Nos. 97-1792 and 97-8964
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
LYLE DAVID PIERCE, III, AND
REGINA PIERCE, PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343, prohibits schemes to use
the interstate wires in the United States to defraud a foreign government
of tax revenue.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below
1
Jurisdiction
2
Statement
2
Argument
5
Conclusion
12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964)
8
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of
British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161
(9th Cir. 1979)
7-8
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268 (1935)
8
Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929),
aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930)
8, 11
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey,
No. 97-634 (June 15, 1998)
7
Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxem-
bourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997)
6
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d
1355 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035
(1989)
6
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 263 (1996)
3-4, 5, 11
United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (4th
Cir. 1975)
6
United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989)
9, 10
United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1328 (1997)
9
Cases-Continued:
Page
United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993)
6
United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795 (3d Cir.
1994)
9
United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983)
6
United States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061 (1994)
6
United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992)
4-5, 6, 9
United States v. Jackson, 451 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928 (1972)
9
United States v. Melvin, 544 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977)
6
United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976)
9
United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir.
1989)
5-6
United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d
424 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042
(1988)
6
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990)
11
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const. Art. IV, _ 1 (Full Faith and Credit
Clause)
9
18 U.S.C. 1343
3, 4, 5
18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)-(2)
2
18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)
3
18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2)(A)
3
18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(7)(A)
3
18 U.S.C. 1956(h)
2
18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996)
3
Miscellaneous:
Page
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
(1987)
7
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
No. 97-1792
LYLE DAVID PIERCE, III, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 97-8964
REGINA PIERCE, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-12a) is reported at 130
F.3d 547.1 The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 13a-20a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on December 5, 1997. A
petition for rehearing was denied on February 5, 1998 (Pet. App. 21a). The
petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 97-8964 was filed on May 4, 1998.
The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 97-1792 was filed on May 5,
1998. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Over the past decade, as the Canadian government has significantly increased
the taxes and duties on liquor and tobacco products, a lucrative "black
market" has arisen for liquor and tobacco products smuggled into Canada
from the United States. The St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation (or Akwesasne),
which straddles the boundary between the United States and Canada, has become
a center for such smuggling activity. Pet. App. 3a-4a; Gov't C.A. Br. 2-3.
2. On February 29, 1996, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of
New York returned a single-count indictment charging petitioners and others
with conspiring to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)-(2)
and (h). The conspiracy charge arose out of the defendants' alleged participation
in an enterprise to smuggle liquor through the Reservation into Canada.
Pet. App. 3a-5a, 22a-28a.
According to the indictment, petitioners and their co-conspirators, using
interstate telephone calls, facsimiles, and wire transmissions, ordered
large shipments of liquor from suppliers in the United States. They allegedly
stored the liquor on the Reservation, smuggled the liquor into Canada, avoiding
Canadian customs agents, and delivered the liquor to black marketeers in
such cities as Montreal and Toronto. The conspirators allegedly transported
the Canadian currency generated by the liquor sales back to the United States,
where the funds were deposited or exchanged to obtain bank drafts or wire
transfers, which, in turn, were used to purchase additional liquor to be
smuggled into Canada. Pet. App. 4a-5a, 22a-28a.
The indictment charges that petitioners and their co-defendants conspired
to violate two substantive provisions of the money-laundering statute: the
prohibition on conducting a financial transaction involving "the proceeds
of specified unlawful activity" with "the intent to promote the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity," 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i),
and the prohibition on transporting currency between the United States and
another country with "the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity," 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2)(A). The indictment identifies
the "specified unlawful activity" as wire fraud "to defraud
the Canadian government of revenue," in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343.
Pet. App. 23a.2
3. Petitioners and their co-defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that the United States lacks authority to prosecute wire fraud
aimed at defrauding a foreign government of tax revenue. Relying on the
First Circuit's decision in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 263 (1996), the district court granted the motion. Pet. App.
13a-20a. The court reasoned that it could not determine whether the defendants
had the requisite intent to defraud without passing on the validity of Canadian
revenue laws, because "[i]f the law they intended to violate was not
valid, the defendant could not have had a criminal intent." Id. at
20a. The court then concluded that inquiry into the validity of Canadian
revenue laws is precluded by the common-law "revenue rule," which
bars United States courts from entertaining suits to enforce foreign tax
judgments. Id. at 17a, 20a.
4. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1a-12a. The court recognized
that the text of the wire fraud statute "unambiguously prohibits the
use of interstate or foreign communication systems by anyone 'who intend[s]
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud.'" Id. at 9a (quoting 18
U.S.C. 1343). The wire fraud statute thus "neither expressly, nor impliedly,
precludes the prosecution of a scheme to defraud a foreign government of
tax revenue." Ibid.
The court of appeals went on to hold that the common-law revenue rule is
"inapplicable to the instant case" and, therefore, "provides
no justification for departing from the plain meaning of the statute."
Pet. App. 9a. It reasoned that United States courts need not pass on "the
validity of a foreign sovereign's revenue laws"-the inquiry forbidden
by the revenue rule-in order to determine whether a defendant used the wires
with the intent to defraud the foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Id. at
11a. The wire fraud statute, explained the court, "punishes the scheme,
not its success." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d
71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992)). Accordingly,
a defendant may violate the wire fraud statute by using the wires to carry
out a scheme designed to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue, even
if the scheme could not succeed because, for example, no tax was actually
due. Pet. App. 10a-11a.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners' contention that the
wire fraud statute cannot, as a matter of law, apply to schemes to use the
wires to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue. Although the Second
Circuit's decision in this case conflicts with the First Circuit's decision
in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 263 (1996),
we do not believe that the question presented by the petitions, which has
thus far been addressed in only two circuits, requires the Court's review
at this time.
1. The language of the wire fraud statute is broad. It applies to "any
scheme or artifice to defraud * * * by means of wire, radio or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. 1343 (emphasis
added). It contains no exception based on the identity of the victim of
the fraud or the nature of the property at which the scheme was directed.
The wire fraud statute, and the analogous mail fraud statute, have thus
been recognized to apply to fraudulent schemes involving the sort of victim
(i.e., a foreign government) and the sort of property (i.e., tax revenue)
involved in this case. The courts have upheld convictions of defendants
who were found to have engaged in schemes to defraud foreign governments,
foreign corporations, and foreign individuals. See, e.g., United States
v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (foreign corporation owned by foreign
government); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1987)
(foreign individual and foreign corporation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042
(1988); United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 237-238 (2d Cir. 1982) (foreign
government), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983).3 The courts have also upheld
mail and wire fraud convictions of defendants who were found to have engaged
in schemes to defraud the federal government or a State of tax revenue.
See, e.g., United States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir.) (federal
taxes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061 (1994); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d
819, 849 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (federal taxes), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
906 (1993); United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 1991) (state
taxes), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992); United States v. Melvin, 544
F.2d 767 (5th Cir.) (state taxes), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977); United
States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1975) (state taxes).
Petitioners nonetheless assert that the mail and wire fraud statutes should
not be used "to protect foreign countries against fraudulent schemes,"
especially schemes to defraud foreign countries of tax revenue, because
"[t]here is nothing in [those] statutes or their legislative histories
that indicates" that Congress intended the statutes to apply to such
schemes (L. Pierce Pet. 9-10; see R. Pierce Pet. 3). Petitioners view such
congressional silence as creating "ambigu[ity]" (L. Pierce Pet.
10, 11) about the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes. As this Court
recently reiterated, however, "the fact that a statute can be applied
in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity," but instead "demonstrates breadth." Pennsylvania
Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, No. 97-634 (June 15, 1998), slip op. 5 (internal
quotation marks omitted).4
2. In urging the inapplicability of the wire fraud statute, petitioners
principally rely (L. Pierce Pet. 12-16; R. Pierce Pet. 2-4) on a judge-made
doctrine-the "revenue rule"-that generally "prevent[s] a
foreign country from enforcing its tax judgment in the courts of the United
States." Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British
Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to
entertain suit by Canadian government to enforce provincial tax judgment);
see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-414 (1964) (noting
"the principle enunciated in federal and state cases that a court need
not give effect to the penal or revenue laws of foreign countries").
The accepted rationale for the revenue rule is that a domestic court could
not enforce a foreign tax judgment without inquiring into whether the foreign
tax is "consonant with its own notions of what is proper"-an inquiry
that could "seriously embarrass" the foreign state and that "involves
the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent
to deal." Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand,
J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).5
This case does not implicate either the revenue rule itself or the rationale
on which it is based. It is not an action brought by the government of Canada
to enforce a Canadian tax judgment. It is, instead, an action brought by
the United States government to enforce its own criminal laws against money
laundering and wire fraud committed in this country.
Nor does such an action require a United States court to construe a foreign
tax law, much less to pass on whether such a law is valid or "proper."
It is well-settled that the mail and wire fraud statutes "punish[]
the scheme, not its success." Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 94; accord United
States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1004 (1989).6 In Helmsley, for example, the Second Circuit held that the
defendant could be convicted of mail fraud in connection with a scheme to
defraud New York State of tax revenue, even if she did not, in fact, owe
any tax to the State. It was enough that she had used the mails to carry
on a scheme designed to commit tax fraud. See Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 94 ("an
actual tax debt is not an element of the mail fraud offense"). And,
in Bucey, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the mail fraud conviction of a defendant
who had participated in a scheme to defraud the United States of tax revenues,
even though "the government was not in fact deprived of tax revenues"
since his "tax-evading 'clients' in this case were undercover government
agents." 876 F.2d at 1311. "[T]he fact that the government was
not actually deprived of tax revenues does not warrant reversal of [the
defendant's] conviction," the court explained, because "the ultimate
success of the fraud and the actual defrauding of a victim are not necessary
prerequisites to a successful mail fraud prosecution." Ibid.
Similarly, here, the government must prove that petitioners and their co-conspirators
intended to defraud Canada of taxes and duties.7 But the government need
not also prove that they actually did defraud Canada (or would have done
so had the scheme not been discovered). The fraudulent scheme could be established
without proof that they were required by Canadian law to pay taxes and duties
on liquor brought into the country for commercial sale. Accordingly, contrary
to petitioner Lyle Pierce's assertions (L. Pierce Pet. 5, 14), our courts
need not decide whether the Canadian revenue laws apply to "aboriginal
people," such as petitioners, in order for petitioners to be convicted
of the charged conspiracy to engage in financial transactions in furtherance
of a scheme to defraud the Canadian government of revenue.8 Nor need our
courts otherwise pass on the validity or the construction of the Canadian
revenue laws. It is thus evident that domestic criminal prosecutions such
as this one do not present the concerns that, as explained by Judge Hand
in Moore v. Mitchell, motivated the adoption of the revenue rule in the
different context of civil suits by foreign governments to enforce their
own tax judgments. Cf. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990) (explaining that "the factual predicate
for application of the act of state doctrine d[id] not exist" where
"[n]othing in the present suit requires the Court to declare invalid
* * * the official act of a foreign sovereign").
3. We recognize, as did the Second Circuit, that the decision below conflicts
with the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Boots, supra, on the
question whether the wire fraud statute encompasses schemes to defraud a
foreign government of tax revenue. See Pet. App. 3a (noting "disagree[ment]
with the reasoning in Boots").9 But no appellate or district court
in any other circuit has yet had an occasion to address that question. We
thus cannot say that the question arises with sufficient frequency to require
this Court's consideration at this time. If the Court is nonetheless inclined
to resolve the conflict before it deepens, we are not aware of any reason
why this would be an unsuitable case in which to do so.
CONCLUSION
The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
JOEL M. GERSHOWITZ
Attorney
JULY 1998
1 All "Pet. App." citations refer to the appendix to the petition
in No. 97-1792.
2 The money-laundering statute defines "specified unlawful activity"
to include, with exceptions not relevant here, "any act or activity
constituting an offense listed in section 1961(1) of this title." 18
U.S.C. 1956(c)(7)(A). Section 1961(1)(B), in turn, identifies as an offense
"any act which is indictable under * * * section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud)." 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
3 Cf. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358-1361 (9th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (federal district court could adjudicate foreign government's
civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based,
in part, on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1035 (1989); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119
F.3d 935, 948-951 (11th Cir. 1997) (assuming that federal district court
could adjudicate such claim by foreign government if elements were properly
pleaded).
4 Contrary to petitioner Lyle Pierce's suggestion (L. Pierce Pet. 11), this
case does not implicate the international law principle that a country should
not prosecute conduct occurring beyond its borders unless the conduct has
"a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect" within that country.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law _ 421(2)(j) (1987). This case
does not involve conduct that occurred solely, or even primarily, outside
the United States. To the contrary, the indictment alleges numerous overt
acts that petitioners and their co-conspirators committed or caused to be
committed in the United States as part of the scheme to defraud Canada of
tax revenue. See Pet. App. 24a-26a; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law _ 421(2)(i) (1987) (a state may assert jurisdiction with respect
to "activity in the state"). Nor can it be assumed that the alleged
scheme, which included multiple transactions with at least one financial
institution and two other businesses in the United States (see Pet. App.
24a-26a), had no "substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect"
in this country.
5 The Moore case was brought in district court in New York against the executors
of the estate of a decedent who had allegedly owed state and local taxes
in Indiana. Although the court of appeals in Moore assumed that the same
"settled principles of private international law" applied whether
the party seeking to collect the tax was a foreign country or a State (30
F.2d at 602), this Court has since made clear that a State is required by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to honor another State's tax judgment.
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
6 See also, e.g., United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996)
("The crime of wire fraud does not require that the defendant's object
be attained. It only requires that the defendant devise a scheme to defraud
and then transmit a wire communication for the purposes of executing the
scheme."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1328 (1997); United States v. Frey,
42 F.3d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1994) ("the success of the scheme is not
relevant in a mail or wire fraud conviction"); United States v. Pollack,
534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) ("success of the scheme and loss by a
defrauded person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C.
__ 1341, 1343"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States v.
Jackson, 451 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The Wire Fraud Statute
does not require that the scheme be successful, or even that the victim
be deceived."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 928 (1972).
7 The government will seek to establish the requisite criminal intent at
trial by offering evidence that, among other things, petitioners and their
co-conspirators conducted their activities in code, destroyed records of
their transactions, and operated under cover of darkness. Gov't C.A. Br.
14. Petitioners may, of course, attempt to persuade the jury that they did
not possess such intent, for example, by arguing that they reasonably believed
that the Canadian revenue laws did not apply to them and their co-conspirators.
But such a defense does not, as petitioners suggest (L. Pierce Pet. 14-15;
R. Pierce Pet. 2), require any determination of what Canadian law actually
provides. It merely requires a finding as to what petitioners reasonably
believed the law to be.
8 Petitioner Lyle Pierce implicitly concedes (L. Pierce Pet. 11) that no
Canadian court has held that an aboriginal person is exempt from having
to pay taxes and duties on liquor brought into Canada for commercial sale.
9 The two cases differ to the extent that Boots involved a prosecution directly
under the wire fraud statute, while this case involves a prosecution under
the money-laundering stat-ute, with wire fraud as the "specified unlawful
activity." The court of appeals did not perceive that difference as
affecting the analysis of the question presented.