RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
PETITIONER V. CARMEN CAMPBELL

   No. 81-1983

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1982

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit

   Brief for the Petitioner

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statute and regulations involved
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:  The medical-vocational regulations are a
      lawful exercise of the Secretary's rulemaking authority
      under the Social Security Act
      I. The medical-vocational regulations implement
          the authority delegated to the Secretary by Congress
          A. The regulations carry out explicit delegations
            of statutory authority in connection with the
            disability programs
          B. Congress urged the adoption of, and has
            implicitly ratified, the regulations
      II. The medical-vocational regulations provide
          a uniform, accurate, and efficient means for making
          disability determinations
      III. The medical-vocational regulations are
          procedurally fair
          A. The guidelines provide for individualized
          consideration of all facts unique to each claimant's
          case
          B. A claimant need not be given notice and an
            opportunity to challenge the suitability and
            availability of the jobs underlying the tables
   Conclusion
   Appendix

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-11a) is reported
at 665 F.2d 48.  The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 12a-14a)
is unreported.  The decisions of the Social Security Administration
Appeals Council (Pet. App. 16a-19a) and the Administrative Law Judge
(Pet. App. 20a-29a) are unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 32a-33a) was
entered on November 30, 1981.  A petition for rehearing was denied on
February 11, 1982 (Pet. App. 30a-31a).  The petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on April 26, 1982, and was granted on June 21,
1982 (J.A.56).  The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254 (1).

                   STATUTE AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

   The pertinent provisions of Sections 205(a) and 223(d) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(a) and 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV)
423(d);  20 C.F.R. 404.1545;  20 C.F.R. 404.1560 to 404.1569;  and 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, are set forth in Pet. App.
34a-75a.

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   Whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services in appropriate
cases may rely upon published medical-vocational guidelines, rather
than testimony of vocational experts, to determine the existence of
substantial gainful work in the national economy for disability
claimants under the Social Security Act.

                               STATEMENT

   1. Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act provide disability
benefits to individuals who, because of a physical or mental
impairment, are unable to do their previous work or to "engage in any
* * * kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy * * * ." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).  /1/ In
determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Act requires the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to consider, in addition to a
claimant's physical and mental impairments, the vocational factors of
age, education, and work experience.  Ibid.  In 1978, after years of
study and consultation with Congress, and after giving interested
parties notice and an opportunity for comment, /2/ the Secretary
promulgated regulations governing the effect such factors should have
in disability cases.  43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978).  The regulations
became effective on February 26, 1979.  Ibid.  /3/

   The regulations are the basis for hundreds of thousands of
disability determinations each year.  The disability hearing system
managed by the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the
Social Security Act is "'probably the largest adjudicative agency in
the western world.'" Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir.
1982), petition for cert. pending, No. 82-5276 (filed Oct. 18, 1982),
quoting J. Mashaw, C. Goetz, F. Goodman, W. Schwartz, P. Verkuil & M.
Carrow, Social Security Hearings and Appeals:  A Study of the Social
Security Administration Hearing System xi (1978) ("Mashaw").
Approximately 2.3 million claims for Title II disability insurance
benefits and Title XVI disability benefits were filed in fiscal year
1981.  /4/ Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1981, 22, 26 (1982).
More than a quarter of a million claimants requested hearings before
an administrative law judge ("ALJ").  Id. at 29.  More than 8000 filed
suit in federal district court seeking review of an adverse
administrative decision.  Id. at 31.  With respect to a large number
of those claims, the ultimate question was whether the claimant's age,
education, and work experience, coupled with his impairment, rendered
him unable to perform "substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).

   From an early date ALJs were required in many cases to decide that
ultimate question with the assistance of vocational experts.  See,
e.g., Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).  These experts,
who worked under contract with the Social Security Administration
("SSA"), were professors of rehabilitation counseling, directors of
employment agencies, and other persons skilled in job placement and
knowledgeable about labor market conditions.  After evidence had been
introduced about the claimant's medical problems and work experience,
the vocational expert would be the last witness called by the ALJ.  He
would be asked to assume certain relevant facts about the claimant and
would then testify about specific job opportunities for a person of
that age, education, work experience, and medical condition.

   The use of vocational experts was fraught with difficulties.  Not
only did reliance on vocational experts produce inconsistent results
in similar cases, but their testimony was time-consuming and
expensive.  The medical-vocational regulations /5/ were designed to
eliminate the need for experts in a large number of cases.  They
establish a sequence for decision of disability claims.  Before the
guidelines in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2 may be consulted,
the claimant must demonstrate that he is not currently working.  If he
is, the claim will be denied.  20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b).  Second, the
claimant must show, on the basis of medical evidence alone, that his
impairment is "severe," i.e., that it "significantly limits (his)
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." If it does
not, the claim will be denied.  20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c).  Third, if the
impairment is as severe as those listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, the claimant will receive
benefits without regard to his age, education, and skills.  20 C.F.R.
404.1520(d).  Fourth, if the impairment is less severe than those
listed in Appendix 1, the claimant must show that, because of his
impairment, he can no longer perform work he has done in the past.  If
he can still do such work, his claim will be denied.  20 C.F.R.
404.1520(e).  If he cannot do such work, there must be further factual
determinations about each of the variables made relevant by the Act
and the regulations:  the claimant's "residual functional capacity"
(i.e., the level of work he can perform, based upon medical evidence,
despite his impairment), age, education, and work experience.  42
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A);  20 C.F.R. 404.1545, 404.1560 to 404.1568.  With
regard to each of these factors, the claimant may introduce evidence
and rebut the factual findings made by the Secretary.  20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 200.00(a).

   It is only after this detailed and individualized factual inquiry
into a claimant's medical and vocational characteristics that the
guidelines and tables in Appendix 2 come into play.  They are
consulted to determine the one question that formerly was the subject
of testimony by vocational experts:  whether jobs exist in the
national economy that can be performed by a person of the claimant's
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.
The tables do not purport to answer that question for all claimants
who have reached the last stage in the decisional sequence.  For
example, although many physical limitations are relevant to disability
determinations, the tables consider only a claimant's strength.  For
one whose impairment results from mental or sensory limitations, a
more individualized determination of available work must be made.  20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 200.00(e).

   For those cases in which use of the tables is appropriate, the
Secretary in rulemaking proceedings has determined what jobs are
available in the national economy.  Underlying the table for sedentary
work -- the most restricted category encompassed by the tables -- are
approximately 200 unskilled occupations, each representing numerous
jobs, that can be performed by claimants with the exertional capacity
for a full range of sedentary work.  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
App. 2, Section 201.00(a).  See also Section 202.00(a) (1600 unskilled
occupations for those able to do light work);  Section 203.00(a) (2500
unskilled occupations for those able to do medium work).  The weight
given to the combinations of age, education, and work experience in
each table is based on a further determination of the significance of
those factors for the claimant's ability to adapt to new work
situations.  43 Fed. Reg. 55353-55355 (1978).  /6/

   2.  Respondent filed a claim for disability benefits in October
1979, alleging disability due to a back problem and high blood
pressure (Pet. App. 2a).  Her claim was denied initially, and upon
reconsideration (ibid.).  On September 26, 1980, an ALJ concluded
after a hearing that respondent was not disabled.  He found that while
she was unable to perform her past work, she retained the residual
functional capacity for light work (id. at 22a-27a).  The ALJ found
that respondent was then 52 years old ("closely approaching advanced
age"), had a marginal education, was able to read and communicate in
English, and had unskilled work experience (id. at 27a-29a).  On the
basis of these findings, the ALJ applied Rule 202.10 in Table 2 of
Appendix 2, which directed a conclusion that respondent was not
disabled (see Pet. App. 69a).

   In December 1980, the Social Security Administration Appeals
Council denied respondent's request for review (Pet. App. 16a-19a).
/7/ Respondent then sought judicial review in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  On April 29,
1981, the district court concluded that there was substantial evidence
to support the Secretary's decision and dismissed the complaint (id.
at 15a).

   The court of appeals remanded to the Secretary for further
evidentiary proceedings (Pet. App. 1a-11a).  The court agreed that
there was substantial evidence in the administrative record to support
the finding that respondent had the residual functional capacity to
perform a wide range of light work (id. at 7a).  It also did not
dispute the appropriate classification of respondent's age, education,
and work experience.

   The court of appeals nevertheless held that the Secretary, in
determining whether there was "work * * * in the national economy"
(see 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A)) that respondent could perform, was not
entitled simply to rely on the tables in Appendix 2.  Rather, the
court held, the Secretary must "'identify specific alternative
occupations available in the national economy that would be suitable
for the claimant'" and give for each "'a job description clarifying
the nature of the job, (and) demonstrating that the job does not
require' exertion or skills not possessed by the claimant." (Pet. App.
9a, quoting Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Without such specificity, the court believed, "the claimant is
deprived of any real chance to present evidence showing that she
cannot in fact perform the types of jobs that are administratively
noticed by the guidelines" (Pet. App. 10a).

   3. The court of appeals did not specifically state that the
medical-vocational regulations are invalid. The very purpose of the
regulations, however, is to determine conclusively the types and
numbers of occupations available, and their suitability for claimants
whose medical and vocational characteristics are described in the
tables.  To reopen any of those questions is to render the regulations
useless, if not invalid.  Moreover, given the limitations on judicial
review of agency action, see 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(g), the court
had no authority to supplant reliance on the tables in Appendix 2
unless the regulations directing such reliance are invalid.  20 C.F.R.
404.1569;  App. 2, Section 200.00(a).  /8/

   The court of appeals also recognized that the demands it was making
on the adjudicatory system had "(i)n the past * * * been (satisfied)
largely through the use of vocational testimony to establish that
there are specific jobs suitable to the claimant's capabilities" (Pet.
App. 9a).  It has since indicated its inclination to require the same
procedure in future cases.  Noel v. Schweiker, No. 81-6156 (2d Cir.
Feb. 22, 1982) (unpublished).  See Reply Br. 4.

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

                                  I.

   The medical-vocational regulations implement the explicit authority
given to the Secretary in 42 U.S.C. 405(a) and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)
423(d)(5).  Section 405(a) authorizes the promulgation of all rules
"appropriate" to carry out the provisions of Title II and states that
the Secretary "shall adopt" rules governing the quantity and quality
of evidence necessary to support a finding of eligibility for
benefits.  Section 423(d)(5) reiterates the Secretary's power to
regulate proof in disability cases.  The regulations issued pursuant
to this authorization to interpret the terms of the statute are
entitled to legislative effect.  Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 44 (1981).  The courts of appeals, with the exception of the
Second Circuit, have given them that deference.

   The authorization for the regulations is evident not only on the
face of the Act, but also in the legislative history that preceded and
followed their promulgation.  From the time the Act was amended to
include disability provisions, Congress expressed a desire that the
broad terms of the legislative definition be implemented by specific
regulations based on the Secretary's experience in administering it.
And for 18 years before promulgation of the medical-vocational
regulations Congress expressed its hope that the Secretary would
develop specific criteria to govern the effect of nonmedical factors
on the evaluation of disability.  Since the regulations were proposed,
Congress has amended the disability provisions on six occasions, but
has declined to disturb the regulations.

                                 II.

   The medical-vocational regulations are a significant improvement
over the former procedure for evaluating vocational characteristics.
The testimony of vocational experts about the effect of a claimant's
age, education, work experience, and impairment on his job
capabilities proved to be expensive, time-consuming, inaccurate, and
inconsistent.  Those difficulties resulted from a number of causes:
the experts' knowledge of the labor market was both limited and
variable;  their testimony also slighted, on occasion, the vocational
factors that Congress considered relevant;  and perhaps most
important, there was no way to assure that experts in different cases
assigned the same weight to claimant's medical and vocational traits.
The regulations replace that system with a uniform, accurate, and
efficient means for making disability determinations, based on the job
sources formerly considered by vocational experts, in the thousands of
cases each year in which age, education, and work experience are
relevant.

                                 III.

   The regulations are procedurally fair.  They do not come into play
except in cases reaching the last step in the sequential disability
evaluation process.  Even then, they are consulted only after all of
the claimant's relevant individual characteristics have been
ascertained through proof at a hearing.

   It is unnecessary to require, as respondent would (Br. in Opp.
9-10), that the Secretary identify specific jobs for a claimant in
order to illustrate the meaning of residual functional capacity.  The
physical demands of jobs underlying the tables are clearly spelled out
in the regulations, which are available to claimants at district and
branch offices.  Claimants have the right to be represented at
hearings, and when they are not, the administrative law judge has a
special obligation to develop a full and fair record -- an obligation
that was satisfied in this case.

   It is also unwise to relitigate in each case, as the court of
appeals would require, the question of the types and numbers of jobs
that exist in the national economy.  Even when vocational experts were
used at hearings, proof of those facts was unnecessary in many cases.
Moreover, the court of appeals erred in believing that it was
necessary to prove the suitability of specific jobs for disability
claimants.  That burden need not be imposed because the guidelines
only direct a finding of nondisability in cases where the number of
jobs that exist is very large.  Neither the court of appeals nor
respondent has challenged the accuracy of the job data underlying the
regulations and tables.  Finally, the court's requirement ignores the
Secretary's authority to dispense with costly fact-finding procedures
in the face of a burgeoning disability caseload and to proceed by
general rule.

                               ARGUMENT

 THE MEDICAL-VOCATIONAL REGULATIONS ARE A LAWFUL EXERCISE OF THE
SECRETARY'S RULEMAKING AUTHORITY UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

         I.  The Medical-Vocational Regulations Implement The

               Authority Delegated To The Secretary By Congress

   Regulations that implement an explicit delegation of authority by
Congress are entitled to legislative effect and should be upheld
unless they are arbitrary or exceed the statutory mandate.  The
medical-vocational regulations are a reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the Secretary's rule-making authority.  They were adopted
at the repeated urging of the congressional committees charged with
oversight of the social security laws.

 A. The Regulations Carry Out Explicit Delegations of Statutory
Authority In Connection With the Disability Programs

   1.  The medical-vocational regulations were promulgated by the
Secretary pursuant to a broad grant of statutory authority.  42 U.S.C.
405(a) provides:

         The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make
      rules and regulations * * * which are necessary or appropriate
      to carry out (the) provisions (of Title II), and shall adopt
      reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and
      provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and
      the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to
      establish the right to benefits hereunder.

   This section gives two directions.  The first grants the Secretary
"full power and authority" to promulgate any regulations "necessary or
appropriate" to implement the disability provisions of the Act.  The
medical-vocational regulations are an appropriate means to carry out
the statutory command that age, education, and work experience be
considered along with claimants' mental or physical impairments in
determining entitlement to disability benefits.  42 U.S.C.
423(d)(2)(A).  The second direction in Section 405(a) is both more
explicit and mandatory.  It states that the Secretary "shall adopt"
rules that are both procedural ("the method of taking and furnishing"
proof) and substantive ("the nature and extent for the proofs and
evidence").  In the second clause "Congress has authorized, if it has
not required, the Secretary to issue regulations prescribing both the
quality ('nature') and quantity ('extent') of evidence necessary to
support a finding of entitlement to disability benefits." McCoy v.
Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1143 (8th Cir. 1982).  As the Eighth Circuit
stated in McCoy (ibid.), "a decision as to what kinds of cases are
appropriate for the testimony of vocational experts is squarely within
the rubric 'nature and extent of the proofs and evidence.'"

   Section 405(a) is not the only basis for the authority exercised by
the Secretary.  42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 423(d)(5) states:

         An individual shall not be considered to be under a
      disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence
      of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require.

   This provision repeats -- in the very section in which "disability"
is defined -- the direction given in Section 405(a) regarding Title II
generally:  that the existence of a disability is to be determined
according to standards regarding "medical and other evidence" fixed by
the Secretary.  /9/ The issue whether a vocational expert should be
required to give evidence about the interplay of the medical and
vocational factors with the demands of the labor market falls squarely
within the authority given the Secretary.

   Other provisions in the same section underscore Congress's evident
purpose to have the Secretary flesh out the meaning of the statutory
term.  The definition of disability, which merely directs
"consider(ation)" of how the claimant's age, education, and work
experience affect his ability to do substantial gainful work, 42
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A), is clearly not self-executing.  It would be
irrational to conclude that the Secretary has exceeded the generous
scope of his rule-making authority by attempting to assure that a
general congressional definition of entitlement is made specific
enough to be applied consistently in vast numbers of cases.

   Moreover, the subsection immediately following the definition of
disability states that widows and certain other claimants shall be
considered disabled only if their "impairments are of a level of
severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary (are)
deemed to be sufficient to preclude * * * gainful activity." 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(2)(B).  And 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 423(d)(4) states that "(t)he
Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the criteria for determining
when services performed or earnings derived from services demonstrate
an individual's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity."
/10/ It would be odd if the Secretary were given the power to define
by regulation the requisite severity of an impairment, but denied the
power to specify what consideration should be given to the equally
general vocational factors enumerated in the same section.  It would
also be strange if the Secretary were permitted to promulgate rules
disqualifying claimants because of the kind of work they are currently
performing, but not allowed to promulgate rules governing the effect
that past work should be given.

   2. This Court recently rejected a claim, similar to the court of
appeals' conclusion, that the Secretary was required to make
individualized factual determinations regarding the income "available"
to Medicaid applicants under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17).  That section
states that the availability of income and resources shall be
determined "in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary *
* * ." In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981), the
Court held:

         In view of this explicit delegation of substantive authority,
      the Secretary's definition of the term "available" is "entitled
      to more than mere deference or weight" * * * .  Rather, the
      Secretary's definition is entitled to "legislative effect"
      because, "(i)n a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to
      the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary
      responsibility for interpreting the statutory term." * * *
      Although we do not abdicate review in these circumstances, our
      task is the limited one of ensuring that the Secretary did not
      "excee(d) his statutory authority" and that the regulation is
      not arbitrary or capricious.

   See also Herweg v. Ray, No. 80-60 (Feb. 23, 1982), slip op. 9;
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-426 (1977).

   With the exception of the Second Circuit, the courts of appeals
have found "(t)he language of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(a) (and 423(d)(5))
* * * different from that of the authorizing statutes in Herweg, Gray
Panthers, and Batterton, but * * * hardly less emphatic" (McCoy v.
Schweiker, supra, 683 F.2d at 1144.  They also have concluded that the
medical-vocational regulations are an appropriate means of carrying
out the Secretary's statutory authority.  Id. at 15-22;  1144-1149;
Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 677 F.2d 167, 169
(1st Cir. 1982);  Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 932-936 (3d Cir.
1982), petition for cert. pending, No. 82-5276 (filed Oct. 18, 1982);
Rivers v. Schweiker, No. 81-1413 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1982), slip op.
4481;  Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524,
530-531 (6th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. pending, No. 81-6754
(filed May 20, 1982);  Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir.
1982);  Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357-1359 (11th Cir. 1982).
/11/ See also Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144-145 (4th Cir. 1981).

   3. It is not surprising that the courts have found, with such
uniformity, that the medical-vocational regulations effectuate the
Secretary's statutory authority.  The definition of disability in the
statute provides the framework both for the regulations themselves and
for the guidelines and tables in Appendix 2.  The statute declares
that a claimant shall be considered disabled if his physical or mental
impairment, taken together with his age, education, and work
experience, renders him unable to engage in "work which exists in
significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives
or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).  As we
explain in Part II, the decision of that issue depends on several
judgments that can most consistently, accurately, and efficiently be
made by rule, rather than case-by-case adjudication.

   In the first place, the decision demands an encyclopedic knowledge
of the types of jobs available throughout the country, the numbers of
such jobs that exist, and the physical, educational, and experiential
requirements for satisfactory performance of each type of job.  The
tables in Appendix 2, which are the product of years of exhaustive
research and public comment (see pages 2-3, supra), incorporate the
Secretary's determination of how many types of unskilled jobs are
available in significant numbers for people whose strength is limited
in certain ways.  See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Sections
201.00(a), 202.00(a), 203.00(a).  /12/ The tables also incorporate the
Secretary's determination that where a claimant has a greater level of
education or work skills, he may have a greater range of occupations
to choose from if his knowledge is "readily transferable to a
significant range of semi-skilled or skilled work within an
individual's residual functional capacity * * * ." App. 2, Section
202.00(e).  They accordingly give separate consideration to claimants
whose education or experience provides for direct entry into skilled
work, based on the Secretary's determination of the availability of
skilled and semi-skilled occupations.  See 20 C.F.R. 404.1564,
404.1565, 404.1568.

   In the second place, the tables, guidelines, and regulations
incorporate the Secretary's determination of issues that are less
strictly empirical, but that Congress nonetheless left for his
resolution.  These include such factors as the effect of age on a
claimant's ability to adapt to a new job and the number of job
opportunities that will satisfy the "significant numbers" requirement
in Section 423(d)(2)(A).  A comparison with Appendix 1 will illustrate
this point.  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 lists certain
medical impairments thought to be so severe that they are per se
disabling.  Among them are deafness and muteness, App. 1, Sections
2.08, 2.09, even though many deaf and mute individuals in fact are
able to hold jobs.  On the other hand Appendix 1 does not list the
loss of a hand as presumptively disabling, cf. App. 1, Section 1.09,
even though that may be a great functional impairment.  The line drawn
is not a scientific one;  rather, it represents an informed judgment
about the individual's likely ability to adapt and perform
successfully in a competitive labor market.  See Goldhammer, The
Effect of New Vocational Regulations on Social Security and
Supplemental Security Income Disability Claims, 32 Ad. L. Rev. 501,
502-503 (1980).  The same is true about the Secretary's determination
of the effect of age, or his decision that a person who is 45,
severely impaired, and illiterate is disabled, while an otherwise
identical individual with a limited education is not.  20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App. 2, Table No. 1, Rules 201.17, 201.18.  Given the
nature of those judgments, it makes little sense to repeat them, with
varying outcomes, in individual proceedings.  The very existence of a
disability program necessitates the drawing of such lines, but the
task of doing so was left by Congress to the Secretary.

 B. Congress Urged The Adoption Of, And Has Implicitly Ratified, The
Regulations

   In 1954, when Congress amended the Social Security Act to afford
disability coverage, /13/ it provided that an individual should be
deemed disabled if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment" that could be expected to be prolonged or result in death.
 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(1)(A).  /14/ What Congress offered was "a
legislative definition written in rather broad terms to be implemented
by more specific administrative regulations on the basis of
operational experience." Subcomm. on the Administration of the Social
Security Laws, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Administration of Social Security
Disability Insurance Program:  Preliminary Report to the House Comm.
on Ways and Means 14 (Comm. Print 1960) ("Preliminary Report");  S.
Rep. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1954).

   Although the original statutory definition of disability was framed
in terms of purely medical criteria, the Social Security
Administration recognized from the outset "the importance of the
nonmedical factors, such as age, experience, and education of the
individual." Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance
Program:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Administration of the
Social Security Laws of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 81, 82-88 (1959).  Congress not only viewed that as an
appropriate interpretation of the Act;  it also suggested that SSA
should provide by regulations the precise weight to be given such
considerations.  Preliminary Report, supra, at 18 (emphasis in
original):

         The subcommittee recognizes the difficulty of developing and
      enunciating specific criteria for the weight to be given
      nonmedical factors in the evaluation of disability and the
      extreme sensitivity of this area.  But the subcommittee believes
      that the time has come, if it is not well overdue, to make a
      determined effort to develop and refine these criteria and make
      them available to the evaluators and to the public in the form
      of published regulations.

   Although SSA developed administrative materials (for use by state
agencies in their initial and reconsideration determinations) that
detailed the weight to be given to vocational factors, 43 Fed. Reg.
55350-55351 (1978);  see pages 28-29, infra, it did not issue
vocational regulations at that time.

   In 1967 Congress amended the Act to make explicit its concern that
such factors be weighed as part of disability determinations.  42
U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).  It also redefined "substantial gainful work" to
mean work that exists in the national economy, not work that a
claimant could actually find in the area where he lives.  Ibid.
Although the legislative history of those amendments does not
specifically address the publication of vocational regulations, it
does make several points relevant to a decision about their validity.
First, it notes with approval the approach that the Secretary had
taken to implement the Act -- an approach that had included the use at
the state level of materials very similar to the current regulations.
See pages 28-29, infra;  113 Cong. Rec.23116 (1967) (remarks of Rep.
Rostenkowski);  id. at 23065 (remarks of Rep. King);  see also H.R.
Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-31 (1967);  S. Rep. No. 744,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-49 (1967).

   Second, Congress noted its concern that the statutory definition
"be applied with uniformity and consistency throughout the Nation * *
* ." H.R. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 30;  113 Cong. Rec. 23065 (1967)
(remarks of Rep. King).  Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
there is the stated recognition that the Secretary would continue to
implement the statute through regulations that would explain and
elaborate upon the broad statutory language.  Concerning the newly
adopted section on the effect of work and earnings, 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(4), the Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House
declared (H.R. Conf. Rep. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1967)):
"The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is directed to
establish criteria which are to be conclusive for determining when
work or earnings demonstrate ability to engage in substantial gainful
activity." Similarly, both the House and Senate Reports state that the
level of severity at which an impairment -- taken alone -- should be
considered presumptively disabling is a matter for the Secretary to
determine by administrative rules.  H.R. Rep. No. 544, supra, at 30,
31;  S. Rep. No. 744, supra, at 49.

   The administrative policies affirmed in the 1967 amendments
continued, however, to be published only in the manuals used by state
agencies processing initial and reconsideration determinations.  They
were not binding on or even readily available to administrative law
judges or the federal courts.  See 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978).  As a
result, the first two levels of administrative consideration of
disability claims applied standards not always reflected in the courts
and in decisions of administrative law judges, who had to rely on the
testimony of vocational experts.

   A 1974 report on the disability insurance program prepared by the
staff of the House Ways and Means Committee criticized this situation.

         The original idea was that the broad language of the
      statutory definition would be amplfied by regulations based on
      operational experience.  As it turned out the Courts, rather
      than the Social Security Administration or the Congress, have
      effectuated the major changes in the definition, particularly in
      the area of the definition's somewhat subjective nonmedical
      factors.  * * *

                      * * * * *

         * * * The staff believes that the Department of HEW with the
      assistance of skilled personnel from the State Agencies and
      those in the private sector with expertise in disability
      adjudication should explore the possibilities as to whether the
      definition of disability can be stated more specifically in the
      law or regulations, and whether more operational presumptions
      may be incorporated into its administration so that the
      definition can be more effectively applied to greatly
      accelerating caseloads.

   Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Report
on the Disability Insurance Program 6 (1974) ("1974 Report");  see
also id. at 45, 50, 81.

   Several months after publication of the 1974 Report, the Social
Security Administration completed an internal report on the disability
claims process which also concluded that disability standards needed
to be spelled out in regulations.  Social Security Administration,
Report of the Disability Claims Process Task Force 46 (1974),
reprinted in Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Recent Studies Relevant to the
Disability Hearings and Appeals Crisis, at 46 (Comm. Print 1975).  The
agency then drafted the medical-vocational regulations and began the
review process that precedes issuance by the Secretary of a notice of
proposed rulemaking.  In the case of the medical-vocational
regulations, this process involved extensive review by expert
consultants, state agency personnel, and congressional committees and
their staffs.

   In May and June 1976, the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
House Ways and Means Committee held hearings that focused on the draft
regulations.  In connection with the hearings, the Subcommittee staff
reprinted the regulations and prepared a legislative issue paper
noting that Congress had been pressing for issuance of regulations on
the vocational factors for 16 years. Disability Insurance Program:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 166-266 (1976) ("Disability
Insurance Program:  1976 Hearings").  In response to written questions
from the Subcommittee, the Commissioner of Social Security stated that
Section 205(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(a), provided sufficient
statutory authority for the Secretary's issuance of the draft
regulations.  Disability Insurance Program:  1976 Hearings, supra, at
289-290.

   In 1976 Representative Burke (Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Social Security) introduced a bill that would have required the
Secretary to promulgate the medical-vocational regulations after a
60-day comment period.  H.R. 15630, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Section 7, at
23 (1976).  Representative Burke acknowledged that it was too late in
the legislative session to take action on the bill, but stated that he
wished to focus discussion on the disability program so that action
would be taken early in the next session.  Subcomm. on Social Security
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. 15630
-- Disability Insurance Amendments of 1976, 1 (Comm. Print 1976).

   The next year Representative Burke introduced a revised bill.  H.R.
8076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).  He noted that the agency had
promised to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning the
medical-vocational regulations that year and that the Administration
believed the regulations were authorized by the statute.  Subcomm. on
Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., H.R. 8076 -- Disability Insurance Amendments of 1977, 7 (Comm.
Print 1977).  Consequently, the revised bill included no provision
requiring promulgation of the regulations.

   The notice of proposed rulemaking was not issued, however, by the
time the House Subcommittee held hearings on the disability program in
February 1978.  In a colloquy during the hearings, the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security stated that the notice would be
published shortly.  Disability Insurance Program -- 1978:  Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1978).  A month later the notice was
published, 43 Fed. Reg. 9284 (1978), a fact noted favorably by the
House Subcommittee.  Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Disability Insurance -- Possible
Areas of Subcommittee Action 14 (Comm. Print 1978).

   Shortly thereafter, after considering several bills that would have
redefined disability in the Act, the Subcommittee concluded that no
legislative action should be taken until it could be determined
whether operation of the new regulations adequately met the problems
in the program.  It unanimously approved a bill that included no
change in the definition of disability.  See Subcomm. on Social
Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Proposed Disability Insurance Amendments of 1978 (H.R. 14084) (Comm.
Print 1978).  The final regulations were promulgated in November 1978
and became effective on February 26, 1979.  43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978).

   Since 1976, when it first held hearings on the medical-vocational
regulations, Congress has amended 42 U.S.C. 405 and 423 -- which
define disability and authorize the Secretary to implement the
definition with regulations -- on six different occasions.  /15/ Among
other changes, Congress has required the Secretary to justify
unfavorable disability decisions with a discussion of the evidence and
the basis for the decision (Pub. L. No. 96 265, Section 305(a), 94
Stat. 457 (Section 405(b));  amended the provision dealing with
judicial review (Pub. L. No. 96-265, Section 307, 94 Stat. 458
(Section 405(g));  and enlarged Section 423(d)(5), which authorizes
the Secretary to promulgate the regulations at issue here (Pub. L.
96-265, Section 309(a), 94 Stat. 459).  On each of those occasions
Congress declined to disturb the Secretary's exercise of his statutory
authority of which it was fully cognizant.  "Congress has been made
aware of (the regulations), yet (six) times has 'revisited the Act and
left the (regulations) untouched.'" Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978)
(footnote omitted), quoting Saxbe v Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).

   In light of this history, the court of appeals was plainly
unwarranted in rejecting the sufficiency of the medical-vocational
guidelines to support determinations of nondisability.  Judicial
deference is especially appropriate "'when Congress has refused to
alter the administrative construction * * * " and "that construction
accords with well-established congressional goals." Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., supra, 439
U.S. at 248 251, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 381 (1969).  "(O)nce an agency's statutory construction has been
'fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and
the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has
amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative
intent has been correctly discerned." United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979), quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 489 (1940).  See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-301
(1981).

 II. The Medical-Vocational Regulations Provide A Uniform, Accurate,
And Efficient Means For Making Disability Determinations

   The medical-vocational guidelines improve disability determinations
made both by state agencies at the initial and reconsideration stages
and by administrative law judges at the hearing stage.  Before the
medical-vocational regulations were promulgated in 1978, state
agencies and administrative law judges integrated medical evidence
with information about a claimant's age, education, and work
experience in different ways.  State agencies used detailed guides
developed by the Social Security Administration that incorporated the
same principles as the guidelines, but lacked the structure and
organization of the tables in the guidelines.  For example, the
Disability Insurance State Manual ("Manual") provided in 1963 that
"(c)ases should be put through sequential evaluation tests."
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security
Administration, OASI Disability Insurance Letter No. III-3, at 1
(Sept. 20, 1963) ("DIL No. III-3).  /16/ The first issue was whether
the claimant -- if not actually working -- could be found disabled
solely on the basis of the medical listings then found in 20 C.F.R.
404.1502(a) (1961).  Except in unusual cases, see 20 C.F.R.
404.1502(c) (Cum. Supp. 1964), state agencies were then directed to
determine whether a claimant was able to do his past work (DIL No.
III-3, supra, at 3).  If he was not, the next issue was whether there
was other substantial gainful activity the claimant could perform.  As
an example, the Manual suggested (id. at 5):

         Generally, the applicant who retains the physical ability to
      do a wide range of light work, who is not of advanced age
      (ordinarily under 55 years of age), and is able to communicate,
      read and write on an elementary level may be considered to still
      be in the competitive labor market for light unskilled work,
      despite the absence of special experience or skills * * * .

   "Light work" was defined as:

         equivalent to lifting 20 pounds maximum with frequent lifting
      and/or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds, or
      requiring walking or standing to a significant degree, or
      requiring sitting most of the time but entailing pushing and
      pulling of arm and/or leg controls.

   Bureau of Disability Insurance, Vocational Specialist Training
Handbook 2-50 ("Training Handbook).  /17/ Cf. 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b).
As is evident from the similarity to the currently effective
provisions, these guides were incorporated into the medical-vocational
regulations at issue here.  43 Fed. Reg. 55351 (1978).  /18/

   Although these state agency materials included the same principles
as the current regulations, they "were often incomplete, vague,
contradictory, time consuming to implement, and subject to divergent
interpretations." Comptroller General of the United States, The Social
Security Administration Should Provide More Management And Leadership
In Determining Who Is Eligible For Disability Benefits 10 (1976).  The
1976 study by the Comptroller General reported that a study of ten
state agencies showed complete agreement on the proper disposition of
only 22% of a test group of disability claims.  Id. at 6-10.

   On the other hand, administrative law judges -- who were not bound
by the Disability Insurance State Manual and to whom the Manual was
not even generally available (see 43 Fed. Reg. 55351 (1978)) -- relied
on vocational experts to weight the significance of claimants' medical
and vocational characteristics.  After evidence had been introduced
about the claimant's medical problems and work experience, the
vocational expert would be called by the ALJ.  SSA's Office of
Hearings and Appeals provided the following example of the proper
method for an ALJ to question the vocational expert (1974 Report,
supra, at 95):

   Q. Dr. Jones (the Vocational Expert), we have a picture of what Mr.
Smith did in the past from the documentary evidence of record.  Will
you kindly summarize his background, especially his work experience
and all other factors which you take into consideration in evaluating
vocational capacity of an individual, especially Mr. Smith's.

   A. (Vocational expert summarizes claimant's education and work
history.)

   Q. The jobs that you mentioned were jobs that you found the
claimant had done some time in the past according to the record, is
that right?

   A. Yes, sir.

   Q. Now, Dr. Jones, what is your understanding of sedentary work?

   A. (Answer given probably as in Dictionary of Occupational Titles.)

   Q. What is your understanding of light work?

   A. (Answer given probably as in Dictionary of Occupational Titles.)

   Q. What is your understanding of moderate work?

   A. (Answer given probably as in Dictionary of Occupational Titles.)

   Q. Under the assumption that I will find from the medical evidence
in this case that there is no physical impediment to Mr. Smith's
undertaking and performing sedentary (light or moderate) work
activity, as same was described by you, do you know of any jobs which
exist in this region which you feel Mr. Smith is vocationally
qualified to perform based on his age, education, training, and
background?

   A. (Vocational expert responds.)

         (T)he hearing examiner * * * can follow through for further
      amplification with specific questions as to the physical
      requirements, such as the necessity for bending, lifting,
      turning, stooping, etc.; the tools and equipment used;  the
      working conditions * * * .

   In making his decision about the existence of suitable jobs for a
particular claimant, the vocational expert would rely on the same
sources that state agencies used in the initial and reconsideration
decisions.  /19/ Applying that information to particular cases
required the vocational expert to make several judgments.  /20/ These
included:  (i) in cases where the claimant had physical limitations
other than strength (e.g., lack of dexterity, or a reaction to dust),
the types of jobs unavailable because of the demands of the work or
the environment;  (ii) the effect of the claimant's education and
skills on the types of jobs open to him;  (iii) the effect of the
claimant's age on his ability to adapt to his impairment and to a job
situation requiring unfamiliar skills, and on his physical abilities
(such as vision, hearing, manual dexterity, balance, and agility)
other than strength;  and (iv) given the types of jobs the claimant
could perform, the number of such jobs existing in the national
economy.

   Because of the nature of the judgments made by vocational experts,
it is not surprising that they frequently reached inconsistent results
in similar cases.  Santise v. Schweiker, supra, 676 F.2d at 930.  The
apparent arbitrariness of this adjudicatory system resulted from a
number of causes.  First was the occasional failure of the expert to
consider all the vocational factors that Congress considered relevant
and to relate them to the claimant's medical condition.  See
Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1979).  Second,
and perhaps more serious, was the tendency of experts to assign
different weights to the claimant's relevant medical and vocational
characteristics.  Although the question about the jobs available to a
claimant of a given description masqueraded as a factual issue, it
actually involved judgments like those mentioned in the last
paragraph, and policy decisions.  For example, the statutory
requirement that age be considered in determining a claimant's ability
to perform a job (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)) is not susceptible of any
precise calibration.  There is unquestionably an "increasing
physiological deterioration in the senses, joints, eye-hand
coordination, reflexes, thinking processes, etc., which diminish(es) a
severely impaired person's aptitude for new learning and adaptation to
new jobs." 43 Fed. Reg. 55359 (1978);  cf. Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976).  But precisely how
those often unmeasurable effects of senescence should affect a
claimant's entitlement to disability benefits is a matter that
Congress did not specify and on which various experts could disagree.
See also Mashaw, supra, at 78.  Third, an important part of what the
vocational expert did was to inform the ALJ of the number and types of
jobs available in the national economy, and that question received
different answers because of the ALJs' and the experts' "limited and
variable knowledge of the labor market." Cummins v. Schweiker, supra,
670 F.2d at 83.

   There were other problems with the use of vocational experts as
well.  "Their usage in live testimony * * * increased from slightly
under 5,000 in 1965 to over 13,000 in fiscal 1973." 1974 Report,
supra, at 94.  By 1978 vocational experts were used in more than 40%
of all disability hearings, which by then numbered approximately
200,000 annually.  DMIS/OHA, Participant Involvement In Request For
Hearing Cases (Mar. 1982);  DMIS/OHA, FY 81 Key Workload Indicators 1
(Nov. 20, 1981).  That imposed significant monetary costs on the
hearing process, since experts were under contract with SSA.  1974
Report, supra, at 94.  It also was time-consuming.  Kirk v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, supra, 667 F.2d at 530.

   The medical-vocational regulations were designed to resolve these
difficulties.  Most obviously, and most importantly, they address the
problem of inconsistent treatment of disability claimants.  One virtue
of the approach required by the regulations is that it focuses the
ALJ's attention on the specific factors that afffect an individual's
employability.  Before he can even profitably consult the guidelines
the ALJ must take evidence and make specific findings regarding the
claimant's residual functional capacity, work experience, education,
and age.  He must also consider any non-exertional physical or mental
impairments the claimant may have, since the existence of such
problems will preclude a straightforward use of the guidelines.  20
C.F.R. 404.1569;  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section
200.00(e).

   A second virtue of the regulations is that they provide a
consistent judgment about the weight to be given the various
vocational characteristics.  For instance, the regulations eliminate
the unfairness of treating claimants of the same age differently on
the basis of unmeasurable facts about senescence.  In place of the
former system they provide, for example, that all those over 55 who
are severely impaired, and have limited education and no work
experience, are disabled regardless of their residual functional
capacity.  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Tables 1, 2 and 3,
Rules 201.01, 202.01, 203.01.  They also provide that all impaired
claimants over 50 who are illiterate and unskilled are disabled,
unless they have at least the residual functional capacity to do
medium work.  See, Rules 201.09, 202.09, 203.18.  Each of those
conclusions rests on a factual judgment about the types of jobs open
to such individuals, a judgment made by the Secretary after a thorough
review and interpretation of the available data.  43 Fed. Reg.
55352-55355 (1978).  Each also relies, however, on a policy judgment
about whether the jobs an individual is capable of performing are
sufficiently "significant" in number to satisfy the statutory
requirement.  42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A).

   Still a third aspect of the regulations that leads to more
consistency is the fact that they incorporate a fund of knowledge
about the types and numbers of jobs available that is more
encyclopedic than a vocational expert's information could ever be.
For example, on the basis of the available sources, and surveys
prepared for SSA by various state employment agencies, the regulations
take notice of some 1600 different sedentary and light occupations
that can be performed after a short demonstration or within 30 days,
and that do not require any special skills.  20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App. 2, Sections 200(b), 202.00(a).  Similar data support
the determinations about the effects of education, work experience,
and age on the types and numbers of jobs open to claimants.  43 Fed.
Reg. 55353-55355 (1978).  Moreover, "(t)he regulations and Appendix 2
take appropriate account of the Social Security Administration's
extensive experience * * * in administering disability programs." Id.
at 55362.

   By eliminating the need in many cases for the testimony of a
vocational expert, the regulations also accomplish the twin
efficiencies of reducing costs and hearing time.  See page 34, supra.
Of course they do not render altogether unnecessary the use of such
testimony.  It may still be required where the claimant suffers from a
limitation, such as a mental or sensory impairment, unrelated to
strength.  See App. 2, Section 200.00(e);  Thomas v. Schweiker, 666
F.2d 999, 1004 (5th Cir. 1982).  /21/ But it is undoubtedly true that
the current regulations represent a significant improvement -- in
uniformity, accuracy, and efficiency -- over the former system for
making disability determinations.  See Cummins v. Schweiker, supra,
670 F.2d at 83 ("We think it was not only lawful * * *, but highly
appropriate, for the Secretary to try to streamline the adjudication
of Social Security disability cases and bring about some greater
uniformity in the results of these adjudications * * * made by
hundreds of different administrative law judges").

     III. The Medical-Vocational Regulations Are Procedurally Fair

   The court of appeals did not challenge the accuracy of the job data
embodied in the medical-vocational regulations.  Rather, the court
held that the Secretary could not rely exclusively on the regulations
and Appendix 2 to direct a conclusion that respondent was not disabled
because they failed "'to achieve the underlying objectives of
procedural fairness to the claimant and preservation of an adequate
record for review'" (Pet. App. 10a, quoting Decker v. Harris, supra,
647 F.2d at 298).  Respondent has echoed that contention (Br. in Opp.
6-11), which is based on a misunderstanding of the disability review
process.

 A. The Guidelines Provide For Individualized Consideration Of All
Facts Unique To Each Claimant's Case

   To understand the "procedural fairness" of the tables and
guidelines in Appendix 2, it is important to comprehend the process
that precedes their application.  Appendix 2 does not even become
relevant until the last stage of the sequential disability evaluation
process.  It must first be determined that the claimant is not
currently working, has a severe impairment (though not severe enough
to be listed in Appendix 1), and is unable to perform work he has done
in the past.  The claimant is then given the opportunity to present,
and to rebut, all relevant evidence bearing on his residual functional
capacity -- which determines which one of the tables will be
consulted.  /22/ Similar consideration is given to a claimant's age
(see J.A. 40), education (see id. at 42), and work experience (see id.
at 44-47), which determine the appropriate rule to be consulted in the
applicable table.  /23/

   The factual inquiry into each of those medical and vocational
factors is not a perfunctory undertaking.  Age, for example, usually
is easily determined, but the regulations expressly state that age
categories will not be applied "mechanically in a borderline
situation." 20 C.F.R. 404.1563(a).  When a claimant has (as respondent
did not) skills acquired from prior work experience, the determination
whether his skills are transferable (and so suit him for jobs other
than those unskilled occupations underlying the tables) demands an
inquiry into the degree of skill required in the other jobs, and the
similarity of tools, machines, raw materials, products, processes, and
services involved.  20 C.F.R. 404.1568(d)(2).  In such cases, the
regulations state that "we may use the services of a vocational expert
or other specialist." 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e);  cf. Vazquez v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 683 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).  Education
is analyzed with like flexibility.  "(T)he numerical grade level that
you completed in school may not represent your actual educational
abilities." 20 C.F.R. 404.1564(b).  Other information, such as
hobbies, daily activities, and test results, are considered for the
contributions they may make to "reasoning ability, communication
skills, and arithmetical ability." 20 C.F.R. 404.1564(a).

   Not only is there a detailed factual inquiry into the
characteristics analyzed in the tables, but the regulations also
specifically dictate that "a conclusion of disabled or not disabled"
is not directed if a claimant's vocational and medical profile is not
precisely contained in Appendix 2.  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
App. 2, Section 200.00(a), (d);  20 C.F.R. 404.1569.  For example, if
the claimant has an impairment unrelated to physical strength, the
tables cannot be used to deny benefits. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
App. 2, Section 200.00(e).  Such impairments would include "mental,
sensory, or skin" conditions;  they also encompass "(e)nvironmental
restrictions * * * which result in inability to tolerate some physical
feature(s) of work settings * * *, e.g., an inability to tolerate dust
or fumes." Ibid.  /24/ Similarly, if a claimant's impairment is
exertional, but falls between the ranges indicated in the tables, the
rules only offer guidance, not a fixed result.  Ibid.  /25/

 B. A Claimant Need Not Be Given Notice And An Opportunity To
Challenge The Suitability And Availability Of The Jobs Underlying The
Tables

   The court of appeals expressed concern that a claimant be given
notice and an

         "adequate opportunity to challenge the suitability or
      availability of the jobs noticed (in Appendix 2)."

         * * * Absent sufficient notice, the claimant is deprived of
      any real chance to present evidence showing that she cannot in
      fact perform the types of jobs that are administratively noticed
      by the guidelines.

   (Pet. App. 10a, quoting Decker v. Harris, supra, 647 F.2d at 298).
Respondent, perhaps aware of the indefensibility of that position, has
argued that the Secretary's burden of specifying the types of jobs
available is not an evidentiary requirement, but a way (albeit
mandatory) of explaining "the critical factor of residual capacity" to
claimants (Br. in Opp. 9-10).  We have already demonstrated that this
reading is inconsistent with what the court said, with what it has
done subsequently, and with the understanding of other circuits that
have interpreted the opinion.  Pages 9-10, supra;  Reply Br. 3-4.  In
any event, the positions taken by the court of appeals and respondent
are both without merit.

   1. It is entirely unnecessary to impose on the Secretary the duty
-- urged by respondent -- of illustrating the meaning of residual
functional capacity by identifying specific jobs a claimant could
perform.  The meanings of "sedentary," "light," and "medium" work --
and of each other step in the disability determination process -- are
spelled out in the regulations.  See 20 C.F.R. 404.1567.  The
Secretary has required that those regulations be made available to
claimants at district and branch offices.  20 C.F.R. 422.430(a)(3).
He has also required that claimants be allowed to inspect and copy
such materials as the Disability Insurance State Manual, on which
state agencies rely in making initial and reconsideration decisions.
20 C.F.R. 422.430(b)(4).  /26/

   Claimants are entitled to be represented at hearings, a fact of
which respondent was repeatedly advised.  /27/ The regulations also
impose on the administrative law judge an obligation "to develop a
full and fair record, which * * * rises to a 'special duty . . . to
scrupulously and conscientiously explore for all the relevant facts'
where an unrepresented claimant has not waived counsel." Broz v.
Schweiker, supra, 677 F.2d at 1364;  20 C.F.R. 404.944.  The ALJ in
this case fully satisfied that obligation.  See pages 38-40 and notes
22, 24 supra.  He concluded that respondent retained "sufficient
residual functional capacity for light work" (Pet. App. 25a).  His
decision was upheld by the Appeals Council (id. at 17a-18a), the
district court (id. at 14a), and the court of appeals (id. at 7a).
There is no reason to undo that determination simply because the ALJ
failed to give the type of illustration that respondent now feels
would have been most satisfactory.  The regulations contain no such
requirement.  They are fully consistent with the statute, and it is
not the judicial function to rewrite them.

   2. The court of appeals seemed to suggest that the Secretary must
prove the existence of particular jobs so that claimants may have an
opportunity to show that such jobs do not exist (Pet. App. 10a,
quoting Decker v. Harris, supra, 647 F.2d at 298 (emphasis added) (the
claimant must have an "adequate opportunity to challenge the * * *
availability of the jobs noticed'").  But where a claimant is -- like
respondent -- capable of a full range of light work, the decision
about the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy
is particularly unsuited to adjudication.  As the Seventh Circuit
recently noted (Cummins v. Schweiker, supra, 670 F.2d at 83):

         Such a judgment, to be well informed, requires a broad
      knowledge of the labor market.  The Department of Health and
      Human Services has this knowledge and can both supplement and
      draw upon it in a rulemaking proceeding.  It was entitled to
      substitute an institutional judgment for the ad hoc judgments of
      administrative law judges based on the testimony of vocational
      experts and other witnesses and on their own limited and
      variable knowledge of the labor market.

   See also Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, supra,
677 F.2d at 169.  Unless the regulations rest on an incorrect factual
basis -- and neither respondent nor the court of appeals has suggested
that they do -- there are some 1600 types of unskilled jobs (i.e.,
jobs that can be learned by one with minimal education and skills)
that exist for people (like respondent) with no physical or mental
limitations other than an inability to do more than light work.  To
afford individual claimants a chance to dispute that proposition in
case after case would uselessly consume administrative and judicial
resources and would destroy the utility of the guidelines.  It was
well established even before the medical-vocational regulations were
promulgated that, in cases like respondent's where the claimant was
able to do a full range of light work, the Secretary was entitled to
dispense with proof of the fact that such work existed.  Breaux v.
Finch, 421 F.2d 687, 689-690 (5th Cir. 1970);  Mashaw, supra, at
78-80.

   3. Contrary to the court of appeals' assumption, the claimant is
not precluded from showing that he "cannot in fact perform the types
of jobs that are administratively noticed by the guidelines" (Pet.
App. 10a).  One of the primary functions of the guidelines is to
provide a structure that will require the ALJ to elicit all relevant
information about age, education, work skills, residual functional
capacity, and non-exertional limitations insofar as they bear on a
claimant's ability to do the types of work underlying the tables.
Moreover, before the hearing the claimant will have seen the medical
and other evidence upon which the initial and reconsideration denials
of his claim rested (J.A. 37).  The claimant is thus free to rebut
that and any other contrary evidence concerning his medical and
vocational characteristics.  The guidelines make this right explicit:
"(E)ach of these findings of fact is subject to rebuttal and the
individual may present evidence to refute such findings." 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 200.00(a).

   The information that the claimant is asked to supply is not, of
course, targeted at specific occupations.  But in the class of cases
to which the guidelines apply, that focus is unnecessary.  Take
respondent's situation as an illustration.  What the ALJ found was
that she was able to perform a wide range of unskilled light work
(Pet. App. 27a) that could be undertaken "after a short demonstration
or within 30 days, and (that does) not require special skills or
experience." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 202.00(a).
 It was shown above (page 31) that a claimant's ability to perform
light work (his exertional capacity) was not a matter about which the
vocational expert testified.  In that regard the guidelines effect no
change from the prior system.  On the other hand, it would be
pointless to allow extended proof of the ways in which respondent was
uneducated or unskilled, since the approximately 1600 jobs noticed in
the tables presume that the claimant has no skills, and only minimal
literacy and the ability to communicate in English.  20 C.F.R.
404.1564(b)(1) to (3);  App. 2, Table 2, Rules 202.09, 202.10.  It
would be possible for a claimant to show that he could not perform
many of the jobs noticed in Table 2 because he had nonexertional
limitations -- e.g., an allergy to dust.  But in cases (unlike
respondent's) where such limitations are present, the guidelines can
no longer be used to direct a conclusion of nondisability.  See pages
39-40, supra.

   The court of appeals stated (Pet. App. 10a) that "(i)f there are so
many types of jobs available, it would not be too great a burden for
the Secretary or the ALJ to specify a few suitable alternative
available types of jobs so that a claimant is given an opportunity to
show that she is incapable of performing those jobs." But to review,
one by one, the approximately 1600 jobs underlying the table
applicable to respondent's case, and permit her to introduce evidence
about her inability to perform each of them, would be an utterly
fruitless investment of administrative resources.  The very point of
the guidelines is to obviate the need for such an inquiry.  Once a
claimant's medical and vocational characteristics have been thoroughly
reviewed, then, unless the data on which the guidelines are based are
seriously deficient (a point not contended in this case), it is clear
that he can perform a full range of the jobs incorporated in the
applicable table.

   4. The court of appeals' conclusion that respondent should be
allowed to dispute the availability and suitability of particular
occupations not only interjects a superfluous procedure into
disability hearings, but also rests on a mistaken perception of the
disability determination process.  The statutory term "disability" is
not a historical fact that can only be ascertained on a case-by-case
basis.  /28/ Cummins v. Schweiker, supra, 670 F.2d at 83.  Its
implementation involves in the first instance a judgment about what
kind of impairments -- coupled with what age, educational, and
vocational characteristics -- render claimants sufficiently unable to
work that they are entitled to benefits.  Congress has delegated to
the Secretary the responsibility of making specific the relevant
medical and vocational factors, and he has done so by the regulations
at issue here.  "The administration of public assistance based on the
use of (such) a formula is not inherently arbitrary.  There are
limited resources to spend on welfare.  To require individual
determinations of need would mandate costly fact-finding procedures
that would dissipate resources that could have been spent on the
needy.  Sometimes, of course, Congress has required individualized
findings of fact.  In this case, however, the Act and legislative
history make clear that Congress" both authorized and approved the
Secretary's decision to proceed by general rule.  Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, supra, 453 U.S. at 48 (citations and footnotes omitted).

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   REX E. LEE

      Solicitor General

   J. PAUL McGRATH

      Assistant Attorney General

   KENNETH S. GELLER

      Deputy Solicitor General

   JOHN H. GARVEY

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   ROBERT S. GREENSPAN

   ANNE BUXTON SOBOL

      Attorneys

   SEPTEMBER 1982

   /1/ The Act's definition of disability is the same for both the
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program (Title
II) and the Supplemental Security Income ( SSI") program (Title XVI).
Compare Section 223(d) of Title II, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 423(d),
with Section 1614(a)(3) of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV)
1382c(a)(3).  The medical-vocational regulations apply to disability
determinations under both programs:  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P
governs Title II Claims;  20 C.F.R. Part 416, Subpart I, which is
virtually identical to Subpart P, applies to SSI claims, 20 C.F.R.
416.969.  Respondent claimed benefits only under Title II.

   /2/Numerous public interest groups participated in this phase of
the rulemaking process.  See 42 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1977);  41 Fed. Reg.
51471 (1976).

   /3/ The agency later rewrote the regulations to make them clearer
and easier to use.  45 Fed. Reg. 55566 (1980).

   /4/ There are four levels of administrative consideration of
disability claims.  The first two levels of decision, the initial and
reconsideration determinations, are made by state agencies.  42 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV) 421(a).  The third level of the administrative process is a
hearing before an administrative law judge in the Social Security
Administration.  42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b), 421(d).  The fourth
level is review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security
Administration.  Judicial review of the final administrative decision
is authorized by 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(g), 421(d).  See Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 101-102 (1977).

   /5/ The term "regulations" will generally be used to refer to 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P in its entirety.  Subpart P includes,
following 20 C.F.R. 404.1598, two appendices.  Appendix 1 is a listing
of impairments that are considered presumptively disabling.  Appendix
2 is entitled "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" and will generally be
referred to as the "guidelines" or "Appendix 2." Within Appendix 2 are
various "tables" directing disability outcomes according to claimants'
residual functional capacity.  Each of the tables contains a number of
"rules" for different combinations of age, education, and work
experience.  See Pet. App. 35a-75a.

   /6/ The sources of data on the numbers of unskilled jobs and the
vocational significance of age, education, and work experience are set
forth in the preamble to the regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55352-55355
(1978), and in the text of the regulations, 20 C.F.R. 404.1566(d) (job
data);  App. 2, Section 200.00(b) (job data).  For example, the
determinations about unskilled jobs at various levels are "supported
by the 'Dictionary of Occupational Titles' and the 'Occupational
Outlook Handbook,' published by the Department of Labor;  the 'County
Business Patterns' and 'Census Surveys' published by the Bureau of the
Census;  and occupational surveys of light and sedentary jobs prepared
for the Social Security Administration by various State emploment
agencies." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 200.00(b).
As later editions of these publications become available -- e.g., the
fourth edition of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (1977),
recently published by the Department of Labor -- the guidelines will
be updated to incorporate them.  43 Fed. Reg. 55351 (1978);  cf.
Sherwin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, No. 81-1885 (1st
Cir. June 22, 1982), slip op. 8-9.

   The guidelines also include a detailed textual statement that
explains and justifies the tables and rules in Appendix 2 (Pet. App.
52a-75a).

   /7/ On April 28, 1982, the agency adjudicated a claim for
disability benefits filed by respondent on February 9, 1982.  The
agency found respondent disabled as of January 1, 1981 on the basis of
a change in her condition.  The decision on respondent's subsequent
claim has no effect on her right to benefits through December 31,
1980, the date of the agency's final decision on the claim now before
this Court.  See 42 U.S.C. 405(h);  20 C.F.R. 404.957(c)(1);  Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).

   /8/ The court did state that "(i)n failing to show suitable
available alternative jobs for Ms. Campbell, the Secretary's finding
of 'not disabled' is not supported by substantial evidence" (Pet. App.
11a).  That criticism evidently applies to the adjudication of
respondent's claim, rather than to the rulemaking proceeding that
resulted in promulgation of the regulations.  Cf. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(E).
But the evidence that the court found lacking was rendered unnecessary
by the regulations, so its absence is significant only if the
regulations are invalid.

   /9/ Provisions comparable to Sections 405(a) and 423(d)(5) are
found in Title XVI.  See 42 U.S.C. 1383(d)(1), (e)(1).

   /10/ Section 423(d)(4) also provides that there shall be excluded
from earnings the cost of services, devices, and drugs "which are
necessary (as determined by the Secretary in regulations)" to enable
the individual to work, and "that the amounts to be excluded shall be
subject to such reasonable limits as the Secretary may prescribe."

   /11/ In Broz the court sustained the Secretary's authority to enact
regulations specifying the effect of residual functional capacity,
education, and work experience on a claimant's ability to engage in
substantial gainful work, but held that individualized consideration
must be given to the effect of age on disability claimants.  677 F.2d
at 1359-1361.

   /12/ Unskilled jobs are those that "can be performed after a short
demonstration or within 30 days, and do not require special skills or
experience." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 202.00(a).

   /13/ In 1954 Congress created a "freeze" program perpetuating
coverage of workers during periods of disability when they were unable
to continue paying into the Social Security system.  Social Security
Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, Section 106, 68 Stat. 1080.  In 1956
Congress authorized the payment of benefits to disabled workers at age
50.  Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, Section 103, 70
Stat. 815.  In 1958 benefits were extended to the dependents of
disabled workers.  Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-840, Section 205, 72 Stat. 1021.  In 1960 Congress extended
eligibility for benefits to disabled workers below age 50.  Social
Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, Section 401, 74 Stat.
967.

   /14/ The currently effective provision, cited in text, differs in
respects not here relevant from that enacted in 1954.

   /15/ Pub. L. No. 97-123, Section 6, 95 Stat. 1664 (Section 423(f));
 Pub. L. No. 96-473, Section 5(a)(1), (c), 94 Stat. 2264, 2265
(Section 423(d)(6), (f));  Pub. L. No. 96-265, Title I, Section
102(b), Title III, Sections 302(a)(1), 303(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), 305(a),
306(c), 307, 309(a), 94 Stat. 443 450, 451, 453, 457, 458, 459
(Section 405(b), (g);  Section 423(a)(1), (2), (b), (d)(4)-(5), (e));
Pub. L. No. 95-600, Title VII, Section 703(j)(14)(B), 92 Stat. 2942
(Section 405 (p)(3));  Pub. L. No. 95-216, Title III, Sections 335,
353(f)(2), 91 Stat. 1547, 1554 (Section 405(c)(1)(A), (D), (o);
Section 423(d)(4));  Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XII, Section 211(b), 90
Stat. 1711 (Section 405(c)(2)).

   /16/ The Disability Insurance State Manual included Disability
Insurance Letters like that cited in text.  The same materials were
included in the Bureau of Disability Insurance, Vocational Specialist
Training Handbook, cited below.  Copies of relevant portions of the
Vocational Specialist Training Handbook, including DIL No. III-3, have
been lodged with the Court and furnished to counsel for petitioner.

   /17/ The Vocational Specialist Training Handbook was used by SSA to
train vocational specialists within each state office responsible for
making the initial and reconsideration decisions.  Such state offices
were established by agreement between the state and the Secretary, 42
U.S.C. 421(b), and were reimbursed for their services out of trust
funds.  42 U.S.C. 421(e).  Sections 421(b) and 421(e) have since been
amended.

   /18/ Both the Disability Insurance State Manual and the Vocational
Specialist Training Handbook, in assessing the significance of the
vocational factors, relied upon many of the sources underlying the
medical-vocational regulations, such as the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, supra, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook
Handbook;  Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns;  and the
Bureau of the Census, Census Reports;  43 Fed. Reg. 55350-55351
(1978);  Training Handbook, supra, at 5-1 to 5-6.

   /19/ See note 18, supra.  These materials are also among those of
which the current regulations take administrative notice.  20 C.F.R.
404.1566(d);  Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, supra,
667 F.2d at 530.

   /20/ Every job involves various physical demands, such as strength
(exertion), balancing, stooping, manual dexterity, and aural and
visual acuity.  Moreover, jobs are performed under a variety of
different working conditions:  they may be indoors or outdoors,
subject to extremes of temperature, humidity, noise, toxic conditions,
or other hazards.  They may also require an applicant to have more or
less education or vocational training.  For example, operating a dough
mixer in the baking industry is classified as light work, but it
involves stooping or crouching, as well as a degree of manual
dexterity.  The job is also performed in conditions that are often
hot, humid, and dusty.  The training required to undertake the job may
last from six months to a year.  Department of Labor, Selected
Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles 129 (1981).  By contrast, the job of garment
bagger in the laundry industry -- also classified as light work --
involves no additional physical demands other than some manual
dexterity.  The job is not performed under any unusual environmental
conditions and can be learned after only a brief demonstration.  Id.
at 212.

   /21/ Moreover, expert testimony may be desirable for deciding some
difficult questions that can arise under the guidelines.  One such
issue is whether a particular claimant's skills are transferable to a
relatively wide range of jobs.  20 C.F.R. 404.1566(e);  McCoy v.
Schweiker, supra, 683 F.2d at 1141 n.1.  Compare App. 2, Table 1, Rule
201.14 with Rule 201.15.

   /22/ "Light work" (the table applied in respondent's case), for
example, is described as

         involv(ing) lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
      frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
      pounds.  * * * (A) job is in this category when it requires a
      good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting
      most of the time with some pushing and pulling or arm or leg
      controls.

   20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b).  At her hearing respondent introduced
evidence on each of those facts.  J.A. 21, 28-29, 31-33, 46-51.  She
was also instructed by the administrative law judge at the beginning
of the hearing that he would "take * * * evidence on your residual
functional capacity to engage in sedentary, light, medium, or heavy
work.  This essentially (is) * * * your ability to walk, stand, sit,
lift, push, pull or carry." Id. at 37.

   /23/ The circuits that have upheld the regulations have recognized
that an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence if it
does not establish each of these factors.  See, e.g., Spencer v.
Schweiker, 678 F.2d 42, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1982) (no substantial evidence
supporting ALJ's conclusion that claimant could do sedentary work);
Dodgins v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1982) (light work).

   /24/ In this case the administrative law judge specifically
questioned respondent about the nonexertional impairments she might
have.  J.A. 39 ("If your case does not fall under a particular rule or
you have some non-exertional impairments, the rule will be used as a
frame of reference to determine whether you are disabled"), 40-41,
47-54 (Q. "You have told me just about your medical problem, have you
not, as you understand it to be?" A. "I think so, sir.  * * * I don't
think I forget anything.")

   Even the circuits that have upheld the regulations have been
careful to find that the tables may not be used where a claimant has
some significant nonexertional impairment.  Burnam v. Schweiker, 682
F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1982);  McClenny v. Harris, 681 F.2d 814 (4th
Cir. 1982);  Thomas v. Schweiker, supra, 666 F.2d at 1004 (sensitivity
to dust, heat, fumes);  Roberts v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th
Cir. 1981) (sensitivity to lint);  Torres v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 668 F.2d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 1981) (psychiatric
impairment);  Cannon v. Harris, 651 F.2d 513, 518-520 (7th Cir. 1981)
(alcoholism);  Gagnon v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 666
F.2d 662, 666 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981) (pain).

   /25/ 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2, Section 201.00(h) gives
the following example:

         Example 1:  An individual under age 45 with a high school
      education can no longer do past work and is restricted to
      unskilled sedentary jobs because of a severe medically
      determinable cardiovascular impairment (which does not meet or
      equal the listings in Appendix 1).  A permanent injury of the
      right hand limits the individual to sedentary jobs which do not
      require bilateral manual dexterity.  None of the rules in
      Appendix 2 are applicable to this particular set of facts,
      because this individual cannot perform the full range of work
      defined as sedentary.  Since the inability to perform jobs
      requiring bilateral manual dexterity significantly compromises
      the only range of work for which the individual is otherwise
      qualified (i.e., sedentary), a finding of disabled would be
      appropriate.

   /26/ We are informed by the Secretary that the Notice of Hearing
sent to claimants is accompanied by Form HA-4607, which states that
Appendix 2 will be considered in making the disability determination.
Form HA-4607 also outlines the sequential disability evaluation
process.  The Form is reproduced in the Appendix to this brief.

   /27/ See, e.g., J.A. 36:

         Q. All right.  I might say this to you.  If you want legal
      assistance or help and they are busy now, the case could be put
      off at a later time and whenever they could represent you.  But
      if you want to go forward today and see what the evidence is and
      see if you need -- need a representative, we are ready to do so.

         A. I'm willing to go forward.

   /28/ The disability insurance system should not be confused with
unemployment compensation.  The issue in disability cases is not
whether the claimant has sought and been unable to find a job.

   Appendix Omitted