TRANSP National Transportation Safety Board	NTSB ID:	FTW01FA11	5	Aircraft Registration Number: N917AL					
FACTUAL REPORT	Occurrenc	e Date: 05/04	/2001	Most Critical Injury: None					
Occurrence Type: Accident Investigated							tigated By: NTSB		
Location/Time									
Nearest City/Place	State	Zip	Code						
Vermillion 44	GM	00	000	1616	CDT				
Airport Proximity: Off Airport/Airstrip	Distanc	ce From La	nding Facility:						
Aircraft Information Summary									
Aircraft Manufacturer			Model/Series	3			Type of Aircraft		
Bell			407				Helicopter		
Revenue Sightseeing Flight: No			Air N	ledical Transport	Flight: No				
Narrative									
Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstan HISTORY OF FLIGHT	nces pertine	ent to the acci	ident/incident:						
the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot and his passenger were not injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Air Logistics LLC, of New Iberia, Louisiana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. The helicopter departed the High Island 368 offshore platform at 1535, and was destined for Intracostal City, Louisiana. In an interview with the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the pilot reported that while in cruise flight at 700 feet agl, enroute from High Island 368 to Intracoastal City, a "slight vibration became noticeable." After a few minutes, the vibration became more pronounced, and was accompanied by a noise. During an attempted precautionary landing to an offshore platform, the vibration and noise level increased again, and total engine power was lost. The pilot then initiated an autorotation to the water, deployed the skid floats, and landed safely. After landing, the pilot retarded the throttles, shut off the fuel valve and placed the electrical switches to the OFF position. While the helicopter was being towed in the water, the helicopter rolled over inverted. Examination of the helicopter, after recovery by the operator, revealed that the KAflex engine-to-transmission driveshaft had fractured, and the forward section of the tail rotor									
PERSONNEL INFORMATION									
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with helicopter, airplane single-engine land and multi-engine land ratings. In addition, he held helicopter and airplane instrument ratings. The pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate on March 8, 2001, with the limitation, "Glasses near and intermediate." His total flight time, as of May 4, 2001, was 15,100 hours, of which 2,800 hours were in the Bell 407. He had flown 166 operational flight hours in the Bell 407 during the 90 days prior to the accident.									
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION									
Manufactured at Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC), the Bell model 407 helicopter, S/N 533 was certified on September 15, 1999, and delivered to Air Logistics L.L.C., of New Iberia, September 21, 1999, with 14.6 total flight hours. The helicopter was powered by a 630 horsept turboshaft Rolls Royce Allison 250-C-47B engine, S/N CAE-847417. According to records provided the operator, the helicopter had accumulated 2,114.2 total flight hours, 1,771 total cycles, 4,476 total takeoffs at the time of the accident.							opter, S/N 53381, of New Iberia, on a 630 horsepower cords provided by cotal cycles, and		

FACTUAL REPORT - AVIATION

National Transportation Safety Board	NTSB ID: FTW01FA115	
FACTUAL REPORT	Occurrence Date: 05/04/2001	
AVIATION	Occurrence Type: Accident	

Narrative (Continued)

The maintenance records revealed that the fractured KAflex driveshaft, P/N 206-340-300-105, S/N KC734, was last removed and reinstalled on the helicopter on April 10, 2001, at a helicopter time of 1,998 hours. The KAflex driveshaft is often removed when maintenance is performed near the transmission area, pylon mounts, engine, etc. The records indicated that the helicopter's KAflex driveshaft had been removed and reinstalled nine times for both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance prior to accident. The KAflex driveshaft had a total time of 2,114.2 hours and an airworthiness life limit of 5,000 hours.

According to the BHTC maintenance manual, each end of the KAflex driveshaft is comprised of four rectangular flex frames that are attached with bolts to each other and to each end of the shaft. A flange adapter is attached to each flex frame assembly with bolts. One flange adapter bolts to the transmission input adapter, and the other flange adapter bolts to the rotor disk and to the freewheel adapter. The driveshaft turns at 6,317 rpms and transmits the power from the engine to the transmission. The driveshaft is designed to flex to accommodate the misalignment between the engine and transmission that occurs during operation. According to Transport Canada (TC), three incidents involving cracked flex frames on the forward (transmission) end of the driveshaft had previously been reported.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Initial examination of the wreckage was conducted by the NTSB at the operator's base in New Iberia, on May 8, 2001. The helicopter's fuselage and tail boom were predominately intact. The chin bubbles, forward windscreens, and skid gear floats were damaged during recovery. The mast and rotor system were removed from the helicopter prior to the examination and were also substantially damaged during the recovery. The upper cowlings, with the exception of the hydraulic flight control actuators' cowling, were removed prior to the examination. The engine was observed mounted to the airframe and the engine mounts were found to be secure. The steel tail rotor drive shaft had been torsionally separated approximately 2 inches forward of the dynamic balance weight. The tail rotor gearbox case displayed evidence of salt-water corrosion, and the tail rotor hub and blades were securely mounted to the output shaft with no anomalies noted. The cockpit controls were manually manipulated with no anomalies noted, and continuity was established from the cockpit throughout the entire flight control system. The cockpit switch positions were all in their normal shutdown positions, with the exception of the hydraulic system and the avionics master switches, which were ON. The only open circuit breaker was the GPS circuit breaker.

The KAflex driveshaft was found separated from the transmission input side. The anti-flail device was observed separated from the transmission side of the driveshaft. Separated portions of the driveshaft flex frames were found on the roof deck. The roof deck immediately below the transmission end of the driveshaft had been punctured and displayed signatures of rotational scoring and tearing. In addition, the fuel vent line had been punctured. The oil line that connects to the oil manifold for the freewheeling unit had also been severed. The driveshaft and its fractured components, along with the separated forward tail rotor drive shaft, were retained by the NTSB for further examination.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

On May 17, 2001, at the facilities of Bell Helicopter, Hurst, Texas, under the supervision of the NTSB, the KAflex driveshaft and tail rotor driveshaft were examined by Bell engineers. Bell Helicopter's materials laboratory examination of the KAflex driveshaft "revealed fatigue fractures at a bolt hole in the first flex frame at the transmission end of the shaft and fatigue fractures in the end fitting at the transmission end. The primary fracture was a fatigue crack that occurred in a bolt hole where a bolt joined the first flex frame to the center flex frame. All the other fractures were a result of overstress." The driveshaft was determined to be manufactured within engineering specifications.

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	AVIATION ETYBON	Occurrence Type: Accident	

Narrative (Continued)

Bell Helicopter's materials laboratory report also stated that "the fractured tail rotor driveshaft was a result of torsional overstress. The direction of overstress was consistent with restraint of the driveshaft from the flywheel aft while the forward portion of the shaft was driven in a clockwise direction as viewed looking forward."

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Transport Canada issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) CF-2001-24 on June 11, 2001. The AD discussed this accident and three other incidents involving cracked flex frames on the driveshaft. The AD required a one-time visual inspection for any obvious discrepancy of the driveshaft: "(a) within the next 25 hours air time for shafts with more than 1,000 hours, and for shafts with less than 1,000 hours which have been removed or installed since the helicopter was delivered; (b) or within the next 300 hours for shafts with less than 1,000 hours that have never been removed or installed since delivery." The one-time inspection was to be conducted in accordance with Bell Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 407-01-43, dated June 8, 2001. The ASB discussed the possibility of driveshaft failure due to fatigue cracking of the flex frames. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued AD 2001-13-51, dated June 27, 2001, which addressed the same subject matter as TC's CF-2001-24 AD and utilized the same inspection requirements and intervals.

Transport Canada also issued AD CF-2002-03, effective on February 28, 2002. The AD discussed this accident and the three additional incidents of cracked driveshaft flex frames. The AD stated that: "It has been determined that the KAflex driveshaft on model 407 helicopters is experiencing higher loads than on other helicopter models. Since the KAflex shaft P/N 206-340-3---105 can also be installed on Models 206L-4 and 427, this directive requires a component review to determine if the KAflex shaft was previously installed on Model 407." The corrective actions called for in the AD were:

"Part 1. Models 206L-4 and 427

Review of the Historical Service Record of the KAflex driveshaft to determine if it was ever installed on a Bell Model 407 helicopter:

(a) If the KAflex driveshaft has never been installed on a Bell Model 407 helicopter, then annotate the helicopter log book as follows: $P/N \ 206-340-300-105$ KAflex driveshaft has not been installed on a Bell 407. AD CF-2002-03 accomplished;

(b) If the KAflex driveshaft P/N 206-340-300-105 has been previously installed for any length of time on a Bell 407 helicopter, remove from service as per the applicable schedule published in BHTC Alert Service Bulletin 206L-01-123 or 427-01-45, both dated 12 October 2001, or later revisions approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada."

Part 2. Model 407

Remove shaft P/N 206-340-300-105 as per the compliance schedule provided in BHTC Alert Service Bulletin 407-01-45 Rev "A" dated 21 November 2001, or later revisions approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada.

The BHTC ASB 407-01-45 was issued to introduce the a new engine-to-transmission driveshaft, P/N 206-340-300-107, with a 1,250-hour overhaul interval and end identification marks. The bulletin requires the removal of driveshafts 206-340-300-105 per a described compliance schedule. The overhauled driveshafts are renumbered and retain an airworthiness life limit of 5,000 hours from new.

At the time of this writing, the FAA has not adopted an AD regarding Transport Canada's AD CF-2002-03.

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Narrative (Continued)		
The helicopter was released to the o	owner.	

National Transportation Safety I	ty Board NTSB ID: FTW01FA115													
FACTUAL REPOR	FACTUAL REPORT Occurren					urrence Date: 05/04/2001								
AVIATION		Occurrer	псе Туре:											
Landing Facility/Approach Inf	ormation		-											
Airport Name		Airŗ	port ID:	Airport Elevation	Run	way Used	Runwa	ay Lengtl	h Ru	nway Width				
				Ft. MSL	-									
Runway Surface Type: Water						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·								
Runway Surface Condition: Unkno	wn													
Approach/Arrival Flown: NONE	Approach/Arrival Flown: NONE													
VFR Approach/Landing: Forced La	anding													
Aircraft Information														
Aircraft Manufacturer Bell			Model/ 407	Series				Serial I 5338	Number 1					
Airworthiness Certificate(s): Normal														
Landing Gear Type: Skid														
Amateur Built Acft? No	Number of Seats: 7	,	Certified	d Max Gross Wt.		5250	LBS	r of Engine	əs: 1					
Engine Type: Turbo Shaft		Er F	ngine Ma Rolls Roy	nufacturer: /ce Allison		Model/Ser 250-C-47	ies: 7B		Rated Power: 630 HP					
- Aircraft Inspection Information														
Type of Last Inspection		Da	Date of Last Inspection Time Since Last Inspection						Airframe 7	otal Time				
AAIP		04	4/2001			139 Ho	ours	2	114.2 Hours					
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (E	ELT) Information													
ELT Installed?/Type Yes /		EL	T Operat	ed? No	ELT Aid	ded in Locating	g Accide	ent Site?	No					
Owner/Operator Information														
Registered Aircraft Owner			Street A	ddress 4605 Industria	al Dr.									
Air Logistics L.L.C.	City							Zip Code						
			Street A	New Iberia					LA	70560				
Operator of Aircraft			0	4605 Industria	al Dr.									
Air Logistics L.L.C.				City New Iberia						Zip Code 70560				
Operator Does Business As: Operator Designator Code: ALGL														
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:														
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s): On-demand Air Taxi														
Operating Certificate:				Operator Certific	cate: Air	craft Externa	l Load							
Regulation Flight Conducted Under	: Part 135: Air Ta	xi & Comr	muter											
Type of Flight Operation Conducted	Non-scheduled;	Domestic	c; Passe	nger/Cargo										
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National Transportation Safety Board NTSB ID: FTW01FA115														
FAC	CTUAL RE	EPORT		Occurren	Occurrence Date: 05/04/2001									
	AVIATI	QN		Occurren	ce Type: A	ccident								
	VETY BO	Pr.		Occurrent	ce Type. A	coldent								
First Pilot Ir	nformation													
Name City										State	Da	ate of Birth	Age	
On File On File On File										51				
Sex: M S	Seat Occupied:	Right	Oc	cupational Pi	lot? Civilia	an Pilot				Ce	ertificate Nu	ımbei	r: On File	•
Certificate(s):	Airlin	ne Transpor	t											
Airplane Ratin	ng(s): Multi	i-engine Lar	nd; Single-e	engine Land										
Rotorcraft/Glic	der/LTA: Helio	copter		-										
Instrument Ra	ating(s): Airpl	ane: Helico	nter											
Instructor Rati	ing(s): None	e	1											
Current Bienni	ial Flight Revie	w? 03/200 ⁻	1											
Medical Cert.:	Class 2	Medica	al Cert. Statu	s: Valid Me	dicalw/ w	/aivers/	lim.		D	ate of L	ast Medica	al Exa	am: 03/2001	
			This Make	Airplane	Airolane				Instrument					Lightor
- Flight Time I	Matrix	All A/C	and Model	Single Engine	Mult-Engine	Ni	ght	Actu	Simulated		Rotorci	aft	Glider	Than Air
Total Time		15100	2800	285	1970)			363				_	
Pilot In Comma	and(PIC)	14100	2800	248	1140)								
Instructor														
Instruction Rec	ceived													
Last 90 Days		180	166											
Last 30 Days		72	72			_					_			
Last 24 Hours		6	6											
Seatbelt Used? Yes Shoulder Harness Used? Yes Toxicology Performed? No Second Pilot? No								C						
Flight Plan/	Itinerary													
Type of Flight	Plan Filed: VF	FR												
Departure Poi	nt						State	;	Airport	Identifi	er De	partu	ure Time	Time Zone
HI-338 GM 368							15	35		CDT				
Destination State Airport Identifier														
Intercoastal LA 7RA														
Type of Clear	ance: Unkno	wn					•		-					
Type of Airspa	ace: Class	G												
Weather Inf	formation													
Source of Wx	Information:													
	Unkno	wn												
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FA	ACTUAL REPOR	RT	Occurrent	Occurrence Date: 05/04/2001			1			
	AVIATION		Occurrent							
) / / o o the o r										
WOEID		Time Zone		00		iotonoo E		ident Site		Direction From Accident Site
WOFID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF Eleval	on		Istance F	OIII ACC	ident Site		Direction From Accident Site
			Ft	MSL				NM		Deg. Mag.
Sky/Lowes	st Cloud Condition: Clea	ar				Ft.	AGL	Condition of	of Lig	nt: Day
Lowest Ce	iling: None		Ft.	AGL	Visib	ility:	10	SM	Alti	meter: "Hg
Temperatu	ure: 28 °C	Dew Point:	°C	Weath	ner Condi	tions at A	ccident	_{Site:} Visual	Conc	litions
Wind Direc	ction:	Wind Speed	l:		Wine	d Gusts:				
Visibility (F	RVR): Ft	. Visibility (R	√V)	SM	I					
Precip and	l/or Obscuration:	I								
Accident	Information									
Aircraft Da	mage: Substantial		Aircraft Fir	e: None				Aircraft Exp	olosio	n None
			1					1		
- Injury Su	mmary Matrix	Fatal Se	rious Mino	or	None	TOTAL				
First Pi	ilot				1		1			
Second	d Pilot									
Studen	it Pilot									
Flight I	nstructor									
Check	Pilot									
Flight E	Engineer									
Cabin /	Attendants									
Other 0	Crew									
Passer	ngers				1		1			
- TOTAL A	ABOARD -				2		2			
Other (Ground									
- GRANE	D TOTAL -				2		2			
			FACTUAL	REPO	RT - AV	IATION				Page 4

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AVIATION	Occurrence Type: Accident	
Administrative Information		
Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)		
Alexander Lemishko		
Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incid	lent Investigation:	
Mark S Evans		
FAA FSDO Baton Rouge I A		
Mattew Rigeby		
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada		
Fort Worth, TX		
Gary Tucker		
Air Logistics, L.L.C.		
Jeffery M Post Kamatics Corporation		
Bloomfield, CT		