Summary: Defendants made a motion in limine to exclude the presentation of evidence of the plaintiff's acquittal of the disorderly conduct charge, asserting the admission would be wholly inappropriate and prejudicial. Plaintiff asserts the evidence is admissible as relevant evidence to prove his excessive force claim. The court concluded that, because the excessive force claim presents issues that are entirely separate and distinct from those underlying the state prosecution, the outcome of the state prosecution in irrelevant.

Case Name: Shirley v. Dietz
Case Number
: A3-99-120
Docket Number
: 35
Date Filed
: 11/22/00
Nature of Suit
: 440

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

Norman Shirley,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

Richard Dietz, Jay Gruebele and Scott Edinger,

Defendants.

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) Civil No. A3-99-120
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ORDER

Before the court is defendant's Motion in Limine Concerning Shirley's Criminal Case, and Brief (Doc. #26) and the Plaintiff's Return to Motion in Limine in opposition (Doc. # 31). In their motion the defendants assert that introduction of the plaintiff's acquittal of the charge of disorderly conduct "would be wholly inappropriate and prejudicial." To support their position defendants cite several Annotated Law Reporters and a North Dakota Supreme Court case, Renner v. Murray, 136 N.W.2d 794 (N.D. 1965). In his brief in opposition to the motion the plaintiff correctly points out that Renner and Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (1968) have been abrogated by Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Clark, 583 N.W.2d 377 (N.D. 1998). The court closely reviewed these cases and concluded that they are not dispositive of the issue presently before the court. Regardless of the current state of case law in North Dakota, the court finds that plaintiff's acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge is irrelevant to the issues presented in this case and will therefore not be admitted as evidence. Accordingly, defendant's Motion in Limine (Doc. #26) is GRANTED.

It is well settled that a district court has a great deal of discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. See Lowe Bey v. Hamon, 977 F.2d 586, 1992 WL 279284 (8th Cir. 1992) ("A district court is accorded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules."). The court's decision to exclude evidence will only be reversed "upon a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion." Id.

Whether or not the plaintiff was convicted of the underlying offense is irrelevant to whether or not the officers used an excessive or unreasonable amount of force in order to effectuate the arrest. Although such evidence may be relevant to issue of the lawfulness of the arrest, Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1980), that issue is not a claim to be presented to the jury in this case. Thus, because the excessive force claim presents issues that are entirely separate and distinct from those underlying the state prosecution, the outcome of the state prosecution in irrelevant. Again, whether the officers used more force than was necessary to arrest Shirley has no bearing on Shirley's guilt or innocence with respect to the disorderly conduct charge. Conversely, Shirley's acquittal will have no impact, and is therefore irrelevant, to his excessive force claim. See Manning v. Tefft, 839 F. Supp. 126 (D. R.I. 1994) (the court declined to stay plaintiff's civil 1983 excessive force claim until resolution of the state criminal charges against him stating that the issues presented are "separate and distinct.").

Based on the foregoing, defendant's Motion in Limine (Doc. #26) is GRANTED.

Dated this ____ day of November, 2000.

Karen K. Klein
United States Magistrate Judge