BSC ENGINEERING STUDY

Transport Locomotive and Waste Package Transporter ITS Standards Identification Rev 00, ICN 00

800-30R-HEOO-00400-000-000 

March 2005 


1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
To date, the project has established important to safety (ITS) performance requirements for 
structures, systems and components (SSCs) based on identification and categorization of event 
sequences that may result in a radiological release. These performance requirements are defined 
within the Nuclear Safety Design Basis for License Application (NSDB) (BSC 2005). Further, 
SSCs credited with performing safe functions are classified as ITS. In turn, performance 
confirmation for these SSCs is sought through the use of consensus code and standards. 
The purpose of this study is to identify applicable codes and standards for the waste package 
(WP) transporter and transport locomotive ITS SSCs. Further, this study will form the basis for 
selection and the extent of applicability of each code and standard. 
This study is based on the design development completed for License Application only. 
Accordingly, identification of ITS SSCs beyond those defined within the NSDB are based on 
designs that may be subject to further development during detail design. Furthermore, several 
design alternatives may still be under consideration to satisfy certain safety functions, and that 
final selection will not be determined until further design development has occurred. Therefore, 
for completeness, throughout this study alternative designs currently under consideration will be 
discussed. Further, the results of this study will be subject to evaluation as part of a follow-on 
gap analysis study. 
Based on the results of this study the gap analysis will evaluate each code and standard to ensure 
each ITS performance requirement is fully satisfied. When a performance requirement is not 
fully satisfied a “gap” is highlighted. Thereafter, the study will identify supplemental 
requirements to augment the code or standard to meet performance requirements. Further, the 
gap analysis will identify non-standard areas of the design that will be subject to a Development 
Plan. Non-standard components and non-standard design configurations are defined as areas of 
the design that do not follow standard industry practices or codes and standards. Whereby, 
performance confirmation can not be readily sought through use of consensus standards. 
In order for this to be accomplished, a control schematic will be developed to correlate with the 
baseline configuration presented in the Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis 
(BSC 2004). 
The study contained in this document has been developed by Design & Engineering / 
Mechanical Handling in its work regarding ITS codes and standards identification for the 
Emplacement and Retrieval. Yucca Mountain Project personnel from Design & Engineering / 
Mechanical Handling should be consulted before use of the study for purposes other than those 
stated herein or used by individuals other than authorized personnel in Design & Engineering / 
Mechanical Handling. 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This document was prepared in accordance with LP-ENG-014-BSC, Engineering Studies. The 
results of this document are only to be used as the basis for selection of applicable codes and 

3. USE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
Computer software used, Microsoft Word 1997, in this study is classified as exempt from 
procedure LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management. All software used to prepare this analysis is 
listed under Section 2.1 Software Not Subject To This Procedure, of LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software 
Management. 
4. TRANSPORT LOCOMOTIVE AND WP TRANSPORTER FUNCTIONAL 
DESCRIPTION 
Before these ITS Codes and standards can be identified, a basic control block diagram needs to 
be developed to correlate with the baseline configuration presented in the Waste Package 
Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis. Within the Waste Package Transporter Preclosure 
Safety Analysis, a fault tree analysis was performed with two possible alternatives that meet the 
necessary reliability. Alternative 1 is a single-channel dynamic brake in conjunction with the 
basic service brake system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.2). Alternative 2 is a single-channel 
independent brake in conjunction with the basic service brake system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.3). 
4.1 LOCOMOTIVE 
The primary function of the transport locomotive is to move the WP transporter and other rail-
based support equipment utilized by the emplacement and retrieval system, such as the gantry 
carrier and WP transporter. 

4.1.1 Transport Locomotive Basic Control System 
Figure 4.1.1-1 depicts a generalized control block diagram of LCS interface with the following 
systems and components: 
• 
main control system (MCS) • drive system 
• 
locomotive control system (LCS) • speed sensor 
• 
speed control system (SCS) • dynamic brake 
• 
transporter control system (TCS) • pneumatic tread brake system 
• 
locomotive brake control system (LBCS) • disc brake system 
• 
coupler (connects to the WP transporter) 
Coupler 
WP Transporter 
Transport Locomotive 
Speed 
(SCS) 
) 
Central Control Center 
Facility 
(MCS) 
Transporter Control 
m (TCS) 
Coupler Sensors 
Speed 
Sensor 
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) 
Control 
System 
Locomotive Brake Control System (LBCSMain Control System 
SysteAir Hose 
Power Transmission Wire 
Pneumatic Tread 
Brake System 
Disc Brake 
System 
Dynamic 
Brake 
Drive System 
Communications Cable 
Figure 4.1.1-1: Transport Locomotive Basic Control Block Diagram 

4.2 WP TRANSPORTER 
The primary function of the WP transporter is to safely transport waste packages between the 
Surface Facilities and the emplacement transfer docks for both emplacement and retrieval 
operations. The transport locomotive provides the motive force for all movements of the waste 
package transporter. The transporter primarily consists of a radiological shielded enclosure (with 
bedplate) mounted to a railcar. 
4.2.1 WP Transporter Basic Control System 
Figure 4.2.1-1 depicts a generalized control block diagram of the TCS interface with the 
following systems and components: 
• 
facility control system (FCS) • radiation detection sensor 
• 
transporter control system (TCS) • pneumatic tread brake system 
• 
locomotive control system (LCS) • disc brake system 
• 
position control system (PCS) • bedplate position sensor 
• 
bedplate control system (BPCS) • bedplate drive system 
• 
shield door control system (SDCS) • bedplate locking mechanism 
• 
transporter brake control system (TBCS) • shield door position sensor 
• 
coupler (connects to the transport • shield door locking mechanism
locomotive)
• 
Position Detector • shield door drive mechanism 

Coupler 
Transport Locomotive 
WP Transporter 
(TCS) 
Transpystem (TBCS) 
Surface Facilities 
(FCS) 
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) 
Cable 
Cable 
) 
Radiation 
Detector 
Sensor 
LockingBedplate 
Position 
Sensor 
Shield Door 
Locking 
Shield Door 
Shield 
Door 
Position 
Sensor 
Position 
Detector 
Transporter Control System 
Shield Door Control System (SCS) 
orter Brake Control SFacility Control System 
(When at WP Loading Area) 
Communications 
Coupler Sensors 
Power Transmission 
Bedplate Control System (BPCSAir Hose 
Pneumatic Tread 
Brake System 
Disc Brake 
System 
Bedplate 
Drive 
System 
Bedplate 
Mechanism 
Mechanism 
Drive 
Mechanism 
Position Control 
System (PCS) 
Figure 4.2.1-1: WP Transporter Basic Control Block Diagram 

4.3 ALTERNATIVE 1 
Alternative 1 is a single-channel dynamic brake in conjunction with the basic service brake 
system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.2). 
4.3.1 Transport Locomotive Basic Control System 
Figure 4.3.1-1 represents the transport locomotive basic control system (for alternative 1) with 
the systems and components identified as ITS or NITS. 
Coupler ITS 
WP TransporterTransport LocomotiveSpeed 
(SCS) 
Central Control Center 
Facility NITS 
(MCS)
Transporter Control 
m (TCS) ITS 
NITS 
Coupler Sensors 
Speed 
Sensor 
ITS 
ITS 
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) ITS 
Control 
System 
ITS 
Main Control System 
NITS 
SysteAir Hose 
ITS 
Power Transmission Wire NITS 
Locomotive Brake 
Control System ITS 
ITS 
Dynamic 
Brake ITS 
Drive System NITS 
Communications Cable 
NITS Pneumatic Tread 
Brake System ITS 
Figure 4.3.1-1: Alternative 1 Transport Locomotive Basic Control Block Diagram 

4.3.2 WP Transporter Basic Control System 
Figure 4.3.2-1 represents the WP transporter basic control system (for alternative 1) with the 
systems and components identified as ITS or NITS. 
Coupler ITS 
Transport Locomotive 
WP Transporter(TCS) 
ITS 
Surface Facilities(FCS)
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) 
Cable 
Cable 
) 
Radiation 
Detector 
Sensor 
() 
NITS 
ystem 
LockingBedplate 
Position 
Sensor 
Shield Door 
Locking 
Shield Door 
Shield 
Door 
Position 
Sensor 
Position 
Detector 
Position 
Transpystem ITS 
ITS 
Transporter Control System 
ITS 
Shield Door Control System (SCS) 
ITS 
Facility Control System 
NITS 
(When at WP Loading Area) 
ITS 
Communications 
NITS 
Coupler Sensors 
ITS 
Power Transmission 
NITS 
Bedplate Control System (BPCSITS 
ITSAir Hose 
Pneumatic Tread Brake SITS 
Bedplate 
Drive 
System 
ITS 
Bedplate 
Mechanism 
ITS 
ITS 
Mechanism 
ITS 
Drive 
Mechanism 
NITS 
ITS 
ITS 
Control 
System (PCS) 
ITS 
orter Brake Control SITS 
Figure 4.3.2-1: Alternative 1 WP Transporter Basic Control Block Diagram 

4.4 ALTERNATIVE 2 
Alternative 2 is a single-channel independent brake in conjunction with the basic service brake 
system (BSC 2004, Section 6.8.3). 
4.4.1 Transport Locomotive Basic Control System 
Figure 4.4.1-1 represents the transport locomotive basic control system (for alternative 2) with 
the systems and components identified as ITS or NITS. 
Coupler ITS 
WP TransporterTransport LocomotiveSpeed 
(SCS)
)
Central Control Center 
Facility NITS 
(MCS)
Transporter Control 
m (TCS) ITS 
NITS 
Coupler Sensors 
Speed 
ITS 
ITS 
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) ITS 
Control 
System 
ITS 
Locomotive Brake Control System (LBCS ITS 
Main Control System 
NITS 
SysteAir Hose 
ITS 
Power Transmission Wire NITS 
Pneumatic Tread 
Brake System ITS 
Disc Brake 
System ITS 
Sensor 
ITS 
Dynamic 
Brake 
NITS 
Drive System NITS 
Communications Cable 
NITS 
Figure 4.4.1-1: Alternative 2 Transport Locomotive Basic Control Block Diagram 

4.4.2 WP Transporter Basic Control System 
Figure 4.4.2-1 represents the WP transporter basic control system (for alternative 2) with the 
systems and components identified as ITS or NITS. 
Coupler ITS 
Transport LocomotiveWP Transporter 
(TCS) 
) 
Transpystem (TBCS) 
Surface Facilities(FCS)
Locomotive Control 
System (LCS) 
Cable 
Cable 
) 
Radiation 
Detector 
Sensor 
NITS 
LockingBedplate 
Position 
Sensor 
Shield Door 
Locking 
Shield Door 
Shield 
Door 
Position 
Sensor 
Position 
Detector 
ITS 
Transporter Control System 
ITS 
Shield Door Control System (SDCSITS 
orter Brake Control SITS 
ITS 
Facility Control System 
NITS 
(When at WP Loading Area) 
ITS 
Communications 
NITS 
Coupler Sensors 
ITS 
Power Transmission 
NITS 
Bedplate Control System (BPCSITS 
ITS 
Air Hose 
Pneumatic Tread 
Brake System ITS 
Disc Brake 
System ITS 
Bedplate 
Drive 
System 
ITS 
Bedplate 
Mechanism 
ITS 
ITS 
Mechanism 
ITS 
Drive 
Mechanism 
NITS 
ITS 
ITS 
Position Control 
System (PCS) 
ITS 
Figure 4.4.2-1: Alternative 2 WP Transporter Basic Control Block Diagram 

5. ITS REQUIREMENTS FOUND 
The ITS requirements that were identified in this study were directly taken out of the Nuclear 
Safety Design Basis for License Application (BSC 2005). There were no additional ITS 
requirements identified other than the thirteen ITS requirements listed in the Nuclear Safety 
Design Basis for License Application (BSC 2005). See Section 8 for a listing of other documents 
reviewed. 
5.1 REQUIREMENTS 
Each requirement that was identified in the NSDB has been assigned its own requirement 
number, and is highlighted in an italic font, in this document. 
5.1.1 Requirement 1 
“The WP Transporter shall transport the WP in a manner such that if a collision or derailment 
(excluding tipover) occurs, the WP impact energy will be low enough to preclude a WP breach; 
this impact energy translates into a maximum WP Transporter speed of 15 mph” (BSC 2005, 
Table A-II). 
Since the transporter shall not exceed the speed of 15 mph, the following are ITS functions: 
speed detection, speed limiting/braking, and the coupler connection and detection. The coupler 
connection and detection is ITS because the locomotive assists in the speed limiting/braking 
function and therefore must remain coupled to the WP Transporter. The SSC performing the 
speed detection function is a speed sensor. The SSCs performing the speed limiting/braking 
function are the dynamic braking (Alternative 1 only), the pneumatic tread brake system, and the 
disc brake system (Alternative 2 only). The SSC performing the ITS function for the coupler 
connection detection is the coupler sensor. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have 
to be ITS. The SCS receives information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic 
braking if the maximum speed is exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and 
LCS then activates the brakes through the LBCS and TBCS. Table 5.1.1-1 and Table 5.1.1-2 
contains the identified SSCs and ITS functions. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Transport Locomotive Control System Locomotive Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1 
Speed Control System Speed Control Interlocking 
Controls Section 6.1.1.1 
Speed Sensor Speed Detection Section 6.1.1.1 
Dynamic Braking Control System 
(Alternative 1 Only) Speed Limiting Section 6.1.1.1 
Transport Locomotive Brake Control 
System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1.2 
Pneumatic Tread Brake Systems Braking Section 6.1.1.2.1 
Disc Brake Systems (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.1.1.2.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.1.1.3 
Table 5.1.1-2: WP Transporter Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
WP Transporter Brake Control System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.1 
Pneumatic Tread Brake System Braking Section 6.2.1.1.1 
Disc Brake System (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.2.1.1.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.2.1.2 
5.1.2 Requirement 2 
“The WP Transporter shall transport the WP in a manner such that if a collision or derailment 
leading to a WP Transporter tipover occurs, the WP impact energy will be low enough to 
preclude a WP breach” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
The height at which the WP is transported is ITS to ensure that in the event of a tipover the WP 
impact energy with the grade will be low enough to preclude a WP breach. This will be 
addressed later during the gap analysis. Table 5.1.2-1 contains the identified SSC and ITS 
functions. 

Code and 
SSC ITS Function Standard 
Reference 
WP Transporter Design Height at which the WP is transported None 
5.1.3 Requirement 3 
“While on the surface, the WP transporter shall be designed to function in extreme straight wind 
(90 mph)” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
In extreme straight wind, the SSCs must maintain their safety function. Therefore, the design 
must contain barriers to protect the SSCs and will be addressed later in the gap analysis. Table 
5.1.3-1 contains the identified SSC and ITS functions. 
Table 5.1.3-1: WP Transporter Identified ITS Function 
Code and 
SSC ITS Function Standard 
Reference 
External Body Surface Protection of SSC equipment None 
Suspension Design Maintain Safety function during high wind Section 6.2.3 
5.1.4 Requirement 4 
“The WP Transporter and its bedplate shall not collide with a WP on the WP turntable and 
cause a WP breach” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
To prevent a collision with the WP on the WP turntable, the following are ITS functions: 
transporter / bedplate limit switches, and the braking. The SSC performing the transporter limit 
switch function is a position sensor. The SSC performing the bedplate limit switch function is a 
bedplate position sensor. The SSCs performing the braking function are the pneumatic tread 
brake subsystem, and the disc brake subsystem (Alternative 2 only). With these SSCs, the 
interlocking controls also have to be ITS. Table 5.1.4-1 and Table 5.1.4-2 contains the identified 
SSCs and ITS functions. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Transport Locomotive Control System Locomotive Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1 
Transport Locomotive Brake Control 
System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1.2 
Pneumatic Tread Brake Systems Braking Section 6.1.1.2.1 
Disc Brake Systems (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.1.1.2.2 
Table 5.1.4-2: WP Transporter Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Interlock Controls Section 6.2.1 
Position Control System Interlock Controls Section 6.2.1.5 
Positon Sensor Position Locator Section 6.2.1.5.1 
WP Transporter Brake Control System Interlock Controls Section 6.2.1.1 
Pneumatic Tread Brake System Braking Section 6.2.1.1.1 
Disc Brake System (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.2.1.1.2 
Bedplate Control System Interlock Controls Section 6.2.1.3 
Bedplate Position Sensor Limit Switch Section 6.2.1.3.2 
5.1.5 Requirement 5 
“The rate of a WP Transporter runaway shall be less than 8.3 ×10-9 runaways per trip” (BSC 
2005, Table A-II). 
To prevent WP transporter runaway, the following are ITS functions: speed detection, speed 
limiting/braking, and the coupler connection and detection. The SSC performing the speed 
detection function is a speed sensor. The SSCs performing the speed limiting/braking functions 
are the dynamic braking (Alternative 1 only), the pneumatic tread brake system, and the disc 
brake system (Alternative 2 only). The coupler sensors are the SSCs that sense the coupler 
connection. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. The SCS receives 
information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic braking if the maximum speed is 
exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and LCS then activates the brakes 
through the LBCS and TBCS. Table 5.1.5-1 and Table 5.1.5-2 contains the Identified SSCs and 
functions. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Transport Locomotive Control System Locomotive Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1 
Speed Control System Speed Control Interlocking 
Controls Section 6.1.1.1 
Speed Sensor Speed Detection Section 6.1.1.1 
Dynamic Braking Control System 
(Alternative 1 Only) Speed Limiting Section 6.1.1.1 
Transport Locomotive Brake Control 
System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1.2 
Pneumatic Tread Brake Systems Braking Section 6.1.1.2.1 
Disc Brake Systems (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.1.1.2.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.1.1.3 
Table 5.1.5-2: WP Transporter Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
WP Transporter Brake Control System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.1 
Pneumatic Tread Brake System Braking Section 6.2.1.1.1 
Disc Brake System (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.2.1.1.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.2.1.2 
5.1.6 Requirement 6 
“The WP Transporter (together with the locomotive and coupler) shall be designed to prevent 
runaway of the WP Transporter for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-2 seismic event. 
In addition, an analysis shall demonstrate that the WP Transporter (together with the locomotive 
and coupler) has sufficient seismic design margin to ensure that a “no runaway” safety function 
is maintained for loading conditions associated with a BDBGM seismic event” (BSC 2005, Table 
A-II). 
To prevent WP transporter runaway from the DBGM-2 seismic event, the following are ITS 
functions: speed detection, speed limiting/braking, and the coupler connection detection. The 
speed detection ITS function is performed by the speed sensors. The speed limiting/braking ITS 
function is performed by the SCS, the dynamic braking (Alternative 1), the pneumatic tread 
braking, and the disc braking (Alternative 2). The coupler sensors are the SSCs that sense the 
coupler connection. With these SSCs, the interlocking controls also have to be ITS. The SCS 
receives information from the speed sensor and activates the dynamic braking if the maximum 
speed is exceeded. If the excessive speed is continued, the TCS and LCS then activates the 
braking through the LBCS and TBCS. Table 5.1.6-1 and Table 5.1.6-2 contains the Identified 
SSCs and functions. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Transport Locomotive Control System Locomotive Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1 
Speed Control System Speed Control Interlocking 
Controls Section 6.1.1.1 
Speed Sensor Speed Detection Section 6.1.1.1 
Dynamic Braking Control System 
(Alternative 1 Only) Speed Limiting Section 6.1.1.1 
Transport Locomotive Brake Control 
System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.1.1.2 
Pneumatic Tread Brake Systems Braking Section 6.1.1.2.1 
Disc Brake Systems (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.1.1.2.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.1.1.3 
Table 5.1.6-2: WP Transporter Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
WP Transporter Brake Control System Brake Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.1 
Pneumatic Tread Brake System Braking Section 6.2.1.1.1 
Disc Brake System (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.2.1.1.2 
Coupler & Coupler Sensor Coupler Connection & Detection Section 6.2.1.2 
5.1.7 Requirement 7 
“The WP Transporter shall be designed for loading conditions associated with a DBGM-1 level 
seismic event and demonstrate sufficient margin to a “shielding integrity remains intact” safety 
function” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
With a DBGM-1 level seismic event, the shielding integrity must remain intact. The WP 
transporter shielded compartment, shield doors, shield door hinges, and shield door locking 
mechanism must be designed and constructed to provide the required shielding after a DBGM-1 
level seismic event. Table 5.1.7-1 contains the Identified SSCs and ITS function. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Shielded Compartment Shielding Integrity Section 6.2.2 
Shielded Compartment Doors Shielding Integrity Section 6.2.2 
Shield Door Locking Mechanism Shield Doors Restraint Section 6.2.1.4.1 
Shielded Compartment Door Hinges Shield Doors Restraint Section 6.2.1.4.2 
5.1.8 Requirement 8 
“The transporter shielded compartment shall withstand any fall of failed ground support 
materials, as well as a set of rockfalls having a total mass of 5.4 MT, without jeopardizing the 
structural integrity of the WP” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
After a rockfall/failed ground support event, the structural integrity must remain intact. The WP 
transporter shielded compartment and shield doors must be designed and constructed to provide 
the required structural protection for the WP after a rockfall/failed ground support event (with a 
total mass of 5.4 MT). Table 5.1.8-1 contains the Identified SSCs and ITS function. 
Table 5.1.8-1: WP Transporter Identified ITS Function 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Shielded Compartment Structural Integrity Section 6.2.2 
Shielded Compartment Doors Structural Integrity Section 6.2.2 
5.1.9 Requirement 9 
“Movement of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors shall not breach the WP or cause it 
to fall from the bedplate of the transporter” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
During the loading or unloading, protection for the WP colliding with the shield doors is needed. 
The ITS functions must prevent the shield doors from closing until the bedplate is fully retracted 
and preventing bedplate extention while the shield doors are closed. Therefore, the ITS functions 
are detecting bedplate position and shield doors positions. With these identified SSCs the 
interlocking controls also have ITS functions. The BPCS receives data from the Bedplate 
Position Sensor. The SDCS receives data from the Shield Door Position Sensor. The TCS 
interlocks the BPCS with SDCS. Table 5.1.9-1 contains the Identified SSCs and ITS functions. 

SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
Bedplate Control System Bedplate Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.3 
Bedplate Position Sensor Detecting Bedplate Position Section 6.2.1.3.2 
Shield Door Control System Shield Doors Interlocking 
Controls Section 6.2.1.4 
Shield Door Position Sensors Detecting Shield Door Position Section 6.2.1.4.3 
5.1.10 Requirement 10 
“The restraints used to immobilize the bedplate inside the shielded compartment of the WP 
Transporter and the mechanism for locking the doors of the shielded compartment shall 
withstand a collision or derailment (including tipover) of the transporter without resulting in a 
Category 1 or Category 2 event sequence” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
During transport of the WP, restraints are required to immobilize the bedplate. Also, prevention 
of the shielded doors opening during a collision or derailment (including tipover). The ITS 
functions are restraining the shield door, bedplate and WP, which are accomplished with the 
shield door locking mechanism, shield door hinges, bedplate locking mechanisms, shielded 
compartment doors and shielded compartment. With these identified SSCs the interlocking 
controls also have ITS functions. The TCS sends information to the BPCS and SDCS for 
activating the Bedplate / Shield Door Locking Mechanisms. In turn, the BPCS and SDCS 
activate the Bedplate / Shield Door Locking Mechanisms. Table 5.1.10-1 contains the Identified 
SSCs and ITS functions. 
Table 5.1.10-1: WP Transporter Identified ITS Function 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
Bedplate Control System Bedplate Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.3 
Bedplate Locking Mechanism Bedplate Restraint Section 6.2.1.3.1 
Shield Door Control System Shield Doors Interlocking 
Controls Section 6.2.1.4 
Shield Door Locking Mechanism Shield Doors Restraint Section 6.2.1.4.1 
Shield Door Hinges Shield Doors Restraint Section 6.2.1.4.2 
Shielded Compartment Shielding and WP Restraint Section 6.2.2 
Shielded Compartment Doors Shielding and WP Restraint Section 6.2.2 

5.1.11 Requirement 11 
“Spurious or operator-induced opening of the WP shielded compartment followed by a bedplate 
roll-out shall be precluded when the transporter is in motion” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
During transport of the WP, operator-induced opening of the WP shielded compartment and 
bedplate extraction should be precluded. The ITS function is restricting areas, by position 
sensors, detecting where the shield doors can open. With these identified SSCs the interlocking 
controls also have ITS functions. The TCS receives information from the PCS and permits the 
opening of the shield doors. The PCS receives information from the position sensor and 
determines the location of the WP Transporter. Table 5.1.11-1 contains the Identified SSCs and 
ITS functions. 
Table 5.1.11-1: WP Transporter Identified ITS Function 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
Position Control System Position Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.5 
Position Sensor Position Locator Section 6.2.1.5.1 
5.1.12 Requirement 12 
“Radiation exposure to workers due to inadvertent actuation of the WP transporter shielded 
compartment doors shall be precluded such that this is not a Category 1 event” (BSC 2005, 
Table A-II). 
Inadvertent actuation of the WP shielded doors should be precluded such that it is not a Category 
1 event. Therefore, the ITS function is restricting areas where the shield doors can open when a 
radioactive source is present. Also, preventing the shield doors opening in maintenance areas 
with a radiation source within the shielded compartment. Therefore, the ITS functions are the 
position locator and radiation source detection. The position sensor performs the position locator 
function; and the radiation detector performs the radiation source detection function. With these 
SSCs, the interlocking controls also have ITS functions. The TCS receives information from the 
PCS and the radiation detector and permits the opening of the shield doors. The PCS receives 
information from the position sensor and determines the location of the WP Transporter. Table 
5.1.12-1 contains the Identified SSCs and ITS functions. 
Table 5.1.12-1: WP Transporter Identified ITS Function 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
WP Transporter Control System Transporter Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1 
Position Control System Position Interlocking Controls Section 6.2.1.5 
Position Sensor Position Locator Section 6.2.1.5.1 
Radiation Detector Radiation Source Detection Section 6.2.1.6 

5.1.13 Requirement 13 
“Upon a loss of power, the WP Transporter shall be designed to stop, retain the load, and enter 
a locked mode; upon a restoration of power, the WP Transporter shall stay in the locked mode 
until operator action is taken” (BSC 2005, Table A-II). 
Upon loss of power, the ITS function is braking. The SSCs performing the braking function are 
the pneumatic tread brake system and the disc brake system (Alternative 2 only). The Transport 
Locomotive and WP Transporter automatically enter fail safe condition. For example, during 
power loss the brakes automatically engage. Upon power restoration, operator action must be 
performed to reset and restart the Transport Locomotive and WP Transporter motion. Table 
5.1.13-1 and Table 5.1.13-2 contains the Identified SSCs and ITS functions. 
Table 5.1.13-1: Transport Locomotive Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Pneumatic Tread Brake Systems Braking Section 6.1.1.2.1 
Disc Brake Systems (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.1.1.2.2 
Table 5.1.13-2: WP Transporter Identified ITS Functions 
SSC ITS Function Code and Standard Reference 
Pneumatic Tread Brake System Braking Section 6.2.1.1.1 
Disc Brake System (Alternative 2 Only) Braking Section 6.2.1.1.2 

6. IDENTIFIED ITS CODES AND STANDARDS 
In order to capture all of the codes and standards an exhaustive study was performed. This study 
consisted of an evaluation of industry consensus codes and standards to identify applicability to 
the ITS SSCs. Refer to Section 8.5 for a list of codes, standards, regulations, and directives 
reviewed for this section. The codes and standards selected were based upon their applicability to 
the requirements of the ITS SSCs, in particular within a nuclear environment. The evaluation of 
the identified industry codes and standards (see section 7.2 for a list of identified Industry Codes 
and Standards) looked at the applicable sections of each code and standard. This was done to 
ensure that the design, construction, installation, testing, and operations were all analyzed to 
show how each of the particular SSC will satisfy the ITS requirements. 
Note: The extent of the applicability of each code and standard identified will be further 
defined through the completion of a subsequent gap analysis study. 
6.1 TRANSPORT LOCOMOTIVE 
6.1.1 Transport Locomotive Control System 
The codes and standards listed in Table 6.1.1-1 will be used in their entirety. The locomotive 
control system (LCS) provides the operator local control console, and radio frequency (RF) 
communications to the operators in the main control system (MCS) (see Figure 4.3.1-1 and 
Figure 4.3.2-1). The LCS interfaces to the SCS, LBCS, power transmission, and communication 
with the transporter though an umbilical communications cable attached to the transporter. The 
LCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE Std 603-1998, and 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the LCS. The additional 
IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, setpoints, 
single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
Table 6.1.1-1 is a list of applicable codes and standards for the Locomotive Control System. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2000* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation-Formally ANSI/ISA-
S67.04-2000 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.1.1.1 Transport Locomotive Speed Control System 
This section is applicable in Alternative 1 only. Even though standard AAR 2004, Section M 
Standard S-5018 is specific to diesel-electric locomotives, some of the principles presented may 
be applicable to an electric locomotive. It is however, the only established railroad standard for 
dynamic braking. Further analysis needs to be performed and dynamic braking will be addressed 
later within the gap analysis. 
The codes and standards listed in Table 6.1.1-2 will be used in their entirety. The locomotive 
speed control system (SCS) provides the instrumentation and speed control capability to the local 
operators and to the operators in the main control system (MCS) via the LCS (see Figure 4.3.1-1 
and Figure 4.4.1-1). The SCS interfaces with the LCS, dynamic brake, drive system, and the 
speed sensor. The SCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 
603-1998 and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the SCS. The 
additional IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, 
setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
For this requirement, the speed sensor and the dynamic brake subsystem are ITS. The SCS 
applicable codes and standards are shown in Table 6.1.1-2. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, S-5018 
Entire Dynamic Braking Control (May not be Applicable) 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2000* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation-Formally ANSI/ISA-
S67.04-2000 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.1.1.2 Transport Locomotive Brake Control System 
The LBCS interfaces the pneumatic tread brake subsystem and the disc brake system 
(Alternative 2 Only) (See Figure 4.3.1-1 and Figure 4.4.1-1). 
Braking commands issued from the LCS are interrogated by the LBCS and the appropriate 
braking response is sent to the brakes. Braking can be applied independently to the locomotive, 
the transporter, or both the locomotive and the transporter. 
The LBCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE Std 6031998, 
and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the LBCS. The 
additional IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, 
Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
Table 6.1.1-3 lists the applicable codes and standards for the locomotive brake control systems. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2000* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation-Formally ANSI/ISA-
S67.04-2000 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.1.1.2.1 Pneumatic Tread Brake Subsystem 
Contained in Table 6.1.1-4, are the railroad industry brake standards for locomotives. With the 
current design, numerous AAR 2004, Section M standards apply. These standards discuss the 
braking system design and components for locomotives. As the design progresses and equipment 
selection is made, many of the standards will no longer apply. 
The pneumatic tread brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS (see Figure 
4.3.2-1 and Figure 4.4.2-1) and modulates the pneumatic cylinder pressure to gradually apply 
pressure to the tread brakes. The pneumatic tread brake is actuated by an electronically 
controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake system. The ECP brake system allows the operator to apply a 
graduated increase or decrease of pneumatic pressure to the braking systems. This provides a 
graduated braking to the locomotive and transporter. The graduated braking is controlled by a 
microprocessor based control system that monitors brake cylinder pressure, reservoir tank, and 
pipe pressure. 
Table 6.1.1-4 lists the applicable codes and standards for the pneumatic tread brake subsystems. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, S-5529 
Entire Multiple Unit Pneumatic Brake Equipment for Locomotives 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, RP-509 
Entire Braking Ratios 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, RP-518 
Entire Brake Shoe Unflanged 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, RP-599 
Entire Brake Shoes - High Friction Composition Type for Locomotives 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, RP-5209 
Entire Basic Brake Design Data for Freight Locomotives 
AAR 2004, Section 
M, RP-5596 
Entire Brake Shoes – Metal Type 
6.1.1.2.2 Disc Brake Subsystem (Alternative 2) 
The disc brake subsystem gets braking commands from the LBCS. Currently there are no codes 
and standards identified for disc braking systems. Disc brakes are typically used in passenger 
transit not in freight applications. This will be addressed later in the gap analysis. 
Table 6.1.1-5 lists the applicable codes and standards for the disc brake subsystems. 
Table 6.1.1-5: Disc Brake Subsystem Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Sections 
Title
Standard 
None 
N/A 
N/A 
6.1.1.3 Transport Locomotive Coupler 
Section 4.1.5.3 of the AAR, states that the vertical loads on the coupler must follow Paragraph 
4.1.5 of AAR 2004, Section C - Part II Standard M-1001. Also Section 4.1.7.1 discusses that 
“the coupling system must be designed such that overriding will not occur and that the train will 
remain coupled together” (AAR S-2043). 
The coupler between the locomotive and the transporter has a sensor that verifies that the coupler 
is engaged or disengaged. The sensor when disengaged commands the transporter brake system 
to actuate (i.e. the transporter cannot be moved when disengaged from the locomotive). The 
sensor is installed per the functional requirements of ANSI/ISA 67.01.01-2002. 

Table 6.1.1-6: Transport Locomotive Coupler Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section C 4.1.5 Specification for Design, Fabrication and Construction of Freight Cars 
- Part II, M-1001 
AAR S-2043 4.1.5.3 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
4.1.7.1 Material 
ANSI/ISA 67.01.01-Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
2002* 
* This nuclear standard applies for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2 WP TRANSPORTER 
6.2.1 WP Transporter Control System (TCS) 
The TCS interfaces with the WP transporter brake control system (TBCS), bedplate control system 
(BPCS), shield door control system (SDCS), position control system (PCS), and the facility control 
system (FCS). Inputs are received from power, communications, sensors, and the radiation 
detector (see Figure 4.3.1-1 and Figure 4.4.2-1). 
The TCS controls all activities onboard the transporter. The TCS interlocks the TBCS with the 
speed sensor, and locomotive (via communications cable) for excessive speed. Also, TCS 
interlocks the BPCS and SDCS to prevent closing of the shield doors on the WP. The TCS 
interlocks the radiation detection sensor, position detector, and PCS to allow the WP to be 
exposed only in acceptable areas (i.e. surface WP loading docks and emplacement drift docking 
area). The FCS communicates directly with the TCS at the surface WP loading dock (via the WP 
loading dock umbilical cable). 
The TCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE Std 603-1998, 
and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the TCS. The additional 
IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, Setpoints, 
single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
Therefore, the TCS is ITS and Table 6.2.1-1 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2000* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation-Formally ANSI/ISA-
S67.04-2000 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.1 WP Transporter Brake Control System 
The TBCS contains the microprocessor electronics system that performs the functions of the 
ECP brake system. The TBCS commands the pneumatic tread brake system and disc brake 
system (Alternative 2 Only) to stop the transporter. The ECP has the capability to gradually 
apply brake pressure or in emergency situations, to fully engage the brakes. 
The TBCS gets the braking commands from the TCS via the communications cable from the 
locomotive on board operator (see Figure 4.3.2-1 and Figure 4.4.2-1). 
The TBCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998 
and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the TBCS. The additional 
IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, Setpoints, 
single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
Therefore, the braking systems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed in Table 
6.2.1-2. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section E 
– Part II, S-4200 
Entire Electrically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Cable-Based Brake Systems – 
Performance Requirements 
AAR 2004, Section E 
– Part II, S-4210 
Entire ECP Cable-Based Brake System Cable, Connectors, and Junction Boxes – 
Performance Specification 
AAR 2004, Section E 
– Part II, S-4220 
Entire ECP Cable-Based Brake DC Power Supply – Performance Specification 
AAR 2004, Section E 
– Part II, S-4230 
Entire Intratrain Communication Specification for Cable-Based Freight Train 
Control Systems (Either S-4230 or S-4300) 
AAR 2004, Section E 
– Part II, S-4300 
Entire Performance Requirement for Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) 
Radio-Based Freight Brake Systems (Either S-4200 or S-4300) 
AAR S-2043 4.4 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.1.1 Pneumatic Tread Brake Subsystem 
The pneumatic tread brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS and modulates the 
pneumatic cylinder pressure to gradually apply pressure to the tread brakes. The pneumatic tread 
brake is actuated by an ECP brake system. The ECP brake system allows the operator to apply a 
graduated increase or decrease of pneumatic pressure to the braking systems. This provides a 
graduated braking to the locomotive and transporter. The graduated braking is controlled by a 
microprocessor based control system that monitors brake cylinder pressure, reservoir tank, and 
pipe pressure. 
Stated in Section 4.4 of AAR S-2043, the brake system design must follow S-401 (AAR 2004, 
Section E) with exception to items specifically addressed within, and the brake analysis submittal 
must include all of the items listed in AAR 2004, Section C - Part II Standard M-1001, 
Paragraph 1.2.3.2 (AAR S-2043). The ECP brake system must follow the requirements presented 

The pneumatic tread brake subsystems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed 
in Table 6.2.1-3. 
Table 6.2.1-3: Pneumatic Tread Brake Subsystem Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section C 
- Part II, M-1001 
1.2.3.2 Specification for Design, Fabrication and Construction of Freight Cars 
AAR 2004, Section E, 
S-401 
Entire Freight Car Brake Design Requirements 
AAR S-2043 4.4 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
6.2.1.1.2 Disc Brake Subsystem (Alternative 2) 
The disc brake subsystem gets braking commands from the TBCS. However, currently there are 
no codes and standards identified for disc braking systems. Disc brakes are typically used in 
passenger transit not in freight applications. This will be addressed later in the gap analysis. 
The disc brake subsystems are ITS and the applicable codes and standards are listed in Table 
6.2.1-4. 
Table 6.2.1-4: Disc Brake Subsystem Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
AAR S-2043 4.4 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
6.2.1.2 WP Transporter Coupler 
The WP transporter coupler contains the coupler sensors that send a signal to the TCS to verify 
the coupler is engaged. When the coupler sensor senses a disengaged coupler a signal is sent to 
set the transporter brakes. When the sensor senses an engaged coupler, a signal is sent to allow 
the transporter brakes to be disengaged. 
Section 4.1.5.3 of the AAR S-2043, states that the Vertical Loads on the Coupler must follow 
Paragraph 4.1.5 of AAR 2004, Section C - Part II Standard M-1001. Also Section 4.1.7.1 
discusses that “the coupling system must be designed such that overriding will not occur and that 
the train will remain coupled together” (AAR S-2043). 

Table 6.2.1-5: WP Transporter Coupler Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
AAR 2004, Section C 4.1.5 Specification for Design, Fabrication and Construction of Freight Cars 
- Part II, M-1001 
AAR 2004, Section E, Entire Freight Car Brake Design Requirements 
S-401 
AAR S-2043 4.1.5.3 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
4.1.7.1 Material 
ANSI/ISA 67.01.01-Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
2002* 
* This nuclear standard applies for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.3 Bedplate Control System 
The bedplate control system (BPCS) contains the interlock logic that prohibits the inadvertent 
extending or retraction of the bedplate. When inputs from the logical interlocks are met, the 
BPCS sends the “extend” or “retract” commands to the bedplate drive system. 
The BPCS controls the movement of the bedplate. The BPCS interlocks the drive mechanism, 
locking mechanism, and position sensor. 
The BCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, and 
IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the BCS. The additional IEEE 
and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, Setpoints, single 
failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
The BPCS is ITS and Table 6.2.1-6 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.3.1 Bedplate Locking Mechanism 
The HLRM Cask in AAR S-2043 provides shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the 
shielded compartment provides shielding from the WP. The bedplate, within the shielded 
compartment, supports the emplacement pallet, which serves as a cradle for the WP. Therefore 
per Paragraph 4.1.8 of the AAR S-2043, the bedplate locking mechanism "must have the ability 
to withstand any forces resulting from tie-down loads.” Therefore, the bedplate locking 
mechanism is ITS and Table 6.2.1-7 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 
Table 6.2.1-7: Bedplate Locking Mechanism Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR S-2043 Paragraph Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
4.1.8 Material 
6.2.1.3.2 Bedplate Position Sensor 
The bedplate position sensor inputs the bedplate position to the interlock logic in the BPCS. 
Position logic will not allow the bedplate to extend if inputs from the shield door sensors, for 
example, do not confirm that the doors are open. The bedplate position sensor indicates whether 
the bedplate is fully retracted or fully extended. 
The ANSI/ISA Standard will provide the installation/mounting requirements for the system. 
The bedplate position sensor is ITS and Table 6.2.1-8 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
2002* 
* This nuclear standard applies for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.4 Shield Door Control System 
The shield door control system (SDCS) contains the interlock logic that prohibits the inadvertent 
opening or closing of the shield doors. When inputs from the logical interlocks are met, the 
SDCS sends the open or close commands to the shield door drive system. 
The SDCS controls the movement of the shield doors. The SDCS interlocks the drive 
mechanism, locking mechanism, and position sensor. 
The SDCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, 
and IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the SDCS. The additional 
IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, Setpoints, 
single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
The SDCS is ITS and Table 6.2.1-9 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 
Table 6.2.1-9: Shield Door Control System Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.4.1 Shield Door Locking Mechanism 
The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded 
compartment provides shielding from the WP. Therefore AAR S-2043, Paragraph 4.1.8 
800-30R-HE00-00400-000-000 40 March 2005 

Table 6.2.1-10: Shield Door Locking Mechanism Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR S-2043 4.1.8 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
6.2.1.4.2 Shield Door Hinges 
The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded 
compartment provides shielding from the WP. Therefore AAR S-2043, Paragraph 4.1.8 
indicates, the shield door hinges "must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from tie-
down loads." The shield door hinges are ITS and Table 6.2.1-10 is a list of applicable codes and 
standards for the shield door hinges. 
Table 6.2.1-11: Shield Door Hinges Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
AAR S-2043 4.1.8 Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
AISC 1997 Entire Manual of Steel Construction, Allowable Stress Design 
6.2.1.4.3 Shield Door Position Sensor 
The shield door position sensor inputs the door position to the SDCS. The sensor will confirm 
the position of the shield doors to the SDCS control logic. The shield door position sensor 
indicates when the doors are full closed. 
The ANSI/ISA Standard will provide the installation/mounting requirements for the sensor. 
The shield door position sensors are ITS and Table 6.2.1-12 contains a list of applicable codes 
and standards. 
Table 6.2.1-12: Shield Door Position Sensor Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Sections 
Title 
Standard 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
Entire 
Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
2002* 
* This nuclear standard applies for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 

6.2.1.5 Position Control System 
The position control system (PCS) interlocks the shield door control logic such that the shield 
doors can only be opened in safe locations. Position sensors will be embedded in strategic 
locations within the surface and subsurface areas such that the interlock logic will only allow the 
shield doors to open in those locations (e.g. in the surface loading areas, and the emplacement 
gantry loading dock). The PCS permits the TCS to expose a radiation source in safe areas only. 
The PCS will contain the functional and design requirements established in IEEE 603-1998, and 
IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 for the instrumentation and control portions of the PCS. The additional IEEE 
and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, Setpoints, single 
failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the system. 
Therefore PCS is ITS and Table 6.2.1-13 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 
Table 6.2.1-13: Position Control System Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-
2003* 
Entire IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.5.1 Position Sensor 
The position sensors will be embedded in a suitable location such that instrumentation on board 
the transporter can sense the presence of the position sensor. When the position sensor is sensed, 
the logic will enable the shield door controls. In the absence of a position sensor, the shield doors 
cannot be opened automatically or remotely. 
The IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, 
Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the sensor. 
The position sensor is ITS and the applicable codes and standards are shown in Table 6.2.1-14. 

Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.1.6 Radiation Detection Sensor 
The purpose of the radiation detection sensor is to detect the presence of a WP within the 
shielded compartment. The radiation detection sensor inputs the radiation level inside the 
shielded compartment to the interlock logic in the TCS. A radiation source detected within the 
shielded compartment will not allow a manual override to open the shield doors. 
The IEEE and ANSI/ISA Standards will provide the installation/mounting, independence, 
Setpoints, single failure criteria, and qualification requirements for the sensor.The radiation 
detection sensor is ITS and Table 6.2.1-15 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 
Table 6.2.1-15: Radiation Detector Sensor Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard 
Sections Title 
ANSI/IEEE Std 3441987* 
Entire IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-
2002* 
Entire Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-
2002* 
Entire Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
IEEE Std 323-2003* Entire IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-2000* Entire IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE Std 384-1992* Entire Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998* Entire Standard Criteria for Safety Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 

6.2.2 Transporter Shielded Doors and Compartment 
The HLRM Cask in S-2043 provided shielding from radioactive materials; likewise, the shielded 
doors and compartment provides shielding from the WP. Paragraph 4.1.8.2 requires that 
"...securement points on the car body must have the ability to withstand any forces resulting from 
the tie-down loads" (AAR S-2043). 
The AISC 1997, ANSI/AISC N690-1994 and AWS D1.1/D1.1M:2004 will provide the 
construction of the shielded compartment. The ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977 and ANSI/ANS-6.4-1985 
will provide the design of the shielding for the shielded compartment. 
Therefore, the transporter shielded doors and compartment structure must remain intact during 
and after a tipover or rockfall. Also, the shielded doors and compartment must maintain the 
shielding integrity for the protection of personnel. The transporter shielded doors and 
compartment are ITS and Table 6.2.2-1, contains the applicable codes and standards. 
Table 6.2.2-1: Shielded Doors and Compartment Applicable Codes and Standards 
Applicable Code or 
Standard Sections Title 
AAR S-2043 Paragraph 
4.1.8 
Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
Material 
ANSI/AISC N6901994* 
Entire American National Standard Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and 
Erection of Steel Safety-Related Structures for Nuclear Facilities 
ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-
1977* 
Sections 3 
& 4 Neutron and Gamma-Ray Flux-to-Dose-Rate Factors 
ANSI/ANS-6.4-1985* Entire Guidelines on the Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation 
Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants 
AWS 
D1.1/D1.1M:2004 Entire Structural Welding Code - Steel 
AISC 1997 Entire Manual of Steel Construction, Allowable Stress Design 
* These nuclear standards apply for nuclear power industry and may not necessarily apply to rail SSCs. 
6.2.3 Suspension Design 
The suspension system is must be designed to remain stable in curves, turnouts, switches, etc 
during extreme straight winds (90 mph). This is to reduce the likelihood of a tipover. 
In Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 of AAR S-2043, discusses the nonstructural static and dynamic 
analysis requirements for the suspension. However, the AAR S-2043 does not address the 
suspension response during extreme straight winds (90 mph). Therefore, this will be addressed in 
the gap analysis. 
The suspension design is ITS and Table 6.2.3-1 is a list of applicable codes and standards. 

Applicable Code or 
Sections 
Title
Standard 
Paragraph 
Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High Level Radioactive 
AAR S-2043 
4.2 – 4.3 
Material 
7. REFERENCES 
7.1 DOCUMENTS CITED 
BSC 2004. Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis. 800-MQC-HET0-00200-
000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20040623.0002. (DIRS 
169554) 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2005. Nuclear Safety Design Bases for License Application. 000-
30R-MGR0-00400-000-001. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: 
ENG.20050308.0004. (DIRS 171512) 
DOE 2004. Quality Assurance Requirements and Description. DOE/RW-0333P, Rev. 16. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: DOC.20040907.0002. (DIRS 171539) 
LP-ENG-014-BSC, Rev. 0, ICN 2. Engineering Studies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: DOC.20040225.0003. (DIRS 
168862) 
LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Rev. 0, ICN 1. Software Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: DOC.20041005.0008. (DIRS 
171923) 
7.2 CODES AND STANDARDS 
AAR S-2043. 2003. Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-level Radioactive 
Material. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Railroads. (DIRS 166338) 
AAR 2004. Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices. Washington, D.C.: Association 
of American Railroads. TIC: 256289. (DIRS 169910) 
AISC 1997. Manual of Steel Construction, Allowable Stress Design. 9th Edition, 2nd Revision, 
2nd Impression. Chicago, Illinois: American Institute of Steel Construction. TIC: 240772. (DIRS 
107063) 

ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977. Neutron and Gamma-Ray Flux-to-Dose-Rate Factors. La Grange Park, 
Illinois: American Nuclear Society. TIC: 239401. (DIRS 107016) 
ANSI/ANS-6.4-1985. Guidelines on the Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation 
Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants. La Grange Park, Illinois: American Nuclear Society. TIC: 
204995. (DIRS 107721) 
ANSI/IEEE Std 344-1987 (Reaffirmed 1993). IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic 
Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. New York, New 
York: American National Standards Institute. TIC: 253538. (DIRS 159619) 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-2002. 2002. Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety 
Applications. Research Triangle Park, North Carolina: Instrumentation, Systems, and 
Automation Society. (DIRS 172965) 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2002. Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation. Research 
Triangle Park, North Carolina: Instrument Society of America. (DIRS 172968) 
AWS D1.1/D1.1M:2004. 2004. Structural Welding Code—Steel. 19th Edition. Miami, Florida: 
American Welding Society. TIC: 256262 (DIRS 170489) 
IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003. IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of 
Nuclear Power Generating Stations. New York, New York: Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. TIC: 256291. (DIRS 170777) 
IEEE Std 323-2003. 2004. IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear 
Power Generating Stations. New York, New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers. TIC: 255697. (DIRS 166907) 
IEEE Std 379-2000. 2001. IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear 
Power Generating Station Safety Systems. New York, New York: Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers. TIC: 255427. (DIRS 166688) 
IEEE Std 384-1992. 1992. IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and 
Circuits. New York, New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. TIC: 237497. 
(DIRS 103105) 
IEEE Std 603-1998. IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations. New York, New York: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. TIC: 
242993. (DIRS 125916) 

8. REVIEWED MATERIAL 
The following lists indicate the, Project, Documents, Drawings, and Calculations/Analysis, the 
Industry Codes and Standards, the Regulatory Documents, the Federal Regulations and the DOE 
Documents reviewed in the performance of the study. 
8.1 REVIEWED DOCUMENTS 
Seven documents were identified as the documents to be used for this study. These documents 
were identified as documents that had potential ITS standards that could be found. Beginning 
with the Transport Locomotive / WP Transporter Design Calculation a list of documents with all 
references pertaining to the locomotive and transporter was generated. From this list of reference 
documents, another sub list of references was generated. This process was continued until a list 
of all the documents that could potentially discuss ITS requirements had been generated. 
Nuclear Safety Design Bases for License Application - 000-30R-MGR0-00400-000-001. 
Waste Package Transporter Preclosure Safety Analysis. 800-MQC-HET0-00200-000-00A 
Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application - 000-00C-MGR0-00800-000-00Be 
Project Design Criteria – 000-3DR-MGR0-00100-000-003 
Project Requirements Document – TER-MGR-MD-00001 Rev 02 
Project Functional and Operational Requirements. – TDR-MGR-ME-000003 Rev 02 
Emplacement and Retrieval System Description Document. – 800-3YD-HE00-00100-000-003e 
8.2 REVIEWED DRAWINGS 
The following list is the Project drawings depicting the baseline concept of the Transport 
Locomotive / WP Transporter: 
Emplacement and Retrieval General Arrangement Locomotive - 800-MQ0-HES0-00201-000-
00B 
Emplacement and Retrieval General Arrangement Waste Package Transporter – 800-MQ0-
HET0-00101-000-00B 
8.3 REVIEWED CALCULATIONS/ANALYSIS 
The following Calculations and Analysis are the Project documents used in the development of 
the baseline concept of the Transport Locomotive / WP Transporter. 
Transport Locomotive Calculation - 800-MQC-HES0- 00100-000-00A 

Waste Package Transporter Calculation - 800-MQC-HET0- 00100-000-00B 
Waste Package Transporter Shielding Design Calculation - 000-00C-HE00- 00100-000-00A 
8.4 REVIEWED SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT 
The following is the current revision of the System Description Document pertaining to the 
Transport Locomotive / WP Transporter. 
Emplacement and Retrieval System Description Document - 800-3YD-HE00-00100-003e 
8.5 REVIEWED INDUSTRY CODES AND STANDARDS 
The following represents the codes, standards, regulations, and directives studied for 
applicability to the recognized ITS SSCs. 
AAR S-2043 -Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-level Radioactive 
Material 
AAR 1997 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C – Part II, 
Specifications for Design, Fabrication and Construction of Freight Cars M-1001, Volume I 
AAR 1997 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C – Part II, 
Specifications for Design, Fabrication and Construction of Freight Cars M-1001, Volume II 
AAR 1997 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section D – Truck and Truck 
Details 
AAR 1998 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section G – Wheels and Axles 
AAR 2001 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C – Part II, Appendices 
to Section C-II, Vol. I. 
AAR 2001 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section D – Part II, Code for 
Side Frame and Truck Bolster Design 
AAR 2002 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E, Part II – 
Electronically Controlled Brake Systems 
AAR 2002 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices: Section K, Part II – Railway 
Communications 
AAR 2002 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section M – Locomotives and 
Locomotive Equipment 
AAR 2003 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section B – Couplers & Freight 
Car Draft Components 

AAR 2003 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices: Section E-Brakes and Brake 
Equipment 
AAR 2003 -Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices: Section K, Part I – Railway 
Electronics 
AISC 1997 -Seismic Provisions for Structural Steel Buildings 
AISC 1997 -Manual of Steel Construction, Allowable Stress Design 
ANSI/AISC N690-1994 -American National Standard Specification for the Design, 
Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Safety-Related Structures for Nuclear Facilities 
ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977 - Neutron and Gamma-Ray Flux-to-Dose-Rate Factors 
ANSI/ANS-6.4-1985 - Guidelines on the Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation 
Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants 
ANSI/AWS D14.1-97-1998 -Welding of industrial & Mill cranes & other Mechanical Handling 
equipment 
ANSI/ISA-67.01.01-2002 -Transducer and Transmitter Installation for Nuclear Safety 
Applications 
ANSI/ISA-67.04.01-2002 -Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation 
ANSI-ISA-S84.01 -Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for Process Industries 
AWS D1.1/D1.1M-2002 - Structural Welding Code 
AWS D1.6:1999 - Structural Welding Code – Stainless Steel 
IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2-2003 -IEEE Standard Criteria for Digital Computers in Safety Systems of 
Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 323-2003 -IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 344-1987 - IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 
IEEE Std 379-1994 -IEEE Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear 
Power Generating Station Safety Systems 
IEEE 384-1992 -Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits 
IEEE Std 603-1998 -IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations 

UL 508-December 2, 2003– Industrial Control Equipment 
UL 583-July 12, 1999– Electric Battery Powered Industrial Trucks 
UL 698-March 15, 1999 – Industrial Control Equipment for Use in Hazardous (Classified) 
Locations 
8.6 REVIEWED REGULATORY DOCUMENTS 
NUREG-0700 (O’Hara et al. 2002), - Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines 
Regulatory Guide 8.8 -Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation 
Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will be as Low as is Reasonably Achievable 
8.7 REVIEWED FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
10 CFR Part 20, -Standard for Protection Against Radiation. 
10 CFR Part 71, -Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material 
29 CFR Part 1910, -Occupational Safety and Health 
49 CFR Part 172, -Hazardous Material Table 
49 CFR Part 173 – Shippers 
49 CFR Part 220 – Railroad Communications 
49 CFR Part 229 & 238 -Locomotive Crashworthiness; Proposed Rule 
49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232 -Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-
Passenger Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices; Final Rule 
8.8 REVIEWED DOE DOCUMENTS 
DOE-STD-1090-2001, -Hoisting and Rigging 
DOE-HDBK-1140-2001 – Human Factors/Ergonomics Handbook