The Sedition Act Trials

Historical Documents

Charles Pinckney, “On the Election of the President of the United States”

To make, therefore, their favorite object sure, and prevent an enquiry into the president’s administration as it progressed, and to prohibit that investigation of its measures; that appeal to the wisdom and republicanism of the people on the approaching election, from which they were afraid Mr. Adams, or the supporters of his measures, had every thing to dread, and nothing to hope; for these reasons they determined to create a new crime, and to give to their courts a new jurisdiction; to take from the state courts and juries their undoubted right to decide every question of libels, and give it to courts formed by judges appointed by the president, whose administration this act is intended to screen; and what, if possible, is still more intolerable, to juries packed by marshals who have received and hold their offices at the will of the same president. These, my countrymen, are the true objects of the sedition law. They know your state judges are impartial and independent men; that they neither fear the frown of power, nor court the smile of office; that your juries are either impartially drawn by lot, or selected by sheriffs elected by the people, and that they would be likely, upon every occasion, to discountenance any attempt to enslave the press; that these state juries, so far from considering as a crime, would view as a duty the investigation of public measures; . . .

It has been said, in extenuation of this law, that the parties accused are allowed to plead the truth of their charge in their defence, in extenuation of their punishment. Holding, as I do, the fixed and unalterable opinion that congress have no right to legislate at all upon the subject; that they possess the same right to tell me what God I shall worship, or in what manner adore him, as to say under what limitations I shall be permitted to investigate the conduct of our public servants; it is with difficulty I can bring myself to condescend to examine any part of the law; . . . I will, however, for a moment consider the nature of the defence, which is, that a person accused may plead the truth of what is charged as a libel; and I will ask, what safety or success he can promise himself by such a defence, and before a court constituted as I have mentioned, that is composed of judges chosen by the President, and juries packed by marshals appointed by and dependent on the President? . . .

I think you will confess, that men of such opposite opinions as I have stated, could never easily be brought to agree upon any public measure, where there was room for difference in opinion; and that to commit a man who is known to be in what is called the republican interest, to be tried for any political writing, by a jury of men known to be in the federal interest, and packed by a federal marshal, is allowing him that sort of defence which may be considered as something very like a solemn mockery of justice.