




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Defense Issues, NATO Response to Terrorism

October 2007


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
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NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY. Homeland Security Council. October 2007



Homeland security requires a truly national effort, with shared goals and responsibilities for protecting and defending the Homeland. Our *Strategy* leverages the unique strengths and capabilities of all levels of government, the private and non-profit sectors, communities, and individual citizens. Mindful that many of the threats we face do not recognize geographic boundaries, we also will continue to work closely with our international partners throughout the world.

This updated *Strategy*, which builds directly from the first *National Strategy for Homeland Security* issued in July 2002, reflects our increased understanding of the terrorist threats confronting the United States today, incorporates lessons learned from exercises and real-world catastrophes – including Hurricane Katrina – and proposes new initiatives and approaches that will enable the Nation to achieve our homeland security objectives. This *Strategy* also complements both the *National Security Strategy* issued in March 2006 and the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* issued in September 2006.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/NSHS.pdf>

THE 500-DAY PLAN. Director of National Intelligence. Washington, DC. October 2007

The United States is challenged by many different and evolving threats, including enemies with many faces and no borders – terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, infectious diseases, cyber attacks, and illegal trafficking. The Intelligence Community (IC) is adjusting to meet this new complex threat environment and adapt to the new strategic context in which it now operates. To do so, the IC must have people, process and technology that provide seamless integration and cross-agency collaboration. The 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration continues to build the foundation to enable the IC to work as a single, integrated enterprise so we can collaborate across critical missions, enhance our support to a wide range of customers and partners, contribute to our national security priorities, and reduce the risks that the nation faces today and in the future.



<http://dni.gov/500-day-plan/500-day-plan.pdf>

BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT. September 14, 2007

This report is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the "Act"). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the second of two reports to be

submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander, United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914.pdf>

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SITUATION IN IRAQ. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq. September 10-11, 2007

"One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, and I quote, "We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far."

(...The) assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; Al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf>

AIR FORCE GENERAL ROBERT HOLMES ON ASYMMETRIC WARFARE; UPDATE ON CENTRAL COMMAND, IRAN, BLACKWATER, AFGHANISTAN. Foreign Press Center Briefing. Briefer: Brigadier General Robert Holmes, USAF, CENTCOM Deputy Director For Operations. The Foreign Press Center, Washington, D.C.. 2007-10-05

"(...) it's very, very important that we look at, particularly now, with regard to asymmetric warfare, that what we're in is in a sense a battle for hearts and minds, not for objectives, not for, you know, military objectives but it's about the hearts of minds of the people not only of the Middle East but of the world.

As we look at the nature of the enemy we face globally, that of terrorists, insurgent, violent actors, understanding that many of these people don't necessarily like or want ascribe to those values that are very important to peace-loving peoples of the world and that if they -- these

violent actors are able to pursue their vision, to pursue their end states, that it ultimately rests with being able to go after the hearts and minds of many of the world's population.

So for us as military officers, particularly at Central Command, we understand that a military solution in and of itself, without the accompanying elements of power to very importantly include diplomacy, political governance and economic development and the societal, cultural things that must be done, that the military solution in and of itself will not be the answer. "<http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=4A5EB468-5FEB-4B16-9592-CF4E45997087>

REMARKS OF CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREG GARCIA AT THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY AWARENESS MONTH KICK-OFF SUMMIT. (Remarks as prepared.) Washington, D.C. Release Date: October 1, 2007

We're in a time of increasing global threats to our cyber infrastructures and to the services, systems, and assets that depend on them. While these at-risk-systems are vast, they easily fade into the background of everyday life. The local ATM, the overhead lights, and the water faucets are all dependant on larger, more comprehensive systems controlled by it networks. An exploited vulnerability in one of these it control systems could range from the annoying to the catastrophic. Our adversaries would like nothing more than to gain control of our financial markets, power generation plants, water purification facilities, or transportation systems. That's why, here in our Nation's capital, as in any American city, cyber vulnerabilities can have real world consequences.

Botnets, phishing, ad-ware, spyware and other attacks make up the more-than-\$100 billion global market for cyber-crime –surpassing drug trafficking from a monetary perspective. Worst of all, the money obtained through cyber crime can be used to finance terrorism. The threats are real. Hackers are becoming more sophisticated and focused in their efforts. Cyber crime is big business; cyber espionage is on the rise.

The numbers say it all. From October 1, 2006, through last weekend, our US-CERT—which I'll describe in more detail in a moment – handled 37,006 incidents, compared with 23,993 the year before. This increase can be attributed to not only increased attacks on our public and private networks, but also increased situational awareness levels and reporting rates. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1191270671928.shtm

SMALL ARMS DESTRUCTION EFFORTS REVERBERATE AROUND THE WORLD Countries take steps to eliminate dangerous surplus, obsolete weapons. By Jacquelyn S. Porth, USINFO Staff Writer, 01 October 2007



Washington -- Left unattended, even small stockpiles of surplus and obsolete AK-47 assault rifles, grenade launchers and shoulder-fired missiles could be stolen and used to fuel regional conflicts.

Angola Navy Captain Mario Andre destroys a weapon with HALO Trust equipment in Luanda, Angola, July 9. (U.S. Embassy Luanda, Angola)

Over the years, U.S. assistance has helped destroy more than a million weapons in places like El Salvador, Suriname, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia. A \$58 million

investment in more than two dozen countries has destroyed more than 21,000 MANPADS and 90 million ammunition clips.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=October&x=20071001150846sjhtrop0.7743341>

FACT SHEET: THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF 9/11: REMEMBERING LIVES LOST AND HEROIC SACRIFICES MADE, SEPTEMBER 11, 2007. (What The United States And Its Partners Are Doing To Defeat Al Qaeda And Protect America Against Attack. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. 11 September 2007

Today, America Remembers The Innocent Who Lost Their Lives In The Most Barbaric Attack In Our Nation's History. We remember the heroic men and women who risked and sacrificed their lives so others might survive; we extend our thoughts and prayers to the families and friends of those who were lost; and we honor the selfless men and women of our Armed Forces, the dedicated members of our law enforcement and intelligence communities, and the thousands of others at the local, State, and Federal levels who protect our country, secure our liberty, and work to prevent future attacks.

http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2007_09/alia/a7091101.htm

SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MET MOST LEGISLATIVE, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS. General Accountability Office (GAO). Web posted September 4, 2007. 07AD927

According to this General Accountability Office (GAO) analysis, of the 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq, the Iraqi government has met 3; partially met 4; and has not met 11. GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense clearly specify “what step in the Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached;” recognize trends in sectarian violence; and better identify operation readiness of Iraqi security forces. The Departments of State and Defense concur with these recommendations but disagree with certain benchmark assessments.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071195.pdf> [pdf format, 100 pages]



TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2007. Office of Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State. Web posted August 3, 2007. 07AD874

This publication is prepared “for the purpose of providing information on treaties and other international agreements to which the United States has become a party and which are carried on the records of the Department of State as being in force as of its stated publication date, January 1, 2007.” This volume is arranged in two sections. Section 1 includes bilateral treaties listed by country with subject headings under each entry. Section 2 lists multilateral treaties and other international agreements arranged by subject.

Full Text: [May need to cut and paste URL]

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<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83046.pdf> [pdf format, 419 pages]

Section 2: Multilateral Agreements

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89668.pdf> [pdf format, 196 pages]

THE U.S. AND NATO

NUCLEAR THREAT, ARMED CONFLICT REDUCTION HIGHEST U.S. PRIORITY; Solid U.S. record of disarmament achievements outlined. By Jacquelyn S. Porth, USINFO Staff Writer. 2007-10-11

Washington -- The United States has been a leader in promoting gradual nuclear disarmament and garnering broad support for international efforts to destroy dangerous stockpiles of small arms and light artillery.

On the nuclear side, the United States long has supported multilateral solutions to the challenges posed by Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons development. At the same time, U.S. officials have emphasized their commitment to working with international partners to find diplomatic solutions to these twin challenges.


During a recent speech to United Nations delegates in New York, U.S. Ambassador Christina Rocca pointed to sustained engagement in developing policies and systems seeking "to reduce the risk of proliferation or to stop proliferation when it is happening."
<http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=B25BAFA8-4B20-4EF3-9CAC-E45B2A909875>

The full text of Rocca's October 9 speech in New York is available on the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva Web site:
<http://geneva.usmission.gov/Press2007/1009AmbRoccaUNAG.html>

THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

No Middle Way: The Challenge of Exit Strategies from Iraq. By Frederick W. Kagan. PAPERS AND STUDIES. AEI Online. Publication Date: September 6, 2007



As the debate over American strategy in Iraq heats up, many opponents of the current counterinsurgency approach are seeking a middle way between the strategy General David Petraeus has designed and is executing and a complete withdrawal from Iraq that they recognize will gravely harm American security and national interests. The search for this middle way goes back to the Iraq Study Group's report, which suggested that an expanded diplomatic and military training effort could permit a significant reduction in American combat forces in Iraq while still offering the prospect of at least partial success. In June, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) published a report entitled *Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq* that is the most detailed effort yet to describe what a middle-way military strategy would look like.

The importance of the debate over American strategy in Iraq, and in particular the importance of thinking through the challenges of moving from an active counterinsurgency strategy to an advisory mission in Iraq, led the Iraq Planning Group at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to conduct a detailed evaluation of the CNAS report and, more generally, the efforts to find a middle-way strategy that relies on expanded training efforts to permit rapid withdrawal of most American combat units from Iraq. . . .

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26760/pub_detail.asp

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN; Learning from India. By Anit Mukherjee, Moeed Yusuf. NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK. AEI Online. Publication Date: September 28, 2007



Pakistan is facing tremendous pressure to take on the threat posed by the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus in its "tribal belt" along its border with Afghanistan. Topping the list of U.S. demands is the concerted use of the Pakistan army to stem and roll back extremist influence. What is required is a classic counterinsurgency campaign within Pakistani territory. Pakistan's neighbor and traditional rival India provides a model for tackling this challenge.

Recent statements from high-ranking Bush administration officials as well as several residential candidates favoring military action within Pakistan reflect growing frustration with Islamabad's inability to deliver on its promises to curb militant activities. Washington realizes--correctly--that while it is leading the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, victory in the war on terror depends on Pakistan's performance in dealing with the militant presence in its tribal region.

Much of the current discussion has revolved around the sincerity of Islamabad's commitment to take on the Islamist militants whom it has long treated as proxy allies. Most observers

suggest that Pakistani policymakers have not been entirely forthcoming, instead choosing to play both sides in which they do just enough to stave off American criticism while allowing the militants to retain their sanctuaries. While this may well have been true, recent events in Pakistan seem to have forced a strategic shift in the Pakistani mindset.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26888/pub_detail.asp

READY, WILLING, AND ABLE. By Thomas Donnelly, AEI Resident Fellow. Article published in The Weekly Standard. September 24, 2007

In the wake of last week's Iraq-related developments in Washington, the strongest quasi-respectable argument available to Democrats who want to oppose President Bush and General Petraeus while sounding responsible is the claim that a troop drawdown larger than the one they propose is needed to "rebalance risk"--that is, that the surge in Iraq has made us more vulnerable elsewhere in the world.

(...) Yet the military logic behind this argument is weak. What are the "other risks to our nation" that are so "unexpected" and would exact such a "devastating cost"? It's a dangerous world and the risks are great, but our ability to respond is likewise great. Consider the threats the Pentagon regards as most real. A crisis across the Taiwan Strait or even a Chinese attack would call for the deployment of naval and air power--capabilities not much employed in Iraq. Suppose we collected "actionable" intelligence on Osama bin Laden's whereabouts. We'd launch air and missile strikes and perhaps a special operations raid. Again, not really a problem. Even a North Korean invasion would initially demand the strike power of naval and air forces in support of South Korea's large, well-equipped, and well-trained land forces.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26806/pub_detail.asp

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

A CONVERSATION ON RUSSIA WITH SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR: Russia, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chemical Weapons. A Foreign Policy Studies Event. Brookings Institution, October 8, 2007

Russia's path forward since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been a turbulent mix of openness and retrenchment. In his remarks, Senator Lugar, who recently returned from Russia, will examine the prospects for progress at the October 12 meeting in Moscow of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates with their Russian counterparts, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Lugar discussed the agenda, including the U.S. proposed missile defense system in central Europe, non-proliferation and energy security. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/1008lugar/20071008.pdf>

UPGRADING AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE ARAB WORLD; Middle East, Islamic World, Democracy Promotion. Steven Heydemann, Associate Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace. Saban Center Analysis Paper. October 2007

Authoritarianism in the Arab world is not what it used to be. Indeed, it might well be stronger, more flexible, and more resilient than ever, despite the best efforts of the United States, its European Union partners, and Arab democrats to bring about sustained and systematic political reform over the past two decades. While U.S. conceptions of Arab authoritarianism and U.S. strategies for promoting democratic reform have remained largely unchanged during this period, Arab regimes have not stood still. They have adapted by re-organizing strategies of governance to adjust to new global, regional, and domestic circumstances. Autocrats have not simply fallen back on coercion to fend off pressures for change—though repression remains a visible and potent element in the arsenal of Arab governments. Regimes have turned instead to a process that can best be described as “authoritarian upgrading.”

<http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/10arabworld.aspx>



SHOULD THERE BE A "WAR ON TERROR"? TERRORISM, HOMELAND SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE, U.S. MILITARY. Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy Studies. Published in the the *New Republic Online*, September 24, 2007

Parts one and three of a four-part debate between Philip Gordon and Reuel Marc Gerech, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, about the war on terror.

Six years after the start of President Bush's war on terror, the strategy is failing. Iraq is a terrorist recruitment center, Al Qaeda is reorganizing along the Afghan-Pakistan border, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large, America's standing in the world is at an all-time low, Hamas and Hezbollah are growing in strength, Iran is increasingly defiant, and democracy, far from being "on the march," is in retreat. It's true that the U.S. homeland has not been attacked since 2001, which is obviously an important accomplishment and good news—but terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world have been more than twice as numerous in the six years since 9/11 as in the six years preceding it.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0924terrorism_gordon.aspx

CLONING HIZBALLAH: EASIER SAID THAN DONE; Israel, Terrorism, Middle East, Arab-Israeli relations. Terree Haidet, Federal Executive Fellow 2006-2007, Foreign Policy Studies. The Brookings Institution. August 2007

Hizballah's performance in the "Summer War" between Israel and Hizballah in July-August 2006 has been touted as an effective new model of war fighting that will likely be emulated throughout the Middle East and the Muslim world. Replicating Hizballah's performance on the battlefield, however, is likely to be more difficult than many imagine. The Hizballah military model is a product of special circumstances that pertained in Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s and may not be applicable to many other situations. As a result, attempts to copy Hizballah are likely to result in a profusion of different imitations exhibiting varying degrees of military effectiveness each of which would have to be addressed on a case by case basis.

<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2007/08middleeast/08middleeast.pdf>

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DURING AND AFTER BUSH. By Thomas Carothers. Publisher: Carnegie Endowment



Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.

Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, *U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush*, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.

Full Text (PDF):

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_promotion_after_bush_final.pdf

SIX YEARS LATER: ASSESSING LONG-TERM THREATS, RISKS AND THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD. By Jessica Tuchman Mathews. Testimony before the House Oversight Committee's National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, October 10, 2007

Even with the amazing amount of money and energy that's been spent, and so far lives lost on military engagements, homeland security, intelligence since 9/11, there remains somewhat of an inescapable sense that our national security policy may be adrift.

We have rising extremism, gathering terrorism storm clouds. There's a question about whether or not al Qaeda will have a resurgence in Pakistan. There are innumerable anti-American attitudes. And more than six years after September 11th, we still really don't have a bipartisan consensus on a comprehensive long-term strategy to combat the grave threat that exists or to put those threats in context, assess the priorities and move forward.

In the words of one of our panelists today, we have yet to act with the burst of creativity that was the trademark of the United States at the beginning of the Cold War. We have studies that have been commissioned, including the work of the 9/11 commission. Analyses have been offered. Strategies have been published. The hard work of formulating and forging and implementing a bipartisan national security strategy, however, still remains lacking.

Transcript (PDF):

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/jtm_testimony2007-10-10.pdf

THE SURGE IN IRAQ HAS FAILED. By Jessica Tuchman Mathews. Carnegie Endowment. Policy Outlook No. 38, September 2007



The surge the president of the United States launched last January has failed. By tacitly conceding that there has been no political progress in Iraq since then, Mr. Bush admits as much, but asks for more time. He raises some important fears (and some wildly exaggerated ones) of the consequences of withdrawal. What he has said nothing about are the positive reasons to keep on trying. That is what the upcoming debate must address: more time to achieve what?

The purpose of the surge was an enlarged security force so that, as the president said, over time, "daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress." That progress was to include a raft of fundamental political changes. Al Qaeda was a relatively minor factor. ("As we make these changes, we will continue to pursue al Qaeda.... Al Qaeda is still active in Iraq.") Until midsummer, the administration insisted that the escalated military effort was not to reduce violence per se, but to reduce it because political reconciliation would follow.

Full Text (PDF): http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/po38_iraq_surge_final.pdf

CATO

DOUBLESPEAK AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM. By Timothy Lynch. CATO Briefing Paper no. 98. September 6, 2006

Five years have passed since the catastrophic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Those attacks ushered in the war on terror. Since some high-ranking government officials and pundits are now referring to the war on terror as the "Long War" or "World War III," because its duration is not clear, now is an appropriate time to take a few steps back and examine the disturbing new vocabulary that has emerged from this conflict.

One of the central insights of George Orwell's classic novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* concerned the manipulative use of language, which he called "newspeak" and "doublethink," and which we now call "doublespeak" and "Orwellian." Orwell was alarmed by government propaganda and the seemingly rampant use of euphemisms and halftruths—and he conveyed his discomfort with such tactics to generations of readers by using vivid examples in his novel. Despite our general awareness of the tactic, government officials routinely use doublespeak to expand, or at least maintain, their power.



The purpose of this paper is not to criticize any particular policy initiative. Reasonable people can honestly disagree about what needs to be done to combat the terrorists who are bent on killing Americans. However, a conscientious discussion of our policy options must begin with a clear understanding of what our government is actually doing and what it is really proposing to do next. The aim here is to enhance the understanding of both policymakers and the interested lay public by exposing doublespeak.

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp98.pdf>

ARE CIVIL LIBERTIES AT RISK IN THE WAR ON TERROR? Cato Policy Report, September/October 2007

What is conservative about President Bush's expansion of executive powers in the war on terror? Some conservatives blast the president's warrantless surveillance program, his designation of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, and other recent controversies as attacks on limited government. Others defend those moves as necessary to protect Americans from violent attack. Bruce Fein, a deputy attorney general under Ronald Reagan and current chairman of the American Freedom Agenda, and Andrew McCarthy, director of the Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, debated the question "Are Civil Liberties at Risk in the War on Terror?" at a Cato Policy Forum on May 24.

http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n5/cpr29n5-4.html

CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

THREATS AND CAPACITIES. By Daniel N. Nelson. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. October 2007

Security is "a dynamic balance between threats and capacities. For individuals, imminent threat can be balanced with the assistance of friends and family, or by adding financial or physical resources. Threats can also be ameliorated by actions that reduce others' insecurity, reciprocal actions, and negotiated agreements. If states are threatened, they can retreat, give up territory or resources, or offer aid and assistance. They can also negotiate, seek arbitration from a third party, appeal to multilateral organizations, and talk. Threatened states can, of course, also summon powerful allies with large armies or imply asymmetric countermeasures."

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/threats_and_capacities/

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

THE EMBASSY OF THE FUTURE. A Report by George L. Argyros, Marc Grossman, and Felix G. Rohatyn. Center for Strategic and International Studies., October 15, 2007

The truest test of the value to our nation of the U.S. diplomatic presence abroad is whether the people we ask to represent us effectively promote American values and interests.



Diplomacy is a vital tool of national security. The aim of this report is to make the diplomatic pursuit of U.S. interests abroad even more effective than it is today. Our diplomats and those who support them must have the right tools and capacity to do their work. This is an urgent national priority. Transnational threats, including terrorism, put U.S. citizens and national interests at risk. Potential competitor nations are emerging on the global stage. Anti-Americanism can have lethal consequences for our nation and its citizens. Operating in a higher threat environment is part of today's diplomatic job.

(...)This project is called the “Embassy of the Future,” but “embassy” is meant in a broad sense, of which embassy buildings are only one dimension. The commission underscores that the U.S. presence and our diplomacy are about our people — Foreign Service, Civil Service, Foreign Service nationals and other locally employed staff — and their capacity to carry out their mission.


http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/embassy_of_the_future.pdf

THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE BILL AND THE TURKISH REACTION IN IRAQ. Anthony H. Cordesman. Report. CSIS. October 15, 2007

Tragic as the fate of the Armenians may have been in the aftermath of World War I, the fact remains that the issue is more than half a century old. Turkish-Armenian conciliation might serve an important purpose, as might any effort to reconcile Armenians, Turks, and Azerbaijanis. The dead, however, are not grateful, and stirring up new sources of ethnic and sectarian tension are the last thing the region needs.

This is particularly true when the end result is to create problems for the living. Pushing Turkey to be more hostile to Armenia is scarcely a useful goal, but Iraq and the Kurds are affected as well — along with vital US interests. As a result, the net impact of the Armenian genocide bill may well be to create yet another pointless regional source of anger against the US — this time coming from the Congress instead of the Administration.

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/101507_the_armenian_genocide_bill_and_the_turkish_reaction.pdf



MUSLIM INTEGRATION: CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. CSIS Report. September 20, 2007.

As part of its ongoing Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC dedicated its seventh meeting in the series to Muslim integration and assimilation. In partnership with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, Germany, CSIS hosted a two-day event entitled, “The Transatlantic Dialogue on Muslims in Europe: Dealing with, and Looking Beyond, the Terrorist Threat ” to question and explore many of the conclusions Europeans and Americans have drawn about Muslim communities in their own countries.

As a summary to the meeting, CSIS commissioned six papers by U.S. and European experts on immigration, demographics, and integration policy, in order to further explore the situation facing Muslim communities on both sides of the Atlantic. Many of the papers reveal the sometimes shaky foundations upon which European and U.S. policymakers are crafting integration policies. More importantly, the report also shows that despite efforts to improve the West’s collective understating of Islam and Muslim integration in American and European societies, many countries remain ill-equipped to fully incorporate these growing groups into society at large in terms of economic advancement, social mobility, and political participation. As such, the report highlights some of these shortcomings, puts forth a more accurate picture of European and U.S. Muslim communities, and presents recommendations for improving the status quo.

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf

NOT THE SAME PAKISTAN. Teresita Schaffer. CSIS Commentary. September 18, 2007

Six years ago this week, the United States launched a new relations hip with Pakistan – or more precisely with its president, General Pervez Musharraf. Today, Musharraf is fighting for his political life, and the U.S. government is trying to help him stay in charge. Neither he nor the United States can restore the relatively open government he has run since taking power in 1999. The United States needs to manage the transition to an eventual post-Musharraf setup, so as to protect America’s enduring interests in this volatile part of the world.

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/091807_schaffer_commentary.pdf



THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE SECURITY FORCES OF IRAQ [JONES REPORT]. Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. September 6, 2007. 08AD014

General James L. Jones, USMC (Ret.) presented this report to the U.S. House and Senate Committees on Armed Forces. The report addresses the “readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces to assume responsibility for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, their ability to deny international terrorists safe haven, their ability to bring greater security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the next 12 to 18 months, and their ability to bring an end to sectarian violence to achieve national reconciliation.”

<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/isf.pdf> [pdf format, 153 pages]



AMERICA’S LAST CHANCE IN IRAQ: CHANGING US STRATEGY TO MEET IRAQ’S REAL NEEDS. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. CSIS. September 4, 2007



The US cannot impose its will on Iraq. It is dealing with a sovereign government. America does, however, retain immense influence because of the role its military forces still play, its role as a major aid donor, and the potential value of its advisory services and help in dealing with outside powers. This gives the US one last opportunity to help Iraq achieve some degree of security and stability.

The attached report examines US options and makes detailed suggestions for changing or improving the current US strategy and US military and civil programs. It highlights the fact that the most important

US task is to reinforce its efforts to push Iraq's leaders toward political conciliation and compromise.

<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraqstrategyperfin9-4-07.pdf>

RUSSIA AND GEORGIA: THE MESSAGE BEHIND THE MISSILE? Cory Welt. CSIS Commentary, August 27, 2007

Last week the Russian ambassador to the United Nations had some creative explaining to do. On August 6, an air-to-ground anti-radar missile burrowed into the earth in Georgia, Russia's neighbor and the object of a trade and transport embargo. According to the Georgian government, an unidentified aircraft flew into Georgia from Russia, firing a missile at or close to a newly installed mobile radar station located near the border of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia (but near a part of this de facto Russian protectorate under Georgian control).

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/070827_welt_commentary.pdf



IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, THE AL QUDS FORCE, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). August 16, 2007. 07AD922

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was formed after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to protect the new government's Islamic order. It has since evolved "to be a major political, military, and economic force in Iran." This report describes the various parts and interactions of the IRGC, and who it supports with warfare and covert operations both covertly and openly.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf

[pdf format, 18 pages]



CENTURY FOUNDATION (TCF)

ENDING THE IMPASSE OVER KOSOVO. Morton Abramowitz, Jacques Rupnik. Published in the *Europe's World*, 10/15/2007

The future of Kosovo has become a dangerous international muddle, and Russia has succeeded in turning the issue into a threat both to Balkan stability and the transatlantic relationship.

The people of Kosovo have been told since 1999, particularly by the US, that they would get independence. In April, the US and the EU supported a draft UN Security Council resolution endorsing UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan of supervised independence for Kosovo with strong protection for the Serb minority. In the face of Serbia's strong opposition, backed effectively by a Russian veto threat, the West retreated and now appears divided and unsure about how to proceed. With the Security Council stalemated and to preserve unity the West opted for a 120 day period of resumed negotiations under the auspices of the six-nation contact group (including Russia) but with no agreement on what happens after negotiations end. Having long declared that partition of Kosovo was out of the question some senior western officials are now murmuring about it as a compromise. Welcome back to the Balkans.

<http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1706>

THE SYRIAN WHITE PAPERS. Moshe Ma'oz , David W. Lesch , The Century Foundation, 9/5/2007

In a pair of new papers, The Century Foundation's Prospects for Peace Initiative offers a fresh look at Syria's role in the region and its relationships with the United States and Israel. In their papers, preeminent Middle East experts David W. Lesch and Moshe Ma'oz examine the past and present conditions and issues that shape Syria's relationships with its neighbors, Israel, and the United States.

In "Missed Opportunities: Cooperation Confrontation in the U.S. – Syrian Relationship," David Lesch reviews the relationship between the United States and Syria, particularly since 1990, and concludes that there have been a number of missed opportunities—spurned opportunities, in the case of the Bush administration—for dialogue and cooperation with Syria on suppressing Islamic terrorism, making peace with Israel, and creating political space in Lebanon. He blames neoconservative ideological hardliners in the administration and their allies in Congress for the sharp turn from constructive engagement to a complete disengagement. He says that while there have been hints of a possible softening of this policy in recent months, there is little evidence for thinking that there will be dramatic change in policy under the current administration.

http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/lesch_syria.pdf

In **"Syria's Role in the Region: Media, Peace Maker or Aggressor,"** Moshe Ma'oz writes that the back-to-back elections of George W. Bush as U.S. president in 2000 and of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister in 2001 marked a crucial change in the U.S.-Syria-Israel triangular relation. The American occupation of Iraq in 2003 further aggravated these relations and contributed to a tightening of Syria's ties with Iran and Hezbollah. He warns that if the United States and Israel continue their refusal to engage Syrian President Bashar, he is likely to strengthen those ties and, in a worst-case scenario, may be dragged into war with Israel. Ma'oz concludes that if Bashar believes he can achieve Syria's strategic goals of regaining the Golan Heights, accruing American and Arab financial support, and influencing Lebanon, he would be prepared to contain Hezbollah's military power and relax relations with Iran.

http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/maoz_syria.pdf

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

DUMB AND DUMBER. Author: Andy Webb-Vidal. *Foreign Policy*, October 11, 2007

This *Foreign Policy* article discusses Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez, stating what really ought to concern us about Chávez is not his strident anti-Americanism, his burgeoning friendship with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or his flirtation with nuclear technology, but his dangerous incompetence.

Unlike the security-weary Venezuelans queuing at Caracas's Simón Bolívar International Airport for a regular American Airlines connection to Miami, travelers booked on the weekly Iran Air Flight 745 to Tehran enjoy a refreshingly different experience. On Saturday afternoons, the Iran Air passengers are whisked past the X-ray machines and immigration

control straight to their seats. Similar consideration is provided to those on the Friday inbound flight, the so-called “ghost plane”: no passport stamps, no baggage checks. (...) The mystery that shrouds the Caracas-Tehran air link is symbolic of the sinister but also bizarre relationship that is being swiftly cemented between Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s quixotic president, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s anti-American leader.
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/14466/fp.html>

KEEPING ‘BOTTOM-UP’ FROM BOTTOMING OUT. Prepared by Greg Bruno. CFR, October 9, 2007

Suicide blasts targeting Sunni tribal leaders cooperating with the U.S. military pose a major challenge to enlisting local sheiks in the war against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sheik Maawia Naji Jebara, leader of the Salahuddin Awakening Council, was killed in a roadside bombing near Samarra October 4. A second Salahuddin leader, Thamer Ibrahim Atallah, came under fire (al-Jazeera) when a bomber detonated explosives outside his home in Baiji five days later. Atallah survived, but the assassination attempts may have hit their targets nonetheless. Two days before the attack on Jebara, the largest Shiite political party called on the Pentagon to “abandon its recruitment” of Sunnis into the Iraqi police. “Stop this adventure,” Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s United Iraqi Alliance declared in a statement.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/14421/keeping_bottomup_from_bottoming_out.html

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

REVITALIZING U.S. EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN. By Lisa Curtis and James Phillips. Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #2076. October 15, 2007



Afghanistan is a crucial front in the global struggle against the al-Qaeda terrorist network and Islamic radicalism. The United States-led coalition was unable to transform an overwhelming military victory in 2001 into a stable postwar political situation because of Afghanistan's fractious politics and shattered economic, state, and civil society infrastructures; a minimalist American approach to committing military forces and foreign aid; Pakistan's failure to crack down decisively on Taliban forces that have taken refuge in Pashtun tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border; the Afghan government's failure to expand its authority and deliver services to rural Afghans; and a shortfall of economic aid, due in part to many countries' failure to fulfill their foreign aid pledges to Afghanistan.

http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/upload/bg_2076.pdf

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. By Lisa Curtis. Testimony delivered on October 10, 2007, before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.

Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan will continue to be one of America's most important foreign policy objectives for several years to come. The range and

complexity of issues involved in our relations – eliminating global terrorist networks, countering the rising tide of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan, securing and safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear assets, and facilitating the transition to civilian-led democracy – require focused and sustained U.S. attention and deft diplomacy.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/tst101107a.cfm?renderforprint=1>

GORDON BROWN'S WRONG MOVE ON IRAQ. By Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1661 October 12, 2007

Retreat is not a word that features prominently in the lexicon of British military history. Over the last 200 years, Great Britain has waged more wars and won more conflicts than any other nation in the world. From the Falkland Islands to Sudan to the North West Frontier, British soldiers have left their mark with a distinguished record of heroism, sacrifice, and bravery. That tradition continues today in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where more than 250 British servicemen have laid down their lives for Queen and Country.



(...) Prime Minister Gordon Brown's announcement this week that Britain will reduce her troop strength in Iraq, from 5,500 to just 2,500 by spring 2008, sends all the wrong signals at a time when the U.S. and the U.K. are engaged in a global war against Islamic extremists. Brown's decision represents a spectacular turnaround from his declaration in August ruling out a timetable for the withdrawal of British forces. Sources in the Ministry of Defense are already suggesting that all British soldiers may be removed from the country by the end of next year.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/upload/wm_1661.pdf

NEW HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY MISSES THE MARK. By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1659. October 10, 2007

In the wake of 9/11, the Administration published a strategy for keeping the nation safe, free, and prosperous in the face of the threat of transnational terrorism. As the nation's first homeland security strategy, it was not bad. It respected the principle of federalism and other constitutional imperatives; fostered a notion of shared responsibility between all levels of government, the private sector, and individual citizens; recognized the necessity of cooperating with friends and allies around the world; and called for new, enduring programs to effectively combat terrorism.



This week, the White House published a new version of the strategy that obfuscates rather than clarifies the government's homeland security mission. Instead of promulgating a new approach, which is largely unnecessary, the Administration and Congress should continue the strategy of strengthening the national instruments needed to combat terrorism while encouraging economic growth and protecting individual constitutional liberties.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/wm_1659.pdf

HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA SHOULD CONFRONT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM. By Sally McNamara. Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #2073 October 2, 2007

The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom

Through immigration and demographic changes, Europe's Muslim population has grown exponentially in recent years. Because of this, several experts and commentators have predicted doomsday scenarios for Europe, forecasting majority Muslim populations in major European cities within a decade.

(...) However, this is not just a European problem. Knowing that Europe is a logistical and fundraising base for both domestic and international terrorist plots, including the September 11 attacks, both the United States and Europe need to confront al-Qaeda and other extremist groups head-on. The atrocities committed by Islamic terrorists in Washington, New York, Madrid, and London were attacks on the principles of freedom and liberty that define Western civilization. Al-Qaeda and its allies have targeted innocent civilians in Europe, America, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Central Asia and will continue to advance their borderless war on Western values and attempt to break the West's will to fight an asymmetric "long war."

A united transatlantic response and commitment to what is currently an indeterminable timetable for victory is not only necessary, but essential if Europe and America are to confront the domestic and global network of extremists intent on annihilating the West and its allies.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/upload/bg_2073.pdf



IRAN: TIME FOR SANCTIONS OF THE WILLING. By Peter Brookes. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1643. September 26, 2007

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to the United Nations this week shines a spotlight on Iran as a growing menace to international security—from its burgeoning nuclear program to its sponsorship of international terrorism to its support of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the failure of diplomacy to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, major powers should work outside of the U.N. framework to impose tough economic sanctions on Tehran.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/upload/wm_1643.pdf

HUDSON INSTITUTE

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Written Statement of Husain Haqqani, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University and Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives. October 10, 2007

Pakistan has been an ally of the United States during the cold war, in the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and currently in the global war against terror. Each period of close U.S.-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides. The U.S. provided large amounts of aid and showered praise

on Pakistan's military rulers during the phase of strategic cooperation, only to turn off the flow of aid when circumstances changed. Pakistan's military rulers failed to keep their own end of the bargain in most cases and failed to tell the Pakistani people the truth about why the quid pro quo came to an end, leading ordinary Pakistanis to hate the United States notwithstanding the significant amounts of economic and military aid previously disbursed.
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5209&pubType=IntSec

TEACHING TERROR: VIOLENCE IS INHERENT IN SAUDI EDUCATION. By Nina Shea. September 17, 2007

Saudi Arabia now supplies jihad fighters for conflicts near and far, often in numbers far disproportionate to its size. As new statistics become available, one thing becomes ever clearer: The Saudi kingdom is the world's leading exporter of suicide bombers and terrorists.
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=5121&pubType=IntSec

INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, INC. (IFPA)

A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY NATIONAL SECURITY. 37th IFPA-Fletcher National Security Conference, Washington, D.C. September 26-27, 2007

Building on previous conferences in this series, the 37th IFPA-Fletcher National Security Conference provided a timely, high-level forum for presentation and analysis of the U.S. Navy's New Maritime Strategy. It brought together a unique mix of expertise from government and the private sector; from the civilian and military communities; from think tanks, industry, and academia; and from the United States and abroad.

Topics included:

- The new multidimensional security setting that encompasses the simultaneous need to facilitate commerce in an era of globalization, while halting illicit traffic in weapons and preventing terrorist operations.
- New mission areas, including WMD interdiction, missile defense, cyber-operations, special operations, humanitarian/disaster relief and assistance, and counterterrorism operations on the high seas.
- Developing enhanced cooperative relationships with international/coalition partners as well as with the private sector, extending from shipping companies to port authorities, in support of maritime security based on greater maritime domain awareness.

<http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/>

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

SERBIA: MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE PRESEVO VALLEY. ICG Europe Report N°186. 16 October 2007

Southern Serbia's Albanian-majority Presevo Valley is one of the rare conflict resolution success stories in the former Yugoslavia. Outwardly, it is increasingly normal, with no major incidents in over three years. Yet, tensions linger: massive unemployment is still the single largest problem but the shadow of Kosovo's future status darkens the political landscape. How Kosovo's final status is determined in the next months will have a profound impact. If formal partition or large-scale violence accompanies independence, the peace could unravel; in a worst case scenario, ethnic cleansing in southern Serbia would be accompanied by significant, cross-boundary, two-way refugee flows. All parties – local Albanian politicians, the Serbian government and the international community – need to work with greater urgency on developing the region's economy and ensuring that developments in Kosovo do not disrupt its peaceful progress.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5126&l=1>

Full

report:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/186_serbia_maintaining_peace_in_the_presevo_valley.pdf

HIZBOLLAH AND THE LEBANESE CRISIS. ICG, Middle East Report N°69. 10 October 2007

The Lebanese crisis has receded from the headlines but has not gone away. Today, all eyes are on the presidential election, the latest arena in the ongoing struggle between pro- and anti-government forces. Yet even if a compromise candidate is found, none of the country's underlying problems will have been addressed, chief among them the status of Hizbollah's weapons. If the election is to be more than a mere prelude to the next showdown, all parties and their external allies need to move away from maximalist demands and agree on a package deal that accepts for now Hizbollah's armed status while constraining the ways in which its weapons can be used.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5113&l=1>

Full report:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/69_hizbollah_and_the_lebanese_crisis.pdf

NEPAL'S FRAGILE PEACE PROCESS. ICG Asia Briefing N°68. 28 September 2007

A Maoist walk-out from government on 18 September 2007 and mainstream political parties' intransigence are threatening elections for Nepal's Constituent Assembly (CA) scheduled for 22 November. Although a compromise to bring the Maoists back on board is possible, the heightened tensions add to longstanding problems including weak political will, poor governance and security, and continued claims for representation by marginalised groups. The Maoists could contest elections from outside government but polls without their participation would be meaningless, and they retain the capacity to make the country ungovernable if they oppose the



process. Critical elements of the 2006 peace deal, such as security sector reform, remain to be tackled, while implementation and monitoring of past agreements have been minimal. Primary responsibility for steering the process lies with the mainstream parties, which need to demonstrate coherence, commitment and a will to reform their own behaviour if lasting peace is to be established.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b68_nepal_s_fragile_peac_e_process.pdf

MEMORIAL INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (MIPT)

TERRORISM: WHAT'S COMING - THE MUTATING THREAT. **Edited by James O Ellis III. Memorial Institute for the Prevention of** **Terrorism, 2007**

MIPT has gathered the world's foremost experts to examine the phenomenon of modern terrorism. With creativity and insight and a deep understanding of social, political, tactical and policy issues, these prominent thinkers illuminate a complex and often misunderstood phenomenon.

<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Terrorism-Whats-Coming-The-Mutating-Threat.pdf>



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)

MOVING THE U.S.–ROK ALLIANCE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY. INSS Special Report. NDU, September 2007.



For over half a century, the U.S. bilateral alliance structure in East Asia has served as the foundation for regional peace and stability. The U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance has been a central link in this alliance structure. The alliance has deterred the outbreak of a second Korean war and contributed to South Korea's emergence as a world-class economic power and trading nation.

While the primary purpose of the alliance remains the deterrence of North Korea, threat perceptions in both the United States and Republic of Korea have changed since the late 1990s. The key issue confronting the alliance today is the strategic dissonance regarding North Korea, but other challenges face the alliance: the rise of China, threats to international order posed by terrorists, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the need to restructure the alliance to meet changing international and domestic realities in both countries.

In considering how best to meet these looming challenges, adherence to the status quo is not a viable option. Yet alternative future pathways pose stark choices of their own. Conceivably, four future scenarios present themselves: alliance termination, alliance without U.S. presence, alliance modification, or alliance transformation.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Research/SRsep07.pdf>

THE COUNTRY TEAM: RESTRUCTURING AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF ENGAGEMENT. By Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr. Strategic Forum No.227. NDU. September 2007



U.S. Embassies are confronting unprecedented challenges that do not fall neatly into diplomacy's traditional categories of political, economic, and consular affairs. A rising tide of transnational threats coupled with weak governance in fragile states poses serious risks that demand concerted action.

U.S. Embassy staffs—our Country Teams—are ideally positioned as the first lines of engagement to face challenges to U.S. national interests. Yet effective interagency collaboration is often a hit-or-miss proposition, due to diluted authority, antiquated organizational structures, and insufficient resources.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF227/SF227.pdf>

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY No.47. Fourth Quarter 2007. NDU



This issue of Joint Force Quarterly takes a look at China and Sino-U.S. engagement, as well as the contextual elements of Chinese security developments, from force modernization to managing internal dissent. We begin with the past and the Middle Kingdom's Confucian social ethics and move to contemporary behavior in a rapidly changing global environment replete with a burgeoning human population, dwindling resources, environmental damage and climate change, Malthusian disease vectors, weapons of mass destruction, the information revolution, and Muslim extremism. Within this complex tapestry, a range of authors exhibits significant variance of comfort with the

intentions of a political regime whose deliberations are secretive and arguably Machiavellian. The final author then takes a critical view of the U.S. Defense Department's annual evaluation of Chinese military modernization, after which follows our Special Feature section, focusing on the largest American regional combatant command in the world: U.S. Pacific Command.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i47.htm

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH INITIATIVE: FUTURE OPTIONS FOR NATO. By Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk. Defense Horizons Number 58. NDU, September 2007.



The adage that "NATO works in practice better than in theory" has become a convenient excuse for not reaching much needed comprehensive agreements on civil-military cooperation, from the top levels down to face-to-face relationships in the field.

More than enough operational experience has been gained to indicate that it is past time to replace expedient constructs with systemic, institutionalized procedures for cooperation on what, as is widely agreed, must be accomplished quickly and effectively.

The last remaining core task of NATO transformation is to link the Alliance's military capabilities effectively with the indispensable nonmilitary elements of power essential to successful conflict resolution. Failure to finish that work hampers and at times frustrates success in the field by operational personnel, civilians, and military across all organizations who are simply trying to get the job done.

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_58.pdf

NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI)

SECURING THE BOMB 2007. By Matthew Bunn. Project on Managing The Atom Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Commissioned By the Nuclear Threat Initiative. September 2007

Securing the Bomb 2007, commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, finds a dangerous gap in efforts to thwart nuclear terrorism and calls for urgent global campaign to reduce the risk.

The new report, commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.



(...) Preventing nuclear terrorism must be a front-burner issue for leaders at the highest level of governments around the world every day. And so far it is not.”

http://www.nti.org/e_research/securingthebomb07.pdf

PEW

PETRAEUS' PROPOSALS DRAW PUBLIC APPROVAL, BUT FAIL TO LIFT WAR SUPPORT; Increases in Optimism Are Mostly Limited to Republicans. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. September 18, 2007

The mostly stable opinions about the war and U.S. policies toward Iraq are consistent with this assessment. In the current survey, a 47% plurality says the United States will probably or definitely fail to achieve its goals in Iraq, which is largely unchanged from July (49%). Most important, opinions about whether to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq have not changed at all over the past two months: 54% believe U.S. forces should be brought home as soon as possible while 39% say U.S. troops should remain in Iraq until the situation is stable.

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/596/petraeus-proposals-draw-public-approval-but-fail-to-lift-war-support>


WHAT COULD CONVINCe AMERICANS TO STAY THE COURSE IN IRAQ? The Strength of Conflicting Opinions May Shade Public Reactions to the Petraeus Report. By Andrew Kohut, President, and Jodie T. Allen, Senior Editor, Pew Research Center. September 5, 2007

No question looms larger on the national scene than how Americans will react to the progress reported by Iraq commander Gen. David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker when they testify before Congress next week. A look at the course of opinions about the Iraq conflict over the past few years suggests that two crucial but opposing factors in American thinking will likely shape the public's response. The first is the growing perception that the war is a failing enterprise. The second is the public's continuing awareness of the risks associated with a hasty retreat.

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/586/stay-the-course-iraq>

RAND

THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP IN THE UNITED STATES: DOES IT EXIST, WHY, AND DOES IT MATTER? By: Thomas S. Szayna, Kevin F. McCarthy, et.al. RAND Monograph, October 2007




What is the potential for a divergence in views among civilian and military elites (sometimes referred to as the civil-military gap) to undermine military effectiveness? The authors propose a five-stage analytical framework that encompasses the main areas where a civil-military gap might have an impact. Using an existing survey-based dataset (prepared and administered by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies) to inform this framework, they find a variety of differences among the military and civilian respondents. However, most of those differences disappeared when the authors focused on the attitudes that are pertinent to civilian control of the military and military effectiveness. The

major exception to this pattern related to such military personnel policies as women in combat, the military's policies with regard to sexual harassment, and whether gays should serve in the military. In contrast, most of the other measures of military effectiveness appear to be influenced more by views of the military threat facing the country and views of foreign policy — where all military officers and civilians share similar perspectives. Overall, concerns about a civil-military gap and possible erosion of the principle of civilian control of the military appear to be overstated.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG379.pdf


NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES FOR NETWORKED TERRORISTS; Assessing the Value of Information and Communication Technologies to Modern Terrorist Organizations. By: Bruce W. Don, David R. Frelinger, Scott Gerwehr, Eric Landree, Brian A. Jackson. RAND October 2007.

Understanding how terrorists conduct successful operations is critical to countering them. Terrorist organizations use a wide range of network technologies as they plan and stage attacks. This book explores the role that



these communications and computer technologies play and the net effect of their use, the purpose and manner in which the technology is used, the operational actions of terrorists and possible responses of security forces. The authors conclude that future network technologies modestly improve terrorist group efficiency, particularly for their supporting activities, but do not dramatically improve their attack operations. Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical; developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, exploiting the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations are more promising options.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR454.pdf

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN TERRORISM INSURANCE: EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD. By: Lloyd Dixon, Robert J. Lempert, et.al. RAND Monograph. October 2007




Concerned that the unavailability of terrorism insurance would impede economic recovery and hinder growth after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA will sunset at the end of 2007 unless Congress takes further action. This book examines the implications of allowing TRIA to expire and of enhancements aimed at improving the availability and affordability of insurance for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) attacks. The analysis takes a systematic approach to addressing the deep uncertainties that underlie the market for terrorism insurance and is the first study of TRIA to consider not just taxpayer payments through the program but also the cost of government compensation and assistance following a terrorist attack when analyzing the program's effect on government spending. The authors conclude that taxpayer cost is lower with TRIA than without TRIA across a broad range of assumptions about attack frequency and the proportion of uninsured losses that are compensated postattack. The analysis also cautions policymakers to be careful when modifying the program to better address NBCR attacks: Simply expanding the program to require insurers to offer NBCR coverage may not achieve the desired outcomes. The authors identify program changes that will produce positive results for both NBCR and conventional attacks that are robust to key underlying uncertainties.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG679.pdf

SMALL ARMS SURVEY

THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN SUDAN: A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW. By Mareike Schomerus. Small Arms Survey, September 2007

The ongoing peace talks between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, have created renewed international interest in the conflict in northern Uganda.


While the negotiations have proved extremely difficult, they have opened up new channels of communication with the LRA. The talks have also allowed the affected population of Eastern and Western Equatoria, South



Sudan, to voice their grievances against the LRA and raise questions about the conduct of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Sudan. This study examines the military history of the LRA in Sudan, the current prospects for ending the conflict, and the main challenges facing the peace talks.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%208%20LRA.pdf

SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies. Web posted August 28, 2007. 08AD015



This report provides new and updated information on small arms production, stockpiles, transfers, and measures. This edition has a special focus on transfer controls, and its thematic section explores the issue of urban violence based on case studies in Burundi and Brazil. The report also has chapters on “lessons learned from the tracing of ammunition, the relationship between gun prices and conflict, and the role of small arms in South Sudan.”

This is the seventh annual report, and it is the primary source of information and analysis on small arms and armed violence. This report is available in Arabic, English, French, German, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. [Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Text by Chapters:

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2007.html> [various pagings]

STANLEY FOUNDATION

RESTRUCTURING AMERICA'S GROUND FORCES: BETTER, NOT BIGGER. Frank G. Hoffman and Steven Metz. The Stanley Foundation, September 2007



The core defense debate of our time is how to make the US military more effective at irregular warfare (IW) and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in weak or failing states while still retaining some aspect of its strategic capabilities for major power warfare. Given the current global security system and likely future American strategy, the configuration that provides the best balance is one with ground forces about the size of today's, with the Marines and the Army organized around a geographic division of labor, but with enough cross-training that each service could, in an emergency, operate outside its normal region. While the ground forces must retain the capability for large-scale conventional combat, they clearly should focus most of their efforts on the requirements of IW/SSTR. This may not be the force we would prefer to have in 2020, but it is the most realistic one for the coming decade.

http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/Metz_HoffmanPAB07.pdf

POLICY MEMO: NEW LEADERSHIP TRENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. The Stanley Foundation. Memo. September 2007

Southeast Asia is in the midst of a gradual, but potentially profound, transformation in its leadership trends and domestic political change. These changes and trends, both domestic and regional, have significant implications for US policy. And they offer new opportunities for the United States to effectively engage in a strategically important region that all too often receives insufficient attention in Washington.



This Policy Memo expands on four key recommendations:

- Encourage a broader cooperative approach to promoting national reconciliation in Burma.
- Nurture future leaders with more vigorous support of civil society.
- Encourage Southeast Asian corporate philanthropy.

To help strengthen ASEAN leadership as a whole, focus more on institution- and capacity-building and less on individual personalities.

The six-page Policy Memo summarizing the discussion and general recommendations is available here.

http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/other/Jakarta_Policy_Memo_PDF_-_mas.pdf

THE FRAGILITY OF WORLD ORDER: AFTER THE UNIPOLAR MOMENT. The Stanley Foundation. August 2007



The Stanley Foundation-IISS conference examined two scenarios with the greatest potential to disrupt the international order—a "perfect storm" of Middle East conflicts and a financial crisis originating in Asia. The conference discussions assessed the hazards such seismic events could pose as follows:

Middle East "Perfect Storm"

Participants said the only thing worse than the United States attacking Iran would be a US attack on Iran with Tehran still obtaining a nuclear capability, a likely outcome given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear facilities.


In terms of political fallout, a US strike against Iran was seen as a "death knell" for the transatlantic relationship.

An additional risk to the United States is the possibility of seeming to overreact to an Iranian nuclear program that is ultimately shown to be in its infancy or demonstrably civilian.

As tension mounts between Sunni and Shia Muslims, there was fear of potential escalating confrontation and violence, particularly since the sectarian split has interstate as well as intrastate dimensions.


<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pdb/UnipolarFragilityPDB.pdf>

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

STRATEGY, NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND MEANS TO AN END. By Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Sklenka. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. October 15, 2007


The U.S. inability—or unwillingness—to connect strategic ends and appropriate means to accomplish those ends has occurred so often over the past 15 years that one could make a credible argument that it has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of the modern American way of war. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of the relationship among ends, means, and strategy, this paper continues by examining specific cases of U.S. intervention from the previous decade and Operation Iraqi Freedom to demonstrate that when the U.S. commits its military forces, success can only be achieved if clear ends are identified, appropriate means are leveraged against those stated ends, and a coherent strategy is developed to coordinate the ends and means.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB802.pdf>

TURNING ON THE DIME: DIPLOMACY'S ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY. By Anton K. Smith. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, October 12, 2007

The differences in approach and culture between the U.S. Departments of State and Defense are stark despite the fact that these organizations are members of the same team and share related national objectives. Understanding the nature of these differences is key to improving interagency cooperation between the two key agents of our national foreign policy. State's historical role as the nation's lead instrument of foreign policy has eroded since World War II, while Defense has seen its power and influence grow. Our nation's diplomatic efforts aim at exhausting opportunities to secure peace and stability before turning to the option of last resort. Defense is no less pleased than State when diplomatic efforts fail and military force is applied.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB801.pdf>


A CONCEPT AT THE CROSSROADS: RETHINKING THE CENTER OF GRAVITY. By Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph M. Janiczek. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, October 09, 2007

Since the 1980s, the U.S. military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts of Clausewitz. Concomitantly, a tremendous emphasis has been placed in doctrine on the center of gravity (COG) as a central element of campaign planning. The doctrinal definitions of the COG are still imperfect, but the concept arguably serves as an effective tool for focusing military effort to win decisively in major operations or campaigns. Although the American military performs brilliantly in decisive operations, the difficulties it has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that a doctrinal renaissance is in order. This paper examines the

potential for employing the COG concept in areas beyond the realm of decisive operations. After examining the concept's evolution, present doctrinal manifestations, and some previous proposals for future employment, the author opines that the COG's role in American military thinking is flawed and must be reconsidered entirely. To that end, three options are offered for evolving the COG, with a specific recommendation that it would be most effective if removed from doctrine and considered as an abstract concept, rather than a practical one.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB805.pdf>

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY FOR LATIN AMERICA IN THE AGE OF RESENTMENT. By Dr. Gabriel Marcella. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, October 04, 2007.


A healthy Latin America is of critical value to the United States as a global power. It is besieged by a powerful force of resentment engendered by a combination of weak states, social exclusion, criminal violence, and corruption. In the context of attack by radical



populism against democratic values, the United States needs a new grand strategy that addresses the causes rather than the symptoms of the malaise. The author argues that such a strategy must strengthen the effectiveness of the democratic state in providing security, justice, and governance, as well as effectively engender a linkage of the 40 percent of the population presently excluded from the social and economic benefits of democracy to the national and international economy. Unless current trends reverse, Latin American countries will be poor security partners and a continuing menace for international security. The author recommends imaginative courses of action for the grand strategy.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB811.pdf>

EGYPT: SECURITY, POLITICAL, AND ISLAMIST CHALLENGES. By Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, October 01, 2007




This monograph approaches three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counterterrorism. The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. However, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength versus movements divisions that led to the truce are now void as "Al-Qa'idism" continues to plague Egypt. The even more pressing need for democratization has been setback by the security situation. Yet political pressures might threaten the

country's stability more thoroughly, in the longer run, than the sporadic terrorist attacks. Widespread political discontent has been expressed for the last several years and, unless uneven economic conditions improve and greater consensus is achieved, Egypt could move in one of three different directions.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB787.pdf>

TURKMENISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA AFTER NIYAZOV. By Dr. Stephen J. Blank. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 28, 2007



President Sapirmurat Niyazov, the all-powerful leader of Turkmenistan, suddenly died on December 21, 2006. Because Central Asia is a cockpit of great power rivalry and a potential theater in the Global War on Terrorism, no sooner had Niyazov died than the great powers were all in Turkmenistan seeking to influence its future policies away from the neutrality that had been Niyazov's policy. Turkmenistan's importance lies almost exclusively in its large natural gas holdings and proximity to the Caspian Sea and Iran. Because energy is regarded as a strategic asset as much if not more than as a mere lubricant or commodity, Russia, Iran, China, and the United


States have all been visibly engaged in competition for influence there. The outcome of this competition and of the domestic struggle for power will have repercussions throughout Central Asia, if not beyond. The author shows the linkage between energy and security policies in Central Asia and in the policies of the major powers towards Central Asia. Beyond this analysis, he provides recommendations for U.S. policymakers as to how they should conduct themselves in this complex situation.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB791.pdf>

THE EMERGING PATTERN OF GEOPOLITICS. By Dr. Peter W. Rodman. Letort Papers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 26, 2007

Without ignoring the two wars that are currently taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) sought to reframe the debate over security within a global context. Thus Mr. Rodman's address sets contemporary security challenges to the United States within a framework of both an Islamist challenge rising from the Jihadi movement across the Muslim world that mostly finds its expression in terrorism and in the dynamics of the rise and decline of great powers.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB807.pdf>




ASEAN AND ITS SECURITY OFFSPRING: FACING NEW CHALLENGES. By Dr. Sheldon W. Simon. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 19, 2007

Southeast Asian states within ASEAN agree that security relations with the great powers are best achieved by enmeshing the latter in ASEAN procedures. The primary goal of ASEAN is that China, Japan, the United States, and India commit to maintaining Southeast Asia's autonomy, integrity, and prosperity. ASEAN is less successful in resolving conflicts internal to the region including human rights in Burma, transnational terrorism, environmental concerns, human trafficking, and illegal arms trade. Sovereignty protection frequently trumps cooperation on these issues.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB793.pdf>




THE RESERVE POLICIES OF NATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. By Dr. Richard Weitz. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 17, 2007



Throughout the world, military reserves are changing. National governments are transforming the relationships between their active and reserve components, the allocation of roles and responsibilities among reserve forces, and the way they train, equip, and employ reservists. Nations no longer consider their reservists as primarily a strategic asset for mobilization during major wars. This increased reliance on reserve components presents national defense planners with many challenges. Recruiting and retaining reservists has become more difficult as many individuals have concluded they cannot meet the increased demands of reserve service. Reservists are increasingly deployed on foreign missions at a time when expectations regarding their contributions to the management of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other domestic emergencies are growing. Defense planners must also continue to refine the optimal distribution of skills and assets between regular and reserve forces. Finally, national governments must find the resources to sustain the increased use of reservists without bankrupting their defense budgets or undermining essential employer support for the concept of part-time soldiers with full-time civilian jobs. The author analyzes the innovative responses countries have adopted to manage these challenges. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=786>

KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM. By Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 14, 2007



The U.S.-Kuwaiti military and political relationship has been of considerable value to both countries since at least 1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with military force in 1991. Saddam's later defeat and removal from power in 2003 has ended an important rationale for the alliance, but a close look at current strategic realities in the Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an important U.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of serious national security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era. Problems with an assertive Iran, an unstable Iraq, and the continuing threat of terrorism will require both Kuwaitis and Americans to rethink and revise previous security approaches to meet the shared goals of reducing terrorism and regional instability. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB788.pdf>

CHINA'S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. By Ms Janie Hulse. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 13, 2007




Chinese involvement in the Latin American telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. Unlike other commercial activities geared toward supplying raw materials to China's 1.3 billion inhabitants, Chinese investment in space and telecommunications

implies broader commercial and strategic interests that potentially put the Chinese into Western Hemisphere air and space. At present, Chinese activity in these industries is growing as U.S. engagement is diminishing. Globalization, advances in information technology, and China's growing capacity and interest in Information Warfare make the United States particularly vulnerable should it abandon international telecommunications and space industries. In order to mitigate future threats, the United States should step up its commerce, aid and diplomacy with Argentina and the region as a whole.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB806.pdf>

RIGHT SIZING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY: EXPLORING THE CONTOURS OF CHINA'S MILITARY. Edited by Roy Kamphausen, Dr. Andrew Scobell. Book. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College, September 2007



This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China's requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and

strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the "Taiwan issue" as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB784.pdf>

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

IRAQ: TIME FOR A CHANGE. Daniel Serwer. USIPeace Briefing, September 2007

As Washington prepares for a critical debate in Congress this fall on what should be done in Iraq, the United States Institute of Peace convened over the summer a group of experts with many different political affiliations to consider next steps over a three-year time horizon. Read about the group's main conclusions.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0909_iraq_change.html

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: WORSENING CRISIS IN A TROUBLED REGION. Jacqueline C. Woodfork and Joel Charny. USIPeace Briefing, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted September 14, 2007. 08AD003

The Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the least known countries in Africa. It is also one of the poorest. CAR's terrain varies from very dry in the northern areas to tropical forests in the south. There are numerous ethnic groups within its four million inhabitants.

Islam is predominant in the north, Christianity in the south, and indigenous religions are important throughout.

Recent internal conflicts and a spillover of political unrest and violence from Sudan and Chad have made CAR more prominent on the international map. This Briefing highlights some of the key elements of the political and social turmoil and provides insights into the current civil unrest and humanitarian crisis.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0911_central_african_republic.html
[html format, various pagings]

KOSOVO: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK. By Daniel Serwer. USIPeace Briefing, September 2007

The earliest possible decision on Kosovo status is December 11, followed under the Ahtisaari plan by a 120-day transition period for departure of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishment of a new International Civilian Presence (ICP) and Rule of Law mission by the European Union. A decision on Kosovo's status has already been delayed repeatedly. Elections in Kosovo are overdue by a year, delayed in anticipation of a status decision (they are now scheduled for November 17). UNMIK needs to be replaced. Further delay in determining Kosovo's status will only increase unrest, heighten tension and uncertainty, strengthen both Albanian and Serbian extremists and guarantee an unsatisfactory outcome.

http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0914_kosovo.html

ENGAGING ISLAMISTS AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT. Mona Yacoubian. USIP, September 2007. Special Report No. 190



While U.S. engagement of moderate Islamists remains a hotly debated question, U.S. democracy promoters have been working with legal Islamist parties and their leaders over the past decade. This Special Report examines the experiences of U.S. democracy promoters at the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) working with Islamist parties in three countries: Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen. The assessment is written from the perspective of democracy promoters; it is based on extensive interviews and discussions with staff members who reside in-country, Washington-based staff, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) democratization experts. The promoters' views are necessarily subjective, providing one viewpoint to understand this complex topic.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr190.pdf>

U.S. POLICE IN PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS. Robert M. Perito. USIP, August 2007. Special Report No. 191

The first obligation of an international intervention force in a peace or stability operation is to provide security for the civilian population. Inevitably the arrival of foreign military forces is followed by a breakdown of public order. The United States should carry through plans to create a federal-level police reserve for international police and stability operations.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr191.pdf>

IRAQ AND THE GULF STATES: THE BALANCE OF FEAR. Jon B. Alterman. USIP, August 2007. Special Report No. 189

Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in order to preserve the status quo—a weak and self-absorbed Iraq—rather than to impose a new one. However, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and its aftermath have not brought stability to the Gulf States as much as they have shifted the most serious challenges from external threats (of a hostile Baghdad) to internal threats (the threat of conflict spillover from Iraq).
<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr189.pdf>



THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY

SYRIA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS. By Michael Eisenstadt. PolicyWatch #1288. The Washington Institute For Near-East Policy. September 20, 2007

The September 6 Israeli airstrike in northeastern Syria has produced intense speculation. According to the New York Times, Israeli intelligence believes the target was part of a clandestine Syrian nuclear weapons program aided by North Korea. This raises broader questions about the status of Syria's strategic weapons programs, which would likely play a crucial role in any future confrontation with Israel.
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2664>

PUSHBACK OR PROGRESS? ARAB REGIMES RESPOND TO DEMOCRACY'S CHALLENGE. Barry Rubin. Policy Focus #75. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. September 2007



Widespread Islamist gains -- from Hamas's ascension in Gaza to the Muslim Brotherhood's successes in Egypt -- seem to have muted the previously high-profile agenda of bringing democracy to Arab countries. In both Washington and the region itself, little confidence remains in the short-term viability of democratic reform in an environment where well-organized Islamist forces are prepared to exploit it. Lost amid these imposing gains, however, is the paramount reason for democracy's retreat: the varying responses of Arab regimes themselves. How have these regimes managed to use the various tools at their disposal -- including the co-optation of Islamist gains -- to effectively neutralize the democratic

challenge? And what implications do their efforts hold for the future of Arab governance? In this Washington Institute Policy Focus, Barry Rubin surveys the Arab government response to democratization efforts, whether homegrown or encouraged by the West. Using a broad array of examples from throughout the region, he examines both regime measures -- ranging from subtle social initiatives to outright repression -- and liberal and Islamist countermeasures. He also discusses how some regimes have responded positively to democratic pressures by attempting real reform. In all, he argues, these varying reactions will have a profound effect on the regimes' long-term stability -- and on those forces competing to reform or replace them.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus75initial.pdf>

SIMILAR THREATS, SIMILAR APPROACHES: IMPROVING TRANSATLANTIC COUNTERTERRORISM TIES. By Michael Jacobson. PolicyWatch #1291. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. September 27, 2007

Note: This PolicyWatch is based on the author's recent op-ed in Financial Times Deutschland. Read the original op-ed (in German).

With U.S. government assistance, three "homegrown" terrorist suspects were arrested in Germany several weeks ago. Despite this success story, transatlantic counterterrorism ties have been seriously tested over the past three months: prosecutors in Munich called for the extradition of CIA agents allegedly involved in abducting a German citizen; an Italian trial began against twenty-six CIA employees charged in absentia with kidnapping an imam in Milan; and Britain released a report accusing the United States of ignoring its concerns regarding terrorist "renditions."

These latest developments have undoubtedly reinforced perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic that U.S. and European counterterrorism efforts have been at odds since the September 11 attacks. Unfortunately, significant commonalities have been lost amid the heated rhetoric, both in terms of approach and problems encountered. Shifting these perceptions is critical for future counterterrorism efforts and should be a priority for U.S. and European policymakers.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2667>

RICE'S OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN BREAKTHROUGH. By David Makovsky. PolicyWatch #1289. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. September 20, 2007

Rice's diplomacy most likely has a personal dimension, given that an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough could transform her legacy from one centered on the Iraq war. In addition, she genuinely seems to share the sentiment of those who fear that failure to make progress could lead to gains for Hamas, which could ultimately transform the nationalist dispute into an uncompromising religious conflict. The obstacles in her path will be difficult to surmount, however.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2665>

SIX YEARS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: A 9-11 COMMISSION PROGRESS REPORT. Featuring Michael Hurley and Chris Kojm. PolicyWatch #1287: Special Forum Report. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. September 17, 2007

On September 12, 2007, Michael Hurley and Chris Kojm addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Hurley, recently retired from twenty-five years of service at the CIA, served on the 9-11 Commission as a senior counsel and director of the counterterrorism policy investigation. Dr. Kojm, now a professor of international affairs at George Washington University's Elliott School, is former president of the Public Discourse Project and deputy director of the 9-11 Commission. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2663>

ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS

COUNTERING THE MANPADS THREAT: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS. Schroeder, Matt. *Arms Control Today* vol. 37, no. 7, September 2007, pp. 6-11 AA07371

Summary: This article describes U.S. efforts to counter the threat from man-portable air defense systems with respect to export controls, stockpile security and destruction, and weapons collection. The author says U.S. counter-MANPADS efforts have been remarkably successful. He also contends that American efforts to secure or destroy these systems overseas may be a better way to ensure the safety of U.S. commercial airliners than using high-tech defensive programs on U.S. territory. Schroeder, who is manager of the Arms Control Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists, says U.S. State and Defense Department teams and special intelligence units have secured or destroyed thousands of surplus or poorly secured MANPADS, collected hundreds of missiles from black markets, and “established global norms and standards on the export of MANPADS that are unprecedented in their scope and specificity.” He suggests that it may be a good idea to install some anti-missile systems selectively on aircraft that are especially vulnerable to MANPADS “but only if doing so does not divert resources from other more cost-effective counter-MANPADS initiatives.” Schroeder also recommends that MANPADS-producing nations should install launch-control devices on them while warning, at the same time, that doing so is not a panacea. This article may be viewed on the Internet at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/CoverStory.asp

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS. Halloran, Richard. *Parameters* vol. 37, no. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 4-14 AA07368

Summary: The author, a former military correspondent for the New York Times, notes that the interagency process has “floundered in trying to organize a strategic communication campaign” even as America’s image abroad has declined over the past five years. Part of the problem, he says, is the inability of U.S. political and military leaders to agree on a definition of strategic communications, which he defines as persuading others to accept one’s ideas, policies and courses of action. Successful persuasive communications, he says, “assumes a defensible policy, a respectable identity, [and] a core value.” Even the best strategic communication cannot rescue a poor policy decision, he warns. It is also important to identify the audience and realize that, although a message is targeted toward a specific audience, others will see it, too -- you can’t say one thing to one audience and something different to another. Most importantly, Halloran notes, the written word is best understood in other cultures and less apt to be misunderstood than spoken language. Strategic messages should be communicated through every possible channel, from speeches to congressional testimony to ceremonies. Deception should be forbidden. Halloran advocates establishing a White House-based Office of Strategic Communications led by a director with Cabinet rank, but says all staff must be kept out of partisan politics. This article may be read on the Internet at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07autumn/halloran.htm>

LOOKING BACK: THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY
Gottemoeller, Rose. *Arms Control Today* vol. 37, no. 5, June 2007, pp. 41-48 AA07355

Summary: Gottemoeller, who directs the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines the legacies of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 20 years after it was signed. She cites U.S. Ambassador Steve Steiner as saying in 2001 that the treaty not only succeeded in eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles but also ushered in “a new standard of openness by creating a 13-year on-site verification regime of unparalleled intrusiveness.” Under the terms of the INF Treaty the United States eliminated 846 Pershing IA, Pershing IB, Pershing II and BGM-109G Tomahawk missiles. Russia eliminated 1,846 SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-20, SS-23 and SSC-X-4 missiles. Looking back, she says the saga of the treaty “mirrors the history of U.S.-Russian relations and European security policy during the transition from the Cold War.” She also says INF “was helped by the fact that it was a total global ban on short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, which made the treaty easier to verify.” A former deputy undersecretary for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the U.S. Energy Department, Gottemoeller notes that the promotion of scientific exchanges might well “provide some new ideas for verification technologies that could simplify and benefit not only U.S.-Russian verification efforts, but also broader multilateral efforts to enhance safeguards in any number of arms control and nonproliferation regimes.” She suggests that INF issues warrant new attention and writes that the future of verification and transparency should be examined in light of the Bush administration’s preference to see the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and its verification protocol “go out of force at the end of 2009.” Available online at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/LookingBack.asp

THE BIG TEN: THE CASE FOR PRAGMATIC IDEALISM. Baker, James A. III.
***National Interest*, no. 91, September/October 2007, pp. 14-19 AA07352**

Summary: Baker, former Secretary of the Treasury and of State, and co-chair of the Iraq Study Group, outlines ten guiding principles which he believes will “offer our surest guide and best hope for navigating our great country safely through this precarious period of unparalleled opportunity and risk in world affairs.” While asserting that the U.S. will remain the dominant global power for some time, he warns that its power must be used carefully, that “spreading it too thinly can lead to disaster,” and offers the following maxims to guide policymakers: 1) The United States must be comfortable using its power. 2) We must remember that even U.S. power is limited. 3) Be prepared to act unilaterally when the situation demands it. 4) Appreciate the importance of allies. 5) Use all possible means to achieve the objectives. 6) Be prepared to change direction if warranted. 7) Understand that the United States will sometimes have to deal with authoritarian regimes. 8) We must be prepared to talk with our enemies. 9) Values are important, but they are not the only thing that should guide our policy. 10) Domestic support is vital to any successful foreign policy. Available online at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15370>

ARAB NUCLEAR ENVY. Salama, Sammy; Weber, Heidi. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 63, no. 5, September/October 2007, pp. 44-49 AA07341

Summary: The authors, with the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, say that a number of Arab nations have become increasingly insecure in the face of Iran’s

nuclear quest. These countries may be willing to “rethink their non-nuclear status as Iran edges closer to becoming a threshold state.” Drawing on primary sources in the Middle East, the authors note that “Arab envy of Iran’s technological progress has increased, along with overt calls for Arab governments to achieve technological and nuclear parity with Iran and Israel as a matter of Arab nationalism and pride.” As an example of some of this thinking in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood advocates Egyptian nuclear weapons acquisition as a means to safeguard the country’s national interests and it views such acquisition as Egypt’s sovereign right. The Arab public is well aware that the West has extended generous offers of cooperation to Iran, despite its lack of transparency on nuclear issues and its acquisition of sophisticated technology from the illicit A.Q. Khan nuclear network. Interest in civilian nuclear programs by members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League are “a direct consequence of Iran’s budding nuclear program and the international community’s inability to stop it.” The article is illustrated by Iranian folk dancers allegedly displaying sealed samples of enriched uranium. Available in PDF format online at <http://thebulletin.metapress.com>

SOLDIERING AHEAD. Yeager, Holly. *Wilson Quarterly* vol. 31, no. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 54-62 AA07325

Summary: Women now make up 14.4 percent of enlisted personnel and 15.9 percent of the officer corps in the 1.4-million-strong active-duty U.S. military. They serve in more than 90 percent of military occupations, but are still barred from jobs having to do with direct ground combat. Nonetheless, they are getting shot at in Iraq, where they work as convoy drivers, military police, and a variety of other jobs having to do with supply and support. How are they doing? Admirably, says Yeager, who has covered the Pentagon for the Hearst newspaper group and *Defense Daily* and writes extensively about women’s issues. Contrary to expectations, most women hold up emotionally in combat, and the American public has not howled in protest over the 70 female soldiers killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The increased number of women in the military has not fundamentally changed martial culture. What has changed, however, is management style, which is geared toward more family-friendliness. And this, the author says, is a plus for attracting and retaining an all-volunteer force. Even so, more women than men leave the service because of the demands of family responsibilities. And lack of combat experience will prevent most women from advancing to the highest levels of the military hierarchy. Available online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=261679

ABU REUTER AND THE E-JIHAD: VIRTUAL BATTLEFRONTS FROM IRAQ TO THE HORN OF AFRICA. Rogan, Hanna. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer/Fall 2007, pp. 89-96 AA07324

Summary: Terrorists have built a pervasive media presence in print, satellite broadcasts, and the Internet. In her survey of “global jihadist” propaganda, the author, a visiting fellow at the Terrorism Research Center and a member of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, concludes that in addition to traditional wartime roles of legitimating its actions and intimidating its foes, terrorist media is geared primarily to followers and potential recruits, facilitating operational command and control as well as inspiring individuals from a “virtual community” to stage attacks of their own. While its overall effectiveness is debatable, the author stresses the need for continued close monitoring to inform future counterterrorism policies. Available online at <http://journal.georgetown.edu/82/rogan.pdf>

IRAN'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE. Dueck, Colin; Takeyh, Ray. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 122, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 189-205 AA07322

Summary: Dueck, assistant professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University, and Takeyh, senior fellow in Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, write that Iran has legitimate reasons for wanting a nuclear deterrent, and the most promising route for the U.S. to take is that of containment, supplemented by direct bargaining. Iran's regime has numerous factions, but they all agree on the need for a nuclear protection from threats they see from Israel, other neighboring countries, and the U.S. The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran's nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated. "The international indifference to Saddam's war crimes and Tehran's lack of an effective response has led Iran's war-veteran President to perceive that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties," the authors write. Iran is "not an irrational rogue state" seeking the bomb as an instrument of an aggressive foreign policy, nor is it likely to hand over an "Islamic bomb" to terrorist organizations, the authors argue, noting that Iran has long possessed chemical weapons and has yet to transfer such arms to its terrorist allies. "Since the U.S. is not about to invade and occupy Iran, an unwillingness to engage in diplomacy with its government amounts to tacit consent as Tehran develops the bomb," the authors say, recommending containment and "direct, hard bargaining" as the only chance to prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Available online at http://www.psqonline.org/cgi-bin/99_article.cgi?byear=2007&bmonth=summer&a=01free&format=view_

A FALSE CHOICE IN PAKISTAN. Markey, Daniel. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 86, no. 4, July/August 2007, pp. 85-102) AA07306

Summary: The author, a veteran of the Policy Planning staff of the U.S. Department State, defends Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf from critics, claiming that his government has taken billions in U.S. aid while covertly undermining counterterrorism efforts, and calls for strong, but discreet, pressure to ensure the return of democracy in October 2007 and expansion of U.S. diplomatic contacts with civilian leaders. Tough talk and aid suspensions, says the author, will only entrench Pakistan's influential security services, confirming suspicions about U.S. reliability and causing them to strengthen their ties with Islamist groups they developed in the 1980s as strategic counterweights against encirclement from Afghanistan and India. Instead, the author says that the U.S. must work to convince the Pakistani military of its long-term commitment by demonstrating the tangible benefits of partnership with more aid and training as well as stepped-up efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and facilitate discussions between India and Pakistan. Domestically, the U.S. must strongly insist on free and fair elections, human rights, and the rule of law as part of a larger effort to helping Pakistanis strengthen democracy, which is ultimately its true long-term defense against extremism. Currently available online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86407/daniel-markey/a-false-choice-in-pakistan.html>

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