W. WAYNE ALLEN, PETITIONER V. INEZ WRIGHT, ET AL. DONALD T. REGAN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ET AL., PETITIONERS V. INEZ WRIGHT, ET AL. /1/ No. 81-757, No. 81-970 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1983 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Brief for the Federal Petitioners TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations involved Statement: A. Background B. The proceedings in this case Summary of argument Argument: I. Respondents lack standing to challenge Treasury guidelines and procedures that have been subject to executive and legislative review and result in no concrete injury to them II. Respondents' allegations of injury establish no direct and concrete injury caused by the government's actions and redressible by the courts A. Respondents' allegation that the government provides tangible aid to racially segregated institutions establishes no "injury in fact," but only a generalized grievance with government conduct B. Respondents' allegation that government encouragement of racially segregated educational opportunities interferes with public school desegregation does not establish an injury fairly traceable to government action and redressible in court III. Under the prudential tests for standing established by this Court, no person not seeking a tax benefit may challenge the tax treatment of others IV. The court of appeals' holding is not supported by this Court's judgments in Norwood, Gilmore, or Green Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the district court (Interv. Pet. App. 1a-15a) /2/ is reported at 480 F. Supp. 790. The opinion of the court of appeals (Interv. Pet. App. 1b-58b) is reported at 656 F.2d at 820. JURISDICTION The court of appeals entered its judgment on June 18, 1981 (J.A. 9, 67) and denied rehearing on August 26, 1981 (J.A. 9; Interv. Pet. App. 1c, 1d). The Secretary and the Commissioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on November 23, 1981 (No. 81-970). This Court granted the petition and consolidated the case with Allen v. Wright, et al. (No. 81-757) on June 20, 1983 (J.A. 85, 86). The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Section 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.), Rev. Stat. 1977 (1878 ed.) (42 U.S.C. 1981), and Sections 103 and 615 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 562, 577, are set forth in Interv. Pet. 2-4. The relevant provisions of Article III of the Constitution and Section 170(a) and (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) are set forth in Appendix A to the petition for certiorari in No. 81-970. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587, the Proposed Revenue Procedure, and the Modified Proposed Revenue Procedure are set forth respectively at Interv. Pet. App. 1e-12e, 1f-13f, and 1g-14g. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether federal courts may entertain equity suits against the Secretary of the Treasury brought by parents of black children in public schools seeking to have the Treasury revise the guidelines and procedures it uses to enforce the prohibition on tax exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools, where they do not allege discrimination or any other distinct injury to themselves or their children by any private school or by the Treasury. STATEMENT A. Background In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service adopted the position that a private school will not qualify as a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or as an eligible recipient of charitable contributions deductible for income tax purposes under Section 170(c)(2) of the Code, unless it establishes that its admissions and educational programs are operated on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. /3/ This position was recently upheld by this Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, Nos. 81-3 and 81-1 (May 24, 1983). In Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230, the Service defined operation under a racially nondiscriminatory policy to mean that "the school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs." Under this policy, the Service has revoked the tax exemptions of more than 100 private schools that failed to adopt and publicize a racially nondiscriminatory policy (Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1979) (statement of Commissioner Jerome Kurtz)). See, e.g., Prince Edward School Foundation v. Commissioner, 478 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd by unpublished order, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 944 (1981). In 1972 and in 1975, the Internal Revenue Service published guidelines and procedures for determining whether a private school operates in good faith under a racially nondiscriminatory policy. See Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 834; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587 (Interv. Pet. App. 1e-12e). Rev. Proc. 75-50, which is currently in effect, provides that "(a) school must show affirmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made known to the general public and that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance therewith" (Section 2.02). The Procedure is enforced by means of annual certifications subject to penalty of perjury, reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and public complaints (Interv. Pet. App. 7e-8e, 9e-11e). The Revenue Procedure enumerates requirements that must be met by each school seeking to establish its eligibility for tax exempt status. The district court summarized these requirements as follows (Interv. Pet. App. 8a-9a n.3): (1) The schools must formally state their nondiscriminatory policy in their organizational charter or similar instrument (Rev. Proc. 75-50, Sec. 4.01); (2) The schools must set forth that policy in all brochures, advertisements, catalogues, fund solicitations and similar publications (Sec. 4.03); (3) The schools must either effectively publish that policy under specified, detailed guidelines in newspapers (Sec. 4.03-1(a)), or broadcast media (Sec. 4.03-1(b)); or, in the alternative, they must be able to demonstrate that they in fact have a significant minority enrollment or have meaningfully sought to recruit such an enrollment (Sec. 4.03-2); (4) The schools must have a nondiscriminatory policy with respect to faculty, school programs, and tuition and scholarship practices (Secs. 4.04, 4.05); (5) They must certify all of the above under penalty of perjury (Sec. 4.06); (6) The schools must provide specified information to (the Service) regarding the racial composition of their faculty and staff, the nondiscriminatory character of their tuition and scholarship policies, and the policies regarding race discrimination held by their incorporators, founders, board, and donors (Sec. 5.01-1 through 5.01-4, see also Secs. 4.07, 4.08); and (7) The schools must keep records for three years periods (sic) from the year of compilation, regarding racial composition of faculty and students, nondiscrimination in scholarship and tuition, and as well as retaining copies of all brochures, catalogues, and the like (Sec. 7). /4/ On August 22, 1978 and February 9, 1979, the Internal Revenue Service published proposed Revenue Procedures (Interv. Pet. App. 1f-13f, 1g-14g) that would tighten the requirements for tax exempt status. Under the August 22, 1978 proposal, any private school which had an insignificant number of minority students and which was formed or substantially expanded during a period of desegregation of the public schools in its community (a "reviewable" school) would be presumed racially discriminatory unless the school could demonstrate that it operated in good faith on a nondiscriminatory basis, to be evaluated according to five specified factors. /5/ The proposal prompted a heavy volume of adverse written comments, as well as adverse testimony at public administrative hearings. In response to the public reaction, the Service published for public comment a revised version of the proposed procedure on February 9, 1979. The revised proposal, like the earlier proposal, established additional criteria "reviewable" schools would have to satisfy in order to retain tax exempt status. The revised proposal, however, would have provided "greater flexibility for a school to show that it is operating on a racially nondiscriminatory basis" (Interv. Pet. App. 2g) by permitting it to demonstrate that it had "undertaken actions or programs reasonably designed to attract minority students on a continuing basis" (id. at 11g). In February and March 1979, the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means conducted hearings on the IRS proposals, and received a great deal of adverse testimony. Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). In the wake of the hearings, the House Committee on Appropriations recommended that adoption of the Service's proposals be deferred until after the regular tax writing committees of Congress had determined that they represented the proper interpretation of the tax laws (H. R. Rep. No. 96-248, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1979). Congress then proceeded to block implementation of the proposed guidelines through enactment of two related provisions in the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559. In Section 615 (93 Stat. 577), known as the Dornan Amendment, Congress stipulated that none of the funds made available by that Act be used to carry out the proposed Revenue Procedures of 1978 and 1979. In Section 103 (93 Stat. 562), known as the Ashbrook Amendment, Congress provided that none of the funds made available by the Act be used "to formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard, or measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious or church-operated schools under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless in effect prior to August 22, 1978." The district court observed that "(t)he effect of (this congressional) action is to retain in effect, at least until September, 1980, the presently effective Rev. Proc. 75-50 * * *" (Interv. Pet. App. 14a). The Ashbrook-Dornan Amendments expired on October 1, 1980, but were reinstated for the period December 16, 1980 through September 30, 1981. /6/ For fiscal year 1982, after the court of appeals' decision in this case, the House of Representatives adopted a spending restriction that specifically denied funding for carrying out even court orders entered after August 22, 1978. /7/ See 127 Cong. Rec. H5392-H5398 (daily ed. July 30, 1981). The Senate Committee on Appropriations subsequently reported out a spending restriction in identical form. Under a joint resolution making continuing appropriations for the 1982 fiscal year, this provision became effective as of October 1, 1981. /8/ These statutory restrictions have now expired, and the Internal Revenue Service is again free to consider appropriate modifications in its enforcement of the prohibition on tax exempt status for discriminatory private schools. Changes, if any, will be instituted through regular administrative procedures and will be subject to congressional oversight. No such changes have yet been proposed or adopted. B. The Proceedings in this Case 1. Respondents are the parents of black students who attend public schools in seven states. They seek to represent a nationwide class of "several million" parents whose children attend public schools in school districts undergoing desegregation (J.A. 18-23, 43). In 1976, they brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, alleging with reference to Rev. Proc. 75-50 that "regulations" issued by the federal defendants are legally insufficient in that they permit schools offering "racially segregated educational opportunities" to receive tax exempt status (J.A. 17-18, 25). Although the complaint asserted that "there are more than 3,500 racially segregated private academies operating in the country having a total enrollment of more than 750,000 children" (J.A. 24), it cited by name only 19 "representative" private schools. /9/ Each of these schools is alleged to have "an announced policy of nondiscrimination, and (to have) satisfied defendants in this regard," but, according to the complaint, is "racially segregated" (J.A. 26-38). /10/ According to the complaint, the federal officials "have fostered and encouraged the development, operation and expansion of many of these racially segregated private schools by recognizing them as 'charitable' organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code" (id. at 24). To establish their standing to sue, respondents included an allegation of injury in their complaint. It states, in full (J.A. 38-39): As a consequence of the grant of federal tax benefits to racially segregated private schools, or the organizations that operate them, which are located in or serve desegregating public school districts, plaintiffs and their class now are suffering and will continue to suffer serious, substantial and irreparable injury for which they have no adequate remedy at law. Specifically, the grant of federal tax exemptions to such schools and organizations in such circumstances injures plaintiffs in that it: (a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other support for racially segregated educational institutions, and (b) fosters and encourages the organization, operation and expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts and thereby interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts which have been operating racially dual school systems. Respondents did not allege that they or their children had applied to, been discouraged from applying to, or been denied admission to any private school or schools. /11/ Nor did they allege that denial of tax exempt status would cause any private school or schools to close down, decrease in enrollment, or change their practices. /12/ They conceded that their children now attend desegregated schools (J.A. 62). They did not allege that their own tax liability is affected by the conduct or policies they challenge. Respondents requested a declaratory judgment that "the acts, policies and practices of defendants in granting federal tax exemptions and benefits to racially segregated private schools * * * violate Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States" (J.A. 40). In addition, they sought a permanent injunction requiring the federal officials to revoke, or to deny, tax exemptions for all private schools (or for the organizations that operate the schools), "which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments, which are located in or serve desegregating public school districts, and which either (J.A. 40) -- (1) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating; (2) have been determined in adversary judicial or administrative proceedings to be racially segregated; or (3) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public schools. Respondents further requested the court to grant injunctive relief in the nature of mandamus requiring the federal officials to revise Rev. Proc. 75-50 to provide that recognition of exempt status for all such schools and organizations would be revoked or denied (J.A. 40-41). The Secretary and the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that respondents lacked standing to sue; that they failed to state a claim; that the subject matter of their suit was nonreviewable; and that the action was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 7421(a)), the tax limitation in the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2201), and the doctrine of sovereign immunity (J.A. 45-46). The district court granted leave to intervene and to file a motion to dismiss to W. Wayne Allen, Chairman of the Board of Briarcrest School, Memphis, Tennessee, one of the private schools named in respondents' complaint (id. at 26-27, 47-50, 54-57). 2. The district court dismissed the suit on three grounds (J.A. 64, 65; Interv. Pet. App. 3a). /13/ First, the court ruled that respondents had no standing to assert their claims because (a) they failed to assert a distinct, palpable, and concrete injury, (b) they had not shown that any injury they alleged was fairly traceable to the actions of the federal officials, (c) it was speculative whether the relief requested would remedy the injury, and (d) there was not a sufficient degree of concrete adverseness between respondents and the federal officials (Interv. Pet. App. 4a-11a). In so ruling, the court relied on Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The court noted that there was no allegation that any of the private schools cited in the complaint actually were discriminating in violation of the Constitution or of federal law, or that any of respondents or their children had suffered any discriminatory treatment or exclusion (Interv. Pet. App. 4a-6a). The court considered it to be speculative whether enforcement of respondents' proposed guidelines would cause any school permanently to lose a tax exemption that it would have retained under existing Internal Revenue Service procedures (id. at 8a-10a). Furthermore, even if implementation of respondents' proposed enforcement procedures might serve to deprive some schools of exemptions that they could not later recover, the court regarded it as equally speculative whether a loss of exemptions would produce a change in the desegregation of any given school district. Instead, it appeared to the court probable that many schools had only a limited dependence on tax exemptions and, if forced to choose, would forgo tax-exempt status rather than abandon their practices. The court accordingly concluded that respondents had failed to show a sufficient causal nexus between the injury alleged and the challenged procedures (id. at 6a-10a). Second, the district court ruled that respondents' action was "barred by the doctrine of nonreviewability" because it "would require this Court to undertake detailed or continuing review of a generalized IRS enforcement program, or to review complex issues of tax enforcement policy and of agency resource allocation" (Interv. Pet. App. 11a). As the court saw the matter, such review "would be tantamount to this Court becoming a 'shadow commissioner of Internal Revenue' to run the administration of tax assessments to private schools in the United States" (id. at 12a). Finally, the court concluded that the enactment in 1979 of the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments to the Treasury Appropriations Act expressed "the Congressional intent that Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (was) not susceptible of the construction which (respondents) would place upon it in this case" (id. at 14a-15a). While the court acknowledged that the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments (as applied in fiscal years 1980 and 1981) apparently allowed a federal court to fashion a remedy, it concluded that "in such an area ripe (sic) with legislative history and government regulation, it is not the business of a federal court to explicitly thwart the will of Congress or to otherwise fail to carry it out" (id. at 15a). /14/ 3. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings (J.A. 67). The court ruled that respondents had standing to maintain their action (Interv. Pet. App. 12b-25b). In so ruling, the court recognized that Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, supra, "suggests that litigation concerning tax liability is a matter between taxpayer and IRS, with the door barely ajar for third party challenges" (Interv. Pet. App. 16b). It recognized also that certain of its own previous decisions had dismissed for lack of standing suits brought by persons who sought to litigate the tax liability of others (id. at 17b, n.24). /15/ But the court of appeals concluded that other decisions of this Court point in an "opposite direction()" (Interv. Pet. App. at 16b). See Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), aff'g Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). In the court's view, those cases "recognized the right of black citizens to insist that their government 'steer clear' of aiding schools in their communities that practice race discrimination" (Interv. Pet. App. 24b-25b). The court ruled that "(i)n view of the centrality of that right in our contemporary (post-Civil War) constitutional order, we are unable to conclude that Eastern Kentucky speaks to the issue before us" (ibid.). In addition, the court found no impediment to the action in the doctrine of non-reviewability (Interv. Pet. App. 32b-35b). The court concluded that respondents' claims derive from constitutional concerns that courts, not administrators, are better equipped to address (id. at 32b-33b n.53). In the court's view, if respondents were to prevail on the merits of their claims, relief would not entail "large scale judicial intervention in the administrative process" (id. at 35b). Nor did the court consider the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments to be an obstacle to fashioning a remedy (id. at 25b-32b). Those amendments, as the court construed them, were merely temporary checks on Internal Revenue Service initiatives and did not purport to control judicial dispositions (id. at 29b-30b). /16/ In dissent, Judge Tamm would have held that respondents had no standing to sue (Interv. Pet. App. 38b-58b). He found that they failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury to themselves, or a sufficient nexus between the Internal Revenue Service's actions and whatever injury they claimed to have suffered. In his view, the majority of the court erroneously interpreted Green, Norwood, and Gilmore "as requiring it to abandon long-established standing principles, principles limiting the exercise of judicial power to the redress of actual injury" (Interv. Pet. App. 38b; emphasis in original). The majority's opinion, he concluded, was "the product of an impermissible shift in focus from the right of these plaintiffs to make their challenge to the rights they wish to assert" (id. at 57b). On August 26, 1981, the court denied the government's motion for en banc consideration, three judges dissenting (Interv. Pet. App. 1d). /17/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. Respondents seek judicial revision of Internal Revenue Service guidelines and procedures that have been the subject of intense public comment and congressional oversight over the last decade. Alleging no injury to themselves at the hands of the private schools whose tax exemptions they challenge, and no injury at the hands of the government defendants other than their disapproval of government practices, respondents stand as mere disappointed observers of the governmental process. The judgment below holding that they have standing to maintain this action is in direct conflict with this Court's decision in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), and with other decisions establishing the limitations on the jurisdiction of an Article III court. II. Respondents alleged two injuries stemming from the government's method of enforcing the restriction on tax exemptions for discriminatory private schools. Neither allegation satisfies this Court's requirements for establishing standing to sue. A. The first allegation of injury -- that the government's action "constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other support for racially segregated educational institutions" (J.A. 38) -- amounts to no more than "assertion of a right to a particular kind of government conduct," which this Court has held to be an insufficient basis for standing under Article III (Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-476, 483 (1982)). Respondents simply have not alleged any "distinct or palpable" injury to themselves (see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)). B. The second allegation of injury -- that the government's "encourage(ment)" of segregated private schools "interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts" (J.A. 39) -- shares the deficiency of the first, and is also too speculative to support standing, since a change in Internal Revenue Service guidelines and procedures might or might not result in a decrease in availability of segregated private schools to white children fleeing desegregating public schools. Indeed, respondents have not even alleged that the relief they seek would produce such a result. Their position, therefore, has all the shortcomings, and more, of the plaintiffs' position in Eastern Kentucky, supra. III. An examination of the means by which Congress intended the federal tax system to operate suggests that no person who is not himself seeking a tax benefit has standing to challenge the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of the tax liabilities of others. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914); Eastern Kentucky, supra, 426 U.S. at 46 (Justice Stewart, concurring). Opening the courts to generalized grievances concerning enforcement of the tax laws would lead to extensive interference in the administrative process, intended to be left to the supervision of the President and Congress. IV. The court of appeals erred in concluding that this Court's decisions in Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), are at odds with Eastern Kentucky and the other rulings of this Court on the doctrine of standing. Although Gilmore addresses standing in but a footnote and Norwood not at all, it is clear that the plaintiffs in those cases had standing on the traditional basis of protecting rights they were entitled to under earlier judicial decrees (see Gilmore, supra, 417 U.S. at 570 n.10). Coit v. Green, a summary affirmance, did not constitute a ruling by this Court on the issue of standing, and was later held by this Court to "lack() the precedential weight of a * * * truly adversary controversy" (Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 (1974)). ARGUMENT I. RESPONDENTS LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE TREASURY GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES THAT HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE REVIEW AND RESULT IN NO CONCRETE INJURY TO THEM Respondents, who are parents of black public school children suing on behalf of themselves and their children and on behalf of all other parents of black students attending public schools in districts undergoing desegregation, have brought this suit to require the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to revise Internal Revenue Service guidelines and procedures implementing the prohibition on tax exempt treatment for educational institutions that engage in racially discriminatory practices, under Sections 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.). Respondents' complaint challenges not the propriety of the Internal Revenue Service's substantive policy against tax exempt status for discriminatory schools, which was upheld by this Court last Term in Bob Jones University v. United States, Nos. 81-3 and 81-1 (May 24, 1983), but the effectiveness of the measures by which that policy is enforced. As the court of appeals expressed it, "plaintiffs complain * * * that some schools 'are slipping through the Commissioner's net of enforcement'" (Interv. Pet. App. 22b n.27). Respondents allege /18/ that current Internal Revenue Service guidelines and procedures regarding applications for tax exempt status by private schools are "legally insufficient" because "many private schools with insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments which were organized or expanded at or about the time public school districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating, have retained their federal tax exemptions merely by adopting and certifying -- but not implementing -- the required policy of nondiscrimination" (J.A. 25). /19/ Respondents do not challenge the tax exempt status of any particular schools, although their complaint lists 19 "representative" tax exempt private schools that they allege to be "racially segregated" (J.A. 26-38). Respondents admittedly have not alleged that they have been excluded or otherwise discriminated against by these or any other tax exempt private schools; nor do they allege that revocation of the schools' tax exempt status would cause the schools to close down or to alter their practices. As the court of appeals noted, respondents "claim indifference as to the course private schools would take" (Interv. Pet. App. 18b). Respondents have asked the courts to require the Service to adopt new guidelines and procedures which would deny or revoke any tax exemptions of schools with "insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments" in districts where public schools are undergoing desegregation, under any of three conditions: (1) if they "were established or expanded at or about the time the public school districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating"; (2) if they "have been determined in adversary judicial or administrative proceedings to be racially segregated"; or (3) if they "cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school systems" (J.A. 40). Respondents' proposed policy is similar to proposals published for public comment by the Internal Revenue Service on August 22, 1978 (Interv. Pet. App. 1f-13f) and February 9, 1979 (id. at 1g-14g). /20/ These proposals were greeted with a barrage of more than 100,000 adverse written comments (id. at 11a). Congress conducted hearings on the proposals, at which it heard additional criticism. Following the hearings, the House Appropriations Committee formally recommended that the Service defer adoption of the proposals until after the regular tax writing committees could determine whether they properly interpreted the tax laws (H.R. Rep. No. 96-248, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1979)). By vote of both houses, Congress then barred implementation of the proposed guidelines through amendments to the Treasury's appropriations. /21/ These statutory restrictions have now expired, but until further proceedings take place, again subject to congressional oversight, Rev. Proc. 75-50 remains in effect. Respondents thus are in the posture of disappointed observers of the governmental process. Proposals substantially similar to theirs have been formally proposed but, as a result of the mixed considerations that govern the fate of agency proposals subject to public comment and congressional oversight, have not been adopted. The question naturally arises whether these individuals' preference for alternative enforcement procedures under Section 501(c)(3) presents a justiciable controversy. Under the holdings of this Court, a plaintiff must "'allege() such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf" (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). The doctrine of standing has both constitutional and prudential aspects, recently summarized by this Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church And State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-476 (1982). As an "irreducible minimum," Article III requires two showings: (1) actual injury that (2) is traceable to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. These requirements ensure that the court can resolve the legal issues presented "not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action" (id. at 472). They also reflect a "(p)roper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure (, which) requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury" (id. at 474). In addition to these constitutional requirements, this Court has also recognized prudential limitations on the ability of litigants to assert their claims in court. These limitations were summarized in Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 499: "Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the case rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief." Particularly pertinent to this case is the admonition against permitting litigants to raise "abstract questions of wide public significance," (id. at 500) which are "pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 474-475). Under both constitutional and prudential standards, respondents' generalized allegations of injury fall short. In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), this Court faced a situation in many ways identical to this. There, as here, members of the public turned to the courts for reversal of Internal Revenue Service rulings governing the grant of Section 501(c)(3) status to certain institutions, in that instance hospitals. This Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, even though they alleged an actual injury -- a denial of service -- by the institutions whose tax exemptions they were challenging. On its face, respondents' complaint appears to provide even less basis for standing than there was in Eastern Kentucky. Respondents freely admit that they do not desire admission to the educational institutions whose tax exempt status they question (Br. in Opp. to Cert. at 8). It should follow, a fortiori, that they lack standing to bring this lawsuit. So the district court held. Nonetheless, the court of appeals found that "Eastern Kentucky is not the line appropriately followed in the matter before us" (Interv. Pet. App. 18b), and reversed the district court's dismissal of respondents' complaint. It is therefore appropriate to consider in detail the allegations of injury in respondents' complaint, and set them against the principles this Court has established for determining whether litigants have standing to sue. II. RESPONDENTS' ALLEGATIONS OF INJURY ESTABLISH NO DIRECT AND CONCRETE INJURY CAUSED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AND REDRESSIBLE BY THE COURTS A. Respondents' Allegation That The Government Provides Tangible Aid To Racially Segregated Institutions Establishes No "Injury In Fact," But Only A Generalized Grievance With Government Conduct Respondents' first allegation of injury is that the grant of federal tax exempt status to racially segregated private schools in districts undergoing desegregation injures them in that it "constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other support for racially segregated educational institutions" (J.A. 38). On its face, this allegation fails to draw any connection between the allegedly wrongful action and respondents' own interests. In the course of the hearing below on the motions to dismiss, the district court sought clarification from counsel as to the nature of the injuries asserted by respondents. Counsel for respondents answered: "Their injury, Your Honor, is an infringement of their Constitutional right to be free of governmental support of private school discrimination * * *" (J.A. 62). As expressed by respondents' brief in opposition to certiorari, "(P)laintiffs here have standing to seek an end to government aid to private discrimination because such government aid in and of itself injures them" (Br. in Opp. at 9). /22/ An allegation that third parties, who themselves have not injured respondents, are improperly receiving tax benefits does not identify a "distinct and palpable injury" to respondents sufficient to justify judicial relief (Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)). This Court has never equated mere dissatisfaction over government conduct with the "injury in fact" necessary to sustain Article III jurisdiction. This Court's formulations to describe the requisite injury have been consistent and unambiguous: the plaintiff must have been "concretely affected" (Blum v. Yaretsky, No. 80-1952 (June 25, 1982), slip op. 7); the injury must be "distinct and palpable" (Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 501); "abstract injury is not enough" (O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)); a plaintiff "must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed" (United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). The injury need not, of course, be economic (id. at 686; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)); aesthetic and environmental interests, for example, may support standing (SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. at 686). On the other hand, as stated in Valley Forge College (454 U.S. at 482-483), "This Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on 'the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law * * *'" (quoting Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 208, quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)). It is not enough that litigants may be correct on the merits, or that they are intensely interested or experienced in the problem (Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, 405 U.S. at 727). The courts are not authorized to review legislative or executive decisions "at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process" (id. at 740). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). Respondents in this case feel aggrieved because they do not believe the government is doing an adequate job of enforcing the laws; but as this Court has made clear, litigants have no legally cognizable right "to have the Government act in accordance with their views of the Constitution (or statutory requirements) * * * * * * (A)ssertion of a right to a particular kind of government conduct, which the government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Article III without draining those requirements of meaning" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 483; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972)). The court of appeals stressed the "denigration" respondents suffer "as black parents and school children when their government graces with tax-exempt status educational institutions in their communities that treat members of their race as persons of lesser worth" (Interv. Pet. App. 13b; see also id. at 34b). But this Court has rejected the notion that "psychological" discomfiture at government action, even if "phrased in constitutional terms," establishes a basis for standing (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 485-486). Were it otherwise, any would-be litigant could defeat the Article III limitations merely by alleging what cannot be disproved: that he suffers "denigration," "stigma," or other forms of psychological distress as a result of the challenged action. With respect to their first allegation of injury, respondents have a claim no stronger than that of other litigants who have been held to lack standing in cases before this Court. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), plaintiffs sued to challenge the eligibility of members of Congress under the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, Section 6, Cl.2, to serve as reservists in the military. Characterizing their interest as one of having their government "act in conformity" with the Constitution (418 U.S. at 217), this Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. See also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (rejecting plaintiff's standing to challenge constitutionality of the appointment and confirmation of a Justice of this Court under the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, Section 6, Cl.2); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (rejecting taxpayer's standing to challenge the alleged failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to comply with the Accounts Clause, Art. I, Section 9, Cl. 7). Also closely analogous to this case is Valley Forge College, supra, in which plaintiffs challenged a transfer of federal property to a religious institution as a violation of the Establishment Clause. /23/ They claimed a "shared individuated right to a government that 'shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion'" (454 U.S. at 482). The court rejected their claim of standing, however, stating: "They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by the plaintiffs as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Article III, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms" (id. at 485-486; emphasis in original). Respondents' allegation that the government is not adequately enforcing the Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution, and that in consequence private discrimination is encouraged, is nothing more than a claim of their "shared individuated right" to a government that adequately enforces the limits on tax exemptions to discriminatory schools. This is indistinguishable from allegations of government failure to comply with the Incompatibility clause, the Accounts Clause, the Ineligibility Clause, the Establishment Clause, or any other constitutional or statutory provision by persons not directly injured. /24/ "(A) right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Article III without draining those requirements of meaning" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 483). Respondents' standing cannot be justified, in the absence of actual injury, on the basis of the "issues (they) wish() to have adjudicated" (Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U.S. at 99). The "right of black citizens to insist that their government 'steer clear' of aiding schools in their communities that practice race discrimination," as identified by the court of appeals (Interv. Pet. App. 24b-25b), is indeed a fundamental concern of government (Bob Jones University v. United States, supra, slip op. 17-20, 29), but "the centrality of that right in our contemporary (post-Civil War) constitutional order" (Interv. Pet. App. 25b) does not create "injury in fact" where in fact there is no injury. The fundamental character of the constitutional or statutory provisions under which a plaintiff seeks to sue is irrelevant to whether he has established standing (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 484). Thus in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, and in United States v. Richardson, supra, citizen claims to standing were rejected even though the constitutional guarantees the plaintiffs sought to put in issue were of manifest importance to the nation. Only recently, in Valley Forge College, supra, the plaintiffs contended that their "personal" right to a government that did not establish religion was more worthy of standing than "the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance" asserted in Schlesinger and Richardson. This Court observed, in words that apply to this case with equal force (454 U.S. at 484): Nor can Schlesinger and Richardson be distinguished on the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are in some way less "fundamental" than the Establishment Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honor -- to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution. To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing under which the Art. III burdens diminish as the "importance" of the claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion. * * * (W)e know of no principal basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary "sliding scale" of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States. See also Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U.S. at 129 n.18 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, this Court has rejected claims of standing based on interests similar to those of respondents. In O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, plaintiffs brought suit to challenge "a pattern and practice of intentional racial discrimination" by government officials (414 U.S. at 491); yet, lacking actual or threatened injury, they were held to have no standing to sue. Similarly, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), this Court denied standing to a black plaintiff to challenge the State's grant of a liquor license to a private club with a discriminatory membership policy, where he did not allege that he had applied for and been denied membership. Respondents' right in this case to be free of "government aid to private discrimination" (Br. in Opp. at 9) no more sustains standing than did the O'Shea plaintiffs' right to be free from the government's "pattern and practice of intentional racial discrimination" or the Moose Lodge plaintiff's right to challenge government licensing of discriminatory establishments. See also Warth v. Seldin, supra (plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the "intentional exclusionary practices" of a municipal zoning board, though they claimed, among other things, that these practices deprived them "of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community" (422 U.S. at 502, 512)); Valley Forge College, supra (rejecting the hypothetical example of standing based simply on the "personal right to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws" (454 U.S. at 489 n.26). See also American Jewish Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1978). /25/ We submit that respondents' first allegation of injury is insufficient to support standing to bring this action. B. Respondents' Allegation That Government Encouragement Of Racially Segregated Educational Opportunities Interferes With Public School Desegregation Does Not Establish An Injury Fairly Traceable To Government Action And Redressible In Court Respondents' second allegation of injury likewise fails to establish a basis for standing under Article III. Respondents allege that the grant of federal tax exemptions to racially segregated private schools located in or serving public school districts undergoing desegregation, "fosters and encourages the organization, operation and expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts and thereby interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts which have been operating racially dual school systems" (J.A. 39). Like respondents' first allegation of injury, this statement fails to spell out any connection between the wrong allegedly perpetrated by the government and an injury to respondents. However, respondents have made clear that they represent school children attending public schools in districts undergoing desegregation, and it might be inferred that their alleged injury stems from the effect of the tax benefits on their opportunity to attend desegregated public schools. But respondents do not allege that the government enforcement policies they complain of have in fact resulted in a denial of their opportunity to attend desegregated public schools. In fact, counsel for respondents conceded in the district court that respondents' children presently attend desegregated schools even under current Internal Revenue Service procedures (J.A. 62). /26/ They have, therefore, alleged no "'threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action'" (Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 499, quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). Their second allegation of injury thus suffers all the deficiencies of the first. Moreover, respondents fail to allege that any interference with their opportunity to attend desegregated public schools "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 472, quoting Eastern Kentucky, supra, 426 U.S. at 36, 41). This deficiency is independently fatal to their claim. Respondents do not allege that the tax exemptions in fact increase enrollment in segregated private schools and thus siphon white students away from the public schools. Nor do they allege that adoption of revised Internal Revenue Service procedures would decrease enrollment in the private schools in question, or cause them to change their practices. Indeed, respondents "claim indifference as to the course private schools would take" if their tax exemptions were lifted (Interv. Pet. App. 18b). Without such allegations there can be no causal link between the challenged conduct and the alleged injury, and no basis for supposing that a favorable decision would bring redress. Under this Court's decision in Eastern Kentucky, any allegation that respondents' proposed change in Internal Revenue enforcement policies would cause private schools to welcome black students or to lose enrollment would be too speculative to support a claim of standing. In Eastern Kentucky, the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the Treasury to withdraw a revenue ruling (Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 117), which held that a non-profit hospital could qualify for recognition as a "charitable organization" under Sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2) even though it provided no more than emergency room service to persons who could not pay for hospitalization, and to require the Treasury to reinstate its earlier position (Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 202), which held that a hospital could not qualify unless it was operated to the extent of its financial ability for the benefit of those not able to pay. Plaintiffs alleged that in extending the benefits of tax exempt status to hospitals not providing care other than emergency room service to indigents, the government was "encouraging" the hospitals to deny medical services to the plaintiffs, in contravention of the Internal Revenue Code, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Constitution. This Court held that the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky had no standing to sue. The Court recognized that the plaintiffs had an interest in obtaining access to hospital services and that some of the plaintiffs had sustained an injury to that interest at the hands of the hospitals. But the Court considered injury at the hands of the hospitals, which were not defendants, to be insufficient by itself to establish a case or controversy with the Treasury. The Court found it "purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to (defendants') 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications" (426 U.S. at 42-43). /27/ Moreover, the Court found it "equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to (plaintiffs) of such services" (id. at 43). To the Court it seemed "just as plausible that the hospitals * * * would elect to forego favorable tax treatment" (ibid.). The Court thus held that the plaintiffs had failed "'to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm'" (id. at 44-45, quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 505). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-264 (1977). Respondents' second allegation of injury is no less "speculative" than the plaintiffs' claim in Eastern Kentucky. As the district court held (Interv. Pet. App. 9a-10a): (I)t is purely speculative that loss of these exemptions would produce any net change in the desegregation of a given school district (the second injury asserted by plaintiffs). It is by no means clear that these schools would not elect to forego the exemption in question rather than end any discriminatory conduct. It appears probable that many such schools have only limited dependence on these exemptions, indeed, even assuming substantial dependence, the schools might well choose to compensate by alternate means for financial benefits otherwise available from the exemptions. Clearly, under law firmly established by Eastern Kentucky, supra, plaintiffs lack standing because there is a sufficient degree of speculativeness that the relief requested will remedy the injury claimed by plaintiffs. Indeed, respondents' claim here is decidedly more speculative even than that in Eastern Kentucky. In order to affect the racial composition of the public schools respondents' children attend, the relief requested against the Treasury would have to influence not only the decisions of the private schools directly involved, but also the decisions of scores of individual parents on where to send their children to school. Only if significant numbers of white parents respond to whatever decisions the private schools may make by returning their children to public school would the desegregation of respondents' schooling be enhanced. This additional link in the causal chain, depending as it does on the varied motivations and reactions of persons subject neither to court order nor to Treasury procedures, multiplies the uncertainties that led this Court to reject the claim in Eastern Kentucky. /28/ Neither respondents nor the court of appeals have disputed the district court's conclusion that respondents' claim is too speculative to support standing under the precedent of Eastern Kentucky. /29/ Respondents merely argue, and the court of appeals agreed, "that Eastern Kentucky is the wrong frame for their case" (Interv. Pet. App. 18b). The reason Eastern Kentucky is considered the "wrong frame" apparently is that respondents and the court of appeals have chosen to rely not upon the allegation of interference with a right to attend desegregated public schools, but upon the first allegation -- of the right to be free from government support for private discrimination. /30/ We have already shown that that allegation does not provide a sufficient basis for standing. III. UNDER THE PRUDENTIAL TESTS FOR STANDING ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT, NO PERSON NOT SEEKING A TAX BENEFIT MAY CHALLENGE THE TAX TREATMENT OF OTHERS We have demonstrated that the allegations of injury in respondents' complaint do not establish existence of a "'distinct and palpable injury' * * * that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted" (Gladstone, Realtors, supra, 441 U.S. at 100, quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 501). It is possible, however, to generalize: No person who is not himself seeking a tax benefit has standing to challenge the Treasury's treatment of the tax liabilities of others. Any claim that a person is injured by private conduct induced or encouraged by considerations of tax treatment will be too "speculative" for the reasons discussed in Eastern Kentucky, while any claim of "taxpayer standing" by virtue of a supposed increase in one's tax liabilities as a result of the tax benefits afforded to another will be rejected for the reasons set out in Valley Forge College and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). As Justice Stewart said in Eastern Kentucky, "I cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else" (426 U.S. at 46) (concurring opinion). The same conclusion may be reached under this Court's rulings on the prudential aspects of standing, where the question must be posed: "whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief" (Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 500). /31/ Thus, even if respondents could allege a concrete injury (as in Eastern Kentucky), and even if they could (contrary to Eastern Kentucky) persuade a court to accept their "attenuated line of causation" from Treasury policy, through the independent decisions of schools and parents, to their alleged injury (see United States v. SCRAP, supra, 412 U.S. at 688), their standing would still be questionable because there is no provision, either of constitutional or of statutory law, that can be understood as granting them a right to litigate the tax liabilities of other persons. /32/ This is not to say that the Internal Revenue Service's administration of the tax laws is never subject to judicial reexamination. /33/ Not only may taxpayers obtain review of decisions directly bearing upon their own tax liability (e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, supra), but they may also challenge the tax treatment of others where it is relevant to their own claim for consistent treatment (e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, No. 81-2338 (May 23, 1983) (organization that was denied tax exempt status because of substantial lobbying activity challenged, under Equal Protection Clause, the right of veterans' organizations to tax exempt status notwithstanding those organizations' substantial lobbying); see also United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Co., 400 U.S. 4 (1970)). But suits by persons whose own tax liability is not affected "would operate to disturb the whole revenue system of the Government and affect the revenues which arise therefrom" (Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914)). This Court has noted that "it is * * * open to serious question whether the Framers of the Constitution ever imagined that general directives to the Congress or the Executive would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen" (United States v. Richardson, supra, 418 U.S. at 178 n.11). Important though it is to each citizen that the government fairly, conscientiously, and efficiently enforce the laws, citizens have never been recognized as having standing to challenge such enforcement in court, as it applies to others. For example, this Court has held that "a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another" (Linda R.S. v. Richard D., supra, 410 U.S. at 619). Thus, in Linda R.S., the plaintiff was denied standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state criminal statute limiting mandatory child support to legitimate children, even though she might receive a clear economic benefit if the requirement were enforced on behalf of illegitimate children as well. /34/ The principle against third-party interference with the government's enforcement policies is especially compelling in the "unique context of a challenge to a criminal statute" (410 U.S. at 617), where the intrusive and coercive power of the state is at its height. It is applicable as well to other areas of law enforcement where would-be plaintiffs alleging no injury may seek to have the courts act as "virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action" (Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). As this Court has observed, "(S)uch a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the 'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action" (ibid.). /35/ The principle is particularly applicable to the administration of the tax laws, where the twin elements of coercive authority and complex administrative considerations are evident. As Justice Brennan has stated, "Courts must be circumspect in dealing with the taxing power in order to avoid unnecessary intrusion into the functions of the legislative and executive branches" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 499 (dissenting opinion)). See also National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-307 (1967); Louisiana v. McAdoo, supra. Congress has delegated "the administration and enforcement of" the tax laws to the Secretary and the Commissioner (26 U.S.C. 7801(a)), including the power to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the tax laws (26 U.S.C. 7805(a)). It has created a Joint Committee on Taxation to investigate the administration, operations and effects of the tax system (26 U.S.C. 8001-8023). Congress has also established precisely defined channels for the adjudication of tax disputes -- by proceedings in the Tax Court (26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 6212, 6213), by refund or collection actions in the district courts or the Claims Court (26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 6532, 7402, 7405, 7422; 28 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1346, 1491), or -- most directly to the point -- by expressly limited declaratory judgment actions, e.g., by an organization seeking recognition as a tax exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) (26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 7428). Otherwise, Congress has prohibited "any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed," from maintaining a "suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" (26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 7421(a), the Anti-Injunction Act), and has barred declaratory relief in all actions "with respect to Federal taxes" (28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2201, the Declaratory Judgment Act). /36/ See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). /37/ These provisions reflect a deliberate judgment that, in the tax area, the right to invoke the judicial power must be closely circumscribed. Congress has shown no intention to create a right to challenge the vigor of the government's enforcement of the tax code. /38/ Thus, the district court properly refused to become "a 'shadow commissioner of Internal Revenue' to run the administration of tax assessments to private schools in the United States" (Interv. Pet. App. 12a). Contrary to the view of the court of appeals (Interv. Pet. App. 35b), the relief respondents seek necessarily would entail extensive interference in the process of tax administration. /39/ Respondents do not challenge specific exemptions of specific schools. Rather, they seek revisions of the guidelines and procedures used by the Treasury to determine the tax status of thousands of private schools (see J.A. 22-24, 40-41). /40/ To adjudicate their claims, a broad-scale inquiry into the enforcement practices of the Internal Revenue Service, as well as into the policies and practices of the schools in question, would be required. As the district court observed, "(i)n order to assess the viability of IRS * * * enforcement efforts, this Court would be required to analyze results from a significant number of schools. Even if, as plaintiffs contend, the Court need examine only a 'representative number' of schools to gauge compliance, the effort would be unfathomable" (Interv. Pet. App. 12a). Such a judicial undertaking cannot be required, or justified, on behalf of litigants whose own tax liability would be unaffected by the guidelines and procedures they seek to revise. This is not to suggest, of course, that the Secretary and the Commissioner are unaccountable in regard to the adoption or enforcement of administrative guidelines and procedures. The role respondents would have the court assume, "as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action," Laird v. Tatum, supra, 408 U.S. at 15, belongs to Congress, which has the power and duty to oversee the operation, administration, and effects of the internal revenue system (see Sections 8021 through 8023 of the Code), and to the President, who, along with the Treasury officials, is required to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (Art. II, Section 3). Absent an assertion of concrete and remediable injury directly attributable to unlawful government action, the judiciary should not assume the "amorphous (task of) general supervision of the operations of government * * *" (United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, 418 U.S. at 217-218). The questions of revenue enforcement policy raised by respondents' suit are properly a matter for public debate. By that means, the views of interested persons and organizations may be ventilated and taken into account. As described (pages 6-9, supra), such a debate has occurred: the Executive branch has proposed procedures similar to those advocated by respondents; the public has responded at public hearings and with more than 100,000 written comments; congressional committees have conducted hearings and expressed their views; the "power of the purse" has been used to block proposals unacceptable to Congress. See Bob Jones University v. United States, supra, slip op. 24-27. Respondents simply are dissatisfied with the outcome of the debate. Nontaxpayer suits of this type thus present a classic example of cases raising "questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated * * *" (Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S. at 99-100). Nontaxpayer litigants are not permitted under the decisions of this Court "to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts" (United States v. Richardson, supra, 418 U.S. at 179; see id. at 188-192 (Powell, J., concurring)). Thus, even apart from the specific deficiencies in respondents' complaint, respondents do not have a judicially cognizable right, as third parties whose own tax liability is unaffected, to litigate the adequacy of Treasury's enforcement procedures under Sections 170(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Code. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THIS COURTS JUDGMENTS IN NORWOOD, GILMORE, OR GREEN The court of appeals made no attempt to explain or distinguish this Court's rulings addressing the standing doctrine. Rather, the court purported to identify "two divergent lines of Supreme Court decision" and then "select * * * the one we believe best fits the case before us" (Interv. Pet. App. 16b). The court frankly recognized that respondents' claim would be insufficient under the precedent of Eastern Kentucky. But "(i)n view of the centrality of (the right asserted by respondents) in our contemporary (post-Civil War) constitutional order," the court professed itself "unable to conclude that Eastern Kentucky speaks to the issue before us" (id. at 25b). Eastern Kentucky cannot be distinguished, however, on the ground that the substantive issues the plaintiffs sought to raise in that case lacked the "centrality" of the issue respondents would litigate here. As discussed above (supra pages 28-29), the requirements of standing do not depend on the merits or nature of the underlying issue tendered by a plaintiff; nor are they a matter of choice or discretion with the court. "To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing under which the Art. III burdens diminish as the 'importance' of the claim on the merits increases," this Court has "reject(ed) that notion" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 484). In any event, this Court has rejected claims of standing based on precisely the same fundamental right asserted here -- the right to be free from governmental assistance to or approval of private racial discrimination. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, 407 U.S. at 163. Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals, the relevant decisions of this Court are not "divergent" (Interv. Pet. App. 16b), and do not "point() in opposite directions" (id. at 15b-16b). Rather than adhering to this Court's teaching on standing, the court of appeals turned to three decisions, two of which did not even address the issue of standing: Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). None of those decisions warrants, much less requires, the court's holding that respondents have standing. In Norwood v. Harrison, supra, this Court struck down a program administered by the State of Mississippi under which students in private schools were permitted to borrow textbooks from the State without regard to the racially discriminatory policies of the students' schools. The complaint, brought by parents of students who attended public schools in Tunica County, Mississippi, alleged that specified private schools whose students participated in the school textbook program excluded black students on the basis of race (413 U.S. at 457, 467 n.9). See United States v. Tunica County School District, 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1971). The district court, in ruling that the textbook program was constitutional, sustained the plaintiffs' standing in one sentence (Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (N.D. Miss. 1972)), and, as the court of appeals here pointed out, "the issue (of standing) was not pursued on appeal" (Interv. Pet. App. 24b). This Court reversed on the merits. As the Court later explained in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, supra, 417 U.S. at 570-571 n.10: "The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they suffered." Thus, plaintiffs' standing in Norwood was by virtue of their position as successful litigants in a related desegregation suit; their injury was the State's interference with their rights under the decree. Similarly, Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, supra, was an outgrowth of an earlier proceeding where there was no question of the plaintiffs' standing. A decree secured by the Gilmore plaintiffs in that earlier proceeding struck down a city ordinance relegating blacks to separate parks and recreational facilities, and mandated the desegregation of those facilities. Plaintiffs' complaint for supplemental relief was entertained to determine whether the city's policy of allocating recreational facilities to segregated private schools had the effect of creating "'enclaves of segregation'" that denied the plaintiffs equal access to the city's parks and recreational facilities, and thereby impaired the efficacy of the prior decree (417 U.S. at 566-568). This Court's discussion of the standing of those plaintiffs -- its only observation upon standing in the cases relied on by the court of appeals -- shows that the rules of standing are not relaxed to accommodate claims of unlawful government aid to racial discrimination. While the Court affirmed the district court's order directing the city not to permit such schools to have "exclusive" use of a city recreational facility, the Court was "not prepared at this juncture and on this record, to assume the standing of these plaintiffs to claim relief against certain nonexclusive uses by private school groups" (id. at 570 n.10). /41/ As the Court explained (id. at 570-571 n.10; emphasis added): The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they suffered. Here, the plaintiffs were parties to an action desegregating the city parks and recreational facilities. Without a properly developed record, it is not clear that every nonexclusive use of city facilities by school groups, unlike their exclusive use, would result in cognizable injury to these plaintiffs. The District Court does not have carte blanche authority to administer city facilities simply because there is past or present discrimination. The usual prudential tenets limiting the exercise of judicial power must be observed in this case as in any other. Thus, in the foregoing cases, as elsewhere, the Court adhered to "the basic principle that to invoke judicial power the claimant must have 'a personal stake in the outcome,' * * *, or 'a particular, concrete injury' or 'a direct injury,' * * * in short, something more than 'generalized grievances' * * *" (United States v. Richardson, supra, 418 U.S. at 179-180; citations omitted). The final decision relied upon by the court of appeals was this Court's summary affirmance without opinion in Coit v. Green, supra. Although similar to this case on its facts, /42/ Green cannot be understood as establishing a precedent on the issue of standing. The Green plaintiffs' standing was not addressed in the district court opinion affirmed by this Court. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). /43/ In this Court, the plaintiffs' standing was addressed only by an intervenor, in an ambiguous initial question in his Jurisdictional Statement. /44/ The issue was not addressed in the body of the intervenor's brief, nor in the Motions to Dismiss or Affirm filed by the plaintiffs and the government. See Jurisdictional Statement, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, in Coit v. Green (No. 71-425, 1971 Term). In these circumstances, this Court can hardly be thought to have ruled on the standing issue. "(T)he precedential effect of a summary affirmance can extend no farther than 'the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions'" (Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182 (1979), quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)). This Court's summary affirmance in Green, therefore, should "not * * * be read as a renunciation * * * of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument" (Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)), nor should it be considered a reason for declining to follow Eastern Kentucky, Valley Forge College, and other later opinions of this Court explicating the doctrine of standing. A second, independent reason not to treat this Court's affirmance of Green as a basis for finding standing in this case is that in Green, the government and the plaintiffs were in agreement; the appeal was taken by an intervenor whose own standing was seriously in doubt. For this reason, as this Court later stated, "the Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy" (Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 (1974)). /45/ It is evident, therefore, that the Norwood, Gilmore, and Green decisions do not justify the court of appeals' departure from Eastern Kentucky and the other standing decisions of this Court. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed and the injunctive order of the court of appeals should be vacated. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General GLENN L. ARCHER, JR. Assistant Attorney General LAWRENCE G. WALLACE Deputy Solicitor General MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL Assistant to the Solicitor General ERNEST J. BROWN ROBERT S. POMERANCE Attorneys SEPTEMBER 1983 /1/ Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is a petitioner in No. 81-970, in addition to Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury. In addition to Inez Wright, who is a party to this proceeding individually and on behalf of her minor children, Oscar Clay Renfro, Anthony Lee Renfro, Lisa Marie Wright, and Ephron Antoni Wright, Jr., of Memphis, Tennessee, the following persons are also respondents: Geneva Walker, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Johnny Ranae Walker and Vincent Calvett Walker, of Memphis, Tennessee; Delores G. Beamon, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Rynthia Beamon, Reuben Beamon, Jr., Cynthia Beamon, and Melvin Beamon, of Montgomery, Alabama; Mary Louise Belser, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Charlotte Belser, Connie Belser, Janice Belser, Lawrence Belser, Marvin Belser, and Anthony Belser, of Montgomery, Alabama; Etherline House, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Elmore House, Roger House, and Zachary House, of Montgomery, Alabama; Lou Ella Jackson, individually and on behalf of her minor children Regina Jackson, Angela Jackson, Phyllis Jackson, Gregory Jackson, Michele Jackson, Dora Lee Jackson, Lewis Jackson, Jr., and Sandra Jackson, of Montgomery, Alabama; Elsie R. Walker, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Sonja S. Walker and Cornell E. Walker, Jr., of Farmville, Virginia; Anna G. Miller, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Joseph W. Miller, Jr., of Farmville, Virginia; Clydia Koen, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Robbie Koen and Cara Koen, of Cairo, Illinois; Annie L. Johnson, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Howard Johnson, Jr., of Cairo, Illinois; Mable Hollis, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Bernadian Hollis and Frank Hollis, of Cairo, Illinois; Hyland L. Davis, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Damon A. Davis and Troy A. Davis, of Beaufort, South Carolina; Lawrence Washington, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Youland J. Washington and Jerry J. Washington, of Seabrook, South Carolina; Rena M. Robinson, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Angela Christine Robinson and Carol Denise Robinson of Bowman, South Carolina; Robert C. Zimmerman, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Robert Zimmerman, Jr., Paul Zimmerman, Cynthia Zimmerman and Andrea Zimmerman, of Bowman, South Carolina; Rev. John Wilbur Wright, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Dedra Olether Wright and JohnCalvin McCurnell Wright, of Holly Hill, South Carolina; Lavinia Washington, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Stephen Washington, Gregory Washington, Eliot Washington, and Kevin Washington, of Holly Hill, South Carolina; Robert Jackson, individually and on behalf of his minor child, Robert Jackson, Jr., of Natchitoches, Louisiana; Moses Williams, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Rhonda Rense Williams, Matra Lucille Williams, and Lula Marie Williams, of Tallulah, Louisiana; Fred Bracy and Betty Bracy, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Willie Bracy and Robert Bracy, of Monroe, Louisiana; Alma Lee Griffin and Darnell Griffin, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Gregory Griffin, Carol Dyne Griffin, Verline Ann Griffin, Carmen Griffin, and Terry Griffin, of Monroe, Louisiana; and Herbert H. Jackson, individually and on behalf of his minor children, Carla Cumberlander, Vincent Cumberlander, Francine Cumberlander, and Herbert H. Jackson, Jr., of Roxbury, Massachusetts. /2/ "Interv. Pet." refers to the petition for a writ of certiorari (No. 81-757) filed by intervenor W. Wayne Allen, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Briarcrest School System, Memphis, Tennessee. /3/ Section 501(c)(3) of the Code lists organizations that are exempt from federal income tax pursuant to Section 501(a). Among these are organizations formed and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. If an organization is described in Section 501(c)(3), contributions to it are deductible as charitable contributions for purposes of the federal income tax under Section 170(c)(2), and deductible for purposes of the federal estate and gift taxes under, respectively, Section 2055 and 2522. The organization is also exempt from social security taxes on employees by virtue of Sections 3121(b)(8)(B) (FICA) and 3306(c)(8) (FUTA). /4/ Even schools that meet the test of Rev. Proc. 75-50 can be found ineligible for tax exempt status under Rev. Rul. 71-447 (Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1979) (statement of Commissioner Jerome Kurtz)). /5/ The five factors specified were: 1. Availability of and granting of scholarships or other financial assistance on a significant basis to minority students. 2. Active and vigorous minority recruitment programs, such as contacting prospective minority students and organizations from which prospective minority students could be identified. 3. An increasing percentage of minority student enrollment. 4. Employment of minority teachers or professional staff. 5. Other substantial evidence of good faith, including evidence of a combination of lesser activities, such as -- (a) Continued and meaningful advertising programs beyond the requirements of Revenue Procedure 75-50, or contacts with minority leaders inviting applications from minority students. (b) Significant efforts to recruit minority teachers. (c) Participation with integrated schools in sports, music, and other events or activities. (d) Making school facilities available to outside, integrated civic or charitable groups. (e) Special minority-oriented curriculum or orientation programs. (f) Minority participation in the founding of the school or current minority board members. (Interv. Pet. App. 9f-10f). /6/ H.R.J. Res. 644, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), Pub. L. No. 96-536, Section 101(a)(1) and (4), 94 Stat. 3166, as amended by Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-12, Section 401, 95 Stat. 95. /7/ The House voted to modify the 1980 Ashbrook Amendment by inserting the phrase "court order" in an amendment to the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1982 (H.R. 4121, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The bill thus provided in Section 616: None of the funds made available pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be used to formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard, court order, or measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church-operated schools under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless in effect prior to August 22, 1978 (emphasis added). /8/ H.R.J. Res. 325, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), Pub. L. No. 97-51, Section 101(a)(3), 95 Stat. 958; see 127 Cong. Rec. H6698-H6699, H6702 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1981). /9/ The following private schools were identified by name in the complaint: Harding Academy, Briarcrest Baptist School System and the Southern Baptist Schools of Whitehaven, Inc., Memphis, Tennessee; Natchitoches Academy, Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana; Delta Christian Academy and Tallulah Academy, Madison Parish, Louisiana; River Oaks School, Monroe, Louisiana; Holly Hill Academy and Bowman Academy, Orangeburg, South Carolina; Sea Pines Academy, Beaufort County, South Carolina; Prince Edward Academy, Prince Edward County, Virginia; Montgomery Academy and St. James Parish School, Montgomery, Alabama; Camelot Parochial School, Cairo, Illinois; Hyde Park Academy, South Boston Heights Academy and Parkway Academy, Boston, Massachusetts (J.A. 26-38). The complaint referred, in addition, to "thousands of other racially segregated independent private schools which operate in or serve desegregating public school districts and which have received, applied for, or will apply for tax exemptions" (id. at 32-33). /10/ Respondents apparently used the term "racially segregated" with reference to private schools in their complaint to signify only that there were few or no black students in attendance at a school, and not to signify that the absence of more black students was the result of racially exclusionary practices. At a hearing in the district court, counsel for respondents conceded that he did not know whether any of the black children who are parties to this action would be denied admission to any private school on the basis of race (J.A. 62-63). /11/ As the court of appeals noted, "Plaintiffs * * * maintain they have no interest whatever in enrolling their children in a private school" (Interv. Pet. App. 13b). /12/ As the court of appeals noted, "Plaintiffs * * * claim indifference as to the course private schools would take" (Interv. Pet. App. 18b). /13/ In a related action confined solely to private schools in the State of Mississippi, Green v. Regan (Civ. Action No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. May 17, 1977)), which was consolidated with the instant case in the district court, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss (J.A. 53), finding that the Green plaintiffs "have a right to proceed to determine whether or not * * * there has been good-faith compliance with the Order of this Court" (J.A. 52). See also Interv. Pet. App. 3a n.1. /14/ The district court found it unnecessary to consider the other grounds urged in support of the motion to dismiss, viz., absence of illegal state action, ban of the Anti-Injunction and Declaratory Judgment Acts, sovereign immunity, and failure to join indispensable parties. The court of appeals remanded on those issues (Interv. Pet. App. 3b n.2), and we will not address them in this brief. /15/ See American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). See also American Jewish Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1978). /16/ The court of appeals' decision was rendered before the Ashbrook Amendment was amended expressly to encompass court orders. See note 7, supra. /17/ Thereafter, on motion of respondents (J.A. 68-78), the court of appeals issued orders on February 18, 1982, and on March 24, 1982 (Tamm, J., dissenting), enjoining the Secretary and the Commissioner from granting Section 501(c)(3) status to any school that unlawfully discriminates on the basis of race (J.A. 81-84). /18/ For purposes of evaluating the correctness of the district court's dismissal of respondents' action, the allegations in their complaint will be accepted as true. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 (1979). /19/ This is not, properly speaking, a challenge to Rev. Proc. 75-50, which expressly requires that, to be tax exempt, "(a) school must show affirmatively, * * * that since the adoption of (a racially nondiscriminatory policy) it has operated as a bona fide manner in accordance therewith" (Interv. Pet. App. 1e). Respondents apparently do not believe Rev. Proc. 75-50 is being enforced, though they allege no specific instance in which a tax exempt school has failed to implement its nondiscriminatory policy. /20/ The Internal Revenue Service proposals and respondents' proposals all are based on a presumption that private schools with few or no minority students formed or expanded in times of public school desegregation in their communities are in violation of the public policy underlying Sections 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3). On the basis of this common element -- characterized by the district court as a "presumed-guilty-until-proven-innocent approach" (Interv. Pet. App. 14a, quoting Second Supp. Mem. of Intervenor in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4) -- the district court concluded that congressional repudiation of the Internal Revenue Service proposals "is the strongest possible expression of the Congressional intent that Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is not susceptible of the construction which plaintiffs would place upon it in this case" (Interv. Pet. App. 14a-15a). The principal difference between respondents' somewhat vague proposal and the published proposals is in the nature of the showing that a school must make once the presumption of ineligibility has attached. The Internal Revenue Service proposals focus on affirmative outreach efforts to attract minority students (see Interv. Pet. App. 9f-10f (August 22, 1978 proposal); id. at 11g (February 9, 1979 proposal)), while respondents' proposal focuses on whether the school has been established or expanded during desegregation or can be said to provide "racially segregated educational opportunities" for white children avoiding desegregation in public schools (J.A. 40). It is not clear that schools with open admissions policies, even with affirmative outreach efforts, would be able to make respondents' requested showing; indeed, the schools' tax exempt status would depend on factors essentially outside their control. By way of contrast, Rev. Proc. 75-50 focuses on whether a school has adopted, announced, and implemented a "racially nondiscriminatory policy" (Interv. Pet. App. 1e). /21/ These developments in Congress are described in more detail (pages 7-9, supra). /22/ Even these explanations may overstate respondents' actual allegations, which concern "schools which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments and which are located in or serve desegregating public school districts" (J.A. 26). As the district court observed, there is no allegation that the schools whose tax exemptions respondents question "are actually discriminating in violation of the Constitution or federal law" (Interv. Pet. App. 5a-6a). Nor would respondents' requested relief be confined to schools that discriminate (J.A. 40-41). /23/ Indeed, a conclusion that respondents lack standing in this case would not raise the special problems associated with restrictions on litigation under the Establishment Clause. See Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 500-505, 507-510 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 515 (Stevens, J., dissenting). /24/ Respondents apparently believe that the rights they assert are not "undifferentiated right(s) common to all members of the public" because the Fourteenth Amendment is intended "to safeguard an identifiable segment of the citizenry: blacks, the same class to which respondents belong" (Br. in Opp. at 10 n.10). There are three flaws in this argument. First, respondents do not allege that they have in fact been discriminated against by the private schools in question; at best they seek to protect the rights of fellow members of their race who might be (cf. Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 514). But injuries, like rights, pertain to individuals and not to classes or races (cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-456 (1982)). The fact that members of their race are specially protected from injury by the Fourteenth Amendment does not accord these respondents standing if they have not been injured (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972)). Second, respondents are simply wrong if they assert that the benefits of equal protection -- even of desegregated schooling -- belong not to all citizens alike, but only to members of one race (see Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, No. 81-9 (June 30, 1982), slip op. 14; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 793 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting)). Finally, the claims petitioners assert derive from the tax code, with its policy of granting exemptions only to charitable organizations whose activities benefit the community (Bob Jones University v. United States, supra, slip op. 11-15). Respondents have no greater standing than any other members of the public to seek improved enforcement of this policy through the courts. /25/ The court below appears to have adopted the position taken by Justice Douglas, dissenting in Moose Lodge, but consistently rejected by this Court. Justice Douglas concluded that, since "American culture and history have been so plagued with racism and discrimination," the mere "brand" upon black citizens of discriminatory practices constitutes "injury in fact," whether or not they themselves suffered the discrimination (407 U.S. at 184 n.4). /26/ In contrast, the individual plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky, who described themselves as subsisting below the poverty line and suffering from medical conditions requiring hospitalization, each alleged a specific occasion on which they or a family member sought and were denied service by particular hospitals, because of their indigency (426 U.S. at 32-33). /27/ The Court observed that where, as here, the alleged injury is indirect, it tends to be "'substantially more difficult'" for the plaintiff to establish that his injury results from the defendant's actions or that judicial relief could redress it (426 U.S. at 44-45, quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. at 505). /28/ The district court also found it "purely speculative whether, in the final analysis, any fewer schools would be granted tax exemptions under plaintiffs' system than under the current IRS system" (Interv. Pet. App. 9a). In this respect, as well, respondents here have a weaker claim for standing than did the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky. /29/ The court of appeals acknowledged: "Plaintiffs do not dispute that it is 'speculative,' within the Eastern Kentucky frame, whether any private school would welcome blacks in order to retain tax exemption or would relinquish exemption to retain current practices" (Interv. Pet. App. 18b; footnotes deleted). /30/ The court of appeals stated: "The very act by the IRS of according tax exemption to a school that discriminates in their vicinity causes immediate injury to them, plaintiffs maintain, and that is the only injury for which they seek redress" (Interv. Pet. App. 14b; emphasis added). /31/ Professor David Currie has described this statement as "the soundest sentence the Supreme Court has uttered on this troublesome subject within human memory" (Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 42). /32/ The district court's conclusion that Internal Revenue Service guidelines and procedures are "nonreviewable" (Interv. Pet. App. 11a-13a), draws upon these same considerations. Because the legality of the Service's guidelines, procedures, and other interpretations of law are judically reviewable at the behest of an aggrieved person seeking a tax benefit, however, the point is better understood as one of standing than of nonreviewability. /33/ But cf. Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 489 (the "assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing" (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, 418 U.S. at 227)). /34/ Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (husband has standing to challenge state marital law granting alimony rights only to female former spouses). /35/ Some courts have entertained suits challenging the "abdication" of an agency's duty to comply with specific statutory enforcement procedures (e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)). Here, the Congress has left enforcement procedures under Sections 170(a) and 501(c)(3) to the discretion of the Commissioner and the Secretary, subject to its own oversight. /36/ The only relevant exception to the prohibition of declaratory relief "with respect to federal taxes" is the provision permitting an organization to seek recognition as a tax exempt organization under 26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 501(c)(3) (26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 7428). See also 26 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 7476, 7477, and 7478. /37/ Whether respondents' action would be statutorily barred under these provisions was not decided by the courts below, and will be subject to litigation on remand should this Court conclude respondents have standing. /38/ The prudential component of standing can be understood as an inquiry into legislative or constitutional intent to make a particular grievance judicially cognizable. As Justice Brennan has suggested, to adjudge standing requires "determining whether the Constitution or a statute defines injury, and creates a cause of action for redress of that injury, in precisely the circumstance presented to the Court" (Valley Forge College, supra, 454 U.S. at 492 (dissenting opinion)). Thus, Congress has the power -- within the limits of Article III -- to make judicially cognizable a claim that otherwise would be barred by the prudential limits on standing. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, 441 U.S. at 100. Here, the total absence of any provision for third party challenges to the tax treatment of others demonstrates the nonjusticiability of respondents' claim under the prudential standard. /39/ The court of appeals believed that "cases of this nature, ultimately raising non-frivolous constitutional objections to IRS action, are 'few and far between'; they do not threaten large interference by 'public interest' litigants with the administrative process of collecting taxes" (Interv. Pet. App. 32b n.52). The number of "public interest" actions by nontaxpayers against the Treasury has in fact been quite substantial, however, and the threat that they pose to the expeditious collection of taxes should not be underestimated. See, e.g., United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974) (Anti-Injunction Act barred suit by Quaker organization to enjoin enforcement of withholding tax on its employees); Lugo v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981) (indigent plaintiffs held to lack standing to obtain revocation of Rev. Rul. 69-545 and to compel revocation of hospitals' tax exemptions); Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (sovereign immunity barred suit to compel revocation of organization's tax exemption on ground that it excluded women from membership); Cattle Feeders Tax Committee v. Shultz, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974) (Anti-Injunction Act barred suit to enjoin enforcement of Revenue Ruling relating to deductibility of prepaid cattle feed); American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978) (travel agencies lacked standing to compel revocation of exempt status of other organizations operating travel programs); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.c. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (organization lacked standing to seek revocation of rulings relating to the foreign tax credit allowed international oil companies); Educo, Inc. v. Alexander, 557 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1977) (Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act barred suit by organization for review of Revenue Ruling relating to status of educational benefit plan for corporate employees); Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980) (Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act barred suit by marketers of investment annuities for review of Revenue Ruling holding that purchasers of such annuities did not qualify for favorable tax treatment); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) (abortion rights advocates held to have standing to challenge exemptions of religious organizations alleged to engage in efforts to change abortion laws); Common Cause v. Connally, Civ. No. 1337-71 (D.D.C.) (suit to enjoin enforcement of Treasury Regulations relating to depreciation guidelines dismissed as moot by agreement). /40/ The Internal Revenue Service advises that there are approximately 20,000 private schools in the United States currently recognized as, or claiming to be, tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3). /41/ The offense supporting standing in Gilmore was not, as the court of appeals implied (Interv. Pet. App. 21b), government aid to segregated schools, but rather governmental exclusion of black persons from public parks and recreational facilities. That is why non-exclusive use by segregated schools might not "result in cognizable injury" to the plaintiffs (417 U.S. at 570-571 n.10). /42/ In Green, however, at the time it entered a preliminary injunction the district court found that the plaintiffs faced the immediate prospect of losing their right to a desegregated education (309 F. Supp. at 1138-1139). Here, respondents' children concededly are attending desegregated schools (J.A. 62). /43/ The plaintiffs' standing had been addressed by the district court on motion for preliminary injunction. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). /44/ The intervenor's statement of questions presented includes whether plaintiffs had "constitutional standing" to bring the action (J.S. 11). The only other reference to "standing" in his brief appears in his discussion of whether the district court judgment rested on constitutional rather than statutory grounds -- an issue relevant to the intervenor's right to take a direct appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1253 (J.S. 5). This was the issue contested by the plaintiff (Mot. to Dis. or Aff. 8-11). It is probable, therefore, that the intervenor's question regarding plaintiffs' "constitutional standing" refers to the issue of appellate jurisdiction under Section 1253, and not to Article III standing. /45/ The court of appeals, though acknowledging this Court's characterization of Green in Bob Jones University v. Simon, supra (Interv. Pet. App. 23b n.29), took the opposite view that Green was "(a) sharp(ly) adversary contest" (id. at 5b).