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Contents
Executive
Summary
Methodology
Introduction
The
Contradictions of Globalization
Rising
Powers
New
Challenges to Governance
Pervasive
Insecurity
Policy
Implications
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Report
of the
National Intelligence Council's
2020 Project
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The nation-state will continue to be the dominant unit of the global order,
but economic globalization and the dispersion of
technologies, especially information technologies,
will place enormous strains on governments. Regimes
that were able to manage the challenges of the 1990s
could be overwhelmed by those of 2020. Contradictory
forces will be at work: authoritarian regimes
will face new pressures to democratize, but fragile
new democracies may lack the adaptive capacity to
survive and develop.
- With
migration on the increase in several places around
the world—from North Africa and the Middle East
into Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean into
the United States, and increasingly from Southeast
Asia into the northern regions—more countries
will be multi-ethnic and multi-religious and will
face the challenge of integrating migrants into
their societies while respecting their ethnic
and religious identities.
Halting Progress on Democratization
Global economic growth has the potential to spur
democratization, but backsliding by many countries
that were considered part of the “third wave” of
democratization is a distinct possibility. In
particular, by 2020 democratization may be partially
reversed among the states of the former Soviet Union
and in Southeast Asia, some of which never really
embraced democracy. Russia and
most of the Central Asian regimes
appear to be slipping back toward authoritarianism,
and global economic growth probably will not on
its own reverse such a trend. The development
of more diversified economies in these countries—by
no means inevitable—would be crucial in fostering
the growth of a middle class, which in turn would
spur democratization.
- Beset
already by severe economic inequalities, aging
Central Asian rulers must contend with unruly
and large youth populations lacking broad economic
opportunities. Central Asian governments
are likely to suppress dissent and revert to authoritarianism
to maintain order, risking growing insurgencies.
“…backsliding
by many countries that were considered part of
the ‘third wave’ of democratization is a distinct
possibility.”
Chinese leaders will face a
dilemma over how much to accommodate pluralistic
pressure and relax political controls or risk
a popular backlash if they do not. Beijing
also has to weigh in the balance its ambition
to be a major global player, which would be enhanced
if its rulers moved towards political reform.
Eurasian
Countries: Going Their Separate Ways?
The regional experts who
attended our conference felt that Russia’s political
development since the fall of Communism has
been complicated by the continuing search for
a post-Soviet national identity. Putin
has increasingly appealed to Russian nationalism—and,
occasionally, xenophobia—to define Russian identity. His
successors may well define Russian identity
by highlighting Russia’s imperial past and its
domination over its neighbors even as they reject
communist ideology.
In the view of the experts,
Central Asian states are weak, with considerable
potential for religious and ethnic conflict
over the next 15 years. Religious
and ethnic movements could have a destabilizing
impact across the region. Eurasia
is likely to become more differentiated despite
the fact that demographic counterforces—such
as a dearth of manpower in Russia and western
Eurasia and an oversupply in Central Asia—could
help pull the region together. Moreover,
Russia and the Central Asians are likely to
cooperate in developing transportation corridors
for energy supplies.
The participants assessed
that among the resource-rich countries, Russia
has the best prospects for expanding its economy
beyond resource extraction and becoming more
integrated into the world economy. To
diversify its economy, Russia would need to
undertake structural changes and institute the
rule of law, which could in turn encourage foreign
direct investment outside of the energy sector. Knowing
that Europe probably would want to forge a “special
relationship” with a Russia that is stronger
economically, Moscow probably would be more
tolerant of former Soviet states moving closer
to Europe. If Russia fails to diversify
its economy, it could well experience the petro-state
phenomenon of unbalanced economic development,
huge income inequality, capital flight, and
increased social problems.
Regional experts were
less confident about the potential for significant
economic diversification in the other resource-rich
countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus
over the next 15 years—in particular, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. For
countries with more limited natural resources,
such as Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, the challenge will be to develop
effective project and service industries, requiring
better governance.
Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan,
Krgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—face
the stiff challenge of keeping the social peace
in a context of high population growth, a relatively
young population, limited economic prospects,
and growing radical Islamic influence. Allowing
more emigration could help alleviate these pressures
in Central Asian countries. Russia
would benefit from migration as a means of compensating
for its loss of approximately one million people
a year through 2020. Russia, however,
has little experience in integrating migrants
from other cultures; Russian nationalism is
on the increase as a result of growing ethnic
unrest domestically, and our experts believe
any efforts to expand immigration policies would
be exploited by nationalist politicians.
Ironically, the experts
foresaw more unity if economic conditions worsen
globally and Eurasia is isolated. In
that case, a stagnant Russia would be looked
to by the others to maintain order along the
southern rim as some Central Asian countries—Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—faced potential collapse.
China may pursue an “Asian way” of democracy
that might involve elections at the local
level and a consultative mechanism on the
national level, perhaps with the Communist Party
retaining control over the central government.
- Younger
Chinese leaders who are already exerting influence
as mayors and regional officials have been trained
in Western-style universities and have a good
understanding of international standards of
governance.
- Most
of the experts at our regional conference, however,
believe present and future leaders are agnostic
on the issue of democracy and are more interested
in developing what they perceive to be the most
effective model of governance.
Democratic progress could gain ground in key Middle
Eastern countries, which thus far have
been excluded from the process by repressive regimes. Success
in establishing a working democracy in Iraq and
Afghanistan—and democratic consolidation in Indonesia—would
set an example for other Muslim and Arab states,
creating pressures for change.
However, a 2001 Freedom House study showed a dramatic
and expanding gap in the levels of freedom and
democracy between Islamic countries and the rest
of the world. The lack of economic
growth in the Middle East outside the energy sector
is one of the primary underlying factors for the
slow pace. Many regional experts are
not hopeful that the generational turnover in
several of the regimes will by itself spur democratic
reform.
- The
extent to which radical Islam grows and how
regimes respond to its pressures will also have
long-term repercussions for democratization
and the growth of civil society institutions,
although radicals may use the ballot box to
gain power.
- An extended period of high oil prices would
allow regimes to put off economic and fiscal
reform.
High-Tech
Pressures on Governance. Today individual PC users have more capacity at their
fingertips than NASA had with the computers used
in its first moon launches. The trend
toward even more capacity, speed, affordability,
and mobility will have enormous political implications: myriad
individuals and small groups—many of whom had
not been previously so empowered—will not only
connect with one another but will plan, mobilize,
and accomplish tasks with potentially more satisfying
and efficient results than their governments can
deliver. This almost certainly will
affect individuals’ relationships with and views
of their governments and will put pressure on
some governments for more responsiveness.
- China
is experiencing among the fastest rates of increase
of Internet and mobile phone users in the world,
according to the International Telecommunications
Union, and is the leading market for broadband
communication.
- Reports of growing investment by many Middle
Eastern governments in developing high-speed
information infrastructures, although they are
not yet widely available to the population nor
well-connected to the larger world, show obvious
potential for the spread of democratic—and undemocratic—ideas.
- Some
states will seek to control the Internet and
its contents, but they will face increasing
challenges as new networks offer multiple means
of communicating.
Climate Change and Its Implications Through 2020
Policies regarding climate change are likely to feature significantly
in multilateral relations, and the United States,
in particular, is likely to face significant
bilateral pressure to change its domestic environmental
policies and to be a leader in global environmental
efforts. There is a strong consensus
in the scientific community that the greenhouse
effect is real and that average surface temperatures
have risen over the last century, but uncertainty
exists about causation and possible remedies. Experts
in a NIC-sponsored conference judged that concerns
about greenhouse gases, of which China and India
are large producers, will increase steadily
through 2020. There are likely to
be numerous weather-related events that, correctly
or not, will be linked to global warming. Any
of these events could lead to widespread calls
for the United States, as the largest producer
of greenhouse gases, to take dramatic steps
to reduce its consumption of fossil fuels.
Policymakers will face a dilemma: an environmental regime
based solely on economic incentives will probably
not produce needed technological advances because
firms will be hesitant to invest in research
when there is great uncertainty about potential
profits. On the other hand, a regime
based on government regulation will tend to
be costly and inflexible. The numerous
obstacles to multilateral action include resistance
from OPEC countries that depend on fossil fuel
revenues, the developing world’s view that climate
change is a problem created by the industrial
world and one they cannot address given their
economic constraints, and the need for significant
technological innovation to maximize energy
efficiency.
Among reasons for optimism, participants noted that the world is ready
and eager for US leadership and that new multilateral
institutions are not needed to address this
issue. Indeed, crafting a policy
to limit carbon emissions would be simplified
by the fact that three political entities—the
United States, the European Union, and China—account
for over half of all CO2 emitted into the atmosphere. An agreement
that included these three plus the Russian Federation,
Japan, and India would cover two-thirds of all
carbon emissions.
Growing connectivity also will be accompanied
by the proliferation of transnational virtual
communities of interest, a trend which may complicate
the ability of state and global institutions to
generate internal consensus and enforce decisions
and could even challenge their authority and legitimacy. Groups
based on common religious, cultural, ethnic or
other affiliations may be torn between their national
loyalties and other identities. The
potential is considerable for such groups to drive
national and even global political decisionmaking
on a wide range of issues normally the purview
of governments.
The Internet in particular will spur
the creation of global movements, which may emerge
even more as a robust force in international affairs. For
example, technology-enabled diaspora communications
in native languages could lead to the preservation
of language and culture in the face of widespread
emigration and cultural change as well as the
generation of political and economic power.
Populist themes are likely to emerge as a potent political and
social force, especially as globalization risks
aggravating social divisions along economic and ethnic lines. In parts of
Latin America particularly, the failure of elites
to adapt to the evolving demands of free markets
and democracy probably will fuel a revival in
populism and drive indigenous movements, which
so far have sought change through democratic means,
to consider more drastic means for seeking what
they consider their “fair share” of political
power and wealth.
- However,
as with religion, populism will not necessarily
be inimical to political development and can
serve to broaden participation in the political
process. Few experts fear a general
backsliding to the rule of military juntas in
Latin America.
The Latin American countries that are adapting
to challenges most effectively are building sturdier
and more capable democratic institutions to implement
more inclusive and responsive policies and enhance
citizen and investor confidence. A sense of economic
progress and hope for its continuance appears
essential to the long-term credibility of democratic
systems.
Rising nationalism and a trend toward populism also
will present a challenge to governments in Asia. Many,
such as Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, are unable
to deliver on expanding popular demands and risk
becoming state failures.
- Experts
note that a new generation of leaders is emerging
in Africa from the private sector; these leaders
are much more comfortable with democracy than
their predecessors and might provide a strong
internal dynamic for democracy in the future.
Latin America in 2020: Will Globalization
Cause the Region to Split?
The experts we consulted in Latin America contended that global changes
over the next 15 years could deepen divisions
and serve to split Latin America apart in economic,
investment, and trade policy terms. As
the Southern Cone, particularly Brazil and Chile,
reach out to new partners in Asia and Europe,
Central America and Mexico, along with Andean
countries, could lag behind and remain dependent
on the US and Canada as their preferred trade
partners and aid providers.
For Latin Americans, government ineffectiveness, in part, prevented
many countries from realizing the full measure
of economic and social benefits from greater
integration into the global economy in the past
decade. Instead, the gap between
rich and the poor, the represented and the excluded,
has grown. Over the next 15 years,
the effects of continued economic growth and
global integration are likely to be uneven and
fragmentary. Indeed, regional experts
foresee an increasing risk of the rise of charismatic,
self-styled populist leaders, historically common
in the region, who would play on popular concerns
over inequities between “haves” and “have-nots”
in the weakest states in Central America and
Andean countries, along with parts of Mexico. In
the most profoundly weak of these governments,
particularly where the criminalization of the
society, and even the state, is most apparent,
the leaders could have an autocratic bent and
be more stridently anti-American.
The experts made the following observations on regional prospects in
other areas:
- Identity
politics. Increasing portions
of the population are identifying themselves
as indigenous peoples and will demand not
only a voice but, potentially, a new social
contract. Many reject globalization
as it has played out in the region, viewing
it as an homogenizing force that undermines
their unique cultures and as a US-imposed,
neo-liberal economic model whose inequitably
distributed fruits are rooted in the exploitation
of labor and the environment.
- Information technology. The
universalization of the Internet, both as
a mass media and means of inter-personal communication,
will help educate, connect, mobilize, and
empower those traditionally excluded.
Identity
Politics
Part of
the pressure on governance will come from new
forms of identity politics centered on religious
convictions and ethnic affiliation. Over
the next 15 years, religious identity is likely
to become an increasingly important factor in
how people define themselves. The
trend toward identity politics is linked to
increased mobility, growing diversity of hostile
groups within states, and the diffusion of modern
communications technologies.
- The
primacy of ethnic and religious identities
will provide followers with a ready-made community
that serves as a “social safety net” in times
of need—particularly important to migrants. Such
communities also provide networks that can
lead to job opportunities.
“Over
the next 15 years, religious identity is likely
to become an increasingly important factor in
how people define themselves.”
While we
do not have comprehensive data on the number
of people who have joined a religious faith
or converted from one faith to another in recent
years, trends seem to point toward growing numbers
of converts and a deepening religious
commitment by many religious adherents.
- For
example, Christianity, Buddhism, and other
religions and practices are spreading in such
countries as China as Marxism declines, and
the proportion of evangelical converts in
traditionally heavily Catholic Latin America
is rising.
- By 2020, China and Nigeria will have some
of the largest Christian communities in the
world, a shift that will reshape the traditionally
Western-based Christian institutions, giving
them more of an African or Asian or, more
broadly, a developing world face.
- Western Europe stands apart from this growing
global “religiosity” except for the migrant
communities from Africa and the Middle East. Many
of the churches’ traditional functions—education,
social services, etc.—are now performed by
the state. A more pervasive, insistent
secularism, however, might not foster the
cultural acceptance of new Muslim immigrants
who view as discriminatory the ban in some
West European countries against displays of
religious adherence.
Many religious adherents—whether
Hindu nationalists, Christian evangelicals in
Latin America, Jewish fundamentalists in Israel,
or Muslim radicals—are becoming “activists.” They
have a worldview that advocates change of society,
a tendency toward making sharp Manichaean distinctions
between good and evil, and a religious belief
system that connects local conflicts to a larger
struggle.
Such religious-based movements
have been common in times of social and political
turmoil in the past and have oftentimes been
a force for positive change. For
example, scholars see the growth of evangelism
in Latin America as providing the uprooted,
racially disadvantaged and often poorest groups,
including women, “with a social network that
would otherwise be lacking… providing members
with skills they need to survive in a rapidly
developing society...(and helping) to promote
the development of civil society in the region.”
At the same time, the desire
by activist groups to change society often leads
to more social and political turmoil, some of
it violent. In particular, there
are likely to be frictions in mixed communities
as the activists attempt to gain converts among
other religious groups or older established
religious institutions. In keeping
with the intense religious convictions of many
of these movements, activists define their identities
in opposition to “outsiders,” which can foster
strife.
Radical
Islam. Most of the regions that will experience
gains in religious “activists” also have youth
bulges, which experts have correlated with high
numbers of radical adherents,
including Muslim extremists.
- Youth
bulges are expected to be especially acute
in most Middle Eastern and West African countries
until at least 2005-2010, and the effects
will linger long after.
- In the Middle East, radical Islam’s increasing
hold reflects the political and economic alienation
of many young Muslims from their unresponsive
and unrepresentative governments and related
failure of many predominantly Muslim states
to reap significant economic gains from globalization.
The spread
of radical Islam will have a significant global
impact leading to 2020, rallying disparate ethnic
and national groups and perhaps even creating
an authority that transcends national boundaries. Part
of the appeal of radical Islam involves its
call for a return by Muslims to earlier roots
when Islamic civilization was at the forefront
of global change. The collective
feelings of alienation and estrangement which
radical Islam draws upon are unlikely to dissipate
until the Muslim world again appears to be more
fully integrated into the world economy.
“Radical
Islam will have a significant global impact…
rallying disparate ethnic and national groups
and perhaps even creating an authority that
transcends national boundaries.”
Radical
Islam will continue to appeal to many Muslim
migrants who are attracted to the more prosperous
West for employment opportunities but do not
feel at home in what they perceive as an alien
culture.
Studies
show that Muslim immigrants are being integrated
as West European countries become more inclusive,
but many second- and third-generation immigrants
are drawn to radical Islam as they encounter
obstacles to full integration and barriers to
what they consider to be normal religious practices.
Differences
over religion and ethnicity also will contribute
to future conflict, and, if unchecked, will
be a cause of regional strife. Regions
where frictions risk developing into wider civil
conflict include Southeast Asia, where the historic
Christian-Muslim faultlines cut across several
countries, including West Africa, The Philippines,
and Indonesia.
- Schisms
within religions, however historic and longlasting,
also could lead to conflict in this era of
increased religious identity. A
Shia-dominated Iraq is likely to encourage
greater activism by Shia minorities in other
Middle Eastern nations, such as Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan.
Fictional
Scenario: A New Caliphate
The
fictional scenario portrayed below provides
an example of how a global movement fueled by
radical religious identity could emerge. Under
this scenario, a new Caliphate is proclaimed
and manages to advance a powerful counter ideology
that has widespread appeal. It is
depicted in the form of a hypothetical letter
from a fictional grandson of Bin Ladin to a
family relative in 2020. He recounts
the struggles of the Caliph in trying to wrest
control from traditional regimes and the conflict
and confusion which ensue both within the Muslim
world and outside between Muslims and the United
States, Europe, Russia and China. While
the Caliph’s success in mobilizing support varies,
places far outside the Muslim core in the Middle
East—in Africa and Asia—are convulsed as a result
of his appeals. The scenario ends
before the Caliph is able to establish both
spiritual and temporal authority over a territory—which
historically has been the case for previous
Caliphates. At the end of the scenario, we identify lessons
to be drawn.
(Click on any image below for scenario
text.)
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