-2B, 350 FT CORRECTION FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS, WET RWY. THAT REQUIRED 6335 FT AND LEFT US WITH A 'CUSHION' OF 534 FT, AND AT XA00 HRS ON THE 3RD LEG OF THE DAY, IT 'DID NOT FEEL RIGHT.' IT WAS IN MY JUDGMENT TO DIVERT TO OUR ALTERNATE. SO ON SHORT FINAL, IN THE RAIN, WET RWY, WE ELECTED TO DISCONTINUE THE APCH AND 'GO MISSED.' THE CONDITIONS WERE NOT GOING TO IMPROVE AND IAD WAS A CLOSE, SUITABLE ALTERNATE. IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS, OUR AIRPLANE HAD THE REVERSER PLACARDED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. WE HAD FLOWN THE AIRPLANE ALREADY TWICE IN THAT DAY AND ON THE INBOUND LNDG AT ZZZ PRIOR TO OUR DCA FLT, WE HAD A 'SPD BRAKE DO NOT ARM' LIGHT AFTER LNDG. MAINT THEN PLACARDED THE AUTO SPD BRAKE WHICH WOULD PREVENT AUTO DEPLOYMENT ON LNDG. I HAD PHONED THE DISPATCHER IN OPS REGARDING THE WX IN DCA AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE CURRENT WX THERE (RAINING) AND WHAT LOOKED LIKE A SECONDARY LINE W OF THE ARPT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE WX WOULD IMPROVE PRIOR TO OUR ARR AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD 'DIE OUT' AND NOT BE A FACTOR. WHEN I WENT TO THE AIRPLANE, MY FO WAS ALREADY IN THE BOOKS AND LOOKING AT LNDG DISTANCES WITH THE NEW MEL. WE DISCUSSED THE LNDG DISTANCES AND I CALLED THE DISPATCHER (WITH THE MECH WHO PLACARDED THE SPD BRAKES IN THE COCKPIT TOO) AND DISCUSSED FURTHER THE CONCERN ABOUT THE RAIN AND STOPPING DISTANCE AND THE NEW INFO REGARDING THE SPD BRAKES. HONESTLY, I CANNOT RECOLLECT THE CONVERSATION FULLY, BUT WAS CONVINCED TO CONTINUE BASED ON OUR DISCUSSION AND HIS THOUGHTS ON OUR ARR AT DCA. I FELT CONFIDENT THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE FLT. ENRTE, THE FO AND I CONTINUALLY CHKED THE WX AND SAW HEAVIER RAIN APCHING FROM THE W AND THAT THE RAIN WAS CONTINUING AT DCA. WE WERE 'RETHINKING' THE DECISION TO LAND WITH THE CONDITIONS AS THEY WERE. WE RAN THE NUMBERS AND SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH AS FOLLOWS: 'HEADS UP, IF DCA RWY WET MY CALCS SHOW US NEEDING 5785 FOR WET RWY 200 FT FOR INOP RVRS AND 360 FT FOR AUTO SPD BRAKE. 6345 RQD, LET'S LOOK AT IAD.' HE RESPONDED WITH THIS: 'GOOD EVENING, RWYS AT DCA ARE GROOVED, DCA TWR RPTS RWYS AS DAMP, THEY SAY FLT LNDG RWY 19 ROLLOUT TO INT AT RWY 22 OR TXWY A. THE RESTR FOR MEL 27-13B IS TKOF WT PLNTY, NOT LNDG. THE PNLTY FOR MEL 27-02B IS USABLE LNDG BEYOND THRESHOLD 6869 MAX PNLTY EVEN WET IS 350 FT.' BY THIS TIME, WE WERE GETTING PRETTY BUSY AND WE LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND SAID, 'DAMP?' NOT EXACTLY SURE WHERE THAT FITS INTO THE CHARTS. WE DISCUSSED AMONG OURSELVES THAT IF THE RWY WAS 'WET' WE WOULD CHOOSE NOT TO LAND. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO THE ARPT AND SEE WHAT THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS WERE. CHKING IN TO THE TWR FREQ ON FINAL, THE FO ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF THE RWY WAS WET AT WHICH TIME THE CTLR RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AFTER LNDG AT IAD AND WAITING FOR PERSONNEL TO ARRIVE, I WAS ON THE PHONE WITH THE DISPATCHER DISCUSsing PARKING AND PAX ISSUES, ETC. HE

WAS WANTING US TO REFUEL AND CONTINUE BACK TO DCA. I INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT IDEA. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION HE TOLD ME THAT IF WE WERE GOING 'FATIGUED' THAT I WOULD NEED TO CALL CREW SCHEDULING. I TOLD HIM THAT WHEN WE PARKED THE JET THAT WE WOULD BE FATIGUED AND THAT I WOULD CALL THE SCHEDULER. I DID CALL CREW SCHEDULING AND IT ENDED UP BEING A MOOT POINT, DIDN'T PARK UNTIL XA12 AND WE WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COMPLETE THE FLT ANYWAY WITHIN OUR DUTY DAY. SOLUTION? I LEARNED SOME THINGS FROM THIS FLT FOR SURE. I'LL BE MORE PROACTIVE AT THE 'FRONT END' CONCERNING THE CONDITION OF MY AIRPLANE AND THE CONDITIONS THAT I'LL BE FLYING INTO. ALTHOUGH THE FORECAST: TEMPO 0105 5SM -SHRA FM 0600 21004KT P6SM BKN030 BKN080 WASN'T SHOWING TOO MUCH, MY EYEBALLS INDICATED SOMETHING OTHER. ALTHOUGH MANY PAX WERE INCONVENIENCED, I BELIEVE WE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION IN FLYING TO THE ALTERNATE.

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW DIVERTS TO IAD AFTER RAIN AND INOPERATIVE COMPONENTS MAKE LANDING AT DCA DICEY.

ACN: 795470

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport

State Reference : FO

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 700

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC

Weather Elements : Fog

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZZ.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : XXL

Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Approach Coupler

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

ASRS Report : 795470

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Alternate

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Missed Approach

Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

RPTED WX CONDITIONS REQUIRED A CAT 3 APCH AND AUTO LAND. ON CTR AUTOPLT INTERCEPTED LOC AND GLIDEPATH TO ZZZZ RWY 17L. AT APPROX 2800 FT ABOVE THE RWY ACFT CTR AUTOPLT AGGRESSIVELY PITCHED THE ACFT NOSE DOWN THEN UP AT WHICH TIME THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED WITH WARNING. I ENGAGED THE R AUTOPLT AND THE LOC AND GS INTERCEPTED INDICATED CAPTURED FOR A MOMENT. THE ACFT PITCHED DOWN MORE AGGRESSIVELY THAN THE FIRST TIME THEN UP VERY RAPIDLY. AT THE SAME TIME THE FO STATED HIS LOC AND GS CAPTURE MODES ON HIS ADI/PDI BOTH HAD RED LINES THROUGH THEM. I ENGAGED THE L AUTOPLT. THE LOC AND GS INDICATIONS WERE CAPTURED, STILL IN THE SLOT ON SPD AS I CONTINUED TO FLY AND CONFIGURE ACFT THROUGH THE MALFUNCTIONS. THE L AUTOPLT SEEMED JUST FINE. MY LOC AND GS INDICATIONS REMAINED NORMAL, CAPTURED WHEN CONNECTED TO L AUTOPLT. THE FO QUESTIONED TWR REGARDING RWY 17L VISIBILITY, WE COULD NOT SEE THE RWY. TWR CTLR RESPONDED WITH RWY VISIBILITY THAT REQUIRED AN ACFT CAT 3 AUTO LAND OP. AT 1700 FT AGL, I REENGAGED CTR AND R AUTOPLT. AT 1400 FT AGL, ACFT COMPLETED ITS OWN TEST AND INDICATED LAND 3. THE FO'S FLT INST INDICATIONS WERE NOW NORMAL LOC AND GS CAPTURED. FOR A MOMENT, EVERYTHING WAS COPASSETIC. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 700 FT AGL THE ACFT ASA DOWNGRADED EQUIVALENT TO CAT 1 STATUS, SO I COMPLETED A NORMAL MISSED APCH, GAR PROC. EVEN DIRECTLY OVERHEAD, I DID NOT VISUALLY ACQUIRE ANY PORTION OF RWY 17L. ON TOP OF THE FOG BANK BLANKETING THE RWY, IT WAS A BEAUTIFUL DAY IN ZZZZ. THAT'S ALL THE HALF ENGLISH SPEAKING PAX WOULD REMEMBER. ZZZZ OPS TOLD OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND CUSTOMERS THAT THERE WAS NO REASON FOR US TO GO AROUND, THE VISIBILITY OVER THEIR DESK TOPS WAS PERFECT. OUR CURRENT ACFT AND RWY STATUS, COUPLED WITH ACFT ARRIVING ZZZZ FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, I ELECTED TO DIVERT TO ZZZZ1. IT WAS DIFFICULT WORKING/COMMUNICATING WITH THE AIR TFC CTLRS ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT/DAY, MY EXPERIENCE TOLD ME THAT AFTER MAKING IT AROUND THE PATTERN IN THE VALLEY COULD PUT US WELL BEHIND THE FUEL CURVE TO SAFELY DIVERT TO ZZZZ1. ADDITIONALLY, CREW FATIGUE WAS ALSO POSSIBLY A FACTOR. ONCE SAFELY ON THE GND IN ZZZZ1, WE LEARNED THAT ACFT HISTORY INCLUDED MANY PROBS WITH THE CTR AND RIGHT AUTOPLTS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME COVERING 54 LEGS OF FLYING. IN THE PAST, ALL AUTOPLT FAULTS ON THIS ACFT, AS PER THE MAINT LOG WERE SUCCESSFULLY RESET ON THE GND.

Synopsis

A B767 EXECUTED A GAR ON A CAT III APCH AFTER THE ACFT EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY DOWNGRADED TO CAT 1. THE FLT DIVERTED TO AN ALTERNATE.

ACN: 795365

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 100

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8-100
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Aircraft : 2

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 155
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 3925
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2390
ASRS Report : 795365

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 5190
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 315
ASRS Report : 795371

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Wake Turbulence
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF ADEQUATE REST WAS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE EVENTS THAT UNFOLDED TODAY. THEREFORE THIS RPT STARTS WITH THE DETAILS SURROUNDING THE OVERNIGHT THE PRECEDING DAY. UPON ARR AT THE ARPT, THE VAN DRIVER TOLD US THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE STAYING AT A DIFFERENT HOTEL THAN EXPECTED. THE HOTEL HAD 12 BASKETBALL TEAMS STAYING IN IT. WITHIN MINUTES OF ARR, AND REALIZING IT WAS GOING TO BE NOISY, I CALLED THE FRONT DESK INQUIRING AS TO THE REASON FOR THE NOISE AND WHAT THEY WOULD DO ABOUT IT. I TRIED TO TAKE A NAP, AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF THE NOISE IN THE HALLWAY. I LEFT THE HOTEL FOR A WALK, CAME BACK, AND IT WAS STILL NOISY. AGAIN I CALLED THE FRONT DESK, AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER ROOMS AVAILABLE. AFTER TRYING TO SLEEP WITH NO LUCK I MADE TWO MORE CALLS TO THE FRONT DESK, THEY FINALLY FOUND ME ANOTHER ROOM AFTER 11 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT. EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON, I HAD CALLED ANOTHER HOTEL, AND ASKED FOR ROOMS THERE FOR THE NIGHT. THEY WERE FULL AND SAID THERE WERE NO ROOMS AVAILABLE. I CALLED MY FO ABOUT THE NOISE, HE TOLD ME THAT HE COULD HEAR IT OVER HIS IPOD, AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE IF I COULD FIND US ROOMS. BACKING UP, I HAD CALLED SCHEDULING AHEAD OF ALL THIS, INFORMING THEM OF THE NOISE, AND THAT I MIGHT BE TIRED IN THE MORNING. AT MY BEST ESTIMATE I MIGHT HAVE GOTTEN 3 HOURS OF SLEEP ALL SAID AND DONE. I MET THE REST OF MY CREW IN THE MORNING AND WE ALL DISCUSSED HOW TIRED WE WERE DUE TO THE NOISE IN THE HOTEL AND LACK OF REST. I STILL FELT TIRED ON THE FIRST FLIGHT TO ZZZ2, AND THE NEXT FLIGHT TO ZZZ. THINGS RAN AS NORMAL BUT UNFORTUNATELY WE DID HAVE A HOT ACFT, WHICH DID NOT HELP. WE ENDED UP TAXIING OUT TO RWY 31, AFTER BEING GIVEN POSITION AND HOLD, TOWER CLEARED US FOR TAKEOFF WITH THE STIPULATION TO KEEP THE PREVIOUS DEP IN SIGHT. WE ENDED UP DOING A ROLLING TAKEOFF, AND MANAGED TO HIT THE PRECEDING AIRBUS 319'S WAKE RIGHT AFTER ROTATION. THIS CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DISTRACTION IN THE COCKPIT, AND I CAN'T RECALL IF MY FO SAID POSITIVE RATE OR NOT, IF I SAID GEAR UP OR NOT, OR WE BOTH JUST MISSED IT. WE TURNED TO THE 340 HEADING AFTER TAKEOFF AND THE REST OF THE CALLS WERE AS NORMAL. DURING CLBOUT AND CRUISE I NOTICED ABNORMALLY LOW ACFT PERFORMANCE, BUT ATTRIBUTED IT TO ISA+15 CONDITIONS. AS TIRED AS I WAS, I DIDN'T EVEN BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT THE

GEAR BEING DOWN. THE CLBOUT WAS STEEP IN AN EFFORT TO GET A TURN ON COURSE, AND ONCE AT CRUISE SPEED WAS NOTICED TO BE NO MORE THAN 160 KIAS AT 14000 FT. AGAIN, I JUST THOUGHT IT WAS THE HIGH TEMPERATURES THAT WERE CAUSING THE LOW PERFORMANCE. WE DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN UNTIL I SAID 'GEAR DOWN' ON APCH INTO ZZZ. WE HAD A SHORT TURN IN ZZZ2 AND DISCUSSED IF WE THOUGHT WE EXCEEDED ANY LIMITATIONS AND WE DECIDED THAT WE DIDN'T THEREFORE I ELECTED TO CONTINUE BACK TO ZZZ1. WE TURNED THE AIRPLANE IN ZZZ2, DEPARTED FOR ZZZ1, AND THE ENTIRE FLT I WAS STRUGGLING TO STAY FOCUSED. I STARTED TO THINK ABOUT THE SPEED LIMITATIONS AND RECALL NOTING THE SPEED IN CLB AND CRUISE BEING WITHIN LIMITATIONS BUT I THEN STARTED THINKING ABOUT THE DSCNT PHASE AND COULD NOT REMEMBER THE INDICATED SPEED AS WE GOT TO A LOWER ALTITUDE. I NEVER RECALLED THE SPEED OVER 172 BUT I STARTED TO THINK ABOUT THE ACFT'S PERFORMANCE IN A DSCNT REALIZED THERE WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED IN THE DSCNT. IT WAS AT THAT POINT I KNEW I HAD TO CONTACT MAINT UPON ARR IN ZZZ1. WHEN I LOOK BACK ON THE EVENT I REALIZE I SHOULD HAVE INFORMED SCHEDULING FIRST THING IN THE MORNING WE NEEDED ADDITIONAL REST. BUT, I TRY TO MAKE THINGS WORK WHEN I CAN. WITH THE STATE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY THE WAY IT IS AND WITH PERFORMANCE BEING SUCH A HUGE FACTOR IN WHO SURVIVES AND DOESN'T IN THIS INDUSTRY I MADE A POOR DECISION TO SERVE OUR PAX INSTEAD OF LISTENING TO AND ATTENDING TO MY PHYSICAL NEED FOR REST AND MY CREWS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 795371: ON A RIGHT BASE FOR RWY 33R IN ZZZ2, CAPT CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, I REACHED FOR THE HANDLE AND SAW IT WAS DOWN ALREADY. WE BOTH LOOKED AT EACH OTHER IN DISBELIEF, BUT WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL AND WERE OCCUPIED WITH THAT FOR THE MOMENT. EXTREMELY SHORT TURN IN ZZZ2 AS WE WERE LATE ARRIVING. WE DISCUSSED IF ANY LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED OR NOT DURING FLT WITH THE GEAR DOWN, AND DECIDED THAT THEY WERE NOT. AFTER GATE ARR IN ZZZ, I FELT A CHAIN OF ERRORS WAS DEVELOPING THAT COULD LEAD TO AN ACCIDENT AND WAS RELIEVED THE CAPT DECIDED TO PUT A STOP TO THE DAY AND DECLARE WHAT HAD HAPPENED. BEING FATIGUED AND DISTRACTED ON TAKEOFF WAS NO EXCUSE FOR LACK OF MY CHKLIST DISCIPLINE.

Synopsis

A DASH 8 FLT CREW RPTED THAT AFTER A POOR NIGHT'S SLEEP IN A NOISY HOTEL THEY INADVERTENTLY FLEW A ONE HOUR LEG WITH THE GEAR DOWN.

ACN: 795258

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZZZ.ARTCC
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 37000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Cruise : Enroute Altitude Change
Route In Use.Enroute : Atlantic

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 221
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 17800
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1725
ASRS Report : 795258

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
ASRS Report : 797062

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Airspace Structure
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CRUISING WBOUND AT FL340, WE HAD JUST PASSED LAT/LONG 1 AT XA45Z, ENRTE TO LAT/LONG 2 (OVER THE N ATLANTIC) WE HAD BEEN REQUESTING CLRNC FOR A HIGHER CRUISING ALT FOR SOMETIME. AS WE PASSED LAT/LONG 1, 2 OPPOSITE DIRECTION ACFT PASSED OVERHEAD AND ABOUT 1 MI S OF US. (AT FL350, AND I BELIEVE, FL370) AT XB50Z A CPDLC MESSAGE (CTRL PLT DATA LNK) CAME IN FROM ZZZ OCEANIC TO CLB TO AND RPT REACHING FL370. WE ACCEPTED THIS CLRNC, CLBED TO FL370, AND AT XB53Z AN AUTO RPT WAS SENT VIA CPDLC CONFIRMING THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT FL370. AT XC07Z CPDLC MESSAGE CAME IN AND IT SAID, 'CONFIRM CLB CLRNC RECEIVED SAID AT TIME XC00 CLB.' LOOKING BACK AT THE ORIGINAL CLRNC MESSAGE, WE REALIZED THAT IT SAID, 'MAINTAIN FL340, AT XC00Z CLB TO AND MAINTAIN FL370, RPT LEVEL FL370.' WE SAW THE CLB CLRNC THAT WE WERE ANTICIPATING, BUT MISSED THE TIME TO BEGIN THE CLB. AT THIS SAME TIME, XC07Z, WE WERE CONDUCTING A CREW CHANGE WHEN A MESSAGE CAME IN TO CALL ATC, WHICH I DID UPON REACHING THE GATE. OBSERVATIONS: 1) WE SAW THE CLRNC THAT WE WERE EXPECTING AND MISSED THE CONDITIONAL STATEMENT. 2) IT MIGHT BE SAFER TO ONLY ISSUE A CLRNC WHEN IT CAN BE EXECUTED IE, NOT AT A CONDITIONAL TIME. 3) FATIGUE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO OUR MISSING THE CONDITIONAL STATEMENT. I WAS UNABLE TO SLEEP ON MY PREVIOUS REST BREAK.

Synopsis

AN OCEANIC ACR CREW REPORTS A CPDLC CLB CLRNC WITH A SPECIFIC TIME TO START THE CLB. THE CREW CLBED EARLY BECAUSE THEY SAW THE CLRNC BUT MISSED THE TIME CONSTRAINT.

ACN: 794743

Time / Day

Date : 200807

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport

State Reference : US

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : A320

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Generator Drive

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3300

ASRS Report : 794743

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Maintenance

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Consequence.Other

Maintenance Factors

Maintenance.Contributing Factor : Briefing

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Fault Isolation

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Logbook Entry

Maintenance.Performance Deficiency : Non Compliance With Legal Requirements

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

WE HAD #2 GENERATOR FAULT LIGHT INOP DEFERRED PER MAINT. THE DEFERRAL USED ON THE MAINT RELEASE WAS FOR #1 IDG FAULT LIGHT. WE NOTICED THIS AND BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE WE CALLED MAINT CTL AND HAD THEM RECTIFY THE PROB. THE THING IS HOW LONG HAD THE DEFERRAL BEEN WRONG? ANOTHER SIGN OF THE FATIGUE THAT IS ENGULFING THIS AIRLINE. HOW MANY CREWS HAD THIS WRITE-UP? HOW DID MAINT KEEP THIS DEFERRAL GOING? EACH MECH WHO SIGNED THIS ACFT OFF ON THE MAINT RELEASE WAS DOING SO ILLEGALLY. FATIGUE -- IT IS NOT ONLY IN THE PLT RANKS BUT MAINT TOO.

Synopsis

AN A320 PILOT REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES FATIGUE CONTRIBUTED TO MAINT CONTROL DEFERRING THE #1 ENG IDG FAULT LIGHT AS INOP, WHEN IN FACT THE #2 ENG IDG FAULT LIGHT WAS INOP. PREVIOUS FLT CREWS ALSO MISSED ITEM.

ACN: 794271

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-300
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground : Pushback

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : Turbine Engine

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 210
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 20000
ASRS Report : 794271

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 192
ASRS Report : 794716

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Critical
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Declared Emergency
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Diverted To Another Airport
Consequence.Other : Aircraft Damaged
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON PUSHBACK, WE STARTED #1 BECAUSE BAGS BEING LOADED. STARTING #2 THE FO SAID I DISCONNECTED THE START SWITCH. LOOKED AT INSTS -- APPEARED TO BE A HUNG START, BUT NO N1, EGT HIGH BUT NOT RISING. SHUT DOWN #2 AND CALLED FOR ABORTED ENG CHKLIST. MOTORED #2 TO COOL. ASKED THE FO TO CHK #2 N1 CIRCUIT BREAKER, PULLED AND RESET. RESTARTED #2, NORMAL START, NORMAL INDICATIONS AND TOOK OFF. ON CLBOUT, 'VIBRATIONS' PEGGED OUT ON #2, NO VIBRATION. CALLED FOR CHKLIST AND BEFORE WE BARELY GOT INTO CHKLIST #2 COMPRESSOR STALLED. VIBRATIONS WENT DOWN. I SAID 'LET'S DECLARE EMER. LET'S RETURN TO ZZZ.' RAN APCH CHKLIST, TALKED TO FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX VERY BRIEFLY, LANDED, AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. I LEFT #2 RUNNING BECAUSE IT HAD NORMAL INDICATIONS. THE PROB IS WHILE RUNNING QRH CHKLIST, ALL BOXED ITEMS WITH NUMBERS ARE FOR REF BOXED ITEMS WITH LETTERS HAVE TO BE PERFORMED. I HAD THIS SAME KIND OF PROB WITH HIGH WINDS AND NOTED THE MUST CALL MAINT AND DISPATCH AFTER 725 OR HIGHER START, WHICH SENDS YOU BACK TO GATE AND DOWNS THE ACFT. I JUST MISSED IT (WE MISSED IT). FOR SOME REASON I WAS THINKING OF A RED OVERTEMP BECAUSE OF UNUSUAL INDICATIONS. SHORT OVERNIGHT, LONG DAY, LAST LEG. I KNOW 725 IS A LIMITATION, BUT I WISH THE NOTE WAS ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE CHKLIST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 794716: ENG START WAS NONSTANDARD. THE #1 ENG WAS STARTED FIRST DUE TO A LATE BAG BEING LOADED. THE #2 ENG HAD AN ABNORMAL START. IT APPEARED THAT THE STARTER HAD SIMPLY FAILED TO CUT OUT. I STATED '#2 STARTER FAILED TO CUT OUT' AND PLACED THE START SWITCH TO THE 'OFF' POS. AS I VERBALIZED THIS, THE CAPT NOTICED A HIGH EGT AND PLACED THE START LEVER TO CUT-OFF. ABORTED ENG START QRH CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. DURING INITIAL START OF THE #2 ENG, DISTRS MOMENTARILY DIVERTED MY ATTN FROM THE ENG MONITORING XCHK. THIS CAUSED ME TO MISS THE ABNORMAL START AS IT WAS DEVELOPING. CAPT RE-ENGAGED THE #2 STARTER AND MOTORED THE ENG. DURING THE MOTORING OF THE #2 ENG, THE CAPT VERBALIZED THAT THERE WAS NO N1 INDICATION AND HAD ME PULL AND RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKER. N1 INDICATIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE #2 ENG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RESTARTED WITH NORMAL INDICATIONS. ON TAXI OUT, CAPT NOTICED THAT THE #2 PMC WAS EITHER 'OFF' OR 'INOP' AND RESET IT. I CANNOT RECALL THE POS/INDICATION OF THE BUTTON PRIOR TO THE RESET. TKOF WAS NORMAL, BUT ON DEP AVM WAS GREATER THAN 4.0 UNITS ON THE #2 ENG. HIGH ENG VIBRATION QRH CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WHILE RETARDING THE THRUST LEVER, AS PER THE QRH, OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THAT, THE #2 ENG COMPRESSOR STALLED. AT THIS POINT, AT A REDUCED PWR SETTING, THE ENG HAD NORMAL INDICATIONS AND THE AVM READING WAS BELOW 4.0 UNITS. THE CAPT OPTED TO LEAVE THE ENG RUNNING AT A REDUCED PWR SETTING. AN EMER WAS DECLARED, APPLICABLE CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, AND THE FLT RETURNED TO ZZZ FOR LNDG. PROCEDURAL ERROR: DID NOT FULLY COMPLY WITH THE 'ADDITIONAL INFO CONSIDERATIONS' PAGE OF THE ABORTED ENG START IN THE QRH. PROCS FOR AN EGT EXCEEDING START LIMIT WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED. PROCEDURAL ERROR: CAPT DEVIATED FROM SOP AND SELECTED FLAPS 5 DEGS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE START SEQUENCE ON THE INITIAL START

OF THE #2 ENG. THIS NEGATIVELY IMPACTED BOTH THE ENG START XCHK AND ENG START FLOWS. SHARING/ENCOURAGING/ACKNOWLEDGING INPUT FROM OTHER CREW MEMBERS: THIS IS AN AREA THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE. A SELF-INDUCED RUSH NEGATIVELY IMPACTED CREW COM. THREAT (DISTR): ANOTHER CARRIER TAXIED IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT AND WAS MOMENTARILY MONITORED.

Synopsis

B737 FLT CREW REPORTS HUNG START WITH HIGH EGT AND ENGINE IS SHUT DOWN AND RESTARTED. DURING DEPARTURE ENGINE VIBRATION IS HIGH AND COMPRESSOR STALLS WHEN THROTTLE IS RETARDED. EMER IS DECLARED AND FLT CREW RETURNS.

ACN: 793915

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 178
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 793915

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

I WAS NOTIFIED BY THE CREW WHO LATER CAME TO THE ACFT AFTER I LEFT TO GO HOME THAT I HAD LEFT THE EXTERNAL PWR ON THE ACFT. I HAD JUST COMPLETED A 6 DAY, 29 HR AND 33 MIN TRIP. I WAS EXTENDED TWICE ON THIS TRIP. THE FIRST TIME AT THE END OF THE 4TH DAY, AND AGAIN ON THE 6TH DAY FOR ONE MORE 'LOW STRESS OUT AND BACK TO ZZZ.' WELL, THE LAST OUT AND BACK WAS TO ZZZ1. ADDITIONALLY, I FLEW IT WITH A FO WHO HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS IN THE CRJ AND HAD NEVER BEEN TO ZZZ1. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, WE DEPARTED FOR ZZZ1. THANKFULLY, THE OUT AND BACK TO ZZZ1 WENT FLAWLESSLY! WHEN WE PULLED UP TO THE GATE AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS, I LET OUT A HUGE SIGH OF RELIEF. THE 6 DAY TRIP FROM HELL WAS OVER! I COMPLETED THE PARKING CHKLIST AND BEGAN TAKING THE CREW BAGS OFF THE ACFT. THE FO COMPLETED THE POSTFLT AND WENT HOME. I TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT FOR A FEW MINS, SHE WAS GOING TO FLY THE SAME ACFT TO ZZZ2 (THAT'S WHAT I REMEMBER ANYWAY) WITH A NEW FLT CREW. I SAID GOODBYE AND THEN LEFT THE ACFT TO SIGN-OUT AND GO HOME. WHAT I FORGOT TO DO WAS THE TERMINATING CHKLIST. THIS PAINFULLY OBVIOUS OVERSIGHT WAS CAUSED BY MY FATIGUE, CAUSING THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT SINCE THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS ON BOARD, THE 'FLT CREW' WAS PRESENT AND I COULD GO HOME. I NEVER GAVE IT A SECOND THOUGHT ABOUT THE CONFIGN OF THE ACFT (IE, THE EXTERNAL PWR WAS STILL POWERING THE ACFT). BEYOND A SHADOW OF A DOUBT THIS MISTAKE WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF FATIGUE. I WAS SO TIRED THAT GOOD JUDGMENT AND CHKLIST DISCIPLINE WAS REPLACED WITH FAULTY JUDGMENT AND CHKLIST COMPLIANCE. BOTTOM LINE: IT AIN'T OVER UNTIL IT'S OVER! REGARDLESS OF HOW TIRED YOU ARE! OR IN PILOTESE: 'TERMINATION CHKLIST -- COMPLETE.

Synopsis

A CRJ200 CAPT REPORTS BEING SO FATIGUED AFTER A 6 DAY 29 HR 33 MIN TRIP THAT HE FAILED TO REMOVE ELECTRICAL POWER AND SECURE THE ACFT BEFORE GOING HOME.

ACN: 793908

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2100

Environment

Flight Conditions : IMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 150
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2000
ASRS Report : 793908

Events

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Publication : NOTAM

Narrative

I TOOK OFF FROM ZZZZ AND FLEW TO ZZZ. UPON ARR AT ZZZ AT APPROX XA45 HOURS, THE ATIS WX WAS REPORTED TO BE OR INCLUDE VISIBILITY OF 1/2 SM. BEFORE STARTING AN ILS CAT I APCH TO ZZZ, THE WX (ON A NEW ATIS) WENT DOWN TO 1/4 SM. RVR WAS NOT INDICATED ON THE ATIS, BUT THE FLT CREW ASKED BOTH APCH CTL AND THE CTL TWR IF RVR WAS AVAILABLE. IT WAS. TOUCHDOWN ZONE WAS REPORTED TO BE 3500 FT, MID RVR WAS 4000 FT, AND ROLLOUT RVR WAS REPORTED TO BE 4000 FT, ALSO. CAT I MINIMUMS WAS 1800 FT RVR. WHILE ON APCH, WE (THE CREW) SAW APCH LIGHTS, HOWEVER, AFTER LNDG, THE CAPT (ME) NOTICED IN THE NOTAMS, INCLUDED WITH OUR WX PACKAGE AT ZZZZ, INDICATED THAT THE ALS WAS OTS EXCEPT STEP 3. I ALSO NOTICED THAT CAT I ILS MINIMUMS WITH ALS OTS (OUT OF SVC) WENT UP TO 4000 FT RVR REQUIRED AT TOUCHDOWN. WE HAD 3500 FT RVR, SO I HAD AN OVERSIGHT ON MY PART. WE DID HAVE AN ALS, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE THAT IT WAS PARTLY NOT ACTIVE AT THE TIME OF OUR ARR. IF NOT, THEN WE MAY HAVE SHOT AN ILLEGAL ILS CAT I. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. LIKELY CAUSES, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A FLT CREW OF 3 PLTS, FATIGUE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT I MISSED THE NOTAM ABOUT THE ALS OTS FOR WHEN I REVIEWED THEM BEFORE TAKING OFF.

Synopsis

A B757-200 CAPT REPORTS MISSING AN APCH LIGHT INOP NOTAM NOTICE AND FLYING AN ILS TO CAT I MINIMUMS WHEN INOP APCH LIGHTS REQUIRED A HIGHER MINIMUM.

ACN: 793579

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 793579

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Weather

Narrative

ON APCH TO ZZZ WE WERE VECTORED ONTO FINAL ABOUT 8 MI FROM ARPT (RWY 3) AND CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH ON SPD APPROX 190 KTS AND FLAPS 2 DEGS. AS WE TURNED FINAL, I CALLED FLAPS 3 DEG GEAR DOWN, SIMULTANEOUSLY TWR CLRED US TO LAND. FO SET FLAPS TO 3 DEGS AND WE CONTINUED. I CALLED FOR FLAPS TO FULL AND FO SET FLAPS TO FULL, AND WE SLOWED TO FINAL APCH SPD. WE BOTH NOTICED THAT WE HAD APPROX 20 KT TAILWIND AND BRIEF DISCUSSION ENSUED. TWR WAS STILL RPTING NE WIND AT APPROX 3 KTS. AS WE APCHED APPROX 1000 FT I REALIZED THE LNDG CHKLST HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED, I SCANNED THE INSTS AND ECAM AND REALIZED THE GEAR WAS NOT YET EXTENDED. I INSTINCTUALLY CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN AND HANDLE

WAS PLACED IN DOWN POS. AS GEAR WAS EXTENDING THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' WARNING WAS ACTIVATED AND WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY FOR A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 3. AS A SIDE NOTE, I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE HAD JUST FLOWN AN 8 HR DAY. THE FIRST TURN WAS MEXICO CITY WITH TSTMS ENRTE AND ON THE FIELD BEFORE DEP AND THEN 3 RERTES BEFORE AND 1 ENRTE, WITH EXTENSIVE DEVS TO ZZZ. NO EXCUSES BUT JUST WHEN I THOUGHT WE WERE IN THE GREEN, WE WERE EVEN DEEPER INTO THE YELLOW, APCHING RED. AS THE CAPT, I SHOULD HAVE DOUBLE-CHKED ALL ACTIONS PERFORMED, AND MADE SURE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER. I HAVE BEEN FLYING OVER 30 YRS ALWAYS TRY TO RUN AS STANDARD A COCKPIT AS I POSSIBLY CAN, I DO THINK FATIGUE, ESPECIALLY THIS DAY, PLAYED A LARGE PART IN THIS INCIDENT. EXTRA VIGILANCE DURING DAYS IDENTED AS HIGH WORKLOAD. THOUGH IT WAS VFR AND WE WERE RIGHT AT 1000 FT I SHOULD HAVE JUST EXECUTED THE MISSED IMMEDIATELY AND NOT GIVEN THE GEAR DOWN COMMAND.

Synopsis

AN A320 PILOT FAILED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR UNTIL 1000 FT. A GAR WAS EXECUTED. FATIGUE WAS AN ISSUE, THIS WAS THE END OF AN 8 FLT HR DAY WITH TSTMS.

ACN: 793535

Time / Day

Date : 200807
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZZ.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B747-400
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1500
ASRS Report : 793535

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WITH FATIGUE ISSUES COMING MORE AND MORE TO THE FOREFRONT OF OUR ATTN I AM REALIZING JUST HOW BIG A PROB THIS REALLY IS. AFTER WALKING OFF THE AIRPLANE IN ZZZ2 IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT WE HAD NOT READ A PARKING CHKLIST. FLT HAS A SCHEDULED DEP TIME OF XA27 CENTRAL TIME. I HAD BEEN UP SINCE XA00 AM LCL TIME AFTER AN EXCELLENT NIGHT'S SLEEP. I WORKED OUT ABOUT XB00. GOING TO WORK I FELT GOOD. ON THE ACFT I TOOK THE LAST BREAK BECAUSE THE FO WAS FLYING AND WANTED THE MIDDLE BREAK. I GOT INTO THE BUNK ABOUT 3 HRS AND 15 MINS BEFORE LNDG WITH

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FO'S TO WAKE ME UP ABOUT AN HR AND 15 MINS BEFORE LNDG. I IMMEDIATELY FELL ASLEEP AND WAS IN A DEEP SLEEP WHEN THE FO'S RANG THE CALL CHIME. I WAS STARTLED AND DISORIENTED BECAUSE OF THE DEEP LEVEL OF SLEEP. I ALMOST FELT WORSE THAN I WOULD HAVE IF I HADN'T GONE TO SLEEP. IT WAS NOW ABOUT XU00 AM MY TIME. I COULD TELL THAT MY MIND WAS SLOW AND I FELT IRRITABLE. ON THE ARR AND APCH THE FLYING FO MADE SEVERAL SMALL ERRORS WHICH I WAS ABLE TO CATCH INCLUDING AT ONE POINT SOMEHOW SELECTING HDG HOLD WHILE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON LNAV AND HE DIDN'T NOTICE IT. I CAUGHT IT JUST BEFORE WE WERE TO MAKE A TURN ON THE ARR. WE ALSO MISSED A COUPLE OF RADIO CALLS I THINK BECAUSE OF WHAT COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS FEELING LIKE I WAS IN A HAZE FROM FATIGUE. ONCE AT THE GATE I RECALL SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE, CALLING FOR AND WATCHING THE FO CUT OFF THE START LEVERS AND WATCHING THE ENGS SPOOL DOWN, AND THEN PERFORMING MY FLOW AND TURNING EVERYTHING OFF. AT THIS TIME SOMEONE FROM THE RAMP CALLED THE COCKPIT AND STARTED INQUIRING ABOUT THE STATE OF THE AIRPLANE, WHAT WRITE-UPS HE RECEIVED, AND IF WE HAD ANYMORE. THIS WAS DEFINITELY A DISTR AND OUT OF THE NORMAL COURSE OF GND TO COCKPIT COMS AND MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB. AT THE END OF THIS DISCUSSION I GATHERED MY BELONGINGS AND WALKED OFF THE AIRPLANE. NEITHER COPLT CAUGHT THE FACT THAT WE MISSED THE PARKING CHKLIST. WHEN I WAS STANDING IN THE TERMINAL AT THE END OF THE JETBRIDGE SOMETHING IN THE BACK OF MY MIND KEPT TELLING ME THAT I MISSED SOMETHING. THEN IT STRUCK ME, WE DIDN'T READ THE CHKLIST. I ADVISED THE FO AND WE THEN TOOK ACTION TO CORRECT THE MISTAKE. WHILE WE ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED ALL OF THE PROPER PROCS IN TERMS OF SHUTTING DOWN THE AIRPLANE, IT IS WORTH NOTING HOW FATIGUE CAN AFFECT OUR PROCESSES. WHEN I THINK BACK ON THE YRS I'VE SPENT IN AIRPLANES WE OFTEN FEEL THIS HIGH LEVEL OF FATIGUE WHEN FLYING INTERNATIONAL TRIPS.

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT DESCRIBES THE FATIGUE AND RESULTING ERROR AFTER THE FIRST LEG OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIP AT THE DESTINATION.

ACN: 793442

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Component : 1

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 7000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 700
ASRS Report : 793442

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable
Consequence.Other : Company Review

Assessments

Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

I FINISHED A 4 DAY TRIP THAT WAS 26 HRS 24 MINS OF HARD TIME. UPON LNDG (AT MIDNIGHT) I WAS ASSIGNED A 2 DAY TRIP WORTH 3 HRS 11 MINS. THIS

WOULD HAVE PUT ME AT 29 HRS 50 MINS IN 6 DAYS. WHEN I WOKE UP I FELT EXHAUSTED FROM THE CHRONIC EFFECTS OF THE PAST 3 WKS OF WORKING. I HAVE FLOWN 93 HRS 33 MINS OF HARD TIME IN THE PAST 3+ WKS. I DECIDED THAT I WAS TOO FATIGUED TO WORK THIS TRIP. WHEN I CALLED THE CREW DESK THEY INFORMED ME THAT I WOULD BE 'PHONE AVAILABLE' THE NEXT DAY. I TOLD THEM THAT I COULD NOT COMMIT TO BEING RESTED BY TOMORROW AND THAT THEY COULD SHOW ME READY AT NOON ON THE 2ND (WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME 1 1/2 DAYS TO GET RESTED). HE TOLD ME THAT IF I COULD NOT BE RESTED BY TOMORROW THAT I NEEDED TO TALK TO THE FLT OP DUTY MGR. THE DISPATCHER TOLD ME THAT I NEEDED TO BE RESTED IN 12-14 HRS, WHICH IS THE TIME OF A NORMAL LAYOVER. I TOLD HIM THAT I COULD NOT COMMIT TO THAT WITHOUT KNOWING HOW I WOULD BE FEELING IN THE MORNING. I SAID THAT IF I WAS RESTED TOMORROW I WOULD LET THEM KNOW. THE DISPATCHER SAID THAT I WOULD NEED TO TALK TO MY FLT OFFICE. IN ADDITION TO TRYING TO GET RESTED TO COME BACK TO WORK ASAP NOW I FEEL ANXIOUS, BECAUSE I HAVE TO WAIT FOR A PHONE CALL FROM MY FLT OFFICE. I DO NOT FEEL LIKE I HAVE DONE ANYTHING WRONG, BECAUSE MY SCHEDULE HAS PUSHED ME TO THE FAA MAX OF 3 WKS STRAIGHT. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY I HAVE TO TALK TO MY CHIEF PLT. THIS HAS ADDED AN ADDITIONAL LEVEL OF CONFUSION AND STRESS. THE ONLY THING THAT I KNOW FOR POSITIVE IS THAT I AM NOT FIT TO FLY AN AIRPLANE UNTIL I GET PROPERLY RESTED.

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS TOO FATIGUED TO WORK AFTER A 4 DAY TRIP AND WAS TOLD BY HIS ACR THAT HE WILL BE CONSIDERED RESTED IN 14 HOURS. HE IS THREATENED AFTER REFUSING TO COMMIT BECAUSE HE MAY NEED MORE RECOVERY TIME.

ACN: 793064

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground.Other

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1700
ASRS Report : 793064

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Narrative

WE WERE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR A REDUCED REST OVERNIGHT CONSISTING OF 9 HRS OF REST SINCE WE HAD EXCEEDED 9 HRS OF FLT TIME IN 24 HRS. WE ORIGINALLY WERE SCHEDULED FOR A DUTY DAY OF A LITTLE OVER 12 HRS AND THE APPROX 9 HRS 30 MINS OF REST BEGINNING AT ABOUT XA30. COMPENSATORY REST WAS TO BEGIN THE NEXT DAY. THROUGHOUT THE DAY WE

WERE DELAYED REPEATEDLY BY TSTMS AND FLOW CTL. WE DIVERTED ON ONE FLT, BUT RETAINED THE SAME FLT NUMBER AND CONTINUED THE FLT TO ZZZ. WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR 7 HRS 40 MINS OF FLT TIME, BUT BY THE END OF THE DAY WE HAD FLOWN 9 HRS 37 MINS. OUR DUTY DAY ENDED UP BEING 14 HRS 20 MINS. WHEN I INITIALLY CALLED OUR CREW SCHEDULING AND INFORMED THEM THAT OUR SHOW TIME WOULD NEED TO BE PUSHED BACK, I WAS TOLD WE WOULD NEED 11 HRS OF REST THAT NIGHT AND WOULD BE ON COMPENSATORY REST THAT EVENING. AFTER BEING PLACED ON HOLD, I WAS INFORMED THAT WE REALLY ONLY NEEDED 9 HRS AND THAT THE COMPUTER HAD MESSED UP. BEING EXHAUSTED AND HAVING NOT HAD A CHANCE TO EAT ALL DAY, I WAS NOT IN THE BEST STATE OF MIND TO BE DOING MATH. AFTER GETTING TO THE HOTEL AND GETTING SOMETHING TO EAT, I PULLED UP MY SCHEDULE IN THE PROGRAM WE USE FOR SCHEDULING ISSUES. THE SYS DISPLAYED XXX NEXT TO OUR SCHEDULE WHICH MEANS WE WOULD NEED THE 11 HRS OF REST I WAS ORIGINALLY QUOTED. NORMALLY, COMPENSATORY REST IS ONLY REQUIRED WHEN A CREW EXCEEDS 15 HRS OF DUTY. I BELIEVED THAT BECAUSE OF ALL THE FLYING WE HAD SCHEDULED BTWN THE 2 DAYS, WE WOULD ACTUALLY REQUIRE AT LEAST 10 HRS OF 'LOOK-BACK' REST TO BE CONSIDERED ON NORMAL REST. WITH A 14 HR 20 MIN DUTY DAY WE ONLY HAD 9 HRS 40 MINS OF LOOK-BACK REST AND THIS IS WHY THE COMPUTER WAS FLAGGING THAT WE NEEDED COMPENSATORY REST THAT NIGHT. I CALLED OUR SCHEDULING BACK AND INQUIRED AS TO THIS ANOMALY AND EXPLAINED MY SITUATION AS ABOVE. THEY DID NOT SEE HOW I COULD HAVE BEEN ON REDUCED REST THE NIGHT BEFORE WHEN I HAD BEEN OFF FOR 3 DAYS. I EXPLAINED THAT THE AMOUNT OF DAYS OFF DID NOT MATTER BECAUSE IT WAS A LOOK-BACK PROB. THEY SAID LOOK-BACK ONLY APPLIED WHEN WE EXCEEDED 15 HRS. I EXPLAINED HOW I BELIEVED IN OUR CASE WE COULD ACTUALLY BE ON REDUCED IF WE EXCEEDED 14 HRS. I WAS CONFERENCED IN WITH A CHIEF PLT AND AGAIN EXPLAINED MY SITUATION AND GAVE MY EXPLANATION AS SEEN ABOVE. HE GAVE ME THE SAME EXPLANATION AS OUR SCHEDULING LEAD HAD GIVEN ME. AT THIS POINT, I WAS GROWING SHORT ON TIME TO SLEEP AND COULD NO LONGER THINK CLRLY. THE CHIEF PLT GOT DISCONNECTED FROM OUR CONFERENCE CALL SOMEHOW AND I INFORMED THE SCHEDULER THAT I WAS GOING TO BED, BUT THAT THE CHIEF PLT SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT FURTHER. IF THEY CAME TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION, THEY WOULD CALL ME WITH A REVISED SHOW TIME IN THE MORNING. I DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING FURTHER FROM MY COMPANY AND SHOWED AT THE NORMAL TIME THE NEXT DAY. THE CREW REST REQUIREMENTS ARE ENTIRELY TOO COMPLEX -- ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE HAS TO FIGURE THESE THINGS OUT WHEN THEY ARE EXTREMELY TIRED ALREADY. I FACED THE UNWELCOME OPTIONS OF FACING DISCIPLINARY ACTION IF I INSISTED ON MY VIEW AND SHOWED LATER, VIOLATING AN FAR, OR CONTINUING MY ARGUMENT AND IF EVENTUALLY BEING PROVED WRONG LOSING OUT ON VALUABLE SLEEP. IT IS TIME TO REVISE THESE COMPLEX ISSUES.

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS HIS ACR DENIED HIM COMPENSATORY REST FOLLOWING 14:20 HOURS ON DUTY DAY WITH 9+37 ACTUAL FLT TIME. THE COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY MADE ACCURATE FAA REST REQUIREMENT DETERMINATIONS DIFFICULT.

ACN: 792763

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LGA.Airport
State Reference : NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LGA.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Aircraft : 2

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LGA.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 230
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6000
ASRS Report : 792763

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Local

Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe
Anomaly.Incursion : Runway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around

Assessments

Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AS WE TAXIED OFF THE RAMP IN LGA (AT NIGHT) OUR INITIAL CLRNC WAS TO DEPART RWY 31, HDG 340 DEGS. WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI ON TXWY B AND HOLD SHORT OF GG. AS WE WERE APCHING GG WE WERE ISSUED THE CONEY CLB OFF RWY 13 AS THE #2 ENG WAS FINISHING ITS START CYCLE. THE FO WAS HEADS DOWN WHILE HE WAS TYPING IN THE NEW DEP. WE WERE THEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI STRAIGHT AHEAD ON TXWY B TO TXWY P AND HOLD SHORT RWY 22. FO READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY. I ALSO REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS OUT LOUD AS I ALWAYS DO, SO THE FO KNOWS I HEARD THE INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY. SUBSEQUENTLY, I BECAME TASK SATURATED AS I LET MYSELF GET DISTR AS I TURNED OFF THE APU AND WAS GLANCING AT THE MCDU ON THE FO'S SIDE TO ENSURE THE DEP WAS BEING LOADED CORRECTLY. FO WAS NEW ON THE ACFT. WE COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND STARTED TO RUN NEW NUMBERS AND VERIFY THE DEP. AS WE APCHED THE RWY, I TURNED ON THE STROBE AND WING LIGHT AND STATED OUT LOUD, 'XING THE RWY, CLR L, HOLD ON THE BOX.' MOMENTS LATER, FO STATED, 'STOP,' AS HE WAS STILL HEADS DOWN. AS I WAS STOPPING THE ACFT THE CTLR SAID, 'HOLD SHORT RWY 22.' AT THAT POINT, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. SUBSEQUENTLY, ATC ISSUED A GAR FOR THE ACFT ON FINAL APCH. WHAT CONCERNS ME IS THAT EVEN THOUGH I WAS AWARE OF OUR POS THE INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT GOT LOST IN THE FLURRY OF ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCURSION, THERE ARE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT I FEEL ARE WORTH MENTIONING. WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED BOTH ENGS ON THE RAMP SINCE WE KNEW IT WOULD BE A SHORT TAXI BECAUSE THERE WAS ONLY 1 OTHER ACFT TAXIING. WE ELECTED TO 1 ENG TAXI AND BE RUSHED BECAUSE A COMPANY ACFT WAS WAITING TO COME INTO THE RAMP. WHILE WE WERE IN THE HOT SPOT, I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE FO TO BE HEADS UP AND FINISH THE AFTER START CHKLIST PRIOR TO ACCEPTING A NEW CLRNC. NOW WE WERE WORKING ON MULTIPLE TASKS AT THE SAME TIME. ADDING TO THE INCREASED WORKLOAD I WAS FEELING FATIGUED AFTER HAVING A LONG DAY AT HOME AND NOT BEING FRESH AS I JUST RETURNED FROM A WK OFF. I AM VERY TROUBLED BY THIS EVENT AND WILL CERTAINLY TAKE AWAY A VALUABLE LEARNING EXPERIENCE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL INCLUDE AS PART OF MY TAXI BRIEF THAT WE WILL MAINTAIN HEADS UP IN ALL HOT SPOTS WHILE MOVING OR NOT. I WILL ALSO REAFFIRM MY COMMITMENT TO NOT LET INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECT MY TEMPOR IN SAFELY OPERATING AN ACFT. AS IN MOST OTHER RWY INCURSION INCIDENTS, I CAN CLRLY SEE HOW ADDITIONAL TXWY LIGHTING COULD HAVE HELPED, SUCH AS A RED STOP BAR TO GET MY ATTN.

Synopsis

DISTRACTED BY NEW CLRNCs, WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH SINGLE ENGINE TAXI AND A CHANGED DEP RWY, A320 FLT CREW FAILS TO HOLD SHORT OF ACTIVE RWY AS CLRED. ACFT ON FINAL MUST GAR.

ACN: 792575

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DFW.Airport
State Reference : TX
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 6000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D10.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-800
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
ASRS Report : 792575

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 792576

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Non Adherence.Other
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : FAA
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE RECEIVED PDC VIA ACARS AND NOTICED A REVISED SEGMENT. REVISED SEGMENTS ON CLRNCs ARE RECEIVED OFTEN AND ARE USUALLY DIFFERENT VERBIAGE TO MEAN THE SAME THING -- USUALLY ADDING A VOR ON THE AIRWAY THAT WAS NOT LISTED ON THE CLRNC, BUT WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED OVER ANYWAY. WE LOOKED AT THAT PART OF THE CLRNC AND AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE. BUT REALLY THERE WAS. WE HAD BEEN FILED ON THE DALLAS 8 DEP, BUT ON THE REVISED SEGMENT, THE DEP WAS CHANGED TO THE CLARE 2, WHICH WE DID NOT NOTICE. CLBING THROUGH ABOUT 6000 FT, THE CTLR GAVE US A LEFT TURN TO JOIN THE DEP AND SAID, 'IT LOOKS LIKE YOU MISSED YOUR TURN.' WE THOUGHT WE WERE ON VECTORS AND WERE WAITING FOR DEP TO TURN US, BUT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE RNAV DEP AND ALREADY TURNED TOWARD THE EAST. I BELIEVE A FEW FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO OUR OVERSIGHT. FIRST, THE REVISED SEGMENT CLRNC HAPPENS ALL THE TIME, BUT NOTHING HAS REALLY CHANGED, SO OUR GUARD WAS DOWN. SECOND, WE HAD A XB30 SIGN IN AND I GOT UP AT XA00. ALTHOUGH I WENT TO BED EARLY WITH ENOUGH TIME TO GET A GOOD NIGHT'S SLEEP AND SET TWO BATTERY POWERED ALARMS, I DID NOT SLEEP WELL, SO I WAS TIRED EVEN THOUGH WE WERE JUST STARTING OUT. NEITHER OF THESE REASONS ARE AN EXCUSE FOR MISSING AN IMPORTANT DETAIL, AND IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MORE DILIGENT IN CHECKING REVISED CLRNCs. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792576: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS VERY EARLY SIGN-IN WITH SIX HOURS OF DISRUPTIVE SLEEP.

Synopsis

A B737 CREW DEPARTING DFW MISSED A PDC CLRNC CHANGE ASSIGNING A SID. BOTH PILOTS HAD EXAMINED THE PDC CAREFULLY. FATIGUE MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR.

ACN: 792446

Time / Day

Date : 200806

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : MKJK.Airport

State Reference : FO

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : DC-10 30

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Oversight : PIC

Qualification.Pilot : ATP

Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer

Qualification.Pilot : Instrument

Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine

Qualification.Pilot : Private

Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 70

Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000

Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1000

ASRS Report : 792446

Events

Anomaly.Cabin Event : Passenger Misconduct

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies

Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

Consequence.Other : Company Review

Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Consequence.Other : Physical Injury

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Company

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Problem Areas : Passenger Human Performance

Narrative

CHARTER FLT OPERATING FROM ZZZZ. THE FLT WAS A REPATRIATION MISSION WITH DEPORTEES RETURNING TO KINGSTON, JAMAICA. THE TOTAL PAX COUNT INCLUDED 100 SECURITY GUARDS AND 60 DETAINEES OF VARIOUS BACKGNDs WHO WERE DENIED POLITICAL ASYLUM BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOV. ALL BOARDED AT THE REAR OF THE ACFT EXCEPT FOR 1 WOMAN, WHOSE OBESITY REQUIRED A LARGER SEAT IN THE FORWARD CABIN. THE SECURITY PERSONNEL CONSIDERED THIS PAX TO BE A HIGH RISK INDIVIDUAL. SHE WAS FORCEFULLY BROUGHT UP THE STAIRS AND AGGRESSIVELY POSITIONED INTO A SEAT AFT OF THE BULKHEAD PARTITION. ANOTHER PAX WAS REMOVED DURING THE BOARDING PROCESS BECAUSE OF HIS VIOLENT MANNER DURING ENTRY. 2 GUARDS WERE INJURED, A BROKEN FINGER, AND A SMALL LACERATION TO A FOREARM. THE WOMAN DIRECTED A VULGAR VERBAL ATTACK TOWARD THE SECURITY INDIVIDUALS RESULTING IN A STRESSFUL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CABIN CREW. 2 CABIN ATTENDANTS BECAME UPSET BY THIS DISPLAY OF BEHAVIOR AND WERE SOMEWHAT TRAUMATIZED BY THIS EVENT. BOTH WERE UNAWARE OF THE PURPOSE OF THIS MISSION AND IT TOOK PERSONAL COUNSELING TO SUBDUE THEIR CONCERNS. DURING TAXI, AN UPRISING IN THE REAR OF THE ACFT BY SEVERAL DETAINEES REQUIRED INTERVENTION BY THE SECURITY TEAM. THE TEAM MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY COMMANDED THE CABIN ATTENDANTS TO MOVE FORWARD TO THE MID GALLEY AS THEY FORCEFULLY EXTRICATED THE PAX FROM THEIR SEATS AND REPOSITIONED THEM BTWN OTHER GUARDS. THE CABIN ATTENDANTS DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS CHAOTIC AND DID OBSERVE THE SECURITY GUARDS USING FORCE AS NECESSARY TO NEUTRALIZE THE CONFLICTS. DURING FLT, PAX BECAME UNRULY AS THEY CONTINUED LASHING OUT TOWARD THE GUARDS. ABOUT 4 HRS LATER, IT APPEARED THAT MOST PAX SETTLED DOWN. ON ARR IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA, ANOTHER SERIES OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR PLACED ADDITIONAL UNDUE HARDSHIP ON THE FLT ATTENDANTS. 1 PAX REFUSED TO LEAVE THE ACFT AND WAS REMOVED PHYSICALLY BY THE JAMAICAN AUTHS. THE LARGE WOMAN SEATED IN THE FRONT OF THE CABIN BEGAN ANOTHER ASSAULT AGAINST THE SECURITY TEAM. HER VULGAR PROFANITY INCLUDED WORDS THAT ULTIMATELY SHOCKED THE CABIN TEAM. THE CABIN CREW WERE IN THE FIRST CLASS PORTION OF THE ACFT. THE DETAINEE BEGAN DEMONSTRATING HOSTILITIES AS SHE SPAT ON THE GUARDS. A FEMALE GUARD RECEIVED A LARGE SECRETION OF BODILY FLUID DIRECTLY IN HER EYE AND REQUIRED IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTN. THIS ACTION CAUSED ADDITIONAL EMOTIONAL DURESS FOR THE CABIN CREW. MANY SUGGESTED NEVER DOING A SIMILAR FLT AGAIN. WE WERE ASKED TO DEPART THE ACFT BY CUSTOMS AND WE DID. IT TOOK ALMOST 30 MINS TO CLR CUSTOMS. WE REMAINED IN THE SAME ARR HALL AS THE DEPORTEES AND THIS MADE FOR AN UNCOMFORTABLE ENVIRONMENT BECAUSE THE PAX BEGAN TO RECOGNIZE WHO WE WERE. I APCHED THE POLICE OFFICER AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE BEYOND THE ARPT LOBBY AS PAX BEGAN CLAIMING THEIR PERSONAL LUGGAGE. HE INFORMED ME THAT A POLICE ESCORT VEHICLE WILL BE PROVIDED ON OUR JOURNEY TO THE HOTEL. UNFORTUNATELY, A PHONE CALL FROM OPS REGARDING THE REMAINING PAX, THE SECURITY TEAM, COMPROMISED OPS MANUAL POLICY. DURING THIS ORDEAL, THE SECURITY GUARDS REMAINED ON BOARD THE ACFT WITHOUT A CABIN TEAM. IN MY HASTE TO REMOVE THE CREW AND PROVIDE A SWIFT JOURNEY AWAY FROM ANY FURTHER EXPOSURE OF HOSTILITIES, I WAS UNAWARE THAT THE OUTBOUND CREW WAS NOT IN THE DEP HALL. SEVERAL THOUGHTS MUST BE ADDRESSED. FIRST, THERE IS NO DIRECTION AS TO THE STATUS OF THE GUARDS. ARE THEY PAX OR ARE THEY SECURITY TEAMS NECESSARY FOR SAFE PASSAGE? ACCORDING TO THE CABIN CREW, THE GUARDS WERE ATTEMPTING TO SUBDUE UNRULY

INDIVIDUALS DURING TAXI. THIS OCCURRED AGAIN DURING TKOF AS THEY PREVENTED OTHERS FROM UNFASTENING SEATBELTS. ONE TEAM FORCEFULLY HELD AN INDIVIDUAL DOWN IN THE AISLE DURING THE CLB PHASE. REGARDLESS OF THE SEATBELT SIGN, OR PHASE OF FLT, THESE INDIVIDUALS MUST DO WHAT IS APPROPRIATE IN MAINTAINING ORDER. A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BY ME BECAUSE I DEFINED THEIR ROLE AS WORKING INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN PAX, WITH AUTH ABOVE AND BEYOND NORMAL OPERATING POLICY. UPON COMPLETION OF THE FLT, I NEGLECTED TO ADDRESS THAT THEIR DUTY WAS OVER AND A RETURN TO NORMAL OPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPS MANUAL. THE CABIN CREW WERE IN A STATE OF AWE FROM THIS ORDEAL AND IT WEIGHED HEAVILY ON MY DECISION TO REMOVE THEM FROM THE ACFT, PROVIDING A MORE STABLE AREA TO GATHER THEIR COMPOSURE. CUSTOM OFFICIALS REQUIRED OUR IMMEDIATE EXIT IN ORDER TO PROCESS OUR ARR, THE LONG EXHAUSTING DUTY DAY, AND MY OMISSION TO RECOGNIZE THE STATUS OF THE GUARDS, RESULTED IN THIS BREECH.

Synopsis

UNDER EXTRAORDINARY DURESS FROM PAX BEING DEPORTED ENGAGING IN PHYSICAL CONFRONTATIONS WITH THEIR GUARDS, DC10 CAPTAIN DISREGARDS COMPANY POLICY BY DIRECTING THE FLT AND CABIN CREWS TO DEPART THE ACFT WHILE THE VIOLENT DEPLANING PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED.

ACN: 792421

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Intersection : zzz
State Reference : US
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZZZ.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : N/S

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2100
ASRS Report : 792421

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Insufficient Time
Consequence.FAA : Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ATC GAVE US ZZZZZ AT 10000 FT, WE GOT HIGH AND WERE UNABLE THE XING. ATC THEN GAVE US ZZZZZ1 AT 9000 FT WITH A SLOW UP. WE ADVISED ATC IT WOULD BE TIGHT. ATC ASKED WHY. WE SAID WE GOT BEHIND ON THE DSCNT. BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF HAVE FLOWN MAX HRS THIS MONTH AND BOTH ARE VERY TIRED. WE GOT BEHIND ON THE DSCNT AND RECOGNIZED IT LATE. NO TFC PROBS OCCURRED AND WE CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY.

Synopsis

AN A320 CREW WAS LATE BEGINNING THE DSCNT AND MISSED TWO INTXN CROSSINGS. ATC ASKED WHY AND CREW REPLIED FATIGUE AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT.

ACN: 792318

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors
Route In Use.Departure.SID : GMN

Component : 1

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 82
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6563
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2175
ASRS Report : 792318

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

PASSING THROUGH 10000 FT MSL ON GMN 4 DEP, FMS COMMANDED ACCELERATION TO 325 KIAS. THROUGH APPROX 11000 FT MSL ON INITIAL CONTACT ON FREQ CHANGE WE WERE TOLD TO '...RESUME NORMAL....' NO OTHER COMMENT WAS MADE BY ATC BUT, ON REVIEW OF SID, ONE OF THE NOTES SPECIFICALLY SAID 'MAINTAIN 250 KTS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY ATC.' INDICATED AIRSPD WAS APCHING 300 KIAS AT THE FREQ CHANGEOVER. LACK OF ATTN TO DETAIL AGGRAVATED BY SOME FATIGUE FROM CIRCADIAN DISRUPTION WAS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS ERROR. FMS COMPLACENCY AND SID NARRATIVE LOCATED IN DIFFERENT SECTIONS WERE LESSER SECONDARY CAUSES OF THIS ERROR. MORE ATTN TO DETAIL AND FURTHER RECOGNITION OF CIRCADIAN RELATED ISSUES ARE WHAT I HAVE TO DO TO PREVENT FUTURE ERRORS.

Synopsis

AN ACR PILOT REPORTS EXCEEDING 250 KTS ON THE GORMAN (GMN) FOUR DEP PRIOR TO ATC'S NORMAL SPEED CLRNC. RPTR STATES THAT CHART FORMAT AND FATIGUE WERE FACTORS.

ACN: 791989

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 11000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 240
ASRS Report : 791989

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 152
ASRS Report : 790884

Events

Anomaly.Excursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER I LANDED IN ZZZ WE TRANSFERRED CONTROLS AND THE CAPT TAXIED OFF THE RWY. WE HAD CLRNC BY THE CTLR TO TAXI TO THE GATE. IT WAS LATE AT NIGHT AND THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC. SOMEHOW THE CAPT MISSED THE CHARLIE TXWY AND TAXIED SOUTH ABEAM TERMINAL C. I MENTIONED TO HIM THAT WE ARE GOING THE WRONG WAY, BUT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT WE ARE GOING TOWARDS THE ACR TERMINAL. I ANNOUNCED TO THE CTLR THAT WE GOT TURNED AROUND AT WHICH POINT HE GAVE US ECHO ALPHA TO THE GATES. WE HAD A LONG DAY AND WERE TIRED AND THERE WAS CONFUSION ON THE CAPT'S PART WHERE ECHO WAS. HE MADE A 180 DEG TURN ON THE TERMINAL RAMP AT FOXTROT TO TAXI BACK TOWARD OUR TERMINAL. I MENTIONED THAT WE ARE GOING THE WRONG WAY, BUT HE MISUNDERSTAND WHAT I SAID. THE TOWER THEN TOLD US THAT WE ARE NOW ON AN UNCONTROLLED RAMP, BUT TO FEEL FREE TO TAKE THAT DIRECTION TO TAXI TO OUR GATES. I FEEL BOTH OF US FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER PROPERLY AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE JUST STOPPED THE ACFT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS AND AGREE ON A TAXI RTE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 790884: WE LANDED AT ZZZ. I HAD PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED THE COMMERCIAL CHART PAGES AND CIRCLED THE AREA I BELIEVED OUR GATES TO BE. I MISTAKENLY CIRCLED TERMINAL C ON MY CHART, NOT TERMINAL A. I BELIEVED ALL WE NEEDED TO DO UPON EXITING THE RWY WAS MAKE A LEFT INTO THE GATE AREA. I WAS COMPLETELY TURNED AROUND AND I TURNED RIGHT AND TAXIED DOWN BRAVO. AS I DID SO, MY FO SAID I THINK WE PASSED IT UP. STILL BELIEVING WE NEEDED TO PARK IN TERMINAL C, I MADE A 180 AND BEGAN TAXIING TOWARDS TXWY D. AT THE SAME TIME MY FO ASKED FOR DIRECTIONS AND WE WERE TOLD TO TAXI DOWN TO E AND OVER TO A. BY THE TIME I PROCESSED THIS INFORMATION, WE WERE ALREADY TURNED THE OTHER WAY AND GND CTL VERY POLITELY GAVE US PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TXWY D. IT WAS THEN THAT I REALIZED I WAS TRYING TO TAXI TO THE WRONG TERMINAL. THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT ON THE GND TAXIING AT THE TIME AND OTHER THAN BEING EMBARRASSED, NO CONFLICTS OCCURRED. I BELIEVE THAT TWO LONG DAYS AND THE LATE HOUR CONTRIBUTED TO OUR COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF TRYING TO TAXI TO THE WRONG TERMINAL AND MY FO, UNAWARE THAT I WAS TURNED AROUND, DID NOT CORRECT ME OR OFFER MUCH IN THE WAY OF ASSISTANCE.

Synopsis

AN ACR FLT CREW RPTS THAT, FATIGUED AFTER A LONG DAY, THE CAPT WAS TAXIING TO THE GATE INCORRECTLY AND CONVINCED OF HIS ROUTING DID NOT TAKE THE FO'S INPUT.

ACN: 791355

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Pushback

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 61
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2330
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 830
ASRS Report : 791355

Events

Anomaly.Cabin Event.Other
Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other : Physical Injury

Assessments

Problem Areas : Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THE AIRPLANE WAS BEING PUSHED BACK. WE HAD JUST COME TO A STOP AFTER THE INITIAL PUSH. THE TOP OF THE STARTING ENG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE -- ONLY ITEMS MISSING WERE 'PARKING BRAKE' AND 'ENG STARTED.' FOR NO PARTICULAR REASON THAT I CAN REMEMBER, I GOT DISTR AND THEN CALLED

RAMP FOR TAXI, WHICH I DON'T NORMALLY DO UNTIL LATER IN THE CHKLIST. RAMP CLRED US TO TAXI. I THINK THIS RADIO EXCHANGE INADVERTENTLY TRIGGERED THE CAPT TO GO OUT OF SEQUENCE AS WELL. NOBODY PROMINENTLY VISIBLE IN FRONT OF US. THE RAMPERS WERE PROBABLY HUDDLED AROUND THE NOSE GEAR. THE CAPT STARTED TO ADVANCE THE THROTTLE AND BEFORE ANYBODY COULD DO ANYTHING, A NOISE WAS HEARD AND A BUMP FELT. WE STEPPED ON THE BRAKES, BUT IT WAS TOO LATE. THE AIRPLANE HAD MOVED A COUPLE OF FT FORWARD AND THE NOSEWHEEL HAD MOVED ON TOP OF THE TOW BAR. THE FLT ATTENDANT LAMENTED GETTING HURT IN THE BUMP. SHE CALLED THE PARAMEDICS AND AFTER TAKING CARE OF THE PAX WALLED HERSELF DOWN THE STAIRS AND TO THE AMBULANCE ABOUT 15 MINS AFTER THE ACCIDENT AND WAS TAKEN AWAY FOR CHKS. NOBODY ELSE SUFFERED ANY INJURY TO MY KNOWLEDGE. THE TRIGGERING EVENT WAS MY GETTING DISTR AND DOING SOMETHING THAT NORMALLY HAPPENS A FEW MOMENTS LATER. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE CAPT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I CANNOT RECALL ANYTHING THAT I MIGHT HAVE SEEN OR HEARD THAT CAUSED MY MOMENTARY LAPSE OF ATTN. THE WX WAS GOOD, WE WERE ON TIME, AND THE CREW GOT ALONG FINE. ELIMINATING THE OBVIOUS, THE ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS COULD HAVE BEEN MAYBE FATIGUE (EARLY WAKE-UP ON THE 4TH DAY OF THE TRIP) OR MAYBE STRESS DUE TO FAMILY RELATED EVENTS (A FUNERAL IN THE FAMILY) THAT POSSIBLY AFFECTED ME MORE THAN I THOUGHT. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) KEEP FOCUSED ALWAYS. 2) USE THE CHKLIST RELIGIOUSLY AND REPEAT IT IF NEEDED. 3) THROTTLES ARE OFF LIMITS UNTIL YOU SEE THE TUG, TOW BAR, AND THE SALUTE. 4) FATIGUE AND STRESS CAN BE SUBTLE ENEMIES -- BE SURE YOU ARE FIT TO FLY. 5) KEEP A MARSHAL IN FRONT OF THE PLANE WITH THE STOP SIGN UNTIL THE VERY END OF THE PUSH SEQUENCE.

Synopsis

CRJ-200 FLT CREW BEGINS TAXI BEFORE GND CREW SALUTE, STRIKE TOW BAR AND INJURE CABIN ATTENDANT.

ACN: 790967

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 2000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 16000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4800
ASRS Report : 790967

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach
Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted
Consequence.Other : Emotional Trauma

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

TO SAY THAT INTL FLYING HAS OCCASIONALLY BEEN DIFFICULT FOR MY BODY CLOCK IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT. BUT BY AND LARGE, WITH THOUGHT AND PREPARATION, I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THE ASSOCIATED FATIGUE. I HAVE OBSERVED OTHER CREW MEMBERS IN SUCH A STATE OF FATIGUE THAT THEY DIDN'T APPEAR TO MAKE CONSISTENT DECISIONS. BUT IN ALL OF MY FLYING CAREER, WITH ALL OF THE NIGHTS I'VE FLOWN WHILE BEING 'TIRED,' I HAVE NEVER HAD AN OCCASION WHERE I WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MY DECISION-MAKING ABILITIES WERE COMPROMISED. UNTIL THIS WEEK...UNABLE TO SLEEP PRIOR TO MY SHOW TIME, BY THE TIME OF THE SECOND TKOF, I WAS WELL BEYOND ANY DEFINITION OF TIRED. PERHAPS THE REASON I DIDN'T CANCEL THE FLT DUE TO FATIGUE WAS BECAUSE OF THE IMPAIRED JUDGEMENT OF THE FATIGUE ITSELF. REGARDLESS, ON THE SECOND LNDG, I FOUND MYSELF 5 MI OUT, AND HIGH AND FAST. THE WX WASN'T AN ISSUE, THE RWY WAS LONG, AND THE LIGHT ACFT HAD A LOT OF PERFORMANCE. 35 YRS OF FLYING EXPERIENCE (16 IN TYPE) MADE ME FEEL LIKE THIS WASN'T AN ISSUE. WITH AGGRESSIVE USE OF FLAPS AND GEAR AND SPD BRAKE, THE AIRPLANE WAS STABILIZED JUST BELOW 500 FT, AND THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. IT WASN'T UNTIL AFTER THE WAKING FROM THE NEXT SLEEP PERIOD THAT I WAS HORRIFIED. WHEN A GAR WOULD HAVE EASILY BEEN THE SAFEST AND MOST LOGICAL CHOICE, I NEVER FELT THE NEED. IS FATIGUE THAT INSIDIOUS? IT CAN OVERRIDE YRS OF BEHAVIOR? UNFORTUNATELY, THE OTHER PLT WAS IN THE SAME MENTAL STATE AS I. IN THIS CASE, WE WERE LUCKY. NO MECHANICALS, NO WX, ETC. IT WAS AN EYE-OPENING EXPERIENCE, AND ONE I DON'T WANT TO SEE AGAIN. I HAVE NEW RESPECT FOR THE WORD 'FATIGUE.'

Synopsis

AN ACR PLT DESCRIBES A STATE OF FATIGUE SO DEEP AND INSIDIOUS THAT HE DID NOT REALIZE UNTIL AFTER REST HOW DANGEROUS A SITUATION THE PREVIOUS DAY WAS.

ACN: 790741

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 700 ER&LR
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Parked
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
ASRS Report : 790741

Person : 2

Function.Other Personnel : Dispatcher
ASRS Report : 790849

Events

Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Improper Documentation
Anomaly.Maintenance Problem : Non Compliance With MEL
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact
Consequence.Other

Assessments

Problem Areas : Aircraft
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative

WHILE REVIEWING THE DISPATCH RELEASE FOR FLT XXX, ZZZ-ZZZ1, I NOTICED THE MEL REGARDING THE GEAR DOOR REMOVAL AND CONFIRMED THAT THE APPROPRIATE WT PENALTIES HAD BEEN APPLIED TO ALL PHASES OF FLT. WHAT I FAILED TO NOTICE UNTIL PREPARING FOR THE RETURN FLT WAS THAT THE MEL APPLIED TO BOTH GEAR DOORS, RESULTING IN ONLY HALF THE REQUIRED WT PENALTIES TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON THE FIRST LEG. I CALLED DISPATCH AND RECEIVED NEW RELEASES AND PERFORMANCE PACKAGE FOR THE 2ND LEG. NO LIMITS EXCEEDED ON THE FIRST LEG IN THAT THE FILED ALT OF FL350 MET THE MEL RESTR FOR BOTH GEAR DOORS REMOVED, AND WT RESTRS WITH APPROPRIATE PENALTIES APPLIED LEFT US WITH STANDARD PERFORMANCE LIMITS FOR TKOF AND LNDG (74000-67000), WITH HIGHER LIMITS FOR THE ENRTE PHASE. FATIGUE ON THE PART OF BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THIS EVENT. THE RPT TIME FOR THE TRIP WAS XC05, WHICH MEANT AN XA15 ALARM FOR MYSELF AND AN XA30 WAKE-UP FOR THE FO. NEITHER OF US RECEIVED MORE THAN 4 HRS SLEEP THE PREVIOUS NIGHT DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH FOR MYSELF WAS JUST THE FACT THAT IT'S SUMMER. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL MY BODY TO GO TO SLEEP AT A REASONABLE HR FOR SUCH AN EARLY ALARM ANYWAY, PERHAPS AT XQ00-XR00 PM, BUT THE FACT THAT IT'S STILL SO LIGHT AT XS00-XS30 LEFT ME WIDE AWAKE. THE ADDITIONAL STRESS OF HOPING NOT TO SLEEP THROUGH SUCH AN EARLY ALARM LEFT ME TOSSING AND TURNING UNTIL AT LEAST XU00 PM. I WOKE UP FINE, AND DIDN'T FEEL FATIGUED. THE FO AND I BOTH COMMENTED TO EACH OTHER THAT WE'D HAD LESS THAN AN IDEAL AMOUNT OF SLEEP, AND VOWED TO KEEP A CLOSER-THAN-USUAL EYE ON EACH OTHER, BUT THE INSIDIOUSNESS OF FATIGUE REARED ITS UGLY HEAD NONETHELESS. WE BOTH MISSED THAT THE MEL WAS FOR BOTH GEAR DOORS. I MIGHT SUGGEST THAT WHEN BOTH GEAR DOORS ARE REMOVED, 2 SEPARATE MEL'S REFLECT THAT RATHER THAN JUST ONE. AS I GLANCED AT THE PAPERWORK, HAD THERE BEEN 2 MEL'S RATHER THAN ONE, I WOULD HAVE BEEN MENTALLY GEARED FOR LOOKING FOR PERFORMANCE INFO FOR THE REMOVAL OF BOTH GEAR DOORS.

Synopsis

A CAPT AND DISPATCHER REPORT MISSING A MEL FOR ONE GEAR DOOR REMOVAL WHEN MAINT ACTUALLY REMOVED BOTH DOORS. THE CAPT CITES FATIGUE.

ACN: 790682

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZZZ.Airport
State Reference : US

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : ZZZ.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Preflight
Flight Phase.Ground : Takeoff Roll

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 60
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 2700
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 150
ASRS Report : 790682

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Override Automation

Assessments

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

THIS WAS A NIGHT FLT TO HAWAII. I HAD STOOD THE NIGHT HOT THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND WAS CALLED BACK AFTER 10.5 HRS REST WITHOUT REALLY ANY REST SO I WAS SLIGHTLY FATIGUED. WE BRIEFED, REVIEWED PAPERWORK, AND HEADED TO THE JET. WE WERE IN A BIT OF A RUSH TRYING TO GET OUT ON TIME OR EARLY. I HAD FLOWN 2 XINGS (ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC) WITH THE MIL IN THE PAST MONTH, HOWEVER, I WAS TRYING TO REFRESH MY ACR PROCS SINCE I HADN'T DONE A XING IN ABOUT A YR. I WAS A BIT RUSHED TRYING TO MAKE

SURE I ACCOMPLISHED MY NORMAL EVERY EVENT DUTIES AS WELL AS MY ADDITIONAL INTL OCEANIC XING REQUIREMENTS. I WAS A LITTLE BEHIND AND ATTEMPTING TO CATCH UP WHEN ANOTHER ACFT TAXIED IN AND WAS AWAITING OUR DEP FROM THE BLOCKS TO PARK AND AVOID JET BLAST. JUST WHEN I THOUGHT I WAS CATCHING UP WE FELT THE PRESSURE TO SPD UP. WHILE TAXIING OUT SLIGHTLY EARLY SO THE OTHER ACFT COULD PARK WE WERE COMPLETING OUR FINAL TKOF DUTIES. I INCORRECTLY SET UP THE WRONG WT CARD FOR TKOF, 270 INSTEAD OF 370, WHILE THE CAPT LOADED THE SPD RESTR TO HELP ME MOVE THINGS ALONG. WE WERE A SHORT TAXI TO RWY AND IMMEDIATE TKOF. WE ACCOMPLISHED ALL OUR DUTIES/CHKLISTS: HOWEVER, WE DIDN'T ALLOW TIME FOR OUR NORMAL DOUBLE CHKS AND XCHKS. UPON TAKING THE RWY I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, ADVANCED THE THROTTLES, AND CALLED 'SET TKOF THRUST.' THE CAPT MADE AIRSPD CALLS AS WE PROCEEDED DOWN THE RWY AND I BEGAN A ROTATION WHEN CALLED. WE NOTICED THE ACFT FELT AND SEEMED SLUGGISH SO I SLOWED ROTATION WHILE THE CAPT ADVANCED THE THROTTLES. WE IMMEDIATELY NOTICED THE ERROR AS WE HAD LEFT THE WT CARD VISIBLE DURING TKOF DUE TO THE SHORT TIMING OF EVENTS. IN RETROSPECT, WE REALIZED THAT FATIGUE, THE TIMELINESS OF EVENTS, AND THE ADDITIONAL PROCS ASSOCIATED WITH INTL FLT HAD CAUSED US TO LAPSE OR BECOME COMPLACENT IN OUR NORMAL DUTIES. IT CANNOT BE EMPHASIZED ENOUGH THAT WHEN YOU FEEL RUSHED, FATIGUED, AND HAVE ADDITIONAL DUTIES TO ACCOMPLISH YOU SHOULD TAKE THAT EXTRA TIME TO DOUBLE AND TRIPLE CHK ALL YOUR PROCS ARE ACCOMPLISHED CORRECTLY. LATE AND SAFE IS ALWAYS BETTER THAN THE ALTERNATIVE. AS UNFORTUNATE AND UNDESIRABLE AS THIS EVENT OR ANY PLT ERROR IS I AM NOW A BETTER PLT BECAUSE OF IT!

Synopsis

FATIGUED, RUSHED, BEHIND DUE TO LACK OF RECENT OCEANIC EXPERIENCE, B767-300 FO PROVIDES TKOF V SPEEDS BASED ON 100,000 POUNDS LESS THAN ACTUAL TOGW OF 370K. EVENTUAL RECOGNITION AND ENOUGH RWY ALLOW RECOVERY.

ACN: 790298

Time / Day

Date : 200806
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9000

Environment

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : C90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 6500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200
ASRS Report : 790298

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Company
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

NOTICED AIRSPEED AT 300 KTS DSNDING THROUGH 9000 FT. PF CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY AND ATC SAID NOTHING ABOUT IT. WE WERE PROBABLY DISTR BY 2ND RWY CHANGE AS DSNDING THROUGH 10000 FT. MAIN FACTOR FOR THIS ERROR WAS THE SCHEDULE THOUGH. TRIPS NEED TO BE LOOKED AT FOR ONEROUS FLT SCHEDULING WITH NO REGARD TO CIRCADIAN RHYTHM. ON THIS TRIP, WE ARRIVED FROM AN ALL NIGHTER INTO ZZZ, IN THE MORNING. 11 HOUR LAYOVER THEN FLEW TO ZZZ1. 12.5 HR LAYOVER THEN STARTED ANOTHER LONG DAY! THIS IS A COMPLETE REVERSAL IN OUR SLEEP SCHEDULE WITHIN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. FATIGUING SCHEDULES. I HAVE TWO DAYS OFF AFTER THIS TRIP

FOLLOWED BY A 5 DAY TRIP. THEN 1 DAY OFF, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER 5 DAY TRIP. HOW SAFE ARE THESE SCHEDULING PRACTICES?

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW CITES RWY CHANGE AND FATIGUING SCHEDULE AS DISTR CAUSING 300 KTS PASSING 9000 FT.

ACN: 785313

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 15000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : B757-200
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.ILS.Localizer & Glide Slope : 24R
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Precision
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : SEAVU

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 180
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 4000
ASRS Report : 785313

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 13300
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 6300
ASRS Report : 785189

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

CLEARED TO DESCEND ON SEAVU ARRIVAL FOR RWY 25L, 'MAINTAIN 300 KNOTS OR GREATER.' PRIOR TO SEAVU, GIVEN RUNWAY ASSIGNMENT CHANGE TO RWY 24R. DURING APPROACH BRIEFING, FO STATED THAT HE HAD INSTALLED, '24 RIGHT IN ROUTE 2.' FOLLOWING RUNWAY ASSIGNMENT CHANGE, FO SELECTED ROUTE 2 AND MY MAP SHOWED A PARALLEL DISPLAY FOR RWY 25L. I TOLD THE FO, 'THAT'S NOT RIGHT, I STILL SEE RWY 25.' AFTER NUMEROUS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS BY THE FO TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, I TOLD HIM TO ABANDON THE FMC AND REQUEST A VECTOR AND DESCENT FOR THE ILS RWY 24 RIGHT FROM ATC. MEANWHILE, I WAS TURNING TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 24 RIGHT LOCALIZER VIA RAW DATA. FO COMPLIED, ATC ISSUED THE VECTOR, DESCENT CLEARANCE AND SUBSEQUENT APPROACH CLEARANCE. THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT DEVIATION FROM THE ARRIVAL AND ATC DID NOT INDICATE ANY CONFLICTS OR PROBLEMS. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FO HAD IN FACT LOADED THE SEAVU ARRIVAL FOR RWY 25 LEFT ON ROUTE 2, NOT RWY 24 RIGHT. FO STATED THAT THIS WAS HIS SEVENTH TRIP IN 2 WEEKS AND HE WAS TIRED. ALSO, WE HAD AN EARLY MORNING, EAST COAST DEPARTURE AND IT WAS APPROXIMATELY AFTERNOON DOMICILE TIME WHEN HE LOADED THE ROUTE 2 PAGE. I GLANCED AT THE ROUTE 2 PAGE, CONFIRMED A SEAVU ARRIVAL, AND ALSO DID NOT NOTICE THAT IT WAS FOR RWY 25L AND NOT RWY 24R. ALSO, THIS WAS MY SEVENTH DAY OUT OF EIGHT FLYING, EARLY DOMICILE TIME, AND SUFFERED PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION DUE TO ONEROUS SCHEDULING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 785189: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS OCCURRENCE WERE: 1) WHILE I CHECKED ROUTE 1 PRIOR TO THE TOP OF DESCENT, I OMITTED RE-CHECKING ROUTE 2. 2) LAST MINUTE RUNWAY/TRANSITION CHANGE. 3) EARLY BODY CLOCK WAKE-UP TIME. 4) THIS WAS MY SEVENTH (7TH) TRIP IN A 2 WEEK PERIOD WITH MINIMAL TIME OFF.

Synopsis

A FATIGUED B757 CREW ON THE LAX SEAVU RWY 25L ARR WAS CHANGED TO RWY 24R BUT DUE TO A FMC PROGRAMMING ERROR NEEDED VECTORS TO THE ARPT.

ACN: 785150

Time / Day

Date : 200805
Local Time Of Day : 0001 To 0600

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : DCA.Airport
State Reference : DC
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 24000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : ELDEE

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 240
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 2300
ASRS Report : 785150

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Person : 3

Affiliation.Government : FAA
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.STAR : ELDEE 3

Narrative

FIRST WORKING FLT EVER FOR MYSELF INTO DCA. ENROUTE SPENT MUCH TIME REVIEWING THE RIVER VISUAL TO RWY 19 AND SPECIAL SECURITY CONCERNS FOR ARRIVAL INTO DCA. ELDEE ARRIVAL WAS NOTAM WITH SEVERAL ALTITUDE CHANGES FROM WHAT WAS PUBLISHED ON THE APCH PAGE. FO ENTERED THE NOTAM CHANGES INTO THE FMS. WE BELIEVE THAT WHEN HE DELETED THE ALTITUDE RESTRICTION AT CAPPS AS PER THE NOTAM THAT THE ALTITUDE RESTRICTION AT REVUE WAS DELETED BY THE FMS -- ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW THIS FOR SURE -- I DID NOT DOUBLE CHECK THE ALTITUDES HE CHANGED IN THE FMS. WE WERE CLEARED TO DESCEND VIA THE ELDEE. WHEN I HIT MY CONSTRAINT BUTTON TO SHOW THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE MAP DISPLAY THERE WAS NO ALTITUDE RESTRICTION AT REVUE. I SHOULD HAVE DOUBLE CHECKED AGAINST THE APCH PAGE AND CONFIRMED WITH ATC BUT DUE TO WORKLOAD AND TIME LIMITATIONS DID NOT. WE DESCENDED BELOW THE REQUIRED ALTITUDE BEFORE REVUE AND AT ABOUT 14400 FT ROUGHLY 2 MILES PRIOR TO REVUE GOT A CALL FROM ATC. WE CONFIRMED OUR ALTITUDE AND CONTINUED THE ARRIVAL WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE NUMBER OF ALTITUDE CHANGES ON THE NOTAM SEEMED EXCESSIVE BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE AND WAS CONFUSING AND CREATED UNNECESSARY WORKLOAD DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 785153: I BELIEVE I INADVERTENTLY DELETED THE CROSSING RESTRICTION OF 15000 FT AT REVUE WHEN I AMENDED THE NEXT WAYPOINT PUGEE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTAM. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING: 1) WE WERE TIRED. THIS WAS DAY 3. 2) IT WAS NIGHTTIME. 3) WE WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS AIRPORT OR THE PROCEDURE. 4) THE UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF AMENDMENTS REQUIRED TO THE ARRIVAL PROCEDURE. 5) NOT REALIZING THAT BY CHANGING ONE WAYPOINT, I SHOULD CHECK ALL THE OTHER WAYPOINTS. THE REST OF THE ARRIVAL AND LANDING WAS UNEVENTFUL. LESSON LEARNED WAS THAT I SHOULD CHECK AND RECHECK EVERYTHING.

Synopsis

AN A320 REPORTS CROSSING THE REVUE WAYPOINT ON THE DCA ELDEE ARR LOW. THE WORKLOAD IS HIGH AND THE NUMBER OF CHANGES TO THE ARRIVAL CONFUSING.

ACN: 784547

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ORD.Airport
State Reference : IL
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Night

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : C90.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A319
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 200
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 950
ASRS Report : 784547

Person : 2

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 220
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 1200
ASRS Report : 784544

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

Assessments

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Situations

Chart.Airport : ORD.Airport

Narrative

OUR 3RD LEG OF THE DAY, 3RD DAY OF TRIP, HAD HAD VARIOUS DEGREES OF TURB FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. ENTERING ORD APCH AIRSPACE, WERE ASKED TO MAINTAIN 310 KTS IN OUR DESCENT, WE REQUESTED SLOWER BECAUSE OF MOD CHOP, WAS GIVEN 300 KTS. UNDER 10000 FT WAS ASKED TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS UNTIL APPROX 15 MILES FROM ORD. THEY SLOWED US TO 210 KTS ABOUT 7-10 MILES FROM TOUCHDOWN, THEN GIVEN 180 KTS TO WILLT FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28, AND ASKED TO CONTACT TOWER AT WILLT. FO WAS FLYING, AUTOPLT/AUTO THROTTLE OFF. I WAS HEADS DOWN BRIEFLY TO PRESET RADIO FREQS, FLAPS, GROUND SPOILERS, AS WE WERE GRADUALLY SLOWING TO 180 KTS. WHEN I LOOKED UP, WE WERE BEGINNING TO CROSS THE FINAL FOR RWY 28, AND TOLD THE FO TO CORRECT BACK TO THE FINAL APCH FOR RWY 28. APCH ASKED US TO VERIFY WE WERE LANDING RWY 28, AND HAD IT IN SIGHT, I ACKNOWLEDGED 'AFFIRMATIVE,' AND HE REPEATED, CALL THE TWR AT WILLT. WE CONTINUED FOR A NORMAL LANDING AND TAXI-IN. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR OUR OVERSHOOT OF THE RWY 28 FINAL: -- THIS TRIP IS FAIRLY FATIGUING. OUR FIRST LAYOVER INCLUDED AN UNSETTLED NIGHT'S SLEEP, EARLY PICK UP AT HOTEL. AN EVEN EARLIER PICK UP AT LAYOVER THE NEXT MORNING AND BEING AT THE END OF A 10:23 HR DUTY DAY. CONTINUOUS TURBULENCE FOR THE ENTIRE LEG, FOLLOWED BY AN ORD APCH REQUESTED HIGH SPEED DESCENT AND APCH. FO CONFUSED RWY 28 WITH RWY 22L, AND CONSIDERING THE POOR RWY NUMBERING ON THE ARPT PAGE, THIS IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE. (THE NUMBER '28' IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE APCH END OF RWY 22L ON THE GRAPHIC. THE RWY NUMBERING SHOULD BE CHANGED TO THE WAY IT IS PRESENTED ON OTHER PAGES.) I MISSED THE INCONGRUITY IN HIS APCH BRIEFING OF THE TXWY TURNOFF, BEING 'S2,' AND NOT 'T,' FOR RWY 28. WE WERE LANDING INTO HAZE AND SUN GLARE, AND THE FO'S SUN VISOR WAS LOOSE AND UNUSABLE, AND HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN UP AND CLEARED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 784544: I BRIEFED THE VISUAL APPROACH BACKED UP ILS TO RWY 28 HOWEVER DUE TO THE RUNWAY NUMBER MARKINGS ON THE CHART I THOUGHT RWY 22L WAS RWY 28 FOR ORIENTATION PURPOSES AND EVEN BRIEFED EXITING AT S3 TXWY. WITH THE SUN IN MY EYES DUE TO UNUSABLE VISOR, HAND FLYING AUTO THRUST OFF AND THE WRONG PICTURE IN MY MIND AS TO THE ORIENTATION OF RWY 28, I OVERSHOT FINAL. CAPT SAW AND CORRECTED ME. AS I WAS TURNING BACK TO RWY 28 FINAL APPROACH CONTROL ASKED TO VERIFY RWY 28 IN SITE AND THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED AND APPROACH TOLD US TO CONTACT TOWER. WE LANDED NORMALLY. IN RETROSPECT WHEN FATIGUED I WILL CALL OFF TRIP. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE GRAPHICS DEPICTING THE RWY NUMBERS NEED TO BE AS THEY ARE ON THE LOW VISIBILITY CHARTS. LASTLY WHEN TIRED I WILL USE THE AUTOMATION UNTIL LINED UP ON FINAL.

Synopsis

A FATIGUED A319 CREW LANDING ORD RWY 28 LINED UP FOR RWY 22L AFTER THE FO MISREAD THE ARPT CHART WHERE RWY 28 NUMBERS APPEAR NEAR RWY 22L PICTURE.

ACN: 781691

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : CYVR.Airport
State Reference : BC
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CYVR.Tower
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A310
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Qualification.Pilot : CFI
Qualification.Pilot : Commercial
Qualification.Pilot : Flight Engineer
Qualification.Pilot : Instrument
Qualification.Pilot : Multi Engine
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 65
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 12000
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 400
ASRS Report : 781691

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Ground

Events

Anomaly.Incursion : Taxiway
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolutive Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Airport
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AFTER LANDING ON RWY 8L VANCOUVER WE EXITED AT TXWY M3. WE WERE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS INITIALLY AS FOLLOWS, EXIT M3,M,R,K,V... TO PARKING. AFTER READBACK OF THIS CLEARANCE THE TAXI CLEARANCE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REVISED AS FOLLOWS, M3, M, J, K, V... AS IS NORMAL FOR AFTER LANDING BOTH THE CAPTAIN AND FO ARE BUSY DEALING WITH BOTH THE GROUND MOVEMENT AND AFTER LANDING PROCEDURES. THE CONCLUSION OF THIS FLIGHT COMES AFTER YET ANOTHER THUNDERSTORM EVENT IN ZZZ WHICH DELAYED THE DEPARTURE BY TWO HOURS AND NINE MINUTES. OUR ARRIVAL TIME CORRESPONDED WITH XA54 ACCORDING TO OUR BODY CLOCKS AND WE WERE VERY FATIGUED. THERE IS EXTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION TAKING PLACE ON THE VANCOUVER AIRPORT AND MUCH OF THIS IS DENOTED ON THE GROUND WITH BARRICADES AND LIGHTING. THE REVISED CLEARANCE INCLUDED A RIGHT TURN ON TAXIWAY KILO OFF OF TAXIWAY JULIET. THE CONTINUATION OF TXWY JULIET TO ITS INTERSECTION WITH TXWY HOTEL HAS A GOOD DEAL OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL AND GROUND BARRICADES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TXWY. THERE ARE MEN AND EQUIPMENT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TXWY PRIOR TO THE INTERSECTION WITH TXWY KILO. BOTH FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS BECAME FOCUSED ON ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT AND BARRICADES THAT WERE ON THE PERIMETER OF TXWY JULIET AND WE MISSED A RIGHT TURN TO TXWY KILO. WE WERE INFORMED OF THIS BY GROUND CONTROL IN WHAT COULD BE DEEMED AS A LESS THAN HOSPITABLE MANNER. HE INFORMED US THAT WE WERE ALSO TAXIING ON A WEIGHT RESTRICTED TXWY. WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS ARE LISTED IN THE CHARTING INFORMATION AND WE CAN FIND NO REFERENCE TO ANY WEIGHT RESTRICTION ON TXWY JULIET. THE NOTAMS FOR VANCOUVER ALSO SHOW CLEARLY THAT NO INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO THE FLIGHT CREWS REGARDING ANY WEIGHT RESTRICTIONS TO TAXI ON TXWY JULIET. THIS DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE FLIGHT CREW FOR MISSING THE RIGHT TURN AT TXWY KILO, AND FOR THAT I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY. I DO BELIEVE FOR REASONS OF SAFETY CLEARANCES THAT ARE ISSUED TO FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS THAT INVOLVE EIGHT SUCCESSIVE TXWY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED EXCESSIVE. THE INITIAL TAXI CLEARANCE THAT WOULD HAVE ROUTED THE AIRCRAFT OVER TXWY ROMEO WOULD HAVE PROVIDED THE FLIGHT CREW AN OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS MORE ON TAXI AND LESS ON CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT PROXIMITY TO THE AIRCRAFT. THE TAXI ROUTING CONTINUING ON TXWY J ALSO APPEARS SOMEWHAT OBVIOUS AS A DIRECT ROUTING TO THE INTERSECTION WITH TXWY H. WE BECAME MORE FOCUSED ON THE PERIMETER SAFETY OF THE AIRCRAFT AND MISSED THE RIGHT TURN ON TO TXWY K.

Synopsis

A310 FLT CREW MISSED A TURN ISSUED BY ATC WHILE TAXIING IN. THIS RESULTED IN PROCEEDING DOWN A TXWY WHICH APPARENTLY IS WEIGHT RESTRICTED. NEITHER CHARTS NOR NOTAMS INDICATE THIS RESTRICTION.

ACN: 781596

Time / Day

Date : 200804
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial
Route In Use.Departure.SID : LOOP

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 250
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 9500
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 3500
ASRS Report : 781596

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Original Clearance

Assessments

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

DURING INITIAL CLBOUT, CAPT FLYING THE LOOP 4 DEP. SOCIAL GAVE US DIRECT TO PEVEE. I DID NOT SEE THIS INTXN ON OUR RTE AND INFORMED ATC. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO FLY HDG 150 DEGS. ATC QUERIED US AS TO WHAT SID WE WERE ISSUED. AT THIS POINT WE REALIZED WE BOTH HAD MISSED THE REVISED SEGMENT ON OUR PDC. SID HAD BEEN CHANGED TO OSHNN3. THIS IS

THE FIRST TIME I MISSED A REVISED SEGMENT (USUALLY VERY THOROUGH REVIEWING THE CLRNC). FATIGUE WAS NOT AN ISSUE. JUST A MATTER OF BEING A LITTLE TOO COMFORTABLE AND THAT IS WHEN SOMETHING IS MOST LIKELY TO COME UP AND BITE.

Synopsis

A320 FLT CREW DEPARTING LAX FAILS TO NOTE DEPARTURE CHANGE IN AMENDED SECTION OF PDC. ATC ISSUES VECTOR TO NEXT FIX.

ACN: 776885

Time / Day

Date : 200803
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAX.Airport
State Reference : CA
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 10000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Dawn

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SCT.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Vacating Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : RIIVR

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Qualification.Pilot : ATP
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 130
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 10544
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 130
ASRS Report : 776885

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

AROUND 12000 FT MSL, SOCAL DECIDED TO CHANGE OUR LNDG RWY AND CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 24R INSTEAD OF RWY 25L. PIC SELECTED HDG MODE AND ASKED ME TO LOAD NEW RWY INTO FMS. BY THE TIME I FINISHED AND LOOKED OUTSIDE, WE WERE AT 8000 FT AND DOING ABOUT 300 KTS INSTEAD OF BEING BTWN 9800/9000 FT AND 250 KTS. THIS INCIDENT HAS SEVERAL CAUSES, FATIGUE (COMING FROM THE EAST COAST), CHANGE OF RWY BY SOCAL AT A VERY BUSY TIME IN THE APCH AND 2 PLTS WITH THEIR HEADS DOWN IN THE FLT DECK AT THE SAME TIME. TO ALLEVIATE THIS KIND OF INCIDENT, FLT CREWS SHOULD FOLLOW PROCS AND ATC SHOULD LIMIT LAST MINUTE CHANGES WHEN POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY AROUND 10000 FT MSL.

Synopsis

AN A320 ON AN LAX ARR WAS CHANGED FROM 25L TO 24R AT 12000 FT. WHILE SELECTING THE NEW RWY, THE ACFT DSNDED TO 8000 FT AT 300 KT MISSING THE 9000 FT CONSTRAINT.

ACN: 772021

Time / Day

Date : 200801
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : ZGGG.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 11800

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC
Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZGZU.ARTCC
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : MD-11
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : N/A

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 4200
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 220
ASRS Report : 772021

Person : 2

Affiliation.Government : Foreign
Function.Controller : Radar

Events

Anomaly.Altitude Deviation : Overshoot
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 2
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Assigned Altitude

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

ON DESCENT INTO ZGGG, WE LEVELED OFF AT THE ASSIGNED ALTITUDE (IN METERS) AND HAD RESET OUR ALTIMETERS TO THE LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING BECAUSE WE THOUGHT WE HEARD THE CONTROLLER USE THE PHRASE 'NONSTANDARD' WITH THE ALTITUDE ASSIGNED. A FEW MINUTES LATER, THE CONTROLLER TOLD US THAT HE SHOWED US 100 METERS LOW AND WE CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE AT THE ASSIGNED ALTITUDE. WE CONFIRMED THAT ALL OF ALTIMETERS WERE AT THE LOCAL ALTIMETER SETTING AND ASKED THE CONTROLLER AGAIN FOR HIS READING OF OUR ALTITUDE. WE DIDN'T RECEIVE A RESPONSE AND DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE HAD SAID 'STANDARD' WITH THE ASSIGNED ALTITUDE. WE RESET OUR ALTIMETERS TO STANDARD AND CONTINUED ON THE APPROACH WITH NO FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE CONTROLLER ABOUT OUR ALTITUDE. I BELIEVE THAT WE MAY HAVE BEEN 100 METERS LOW FOR ABOUT 5 NM DUE TO THE CONFUSION ABOUT THE CONTROLLER'S USAGE OF THE WORD STANDARD. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE ALL A LITTLE FATIGUED DUE TO THE PREVIOUS DAY'S FLIGHT AND WERE ALSO GIVEN A DIFFERENT APPROACH AND RUNWAY AT THE AIRFIELD CLOSE TO THE DESCENT POINT, ALONG WITH THE ALTITUDE ASSIGNMENT. THIS CAUSED THE CREW TO FOCUS ON THE FMS CHANGES AND PULLING OUT DIFFERENT APPROACH PLATES WITHIN A SHORT DISTANCE FORM THE DESCENT POINT. THIS MAY HAVE DISTRACTED US ENOUGH TO MISUNDERSTAND THE CONTROLLER'S INSTRUCTIONS ON STANDARD/NONSTANDARD ALTIMETER SETTING FOR THE ASSIGNED ALTITUDE.

Synopsis

FLT CREW REPORTS MISUNDERSTANDING CONTROLLER ISSUING NEW RWY ASSIGNMENT AND NEW ALTITUDE. FLT CREW SETS QNH PRIOR TO DESCENDING BELOW TRANSITION LEVEL.

ACN: 771204

Time / Day

Date : 200801

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : SBGR.Airport
State Reference : FO
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7000

Environment

Light : Daylight

Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : SBGR.TRACON
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : Widebody Transport
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude
Route In Use.Arrival.STAR : TUCA

Person : 1

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier
Function.Flight Crew : Captain
Function.Oversight : PIC
ASRS Report : 771204

Events

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Speed Deviation
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 1
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative

WE WERE ON DSCNT ON THE TUCA 9 ARR INTO SBGR. WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO FLY THE ARR, BUT NOT 'VIA' THE ARR, SO WE DID NOT HAVE TO COMPLY WITH ALTITUDE AND SPEED RESTRS. SOMEWHERE NEAR LANE INTXN WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC 'VIA' THE ARR. WE CROSSED LANE INTXN ON ALTITUDE BUT ABOVE THE SPEED. WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE HEARING THE CLRNC AND HAD TO ASK SEVERAL TIMES IF WHAT WE WERE CLRED FOR. FOR SOME REASON I WAS NOT PLANNING ON CROSSING LANE AT FL190. VERY CLOSE TO THE INTXN THE FO SAID WE NEED TO CROSS LANE AT FL190. WE PASSED THE INTXN ABOVE THE

FL190 RESTR, BUT SLOWED QUICKLY WITH NO NEGATIVE RESULTS. I STATED THE EVENT AS DEVIATION FROM CLRNC, BUT IT IS ALSO A LACK OF COM PROBLEMS. WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING SBGR APCH. ALSO, IT APPEARED THE FO WAS AWARE OF THE SPD RESTR, BUT DID NOT MENTION IT UNTIL TOO LATE. WE ARE VERY TIRED AT THIS POINT AS THIS FLT LEAVES VERY LATE LCL TIME. IT IS NOW 8 HOURS LATER. MY BRIEFING AT THE GATE STATED THAT WE SHOULD KNOW WE ARE NOT AT THE TOP OF OUR GAMES DUE TO THE HOUR OF OP, AND THAT WE NEED TO CHK EACH OTHER, TO ENSURE A SAFE FLT. IN THIS TYPE OF OP WE NEED TO DOUBLE CHK OURSELVES AND THE ENTIRE CREW TO MAKE SURE WE COMPLY WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Synopsis

A WDB FLT CREW DEVIATED FROM CHARTED SPEED ON ARR INTO SBGR.