Docs 149-169
149. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 22, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. Drafted by Christian. This luncheon meeting lasted from 2:10 to 5:20 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Fowler
Attorney General Clark
Justice Fortas
William Bundy
McGeorge Bundy
Walt Rostow
Harry McPherson
George Christian
The President opened the proceedings with the statement that Senator Hayden was not going to run for re-election. He said that he was glad that he was not taking on Goldwater and that Hayden was one of the finest and best men he had ever known. The President also said that he had talked to Governor Rockefeller and told him that the people close to him had mixed reactions on the Governor's decision. "Those who want me to run were glad you stepped out, and those who do not want me to run are sorry you are not going to be in the race."
The President referred to Secretary Freeman's confrontation with jeering students at the University of Wisconsin and said he thought Freeman handled the matter very well.
Justice Fortas said that he had seen Leon Keyserling on television, and it was the meanest thing he had ever seen directed against Bobby Kennedy.
The President said he feels there has been a dramatic shift in public opinion on the war, that a lot of people are really ready to surrender without knowing they are following a party line.
Secretary Clifford said he thought Senator Kennedy was too "shrill" this early. He referred to Kennedy's comments holding the President responsible for all the evils of society. Secretary Clifford said at this stage a moderate appeal would be better for Kennedy.
The President asked Secretary Clifford to check and see if the National Guard and Reservists who have been called up are doing anything. He said two of his best backers had told him that their sons did not have anything to do, and intimated that Pat Nugent had told him the same thing. He suggested that Secretary Clifford might get Rivers to take somebody and make a study of manpower in the services. He said he went through this during the Kennedy call-ups and hated to see it happening again.
The group then began work on Harry McPherson's draft of a speech incorporating suggestions from McGeorge Bundy, Bill Bundy and Walt Rostow.
Secretary Fowler said the speech did not have a "sense of crisis" on inflation. Fowler also contended that we continue to play to people who are against the tax and budget cutting program. "If we pass this program, it will be the 268 conservative votes. The liberals don't have the guts to vote for a tax bill. They don't want either taxes or a cut."
During the discussions on the speech, the President and Secretary Rusk left the room to talk on the telephone to Sergeant Shriver in Madrid. During their absence, McGeorge Bundy said that extreme care had to be taken in the President's statements. That a speech like the one last Saturday will cost the President the election. Secretary Clifford agreed, saying that the President's Saturday speech to the National Alliance of Businessmen had caused concern among thoughtful people because the President seemed to be saying that he was going to win the war no matter what the cost in American lives./2/
/2/See footnote 11, Document 147.
When the President and Secretary Rusk returned, Secretary Clifford advised that Joe Fowler take the economic part of the speech and he would take the call-up part and they would try to make these sections stronger and more palatable. He wanted to tie in the American call-up with the additional Vietnamese soldiers.
The President suggested that his advisers should get together on their thinking. He said he felt that Congress was going to interpret the speech as pressure on the tax payers and that others would say it was a speech for the campaign year if he made the address before a Joint Session. He said he thought he should make the statement from his office on television, talking about taxes, troops and reserves, negotiations and peace.
The President said it had been his feeling that when the weather is bad we should take advantage of possibilities for changes in bombing. He said we might provide a circle around Hanoi and Haiphong again and wait two weeks on possible developments.
Secretary Clifford said the major concern of the people is that they do not see victory ahead. He said the military has not come up with a plan for victory. He thought the people were discouraged as more men go in and are chewed up in a bottomless pit. Since the men Westmoreland wants won't get there until summer they really aren't going to be any use to him in the emergency. Secretary Clifford suggested that possibly we should call up the reserves but not commit any troops other than those we had promised Westmoreland. He said we could be training now and make the decision later. He said he thought support troops only should be sent.
Secretary Clifford suggested that the President have General Wheeler meet General Westmoreland at Manila and discuss it with him.
The President asked for opinions on how to proceed on more peace moves. Secretary Clifford suggested that de-escalation be started by a limited cessation of bombing above the 20th parallel, with reciprocal action by the enemy by stopping shelling from the DMZ or just north of the DMZ.
Secretary Rusk said this would be alright if there were no hard conditions on the enemy. He did not believe Hanoi would reciprocate.
Bill Bundy said that in Bunker's judgment this would cause major difficulties in Saigon. He said he would be skeptical of the idea but had no alternative.
Walt Rostow said Hanoi would know full well that we were taking advantage of the bad weather. He said it might have some effect on doves and some effect in Europe, but would not succeed and would cause them problems. Secretary Rusk said a critical time for a peace offensive is later after the winter fighting has subsided. He said that if we do this and the enemy hit Saigon, we would have to be prepared to hit Hanoi very hard in retaliation.
Secretary Fowler said he did not think the speech needed to commit us to measured escalation.
Justice Fortas said the decision would be criticized as too little, too late and insincere. He said the speech lacks an essential ingredient in that it does not explain why we are in Vietnam.
If we do not talk in terms of Communism, it is like a production of Hamlet without the prince. He said he would emphasize the invasion of Laos by the North Vietnamese and the brutal murders of the civilians during the Tet truce. He said he did not believe the people would give the President the support we need in the speech's present form.
Mac Bundy said he thought Secretary Clifford's proposal would have a short life diplomatically, but he was not against it. He agreed with Rostow that if you wanted to do more later, it is smarter to do less now.
Justice Fortas suggested that we might get somebody else to sponsor the peace plan like the Pope or U Thant because it is going to fail. Both Bill and McGeorge Bundy thought this was going to be a good idea.
George Christian
150. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell/1/
Washington, March 22, 1968, 4:49 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Russell, March 22, 1968, 4:49 p.m., Tape F6803.02, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared specifically for this volume in the Office of the Historian.
Russell: Hello?
President: Dick, I was giving some thought to some decisions here and I wanted to see if you thought they were all right.
Russell: Yes sir, Mr. President.
President: I understand--I think I talked to you about it, but I wasn't sure, I have had so much on my mind. McNamara on the 18th of January recommended to me and said we should decide it in February--the continuance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He recommended and Clifford recommends that I continue Wheeler for a year, or at least until my term expires in January. What would be your reaction to that?
Russell: I think that is all right, Mr. President.
President: They tell me I'll have to have legislation.
Russell: Is that right?
President: Mmm-hmm.
Russell: Well, I wasn't sure of that. I think we can get it passed. I don't know. I don't know any reason why we shouldn't. How long do you want it for?
President: Just a year.
Russell: Uh-huh, yes sir. I don't think there would be any trouble about that.
President: Now the next thing is--
Russell: When does his term expire?
President: July. They wanted it announced in February. I haven't done it because they were trying to remove Westmoreland and they were making an attack on him and they were hitting Abrams and the Commies were given a big ride and I had intended to move Westmoreland out and Abrams in. Some of them had suggested I go down and get some new fresh man--that was kind of the dovish group. But Wheeler thinks very strongly, as does Clifford--he is not very experienced and his judgment is not as good as yours--as does McNamara, that Abrams would be the better man to replace Westmoreland.
Russell: Well, I think so too.
President: That would be their recommendation.
Russell: Yes sir. I think he's the best man I can think of at the moment. I don't know a better man in the Army.
President: They said there would be two or three they would consider, but they would put him first call. Buzz does--he said he would consider Abrams, he would consider Palmer, he would consider Goodpaster. Goodpaster has had a heart attack, but we are thinking of making him Vice Chief to Westmoreland.
Russell: Well, I don't think I'd pull Abrams out of there without giving him a whack at it if I was going to bring Westmoreland in.
President: Well, that is what I think we would do. The way it would go--would go--Wheeler would be continued for a year. Westmoreland would come out. He would replace [General Harold] Johnson whose term expires and who wants to retire. Goodpaster would step up to Vice Chief and we would have a new man for Honolulu, but the services would nominate him and he wants to retire, and his term is up in April. But we thought we--
Russell: Sharp?
President: Yes. His term is up in April and he wants to retire. He's got some business thing he wants to go with. We thought we would try to ask him to stay on until this took place in July, if he would, and we would put either Ryan of the Air Force or Admiral Clarey of the Navy./2/ They would be the service nominees for the post at Honolulu. We won't have to decide that and that is the Secretary's decision, but I just wanted you to know our thinking.
/2/
Pacific Air Force Commander General John D. Ryan and Admiral Bernard A. Clarey.Russell: All right, sir. I appreciate it.
President: Do you think there would be any reaction that I was demoting Westmoreland and that he'd been a failure? George Christian says he thinks there would; Abe Fortas said he doesn't think much, but Buzz says--
Russell: There would be some among people that don't like Westmoreland undoubtedly, Mr. President.
President: Buzz thinks that it is such an honorary job to be Chief of Staff and Eisenhower and [former General of the Army John] Pershing and all of them had it, and that it wouldn't bear much weight.
Russell: Nobody in the services would think so. There's a lot of people who don't think anything about it. If Steve Young were to make a speech, well they would say they must have been right about it. But you are not going to please all of them anyhow. I don't see anything wrong with it. It's a great distinction. I would think that Westmoreland would be glad to get out and get to be a Chief of Staff.
President: He wants to very much. He thinks he has been there longer than he wanted to stay. His wife does and Buzz thinks it is time.
Russell: Well, I don't see how anybody could be critical of that unless they just wanted to be anyhow.
President: Now Bobby [Kennedy] is storming these states and those governors and switching them and switching the bosses all over the country and a pretty blitz ruthless operation and says if you don't do this I will defeat you and he is doing it with the candidates for the Senate and things of that kind. Ribicoff kind of backed away from an endorsement yesterday.
Russell: I was amazed. I saw it on television.
President: Well, they started this riot business two years ago on television saying if they didn't do something they were going to take the cities and they were encouraging it and Bobby has been hiring Martin Luther King and raising money for him for two years. We have been watching it. They are doing that a good deal. They are going to beat hell out of us in Wisconsin, as you could imagine, from the type of votes you have there. They do the same thing in California.
Russell: Well, I am not as sure about California. I don't know anything about Wisconsin.
President: You know the LaFollettes, don't you?
Russell: Yes sir.
President: Well, it's still there. Pretty deep, they tell me--the boys we have had there. They're against any war--like Henry Reuss, Gaylord Nelson, and stuff like that.
Russell: Well, Nelson has been mighty tender-footed here lately. He has quieted down a lot after he got to running.
President: Well, there's been a great shift of sentiment, unless I am misinformed from what I see in the wires and letters. Just nearly everybody since he got in and started speaking to these student groups around the country just think we played hell and that we ought to get out right quick. It is the worst thing I've ever seen.
Russell: Well, I don't think everybody does by a whole lot.
President: No, but I think there has been a good shift of sentiment is what I am saying.
Russell: Oh.
President: I think since the Tet offensive, then followed by McCarthy's New Hampshire victory, then followed by Bobby's play, and then followed by their 18 speeches up there and our general re-survey trying to determine what to do and all the leaks./3/ [Two lines excised from the tape by the Johnson Library under the donor's deed of gift.]
/3/Reference is to the 18 Congressmen who signed the March 4 statement calling for greater efforts by the administration to secure negotiations.
Russell: Well, some of them, that little coterie that McNamara had in there.
President: Yes, they are.
Russell: They are a big minority.
President: Among the civilians though. The leading civilians that he had are practically--practically all want us to surrender.
Russell: There is no doubt about that. But there aren't more than 12 or 15 of them.
President: That is right. But they are running it.
Russell: Yes, that's right.
President: You take Nitze. Refused to testify on the MAP bill on the military assistance. Just said he didn't believe in the policy. Did not think we ought to be in Vietnam. Just wouldn't do it. Just insubordinate. Wrote me a letter./4/
/4/The Senate Foreign Relations Committee at first had requested that Clifford testify on Vietnam, but he demurred due to his short time in office. According to his autobiography, Nitze refused to testify in Clifford's place because he disagreed with the Task Force's recommendations, and he even offered to resign instead of appearing before the Committee. Nitze believed that his refusal was responsible for his exclusion thereafter from the remaining Tuesday Luncheons with the President. See Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 277-279.
Russell: Well, I would have got him out of there the next day.
President: Well, I would, but Clifford said he just can't do it so quickly by himself. Enthoven is very much the same way. Steadman is the same way. He doesn't really know about his Service Secretaries, but Warnke is the same way.
Russell: Well, Clifford ought to know some good men he could bring in there.
President: Well, there are, but it is a question of just how fast you disrupt them until he can kind of get his feet on the ground and know who is who and what Department they are running. Do you have pretty good confidence in Ignatius and in Resor and in Brown?
Russell: Well, I think those three are all right.
President: You think they would be loyal?
Russell: Yes, I do.
President: Do you think I ought to do any specific thing that you can think of in the Bobby picture that I'm not doing?
Russell: No sir, I don't know of anything. I don't think he is as bad as you apparently think it looks. He started up a big hoorah. But you can go to a place like the University of Alabama or the University of Kansas where you've got six or eight hundred people in the crowd [and] you can make it sound like the whole thing has gone crazy. But when a girl gets up and apologizes like that girl did to Freeman up there and the crowd gives her a standing ovation, now nobody arranged that. That is more a determination of how a crowd feels--all the heckling and booing that were posted over the building.
President: Thank you so much. When are you coming back?
Russell: I am coming back tomorrow.
President: I want to talk to you. As soon as you get in, I want you to rest a little bit and then come over here and have dinner or something because I've to talk to you about these troops.
Russell: All right, sir. I will get in sometime tomorrow about noon.
President: Thank you. You try to have dinner with me sometime tomorrow evening.
Russell: I'll try to do that./5/
/5/The President did not dine with Russell the next day. He did receive a telephone call from Russell at 8:41 p.m. on March 24. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found.
151. Editorial Note
In telegram WH 80711 to General Westmoreland, March 23, 1968, President Johnson informed him that he would be relieved as the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and reassigned as Army Chief of Staff. The President's message read:
"General William C. Westmoreland--Your appointment as Army Chief of Staff gives me great personal pleasure. I have never had higher regard or greater respect for any military colleague. It will be a source of uncommon strength to have you close beside me as we continue to press the struggle for peace and freedom in Vietnam. The prospect for success is so much brighter because of all your leadership has achieved. In a period of rapid expansion of American forces, you have lifted the quality of combat effectiveness and marshalled a unique system of logistics support. Our South Vietnamese and Free World allies have shared in the benefits of your great abilities. For four years, you have thwarted the savage efforts of aggression to cut a nation in half. You have carried the fight to the enemy, routing his forces at every turn and raising the cost of his ambitions. For all these reasons, this nation will be proud to welcome you home as the hero you are. I will be first in line to shake your hand and welcome you to new responsibilities. Lyndon Baines Johnson." (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k)
In a March 23 letter to Westmoreland, the President wrote: "I wish to give you directly the background to your appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army. On January 19 this year Bob McNamara recommended to me that you be elevated to this post. He felt, quite simply, that you were the best man to lead the Army and that, after your protracted period in field command, you deserved a tour in Washington where you were at least equally needed. I did not wish to make the decision until Clark Clifford was in his post and had a chance to make an independent assessment. Clark came to me with an equally firm recommendation that you take command of the Army. I cannot find language strong enough to express the confidence we feel in you; our gratitude for the unique service you have rendered your nation and the cause of freedom in Vietnam; and our satisfaction that you will be joining the team in Washington, where you will be my strong right arm." (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68, [II]) That morning, the President discussed Westmoreland's departure with JCS Chairman General Wheeler. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Wheeler, March 23, 1968, 10:01 a.m., Tape F6803.02, PNO 12)
In a reply transmitted in telegram MAC 4091 to the President, March 25, Westmoreland wrote: "Your message of 23 March is deeply appreciated as is the nomination to serve you as army chief of staff. While confessing a soldier's reluctance to leave the battlefield before the battle is over, I look forward to the challenges and responsibilities of this new assignment. With highest respect, W. C. Westmoreland." (Ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k) In a March 27 letter to Westmoreland, former Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge wrote: "To me your accomplishments are tremendous. The building of the huge base in Viet-Nam, the deployment of so many U.S. troops and the good relations with the Vietnamese are solid achievements which have laid the foundations for the success which will surely come if we are steadfast. They are unique accomplishments in the career of one man. What you have wrought in a few years most men do not achieve in a lifetime. But to us, there is something more which tells us not about your accomplishments, but about your behavior--about the kind of a man you are. I refer to your never-failing courage and willingness to sacrifice yourself, your high sense of honor, your consideration of others, and your refusal ever to stoop to the scheming so common today. I think also of your constancy in spite of prolonged and innumerable strains and harassments. All these qualities of yours show true greatness of soul and explain why you have so many friends who feel themselves so closely bound to you." (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68, [II]) Clifford also sent Westmoreland a congratulatory letter on March 29. (Ibid.)
152. Memorandum From the President's Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 23, 1968, 12:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 6 G (2), 2/68-3/68, Talks with Hanoi. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the memorandum by the President reads: "Walt--For Rostow, Rusk, Clifford, comments at once."
For the President
I wonder whether some kind of sequence like this might be useful:
1. North Vietnam tells the Swiss they are seriously prepared to take part in negotiations after the unconditional halt of the bombing.
2. You announce that you have instructed our air forces to halt the bombing north of the 20th parallel,
--and that you have sent representatives to Geneva and Rangoon to await the North Vietnamese.
3. They say that isn't enough; we've got to stop it altogether.
4. We say, we cannot stop it altogether so long as men and supplies are pouring down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
We show photographs of this and other evidence of the invasion over the past two months.
5. We say, "We'd like to stop the bombing altogether. If you will not mount an attack on our bases or on the cities in I Corps, or upon Saigon, and if you will stop the shelling of South Vietnam from the DMZ and positions north of the DMZ, we will stop it altogether during the period in which you refrain from such attacks. And we will send our man to Geneva or Rangoon."
6. They say that's insulting; we must stop our bombing and all other acts of war, etc.
7. We say we regret they have responded in the same old way--"You disarm, while we pistol-whip you."
Purpose of the exercise: to show the American people that we are willing to do every reasonable thing to bring about talks.
Each step must be in the open--not reported after the fact. We are genuinely seeking peace, and we made several offers and counter-offers.
Harry
153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 25, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k. Top Secret. In an attached covering note to the President transmitting Rusk's memorandum and attachments, March 25, 2:25 p.m., Rostow wrote: "As you can see, Sec. Rusk was already rolling when Harry McPherson's suggestion arrived. I had earlier this morning transmitted your desire for a positive proposal. As background to this proposal, you should be aware that the enemy forces are maneuvering into position for simultaneous attacks in the western highlands, Hue, Quang Tri, as well as Khe Sanh. Moreover there is very heavy movement of men and materiel on the infiltration trails. If the offer came before they had launched their attacks, you would, in effect, be giving them a chance to draw back. If, as we suspect, they do not draw back, we would be in a position to fight the unfought battle against the major North Vietnamese units, flat out. The next natural moment for initiative would come, as I have suggested, in May." The notation "ps" on the covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it and the attachments.
My own mind is running very close to that of Harry McPherson about a possible peace move. The attached papers contain the essence of the suggestion I wanted to discuss with the "wise men." In detail, I have the following observations on Harry's very interesting suggestion:/2/
/2/See Document 152.
1. Rather than our sending representatives to Geneva and Rangoon, I would prefer putting the monkey on the back of the two co-chairmen to get in touch with both sides to see what is possible.
2. A simple condition for stopping the bombing all together might be the withdrawal back into North Viet-Nam of all North Vietnamese forces in the two northernmost provinces of South Viet-Nam and the demilitarization of the DMZ.
3. Otherwise, the McPherson suggestion is a very constructive one. It would require careful coordination with Bunker who would need to get the South Vietnamese on board.
Dean Rusk/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED DRAFT/4/
/4/The attached statement, drafted by Rusk on March 25, reads: "After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S. bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam be limited to those areas which are directly related to the support of their forces invading South Viet-Nam. No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step I have taken can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully."
1. For the next month or so the weather in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would mean that the proposal would not make a major difference from a military point of view.
2. Full bombing would be resumed if there were a major attack on Khe Sanh or a second round of attacks on the cities.
3. We would not send Ambassadors rushing all over the world to convert the bombing action into negotiations but would simply sit back and wait for Hanoi to respond.
4. We should notify Prime Minister Wilson in advance in order that he can test the Soviet Union about the convening of the two Co-Chairmen (and perhaps the three members of the ICC) to be available to talk to any interested parties about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.
5. It would shift away from theological debates about words and put the problem on the de facto level of action. If Hanoi took no corresponding military action, the bombing would be resumed.
6. It would be very important for us not to embroider the statement with all sorts of "conditions" or "assumptions." Just take the action and see whether anybody is able to make anything out of it.
7. The "areas which are integrally related to the battlefield" would presumably be at least as far north as Vinh. Bombing below that area should be intensive and without wraps.
154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 25, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, March 19, 1970, Memo to the President, Decision to Halt the Bombing, 1967, 1968 [I]. Secret.
Mr. President:
You may wish to give some time today to consider the key questions you may well put to the Advisory Group tomorrow morning./2/
/2/See Document 156.
Here are my tentative suggestions; although I shall file a second memo tomorrow morning in the light of this evening's discussions./3/
/3/Not found; presumably the conclusion reached at the "Wise Men" group's meeting later that night made additional questions extraneous. See Document 155. Rostow presented the State and Defense Department plans for structuring the briefing of the "Wise Men" in a briefing book for the President, March 25. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 7, Meeting Notes)
I have tried to keep the questions as close to those of November 2/4/ as possible so that you will be able to gauge the change of view between then and now; although, of course, new issues have arisen--notably, additional troops; and the timing of our actions with respect to the ending of the winter-spring offensive (say, May 15).
/4/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.
Question 1. Should we send more troops to South Vietnam? Do you suggest any change of military strategy or tactics in South Vietnam?
Question 2. With respect to the North, should we: Continue what we are doing? Mine the ports and plan to take down the dikes when the water is high? Unilaterally reduce or eliminate bombing of North Vietnam?
Question 3. In the light of our experiences with negotiating probes over the past year, should we:
--remain passive, awaiting a signal from Hanoi?
--initiate negotiations?
--if so, what formula of initiation do you recommend?
--when should we take the initiative?
Question 4. Taking into account all that you know, do you believe we should, in one way or another, get out of Vietnam and leave it to the Communists?
Question 5. If you believe we should stay the course in Vietnam, what measures would you suggest to rally and unite our own people behind the effort in Vietnam?
W.W. Rostow/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
155. Editorial Note
On March 25, 1968, members of the group informally known as the "Wise Men" assembled at the Department of State for a series of presentations on Vietnam. The following senior U.S. statesmen made up this body: former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the President's former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Representative to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg, former Under Secretary of State George Ball, retired Generals Matthew Ridgway and Omar Bradley, Special Consultant to the President Maxwell Taylor, Justice Abe Fortas, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy, Ambassador at Large Henry Cabot Lodge, former High Commissioner of Germany John McCloy, and Arthur Dean, who had been involved in the Korean war peace negotiations.
The group dined at 7:30 p.m. with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Ambassador at Large Harriman, General John P. McConnell, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy, and Special Assistant Walt Rostow. Over dinner, the Wise Men listened to Clifford's discussion of the overall situation in Vietnam. Clifford outlined the three choices that the United States faced: an expansion of the war effort, "muddling along" by continuing the current policy, or reducing the U.S. role by cutting back the bombing and curtailing ground operations. Following dinner, the Wise Men went to the Operations Center, where they received three formal briefings. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Books, 1968) A schedule for the Wise Men meetings is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Courses of Action--Post Paris Talks, 1967-1968.
The first briefing was by Major General William DePuy, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, who described the post-Tet military outlook in encouraging terms but was assailed by Goldberg in the following exchange, as later recalled by Clifford: "What, Goldberg asked, was the normal ratio of wounded to killed? A three-to-one ratio among the Vietnamese would be a conservative estimate, DePuy answered. How many 'effectives'--regular soldiers--do you think they now have, Goldberg asked. Perhaps 230,000, maybe 240,000, said DePuy. Well, said Goldberg, with 80,000 killed and a wounded ratio of three to one, that makes about 320,000 men killed or wounded. 'Who the hell is there left for us to be fighting?' he asked." See Clifford, Counsel to the President, page 513.
The next briefer was less hopeful. George Carver, top adviser to Richard Helms on Vietnamese affairs, discussed pacification and enemy strength, noting that the problems facing the civil side of the war effort would prove more difficult than expected to overcome. The most pessimistic assessment came from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib. He portrayed the political situation in South Vietnam as extremely dire and military victory as unachievable; he advocated negotiations preceded by a bombing halt.
By the time the meeting ended at 11 p.m., the majority of the Wise Men favored de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. No record of the meeting has been found, but it is described in detail in The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition, pages 591-593; see also George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1982), pages 407-409; Walter Issacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), page 700; Herbet Y. Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pages 259-261; Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton, 1972), page 390; Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War (New York: Norton, 1989), pages 194-195; Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-1971 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), page. 260; and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), pages 451-453.
156. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 26, 1968, 10:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the family dining room of the White House. Tom Johnson joined the meeting at 10:45 a.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
GENERAL EARLE WHEELER, JCS
AND
GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland told me today that with the forces he now has available he does not fear a general defeat. However, the lack of adequate reserves could permit the enemy a tactical victory.
General Westmoreland says the enemy has the capability to reinforce over the next two months with two divisions.
The President: What does our intelligence, our best intelligence, tell us about the number of men the enemy has put into the South?
General Wheeler: In the period from late December to late January, they moved in 30 battalions of North Vietnamese or about 18,000 new combat troops not including support. The total with support would be about 30,000 to 35,000 not including fillers.
The President: What would the complete total be including fillers?
General Wheeler: 50,000.
The President: Are they still moving in fast?
General Wheeler: There are 16 radio terminals coming down toward the DMZ. The best intelligence estimates these as fillers, not troop units. One group is 600 strong--it could be a battalion or replacement group. The enemy needs replacement because the casualties have been high.
The President: I believe that General Westmoreland asked for troops because:
(1) He doesn't have what he needs
(2) Substantial infiltration
(3) Continued infiltration from the north
General Abrams: It is clear to me that replacements are coming in for 70,000 lost since Tet began. There will be a total of 20 groups of men with 7,000 to 9,000 per group. The men in charge have reported how many there are in a group and what types of men. In one message, they asked how to get uniforms for the civilians.
We have run into men for NVA who had no training per se except in the march down.
The President: Howard Tuckner of NBC says they have 250,000 troops in reserve. What are the facts?
General Abrams then showed the President a picture of two captured Viet Cong. One was 12 years old; the other was 14 years old. One carried a U.S. carbine and one carried an AK-47.
General Abrams: In the Viet Cong units, they are putting NVA replacements.
The President: What are the best figures we have on infiltrators from the North--civilian or military?
General Abrams: 60,000. We got two brigades--10,500 men total.
General Wheeler: The enemy has 200,000 men in the north to protect against amphibious attack. He also has anti-aircraft and rocket units. His reserves are not unlimited.
General Westmoreland thinks they can put two divisions (25,000 men) in for reinforcements. It could give the enemy a tactical victory.
He doesn't think it will be Khesanh. It will be Hue or Quang Tri or in the Central Highlands.
The President: Has Khesanh been busted up, or just used as a ploy?
General Wheeler: He got clobbered with air and artillery. He is now going after Hue and Saigon.
The President: Are we vulnerable at Hue?
General Wheeler: No.
General Abrams: No, absolutely not.
General Wheeler: General Abrams was in the Hue area.
General Abrams: We have planned on going out to Khesanh--to bring trucks in April and conduct operations around there. April is a good time. There is more flyable weather.
Whether you hang on to Khesanh is a matter of flexibility. We don't have to have Khesanh as a price of geography.
The President: Except for our vetoing certain targets, how do we run the war out of here?
General Wheeler: Not at all. He's run in the field.
The President: Didn't we tell General Westmoreland we would let him do what he wants to do and we would support him?
General Wheeler: Yes.
General Abrams: Westy feels that way.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland is there in South Vietnam. He has complete authority. He can't go across the DMZ. There are limits on Laos and Cambodia.
The President: Whose strategy is used?
General Wheeler: It is completely from Westmoreland.
The President: Do we handicap him?
General Wheeler: No.
The President: I want you to have the flexibility you need, General Abrams. I told Westy if you want to see it through, you move.
General Abrams: Westy decided to stay in Khesanh himself.
General Wheeler: He can move in or out.
The President: Did you (JCS) review this?
General Wheeler: Yes.
The President: With the exception of a few bombing targets, General Wheeler, General Westmoreland, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Clifford and State are in general agreement about the conduct of the war?
General Wheeler: Yes. The ARVN are doing well, Westy said.
The President: I want you to meet with that group today. Stress that you have worked with the South Vietnamese closely. Tell them, in candor, we want to talk to you about the South Vietnamese.
(The general impression was depressed, and the low morale in the briefing last night by the CIA.)/2/
/2/See Document 155.
Give them the factual, cold honest picture as you see it. We don't want an inspirational talk or a gloom talk. Nitze won't even testify./3/ It is the civilians that are cutting our guts out.
/3/See footnote 4, Document 150.
The President: We weren't caught asleep during Tet. They lost 50,000. They are trying their damnedest to recover.
Give them your plan, hope and belief.
Carter and DePuy weren't up to par last night. I want both of you at lunch. I want General Abrams to give us the whole picture--pros and cons.
The bitterness has built up here. We hope we aren't attacked while this is going on.
General Ridgway said the strategic reserves are down to nothing. He said he thinks we have more commitments than we can handle.
Secretary Rusk: If we can't see some reasonable date, this country can't support a bottomless pit.
General Wheeler: The ARVN is doing well. The morale is good.
The President: Stress that, General Abrams.
General Wheeler: I asked General Abrams about no reporting of ARVN activities.
The President: Say you found C+ or B- or whatever you think should be said. Make a minimum effort to get SVN to do what they can.
General Wheeler: Westy said he understands the situation in the U.S. He wants the Program Five forces to include three tactical fighter squadrons. He would like to have the forces he now has in the country--the 27th RLT and the 82nd Airborne. I told him we must replace the 27th RLT by an army unit because of the Marines training needs.
He will now move the 101st Airborne to the South-Central highlands for flexibility of action. He wants 13,500 support troops, or might have to cancel the civilianization progress. Westy said he could make progress with the forces he has.
He said he should have a ready element in Hawaii in case something goes wrong. If he gets nothing, it will reduce his flexibility to meet the enemy activity and would require certainly some military achievements. He said he did not want to preempt the views of his successor. General Abrams and I have discussed the situation rather extensively. He has been on the ground eleven months.
The President: Our fiscal situation is abominable. We have a deficit running over 20. We are not getting the tax bill. The deficit could be over 30. If it does, the interest rate will raise. The British pound may fall. The Canadian pound [sic] may fall. The dollar will be in danger. Unless we get a tax bill it will be unthinkable.
They say to get $10 in taxes we must get $10 in reductions of appropriations. We have to take one half from non-Vietnam defense expenditures. That will cause hell with Russell. If we don't do that we will have hell. What happens when you cut poverty, housing and education?
This is complicated by the fact it is an election year. I don't give a damn about the election. I will be happy just to keep doing what is right and lose the election.
There has been a panic in the last three weeks. It was caused by Ted Kennedy's report on corruption and the ARVN and the GVN being no good. And now a release that Westmoreland wants 206,000 men, and a call-up of 400,000. That would cost $15 billion. That would hurt the dollar and gold.
The leaks to the New York Times hurt us. The country is demoralized. You must know about it. It's tough you can't have communications. A worker writes a paper for Clifford group and it's all over Georgetown. The people are trying to save us from ourselves. You must bear this in mind.
Bobby advocated: (1) Rusk resigning. (2) Placing the war in the hands of a Commission. I said no./4/
/4/See Document 123.
I will have overwhelming disapproval in the polls and elections. I will go down the drain. I don't want the whole alliance and military pulled in with it.
Ambassador Goldberg wants us not to bomb North Vietnam for three weeks. Secretary Clifford has a plan to stop above the 20th parallel, and his infiltration. We must have something.
I wouldn't be surprised if they repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Senator Russell wants us to go in and take out Haiphong. Senator McCarthy and Senator Kennedy and the left wing have informers in the departments. The Times and the Post are all against us. Most of the press is against us.
How can we get this job done? We need more money in an election year, more taxes in an election year, more troops in an election year and more cuts in an election year.
As yet I cannot tell them what they expect to get in return. We have no support for the war. This is caused by the 206,000 troop request, leaks, Ted Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy.
I would give Westmoreland 206,000 men if he said he needed them and if we could get them.
General Wheeler: They will settle for the 13,500 plus the Air Force squadrons.
The President: The reports are depressing about the Reserves.
General Wheeler: A squadron of A-1s is going into Laos at the end of this month or early next month.
The President: Is there anything we should be doing that we aren't doing?
General Wheeler: Our basic strategy is sound. We can't fight a war on the defensive and win. Westmoreland has tried to go on the tactical offense. In certain places he must defend--such as Cam Ranh Bay. Within our strategy there are tactical variations.
General Abrams: I don't feel we need to change strategy. We need to be more flexible tactically inside South Vietnam. Khesanh is an example. Khesanh hasn't turned out too bad. We have had 5,000 men and irregulars there, and 20,000 loads of bombs on their two divisions. Their losses have been tremendous.
It looked as though they were going to attack on the 23rd. We put B-52s and Tactical Air in. They did start shelling (1100 rounds). The battalions had trouble getting to jump-off places. Another never came. Khesanh hasn't turned out to be a bad thing for us.
He has one division left--shifted one division. We think he has been persuaded not to attack Khesanh. He has lost munitions and fuel.
Now we will open the road to relocate Khesanh so we can support it better and bring more power to bear.
I think three tactical fighter squadrons should go under Program 5.
The brigade of 82nd or equivalent should stay.
The President: Has there been any bitching from the men?
General Abrams: No. I saw a Negro First Sergeant in the 82nd Brigade. He has been back a year. He told me he had been in Vietnam 18 months. He had been in the 1st Cavalry Division. Had been a Platoon leader. He has a wife and kids. He was asked, what do you think about being here now? He said he believes we are doing the right thing and that we should be there. The morale is tops. General Seitz/5/ has taken care of the wives and families at Fort Bragg. The men had to take off and hadn't had their income tax for 1967 filled out. All of them are good soldiers. Eighty percent are Vietnam veterans.
/5/General Richard Seitz, Commander, 82d Airborne Division, U.S. Army.
The President: Do you have 100,000 fighting men out of 500,000, or how many?
General Abrams: About 38% or more.
General Wheeler: It is nearer 200,000.
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Can you say the other 60%, if were extended, what would that do? Ask those not in combat to extend 60 days.
General Wheeler: One twelfth of the force comes out every month.
The President: 30,000. Would 60 days more cause any problem? We might make it 30-60-90 days. Limiting them to 12 months has given us good morale.
Take an extra 90 days for those who aren't in combat.
General Wheeler: There will be some problems. This is difficult to find men who haven't been fired on. I think it would shoot morale to hell.
General Abrams: I would not do it.
The President: Can you do it by volunteers?
General Abrams: I would be hopeful you could have volunteer
drives on that. Out of the non-combat types you get high percentage of volunteers. My judgment is that we should call up a small percentage of reserves.
I want you to tell them all the things that are true. Be sure it is factual. If you soldiers were as gloomy and doomy as the civilians you would have surrendered.
Give thought to how we can maintain the best posture in the world with what we have out there.
I think a senior person who believes in what we are doing ought to meet the Korean President next Saturday/6/ in Honolulu.
/6/March 30.
Nitze says he would resign if we sent extra troops. What we have been doing has got us in a mess.
General Abrams: There are a lot of good civilians.
The President: What can we do to hold South Vietnam and keep North Vietnam from taking it over? I want you to be able to do in South Vietnam what needs to be done.
I like Westmoreland. He was one of four recommended to me. The other three were: General Abrams, General Palmer and General Johnson. Westmoreland has played on the team to help me.
The Stennis hearings hurt us. The civilians in both departments hurt us. I started in 1966 trying to get a surtax. I've made no progress on taxes. I've got a deficit of $30 billion.
157. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 26, 1968, 1:15-3:05 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House. Those attending were the President, Clifford, Rusk, Taylor, Rostow, Goldberg, Bradley, Dillon, Lodge, Bundy, Acheson, Vance, Ridgway, Ball, Dean, Murphy, Wheeler, Abrams, Harriman, Jones, Christian, and Tom Johnson. Fortas entered the meeting at 2:50 p.m. and the Vice President at 3:07 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH HIS FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISERS
(On the table was a document on the growth of North Vietnam Army forces in South Vietnam.)/2/
/2/Attached but not printed; it is summarized below.
The President: Thank you for coming. I am sure Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford have followed this meeting closely. I want to hear from people who are not regular advisers from time to time.
I asked General Abrams to come here today. General Wheeler has been conferring with General Westmoreland. I want to hear your views and what you think will be helpful to me.
General Wheeler: In late February I visited South Vietnam./3/ At that time the situation was fluid. The South Vietnamese were shook and had a variety of paralysis. Government and military were clustered in urban areas to protect against a second wave of attacks. I told President Thieu that the South Vietnam forces had to go on the offensive. Thieu said South Vietnam could not take another Tet offensive.
/3/Regarding Wheeler's report, see Document 160.
General Westmoreland has turned this around. They are now out in offensive activities.
General Westmoreland told me in Manila:
--Do not fear a general defeat with the forces we now have.
--There could be a tactical victory.
--The morale of the South Vietnamese is good.
--ARVN are now on the offensive.
The North Vietnamese army force in South Vietnam is now increased by 50,000-60,000 men. The enemy can reinforce with two divisions in 30 days. It could give the enemy greater chance for a tactical victory.
General Westmoreland believes that replacement packages are coming down from the North. The enemy has suffered great casualties.
Khesanh has served a useful purpose. It held two enemy divisions around it and one enemy division in support. The enemy has been badly battered. He has withdrawn one unit to the south and one moved to the east. I do not think the enemy has the intention of attacking Khesanh now.
We face additional hard fighting. He has sanctuaries. I see no reason for all the gloom and doom we see in the United States press. There were setbacks during Tet--mostly psychological and two military. The most setback was here in the United States, which was one of their objectives.
The President: When General Westmoreland was last here, we did not give him all the troops he asked for. We agreed to make up the difference with a package of additional allied troops. We have sent all but three or four battalions promised./4/
/4/In telegram MAC 4192 to Wheeler and Sharp, March 27, Westmoreland outlined MACV's minimal requirements. He noted that the package would require an adjustment of the force ceiling to 560,000, exclusive of spaces to be filled through civilianization. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 407, Litigation Collection, Westmoreland v. CBS, MACV Backchannel Messages from Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder II)) Wheeler responded in telegram JCS 3449 to Westmoreland, March 28, by noting that the maximum ceiling would be 549,500 spaces consisting of the Program 5 deployments, retention and replacement forces, and reinforcements in support of deploying brigades, and requested Westmoreland to specify the elements that would comprise the forces he wanted. (Ibid., MACV Backchannel Messages to Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder II)) Westmoreland sent a "front channel" request for these forces in telegram MAC 4242 to Wheeler and Sharp, March 28. (Ibid., MACV Backchannel Messages from Westmoreland, 1-31 March 1968 (Folder II))
General Wheeler: Three battalions will arrive by mid April.
The President: General Abrams has been working closely with South Vietnamese.
General Abrams: When I was assigned to Vietnam eleven months ago I was assigned to work with the South Vietnamese troops. I worked with them six days a week. In the first few days of February, I visited all the Vietnamese commanders.
Then I went to northern I Corps to coordinate deployments in I Corps. In the last few days before I came back I spent time visiting all four Corps.
First, the Vietnamese armed forces performed well during the Tet offensive. We would have been in a catastrophe had they not fought well. The South Vietnamese were in bad posture when the attacks came. At that time, most South Vietnamese troops had 50% of their units home on Tet leave. There were three commanders who decided not to let their men off.
The Division commanders expected attacks in several areas, and canceled the leaves of the men. In some cases the division commanders were not ready.
The South Vietnamese have 149 maneuver battalions--8 performed unsatisfactorily; 30 performed with distinction; the rest performed satisfactorily.
The First South Vietnamese division cleaned out two thirds of the Citadel. They lost two thirds of their strength. They took the palace.
The Airborne Division took 11% casualties.
The desertion rate in these divisions was slightly higher than in other divisions. The Second Ranger Group performed very poorly. The trouble is with their leadership.
The 44th Regiment was a great disappointment. It is made up of integrated training and operations. We thought it was a good thing, but in Tet they weren't worth a damn. The problem was with the regimental commander.
There are three divisions in III Corps around Saigon that are a problem. They did fight during the Tet. Desertions exceeded casualties in February. They had more training and help in 1967 than any other. We may have helped them too much.
In the Delta, the divisions performed well. They had nasty and difficult fighting.
In February, there were 7,000 volunteers for service in the Vietnamese army versus 1500 in January.
There have been two replacements of division commanders which look helpful. I feel good about the Delta.
I visited all the outfits. They are out moving, even in 3rd Corps. The roads are open. Traffic is moving. Trucks are moving over Route 4. ARVN is out operating from one end of the country to another.
They have shortened the recruit training period. They will add 135,000 more troops.
Some other commanders have been relieved. Some province chiefs have to go.
I feel good about the way the thing is going. The morale of the ARVN is high. Some have won battles, with the best of the NVA. The ARVN are promoting from the ranks.
We are trying to improve weaponry. Some of this was done before Tet. M-16s have been distributed to two divisions in the Delta. We are going to give them machine guns and mortars.
We need to give regional forces and popular forces better weapons. The regional forces and popular forces stuck and fought too. Desertion rates did not increase in the regional forces and popular forces.
The President: Will you get 135,000?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Are they drafting 18 year olds?
General Abrams: Yes. Thieu and Ky are determined to do it.
The President: What percent of the ARVN are poor?
General Abrams: 8 of 149 battalions.
The President: How many U.S. battalions are there now?
General Abrams: 103 now. We will have 106.
The President: What are the capabilities for improvement?
General Abrams: They are better. Westy has worked on this for a long time. They have a fine Officer Candidate School and Staff Colleges.
The President: How do the ARVN compare with the Koreans?
General Abrams: The Koreans had the same problem of building their army and fighting at the same time. I would say the Vietnamese are doing as well if not better than the Koreans.
The President: What about the battles in I Corps against the North Vietnamese Army units?
General Abrams: In I Corps, his main objectives are the two northern provinces. In that, the principal objective is Hue.
He committed 14-16 battalions to take Hue and 14-16 battalions to take Saigon. Since then, he has moved back in on Hue. I do not believe Hue is in danger.
He has 44% of his main units in I Corps, 22% in II Corps, 24% in III Corps, and 10% in the Delta. Of ours, 49% are in I Corps.
The President: Do you think he will attack in Khesanh?
General Abrams: I would bet he is not. He started out to on the 23rd of the month. We put too much on him.
The President: How?
General Abrams: By bombing.
The President: What do you expect in April?
General Abrams: He will continue his pressure on Saigon. He will try to keep up the pressure. He may try at Hue. I don't believe he has the strength to do that.
The President: What do you see this year?
General Abrams:
--Hard fighting
--Attrition of enemy forces
--Improvement in ARVN, RF and PF
--Enemy is making this year an all-out effort.
The President: Is it a change in his strategy?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: What kind?
General Abrams: He was losing under the old strategy. He was losing control of people.
McGeorge Bundy: What is the relation of Regional Forces and Popular Forces and ARVN to the pacification in the future?
General Abrams: In many places the Popular Forces and the Regional Forces were pulled into towns. This took them away from the influence and protection outside towns. Our biggest problem is in the 4th Corps.
In III Corps, the losses in men in the Regional Forces and Popular Forces have not been great. We only need to move them out of the provinces.
I Corps and II Corps--it is pretty good.
McGeorge Bundy: Were they not as much affected by Tet?
General Abrams: Not as much affected, no.
Ambassador Goldberg: Can there be another series of Tet-like offensives?
General Abrams: No.
Douglas Dillon: When the buildup of the ARVN is completed, can they carry a larger part of the fighting?
General Abrams: Yes. I would have to quit if I didn't believe that. They can take on more fighting against the Viet Cong. I feel quite certain of that.
158. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 26, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Those attending the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 4:32 p.m., were the President, the Vice President, Clifford, Rusk, Taylor, Rostow, Goldberg, Bradley, Dillon, Lodge, Bundy, Acheson, Vance, Ridgway, Ball, Dean, Murphy, Fortas, Wheeler, Abrams, Harriman, Jones, Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
SUMMARY OF NOTES
McGeorge Bundy: There is a very significant shift in our position. When we last met we saw reasons for hope./2/
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 377.
We hoped then there would be slow but steady progress. Last night and today the picture is not so hopeful particularly in the country side.
Dean Acheson summed up the majority feeling when he said that we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must begin to take steps to disengage.
That view was shared by:
George Ball
Arthur Dean
Cy Vance
Douglas Dillon
and myself (McGeorge Bundy)
We do think we should do everything possible to strengthen in a real and visible way the performance of the Government of South Vietnam.
There were three of us who took a different position:
General Bradley
General Taylor
Bob Murphy
They all feel that we should not act to weaken our position and we should do what our military commanders suggest.
General Ridgway has a special point of view. He wanted to so strengthen the Army of South Vietnam that we could complete the job in two years./3/
/3/Ridgway circulated a paper in which he called for the creation of a GVN "defense establishment capable of defending that political independence." He added a final caveat: "Perhaps the serving of notice on the Vietnamese Government that we will give it a maximum of two years to accomplish this, at the end of which time we begin a phase-down of our forces, would serve as an adequate stimulus." ("Random Thoughts on Vietnam," March 26; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Vietnam, General, April-Dec. 1968)
On negotiations, Ball, Goldberg and Vance strongly urged a cessation of the bombing now. Others wanted a halt at some point but not now while the situation is still unresolved in the I Corps area.
On troop reinforcements the dominant sentiment was that the burden of proof rests with those who are urging the increase. Most of us think there should be a substantial escalation. We all felt there should not be an extension of the conflict. This would be against our national interest.
The use of atomic weapons is unthinkable.
Summary:/4/
/4/In a March 27 memorandum for his personal files, Harriman recorded what Lodge had told him about the meeting: "Mac Bundy gave a summary which Lodge thought was pretty fair. The President said, 'then all of you except Wheeler, Taylor, Bradley, Murphy want to disengage.' Lodge said, 'No, I don't want to disengage--I want to use our power differently than we have.' (I commented to Lodge that 'disengagement' is not the right word. Many of us want to start negotiations for a peaceful settlement). Wheeler took the point of view this is the worst possible time that we have ever had to start negotiations. Lodge said he whispered to Acheson, 'Yes, because we are in worse shape militarily than we ever have been.' But the extraordinary thing is the President summed it up by saying, 'You have been hearing things I haven't. I want to hear from the men you have.' " (Ibid., Chronological Files, March 1968)
Ridgway: I agree with the summary as presented by McGeorge Bundy.
Dean: I agree. All of us got the impression that there is no military conclusion in sight. We felt time is running out.
Dean Acheson: Agree with Bundy's presentation. Neither the effort of the Government of Vietnam or the effort of the U.S. government can succeed in the time we have left. Time is limited by reactions in this country. We cannot build an independent South Vietnam; therefore, we should do something by no later than late summer to establish something different.
Henry Cabot Lodge: We should shift from search and destroy strategy to a strategy of using our military power as a shield to permit the South Vietnamese society to develop as well as North Vietnamese society has been able to do. We need to organize South Vietnam on a block-by-block, precinct-by-precinct basis./5/
/5/In a written statement of his proposal used at the March 26 meeting, Lodge wrote: "Less stress on 'search and destroy' would mean fewer casualties (U.S. and Vietnamese), less destruction, fewer refugees, less ill will, and more public support at home. More stress on organization of South Vietnamese society would make South Vietnamese truly competitive with Communism--not just on the conventional battlefield, but in every aspect of life." He added: "If we had focused our past effort on population organization rather than search and destroy, we would, I believe, undoubtedly have been less badly hurt by the Tet raids." (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, 1968 Secretary of Defense Files) In a letter transmitting the statement to Clifford the next day, Lodge further noted: "It does not mean that our troops would be placed in static positions for the physical defense of the cities. In fact, our base camps would stay pretty much where they are now. It does mean that their mission would be the protection of Vietnamese efforts to organize the population (and root out the hard-core terrorists) instead of their mission being the 'war of attrition.'" (Ibid.)
Douglas Dillon: We should change the emphasis. I agree with Acheson. The briefing last night led me to conclude we cannot achieve a military victory. I would agree with Lodge that we should cease search-and-destroy tactics and head toward an eventual disengagement. I would send only the troops necessary to support those there now.
George Ball: I share Acheson's view. I have felt that way since 1961--that our objectives are not attainable. In the U.S. there is a sharp division of opinion. In the world, we look very badly because of the bombing. That is the central defect in our position. The disadvantages of bombing outweigh the advantages. We need to stop the bombing in the next six weeks to test the will of the North Vietnamese. As long as we continue to bomb, we alienate ourselves from the civilized world. I would have the Pope or U Thant suggest the bombing halt. It cannot come from the President.
A bombing halt would quieten the situation here at home.
Cy Vance: McGeorge Bundy stated my views. I agree with George Ball.
Unless we do something quick, the mood in this country may lead us to withdrawal. On troops, we should send no more than the 13,000 support troops.
General Bradley: People in the country are dissatisfied. We do need to stop the bombing if we can get the suggestion to come from the Pope or U Thant, but let's not show them that we are in any way weakening. We should send only support troops.
Bob Murphy: I am shaken by the position of my associates. The interpretation given this action by Saigon would be bad. This is a "give-away" policy. I think it would weaken our position.
General Taylor: I am dismayed. The picture I get is a very different one from that you have. Let's not concede the home front; let's do something about it./6/
/6/According to transcripts of the recording of this meeting, the conversation at this point went: "General Taylor: Well, I have been somewhat amazed, Mr. President, by the views expressed here by some of my friends for whom I have the greatest respect. I look back on the briefings last night because the picture these gentlemen have in their minds is not the one I have developed over a period of time. President: I just want to observe--the first thing I am going to do when you all leave here is to get those briefers last night. [Laughter followed.] I want to hear what they said because I want to see--because I want to evaluate it. I haven't heard of that kind of pictures. [sic] Go ahead. General Taylor: Mr. President, first as Secretary Rusk pointed out, they had spoken in unison. I thought they bent over backwards to balance the good and bad. But I suspect we are all the victims of our environment. I know that I am, and I think my friends are too. I think that if you are accustomed to hearing the bad, the bad comes to view, and I listened to those same briefings and didn't come out any more discouraged than I was when I went in. But behind all this is concern about the election front which I am sure racks us all. But we didn't get around to discussing it. The last time, you will remember, that was the primary subject in November. What could we do about the home front? Now there seems to be a vigorous misconception as to the fact that this home front is going out this month or next. Well, that is not the impression I get when I go around the country. There is indeed more discouragement this year than this time last year, but I still have huge confidence that the people in the United States are willing to do those things that are necessary--and are demonstrated as being necessary. So I am not ready to sell out on the home front yet, but I would like to hear, and perhaps you may wish to--let's do something about it and see if we can't explain the need for doing these very tough things that are facing us in Southeast Asia. Now that's about my only overall comment except I dispute in my own mind the reasoning we must stop the bombing because we muffed the solution and then come to the table knowing that we are going to lose our shirt. I just don't see how success goes down that road. President: I haven't heard the men that reviewed the events since Tet--from them directly. I want to so I can evaluate it and may come to the very same conclusion that everybody else here has. I haven't heard some of these theories. Maybe I haven't gotten the whole story. I gather that it is different from what I have been getting top-side." (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
Fortas: The U.S. has never had in mind winning a military victory out there; we always have wanted to reach an agreement or settle for the status quo between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. I agree with General Taylor and Bob Murphy. This is not the time for an overture on our part. I do not think a cessation of the bombing would do any good at this time. I do not believe in drama for the sake of drama.
Acheson: The issue is not that stated by Fortas. The issue is can we do what we are trying to do in Vietnam. I do not think we can. Fortas said we are not trying to win a military victory. The issue is can we by military means keep the North Vietnamese off the South Vietnamese. I do not think we can. They can slip around and end-run them and crack them up./7/
/7/Following additional remarks by Dillon, Wheeler, Dean, Murphy, and Ball, the President concluded: "What we want to do is take what you have said and what we can produce here from the junior and senior people and what Congress may be able to approve, [which is] what we may need to do, and try to make our course here as effective as possible. I want to thank each of you for taking the time in giving it to me. I want to feel in reasonable limits I could call on you to give me your frank and honest opinions at any time. I would hope that you would be available as occasions arise periodically in the next few months--in the months to come and [thereafter], as you have on other occasions, particularly last November and now. All I believe were here then except General Ridgway and Mr. Vance, and I had them individually on other occasions on the same general subjects. I don't want to consider this a formal group. I don't want to consider it a restricted or restrained group. I want you to feel perfectly free to say anything whether the Secretary of State is here or not--whether or not the Secretary of Defense is here--because primarily I want to inform them myself. I didn't have the chance to spend last evening with you and I wanted to talk with you personally without any other people being present. I would like to ask you to keep your presence and the fact that you were at a meeting with a group like this to yourself and not discuss it. If it does go the way of some of our intelligence documents and some of our reports that are filed with the Defense Department and State Department do, they'll wind up in print. My general [explanation] will be that this represents a group that from time to time I talk to individuals in whom I have confidence and associations with the general problems. I don't want to get in the habit of making those public because I don't want--particularly in a political year--to have them appear or feel I am using them one way or the other. The fact that they advise with me implies that they are part of my policy. And so I would like to have each of you regard it as you have in the past and not let the public know about it. If they ask when I saw you last--I have asked Mr. Christian to say the President from time to time calls upon men who have served in the government and that's a manner calm and patient. Thank you." (Ibid.)
159. Editorial Note
On March 26, 1968, the President met in the Cabinet Room with the Vice President, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, General Creighton Abrams, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, Special Counsel Harry McPherson, and Justice Abe Fortas in a meeting that lasted from 6 to 7:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) The primary topic of conversation was the situation on the ground in Vietnam, with Wheeler presenting General William Westmoreland's assessment of it. Wheeler noted that Westmoreland had emphatically stressed that his troops were "doing well" and that their morale was "good." Westmoreland believed that he could keep on the offensive if he could receive the balance of the Program 5 forces yet to be delivered and necessary support elements for that deployment. He also recommended the stationing of a significant reserve force in Hawaii. Westmoreland also had wanted to clarify that he never had asked for 206,000 men; it had been only one of several packages discussed "in contingency thinking." Wheeler stated that, based on Westmoreland's requirements, the force levels in Vietnam would consist of those already in the pipeline comprising the 525,000 ceiling, plus the 11,000 emergency augmentation and the 13,500 support troops. However, if the civilianization program was canceled, the ceiling could increase by an additional 12,500.
In light of this significant augmentation, Wheeler positively assessed the prospects facing Westmoreland in Vietnam: "My feeling is that, with Westy's present force and when we include in these two brigades and Program V to continue with the addition of these 13,500 support troops, that he was not going to suffer any defeat of any magnitude. Now this does not mean that he may not find it necessary under certain conditions to give up some terrain, temporarily or perhaps even permanently. I don't foresee that he will have to do that, but he might. We have a powerful force out there and if it is well-balanced, and if he has adequate air and unless the enemy reinforces quite substantially--I would even say more than the two divisions that we have been talking about--Westmoreland with the Army should be able to take care of the situation."
At the President's request, Abrams speculated on what would happen in the near future: "I would predict that they will continue to send replacements down in order to maintain the structure that they've got in the next few months, in the next two or three or four months, to try to keep the pressures off the urban and rural areas and with the structure they've got, they may reinforce it by bringing some other units down." But he noted that the South Vietnamese military "was going to get better and better and that we were going to stand up to them more and more." Abrams later offered a personal comment: "One thing, Mr. President, I would like to tell you. I know there is a lot of dying men out there. But you should know about me. I had made up my mind several years ago whether I would continue serving in the Army with all this business and I decided there was something worse than being dead. I thought I would put up with it. I don't like it but it's worth it." (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
160. Editorial Note
The 584th meeting of the National Security Council was held on March 27, 1968, from 1:20 to 2:19 p.m. Those attending the meeting were the President, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Walt Rostow, Bromley Smith, Arthur Goldberg, Secretary of Defense Clifford, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, General Earle Wheeler, Director of USIA Leonard Marks, General Creighton Abrams, AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Price Daniel, ACDA Director William Foster and Deputy Director Adrian Fisher, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Donald Hornig, NSC Staff member Spurgeon Keeny, and George Christian. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Notes of the meeting appear in a memorandum for the record by Keeny dated April 4. These notes in part read:
"The President stated that he had asked General Abrams to join the meeting so that he and General Wheeler could report on the situation in Vietnam before the Council turned to the problem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He asked General Wheeler to summarize his report on his recent trip to Vietnam.
"General Wheeler stated that the situation in Vietnam was very difficult to assess. The Vietnamese government had not been broken by the powerful VC/NVA attacks during the Tet offensive but had been 'frozen' in a defensive posture. The reason for this was that the VC had established a stranglehold around the cities. General Westmoreland had told President Thieu that one could not afford to defend a city from the inside and had to go out after the enemy. Thieu, however, was hesitant to have his forces leave the cities since he felt the government simply could not afford another Tet offensive. However, Thieu was now beginning to push out again from the cities. For example, the current offensive around Saigon was not simply a US operation but was made up of 12 ARVN and 6 US battalions. Westmoreland told him that he believed the ARVN had in general performed well, had maintained high morale, and was now regaining the initiative. While he expected further hard fighting, Westmoreland had no fear of a general defeat. However, the enemy does have the capability of further local victories which can be blown up for propaganda purposes. Westmoreland estimates that the NVA can bring in two more divisions in the next 30 to 45 days and that there are now some 8,000 to 10,000 NVA troops coming down from North Vietnam. Khe Sanh appears to have served the NVA's purpose. Earlier there were two NVA divisions surrounding Khe Sanh with an additional division in reserve. Now one division has moved to the south and the reserve division has moved east. The enemy seems primarily interested now in Hue and Saigon, and Westmoreland believes that the enemy's near-term efforts will be to continue harassments and strangulation of these two cities. In conclusion, he stated that General Westmoreland had no concern that we would suffer a major defeat in South Vietnam.
"The President introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from a memorandum from General Taylor commending General Abrams' excellent record as both a battlefield and staff officer. He then asked General Abrams to tell the group about the plans and problems of the ARVN, particularly with regard to the decision to draft 19- and 18-year-olds.
"General Abrams stated that at General Westmoreland's request, he had been working for almost a year directly with the ARVN forces and had gotten to know most of the officers above the level of regimental commander and some of the regimental commanders as well. He felt that the ARVN, as well as the RF and PF, were continually gaining confidence in themselves. Some deficiencies had been revealed during the Tet offensive, but the general performance of the ARVN had been good--exceeding the expectations of most Americans. The performance of only eight out of the 149 battalions was considered unsatisfactory. Thirty battalions distinguished themselves, and the remainder did very well. He noted that the first ARVN division took 10% casualties--30% in the rifle battalion--but continued to fight. He recounted the story of an ARVN lieutenant who received a field promotion to captain as a result of his aggressive leadership in the recapture of Hue. An increase of 140,000 is now planned in the present ARVN force of around 600,000. They will now draft 19-year-olds and in June will begin the draft of 18-year-olds. He noted that the training centers were all back in operation but that the training job of this large increase is a major task which places a limit on how rapidly the forces can be expanded. He was confident, however, that the ARVN can achieve this force level objective. He reported that they are now trying to obtain from 4,000 to 6,000 additional officers and that a major source will be the commissioning of noncoms who distinguished themselves during the Tet offensive. With regard to new weapons, he noted that a major effort is being made to supply the ARVN with the M-16 rifle as quickly as possible. This program has been completed in I Corps and they are now moving ahead rapidly, particularly in the Highlands where the ARVN is fighting regular NVA units which have modern equipment. He noted the program to upgrade ARVN units with M-60 machine guns and grenade launchers as well as a new mortar. There will be new equipment available by the time the 140,000 new recruits are trained. He reported that an effort must be made to also improve the RF and PF and that, pending availability of additional M-16 rifles, they would be supplied with M-2 automatic carbines as they were replaced in the regular ARVN forces with M-16 rifles.
"The President asked how the Korean forces had operated during the Tet offensive.
"General Abrams replied that the Korean forces leave nothing to be desired. They have the finest officers in the junior grades that he had ever seen. This particularly pleased him since they had been trained in the schools that we had set up after the Korean War.
"The President asked whether the ARVN forces would ever be as good as the Koreans which, he observed, were not considered very good at the beginning of the Korean War.
"General Abrams replied that he saw no reason why the ARVN could not be just as good as the Koreans.
"The President asked how the Australian troops have done.
"General Abrams replied that the Australians had performed very well and that now that they had an additional battalion they had a large enough force to operate independently.
"The President asked what the results of the Tet offensive had really been and what we could look forward to.
"General Abrams stated that the Tet offensive had given a quantum jump to the improvement of the ARVN morale since the ARVN had met and beaten the best of the NVA forces. He observed that nothing you can do does more for a soldier's morale than to give them a victory. The morale of the ARVN is now at the highest point it has ever been. The morale of US soldiers has been good and continues to be so. He told a story of the Marine group on Hill 821 at Khe Sanh that ran up the flag every morning in a bugle ceremony in order to attract fire so that the enemy would use up its quota of shells against them for the day all at once. For the future, he expected more fighting in April. The enemy will apply all the pressure that he can.
"The President asked whether he had enough troops for adequate protection.
"General Abrams replied that, with the currently planned augmentation, he believed that the situation can be adequately handled."
The full text of Keeny's memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 66.
161. Memorandum From the Postmaster General (O'Brien) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, O'Brien, Lawrence--Vietnam. Confidential. The President wrote on the memorandum: "Rostow--ask Rusk to get Larry over here at once & explain."
Mr. President:
During the last several days, I have had contacts with a large number of Democratic officials, leaders and workers around the country--both in person and by phone. Without exception, these people are your supporters and also without exception they express serious concerns about our current posture in Vietnam, both in political and in general terms.
The political aspect came through clearly in the conversations I have had. These people--loyal Administration Democrats--are fearful of the end result in terms of both the Chicago convention and the November election, if our present Vietnam posture is maintained.
I know that this is not news to you--that you have been getting the same reports--but it is apparent that these views are becoming more widespread. I have continued to review the problem in my own mind since sending you my memo of March 21, and now I would like to respectfully suggest some possibly dramatic moves that could allay the fears and buoy the spirit of the nation.
As I suggested in my previous memo,/2/ I believe we should vigorously pursue the course of insisting upon greater responsibility by the Vietnamese people and Government in fighting the War. At the same time, we should publicly express our disappointment and unhappiness with the South Vietnamese failures, both in military terms and in terms of establishing a truly democratic governmental process.
/2/In this March 21 memorandum to the President, O'Brien noted: "What I am suggesting is a phasing out of the tremendous American responsibility for the conduct of the war and a phasing in of far greater responsibility by the South Vietnamese themselves." (Ibid.)
The Government of South Vietnam could follow this up by making a tangible move toward a greater spirit of democracy: the granting of a general amnesty for political prisoners.
The next step would be for President Thieu to express his strong desire for peace and his willingness to negotiate with the enemy. President Thieu would specify that on a date certain the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and all allied troops would begin a cease fire. Our Government would support this effort and would announce a bombing pause to begin on the same date.
As a further effort to dramatize our sincerity, you would announce that you are sending a delegation of outstanding Americans to Geneva who will be sitting at the peace table along with representatives of the South Vietnamese Government--ready to negotiate with North Vietnam at the very hour that the cease fire and the bombing pause would be scheduled to start.
I realize that if we took the above steps or similar steps, the chances for meaningful negotiations and lasting peace would still be questionable. However, I think these moves would accomplish a great deal in making a large segment of the American people understand our sincerity and in convincing them that this Administration will go to the greatest possible lengths to achieve peace.
We all agree, Mr. President, that our problems in Vietnam transcend political considerations and our search for solutions must not be politically motivated. Nevertheless, the widespread anxieties I have found among our political friends and associates convince me that their fears reflect an ever deepening disenchantment among many segments of the population which have heretofore supported our actions in Vietnam.
162. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, March 27, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Those present at the meeting, which lasted from 4:15 p.m. to 5:37 p.m., were the President, the Vice President, Helms, Carver, DePuy, his assistant Lieutenant Colonel H.H. Perritt, McPherson, and Tom Johnson. An hour after the meeting began, Fowler and Zwick entered and were seated at the back of the room. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) An attached cover sheet reads: "CIA-DOD Briefing by General DePuy and George Carver." A transcript of a recording of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
DePuy:
--Build-up of NVA Battalions: Attack force was 85,000--of that, KIA was 42,000
--Areas hit.
Abrams: For every one man we count dead, he loses 1/3 to injury. Saigon wasn't taken. They did get near Tan Son Nhut.
DePuy:
--Losses: NVA-VC--500/day; weapons--16,000 enemy.
--Movements: Buildup near Saigon & Hue.
--Force level of SVN: March '68--647,000; June '68--685,000; June '69--779,154; June '70--801,215.
--Equipment modernization.
--Combat death.
P[resident]: Were 80,000 KIA?
H[elms]: What kind of soldiers were they?
A[brams]: Mixed group, but armed men.
D[ePuy]: Low estimate of enemy force under arms.
153,000--250/day = 98% KIA.
270,000--500/day = 85% KIA.
DePuy: At what point does attrition catch up w/infiltration? They don't.
P[resident]: If we knock off 80,000/yr., can they sustain it?
H[elms]: How many NVA were killed?
Wheeler: I am studying the matter now. Westmoreland believes they could bring in 2 divisions in next 30-60 days. For next several months, he will take more & more chances because he is attacking Americans here at home.
President: Everybody is recommending surrender. What are estimates--input of VC; NVA held down in NVN; how many are available from N.; how fast we can kill them?
Wheeler: Giap's theory is there (are) always going to be people dying.
Carver: Communists want to take South Vietnam. Keep VN state structure from developing.
Decision to put in line elements--late Spring 1964; Autumn 1964--moving in; showed up in early 1965.
Their escalation--March 1965--1st U.S. troops to Danang; Feb. 1965--bombing; May-June; July--Decision by LBJ--100,000 put in.
Are we relatively much stronger today than a year ago/2 years ago?
Abrams: Yes.
P[resident]: From July '65 to July '70. If you take 5-yr. period, are we as far along proportionally as we were in W.W.II?
W[heeler]: Yes. Better off.
P[resident]: How many (do) they have (actual count)?
W[heeler]: 100 (thousand).
P[resident]: How many (do) we have?
W[heeler]: 1,000 (thousand).
P[resident]: You seen any Chinese men?
W[heeler]: No.
P[resident]: Has M-16 problem subsided?
A[brams]: Yes.
Carver: Decisions made last summer in Hanoi. They think they can take us in guerrilla war & that we will not start conventional war. They decided to exploit differences between (not SVN) & (SVN & people) & stop(ping) pacification. Major trends going against them. Had to move off of protracted war status--collapse (of) GVN; destroy pol(itical) basis; collapse our will to carry on struggle in election year. We know all our imperfections. Have an imperfect picture of their losses. They wanted to create fear psychosis. They did take casualties. Controversy over how many.
Abrams: CIA says we lump cab drivers, messengers, couriers, together & call them VC-NVA.
[Omitted here is a list of those present.]
We can't afford to kid ourselves on figures. B-52s and Tac Air (tactical air support) isn't counted.
P[resident]: Any pressure from Washington on body count?
W[heeler]: No. They lost more in 3 months than we have in whole war.
Carver: GVN has been thrown back to district & province towns. Expect 2nd effort. Select individual units. Kontum & Ban Me Thuot.
Abrams: Agree they could hit west of Kontum.
Carver: Still can play with negotiations. Always can make some gesture. Accept S(an) A(ntonio). Prediction--make 1968 a decisive year. Next 2-4 months will be decisive. Political balance may tip. Our contribution must be one of attitude. In next 2-3 months will be decisive.
163. Editorial Note
In late March 1968 the speech for President Lyndon Johnson's television address on Vietnam, scheduled for March 31, underwent significant revision. From 11:03 a.m. to 2:15 p.m. on March 28, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, and Special Counsel Harry McPherson met to discuss drafts of the speech on which McPherson had been working. When the meeting began, Clifford noted his sense that the leaders of the American business and legal communities no longer supported the war effort. "Whatever the specific reason, these men now feel that we are in a hopeless bog," he asserted. "The idea of going deeper into the bog strikes them as mad. They want to see us get out of it." Clifford then proposed that the speech introduce a new element, namely, a halt to the bombing north of the 20th parallel. Notes of the meeting have not been found, but in his memoirs, McPherson described how Clifford's assertion was received:
"Amazingly, the conversation thereafter was concerned with the mechanics of informing our commanders and allies, and with redrafting the speech--not with whether the country should instead be rallied to sustain the effort. No one argued for a continuation of the bombing around Hanoi, or for committing large numbers of fresh troops. Here were five men, all associated with the war; all of whom had either urged its prosecution, helped to form its strategies, argued its rationale, or written its leader's speeches; and not one of them spoke out against 'winding it down'--which would mean, inevitably, accepting a result that was less than satisfactory by the standards they had set for it." (Harry McPherson, A Political Education (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pages 443-436)
The hard-line speech on which McPherson had been working was set aside, and work began on a new alternate draft that emphasized negotiations and de-escalation. In the end, the group decided to give both the hard-line and the de-escalatory drafts to the President. In his memoirs, Clifford related how it was determined which speech the President favored:
"The next morning, shortly after ten o'clock, President Johnson called McPherson to discuss changes in the draft. As Harry began looking through the old draft for places where the President wanted to make changes, he suddenly realized that the President was working on the alternate draft! Suppressing his excitement, he took the President's changes down one by one, but as soon as their conversation was over, Harry called me. 'We've won,' he shouted. 'The President is working from our draft!'" (Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, pages 519-521)
The original version began: "I speak to you tonight in a time of grave challenge to our country." The alternate draft read: "Tonight I want to speak to you of the prospects for peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia." The various drafts of the speech are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, [March 19, 1970, Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing"] 1967, 1968, II. The President discussed his reasons for the decision he conveyed in the speech in his memoir The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pages 423-424.
164. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, March 29, 1968.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968. Secret; Nodis.
Yesterday evening you asked whether I had any advice on future policy./2/ On thinking it over I suggest that an overall decision be made to direct policy towards getting negotiations started under as favorable circumstances as possible. We could move towards negotiations either through the papal or the Goldberg/U Thant routes and should aim at a full bombing stoppage before the middle of May. A halfway stoppage is unlikely to be effective and could be counter-productive.
/2/Harriman met with Rusk between 5:58 and 6:15 p.m. on March 28. (Johnson Library, Dean Rusk Appointment Book, 1968) No other record of their meeting has been found.
I also believe it very important (for the reasons outlined in the attached paper)/3/ to talk to the Soviet leaders first and to attempt, so far as practical, to enlist their cooperation.
/3/In the attached paper, entitled "Objectives of Talks With Soviet Leaders," March 28, Harriman argued that informing the Soviets of the impending peace move "would have a beneficial effect on their future positions and actions" relating to negotiations. "Considering the suspicions that exist between Hanoi and Washington," Harriman noted, "we need some outside influence to assist in reaching a settlement, and there is no other that could be as effective as the Soviet Union." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968) Further elaboration of Harriman's argument in favor of involving the Soviets and East Europeans in the peace process is in a March 25 memorandum entitled "General Principles," which Harriman used during the Wise Men's meetings. (Ibid., Chronological File, March 1968)
In South Vietnam our first move should be to follow through on Thieu's suggestion that he state at a press conference that there is no need for more American troops and that the Vietnamese will raise additional forces as required (Saigon 23309)./4/ (This does not mean that without publicity some additional support troops cannot be sent to balance out current deployments.)
/4/Dated March 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
As far as feasible our military forces should adopt a policy emphasizing protection of the populated areas and reduction of U.S. casualties. We might also subject our present operations to cost effectiveness analysis.
I developed some of these ideas in a paper (attached)/5/ which I prepared for possible use in discussions with the Senior Advisory Group.
/5/In the attached paper, entitled "Proposed Vietnam Policy," March 25, which Harriman had transmitted previously to Ball and Ridgway and discussed at the Wise Men's meetings, Harriman outlined measures to strengthen the ARVN and the RF/PF, means to politically unite the South Vietnamese through a broadening of the governmental structures, an altered U.S. policy that emphasized protection of the population centers, and ways to initiate talks. The latter included Harriman's stated preference for "a neutral initiative which would gain support at home and abroad and ease Saigon's apprehension." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject File, Vietnam--General, Jan.-Mar. 1968)
W. Averell Harriman/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam/1/
Washington, March 29, 1968, 0120Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted by Bundy, approved by Rusk, and cleared by Rostow and Walsh.
138438. No Distribution Outside Department. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: State 131732: Saigon 22548./2/
/2/See Document 137 and footnote 3 thereto.
1. We are now thinking in terms of early policy announcement that would have following major elements:
a. Major stress on importance of GVN and ARVN increased effectiveness, with our equipment and other support as first priority in our own actions.
b. 13,500 support forces to be called up at once in order to round out the 10,500 combat units sent in February. (Westmoreland has details.)
c. Replenishment of strategic reserve by calling up some 48,500 additional reserves, stating that these would be designed for strategic reserve.
d. Related tax increases and budget cuts already largely needed for non-Vietnam reasons.
2. In order to obtain necessary Congressional and public support for this program, it is now the judgment of highest levels that we must include at this time an announcement of an initiative along the lines of the lesser proposal described in State 131732. This would consist basically of announcing that bombing would be restricted to targets most directly engaged in the battlefield area and that this meant that there would be no bombing roughly north of Vinh. Announcement would leave open how Hanoi might respond, and would be open-ended as to time. However, it would indicate that Hanoi's response could be helpful in determining whether we were justified in assumption that Hanoi would not take advantage if we stopping bombing altogether. Thus, it would to this extent foreshadow possibility of full bombing stoppage at a later point.
3. We recognize necessity of full consultation with Thieu and (in accordance with your recommendation) Ky as well before we announce such action. Time factors are such that we would like to move not later than Sunday night. Hence, you should now act urgently to obtain their concurrence.
4. In so doing, you may make following points:
a. You should call attention to force increases that would be announced at the same time and would make clear our continued resolve. Also our top priority to re-equipping ARVN forces.
b. You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the project and thus free our hand after a short period. Nonetheless, we might wish to continue the limitation even after a formal denunciation, in order to reinforce its sincerity and put the monkey firmly on Hanoi's back for whatever follows.
c. With or without denunciation, Hanoi might well feel limited in conducting any major offensives at least in the northern areas. If they did so, this could ease the pressure where it is most potentially serious. If they did not, then this would give us a clear field for whatever actions were then required.
d. In view of weather limitations, bombing north of the 20th parallel will in any event be limited at least for the next four weeks or so--which we tentatively envisage as a maximum testing period in any event. Hence, we are not giving up anything really serious in this time frame. Of course, a major change in the military situation might require full scale resumption at any time.
e. Insofar as our announcement foreshadows any possibility of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. But in any case, the period of demonstrated restraint would probably have to continue for a period of several weeks, and we would have time to appraise the situation and to consult carefully with them before we undertook any such action.
5. In making these points, you may as you see fit use our judgment of the public situation here as another indication of the vital necessity of early and demonstrated GVN improvements such as you have been urging. You may convey our gratification at the actions Thieu has taken and announced, particularly his speech of last week (which we expect to refer to extensively), but make equally clear that a great deal must be done and seen to be done if we are to get through the present difficult period as we must. The joint Thieu-Ky press conference now suggested could be most useful as one move.
Rusk
166. Memorandum for Record/1/
Washington, March 29, 1968, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Miscellaneous Materials, 1968. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Nitze.
SUBJECT
Meeting March 29, 11:00 AM
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze and the JCS
Mr. Clifford reviewed the deliberations he and Mr. Rusk had had over the past days with the President concerning our course of action with respect to Vietnam. He emphasized the point that unanimous advice from all sides was that the American people and the Congress would no longer support a policy of merely more of the same. The President had therefore resolved to go before the people with a speech in which, among other things, he would announce that he was sending 13,500 men to Vietnam and calling up 62,000 Reserves. Included in the speech would be the announcement of a pause in bombing north of the 20th Parallel which, if followed by reciprocal action on the other side, could lead to a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam and negotiations.
Mr. Clifford emphasized that one could not estimate how long the pause in bombing would continue; that there were estimated only to be four good bombing days in April; and that the sorties not flown north of the 20th Parallel would then be available in southern North Vietnam and Laos closer to the battlefield. The principal object would be to broaden the base of domestic support for our policy and to put the monkey on the back of the other side. He recognizes that there might be an adverse effect on the morale of our troops but hoped that this would prove to be manageable. He said that it was Mr. Rusk's view that this action could be explained to General Thieu and the GVN and that they would understand. He then asked General Wheeler for his views.
General Wheeler said that from the military point of view there was no point in lessening pressure on the enemy if one was winning, and he did not think that we were losing. He thought the effect on military capabilities would be negligible; that if the GVN could be brought along, he thought the effect on the morale of our side would be manageable; if the pause were not prolonged beyond an appropriate time, he was not bothered. What did bother him was the question of resumption after a pause. From the information coming to him he thought the situation in the country with respect to support for our current policy was perhaps even worse than Mr. Clifford had described.
General Johnson asked whether the effect on Korea and Thailand had been considered. Mr. Clifford said that it had and that it was Mr. Rusk's view that this could be managed. General Johnson went on to say that he was not self-confident on what the effect might be on the morale on our side. The question at issue was that of the commitment of the middle level in South Vietnam; they were making up their minds as to which side to back in the long run. He also commented that in the last three years when we had backed away from full pressure on the enemy, opposition to our policy had grown. He feared that the announcement of the bombing pause would lead people to believe we had decided to leave the war. Mr. Clifford said that in a certain sense the proposed announcement would not go as far as the San Antonio formula. General Johnson thought there was less ambiguity in this announcement. Mr. Clifford did not agree with that appraisal.
Admiral Clarey said he agreed with General Wheeler that there was no purely military advantage in lessening pressure on the enemy. In view of the fact that the President is resolved to take this action he would support the decision. He did, however, think we should make up our minds what to do if the move fails to elicit a positive response from the other side; to go back and merely do more of the same would seem to him not to be enough. Mr. Clifford said he thought it would be a mistake to attempt to predict now a situation that might arise in the future. The important thing now is to strengthen the base from which the President can then act. Admiral Clarey said he did not believe we had done enough in the diplomatic field; enemy atrocities during the Tet offensive had not been sufficiently exploited in the press; and the restraint which we had exercised in not bombing dikes, rice fields, etc. were not known to the public. He did not believe we had taken strong enough action against our allies, particularly the British, with respect to shipping from Hong Kong. Mr. Clifford agreed that we did have a serious problem with the press. Photographs and moving picture film of the atrocities during the Tet offensive had been given to the press but had not been used.
General McConnell said that if the U.S. public had rallied to the cause, it was his belief that we should have gone harder against the North. In view of the situation as it is, he supports the President's decision and will see to it that the Air Force as a whole does. He pointed out, however, that if the enemy does not respond positively, we are left with only two alternatives: either to go up in escalation or down. He thought it a fallacy to suppose that sorties not flown north of the 20th Parallel would make any significant difference south of there. If the pause were prolonged, he thought it could lead to tragedy.
General Chapman said he thought the military disadvantages might be real; particularly in their effect on the morale of the Marines at the DMZ. He recognized that we faced a battle for resolve--the resolve of the GVN, the NVN and the American people. He questioned whether the will of the Americans would be strengthened by a weaker position. His friends believe that the American people would react better to an escalatory approach. General Chapman asked Mr. Clifford whether he thought the diminution of U.S. support was temporary. Mr. Clifford said no, he thought it was solid; that it sprang from the situation in our cities, price inflation, concern over our gold cover, and a general disorientation of values.
Mr. Clifford asked the Chiefs whether a distinction could be made between support for the decision and opposition thereto. General Johnson said he would certainly support the decision. However, if asked in a Congressional hearing as to whether he had proposed the action, he would reply in the negative, and if asked for his personal views, he would have to express the doubts he had in his mind. All of the Chiefs agreed that they would support the President's decision. General Wheeler, General McConnell and General Chapman felt that, in view of all the circumstances, the President's position was an appropriate one.
It was agreed that Mr. Clifford would suggest to Mr. Rusk that he explain the reasons for the President's decision to Admiral Sharp when he saw him at Wellington, New Zealand. General Wheeler said he would send a back-channel message to General Ryan explaining the reasons for the decision.
Mr. Clifford asked whether any of the Chiefs felt that they desired to express their views directly to the President or whether they would rely upon his, Mr. Clifford's, presentation of their views to the President. They all agreed that they saw no necessity for their seeing the President.
167. Editorial Note
From 4:13 to 7:27 p.m. on March 30, 1968, the President met with his advisers at the White House. Those attending included Secretary of Defense Clifford, General Wheeler, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bundy, Walt Rostow, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Harry McPherson, George Christian, and Tom Johnson. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) On their advice, the President decided against announcing a call-up of reservists either to fill units going to Vietnam or to replenish the strategic reserve (save for medical and other specialized support units). The President conceded: "Okay, I am willing to do it any way that you all want to. I'm just worn down on it. I don't want to leave the impression that they are going to be called up. When they are called up they will get the notice," he stated. He later added: "Well, I am convinced we will have to call up 48,000 people within the next few months. Now the question is whether you want to hit one belly-buster and put it in here or not. I would think that's ill-advised, but how to deal with it I'm not sure." (Ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room)
The President was convinced of the necessity of minimizing the public reaction to the call-up as much as possible, as Wheeler explained in telegram JCS 3564 to Westmoreland, March 31: "At a White House meeting this evening the President cited the fact that we have been accused in the past of always accompanying peace initiatives with increased military operations. He is aware, of course, of your operations leading to clearing Route 9 and eventually operating against the enemy in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The purpose of this message is not to have you stand down those operations. However, it is desired that you, your subordinate commanders and your PA people play them in low key. By this I mean, since the press is always with you, you and your people should take care to describe these operations as being merely in the usual run of offensive operations against the enemy." (Ibid., William C. Westmoreland Papers, #30 History File, 1-31 Mar 68 [II])
168. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Rusk-Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive.
Meeting of the President with Ambassador Anatoliy T. Dobrynin/2/
/2/The meeting lasted from 5:55 to 6:25 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) The Department of State transmitted a summary of the conversation to Rusk, who was in New Zealand to attend a SEATO meeting, in telegram 139705 to Wellington, April 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) Although the Daily Diary notes that Dobrynin met with the President, Rostow, and Harriman, the Soviet Ambassador asserted in his memoirs that only he and the President were present. According to Dobrynin, as he left the Oval Office, the President stopped him in the hallway and informed him of the surprise ending that he planned for his speech. (Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), pp. 170-173) A March 30 memorandum from Rostow to the President suggesting issues to raise and a March 31 list of talking points for the meeting are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-k.
Also present: W. Averell Harriman and W.W. Rostow
(Note: Gov. Harriman and Mr. Rostow had gone over with Amb. Dobrynin the President's speech/3/ for about an hour before joining the President in the Mansion.
/3/See Document 167.
The partial bombing cessation was explained as well as other statements bearing on our negotiating position.)
The President met Ambassador Dobrynin at about 6:05 p.m.
The President began by stating that he was going as far as he could in all conscience go, given the tactical position in the field. He could not endanger lives of his men on the Vietnamese frontiers by having a total bombing cessation. It was up to the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi to bring its influence to bear for a conference and the making of peace.
The President recalled that the Soviet Union had played an important role at Tashkent in settling the India-Pak war. He believed, after his talks with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, that Kosygin wished to be helpful; although nothing had come of it. But the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had shown in many matters that we could work together for constructive results; for example, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This was a time for everyone to bring to bear the greatest forbearance, restraint, and understanding. In South Vietnam itself the contending parties must give up war and seek a one-man, one-vote solution.
The Ambassador should be aware, however, that the U.S. was not going to pull out of Vietnam. The proportion of American voters who actually wanted to pull out was about 5%; another 15% wanted the President to do less militarily; but there were 40% who wanted the U.S. to do more. That was the problem with which he had to deal.
The President had great concern about Southeast Asia as a whole, not only Vietnam. He feared a much wider war that would be contrary to both our interests and the Soviet's interests. He thought perhaps the Chinese were getting "cocky" and "chesty." Their aggressive ambitions should not be encouraged. It was up to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to end the war in Vietnam soon and prevent hostilities from spreading.
The President said he had gone 90% of the way; now it was up to the Co-Chairmen to make it possible to go the last 10% and start negotiations for peace.
Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President to explain precisely why a 100% bombing pause was impossible. The President did so, adding that if Dobrynin thought of what it would be like if there were Russian soldiers in the same position as Americans and German forces were approaching, he would understand. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was lucky enough not to be there. The President countered: "But you are helping them."
Ambassador Dobrynin asked about the area in which we would bomb. It was explained: below the 20th parallel.
He asked if there was a time limit on the cessation. The President said no firm limit--perhaps a few weeks. Dobrynin said that was good. It is better not to have to hurry.
Dobrynin took full notes and a preliminary text of the speech, departing about 6:30 p.m.
W.W. Rostow/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
169. Editorial Note
President Johnson spoke to the nation on March 31, 1968, at 9 p.m. By 1 p.m. that day, Secretary of Defense Clifford had transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an order, effective at 7 p.m., to halt all strikes on North Vietnam north of 20 degrees latitude. (Memorandum by Executive Secretary Benjamin Read, March 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) After Horace Busby, Johnson's former speechwriter, helped the President finish up the surprise ending of his televised address on Vietnam, the President read it to his wife, daughters, and his friends Arthur and Mrs. Krim, who listened without comment. Between 3:03 and 3:36 p.m., Johnson practiced the speech in front of television cameras, after which he requested a copy of former President Harry Truman's withdrawal remarks made in 1952. At 6:35 p.m., as Busby continued to revise the ending, the President told him: "Buzz, we're going down to the line, it's time . . . let's see what you have." The final pages of the speech did not go to the teleprompters until 7:37 p.m. Presidential aide Jim Jones took the final part of the speech to be encrypted to the teleprompters at 8:10 p.m.; this section was placed into the President's speech book at 8:55 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
President Johnson began his address to the nation at 9:01 p.m. The speech marked the culmination of months of debate within the administration over the course of policy in Vietnam. Describing the recent Tet offensive as a failure, the President stated his intention to seek peace by repeating the offer made at San Antonio the previous fall to end the bombing of North Vietnam when assured that prompt and productive talks would follow and that the North Vietnamese would not take military advantage of the halt. The substantive part of his speech reads:
"We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict. We are reducing--substantially reducing--the present level of hostilities. And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once. Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft and naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat. The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population, and most of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal populated areas, or in the food-producing areas of North Vietnam. Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end--if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events."
He also announced his designation of Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman as his personal representative to peace talks. At the end of his speech, the President discussed a final decision:
"With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office--the Presidency of your country. Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President." For full text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 469-476.
After the speech, the President received a number of telephone calls from colleagues. The first that he took came at 9:46 p.m. from Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, who told him: "We're going to draft you. You dropped the biggest bombshell by announcing that you will not be a candidate for nomination for another term as my President." This call was followed in quick succession by calls from Vice President Humphrey (then in Mexico) and Texas Governor John Connally. Calls later in the evening came from the wife of Senator Eugene McCarthy, former aide Bill Moyers, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and others.
The President then took questions during a press conference from 11 to 11:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Dairy) During the press conference, the President described his decision as "completely irrevocable." He noted that the "turning point" in his decision came during the visit of General Westmoreland the previous November. He also pledged to do as much as he could in terms of the peace process in the remaining months of his administration. For full text of his remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 476-482.
In remarks to Krim at 12:12 a.m., the President reflected, "I never was any surer of any decision I ever made in my life, and I never made any more unselfish one. I have 525,000 men whose very lives depend on what I do, and I can't worry about the primaries. Now I will be working full time for those men out there. I don't need to worry, and the only guys that won't be back here by the time my term ends are the guys that left in the last day or two. I think the boys will be glad that I'm working for them." (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)
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