Documents 243-272
Breakdown of Constitutional Government in Greece
November 1966-April 1967
243. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Tatoi, Greece, November 2, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 15, Briefing Book Greece, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Talbot. The meeting was held at the Palace at Tatoi.
PARTICIPANTS
His Majesty King Constantine
The Honorable Phillips Talbot
In taking my leave of the King before Washington consultation, I mentioned the prospective visits to Athens of several U.S. Congressional groups. The King said he would particularly like to see Senator Javits and might even challenge him to a tennis match.
The King said he understood Admiral Toumbas had told me about current Greek-Turkish negotiations on Cyprus and had said the time might be approaching when it would be important for the U.S. to exercise some moderating influence on Turkey. I commented that I had asked the Foreign Minister whether he had any particular issue or timing in mind and he had replied not at present. I added that I had gained the impression from the Prime Minister in a separate conversation that the key sticking point seemed to be the status of the Dhekelia sovereign base area. The King said this was his understanding. I asked whether he would expect the negotiations to break down over such an issue as a Turkish base versus a NATO base with Turkish participation. "Absolutely within this room," he replied, "I have told the Government they can't let that be the final breaking point. It wouldn't work to have obtained 95% and stick on the last 5%". However, he went on, Greece could not accept the present Turkish demand for a Turkish sovereign base combined with demilitarization of the Greek part of the island. One of these two elements would have to be modified. He hoped that the Turks could be persuaded to accept a lease status in Dhekelia. I noted that this might be exceptionally difficult if the Turkish mood continued anything like it was in 1964 when Acheson got nowhere in his effort to persuade the Turks that in today's volatile world a long-term lease is just as good as sovereignty. The King commented that in any case the two governments were still negotiating on this point. The heartening fact was that both governments seemed now to be showing a sense of urgency. That was new.
If the negotiators should reach an agreement, the King foresaw that the problem for Greece would be how to get a national decision and then, of course, how to deal with "the Priest." I commented that I had supposed that the Archbishop could be dealt with much more successfully in the context of a Greek-Turkish settlement than when Greece and Turkey were at odds. The King repeated that a Turkish base on Cyprus would be a very difficult thing to make Makarios swallow. On the Greek side, he said, the question was whether Papandreou could be brought along. In any case, the present government could not carry the burden of a settlement alone; the decision would have to be put up to all the parties. If each party were forced to make its stand known to the public, even the "Old Man" (Papandreou) might pause before rejecting it. However, this would not be an easy matter to get over and if worse came to worst Greece would at least show the Turks which elements in Greek political life had sabotaged the settlement.
The King asked whether I thought the British would go along with cession of Dhekelia. He had understood that in the end they would. I said this was also my impression; I had in fact been somewhat worried for fear the British financial crisis might cause a premature movement by London, such as an announcement of future withdrawals similar to that made on Aden, which would reduce the base area's bargaining importance in the Greek-Turk negotiations. The King said he would try to find an opportunity to caution some people in London about the delicacy of the present situation when he goes there next week.
"And just as soon as the Cyprus issue is settled," the King added with a twinkling eye, "I'll make an official visit to the United States." I said that he would be most welcome at that time, and that I agreed there were good reasons for not planning such a trip while the issue is unresolved.
The King had little to add to the comments he had made to me on October 27 about the Greek domestic situation./2/ He expressed himself as very well pleased at the way things had gone in Thessaloniki. The Prime Minister had also been pleased, he said, with his reception in Macedonian villages. Things seemed relatively quiet in the country and if in fact there should be a Cyprus settlement it ought to be possible to move to elections very quickly. I noted that people such as Markezinis felt that elections in the context of a Cyprus settlement would have a different and much healthier flavor than otherwise. The King agreed that in those circumstances public attention could be turned away from the issue unfortunately now so prominent.
/2/A memorandum of Talbot's October 27 conversation with the King is ibid. The King gave his opinions on government press subsidies, Karamanlis, and the Aspida affair.
The King commented that he had been to the Greek Pentagon for a military briefing and that the projections for 1970-71 showed serious if not critical shortfalls in the Hellenic military proficiency. The projected military assistance program was just not adequate to meet the needs, though he assumed that once Vietnam was settled the prospects might improve. I replied that Vietnam is certainly an important factor in our overall defense posture, but that Congressional attitudes and growing Greek capabilities also have to be considered. On the first, I noted that for reasons good or bad the trend line of military aid, like that of economic aid, is going down. In addition, particular Congressional sensitivity has grown over the military assistance programs to countries seemingly on collision courses with their neighbors. The India-Pakistan war had, of course, stimulated adverse Congressional reactions, but the problems of military assistance to Arab countries and Israel and to Greece and Turkey had also been featured in last year's Congressional hearings. However, a Greek-Turkish rapprochement might ameliorate that situation. "Yes," the King responded, "that's another reason we must get a settlement with Turkey."
The King said he would be back in Greece on November 16.
244. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, November 21, 1966, 1325Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and London.
705. 1. During meeting with Archbishop today he gave me same story he had given Hunt Nicosia 689/2/ re his meeting with Stephanopoulos. Using most emphatic Greek, Makarios said there was absolutely no possibility now or in future that he would agree to establishment of Turkish base in Cyprus whether sovereign or leased. When I asked him whether he felt same way about possible NATO base in which Turks could participate as part of multilateral force along with Greeks and perhaps others, he said this was different matter and he did not object to concept. He expressed doubt, however, that Turks would accept such proposal if GOG made it in connection with dialogue. (According to Finnish Ambassador who called today Archbishop made same statement to General Martola during recent meeting.)
/2/Telegram 689, November 18, reported a Makarios-Stephanopolous discussion of the issue of a Turkish base. (Ibid.)
2. Makarios reiterated well-known view that by mid-December "we should know where we stand" with regard to dialogue and he asked me whether I had any news as to present status. I replied in negative suggesting that probable meeting between Toumbas and Caglayangil in Paris might have some results which would become known to him.
3. Comment: While we have had numerous influential Greek Cypriots express acceptance of NATO base concept, this is first time any of us in diplomatic corps or in UNFICYP have heard direct from Archbishop that he would not be opposed to a NATO base as part of an enosis solution.
Belcher
245. Field Information Report/1/
[document number not declassified]
Athens, December 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, POL 15 GOVT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem.
COUNTRY
Greece
SUBJECT
Leadership of rightist Greek military conspiratorial group
DATE OF INFO
13 December 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]/15 December 66
SOURCE
[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Information on this group has been fairly reliable.
1. The leadership of the rightist military conspiratorial group met secretly on 13 December 1966 at the home of one of its members, Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Ladas. This leadership, now loosely referred to as the "Revolutionary Council," is composed of the following military officers--/2/ /3/
/2/Field Comment--[document number not declassified] reported the continued concern over the political situation of the rightist Greek military conspiratorial group, which has been in existence since late 1963. One of the group's leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, stated on 22 November that if the political situation continues to deteriorate at the present rate, drastic action, i.e., dictatorship, will be needed. [Footnote in the source text. The document is dated December 13. (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files)]
/3/Field Comment--All of the persons named in para 1 were previously reported by the same source [document number not declassified]/7 March 1966/ as being members of the conspiratorial group. However, the leadership grouping was not referred to as a "Revolutionary Council" at that time. Concerning the unidentified General officer referred to in the same paragraph, source reported [document number not declassified]/October 1964/ that a Brigadier General Stamatios Skliros was a member of the group. [Footnote in the source text. The first document is printed as Document 225; the second has not been found.]
A. Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos
B. Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Ladas
C. Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos
D. Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis
E. Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Lekkas
F. Lieutenant Colonel Mihail Roufogalis
G. Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Mexis
H. One or two other officers unknown to source, one of whom is either a Brigadier or Major General, but whose name source did not know./4/
/4/Field Comment--All of the persons named in para 1 were previously reported by the same source [document number not declassified]/7 March 1966/ as being members of the conspiratorial group. However, the leadership grouping was not referred to as a "Revolutionary Council" at that time. Concerning the unidentified General officer referred to in the same paragraph, source reported [document number not declassified]/October 1964/ that a Brigadier General Stamatios Skliros was a member of the group. [Footnote in the source text. The first document is printed as Document 225; the second has not been found.]
2. The group discussed the current political situation, but did not make a decision concerning the establishment of a dictatorship. The merits of selecting a single leader for the group was also discussed but it was finally decided to leave the direction of the group in the hands of the Council as a whole for the time being. The group's members also stated that they would continue their efforts to remove or isolate leftist and other unreliable persons from the Greek Army.
3. Roufogalis is suspected by some members of the group of reporting on its activities to the Deputy Chief of the Greek Central Intelligence Service /KYP/, Brigadier General Emmanouil Zacharakis, because the latter was responsible for the recent assignment of Roufogalis to a senior position within KYP.
246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, December 24, 1966, 1527Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
3093. 1. Former Foreign Minister Toumbas/2/ told me last evening he had returned from Paris strongly heartened by tone and apparent progress achieved in his extended discussions with Caglayangil. For first time he felt optimistic that Greek-Turkish agreement could be reached by careful negotiation. Believing that Turks anxious to settle and get rid of Cyprus issue, he had telephoned Caglayangil in Ankara when Stephanopoulos government fell to assure him Greece continues equally eager to settle issue.
/2/Prime Minister Stephanopoulos resigned on December 21 following the withdrawal of ERE support.
2. As described by Toumbas, he and Caglayangil started Paris meeting with each side putting down in writing the basic principles underlying its position. As anticipated, this exercise resulted in reaffirmation of Turkish insistence on condominium or an independent Cyprus while Greece stood firmly for enosis. However, once the record had been made he and Caglayangil went on in oral discussions for another 10 hours in the course of which Caglayangil proved not only willing but apparently anxious to explore doctrine of enosis and what it would mean for Turk Cypriots and for Turkey. In their discussion of enosis, Toumbas discerned no issue that seemed likely to become a final sticking point except question of a Turkish base area on island. Caglayangil had insisted that Turkey would need to obtain sovereignty over Dhekelia base area. Toumbas had tried to persuade him that in practical terms a lease for a number of years would be just as valuable as sovereignty and also that Turkish needs could be equally well served by an arrangement that put Dhekelia under a NATO umbrella with Turkish, Greek, British and perhaps other participation. Although they did not reach accord on this point, Toumbas did not believe it had brought them to the breaking point. On contrary, he felt optimistic that with skillful negotiation agreement could be reached even on this question.
3. Toumbas said he had returned to Greece with the impression that Turks would definitely be prepared to make a deal on basis of enosis once base question resolved. He described mood of conversation as forthright and friendly throughout. On arrival in Athens he had reported this to Stephanopoulos and had predicted that agreement with Turkey was within reach provided that Makarios should not be brought into the picture until the Athens-Ankara settlement was final. He had also given press conference--though without divulging details of talks--to correct false impression in Greek press that Paris talks had ended in near collapse of dialogue.
4. Toumbas said he would make similar reports to new Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos and to the King. Except to them, he said, he would not reveal the contents of his talks to anyone so that secrecy of dialogue and its future prospects could be protected.
Talbot
247. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, January 18, 1967, 1634Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
3439. NATUS Info.
1. When I made initial call on Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos today I found Cyprus issue at top of his mind. He said GOG trying to persuade Makarios not to distribute Czech arms, and may call for U.S. assistance. He now preparing communication to go to Makarios within few days and would decide on next steps after getting Archbishop's reply./2/ I responded that we also much concerned, as we have made clear in Nicosia and New York where as his government knows, we have been pressing for effective UN action to defuse issue.
/2/On December 13, 1966, Secretary-General Thant reported that the Cypriot Government had confirmed the importation from Czechoslovakia of a quantity of arms to be distributed to the Cyprus Police. (U.N. Doc. S/7611/Add.1) Makarios agreed to delay issuing the arms for 2 months.
2. He reiterated his desire and intention to resume dialogue with Turks, if Turks willing, but in response to my question said he had not yet completed discussion with leaders of major parties on how far his government could go in dialogue. I reminded him that USG had not sponsored any particular plan as best solution for Cyprus, but had repeatedly made clear its strong belief that peace in Eastern Mediterranean can be secured only when Greece and Turkey have settled their problems. As in Arab-Israel and India-Pakistan disputes, I said, time seems to be on no one's side. All would suffer greatly if continuing failure to achieve solution should some day result in an explosion. He insisted that he fully agrees, and that his strong ambition is to move vigorously in direction of settlement with Turkey while he is Prime Minister.
3. Prime Minister said he thought time probably not ripe for Greek Crown Council to meet on Cyprus, but he would be examining this question also with party leaders.
Comment: Political realities here make it clear that Paraskevopoulos can move only as far with Turkey as Kanellopoulos and George Papandreou will permit. I have no fresh reading on Papandreou's private views, but Kanellopoulos told me later today that he favors continuation of dialogue by Paraskevopoulos government. He expressed himself as persuaded that settlement with Turkey can be obtained only if both major Greek parties agree on terms. For that reason he believes present period as propitious as any other for negotiations since both parties support Paraskevopoulos during current interim. At same time he showed himself still bearish on chances of getting agreement, since he sees enosis as only basis Greek parties can accept and professes to be unable to discover what sort of compensation to Turkey could be devised that would be both payable by Greeks and acceptable to Turks. Kanellopoulos favors early meeting of Crown Council to get briefing on dialogue, though presumably not to set guidelines for its continuation (Ankara's 3361)./3/
/3/Telegram 3361 from Ankara, January 16, summarized press reports that the Turkish Government was unwilling to deal with a caretaker government in Greece without the endorsement of the Crown Council. (Ibid.)
Talbot
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, January 20, 1967, 7:54 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Owens, cleared in NEA, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
122819. NATUS. State 118498./2/
/2/Telegram 118498 to Ankara, January 13, reported that Kohler reiterated to the Turkish Ambassador the U.S. belief that the Greek-Turkish dialogue held out the best hope for a Cyprus settlement and urged the Turks to press forward with discussions. (Ibid.)
1. Your talk with GOG Amb Delivanis (Ankara 3420)/3/ as well as Amb. Talbot's conversation with new GOG PriMin (Athens 3439)/4/ has demonstrated GOG determination to resume dialogue and, if possible, reach agreement on Cyprus problem. We are impressed by persistence and sincerity with which GOG appears to be pursuing this objective, and consider GOG recognition that recent bellicose statements in GOT Parliament are designed for domestic consumption as further evidence their sincerity.
/3/Telegram 3420 from Ankara, January 19, reported talks between Hart and Ambassador Delivanis on the Greek position in the Cyprus talks. (Ibid.)
/4/Document 247.
2. As we perceive current situation, existence of Paraskevopoulos Government offers opportunity for move forward on Cyprus issue. Main obstacle on Greek side would be potential opposition of George Papandreou and his CU party to any settlement which could be regarded as sacrificing Greek interests (and since any conceivable settlement will involve Greek concessions, such "sacrifices" will not be hard to identify). However, since Papandreou has reasonable expectation of returning to power in May elections, he is well aware of potentially destructive impact of Cyprus issue on his popularity and existence his government and thus has every reason to wish it out of way before he assumes office. As CU leader has said to Amb. Talbot in past, Cyprus crisis was his greatest worry during his 16 months in office, and preoccupation with this question prevented him from carrying out his domestic policy which was closest to his heart. If Paraskevopoulos Govt. were able to reach Cyprus settlement on terms representing something less than complete success for Greek side, Papandreou could presumably acquiesce, since he would not bear main responsibility for lack of total victory and would be freed of this potential burden when and if he took office. Further he would probably not begrudge current government credit for positive aspects of Cyprus settlement, since Paraskevopoulos and his ministers are "non-political" personalities and hence not his political rivals.
3. We recognize there is no way of preventing certain elements on Greek political scene, notably Andreas Papandreou forces and crypto-Communist EDA party, from attacking efforts to achieve Cyprus settlement on any realistic terms. Younger Papandreou has shown his willingness in past to take irresponsible line on this national issue when he considered it politically profitable. Nevertheless, we think that on balance it is possible that sufficient support from among party leaders--necessarily including G. Papandreou--could be mustered to approve a Cyprus settlement which would then be ratified by Crown Council. Powerful plus factor is determination of King Constantine to settle Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, and we would count on King to exert pressure on political leaders to this end.
4. In light of this assessment you should seek early opportunity to discuss with Caglayangil our analysis Greek situation, and our belief that Greeks mean business on resuming dialogue and working towards final settlement. While GOT skepticism about current GOG ability to reach and implement real agreement is understandable in view of past disappointments with various Greek governments, this should not deter GOT from seizing what appears to be opportunity to make significant progress on explosive Cyprus question. At very least it would halt deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations which has taken place since importation of Czech arms into island and fall of Stephanopoulos Government, and reestablish hot line between Athens and Ankara which would be most helpful in event of further crisis./5/
/5/In telegram 3476 from Ankara, Hart reported that he had transmitted the substance of the Department's instructions to Caglayangil. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Rusk
249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, January 25, 1967, 1:43 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by Draper; cleared in IO, NEA and S/S; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
124890. NATUS. Subj: Cyprus. Following is FYI Noforn subject to revision upon review summary uncleared Secretary-Turk Ambassador Esenbel Memcon Jan. 24th re Cyprus./2/ Other subjects discussed reported septel.
/2/Not found.
1. Turk Ambassador Esenbel said Cyprus and Czech arms problem was one of three major subjects on which Prime Minister Demirel had asked him convey GOT views to Secretary. GOT wanted Czech arms placed under continuous UN custody, considered "control" measures offered through U Thant-Makarios agreement unsatisfactory, did not trust Makarios, and lacked confidence in Greek capacities to deal with him. Turkish people, he added, were puzzled and frustrated in looking at Cyprus issue, and although they basically tended to trust U.S., had been disappointed in past U.S. attitudes. This was situation which leftists exploited.
2. Demirel, he said, might be compelled carry out openly and unapologetically measures such as airdrop of weapons to Turk Cypriots if Czech arms distributed, although he hoped to avoid it. With Cyprus problem one never knew what would happen. Sooner a real solution was found, the better. Nevertheless, GOT entertained doubts caretaker GOG could negotiate seriously in resumed dialogue.
3. Secretary said U.S. had not invented Cyprus problem, U.S. not guarantor power, yet it concerned us deeply. Requested Esenbel to convey personal, private message to Caglayangil urging that Turk-Greek dialogue be resumed. Secretary said earlier dialogue had revealed that both governments had responsible, serious attitude. Caglayangil should not despair of present GOG. Present attitude in Athens appeared good, he said, and he suggested such non-political government might possess advantages over successor government in seeking constructive solution in which Greek compromises would be necessary. Asked his personal comment be passed Caglayangil that little to lose and possibly something to gain in resumed dialogue.
4. Secretary said he personally convinced GOG did not know of arms deal, and noted GOG actions to prevent distribution had been timely. Secretary viewed U Thant-Makarios arrangement as retreat for Makarios. Abuse of agreement would permit UN, U.S. and others to move in vigorously. We are working hard in UN and Nicosia to tighten agreement, but U Thant had accomplished something. In urging U.S. to exert still greater pressures, GOT was giving U.S. credit for more leverage than we possessed. We cannot deliver on Makarios, he concluded, any more than Turks can.
Rusk
250. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, January 26, 1967, 1330Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Paris, London, and USUN.
3550. NATUS Info. Cyprus.
1. In luncheon conversation January 25 George Papandreou seemed to me to be in good spirits, more sure of himself and more durable over several hours conversation than I have seen him in past year. He gave the impression of a man who has gained electoral opportunity he had long sought, and who intends to control his party despite pressures from his son Andreas. His political comments being quoted by airgram./2/
/2/Airgram A-400 from Athens, January 26. (Ibid., POL 14 GREECE)
He also made following comments on Cyprus question.
2. He is not aware of substance of Athens-Ankara discussions. PriMin Paraskevopoulos is scheduled to brief him in next several days regarding dialogue so far. Presumably PriMin Papandreou and Kanellopoulos to work out a consensus with Paraskevopoulos on what the two parties will support with regard to continuation of dialogue before May elections.
3. Based on his reading of press reports, he does not believe dialogue has progressed at all or has accomplished anything beyond relieving tensions between Athens and Ankara while talks have continued. He suspects dialogue in this case has been pseudonym for two monologues. He would be pleased if Paraskevopoulos could report otherwise to him. He has no objection to continuation of dialogue if he, Kanellopoulos and Paraskevopoulos agree among themselves and with the Turks on meaning and intent of dialogue.
4. If his assumption regarding lack of progress on dialogue is correct, he does not see possibility for arriving at agreed solution for present and therefore believes it necessary to agree with Turks to suspend attempts to reach final settlement for some time until situation has become more relaxed.
5. His reasoning for inability to agree is as follows: (1) enosis: Turkey will not agree unless there are territorial compensations, either in Cyprus or in Greece (Thrace and islands) which Cypriot or Greek people are unable to accept even though a government might desire to make the concessions; (2) double enosis: this is equally unacceptable because of resistance of Greek Cypriots to territorial concession this implies; (3) independence: Turks insist on restricted independence of Zurich-London type which again is unacceptable to Greeks because it precludes opportunity for opting for union with Greece after 5, 10 or 20 years.
6. If this is case, Greeks and Turkey should work to agree not on final settlement but on measures to keep situation on island under control. In this context he sees need for Crown Council with participation of Makarios. His reasoning for inclusion Makarios is that otherwise Greeks will make decision and Makarios will assume role of judging whether decision is proper. Roles should be reversed. Makarios should participate in Crown Council discussions and his forecast of coming events, Cyprus initiatives, etc. should be made part of record, and discussed and whatever consensus possible between Greeks and Makarios recorded. This is only way, in Papandreou's view, to "control" Makarios initiatives. He kept returning to what he considers greatest problem of moment on Cyprus--state of enmity between Makarios and Grivas and constant suspicions of former that Grivas is about to pull coup against him. Because of this, Makarios considers every small act in terms of suspicion and insecurity for his personal position. He thus lashes out in various ways, all for wrong reason. If one could solve current "Grivas problem" one would have better chance of agreeing with Makarios on course of action precluding initiatives of faits accomplis which only provoke Turks.
Talbot
251. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Athens, January 28, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 69 D 553, Andreas Papandreou. Confidential. Drafted by Maury on February 1.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Dimitrios Bitsios
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Dimitrios Bitsios, Chief of the Royal Cabinet
Mr. John Maury, First Secretary
1. I had a one-hour private conversation with Dimitrios Bitsios following a dinner at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Angelos Kanellopoulos on January 28. I gained the impression that Bitsios deliberately sought me out to raise some of the matters noted below.
2. He began by commenting on the recent activities of Andreas Papandreou and his friends, remarking particularly upon what he interpreted as their use of the Aspida trials to amplify their electoral campaign themes./2/ Bitsios went on to say that it now seemed perfectly clear that Andreas was serving the purposes of the Communists and the Soviets, and that it was thus hard to explain the apparent American reluctance to face this fact. He added that reluctance of the Embassy to become involved in internal political controversy between the "national" parties was fully understood and accepted; but that if the U.S. was serious about resisting Soviet aggrandizement and internal Communist subversion, it should certainly be serious about countering the activities of Andreas.
/2/An October 1, 1966, report on Aspida had charged Andreas Papandreou with involvement. On January 26, the court martial trying the officers accused of participating in Aspida went into secret session. The Center Union attacked this decision as a violation of the rights of the accused and as an effort by the Greek Government to cover the weakness of its case.
3. I responded that we may all have our suspicions about Andreas, but I was aware of no solid evidence of collaboration between him and the Soviets. I said that if such evidence existed we would be much interested in it. Bitsios admitted that there was no "direct" evidence, but he felt the "circumstantial" evidence was conclusive. He said he had no doubt that Andreas was receiving generous financial support from Moscow and from the KKE. When asked for details Bitsios said that money was probably being provided through Greek business firms who had lucrative contracts with the Soviets, and who, as a quid pro quo, were forced to contribute to Andreas' coffers. Bitsios went on to reiterate that everything that Andreas had said and done demonstrated his sympathy with Communist and Soviet aims and his hostility to constitutional government in Greece and to Western unity.
4. Bitsios then asked what I thought the U.S. reaction would be if the "situation" required resort to "extreme measures." I said if he were speaking of unconstitutional measures, I was confident that U.S. reaction would be extremely unfavorable. I pointed out that:
a. It is our general observation around the world that unconstitutional measures rarely solve knotty political problems, and once such a course is embarked upon it is difficult to turn back.
b. Whatever we may suspect of Andreas' motives and affiliations, there is still no proof of active Communist or Soviet connections.
c. However Andreas may look to us from the perspective of Athens, the fact remains that in the U.S. and perhaps in serveral other Western countries, he has influential admirers in intellectual, political and academic circles.
I added that there was the further question of whether a dictatorship could be effectively imposed in the face of the kind of strikes, violence and general resistance measures with which Andreas might react. Bitsios said that if a dictatorshiop were decided upon, "Andreas would not be around." In response to my further question, Bitsios said that for the present the loyalty of the army could be relied upon to support a temporary dictatorship, but a few years hence "it might be too late."
5. I then asked Bitsios under what conditions the situation might call for "such drastic measures." He replied that action would have to be taken, if at all, before rather than after elections. (It was not clear whether he referred to the next election or some future election from which Andreas might appear likely to emerge with an absolute majority.)
6. I reiterated that whatever justification might be found here for an unconstitutional solution, I saw no way in which it could be justified in the eyes of the American public, press or political leaders. I said that if Andreas was the threat that many believed him to be, it was difficult to see why influential and responsible Greeks did not work more vigorously against him. Bitsios agreed, deploring the lack of leadership in ERE and among moderate elements in the Center.
7. I asked Bitsios' views about the possible return of former Prime Minister Karamanlis. He replied that he felt this was urgently needed "at the proper time" but was not clear on just when this would be. He did, however, go out of his way to emphasize that there is "absolutely no foundation" for rumors that Karamanlis' return would not be welcomed by the Palace. In response to Bitsios' question, I said the nationalist elements seemed much in need of leadership, vitality and unity; but whether Karamanlis' return now would help to fill these needs was a question he could answer better than I.
252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, February 1, 1967, 9:18 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Wood, cleared by UNP and NEA, and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, USUN, London, and Paris.
129683. NATUS.
1. Following, based on uncleared memcon of Secretary's meeting with Cypriot Ambassador Rossides on February 2, is FYI Noforn and subject to revision upon review./2/
/2/In telegram 129862, February 2, the Department informed the Embassy that this telegram was a full and complete report of the discussion and that no memorandum of conversation would be prepared (Ibid.)
2. Rossides, citing Caglayangil remarks of January 6 (Ankara's 3249)/3/ and other evidence, made opening statement which he summed up by saying Turkey insists on an impossible solution (partition) by the use of force (invasion). Turkey should be discouraged from the use of force, in his opinion, by the US.
/3/Telegram 3249 from Ankara, January 7, reported Caglayangil's statement to Parliament that Turkey retained its full right to military intervention in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
3. Secretary replied, in our view situation had been relatively calm on the Island and efforts were being made to reach a solution when everyone was surprised by the importation of arms. Those arms could only have one purpose: to use against the Turkish Cypriots. He inquired about arrangements with the Secretary General and said he had heard some arms had been distributed for training.
4. Rossides said arms not intended for use against Turk Cypriots "because we have sufficient arms." He insisted on new rationalization: arms for police who have paramilitary duties in defense of Island.
5. He claimed in discussions with SecGen latter had suggested small arms distributed at end February, but not heavy arms which to be kept locked and inspected. Makarios had replied we won't distribute arms of either type "for time being."
6. Secretary said defense Cyprus depends on good sense of Greece and Turkey, on the efforts of the UN and on the support of nations interested in peace such as the US. Arms imported by Cyprus would not have major effect in case of invasion. Fact they came in surreptitiously made very unfortunate impression, especially if police already had enough arms. He asked if it wise for Rossides to ask US to seek assurances from Turks without being able give US assurances on how arms would be used. He emphasized GOT concerned about attack on Turk Cypriots for whatever reason or pretext.
7. Rossides said there was no sign of GOC attack on Turk Cypriots.
8. Secretary inquired about SAM missiles. Suggested they were junk and should be left where they were.
9. Rossides speaking personally suggested "balance" whereby GOC would abandon missiles and import no arms in return for which no invasion from Turkey.
10. Secretary said GOC not having taken US into confidence originally now wanted US go to GOT not knowing what might be done on Cyprus tomorrow. Secretary asked if arms import had been discussed with GOG or UN Commander.
11. Rossides said not to his knowledge. This sovereign matter. Many previous arms imports not discussed.
12. Wood raised SC Resolution of 4 March 64 (S/5575)/4/ and gave document to Rossides who read aloud para 1: ". . . all member States . . . to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus . . ."
/4/Reference is to Security Council Resolution 186; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566-567.
13. Rossides suggested since US opposed use force it should oppose use force by GOT. Secretary replied US equally against use force against Turkish community.
14. Secretary emphasized that he had participated in discussions of Cyprus for some years. There had been many suggestions about what US should do. Henceforth he intended to ask each nation separately how it could contribute towards keeping the peace.
15. Rossides said GOC would leave arms alone for time being, perhaps for some time, but if necessity arose would have to use them sooner. GOC had right use arms.
16. Secretary said nations have many rights which they do not exercise in interest avoiding international danger.
17. Campbell (IO) later tried pin Rossides down on circumstances under which arms would be distributed. Rossides refused to say.
Rusk
253. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, February 3, 1967, 0945Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, Paris, Prague, USUN, Adana, Izmir, and Istanbul.
3698. NATUS. Cyprus.
1. Summary: During meeting Feb 2 I raised Cyprus matter with FonMin Caglayangil, who said GOT would not accept fait accompli of Czech arms under Makarios control. GOT had taken very clear decision that if arms were not placed under UN custody, it would "by one means or another" send equal number of arms to Cyprus to restore balance. Caglayangil said GOT fully aware that armed clash on Cyprus might result. Also stated GOT would not resume dialogue with Greece until arms question settled to its satisfaction. (Elekdag and Turkmen also present.)
2. Details: I began by explaining that US takes problem of Czech arms very seriously and is concerned lest situation develop to a dangerous point. We are making constant and unremitting efforts at UN, Nicosia and Athens to obtain tightest possible arrangements to guard against distribution of Czech arms and felt we were making some progress. We have never altered our view that all parties including UNSYG should seek to obtain UN custody of arms but so far results have been negative. We have therefore concentrated on tightening specifics of UNSYG-Makarios arrangements. Mentioned particularly Ambassador Belcher's efforts with Makarios and that Secretary had talked with Rossides (without giving substance)./2/
/2/See Document 252. Belcher's February 3 meeting with Makarios was apparently moved to February 4. Telegram 1109 from Nicosia, February 6, reported that at that meeting Makarios told Belcher he intended to begin the distribution of Czech arms on a phased basis beginning in late February. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
3. In sober tones, Caglayangil said SC resolution of March 4, 1964 provides that no one should undertake action which would worsen situation on island. At moment negotiations were started to find peaceful solution to problem, Czechoslovakia permitted arms to be sent to Cyprus. Czechs should not have done this, nor should Makarios. But there was general belief that all faits accomplis of Makarios end successfully and other countries believe Turkey must eventually accept them. FonMin underscored that GOT cannot accept fait accompli. Concerning Czech arms, GOT decision very clear. If arms were not turned over to UN custody, GOT would send equal number of arms to island to restore balance. "We have taken necessary decisions and will implement them." FonMin continued that no one could expect nation of 32 million to accept faits accomplis endlessly. Repeated that if arms not placed under UN custody, Turkey would send arms by any means possible. This did not necessarily mean Turkey would "intervene" on Cyprus but Turkey would abide by its decision. (This statement not further explained.) Noted that UNSYG was responsible for implementation of SC resolution. Asked rhetorically why UNSYG had [not?] called Czechs to account for shipping arms. Asked why he did not now insist on US [UN?] custody. US had made representations to UNSYG and so had Turkey but UNSYG resisted démarches.
4. I said Secretary and our Missions at New York and Nicosia were all heavily engaged in tightening up arrangements for control over arms. I thought we were slowly gaining some ground. We would continue to work to prevent distribution of arms for indefinite period, however long that may be. Stressed that US not being half-hearted about this.
5. FonMin replied that whatever the effectiveness of inspection and control measures, "nothing less than UN custody would satisfy Turkey." Effectiveness of control system would not satisfy Turkey either from point of view of measures taken or from point of view of its prestige. To my question whether this meant Turkey would not be satisfied even if control were completely effective, Turkmen replied (and FonMin confirmed after returning from phone call) that Turks could not understand how any system could be effective if Makarios retained custody and warehouse keys.
6. FonMin remarked that Turk Ambassador at Athens told by Greek Government that it too wanted UN custody of arms. FonMin noted Makarios does not have "effective power" on island but Grivas has it. Greek Government talks about UN custody but fails to use influence and pressure on Grivas to obtain effective control. If UNSYG would insist on UN custody, this would have effect on GOG attitude and policy. Furthermore, GOT convinced Makarios could respond to U Thant's pressures, if exerted, without losing face.
7. I said our information was that no arms had been generally distributed as yet. FonMin disagreed saying their information indicated one shipment had been unloaded and was now at Nicosia. This was shipment everyone focussed on controlling. But another shipment believed to have arrived week later and was moved elsewhere on island, and distribution of arms from this shipment had occurred. FonMin pointed out that in any case it was against nature of Makarios and pattern of his behavior to have arms and not to use them.
8. I said we would continue applying pressure on UNSYG and Makarios on basis that only by means of such continuous efforts would we move them little by little. Ambassador Talbot in Greece had also weighed in with new Greek leaders against arms distribution.
9. I noted Turk press reports about possible arms airdrop. Said Embassy Nicosia's clear assessment of effect such action was that Grivas would react immediately without waiting for Athens' instructions and that results of clash could spread unpredictably. Parenthetically, also noted MinInt Georkadjis admission that GOG not informed in advance about arrival of Czech arms.
10. Emphatically, Caglayangil said GOT had already accepted that if it dropped arms in Cyprus it would not be an "excursion" but "warfare". Raising his voice, he said no Greek political party would have courage to accept sacrifice in Greece for Cyprus. But government of technicians could do so. Instead GOG is not sincere and fails to hold Grivas under its orders. Greek politicians and Makarios are aggravating situation on island. Hellenic General Staff also government unto itself. In fact, four govts existed in Greece today: army, dynasty, GOG and opposition. Turkmen noted that several higher ranking Foreign Office members (Christopoulos, Rendis, Sgourdeos among others) had requested leave at same time in protest against Makarios.
11. I urged continuation Turk-Greek dialogue and Turkmen interjected by asking "who speaks for Greek Govt." I asked if Turk Ambassador had not seen Paraskevopoulos. Reply was he had not. I said presumably he was point at which all parts of GOG could be pulled together. Furthermore, I convinced King was seriously and sincerely in favor of constructive dialogue. Turkmen wondered whether fall of Stephanopoulos government was not fait accompli directed against King. Caglayangil commented it had often been said that Turkey had made previous threats about landings on Cyprus. Perhaps people had been lulled into false security because landings did not take place. Turkey did not want to threaten or increase tension but situation was intolerable. If it was question of prestige for GOC and GOG, it was also question of prestige for GOT and Turk Cypriots were in danger.
12. To my question as to prospects of resuming dialogue, FonMin replied firmly "not before arms matter settled. It would be ridiculous." He asked if it was not ludicrous to talk with Greece about peaceful settlement while Makarios plans how to use arms under his custody. Besides, FonMin added, if Greece cannot use its influence effectively re UN custody of arms, how can Greeks be expected convince Makarios to accept results of dialogue.
13. I replied it was my understanding conditions in Cyprus were quiet at this time. I then stressed utility of dialogue as means of communication between two govts and opportunity for secret talks. I said if Makarios had intended to upset dialogue he would have succeeded if it were not now resumed. Had new GOG expressed willingness resume talks at point where they had been interrupted by fall of GOT? Caglayangil twice side-stepped answering this. He wondered with whom GOT could possibly talk and Turkmen observed that Greek Crown Council had not even been able to decide to meet. Both major party leaders had expressed reservations re GOG negotiating powers in dialogue. I said resumption of dialogue would help us all and especially at UN. But Caglayangil repeated that Turkey would not resume dialogue before Czech arms were placed under UN custody and again said would be "ridiculous" for it to do so. I ended by saying US working for peace in Cyprus and I hoped this would be kept in mind.
14. As rather an anti-climax and prompting by Turkmen, Caglayangil then mentioned completely unacceptable conditions GOC trying to impose on next Turk troop rotation (March). No conditions whatever would be accepted and rotation would proceed backed by all necessary force. He also referred to Turk-GOC impasse over exit permit for Coskun and asked that US Govt make demarche to GOC to obtain permit. I said I would transmit this request.
15. Comment: At no time did FonMin mention any deadline within which Czech arms would have to be under UN custody. On Feb 3 FonMin and Turkmen both travel to Italy for 3-day visit. Unlikely therefore that Turks would undertake any diplomatic (or military) action before FonMin returns. No sign of military crank-up is observable as of now. Nevertheless, Turks clearly losing patience with attitude present GOG and are convinced only hard line will move things forward. It possible they may plan to run arms in as secretly as possible but will use overt methods if necessary to deliver or in response to further GOC provocation, such as release Czech arms or interference with rotation Turk army contingent./3/
/3/In telegram 131270, February 3, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to inform the Turkish Government of its concern over any efforts to supply arms to the Turkish Cypriots and to urge the Turks to make their concerns about arms supply known to the Greek Government. (Ibid.) Hart reported his démarche in telegram 3735 from Ankara, February 4. (Ibid.)
Hart
254. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 10, 1967, 1530Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris, USUN, and Naples for USDOCOSouth.
3802. NATUS Info. Cyprus
1. Discussions we have had in past few days with persons who participated in Crown Council on Cyprus held Feb 6 have disclosed that Makarios reassured Council on basis his personal knowledge that US would intervene at appropriate moment as mediator to settle problem, enforce negotiations, and could be counted on to prevent Turks from taking any military action. This disconcerting information comes from several sources, as detailed below.
2. I met with ex-FonMin Toumbas Feb 8 at his request. He said he wishes brief me on Crown Council, which he considered of interest to USG. According Toumbas, Makarios took strenuous objection to resumption dialogue, which he considers futile endeavor. When Toumbas asked Makarios if he could offer alternative to dialogue in view deadlock reached with Cyprus issue, Archbishop replied he had good reason believe US would intervene as mediator at appropriate moment and start negotiations in which US, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus would participate, probably under aegis U Thant or some other well-known personality. Archbishop was vague and mysterious on this point, but he gave Council impression some American had whispered to him that that would be case. Toumbas stated he did not believe Archbishop was referring to American Ambassador Nicosia or any other senior officer of Embassy Nicosia, but he wondered whether an American possibly of junior rank might not have whispered something to that effect to Makarios in Nicosia. Toumbas asked me if I could confirm this. I replied in negative and assured him position my government had been made very clear to all parties concerned on number of occasions.
3. Toumbas said he pointed out to Makarios with firmness that Greece's foreign policy could not be based on mere assumptions but on facts only. Archbishop reiterated his belief that US would intervene at appropriate time. Toumbas commented that one good result of Council was that all political leaders present agreed on policy to be followed. Furthermore, after hearing Makarios they became convinced he does not want enosis. I asked if it could be taken for granted that Makarios is now fully acquainted with all phases dialogue. Toumbas replied that full text synopsis (three pages) of minutes of dialogue, signed by Caglayangil and himself, had been read to Archbishop and that note to this effect had been made in minutes Crown Council.
4. Toumbas continued that he is worried about maintenance peace in Mediterranean and involvement his country as well as repercussions on Greece's allies. He is not convinced Paraskevopoulos government is in position handle problem effectively. Though he considers Economu-Gouras intelligent and able diplomat, he feels Gouras will be at disadvantage when he meets with his Turkish colleague. He will not be able to speak as equal to equal. With responsible politician at head FonMin, situation would be different. Toumbas at this point gave example of how a politician can assume responsibility in critical situation. He said that at time he was discussing Czech arms question with Caglayangil and NATO he had not hesitated to send telegram to Greek Amb Nicosia instructing him to return to Athens if Makarios did not comply with obligations he had accepted in connection Czech arms. It had been only after Alexandrakis had shown this telegram to Makarios that latter realized how serious situation could become if he failed comply with prior agreement.
5. I told Toumbas I shared his anxiety, particularly in view fact I have been hearing from Greek friends that they do not doubt USG will intervene in case Turkey should decide attack. I added that from such assumptions, miscalculations and frustration could very well result, precipitating an extremely serious situation. It would then be impossible to make the Greeks believe that the US had given prior warning that it would not be able play again the role which Greeks apparently expect of it. Toumbas said he fully agreed.
6. DCM elicited following from Progressive Party leader Markezinis, who also participated in Council. Principal results Council were: (a) unanimous agreement dialogue should continue; (b) agreement to proposition that enosis can only be achieved if some sort compensation (undetermined) is given Turkey in exchange (although not specifically agreed, consensus was that this compensation could not be territorial); and (c) agreement that GOG could offer NATO base with Turkish participation to be located on an existing British base, presumably Dhekelia. Makarios apparently pointed out that this would be decision of GOG after enosis. According Markezinis, debate was dominated largely by Makarios and himself. At one point Makarios implied that because of his close relations with certain American sources (unidentified) he is in position know that Turks are bluffing and that the Americans, already preoccupied with Vietnam, would never permit Turks to resort to another military action which would produce crisis in this part of world. Markezinis feels that, despite apparent unanimity achieved as result Crown Council, Makarios and perhaps others have already begun undermine situation. Belief exists in some Greek military quarters that the Americans will, in last analysis, prevent any resort to force by Turks.
7. Feb 9 I had long meeting with former PriMin Stephanopoulos, also a Council participant. He expressed anxiety because Makarios had come out strongly against resumption dialogue. In effort convince Archbishop Greek political leaders had used argument resumed dialogue would serve only to elucidate certain obscure points in dialogue carried on by previous government. Makarios' view was that talks with Turks are futile since he is determined not to offer anything in exchange for enosis, or for guarantee of continued independence, and therefore continuing dialogue would only cause Turks to believe Greeks and Cypriots are worried and afraid, with result Turks would be even more demanding. In support his negative attitude on dialogue Makarios displayed to Council paper in English, which bore no signature but which he alleged he had received from an American source. This paper gave him assurance that if Turks decided launch an attack they would be stopped by us. Under these circumstances Makarios took position that situation should be allowed remain more or less as is. Turks are confined to small pockets and are subject severe economic hemorrhage, whereas rest of Cyprus is prospering economically. At this point Stephanopoulos said he remarked it may well be so with Cyprus, which is receiving considerable aid from Greece and UK, but it is not case with Greece. Turning to George Papandreou and Kanellopoulos, Stephanopoulos made point that they, who both hope govern Greece soon, [garble--must?] think not only of what helping Cyprus is now costing Greece but also of what sacrifices will be required in order fill in gaps in Greek economy. Stephanopoulos also reminded Council that General Tsolakas had said earlier to group that in case Turkish attack immediate defense requirements of country would amount to two hundred million dollars. Turning then to Makarios, Stephanopoulos remarked that in these circumstances should enosis be achieved a flourishing Cyprus would not receive much benefit from mother country, which would be in poverty. There can be no happiness in Cyprus if there is none in Greece.
8. On question Czech arms Makarios told Council he did not anticipate violent reaction on part Turks. As evidence he cited call on him by American Ambassador Nicosia three days before arrival of arms via Yugoslavia. He knew their types and numbers. According Stephanopoulos' account, Makarios quoted Ambassador Belcher to effect that if arms were not distributed at once and if provocations by Greek Cypriots were avoided, Turks would not react strongly. I expressed strong doubt that any American official could have made such a statement. On contrary, I said, USG efforts have consistently been directed to getting Czech arms under effective UN supervision. Stephanopoulos continued that at this point in their exchange he reminded Archbishop that his government had first learned of Czech arms from Turks, who in turn may have received information from Americans. In any event, former PriMin continued, so far as he concerned Turks had protested very strongly and whole incident had left GOG exposed in eyes international public opinion. Turks were no longer content to threaten merely to supply their compatriots with additional arms but had even asked that Czech arms be reexported from Cyprus. Archbishop responded vaguely that he had probably forgotten to inform GOG about these arms when he had been in Athens in November 1966.
9. In face Makarios' insistence that dialogue not be resumed, Stephanopoulos suggested to King during an interval in Council session (Paraskevopoulos was present) that it might be well to tell Makarios that if he did not agree with Greek political leaders on resumption dialogue it might become necessary alter instructions of Greek forces in Cyprus. King and Paraskevopoulos agreed to this tactic and it was decided PriMin would break news to Makarios. All three, however, first sought opinion of Kanellopoulos, who, on hearing proposal, threw up his hands and said, "Never, never, we can never say that to Makarios." Idea was at once abandoned. It was finally decided PriMin would issue statement to press that Crown Council had unanimously decided resume dialogue. Stephanopoulos commented that Makarios had very reluctantly gone along.
10. What had come out clearly in Council discussion, Stephanopoulos said, was that both Panpandreou and Kanellopoulos had committed themselves to accept no solution to Cyprus issue that was not acceptable to Makarios. This left Stephanopoulos deeply troubled. On this basis, what future could the dialogue have?
11. Stephanopoulos asked me if paper produced at Council by Makarios could be of American origin. I expressed strongest doubts. I added that I shared his anxiety, for situation as explosive as present one could easily get out of control. Dialogue had virtue that talking is better than doing nothing. I asked if idea of a NATO base had come up in Crown Council. Stephanopoulos said that whereas this idea had originally been proposed by Makarios, he is now clearly uninterested in this solution.
12. Stephanopoulos said he would be seeing King within 24 hours and asked if he might tell him what, in my opinion, USG would do in case Turkish attack. I replied that I doubt that at present anyone can answer that question. We would expect to weigh in with countries concerned in attempt to avert calamity to themselves and Alliance. Matter would also come up immediately in UNSC, which would obviously try to stop fighting. But it is difficult to determine if that could be accomplished in situation where a country has decided to resort to arms in defense its national interests. But it would be risky in extreme to pursue a policy based on assumption US or UN efforts would be successful. Experience has shown, I continued, how difficult it is for USG, UN or anybody else to stop two nations from bringing to a climax an issue which they have failed to solve at less heated levels. I cited India-Pakistan and Israel-Arab states as examples. As for Cyprus, should fighting ever break out a very grave factor which US and NATO would have to consider would be Soviet reactions. Would Soviet Union limit its responses to propaganda field or act in other ways as well? I hope I conveyed to Stephanopoulos the impression that we would always be interested and concerned but that Greece could never count on the Sixth Fleet's being at its beck and call if because of Makarios' intransigence it failed to negotiate seriously toward an understanding with Turkey.
Talbot
255. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 11, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Roger Channel. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 10:41 a.m. For additional information on U.S. views on the Greek political situation in early 1967, see Alexis Papakhelas, The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947-1967 [O Viasmos Tis Ellenikis Demokratias: O Amerikanos Paragon, 1947-1967], pp. 276-281.
3805. After intensive review of all considerations that we can evaluate here, I have concurred in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] recommendation that authority be sought for limited covert political action in connection with forthcoming Greek elections.
In contrast to earlier programs which focused on EDA, purpose would be to restrict dimensions of power base being built by Andreas Papandreou, by encouraging support for certain competitive elements [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Details of action program will be presented to Department [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
I have come to this recommendation reluctantly. Basically, it is for Greeks who believe their country benefits from close ties with West including United States to generate enough political energy to oppose effectively those who would lead Greece down more dangerous trails. It would be unhealthy for even our best friends here to depend overly long on American crutch. However, at this moment following considerations are to my mind compelling:
1. Though forthcoming Greek elections will ostensibly be struggle among pro-Western indigenous nationalist parties, important successes by Andreas could set off policy shifts away from traditional firm alliance with West.
To my knowledge younger Papandreou is not under Communist Party discipline. He has adopted and is vigorously promoting many EDA policies, however. Significance is that he gives respectable centrist cover to advancement of Communist policies. Moreover, his public commitment to these policies has become so complete that EDA and his personal supporters from left will have effective grip on him should he attain high office after elections. American interests in Greece would be vulnerable to substantial erosion in such an atmosphere.
2. These elections come at crucial moment in Andreas' career. They constitute his first major bid for power, at moment when age and weakness of his father open way for succession. If Andreas is set back at this juncture, others with different orientation may improve their chances to take leadership of Center Union. Also, assuming May elections may be inconclusive and followed soon by second elections which (as in 1963/64) would strengthen and confirm political trends identified in May, setbacks in these elections could seriously undermine Andreas' base for takeover effort in second elections. Conversely, successes in May would strengthen Andreas' claim to succeed his father, his position within the party, and prospects of dominating government after second elections.
3. Upsurge of Andreas' strength is deepening dichotomy in Greek public life to degree his incipient success might set off rightist counterrevolutionary attempts with prospectively adverse consequences for Greece and for the Alliance. What we don't need in NATO now is a Greek military dictatorship.
4. Greek political interests opposing Andreas are unquestionably now in a majority but are also in disarray. They seem incapable or at least unprepared for job that should be theirs of cutting Andreas down to size.
5. At this moment Communist-directed EDA faces decision whether to seek strengthened Parliamentary position by fielding a full slate or to throw support of its center-left elements to Andreas. From our viewpoint, former course would be preferable even if it brought EDA more Parliamentary seats. Center Union and other parties would then find it essential to oppose Communist-line minority. Should Andreas gain strong position with EDA assistance, however, not only would Communist Party leverage on Andreas be strengthened but Center Union would become more ambivalent between EDA and national parties.
6. My recommendation presupposes that United States has interest in maintenance in power of a Greek Government, of whatever party, that is committed to continued close and broad relations with United States, and that Andreas is the most immediate and prospectively potent factor opposing this relationship. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] U.S. policy needs also to demonstrate sympathetic American support for Greek progress and stability. This has become more difficult at stage when economic assistance has been phased out, military assistance is being phased down more rapidly than either government had foreseen, and unresolved Greek-Turkish differences put strains on Greek-American as well as on Turkish-American relations. Best long-term answer will be found in maintaining variety of active if inexpensive cooperative and contact programs during this transitional period when, rightly or wrongly, Greeks still have not got over sense of dependence on United States developed during past two decades and look to U.S. to push them into doing what they know they should. Suggestions for overt programs being forwarded separately./2/
/2/Not found.
Talbot
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 13, 1967, 1550Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
3819. NATUS Info. From Ambassadors Belcher, Hart and Talbot.
1. In meeting on USS America February 12 and 13 we have focussed on implications for US policy for Greek-Turkish dialogue and of contingent confrontations over Czech arms and Turkish troop rotation.
2. On dialogue, we all believe Greeks and Turks should be pressed to resume talks urgently and to stretch hard for prompt agreement. Present juncture, while full of difficulties, also offers opportunities unlikely soon to recur. It is significant that Greek Crown Council has committed Greek political leaders, at least temporarily, to acceptance of Toumbas-Caglayangil protocol worked out in Paris in December and also to continuation of dialogue, and that Makarios for moment also committed to this course, however reluctantly. Stresses of Greek politics including Makarios machinations could soon unravel current unified position, resulting possibly in new opposition to dialogue in Greece and in Cyprus and in enhanced prospects of trouble over Czech arms, rotation of troops or other areas. In short, failure to achieve settlement in very near future could make life more difficult for all concerned.
3. On parameters of possible settlement, Greek leaks to Embassy Athens suggest that protocol may include considerations of possible arrangements for protection of Turk Cypriots from mistreatment by majority community. Comments Toumbas has made imply he and Caglayangil may also have laid base for some status of island which would bring it under Greek sovereignty though with certain semi-autonomous fiscal, economic, administrative and political institutions. At any rate, we believe resolution of differences over status of Turk Cypriots and over some sort of commonwealth scheme should be manageable.
4. If our sketchy information valid, Paris protocol seems also to point way toward "NATO base" as means of giving Turkey some locus standi on island to compensate for island's basic attachment to Greece. If Turkey willing to accept concept of a NATO base--whatever that is--in present British sovereign base area of Dhekelia, we believe modalities should be negotiable. They could include continued British sovereignty, transfer of present Greek and Turkish contingents into base area and possible addition of other NATO facilities or national units. In this solution, presumably rest of Cyprus would be demilitarized along lines of Dodecanese.
5. Whether Turkey would be prepared to move quickly toward settlement within these parameters is unclear to us. If so, we estimate present Greek Government with support of Palace and acquiescence of major political leaders could negotiate effectively, subject to ratification of any agreement by Crown Council and then by Parliament. If Turkey should stand on insistence that Turkish sovereign base should be established on Cyprus, then we estimate that present Greek Government would have neither authority nor support in Greece or in Cyprus to proceed with negotiations. Effective Greek-Turkish contact would then presumably be broken off at least until after next Greek elections. Since Greek political climate at that time could be less conducive to solutions based on NATO interests (see recent Andreas Papandreou speeches), we would anticipate that arena of action could shift to more direct Turkey-Cyprus confrontations. Indeed, even with progress in dialogue and almost certainly in absence of progress, coming weeks may bring serious Turkey-Cyrpus difficulties.
6. Following difficulties, now with us, are assessed as follows:
A. Czech arms: Turkey will continue to press SYG and others for UN custody but will probably settle for SYG understanding if GOC position as expressed by Rossides is made reasonably tight. However, in event distribution significant number light arms GOT would be forced to take some action to answer domestic Turk criticism that it is accepting another Makarios fait accompli. It would probably call for session of UNSC to establish that distribution contravenes 4 March 1964 SC resolution. Presumably would get some support. Minor arms infiltration might later be undertaken by Turks. This might not amount to much as it would be operationally difficult but could help to bolster GOT's internal position vis-a-vis TGS and Parliament. Only as later or last resort would GOT attempt arms drop since, as Caglayangil has said, this would mean war on island. (Rationale: GOT aware that issuance of small arms is not sufficient to justify act of war against GOC in eyes world opinion. Having devoted much diplomatic effort over past year to winning friends, GOT is therefore likely, if GOC does not push distribution soon or rapidly, to use all diplomatic and UN channels to find redress. If these fail GOT will have to take some action for domestic reasons. A graduated series of military steps intended to galvanize favorable action in UN seems most likely. We can only speculate what these steps might be.)
B. Rotation: This is potentially most serious problem in immediate future. GOT has made clear it is not accepting GOC conditions set forth aide-mémoire./2/ Furthermore in letter to Turk contingent commander, Chief of Staff has told him if rotation opposed Turkey "will use force."
/2/Transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-137 from Nicosia, February 6. (Ibid.)
If no agreement reached through UNFICYP good offices by March 31 we have assumed unarmed troops on Turk transport would not immediately attempt disembark at Famagusta but rather link up with force which usually alerted by GOT in Mersin/Iskenderun area in conjunction periodic rotations. GOT would probably then make immediate appeal to UNSC to arrange for rotation as provided by treaty and if this not accomplished, would "shoot her way in."
7. Decision to inject Turkish military into either Czech arms or rotation issue would probably mean some sort of graduated action--demonstration flights, selected target bombings, followed if ultimately necessary by air drop of men and supplies and "full scale" invasion. Air drop would require full scale follow-up since we convinced GOC and Grivas would order attack.
8. We note that troop rotation scheduled for day before EOKA day observance and four days before Sunay due in Washington. We assume therefore that failure of parties to reach accommodation would create high tensions and that Turkish reaction might be delayed briefly so Sunay could put problem personally to USG.
9. In order defuse rotation issue believe we should push UN and SYG to find acceptable compromise but should not ourselves as yet get into act directly with either party. However, at some point fairly soon seems advisable approach Makarios making clear to him his views on US intervention as expressed Crown Council utterly wrong (and contrary to what Embassy Nicosia has been saying all along). Belcher would point out that US [garble] would be warned in time to try prevent start of hostilities even though we would as in past make every effort through diplomatic channels.
10. In view above, Ambassadors Hart and Talbot propose subject to Department's approval to seek opportunities in next few days to explore with leading members of host governments prospects of rapidly resuming dialogue. We would informally encourage them to proceed urgently. Without interjecting ourselves into substance of dialogue, we also propose to touch lightly on such topics as possible commonwealth idea. Ambassador Belcher will talk with Makarios and selected Cabinet Ministers re Czech arms and rotation in context of US policy on intervention and at same time will attempt impress upon them fact that present is new opportunity to make progress toward solution.
Talbot
257. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, February 16, 1967, 1430Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and Paris.
3874. Cyprus. NATUS Info. A good deal of familiar ground was covered in seven hour discussion of Cyprus today with Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos.
He also opened up some new terrain, however, particularly on resumption of dialogue and on base question.
When Prime Minister said he ready resume dialogue immediately and couldn't understand why Turks delaying, I replied we believe major misunderstanding must have developed between Greeks and Turks.
It is our impression Turks consider they have not received GOG assurances of willingness to resume dialogue at point where interrupted by fall of Stephanopoulos government. Paraskevopoulos replied flatly that he had told GOT and had announced to Greek Parliament his willingness to do just that. I asked if this meant GOG prepared to talk on basis of full faith and credence in Toumbas-Caglayangil discussions. He replied that since no agreement had been reached it was a question of continuing from point at which it had broken off and that GOG is ready and eager to pick up dialogue even today from point at which it was interrupted in December. He reminded me that Toumbas and Caglayangil had agreed to meet again soon. That is exactly what his government wishes to do.
Paraskevopoulos showed some reluctance to resume dialogue with Turkish Ambassador Athens/2/ (or, presumably, Greek Ambassador Ankara). He suggested Bonn as site where Greek and Turkish Ambassadors are both able men and enjoy good relations. He would be ready to instruct his Ambassador to Bonn immediately, he said, if this agreeable to Turks.
/2/In telegram 3869, February 17, Talbot reported on Tuluy's perplexity about Greek intentions. Talbot stated that he had assured Tuluy that, based on talks with Paraskevopoulos, Greece wanted to continue the dialogue. (Ibid.)
After suggesting that GOG would want to clear up apparent misunderstanding with GOT I asked if it would be helpful for me to inform my colleague in Ankara of Paraskevopoulos government's position on resuming dialogue so that if appropriate Ambassador Hart might advise GOT of our understanding of Greek position. PriMin immediately agreed, and asked our help in getting Turks to respond quickly.
These comments were made in context of exchange between us on value and importance of reactivating dialogue promptly. Paraskevopoulos asserted that his government is well positioned for serious discussions with Turks since Crown Council has given it all-party mandate to proceed.
On substance of dialogue, Paraskevopoulos said that at point Toumbas dropped out Turkey had proposed to Greece that a Turkish military base be established on Cyprus as quid pro quo for enosis. (I did not understand clearly, nor perhaps does Paraskevopoulos, whether Turks had actually agreed that a base would compensate them for straight enosis, or for something less jarring to their ears, such as Greek-Cyprus federation or commonwealth, or whether enosis bridge had not been crossed.) Turks had not indicated extent or nature of base, but were awaiting Greek reply on acceptability of concept. Obviously, Prime Minister said, reply could only be given when dialogue reactivated.
After lengthy review of dangers embedded in Cyprus issue, Para-skevopoulos then made pitch United States support of NATO base idea. He argued that a Turkish military base could guarantee only permanency of tensions that have already so gravely damaged life on island. In contrast, NATO base with Turkish presence along with Greek, British, American and possibly other national components would give all possible protection to security of southern Turkey. It would also help normalize living conditions in rest of island. Prime Minister expressed hope that logic of NATO base would commend itself to Turks. He also expressed certainty that with settlement of base issue other problems such as guarantees for minority community on island could be solved. If base question left unresolved, he said, explosive potentials on island could damage not only Greek and Turk interests but those of Western Alliance since Soviets obviously eager to turn Cyprus into Mediterranean Cuba.
I responded that we have indeed [been] long aware of explosive possibilities both on island and between Greece and Turkey. As Prime Minister knows, United States is not supporting any particular plan for solution of Cyprus issue. We believe parties must reach solution by agreement, and I could say confidently that U.S. would support any agreed solution. We have supported dialogue so strongly, I said, because only hope lies in their direct and common search for accommodation with which each can live. Moreover, as demonstrated more than once during Toumbas period, commitment to dialogue of high officials in Athens and Ankara enables them to communicate directly when dangers emerge on such related subjects as might arise this spring over Czech arms, fortification programs, or the next Turkish rotation. Commenting that some people seem to believe Eastern Mediterranean could live without solving this problem because at last moment United States would somehow prevent explosions, I said that situation obviously not that simplistic. Indeed, I was under instructions to remind Prime Minister that United States had made no undertaking to intervene and that it would be quite dangerous to make any assumption regarding future U.S. position in this regard. He said he understood.
Describing Crown Council meeting to me, Prime Minister said Greek political leaders had started out in considerable disagreement. After eight hours of hard discussion, they had come to virtually full agreement. Makarios strongly opposed political leaders' views, but came around after two more hours so Prime Minister could accurately announce unanimity of views. He took obvious pride in noting that unanimity had been achieved this time even though it has been quite rare not only in course of Cyprus issue but in Greek political history generally. I commented that this another reason to proceed with all speed toward agreement with Turkey, lest unusual unanimity of support for his course be eroded with passage of time. He heartily concurred, and again asked that we help to get the Turks agreement to immediate resumption of dialogue.
Comment:
I believe Ambassador Hart could appropriately mention to GOT that in view apparent confusion we had checked with Greek PriMin, who had confirmed GOG readiness to resume dialogue at point it broke off./3/
/3/In telegram 3977 from Ankara, February 18, Hart reported that he had passed on Talbot's report to the Turkish Government. (Ibid.)
With each high-level conversation here I am becoming more convinced that Greece is preparing to call upon U.S. to persuade Turkey to accept formula consisting basically of a NATO base in Dhekelia and protection of minorities according to best international practices as compensation for substance of enosis. In any case, I avoided probing further on content of understanding between Greece and Turkey in order not to encourage request for further U.S. involvement at this stage./4/
/4/In telegram 3893 from Athens, February 17, Talbot further reported that the Prime Minister also stated that Makarios had confirmed that he would not distribute the Czech arms and added that armored cars were among the Czech weapons. (Ibid.)
Talbot
258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, March 3, 1967, 8:27 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Noforn; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Smith; cleared by NEA, EUR/RPM, OSD, JCS, and L; and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris, USCINCEUR, and Naples for USDOCOSouth and repeated to Rome and USUN.
148939. NATUS. Joint State/Defense cable. Subject: Considerations of NATO Presence on Cyprus. Ref: State 97095./2/
/2/Telegram 97095, December 6, requested the views of concerned posts regarding the possibility of creating a NATO base area on Cyprus with a Turkish contingent attached to it. (Ibid., DEF 15 CYP)
1. Prior to suspension in December Greek-Turkish dialogue on Cyprus included consideration of base on Cyprus as compensation to Turkey for enosis. Reftel explored possibility of a "NATO base" on Cyprus in very general terms as part of a Cyprus solution. Responses at that time indicated that:
a. While a NATO peacekeeping force on Cyprus was not considered advisable, a NATO presence such as a headquarters, command, airfield, port or support base (possibly for AMF) might provide a Turkish and/or multinational military presence on the Island that could satisfy the Turks in the interests of reaching a solution to the problem.
b. The major problems to overcome are the possible opposition of Makarios, the Turkish stand against enosis and the requirement for guarantee of the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
c. The Turks (according to Ambassador Hart) might be willing to accept enosis provided the right formula could be found. This formula must include Turkish troops on the Island under a Turkish-dominated joint or NATO base at Dhekelia and guarantee of Turkish Cypriot rights by the UN.
d. Other NATO nations might go along with such an idea if it becomes a critical factor in a solution. Subsequently, the situation has been altered: (1) Recently the Greek Crown Council (including Makarios) agreed to accept NATO base concept after enosis, and (2) the problems of troop rotations, fortifications, and Czech arms have increased tensions. In order to provide some ideas for further consideration, a closer look at the possibility of utilizing NATO in a Cyprus solution appears necessary, even though we have no assurance this will satisfy the Turks who were "offered more" during 1964 Acheson effort.
2. General concepts in para 3 below might be developed in an attempt to accommodate Turkish-Greek requirements. Their consideration along with response to questions in para 4 is requested. These ideas are entirely exploratory, are aimed at providing plausible NATO role for continued presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus, and represent an expansion of the ideas contained reftel. The US would not initiate or advocate them but would propose them discreetly to the Greeks and/or Turks for their use or sponsorship if NATO base idea proves feasible. They do not represent a US position. These concepts presuppose enosis, adequate guarantees of the rights of Turkish Cypriots, demilitarization of the Island less the SBA bases and the retention of a UN presence on Cyprus as observers. Additionally, all parties involved must accept and have valid assurance of fulfillment of all conditions in advance of execution.
3. The following are listed as possible concepts for utilizing NATO forces on Cyprus at the Dhekelia Base:
a. A Greek-Turkish joint command with the possible addition of UK forces as an extension of LANDSOUTHEAST with a mission of planning and training ground forces. The forces assigned would be from those now on Cyprus.
b. A headquarters and/or exercise base for units of the AMF or other NATO force. The same Greek, Turkish and UK forces as in 3a, above, would be based at Dhekelia as a permanent nucleus force with the addition of limited numbers or representatives of nations providing forces to the AMF as a part of the staff.
4. The questions listed are issues that should be considered and answered in connection with the above concepts:
a. What is the probable reaction of host nations to these ideas at this time?
b. Should sovereignty of Dhekelia be retained by UK?
c. Who should the commander and vice commander of such a force be and should these positions be rotated among the nations involved?
d. Should there be an honorary base commanding officer (Turkish) in addition to the force commander to enlarge the number of prestige positions?
e. Should the size of the Greek, Turkish and UK forces be limited in size to possibly a battalion each?
f. Should the Greeks and Turks contribute to the cost of such a concept particularly in view each spends over $10 million annually on Cyprus?
g. Should other NATO nations contribute towards financing, and to what degree?
h. Would participation by the Turks, by having a military force on Cyprus and a degree of command, satisfy their requirements?
6. Your comments on these ideas and questions are requested by March 10. This material should be closely held. NATO base concept should not be discussed with SYG Brosio at this time. However we realize necessity discuss base concept with Brosio at appropriate stage./3/
/3/In telegram 4344 from Ankara, March 10, the Embassy commented that Turkey remained very guarded about its positions, and no Turkish official had ever suggested a willingness to accept enosis in exchange for participation in a NATO base on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Rusk
259. Minutes of Meeting of the 303 Committee/1/
Washington, March 8, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Greek Coup, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
4. Covert Political Action re May 1967 Greek National Elections.
a. Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Kohler indicated they had definite reservations but were anxious to hear the arguments. Mr. Vance had earlier registered reservations.
b. [1 line of source text not declassified] the major arguments for a U.S. role in the elections were contained in Ambassador Talbot's cable (Athens 3805) dated 11 February 1967./2/
/2/Document 255.
c. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] whereas the U.S. participation could not guarantee the winner it certainly would have an impact. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Andreas Papandreou had been observed for a sufficient period to realistically place him in a camp definitely hostile to U.S. interests. Andreas Papandreou was driving very hard while other candidates were, at best, lethargic.
d. Mr. Rostow wondered if we weren't approaching this type of 1967 election on a momentum started in the fifties. We had assets, techniques and money, and we could perform almost by rote. Was the threat that great? Ambassador Kohler felt that the papers had not made the election issues entirely clear. Was it not possible that we were attributing more potential to Andreas than he deserved?
e. At this point, Mr. Rostow was called to a meeting with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and it was agreed to resume discussion of the proposal on Monday, 13 March 1967, at 1600./3/
/3/See Document 261.
260. Intelligence Information Cable/1/
[document number not declassified]
Athens, March 9, 1967.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/No Dissem Abroad.
COUNTRY
Greece
DOI
15 February through 8 March 1967
SUBJECT
Increased Activity of Group Advocating Dictatorship
ACQ
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (8 March 1967) Field [document number not declassified]
SOURCE
[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] source has provided generally reliable information on Greek military affairs for several years. He obtained this information from Spandidakis and Mitsakos.
1. Summary: On 6 March 1967, Chief of the Greek Army General Staff (GAGS) Lieutenant General Grigorios Spandidakis stated that within the past ten days various key officers have been on unofficial alert status, the first step in implementing "Ierax (Hawk) Number Two." Spandidakis also said that since 15 February, 30 to 35 trusted middle-grade officers have been transferred to the Athens Military Command. Major General (Retired) Petros Mitsakos stated that Air Vice-Marshal Georgios Antonakos has ordered Chief of Air Force Security Lieutenant Colonel Ilias Tsasakos to keep in daily contact with key Air Force officers, all of whom have been briefed on the general objectives of "Ierax Number Two" and their specific duties in connection with it.
2. Spandidakis stated on 6 March 1967 that within the past ten days various key officers have been on unofficial alert status, the first step in implementing "Ierax (Hawk) Number Two". (Field comment: According to Spandidakis, "Ierax Number Two" is a plan for the military take-over of Greece contingent upon the occurrence of another political crisis. In the event such a crisis occurs, the plan outlines the role of key military units which would be involved in the take-over. See [doucment number not declassified] (TDCSDB-315/03301-66)/2/ for additional details on this contingency plan). This unofficial alert status involves maintaining daily contact with Spandidakis and a "fairly high state of readiness for action in the units involved." Spandidakis stated that the above is due to Palace uneasiness over the present situation. Key officers on unofficial alert status are GAGS G-2 Brigadier General Pavourgias Pangorgias, Commander of the 9th Division, Major General Sotirios Liarkkos, Commander of the 8th Division, Brigadier General Stamatios Syliros, and GAGS G-3 Chief Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. Lesser officers involved are director of Spandidakis' office Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Lazaris, and Chief G-2 Athens Military Command Captain Konstantinos Kotinis.
/2/Not found.
3. Spandidakis also stated that since 15 February, 30 to 35 trusted middle-grade officers have been transferred to the Athens Military Command. Kotinis was in this category.
4. Mitsakos stated on 7 March that Antonakos, acting under the orders of King Constantine's personal secretary, Major Mihail Arnaoutis [document number not declassified] (TDCSDB-315/03301-66) ordered Tsasakos to keep in daily contact with key Air Force security officers, all of whom have been briefed on the general objectives of "Ierax Number Two" and their specific duties in connection with it. (Source comment: The above action amounts to a low-key alert.)
5. Field dissem State Army Navy Air EUCOM CINCSOUTH (personal) CINCUSNAVEUR CINCMEAFSA USAREUR USAFE (also sent Paris, London, Rome).
261. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 13, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Greek Coup, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jessup on March 16. Copies were sent to Kohler, Vance, and Helms.
SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 13 March 1967
PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Kohler, and Admiral Taylor
Mr. Vance was absent in hospital
[1 line of source text not declassified]
Covert Political Action re May 1967 Greek National Elections.
a. The meeting interrupted on 8 March 1967 (see minutes dated 10 March 1967)/2/ continued with the members asking [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a series of detailed questions regarding the Greek elections. Mr. Vance, still unable to attend, advised by telephone that he was opposed to the proposal unless there was an overwhelming conviction on the part of the other principals that the United States must participate.
/2/Document 259.
b. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the strong appeal of Andreas Papandreou to discontented youth. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] there was a heavy trend toward urbanization of the youth drifting away from rural areas.
c. When Mr. Rostow suggested that there were other examples of leftists settling down after an election, he mentioned Betancourt in Latin America.
d. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] one of the principal factors making Andreas Papandreou a distinct threat was his percolating animosity to the United States which was unlikely to change. [1 line of source text not declassified] if it looked likely that Andreas was moving closer to victory, the monarchy and the military could well suspend the constitution and take over. The military was estimated as being loyal to the king.
e. Ambassador Kohler stated that there were divided counsels in State and that he should talk to the Secretary.
f. Mr. Rostow summed up both sides of the case: the well stated recommendation of the country team versus the risks of disclosure at a ticklish time and the consequences of not participating at this time.
g. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
h. The principals decided that Ambassador Kohler would take the matter up with Secretary Rusk, and if the latter felt the proposal was vital, Mr. Rostow would discuss the matter with higher authority.
i. On 14 March, Ambassador Kohler reported by memorandum that he had discussed the project with the Secretary and that "He comes down negative. In the Greek case, he believes the possible political gain is outweighed by the security risks. He commented that if the dual-national Greek-Americans are concerned about the prospects and if $200-$300,000 will make the difference, they should have no trouble raising that sum themselves without involving the United States Government."
Peter Jessup
262. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Athens, March 17, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 12-6 GREECE. Confidential. Drafted by Day and approved by Bracken. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-491 from Athens, March 22.
PARTICIPANTS
George Papandreou, Leader of EK Party
The Honorable Phillips Talbot, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
H. Daniel Brewster, Country Director, Greece, State Department
John G. Day, Political Officer, Embassy
We called on EK leader George Papandreou today at his Kastri home and found him mentally alert and in seemingly good health.
Papandreou began by apologizing for his son's, Andreas, recent speech before the Foreign Press Association (A-463 of March 7)./2/ Unfortunately, he said, "Andreas tries to be a Kennedy and a Fulbright" in the wrong setting. Papandreou called our attention to his brief statement after Andreas' speech in which he repeated that the foreign policy of the EK remains unchanged. He added that, specfically, he does not share Andreas' view concerning American interference in the internal affairs of Greece. In the past, particularly during the period of the late Ambassador Peurifoy, there was open intervention by the U.S., but in recent times, especially since the arrival of Ambassador Talbot, there has been no such interference. (Ambassador Labouisse once mentioned to him that CIA in Greece was not completely under his control). The EK leader added that he intended, during a UPI press interview this Sunday, to deny the existence of any U.S. intervention in the recent past. [Q: "Were there interventions by U.S. in the internal policy of Greece? A: Unfortunately there was--in the past. And in such an unprovoked way that they caused the disappointment of our People. During the last period however, as far as I know at least, the United States Embassy made no intervention. And it never encouraged deviation".]/3/ (This quotation appeared in the UPI interview published March 19.)
/2/Brackets in the source text.
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 6 GREECE)
Turning to the current political situation, Papandreou candidly admitted that he knew beforehand of the plan to topple the Stephanopoulos Government and to form the present transitional government. In fact, Paraskevopoulos as Prime Minister was his choice. Papandreou also admitted that he had promised the King not only to support Paraskevopoulos but also to back the simple proportional electoral system. Even though this system is contrary to the interests of the EK and is opposed by many EK deputies, he agreed to vote for it to promote the return of political "normality".
He predicted that all EK deputies will vote for it out of respect for him as leader of the party. He also commented that ERE leader Kanellopoulos had acted as a real statesman during the past several months.
Papandreou expressed grave concern over the current activities of the "junta". In response to the Ambassador's question, he named Garoufalias, Pipinellis, and (retired) General Dovas as members of the junta. It also includes other retired generals and deputies who fear elections. The "president" of the junta, Papandreou added, is probably Queen Frederika.
The EK leader expressed fear that the junta might try to upset the plan for elections and to create the conditions for a dictatorship by arresting Andreas for the Aspida affair just as soon as Parliament is dissolved and he no longer is protected by his immunity as a deputy. If he were arrested, Papandreou continued, there would be no elections. There would surely be demonstrations and protests, and Andreas would become "a hero and a martyr". In fact, the elder Papandreou added, Andreas would like nothing better than to be arrested.
The best way to avoid this danger and to ensure the holding of elections would be the granting of an amnesty for the Aspida affair. This is exactly what he told Bitsios, the King's political advisor, during a conversation at Kastri yesterday. He also said to Bitsios that the EK could not publicly ask for an amnesty because "we are the accused"; the King, however, should take the "initiative" in granting it. Papandreou admitted to Bitsios that some EK politicians and deputies would point to an amnesty by the King as proof that the Palace was guilty on July 15, 1965, and that Aspida was merely a conspiracy against the EK. Though he could not prevent the press from expressing its views, Papandreou stated that he would publicly say that the granting of an amnesty was an act to promote political normality and that he would use his influence to try to persuade the EK papers to follow the same line.
Papandreou also warned Bitsios that a dictatorship would be a disaster not only for Greece but also for the monarchy. King Constantine would soon find that he was no longer master of the situation and that, on the contrary, he was a captive of the dictator, just as the King became a captive of John Metaxas in the 1930's.
According to Papandreou, the King should take a long-range view of developments and should be less concerned over the words of Andreas. He should realize that "it is deeds, not words that count". Papandreou asserted that, despite Andreas' line, he, George Papandreou, is the leader of the party. Evidence of this was the vote for the Paraskevopoulos Government when Andreas disagreed, but eventually accepted the decision of his father to support the new government. In a revealing remark, the elder Papandreou told us that he would have expelled Andreas from the party for his general behavior if Andreas were not his son.
Returning to the King, Papandreou argued that the young monarch should not be worried about the elections because he was given assurances that there would be no "popular front" between EDA and the EK and that he would not raise a regime question. (Papandreou commented that he strongly believes that the institution of the monarchy is necessary in Greece.) Even if Andreas should break away from the EK and take 30, 40, or even 50 deputies with him and cooperate with 20 or 30 EDA deputies, he would still only have less than a third of Parliament and he would not be able to change Greece's foreign policy. Therefore, according to the EK leader, the King should not be so worried over Andreas' attacks.
Finally, referring once more to the junta, Papandreou expressed the hope that the Ambassador would use his influence in favor of an amnesty for Aspida. Papandreou obviously had in mind the Ambassador's speaking to the King.
(Athen's 4249/4/ reported Papandreou's comments on Cyprus.)
/4/Dated March 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, March 21, 1967, 4:51 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Wood and McCaskill, cleared by NEA and UNP, and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Ankara and Nicosia and repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.
159364. NATUS Info. Ref: (A) Ankara's 4448; (b) Athens' 4249, para 4; (C) EKN 1398; (D) Nicosia's 1338./2/
/2/Telegram 4448 from Ankara, March 15, reported Turkish confirmation that the dialogue with Greece would resume. (Ibid.) Telegram 4249 from Athens, March 18, reported George Papandreou's views on Cyprus. (Ibid.) EKN 1398 has not been found. Telegram 1338 from Nicosia reported Makarios' readiness to reduce military pressure on the Turkish Cypriots. (Ibid.)
1. Now that dialogue may be resumed (ref A), GOG and GOT have moved one more step and achieved useful precedent: GOT willing continue dialogue with a new GOG. It is no longer limited to relations of two men, Toumbas and Caglayangil.
2. Next problem would appear to be an agenda. Dept concerned that after rehashing NATO base concept, GOT may be tempted pull out on grounds there nothing further discuss. In view imminence Greek elections a Cyprus solution now seems unlikely. Alternatively GOG and GOT might be discreetly encouraged again open question reducing size Greek and, later, Turk military forces on Island:
a. In view Grivas' intransigent behavior and such incidents as Bozkurt removal and Kophinou/3/ Dept no longer persuaded Greek or Turk forces are a stabilizing influence.
/3/Reference is to armed clashes between Makarios' forces and Turkish Cypriot military formations.
b. Stabilizing force should be UNFICYP.
c. Since solution not now in sight we face problem that supporting and contributing nations likely during coming months take further actions reduce UNFICYP. It would only be possible reduce UNFICYP and maintain its viability if size Greek and Turkish forces on Island reduced.
d. Reduction forces, no matter how gradual, would give all concerned some sense of progress which has been lacking in Cyprus.
e. Would save GOG and GOT money neither can afford.
f. Would facilitate UN rep. Tafall's efforts on Cyprus to achieve greater freedom of movement for population. (See below)/4/
/4/After Bernardes' departure from Cyprus on January 5, Pier P. Spinelli acted as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus until February 20, when Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall took up the function. Secretary-General Thant announced Osorio-Tafall's appointment on January 26.
g. Atmosphere may be ripe. George Papandreou has raised subject (ref B) in Athens and position Turk military elements appears to have been weakened as result Kuneralp's findings during his visit (ref C). If Papandreou comes into power after elections, his Government could continue dialogue on this subject.
3. On basis above Dept requests views Ambassadors Talbot and Hart on possibility they suggest as appropriate occasions may arise that GOG and GOT may wish consider how agreement on gradual troop reduction might be worked out. Realize such negotiations likely be long and difficult, but they would keep dialogue alive and would be in good cause.
4. Meanwhile request Ambassador Belcher continue lend his support as appropriate to Tafall's efforts secure greater freedom circulation by reducing check points and fortifications. We are encouraged by Archbishop's current views (ref D). We believe this is local and complex issue better handled on spot by UN and GOG who understand issues than it would be by GOG and GOT, although they certainly could lend useful, general support.
5. Negotiations on Cyprus to this end would:
a. Reduce tensions on Island which have increased in past decade.
b. Complement any progress that GOG and GOT might make on troop removal.
c. Constitute step toward eventual talks between Greek and Turk Cypriots under UN auspices.
d. Eventually hamper Grivas' braggadocio.
6. In general since time again out of joint for Cyprus solution would seem wise if GOG and GOT could discuss troop reduction, and issue for which they have primary responsibility, while UNFICYP, GOC and eventually Turkish community deal with local issue of freedom of movement which would not detract from importance dialogue and might complement it.
7. Addressees' views welcome./5/
/5/In telegram 1388 from Nicosia, March 27, the Embassy suggested that troop reductions include both Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces as well as Greek and Turkish troops and that Grivas' removal would facilitate a reduction of tensions. (Ibid.) In telegram 4565 from Ankara, March 23, the Embassy reported that Turkey might react favorably to proposed troop reduction talks. (Ibid.) In telegram 4340 from Athens, March 24, Talbot analyzed the difficulties Greece would face in a troop reduction negotiation and its likely reluctance to enter into talks. (Ibid.)
Katzenbach
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, March 24, 1967, 1315Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Paris, Thessaloniki, USDOCOSouth for Freshman, and USCINCEUR for POLAD.
4335. NATUS.
1. During past few days there has been flurry of rumors in press and elsewhere regarding fall of Paraskevopoulos government and postponement of elections. These stories have now been partly discredited, however, by (A) statements of both George Papandreou and Kanellopoulos reaffirming their support of Paraskevopoulos and reexpressing their belief in need for return of political normality through elections in May; (B) Parliament's approval in principle of simple proportional electoral bill; and (C) statement by government day before yesterday saying it "is certain of its stability which is guaranteed by confidence of two large parties supporting it". Most leading personalities now seem either to want early elections or to be reluctantly reconciled to seeing them held.
2. There is still, however, an active rightist group which is reportedly seeking to upset Paraskevopoulos and to postpone elections through formation of government, even if this government could not obtain vote of confidence in Parliament. Reports vary, but persons usually mentioned as favoring this extreme course are: former ERE PriMin Pipinellis, Electheros Kosmos publisher Kostantopoulos, former DefMin Garoufalias, former Public Security Minister Apostolakos, former ERE Deputy Farmakis and Queen Mother Frederika who, according to George Papandreou, is leader of "junta". There have been conflicting reports whether Major Arnaoutis, King's private secretary, is also an adherent of this group. CAS has also reported that Lt. General Spandidakis, Chief of Greek Army General Staff, has recently acted to prepare for implementation of Ierax (Hawk) 2, an alleged plan for military control of Greece contingent upon occurrence of another political crisis.
3. In our view, a plan probably does exist for certain actions by military in event of a dictatorship, but there is no evidence that army leadership is actually plotting to create conditions leading to deviation from Constitution. On contrary, we hold to opinion that military would not seek independently to impose a dictatorship: but it would support a dictatorship if King decided in favor of such a regime. (Also see USDOA message 0345 March 67.)/2/
/2/Not found.
4. Though it is not clear how well integrated civilian side of "junta" is or how determined it is to upset path to elections, its members all seem to be united, however, by fear that elections in May, particularly under Paraskevopoulos government, would result in EK's obtaining at least plurality of votes and in Andreas Papandreou's being the dominant voice in new government. There are several ways by which they could try to topple present government and create situation leading to postponement of elections. One, they could create some incident, e.g. arrest of Andreas Papandreou following dissolution of Parliament, that might produce all kinds of pyrotechnics providing pretext for postponing elections. Similar result might be achieved if government acted flagrantly in favor of ERE during electoral campaign, e.g. actions by gendarmerie and TEA (Home Guard) forces. Another possibility would be to try to persuade Paraskevopoulos himself to resign on pretext his government was under irreconcilable ERE and EK pressures on how it should behave during campaign.
5. In certain quarters, Progressive Party leader Markezinis has been mentioned as likely choice for mandate if government fell. Theory would be for Markezinis to appear in Parliament for vote of confidence for specified period, perhaps six months, to conclude Aspida affair, seek settlement of Cyprus problem, make certain reforms in economic field, etc. Supporters of Markezinis believe he could obtain vote of confidence, even though he does not enjoy wide popularity, because Deputies would realize choice was either Markezinis or dictatorial regime. Markezinis might be able to gain support of EK or part of it for a short postponement of elections, if he could assure George Papandreou that an amnesty of Aspida affair would be forthcoming.
6. Key and still uncertain element in current picture, however, is attitude of King. We know that King was initially pleased by smooth transition from Stephanopoulos to Paraskevopoulos and by prospect of extricating himself, through elections, from vulnerable position in which he found himself after July 1965. Recently, however, the King has reportedly been dismayed by George Papandreou's failure to control his son and King has begun to have second thoughts on wisdom of holding elections in May and of permitting EK, and, particularly, Andreas Papandreou to emerge as leading political force. King has undoubtedly been under strong pressure from rightists, including possibly his mother, to alter his stand towards present transitional government and elections. On other hand, he has also been warned by George Papandreou, through Palace political advisor, Bitsios, that any deviation from Constitution could be catastrophic both for country and for monarchy (A-491)./3/
/3/See footnote 1, Document 262.
7. In our view, any effort by Palace and by Right to postpone elections could play right into hands of Andreas Papandreou and Left, unless it were carefully engineered to avoid appearance of direct involvement by King. This, however, would be extremely difficult to accomplish. Even more dangerous would be establishment of a dictatorship--a view that we have expressed to many Greek personalities, including King, over past several months. On balance, we are inclined to believe that our assessment of political situation as reflected in A-432/4/ is still essentially valid and that King, despite pressures by Right, wishes to avoid extremism. CAS and DATT concur in this message.
/4/Dated February 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 GREECE)
Talbot
265. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Talbot) to the Country Director for Greece (Brewster)/1/
Athens, March 30, 1967.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Athens Post Files: Lot 75 A 02, Greek Desk-Bracken-Brewster. Secret; Exdis.
Dear Dan:
As the attached memo of conversation shows,/2/ the King last night confirmed our suspicion that Greece is entering a new political stage. He represented himself as deadly serious in concluding that he cannot afford to risk the destruction of free Greece by permitting Andreas Papandreou to come to power. From that conclusion, if he should hold to it, there naturally would flow decisions ranging on the extreme. At least for now the King's thinking has been narrowed to the question of whether he can stop Andreas by constitutional (or relatively constitutional) means or will be forced outside the Constitution into an extra-parliamentary government.
/2/Not found.
Perhaps optimistically, I do not regard the dialogue on his major premise as yet closed. Last night, with the Paraskevopoulos Government apparently falling round his head and with the near future even murkier than it had looked 24 hours earlier, the King seemed little interested in any general discussion of the proposition. Indeed, it is hard for us to argue that Greece under the Andreas that has emerged in the past year would be either a liberal democracy or firmly oriented toward the West. The signs increasingly point in another direction.
You will note that I raised enough questions to keep the door open for a later presentation of views of American Andreas-watchers. We in the Embassy will, and perhaps you in Washington can, get to work immediately on a commentary on the King's major premise.
On his minor premise, i.e., that, however reluctantly, he might need to move to an extra-parliamentary government, I used a similar approach. My questions in this area were directed only toward pragmatic aspects: what kind and strength of opposition would be generated and how repressive would such a regime have to become? You'll recall that in earlier talks I had emphasized to the King our generally repugnant attitude toward dictatorships, citing our foot-dragging in recognizing the new Argentine regime. He is sufficiently aware of the general American posture so that I saw little point in going over the same ground last evening.
What we need to do now is to prepare a response which can be presented to the King as the view of the United States Government. I am sure that, like us, you will ponder seriously the King's request for assurance of United States support of moves he may feel forced to take. Nor will it be easy to frame a reply, since our record in dealing with extra-parliamentary regimes covers the broadest possible spectrum of cases, ranging from the Communist coups d'etat of the 1940's through Pakistan in 1958 and Turkey in 1960 to the rash of authoritarian takeovers spreading across Africa in the 1960's--not to mention Latin America. We shall of course work urgently on a draft for consideration by Washington. Naturally, the essential decisions must be made at your end.
As to the question of persuading George Papandreou to give Andreas a one-way ticket out of Greece, it is such a gloriously simple idea that I could wish it were not wholly impractical. If you have any thoughts that would moderate our sense that we can't do anything about this one, please do let me know right away.
A word about timing: in this fast-breaking situation crucial decisions could be made almost any night in the next dozen. As of this moment (when we don't yet know the outcome of the EK-ERE confrontation over immunities), however, it still seems more likely that the King will try to stick to the parliamentary track as long as he can until he is finally persuaded that if elections are held the Andreas forces are headed for an EK majority. Today I don't know whether the critical moment will come in mid-May or a further interim period will carry Greece through the summer and into the autumn.
In any case, until the signals become clearer I believe the King's request must be treated with the utmost urgency. Unless we learn over the weekend that a more extended time-frame will be available to us, I would hope that you can get instructions to me early in the coming week. Knowing what a demand this puts upon you, I pondered sending all this by telegram. Since pouch delivery should be very prompt, however, I concluded you would be in a better position to proceed by having the whole story at once.
As I say to my colleagues here: Well, chaps, we're in it now!
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
Phillips Talbot/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
266. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 3, 1967, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Turkey, Memoranda, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Howison. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
NATO and the East-West Détente; The Middle East; Cyprus; U.S.-Turkish Relations; and Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
Cevdet Sunay, President of Turkey/2/
Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey
/2/Sunay visited Washington April 3-5. For texts of statements regarding the visit, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 412-414, 418-421, and 425-426.
Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States
The two presidents met at 5:00 PM at the White House for the first of two substantive meetings during President Sunay's state visit. After an initial exchange of courtesies, the Turkish President discussed at length, from prepared notes, Turkey's position on NATO and the East-West détente; the Middle East; Cyprus; U.S.-Turkish relations; and Viet-Nam.
Sunay's Presentation
NATO--Turkey seeks national security in NATO. No sacrifice would be too great to raise Turkey's military strength to the required level. NATO was an important force for world peace. Sunay was concerned about the effects of France's attitude. Political rather than military devices would do most to strengthen NATO. Equality among member nations was one need.
Turkey's position at this juncture was critical. Turks "appreciated and respected" United States commitments to Turkey, but the entire Southeastern flank would collapse if Turkey could not hold out until help arrived. Turkey's forces were being kept strong. Soviet aims and aspirations remained unchanged. If NATO collapsed, countries bordering the Soviet Union could not resist.
Lately some East European countries had begun to pursue their separate national interests. In the atmosphere of détente, Turkish relations with Romania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union had begun to improve, but Turkey had no illusions. The basic guiding principle in Turkish foreign policy remained "fulfillment of commitments to allies."
The Middle East--Conflicts among the Arabs were matters of concern. The Arab-Israeli question remained unsolved, and now there was the question of Aden. As a result of the Soviet factor, this situation was becoming more delicate.
North Africa was not a bright spot. In December, Bourguiba had told him that Tunisia sought United States assistance in view of Soviet military assistance to Algeria and Egypt.
India-Pakistan disputes produced many difficulties. Pakistan was very disappointed not to have American aid. The Pakistanis had right on their side in the Kashmir dispute; they should be helped to settle it, to prevent their turning to Red China. India would then be able to extend Western influence to Burma and elslewhere. If Iran could strengthen its armed forces, peace and security in that area would prevail.
Cyprus--Good Greek-Turkish relations, within the alliance to which both belonged, were vital for regional security. The Cyprus question must be settled peacefully before these relations are damaged further. The Turks had been patient, but Greece still wanted to annex the island. Cyprus was now a question of national pride in Greece. In Sunay's view, solution would only be possible through mutual concessions. The gap between the communities on the island was deep; it would be difficult for them to co-exist peacefully. He suggested (a) in Turkish majority areas, Turks should be granted municipal autonomy, (b) Cyprus should be demilitarized, and (c) Turkish troops should be permitted to stay there as a guarantee of Turkish interests.
The Turks had recognized sincerity and understanding on the Greek side during the recent dialogue, but no agreement had been reached. The Greeks could only talk about annexation. The Greeks maintained that independence meant increasing Communist influence and decreasing mainland influence.
In the Turkish view, these arguments did not justify enosis. Greek forces have de facto control on the island today, but a solution to the problem should be possible with the help of the allies. He suggested a Turkish-Greek condominium putting an end to Cypriot independence.
Sunay reflected concern about political instability in Greece and urged that Czech arms on the island be at the "disposal" of the UN. He implied that Turkey would be willing to resume the dialogue with the Greeks when the Greek political situation permitted. The sufferings of the Turkish community on the island were a result of Makarios' "Byzantine tactics." Makarios must be made to see reason.
Perhaps the U.S. could help bring this about. "Turkey expects the utmost help from the United States."
U.S.-Turkish Relations--There was real identity of interests and policies between the two countries. Their fortunes were inseparable. Turks would never forget 1947 and the Truman Doctrine. Sentiment had entered the equation, and had been an emotional shock to the Turks when the U.S. disappointed them on the Cyprus issue. Turkey had rushed to help in Korea, and had expected the U.S. to reciprocate. Our "intervention" had provoked strong criticism and charges that Turkey's foreign policy had produced a loss of freedom of action.
The present Turkish regime wished to eliminate these wrong views. The enemies of our friendship were merely a noisy minority. We hoped his visit would aid in producing a consensus in support of Turkish-American cooperation.
Viet-Nam--President Sunay recognized the wisdom of President Johnson's efforts in Viet-Nam for the preservation of world peace. Our policy was similar to our Eastern European policy of 1947. Sunay thought there could be no purely military solution to the problem. Under these circumstances, the Turks followed closely our efforts toward a peaceful settlement.
President Johnson's Response
President Johnson thanked President Sunay for an enjoyable and constructive presentation. He hoped that when the Viet-Nam conflict is finally settled, people will think we did the right thing as they now think we did the right thing in 1947 by aiding Turkey under the Truman Doctrine. Fighting aggression anywhere is costly in dollars and lives, but worth it.
He was aware of strong Turkish feelings about Cyprus and mentioned the United States initiative to avert a Turkish invasion, to which the Turks had reacted. We were in full sympathy with the Turkish community in Cyprus and would help to see their security guaranteed. He was encouraged by Sunay's stress on the need for a peaceful solution. Just as he regretted that peace in Viet-Nam was so elusive, he regretted that no Cyprus solution had been found.
The President noted that the topics discussed by Sunay would be discussed one by one between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Caglayangil on April 4./3/
/3/The Department of State reported to Ankara on these talks in telegram 168638, April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
The President believed the benefits derived from some $5 billion in aid to Turkey since 1947 had been mutual. This aid was a reflection of the American people's attitudes toward Turkey. While there might be some anti-American feelings in Turkey, there are strong pro-Turkish feelings here.
267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, April 3, 1967, 8:14 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Brewster and Owens and approved by Rockwell.
167844. For Ambassador from Rockwell.
1. Your two letters received over weekend/2/ and given very careful study. You are to be highly commended for manner in which you handled first session with King. We hope that there will be continuing dialogue. Gratified in meanwhile to see that King has offered mandate to Canellopoulos thus providing time for political parties themselves to work their way out of impasse. We concur with points you propose to make orally (ref March 31 letter). We recommend that points one, two and four be made strongly and in whatever detail you consider advisable at time.
/2/Talbot's March 30 letter is Document 265. The letter of March 31 has not been found.
2. We would be inclined to warn more strongly against possible constitutional deviation. Depth of Greek feeling against such a move should be more carefully weighed by King. Andreas as "martyr" with Lambrakis machine standing fully behind him would be very formidable opponent. As matter of principle, of course, U.S. would be opposed to extra-parliamentary move. You should stress point that U.S. reaction to such move cannot be determined in advance but would depend on circumstances at time.
3. Finally, strong statements along lines paras 6 and 7 most desirable. We are glad that lines of communication are open to you and hope that King will feel free to communicate directly with you whenever he wishes to discuss his problems.
4. Letter follows.
Rusk
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 8, 1967, 2340Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Athens Post Files: Lot 72 A 5030, POL 15. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Talbot and Day. The date-time-group was obtained from the copy in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE.
4573. 1. In our view, decision to give mandate and right to dissolve Parliament to Kanellopoulos is most important move young King has made since he ascended to throne three years ago./2/ It may prove to be his worst. Admittedly, King's choices were limited once he had decided that he could not risk a Center Union majority victory in the elections and once Paraskevopoulos Govt was upset./3/ Whether ERE's unyielding stand on amendment of electoral law was part of a pre-arranged plan by Palace and Right to overthrow Paraskevopoulous and to provide ground for formation of an ERE Govt, as alleged by Andreas Papandreou and Eleftheria, is highly debatable. In any case, if Paraskevopoulos Govt had not fallen over amendment issue, we believe another way would probably have soon been found by hard-core ERE and Palace to bring it down. ERE press and Kanellopoulos have argued that King had no alternative but to grant him mandate when George Papandreou refused invitation to meeting to discuss ecumenical-type govt. King knew, of course, that Papandreou was opposed to idea of an ecumenical govt, and even if meeting had been held, chances were party leaders could not agree.
/2/The King asked Kanellopoulos on April 3 to form a government to take the country through elections. In telegram 4569 from Athens, April 7, Talbot reported that he had pressed the new Prime Minister for an indication of what action he would take in the event of a Papandreou victory in the May elections. Talbot noted that his "prodding" led Kanellopoulos to declare that "the Greek nation would never be delivered to the communists or to Andreas Papandreou. It would be saved for real democracy." (Ibid.)
/3/Following a disagreement over an amendment to the proposed electoral law designed to extend the parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreou, the Center Union announced its decision to withdraw its support of the Paraskevopoulos government, which resigned on March 30.
2. By granting mandate to Kanellopoulos, King has openly committed himself to ERE which probably has support of between 35% to 40% of population. This is obviously narrow ground on which to base his future. (King has undoubtedly hoped that FDK and Progressives would vote for Kanellopoulos for sake of electoral bill and that their support would give to government appearance of broader base.) No only has King provoked EDA and EK, both moderates and Andreas Papandreou supporters, but he also has deeply embittered Progressive and FDK deputies who feel they have been left in lurch after they came to King's rescue in July 1965. They have now unhappy choice of either voting for ERE Govt or going to elections under an electoral system which is to their disadvantage. Stephanopoulos has bitterly remarked to us that FDK and probably Tsirimokos and Progressives will abstain if Kanellopoulos Govt conducts elections.
3. For time being, George Papandreou seems to be following cautious policy, despite his strong criticism of King and Kanellopoulos and his warning of a "revolution." We have impression that both Papandreous are frightened by present situation, Andreas because of possibility of his arrest and imprisonment and George because of chance of postponement of elections and constitutional deviation. EK leader still seems to believe that, notwithstanding ERE Govt, his party will gain at least plurality in elections. Therefore, he has shown no interest in Mitsotakis' proposal that EK, FDK, etc. announce that they will abstain from elections. Panpandreou might change his mind, however, if he became convinced that elections would be rigged to make ERE first party. His attitude would undoubtedly be different if Andreas was arrested prior to elections.
4. Hope of ERE has undoubtedly been that right of dissolution would be sufficient weapon to persuade smaller parties to support Govt and that psychological and material benefits of office would give party a significant advantage in electoral campaign. Though PriMin has spoken confidently of an ERE victory, he would probably not be unduly disappointed if his party emerged as close second to EK. We believe hard-core ERE ministers, on other hand, would be willing to proceed to elections only if they were certain of ERE's achieving first place. They would argue that if EK won plurality, it could form govt with EDA support and that this possibility could not be risked. Therefore, we fear that ERE will soon realize that 45 days is not enough time to change situation appreciably and that effort will be made to find a pretext to postpone elections, if necessary, through a deviation from constitution.
5. It is difficult to convey gloom over future developments which exists in political circles. Especially dismaying is present deep lack of trust between political leaders themselves as well as notably between King and both Papandreous and also between King and Stephanopoulos and Markezinis. Latter two, who believe King deliberately deceived them recently and who despise Kanellopoulos personally, seem to feel no sense of responsibility to try to help avoid collision course on which country is now heading. In our view, there are basically two options (a) for King and ERE to push ahead to elections in late May despite opposition of all other parties; or (b) for King to try to promote formation of inter-party government. Situation might still be salvaged if Kanellopoulos could be persuaded to step aside and to give up his right to dissolve Parliament and if ERE, FDK and Progressives could agree on inter-party govt. Everyone agrees, however, that hour is late.
Talbot
269. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 9, 1967, 1426Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
4574. Basing myself on State 167844/2/ and NEA/GRK letter dated April 3,/3/ I gave King Constantine five-part answer Saturday evening to his question of March 29 whether he could count on United States support should he be forced to undertake a constitutional deviation. I reassured him of continuing United States interest at highest level in Greece's difficult situation. I said we share his concern over policies that might be adopted by government with Andreas Papandreou as leading figure but believe certain restraints could operate to keep such a government from at least some of extreme measures Andreas now advocating. I expressed our agreement with the King's hopes that current difficulties can be overcome through parliamentary processes. I stated the inability of USG to give advance assurances of support to King and noted our traditional opposition to dictatorial solutions to constitutional crises. They are wrong in principle and rarely work yet create many new difficulties. A dictatorship in Greece might cause short-term upheavals, leading to more repressive measures, and to coalescence of opposition forces which in turn could be penetrated and dominated by international Communist agents. Adverse international reactions would not be limited to the Communist apparatus but would include supporters of democracy. Considerable criticism could be expected in United States. Finally, I restated as a guiding principle of United States in Eastern Mediterranean our policy to encourage progress and stability in Greece and to maintain close relations with Greece.
/2/Document 267.
/3/Not found.
The King responded with thanks, but felt many questions remained unanswered. His own key question about risks inherent in a Papandreou victory related to control of the armed forces. He anticipated that a Papandreou government would move rapidly to retire or transfer officers loyal to the King and move Papandreou adherents into positions of trust, thus effectively ending the King's control of armed forces. This would destroy his ability to keep Greece free and attached to West. He asked whether this is what United States wished.
In response to my prodding the King conceded that constitutional crisis might arise as early as coming week. Kanellopoulos government is scheduled to appear before Parliament and will probably have to dissolve it for lack of vote of confidence. I asked whether this could immediately precipitate question of arresting Andreas Papandreou. King said it could, though no decision to arrest him has been made. Consequences of his arrest should it occur could raise issue whether elections would have to be postponed and Greece ruled for a period by a government without parliamentary sanction.
The King estimated that next critical moment could come in mid- May if ERE party had by then failed to develop electoral lead which Kanellopoulos but few others expect it to achieve. At that point the King would have to decide whether to let elections proceed. At that point also he would want American assurances. Most important of these, he said, would be assurances that Greece would continue to be protected against its northern neighbors, that U.S. would help keep Turkey from taking advantage in Cyprus of Greece's difficulties, that USG would help American public and other countries understand need to stabilize Greek situation and protect Greece from Communist penetration of sort that almost succeeded in the 1940's, and that economic assistance would be available to enable the new government to meet basic problems of Greek economy. He asked whether he could get further clarification of USG position.
I emphasized that in other situations, such as in Argentina, where extra-constitutional governments had been imposed, American actions had been different from what he had in mind. I repeated that USG would watch situation closely, but discouraged him from expecting further statement of American position at this time.
It was clear that young King believes his throne and Greece's attachment to the West to be at stake in this crisis. He has concluded that only near miracle can save him from final choice of yielding his country to Papandreou, or establishing a dictatorship either before or just after elections scheduled in May. More clearly than in any previous conversation, he expressed his dependence on United States for general support. I would anticipate his continuing to ask for American reassurances, with ever shorter deadlines as the scheduled electoral date approaches.
Memcon being pouched.
Comment: We share King's fear that events in Greece approaching climax. In recent days we have found little if any taste for compromise in any quarter. Should government decide to arrest Andreas Papandreou after dissolution of Parliament, as hard-liners urging, country could be thrown into crisis. For moment, however, most likely course is continuation of Kanellopoulos government and active political campaigning until mid-May. Embassy recommendations of USG actions that could be helpful will follow as situation evolves.
Talbot
270. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 13, 1967, 2300Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, Brussels for POLAD SHAPE, Paris, USDOCOSouth for Freshman, USCINCEUR for POLAD, and Thessaloniki. Passed to the White House and USIA.
4650. 1. My expectation is that Kanellopoulos government, acting on decree by King, will dissolve Parliament tonight or tomorrow and will announce elections May 28. This situation follows several days of intense efforts, primarily by FDK elements, to gain approval of concept of an ecumenical government. It also follows period of largely unsuccessful efforts by ERE to obtain FDK and Progressive Party support of Kanellopoulos government. Both King and ERE obviously miscalculated in their estimate that two smaller national parties would give PriMin vote of confidence for sake of simple proportional electoral law.
2. FDK view, as expressed to Embassy by Mitsotakis and Eleftheria publisher Kokkas, has been that ERE government would inevitably lead to dictatorship prior to elections and that only way to avoid this disaster would be for King to make final effort to form ecumenical government to pass electoral bill and to postpone elections until 1968. FDK theory has been that Papandreou would probably refuse initially to participate in ecumenical government and that ERE, FDK, and Progressives would then be in better position to form coalition government. Neither ERE nor Papandreou, however, was receptive to FDK proposal. ERE was naturally reluctant to give up fruits of office and to admit defeat, and Papandreou argued that ecumenical government would be an unworkable political "monstrosity." FDK proposal was also weakened when Papandreou reportedly enticed six or seven FDK deputies away from party by promise they would be eventually re-admitted to Center Union. Votes of these six or seven, plus 122 of EK and 22 of EDA, could thus make it virtually impossible for coalition of other parties to win vote of confidence in house of 300.
3. Having seen Markezinis, Stephanopoulos, and Kanellopoulos in past few days, I called on George Papandreou today and found him, like other leaders, in self-righteous, unyielding mood. EK leader asserted that King had made major blunder by giving mandate to Kanellopoulos and that he has now ceased to be King of all Hellenes. "He is now King of ERE," and must suffer fate of any party leader. Papandreou made repeatedly clear that, if Parliament is dissolved and country is led to elections by ERE government, it will no longer be just Andreas, but all of EK including himself who will be conducting anti-monarchical campaign. Elder Papandreou also warned that if dictatorship occurs, he will wage civil war. In his view, only exodus from present crisis would be for King to name service government of common confidence to conduct free and honest elections. Such a government could be given an ecumenical flavor by having each party designate a Minister without portfolio as an observer. Otherwise Papandreou made no concession to idea of ecumenical government.
4. This evening King's political advisor Bitsios visited me to pass on latest thinking of Palace. Part of Bitsios' presentation was detailed account of how George Papandreou had repeatedly broken his promises to King between December when Paraskevopoulos government was formed and late March. EK leader had specifically failed to live up to his written promise to expel Andreas if latter deviated from party line and attacked monarchy. Turning to today's developments, Bitsios reported that, following careful consideration by King, Palace intermediary was authorized this afternoon to make following proposal to Papandreou: formation of ecumenical government under non-politician of common confidence with Cabinet representation from all parties to pass simple electoral bill and to conduct elections May 28, provided two largest parties, i.e., ERE and EK, would make written promise to cooperate in a post-electoral government for 6, 8 or 10 months.
5. Later this evening Bitsios telephoned me that Papandreou had not only rejected this proposal but had also made "threats." (These, I presume, were same threats he had expressed earlier today to me regarding anti-monarchical campaign, etc.) Bitsios added that PriMin has been informed of Papandreou's response and that he will be in touch with King later tonight. In my and my colleagues view, King's last minute approach to Papandreou was not really serious effort to find another solution, since he could hardly have expected Papandreou to sign paper promising to cooperate with ERE after elections. Even if elder Papandreou had accepted, Andreas would surely have disagreed and would probably have broken away from party.
6. All this gives only highlights of recent fast-moving events which will be reported in detail later and which have been characterized by blunders, miscalculations, distrust and stubbornness on all sides. In last few days, insatiable vivacity of Greeks for quarreling among themselves seems to have triumphed over their traditional knack for producing compromises.
Talbot
271. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, April 14, 1967, 0001Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Priority.
4651. Personal for the Secretary from Ambassador.
1. I regret to report time has come to hoist urgent storm signals from Greece. Through multiple blunders of past fortnight instability endemic since July 1965 has deteriorated into imminent danger of first-class mess leading country to brutal choice between dictatorship and Andreas Papandreou-led attacks on monarch and probably Greece's foreign alignment.
2. Our reporting has supplied details and, I hope, has adequately signalled threat to U.S. interests. In summary, Greek failure to find acceptable solution to 21-month political impasse has led principal players not to try harder but to dig deeper into inflexibly polarized positions. With King and one party (ERE) now aligned against rest of political field, traditional instruments of power--Palace, armed forces, conservative political and economic interests--find themselves ranged against all centrists as well as leftist elements, undoubtedly representing majority of population, who in turn act increasingly frustrated, angry, anti-monarchical and probably anti-Alliance.
3. PriMin Kanellopoulos as well as Papandreous and apparently bulk of voting population still want election May 28, but nobody can expect these to be ordinary elections. In relatively free elections under existing electoral system, Papandreous predicted to come in probably with clear majority and at least as leading party, depending on popular groundswell and also largely on how much strength Communist-line EDA diverts from its own candidates to Andreas-supported centrists.
4. This wouldn't be too bad if George Papandreou would emerge as boss. At age 80, however, he's lost biological race to his son Andreas, only other leader of vigor now in party, and a government with Andreas either as backstage manager or at helm would--as we evaluate thrust of his campaign--transform military high command into a party-controlled instrument and thus effectively break authority of King and traditional influentials in this country. United States would not necessarily find that and various domestic programs projected by Andreas so damaging except that they would give him springboard for foreign policies that sound like a Mediterranean Bhutto's. Comfortable and satisfactory Greek-U.S. relationship of past 20 years would inescapably yield to kinds of strains we are experiencing not only in Pakistan but in too many other countries. By all signs visible here, Russians would not be slow to take advantage.
5. Fearing such consequences of adverse election results next month, coteries in Palace, armed forces and ERE are evidently building up steam for "constitutional deviation," meaning dictatorship. They would hope to set things straight by period of firm rule and control of radicals. While their script is unclear, we presume that after dissolution of Parliament, and probably in May if election prospects then look unfavorable to them, current ERE government would be transformed into an emergency government with, initially, civilian Ministers backed up by armed forces under orders of King. Whether difficulties in enforcing order and meeting national problems would subsequently lead to direct army takeover is hard to perceive, as is method by which authoritarian rule would later make way for resumption of democratic government.
6. How to escape both Scylla and Charybdis? The King muffed best chance ten days ago when he failed to get smaller parties opposing Papandreous (FDK and Progressives) into governing combine with ERE. With Karamanlis, the "authentic" ERE leader, still in Paris, I am not sure even most powerful effort by King would have brought Kanellopoulos and small parties under same roof; at any rate, his milder efforts failed.
7. Since then, extremely limited remaining options have been intensively explored. We are told tonight that no nourishment has been found in any of possible alternatives to present course.
8. It now appears that Greece will proceed toward elections May 28 with King hoping ERE can garner enough support to hold Center Union to plurality. This result, still possible though not now probable, would be acceptable solution. It would enable King to insist on post-electoral coalition government excluding EDA and excluding Andreas from sensitive security ministries.
9. This is result I believe we should next encourage diplomatically and with whatever resources can be made available to us. Although it will open us to charge of consorting with rightwing, that is preferable to visible alternatives.
10. If ERE campaign falters under Center Union attacks on it and on King leaving prospect in mid-May of clear Center Union majority, then I believe dictatorship can be avoided if at all only by very heavy American pressures on Palace, armed forces and rightist politicians. From here I cannot judge what would be domestic US reaction to dictatorship in Greece, though I suppose it would produce new attacks (generated in part by anti-Royalist Greek-Americans) on administration's alleged support of rightwing, militaristic, monarchical regimes and would deepen difficulties encountered by military assistance program on Capitol Hill. In any case, efforts cited earlier in this message would set Greece far back domestically and internationally and in end might not save either monarchy or Western orientation, though immediate foreign policy of authoritarian regime would presumably be pro-US.
11. As you know, King and Kanellopoulos have told me Greece "will not" be delivered to Andreas Papandreou. Nonetheless, we must consider this possibility if we are to oppose dictatorship. My own view is that key question--to which I have no present answer--is whether basic Greek institutions can withstand shock of Andreas' takeover attempts so that further elections could be assured after couple of years or so. Based on his past record of executive performance, I believe Greek people would then reject him and excesses of his fiscal and administrative policies. In these circumstances we could live for a while with his abrasive if not defiant policies. However, Andreas strikes me as capable in adversity of dismantling traditional Greek institutions and policies if he is permitted to do so and to lead country even deeper into Nasserist posture.
12. Whole picture has many imponderables, of course. Questions that cannot now be answered but could vitally affect situation include such as when and how Karamanlis will return to Greek scene, when George Papandreou will disappear and effect of this on his party, and whether some new leader capable of challenging Andreas will emerge.
13. As any US action in this situation would need to be speedy and decisive, I should like to discuss issues personally with you and others before crunch comes. For this purpose I may ask soon to come to Washington for few days.
14. Meanwhile we have been urging conciliation and compromise on party leaders (though whether they have been listening is another question) and, as detailed in recent reports, in recent talks with King I have stated with increasing plainness our views of dangers in situation.
15. Sorry to burden you with this lengthy message, but despite your other preoccupations I fear you need now to be specifically informed on looming dangers here.
Talbot
272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, April 20, 1967, 6:51 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Owens and Brewster, cleared by Rockwell and Katzenbach, and approved by Battle.
179151. For Ambassador from Battle.
1. We have studied closely your recent messages describing the grave situation in Greece and dilemma facing King of (1) imposing dictatorship or (2) permitting CU to assume power following next elections with possible far-reaching consequences for Greece and its relations with US. We have pondered carefully question of what, if any, steps USG might take to meet situation and propose following formula for your consideration and comment.
2. We are working on assumption Papandreou's chief fear at present time is arrest of his son Andreas for alleged membership in Aspida conspiracy. Arrest of Andreas could easily touch off violent demonstrations which in turn would be met by extreme repressive measures by government and possible imposition of dictatorship. On other hand, King's deepest fear is that if Papandreous win elections, Center Union will move immediately to strip King of his power by major shakeup in military forces and intelligence setup, with eventual aim of undermining and perhaps eliminating monarchy. Concurrent to this is general concern that younger Papandreou would move Greece away from Western Alliance.
3. Proposed scenario would be that you call on George Papandreou at earliest opportunity, and inform him on instructions that USG deeply concerned at present rift in Greek body politic and increasing polarization due to extreme positions being taken by both sides. You would emphasize that we have great stake in future of Greece as result of major US investment in men, money, and matériel dating from 1947. We consider prosperous Greece is essential to Western Alliance. USG is fully aware of Papandreou's devotion to democracy, his long history of anti-Communism, and his dedication to welfare of his country.
4. You could add that as we view situation, cooling off of highly charged political atmosphere could result from an agreement on both sides to moderate language in public statements and speeches. (This would seem to be particularly important at present juncture, since elder Papandreou is about to make one of his two major speeches this Sunday in Thessaloniki. Extremist remarks on that occasion would set unfortunate tone for entire campaign and might increase tensions, already dangerously high, to breaking point.)
5. To meet problem outlined para 2 we would propose compromise based on iron-clad assurances from both sides. Our formula would envision assurance from King to G. Papandreou that Andreas Papandreou would not be arrested, in return for following two concessions from Papandreou, on assumption he wins May 28 elections: (1) that he appoint only persons of "mutual confidence" to sensitive positions of Foreign Affairs and Defense and (2) that he not carry out widespread shakeup in armed forces leadership. FYI, these two assurances from Papandreou would appear to be minimum concessions acceptable to King to stay his hand from imposing dictatorship in event CU wins majority in elections. End FYI.
6. You should attempt to induce George Papandreou to put such a compromise formula forward to Palace on his own. If he will not see King but asks you to help, you could serve as "honest broker" and convey compromise proposal to King.
7. None of elements in proposed formula is sacrosanct and we leave it to you to modify them according to prevailing conditions there. If you perceive major objection to recommended action, we would welcome countersuggestions from you. However we feel time is of essence in view of fast-moving developments in Greece, including Papandreou's opening speech this weekend and indications that government may be moving to arrest Andreas Papandreou. If latter happens, it may be too late to play constructive role in this deteriorating situation.
8. Would appreciate your comments urgently as to wisdom foregoing proposal. Please include your thoughts re dangers, charges US meddling in internal situation. Also comment on possibility approach being made through CAS or unofficial channel.
9. Take no action in absence further instructions.
Rusk
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