The Putin Era In Historical Perspective
Conference Report
February 2007
The
views expressed are those of individuals and do
no represent official US intelligence or policy
positions. The National Intelligence Council routinely
sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside
experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen
the level of debate on critical issues.
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Summary
Participants in a November 15, 2006 conference
sponsored by the National Intelligence Council broadly
agreed that Russia has never developed a
capitalist culture or the institutional structure
of a modern capitalist state; that Russians historically
have believed that autocracy is the only viable
system for their country because it is too large
and ethnically diverse to survive intact under any
other form of rule; and that being a great power
is a central part of Russia’s historical identity.
Given the continuity of these long-held attitudes,
change in Russia probably will come only
when a leader is willing to confront and transcend
the roots of this historical legacy, which the Putin
administration is unlikely to do.
Russia has never had legally enforceable property
rights, an essential feature of a functioning
capitalist society. For centuries, property rights
and business associations have existed in limbo,
enjoying no legal status or protection. Instead,
the principle of kormleniye—currying favor with
the leaders to protect one’s property—has prevailed.
The continuation of these practices
under Putin presents an impediment to economic
development. A small group of Putin’s
close allies occupy the commanding heights of
the economy, driving growth through natural resource
extraction and enjoying privileges through kormleniye.
The lack of a firm dividing line between public
and private, and the symbiosis of state and organized
crime elements, are a real danger to long-term
prosperity.
Most Russians fear the disorder that
many believe would result from a more open, pluralistic
system. The system historically has been
stable because some form of authoritarianism is
the default mode, and opportunistic attempts to
introduce more freedom have been the exception.
Compared to other imperial collapses, the Soviet
disintegration was relatively orderly and non-violent.
Bereft of its former empire, Russia still
aspires to be a great power and to be respected
as such.
Participants disagreed over whether
Russia had developed an identity as a post-imperial
power. They did agree, however, that
Russia is increasingly is using tougher forms
of “soft power” in dealing with its neighbors.
Introduction
The National Intelligence Council and the Department
of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research held
a conference entitled, The Putin Era
in Historical Perspective, on 15 November
2006. The goal of the conference was to examine
the historical roots of the current Russian political
and economic system—one in which an increasingly
authoritarian state has recaptured the commanding
heights of the economy, where capitalism has developed
through a symbiotic relationship between political
and economic elites, and the Kremlin is pursing
a more assertive foreign policy. Conference speakers
were experts on Russian history: Professors Richard
Pipes (Harvard), Stefan Hedlund (Uppsala University).
Thomas Owen (Harvard), Stephen Kotkin (Princeton),
Marshall Poe (The Atlantic Monthly), Nigel Raab
(Loyola Marymount), Eric Lohr (American University),
Dominic Lieven (London School of Economics), Ronald
Suny (University of Chicago), and Arnold Horelick
(RAND).
State Capitalism: The Long View
Participants agreed that Russia has never
developed either a capitalist culture or the institutional
structure of a modern capitalist state.
Since the 15th century, the Russian state has controlled
land, natural resources, and labor. The notion of
private property only emerged in 1785 and, even
today, only 24 percent of Russians consider the
protection of private property a fundamental right,
while a majority believes that natural resources
should be controlled by the state.
Russia never has had legally enforceable property
rights, an essential feature of a functioning
capitalist society. For centuries, property rights
and business associations have existed in limbo,
enjoying no legal status or protection. This resulted
in a system that, at its heart, lacked accountability.
Where there are no institutions that can call
an autocrat to account, property rights are always
conditional upon one’s personal influence with
the autocrat. Throughout the centuries, under
both the Tsars and the Soviets, the principle
of kormleniye—currying (and purchasing) favor
with the leaders to protect one’s property—has
prevailed, but kormleniye is conditional and can
always be revoked.
Citizens have never had access to the institutionalized
means by which they could hold their autocratic
leaders accountable. The business elite has never
had a political party to represent its interests
and has often been stigmatized because of its
wealth.
Russia has long been suspicious of foreign involvement
in its economy. During the Tsarist era, foreign
businessmen would win concessions and present
detailed plans to the government for developing
natural resources, only to have the state revoke
the concession and have Russians appropriate the
foreign business plans.
Participants agreed that, under Putin,
many of these traditional features have resurfaced,
and present an impediment to long-term economic
development.
Russia’s current growth—largely based on high
energy prices—has not stimulated sufficient demand
for contracts and property rights. A small group
of Putin’s close colleagues occupy the commanding
heights of the economy, driving growth through
natural resource extraction. They enjoy privileges
through kormleniye as well as increasingly through
excluding foreign companies after allowing them
to do much of the initial investment work in energy
projects.
There is too much room for arbitrariness in the economy. The current tax system leaves
people in limbo, with the rights of the state always superior to the rights of the individual.
The tax police do not act as impartial professional auditors, but maraud in black ski masks
and intimidate businessmen.
Government-business relations in the late Tsarist period, however, could serve as a positive
model for today’s Russia, as high officials were prohibited from holding business positions.
Novgorod, returning to its historical roots as a trade city, remains an encouraging example of
what is possible in Russia. Its political and business leaders are seeking to become a model of
transparency and honesty in dealings with Western investors.
-
One presenter argued that Russia will change
the way its economy is structured only when
the rest of the world finds a cheap, widely
available alternative to fossil fuels. As it
is, this presenter contended, Russia is seeking
to imitate Asian models of capitalist development
and could easily continue to enjoy high rates
of growth, as has China, without introducing
rule of law, independent judiciary or property
rights.
- Other experts contend, however, that even a modest decline in energy prices could help spur
economic reform and diversification, and that Asian models of development are not readily
applicable to Russia, whose economy is significantly more dependent on resource-extractive
industries.
Managing Society From the Top Down
Conference presenters agreed that, since the 16th century, many Russians have regarded
autocracy as the most viable government for their country because it is too large, populous
and ethnically diverse to survive intact under any other form of rule. Although many states
have experienced centuries of autocracy, what is unique is that Russia maintained its autocracy
while more democratic governments developed around it.
-
The Russian elite traditionally has feared
the disorder (bezporyadok) and state
collapse that would, they believe, result from
a more pluralistic system. Even today, polls
show that 85% of respondents claim that order
(proyadok) is more important than freedom.
Russians also prefer a truly grozny
(awe-inspiring) leader.
-
The system is historically stable, because some form of authoritarianism is the default
mode and opportunistic attempts to introduce more freedom have been the exception.
Putin inherited a state shaped by five centuries of predatory, militarized, centralized statism
and government for the elite by the elite; a large, untrustworthy, ineffectual bureaucracy; an
amorphous, atomized, dispirited society; a poorly-structured economy; and a fracture
empire with large fissures, much of which is beyond Moscow’s ability to control. Putin
understands that the tools he has at his disposal have failed every time a Russian leader has
tried to effect change deliberately.
Presenters did identify some precedents for greater pluralism and burgeoning civil society in
Russia. In the late imperial period, non-state activity—in the form of charitable associations and
volunteer fire departments—grew as Russia urbanized. Ultimately, however, all of the
organizations sought the state’s protection, allowing themselves to be co-opted in return for state
assistance.
- Participants agreed that a primary task is to identify what is useable in a positive sense in
Russian history—for instance, high literacy rates, high standards of education and prowess in
science, and the relative success of interethnic relations.
One speaker expressed concern that roughly one-third of Russian youth express support for
“skinhead” values. Whereas it once was thought that the youth would be the vanguard of
liberalism, increasingly it appears that they are more inclined toward fascism.
Dealing with Lost Empire
Presenters agreed that being a great power is a central part of Russia’s
historical identity. Russians traditionally
have confused size with greatness and today this
means that retaining whatever is left of the empire—namely
the Russian Federation—is a key Kremlin goal. The
quest for great power status always has coexisted
with an inferiority complex manifested in an overreaction
to perceived foreign slights, lest the country appear
weak. Today, this has created expectations
of power and respect and the responsibilities of
empire without the resources, in a world where Russia
continues to struggle to maintain its status.
-
Russia’s leaders’ perceptions of weakness and
insecurity—both domestically and in the international
arena, given Russia’s huge population, geographic
location, and borders that are difficult to
defend—have driven and distorted Russian foreign
policy for centuries.
-
Managing the transition from empire to nation
state has been difficult for all previous empires.
This is especially true for those that are land-based
rather than maritime, because land empires have
more integrated economies, greater difficulties
in shedding the burdens of empire given physical
contiguity, no clear distinctions between the
metropolis and the colonies and thus little
‘state” affinity. Compared to other
imperial collapses, the relative lack of disorder
and violence in the wake of the USSR’s disintegration
is remarkable.
- The USSR’s collapse is not comparable to the end of the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman
empires because Russia does not face or accept the options they had—being taken over by
another power or voluntarily accepting less than great power status.
Presenters disagreed about Russia’s identity as a post-imperial power.
One speaker argued that Russians know who they are,
based in large part on their strong military-patriotic
tradition and their rich culture. Another argued
that, with the dissolution of the USSR, Russia lost
its identity and empire at the same time and has
yet to redefine it. Another speculated that, given
Russia’s imperial history and fragmented identity,
it is difficult to define national interests, generating
fear that change could undermine or destroy the
state.
-
Putin is a state-builder, not a nation-builder,
who has restored order, maintained Russia’s
territorial integrity, aspired to regain great
power status, but has decided to work within
the existing international system because he
recognizes Russia’s weakness. He is a patriot,
not a nationalist, craves order for the public
good, and tries to avoid foreign policy defeats
because he recognizes they weaken foreign policy
in general.
- Putin is willing to use “hard” soft power, such as border closures, deportations and other
measures short of military force, to achieve his goals. But Putin’s Russia is not an empire,
because it does not rely on the perception that the center can dictate to its subjects. Russia
retains imperial pretensions in some areas, but its “near abroad” policy mostly reflects a
desire to remain the dominant power in the region.
Participants agreed that Russian’s collective memory and culture argue against a transformation
into something different in the next few decades. Change will come only when a leader is
willing to tackle crime and corruption and scale back great power ambitions. Russian society
today is depoliticized and dissocialized and there is little impetus for change from below at this
time.
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