Questions & Answers

Plutonium Disposition Educational Forum April 25, 1996

Introduction

Questions answered orally by guest speakers are not included in this file, but are available on videotape from the CAB.

Questions directed to Greg Rudy, Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, DOE

The Russians have made it clear during the ongoing joint U.S./Russian study that they consider plutonium to be valuable and wish to consume it in reactors. They have indicated that they would only use immobilization or geologic disposal for plutonium forms that they declare to be waste. During the course of the study, the Russians have agreed, in principle, to the general objective of achieving the "spent fuel standard" in which the plutonium is made as unattractive and difficult to retrieve and use in a nuclear weapon as the residual plutonium in commercial spent nuclear fuel. Each of the alternatives being considered for plutonium disposition (reactors, immobilization and geologic disposal) will meet this standard. The ultimate technology(ies) chosen by the U.S. and Russia need not necessarily be identical if the "spent fuel standard" can be attained in a manner that satisfactorily addresses proliferation concerns.

There are a number of nuclear security and plutonium disposition activities in which the U.S. and Russia are engaged. These include the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (known by its Senate authors as Nunn/Lugar), and various bilateral and international collaborative efforts such as the joint technical studies of plutonium disposition chartered by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. An example of the bilateral effort is the U.S./Russian technical study of plutonium disposition options which is led on the U.S. side by an interagency group jointly headed by the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council with support from DOE and the national laboratories. The Russian side of the joint study is headed by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) with support by the Russian Laboratories. An example of international efforts includes the formal meetings of the P-8 such as the recent nuclear safety summit in Moscow on April 19, 1996 where the disposition of surplus weapons was a major topic. Taken together, the bilateral and international efforts help form a cooperative basis from which future plutonium disposition agreements can be made.

The PEIS addresses the disposition of separated, weapons usable plutonium. Other surplus plutonium in the forms of scrap and certain residues (not separated/weapons usable) are in the process of stabilization and packaging under the Department's environmental management program efforts. Any separated weapons usable quantities eventually resulting from these cleanup and stabilization efforts would be stored and prepared for disposition in accordance with the decisions to be made following completion of the PEIS.

The U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal does not utilize commercial (reactor grade) plutonium from spent fuel. Tests were completed, however, to confirm that reactor grade plutonium could be used in a nuclear explosive and is therefore a nonproliferation concern.

No, see the answer above. Also see the National Academy of Sciences report "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium" for a comprehensive discussion on how a crude weapon could be made from commercial stores of plutonium.

The Record of Decision for the long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials and technologies and systems for the disposition of surplus fissile materials is planned for late 1996 (Storage and Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissle Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. The Department is considering three alternatives for the storage of weapons-usable fissile materials in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, plus a "no-action" alternative required by the National Environmental Policy Act.

The three alternatives are: facility upgrades and storage of plutonium at multiple DOE sites (upgraded or new facilities); consolidated storage of plutonium at one DOE site (new facilities); and collocated storage of plutonium with highly enriched uranium at one DOE site (new facilities). Six departmental sites are being analyzed for the long-term storage missions. These are: Hanford Reservation, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation (Y -12), Pantex, and Savannah River.

MOX refers to Mixed (plutonium and uranium) Oxide, not the percentage of plutonium fuel in the core. Currently, foreign commercial reactors utilizing "MOX" fuels load 1/3 of the reactor core with MOX. Some reactor designs are capable of using a full MOX core load (100%). The Department did evaluate some advanced reactor options which utilized all plutonium (no uranium) cores. These were screened out from further consideration because they were not technically mature and hence, the cost and schedule requirements were substantially greater than for MOX options.

The Department is evaluating both plutonium storage and disposition. The potential use of "multi-purpose" reactors (production of tritium, disposition of plutonium and production of electricity) is being evaluated through the Department's efforts in the Plutonium Disposition and Tritium Production Programs.

Decisions are planned for the approach and location (among six sites as listed in the response to question six) of plutonium storage and the technologies for disposition. With varying degrees of processing of the various surplus plutonium into appropriate feed forms, each of the technological options (reactors, immobilization, borehole) could be used for the surplus inventories with the borehole and immobilization options capable of handling a broader range of the surplus materials. Specific processing needs and associated costs are under evaluation.

A decision on both storage and disposition technologies is planned for the end of the year. The Department will choose a site for the storage mission and depending on the disposition technology (s) selected, a site may be identified. For example, a decision may be made to vitrify plutonium and combine it with high level waste at the Savannah River Site using the Defense Waste Processing Facility.

It appears the only way to keep track of plutonium us to check who has it and where. We can not stop its production through commercial power reactors or for defense systems. Therefore, accountability becomes the primary control. Materials protection, control and accounting, throughout all phases of storage and disposition is essential for an effective nonproliferation effort. The President's four part nonproliferation policy, summarized in the briefing (see Greg Rudy's presentation), highlights the importance of this.

None of the technical options fully eliminate the problem. All of them would however be able to attain the spent fuel standard whereby the surplus plutonium is made as unavailable for reuse in a nuclear weapon as is the plutonium contained in spent commercial fuel. The spent fuel standard can be attained through a combination of radiation and other engineered and administrative barriers to reuse.

Yes. If the MOX (reactor burning) option were to be selected, the greater the number of reactors used, the quicker the disposition mission would be completed.

The DWPF was designed for high level radioactive wastes, not plutonium disposal. Among other things, the size of the DWPF process precludes direct vitrification of weapons plutonium due to criticality concerns. The "can-in-canister" concept would utilize the DWPF glass stream around small cans of vitrified plutonium prepared outside of DWPF and arranged within the DWPF canisters. As of this month, the DWPF process is on line and glass production has begun.

The DWPF is being used to vitrify liquid, high level radioactive wastes that resulted from past reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel associated with the U.S. nuclear weapons program. The U.S. does not reprocess commercial spent fuel. The DWPF will operate as long as is required to complete the vitrification of high level radioactive liquid wastes at the site.

Different immobilization facility processes, of varying sizes and capacities are used in other countries. The specific size and immobilization technology selected would be matched to the particular inventories to be disposed of over time and would ultimately determine the cost of the disposition effort in comparison to other technology options.

The canisters of high level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear reactor fuels would provide attendant radiation barriers to prevent such an occurence. Additional deterrent measures of providing engineered barriers and physical safeguards and security make this scenario highly unlikely.

Escrow funds would not be required to guarantee the potential extraction of plutonium from either spent fuel or vitrified forms. While these forms would attain the spent fuel standard, they would not preclude the potential future retrieval of the residual plutonium.

The percentage would depend on the particular type of reactor (light water pressurized or boiling reactor or CANDU reactor) and the period of time the fuel is irradiated. An average ranges from approximately 25% - 35%. The spent fuel volume and radioactivity would be approximately the same as would occur under a uranium oxide fuel cycle. Other cycles range up to 7%. (NAS)

Reprocity with Russia to reduce the nuclear danger is a core objective of U.S. efforts regarding the selection and future implementation of plutonium disposition technologies. In order to initiate the effort, however, decisions on the technologies to be deployed by the U.S. are necessary first steps.

If the weapons are safely and securely dismantled and subjected to the same level of security and control as intact nuclear weapons throughout the dismantlement and storage process, the nuclear danger would be decreased. Dismantlement is a necessary step enroute to disposition of the nuclear materials to the spent fuel standard. The risks of the status quo, and risks inherent in disassembly, storage, and disposition will be considered in arriving at national and international decisions on the disposition approach and timing.

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Questions directed to Myron Kratzer, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Affairs

The term "clear and present danger" was first used by the National Academy of Sciences but their conclusion was shared by the American Nuclear Society panel. There are two technical differences between the 50 metric tons of surplus grade plutonium (i.e., 50 metric tons each in Russia and the U.S.). The first, and by far the most important is that the 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium is already separated and purified from fusion products and uranium and is therefore an easy target for terrorists or other unauthorized individuals.

In addition, the 50 MT is of "weapon-grade", that is nearly pure plutonium 239, whereas the plutonium in commercial fuel is much lower in plutonium 239 and higher in the isotopes that are undesirable for weapons use. This, however, is not a crucial difference, since all plutonium can be used in weapons. The other and really key difference, is a non-technical one. This is that 50 metric tons of surplus separated plutonium is in Russia, where the means employed to protect and account for it are seriously inadequate. It is this Russian plutonium that was viewed by NAS and ANS as a "clear and present danger". The 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium in the U.S. are well protected and are not a "clear and present danger" to the U.S. or any other country.

Reactor experts are satisfied that MOX fuel can be used in existing U.S. PWRs and BWRs without significant problems or changes, provided no more than about 1.3 of the core is MOX. To use full MOX cores requires some additional controls, probably in the form of burnable poisons, would be required in most reactors the latest combustion engineering reactors were designed to be able to use full MOX cores without modification, but there are only a few of these reactors. A number of European reactors of similar design to U.S. LWR and BWRs are using MOX routinely, on a 1/3 core basis, without difficulty.

The paradox is that although the nuclear weapons countries, especially the U.S. and Russia, are the countries that are best able to make weapons use of reactor grade plutonium (because of their far superior knowledge of weapons design), they are the least likely to do so. This is because they have enormous investments in nuclear weapons technology, stockpiles and infrastructure, all based on use of weapons grade plutonium. Therefore, to provide maximum assurance that the surplus weapons-grade plutonium is never returned to weapons by the host countries themselves (i.e.. the U.S. and Russia), it should be converted from weapons grade to reactor grade. Irradiation as fuel in reactors accompanies this conversion. Vitrification does not accomplish it since it leaves the isotopic compound unchanged.

A conclusion of both the NAS and ANS studies was that plutonium in all forms, including spent fuel, entails some proliferation risks. This could apply particularly for example, to stocks of spent fuel accumulating in countries of proliferation concern, even if they have no present capability for reprocessing. The ANS concluded that the best way to deal with this risk was to limit and eventually reverse the accumulation of plutonium in either separated or unseparated (spent fuel) form is to burn it in reactors under tight and effective safeguards over the intermediate processing and fabrication steps.

The problem of spent fuel accumulations at utility reactors is a serious one that must be addressed on a much shorter time schedule than nay possible program of reprocessing and MOX irradiation. The best solutions in my view is intermediate retrievable surface storage at an MRS (monitored retrievable storage) repository, while we make decisions as to what to do with it in the long run. This is the approach being taken in most countries. Even if we decide to place spent fuel in an underground "permanent" repository, and succeed in siting and building such a repository, the spent fuel will remain intentionally and easily retrievable for at least 50 years while we monitor the repository performance. By the end of that period, we may well decide to do something else with the spent fuel and the plutonium it contains. As far as SRS is concerned, the spent fuel being delivered there is highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors. This is a specialized and much smaller problem than that of the spent fuel from utility power reactors. There are no plans to send that to SRS.

Yes. European experience demonstrates that MOX fuel assemblies perform as well and can be carried to the same burn up as conventional low enriched uranium assemblies and the reactor power rating while operating with MOX would not be affected. In Canadian "CANDU" reactors, which are being considered for irradiation of the surplus weapons plutonium, MOX assemblies would last much longer-approaching twice as long-as the natural uranium fuel now used in these reactors. This would cut the amount of spent fuel to be disposed of almost in half. Reactor power level would not be affected.

I cannot give quantitative answers, but will provide some general comments.

1. Fuel facilities handling plutonium would require increased security compared with those handling low enriched uranium. We already have experience with meeting these requirements at facilities, handling highly enriched uranium (HEU), for navy reactor fuel for example. In my judgment, the uncleared security costs would not be a significant item in relation to the overall cost of MOX fabrication.

2. The largest MOX fuel fabrication facility built to date, the Siemens plant in Harrau, Germany, (never operated for political reasons) reportedly cost a out $1 billion German marks, equivalent at the time to about $500,000,000 U.S. dollars. A working assumption is that a similar plant built in the U.S. today would cost in the order of $1 billion. The key number to develop is the cost of fabricated MOX fuel assemblies and how this cost compares with the cost of conventional LEU assemblies. The increase would be substantial, but I don't have a number. I do not believe it would be cost-effective to convert an existing commercial fuel fabrication plan to MOX, although it could well be attractive to build a new MOX plant on the same site as an existing fabrication plan to take advantage of the personnel and infrastructure.

3. I have no cost data for this but doubt that there would be a significant difference, if any, since the expense level at discharge, and therefore the pri ....product heat generation would be essentially the same for MOX and conventional fuel. Many decades later after substantial decay of all fusion products, the higher plutonium content of MOX would result in higher heat output per assembly, but by this time, the heat generation is far below original values.

4. Cost of power production with MOX fuel will be higher than for conventional fuel, due to the higher cost of fabricating MOX assemblies. This would be offset in past, but not entirely by reduced need for uranium enrichment. The cost differential cannot be determined with certainty until actual price quotations for MOX fabrication are obtained. European utilities apparently do not find the cost differential prohibitive.

5. As just noted, power production costs using MOX fuel would be higher, primarily due to higher fuel fabrication costs. It does not appear that other costs such as burnup and storage, would be affected significantly.

The use of plutonium as MOX fuel in thermal (LWR) reactors would reduce total plutonium inventories by something of the order of 25%. However, the principal nonproliferation benefit of plutonium recycle is that stocks of separated plutonium, including surplus weapons plutonium, would be converted to the more proliferation resistant spent fuel standard. In the longer run, however, use of plutonium fuel in fast reactors, such as the liquid metal reactor would enable higher weight elements, resulting in waste containing essentially more of these materials. In these circumstances, the enormous and growing inventory of plutonium in spent fuel could be gradually worked off and the only plutonium would be that in the working inventory of operating reactors. The time scale for accomplishing this would be very long, but it is nevertheless a goal toward which we should be working.

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Questions directed to Louis Long, Vice President, Technical Services, Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Existing nuclear power plants generate electricity based on cost of service regulations approved by the state Public Utility Commissions. Thus any additional costs to modify those reactors would be paid for by the government. In order to burn partial (approximately 40%) MOX cores, with most additional costs incurred for securing MOX fuel, only minimal reactor modifications are anticipated.

A typical new MOX fuel assembly has approximately 19 kg of PU-239 and 0.9 kg of U-235 and when discharged has approximately 6.5 kg of Pu-239 and 0.4 kg of U-235. This composition may be compared to the typical fuel assembly now used in reactors which have approximately 0 kg of Pu-239 and 19 kg of U-235 and when discharged have 2.5 kg of Pu-239 and 4.5 kg of U-235. Thus discharged both MOX fuel and existing fuel have fissionable material. Discharged fuel is contained in highly radioactive fuel assemblies which will ultimately be stored in federal High Level Waste Repository. Thus, discharged MOX fuel would treated no differently than discharged existing fuel.

Yes. Vogtle has the capability to burn plutonium, produce tritium and generate electricity. Additionally, the costs of building and operating Vogtle are known and the staff has a proven record of excellence.

Many of the nation's reactors were designed to accommodate MOX fuel since reprocessing was initially considered an integral part of the fuel cycle. Because of security concerns, the DOE is clearly interested in minimizing the number of MOX fuel shipments to reactors. Additionally, they are probably interested in building only one MOX fuel type in one facility for economic reasons. Thus the DOE is probably interested in selecting large reactors of a specific design, e.g. 4 loop Westinghouse PWRs. Approximately seven 4-loop PWRs would be required to dispose of 50 metric tons of plutonium.

Southern nuclear conducted a preliminary assessment of a partial MOX core which indicated very little reduction in performance to current PWR designs. Technical specification limits, core design limit assumptions and operating reactor parameters are similar to current limits. Moderate temperature limits and shutdown margin requirements are identical. No BWR designs were assessed.

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(Unanswered) Questions directed to Arjun Makhijani, Director, Institute for Energy & Environmental Research

Do you think taking the "Big Brother" approach will cause countries like the U.K., Russia, and others to stop commercial reprocessing or the use of MOX fuel? If so, how?

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Questions directed to Carol Jantzen, Senior Fellow Scientist, Savannah River Technology Center

The Defense Waste Processing Facility, the West Valley Nuclear Services Melter and the plutonium vitrification melters are all "conventional" joule heated electric melters. These types of melters have been used extensively in the commercial glass industry for hundreds of years. Conventional vitrification is a safe technology and all the vapors produced are completely contained in a specially designed off-gas treatment and filtration system.

"In-situ" vitrification, as commercialized by Geosafe, is a design whereby two electrodes are stuck in the ground and a containment dome is put over the area to be vitrified. It is not as mature a technology as conventional vitrification. The hazards associated with vitrification are rapid release of stored energy in the glass or vapors trapped in the molten glass, inhalation of vapors released from the molten glass or particles entrained in the melter off gas. There is also a potential hazard from the electricity used to power the melter and burns from contact with the glass or melter.

The incident at Oak Ridge on Sunday April 21 has been described by personnel at Oak Ridge as a burp with a subsequent fire. It has been classified by the Department of Energy as a Level 3 Unusual Incident (Level 1 is the most serious). The incident occurred at an in-situ vitrification demonstration. Soil was being vitrified to a depth of about 15 feet. The cause of the pressurization at Oak Ridge is thought to be ground water which evaporated and could not escape around the edges of the melt. Oak Ridge personnel are continuing to evaluate the incident and expect to be able to restart the demonstration this fall.

Vitrification of about 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium is expected to take 10 years with the vitrification beginning as early as 2004 with sufficient priority and funding authorization.

Vitrification is a permanent, long term solution. With vitrification and all of the disposition options, the immediate and urgent need for securing surplus plutonium will have to be addressed through physical safeguards and verified accountability of the plutonium feed. For the can-in-canister option, the production facility will be designed to produce 2000 small cans of plutonium glass each containing 2.5 kg per year. Expected funding levels will allow the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) to produce enough High Level Waste Glass to fill 200 large canisters per year. One hundred of these canisters would each contain 20 small cans of plutonium glass.

At the expected funding level all of the High Level Waste in tanks at SRS would be processed by 2028. With a requested increase in funding this work could be accelerated by eight years to 2020. Inserting small cans of plutonium glass in DWPF canisters will not have an effect on this schedule. Additional canisters will be required because of the volume displaced by the small cans, but because the DWPF process will be feed limited, pouring the same amount of glass into more canisters will not affect the time to process the High Level Waste.

The disposition of the Spent Nuclear Fuel being shipped to SRS is not expected to affect the disposition of plutonium. Some of the options being considered for this Spent Nuclear Fuel would increase the fission products added to the SRS waste storage tanks and thus would increase the time required to process the High Level Waste through DWPF.

The can-in-canister operation could be in full operation in 2004. To place 50 metric tons of plutonium, which is now located at a number of sites in the DOE complex, in cans in DWPF canisters would take 10 years. Therefore the program would be completed in 2014.

The present Disposition Program R&D plan, which is based on evaluating a number of options, has a production integrated testing of can-in-can in 2001. Work is in progress to define and implement an accelerated production integrated testing program by the end of 1997.

Samarium is readily available and in bulk quantities can be purchased for about $15 per kilogram. Use of a neutron poison is cost effective to provide an additional margin for sub criticality during processing, intermediate storage of the plutonium glass cans and long term storage in a repository. The final choice of a " neutron poison " and the loading of the poison in the plutonium glass has not been made. Samarium is one of the options and was selected for the "proof of principle" glass because its effect on the plutonium glass is representative of all the poisons being considered. The final loading of a "neutron poison" is expected to be lower than the concentration in the "proof of principle glass" discussed by Dr. Carol Jantzen at the Citizens Advisory Board meeting.

Yes. A chemical flow sheet could be developed to dissolve the plutonium glass and recover the plutonium. Of course it must be remembered that placing the cans of plutonium glass in a DWPF canister provides a high radiation field around the cans and that removal of a 10 foot by 2 foot diameter DWPF canister, which weighs about 5500 pounds, will require a high capacity lifting device. It should also be noted that existing chemical flow sheets and facilities could be used to recover plutonium from spent power reactor fuel and MOX fuel.

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Questions directed to Kevin O'Neill, Research Analyst, Institute for Science and International Proliferation

Both Russia and U.S. will retain thousands of weapons and material in strategic reserves at levels adequate for any conceivable defense scenarios. Sure they can use plutonium to build more weapons, but what's the difference among 5,000; 10,000; or 20,000 nuclear weapons pointed at you. Diversion is the issue. Reuse by declared weapon states is a minor issue. The United States and Russia have agreed under the Strategic Arms Treaty (START II) to significantly reduce their strategic stockpiles to approximately 3,000 - 3,500 weapons on each side. A key goal of this treaty is to bring about the end of the arms race. While it is true that both sides with retain strategic material reserves, the recycle of materials from dismantled warhead undercuts this goal. From an arms control verification and security perspective, it would be better for Russia to declare materials from dismantled warheads to the surplus to military needs and voluntarily place these materials under IAEA safeguards.

Through safeguards agreements with individual countries, the IAEA requires national authorities to develop material accounting procedures for all fissile materials-including plutonium-that conform with international norms and with IAEA inspection requirements. These procedures are based upon principles of physical accounting and measurements of material flows along the process line with the goal of tracking fissile material inventories throughout the fuel cycle. The IAEA then audits facility records and takes material balances at certain locations to assure that there have been no diversions of "significant quantities" of materials, which is defined as 8 kilograms for separated plutonium. With the recent adoption by the IAEA of strengthened safeguards, the Agency will be able to more rigorously inspect facilities to determine if materials have been diverted.

Deployed and dismantled weapons in the former Soviet Union present different risks. Deployed weapons are inherently less risky than dismantled weapons, from a proliferation perspective, but pose a potential military threat. Dismantled weapons are less of an immediate military concern, but pose significant proliferation risks if components and materials are not securely stored or accurately accounted for. The trick for policy makers is to minimize both risks-by seeking greater reductions in deployed weapons and by assuring that components and materials from dismantled weapons are secured and can only be used for peaceful purposes.

The issue raised by this question is not whether my organization -the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) "appreciate(s) SRS reprocessing activities," or if we would be "happier with all the canyon material and plutonium trash sitting around indefinitely." Rather, it is more appropriate to consider the technical issues of whether or not the arguments that favor reprocessing justify the policy implications with respect with respect to Russia or other nations that might consider reprocessing, or the environmental, health and safety risks closer to home.

ISIS believes that DOE should have taken the steps to properly dispose of the remaining plutonium and HEU solutions when the canyons were first closed down. These steps were not taken because at the time, DOE assumed that operations would resume; an outcome that experts at ISIS did not believe would happen. Consequently, we are left with a problem that was created by DOE's own lack of foresight. Solving this problem today requires an expensive clean out, in preparation for safely closing down the canyons-a step, by the way, which is not called "reprocessing" by experts. My organization encourages DOE to take necessary steps to implement final closure. However, even DOE admits that about half of the so-called "scraps and residues" at SRS can be safely stored without reprocessing. Alternative ways to safely store the remaining scraps, through, for example, repackaging, should be further considered.

Taking steps to "implement final closure" at SRS would indeed send a positive message not only to the other nuclear weapons states, but also to proliferation states. However, the introduction of new irradiated materials into the canyons send the exact opposite message. The issue raises its own set of policy implications and environmental, safety and health risks; it needs to be considered separately from what is needed to safely clean out and shut down the canyons. ISIS is not convinced that the current reasons for introducing new material justify these risks or the policy outcomes that may result.

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Questions directed to Marilyn Meigs, Vice President, British Nuclear Fuels, Inc.

Burning plutonium as mixed oxide fuel does, in fact, reduce the total amount of plutonium in the world by virtue of the fact that the plutonium is destroyed by fissioning while in the reactor. Any remaining plutonium left in the fuel after it has been removed from the reactor will be significantly downgraded by the contamination of the fission products, making the remaining material virtually unattractive for any diversion for weapons use (similar to the unattractiveness of existing, uranium- based spent fuel that happens to contain some plutonium.

I did NOT say this. Actually, what I said was that burning plutonium as mixed oxide DOES NOT produce any additional waste, since it actually displaces normal uranium-based fuel that would otherwise be burned in reactors. Further more the mixed oxide fuel eliminates the need to immobilize the plutonium, which would create additional waste (323 cubic meters of glass) and burning mixed oxide fuel eliminates the need to mine, mill, and enrich the equivalent amount of uranium needed to make fuel, which would result in millions of cubic meters of mill and enrichment tailings. I am sorry if I did not make this clear in my presentation.

There are other options. Commercial power reactors built in this country provide approximately 22% of this nation's electricity needs. Utilities value the contribution these reactors make to their electricity requirements. In order to maximize a utility's investment in any type of power plant and to minimize costs of electricity to the ratepayer, the utility will run all its plants until their "end of life," which of course requires the plants to be fueled until "end-of-life."

Thus, in the case of nuclear power plants, this means the utility will need to purchase fuel for the plant. The alternative-that is, to stop fueling the plant, i.e., to prematurely shut the plant down-would require the utility to make an additional, huge, investment in an alternative source of power. Such a redundant, unnecessary, capital expenditure would be viewed as totally imprudent by the ratepayers who would have to "pay twice" and would be totally rejected by the utility regulators and shareholders, who would be carting the utility executives off the funny farm if they ever proposed such an idea.

It would cost money to actually clean up the various forms of plutonium scrap material, so one would have to do a cost/benefit analysis to determine if it would be worth investing in the technology and processes necessary to clean the scrap material up and use it as mixed oxide, versus, the costs to simply immobilize the material and dispose of it directly. I am not aware of nay scrap "stabilization" program that is underway that will actually put the plutonium in a sufficiently clean condition so as t o make it suitable for mixed oxide use.

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Questions directed to Ernie Chaput, Deputy Site Manager, DOE-Savannah River

As regards the visitor center concept, for the past several years, SRS officials have discussed the possibility of having an SRS Visitors Center, and developed a 'wish list' that included concepts such as the Sellafield example, interactive displays and the like. In fact, a small, science-focused display was created at the Ruth Patrick Science Center on the campus of the University of South Carolina in Aiken with DOE assistance. However, active planning for an official visitors center fell victim to the budget reductions and downsizing of site employment that resulted from the end of the Cold War.

On a more positive note, last year Aiken County officials and representatives of the organization Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness (CNTA) proposed to build, on the Savannah River Research Campus adjacent to the Site, a combined visitors center and conference center. As proposed (and subsequently agreed to in principle by DOE, Westinghouse, Aiken County, and CNTA), the center would be built and paid for by Aiken County with a mix of county and private funds solicited by CNTA, with the public tours program from the center. Planning the displays and the center is now beginning, and the tour program is being operated out of an interim, informal visitors center in the lobby of the current Research Campus building.

The Site (including DOE, the operating contractor, the Savannah RiverEcology Lab, and the U.S. Forest Service) has an extensive educational outreach program that encompasses elementary, middle, and high schools, and all levels of college and post-graduate education. Involvement includes providing educational materials and excess computers for schools, teacher training and program plans, onsite classes in elementary science for grade schools, and onsite coursework and advanced study, including post-doctoral studies, in higher education. The site is the major sponsor for science fairs and sends individuals into classrooms to promote education in the sciences, mathematics and engineering. In addition, many employees volunteer their personal time to mentor students and provide career counseling.

SRS has an extensive annual planning program for program execution that identifies in great detail what work will be performed and the financial and human resources required. In addition, resource loaded schedules have been developed for the plutonium processing operations. SRS will ensure that the necessary Pu management and extraction (processing) skills will be maintained in two ways. 1) when SRS staff is downsized, the critical skills will neither be elebible for voluntary separation incentives nor targeted for involuntary separation, and 2) if additional critical skills are required, they will be hired, even if overall staff is being reduced.

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Questions directed to Jill Lytle, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials and Facility Stabilization, DOE-Headquarters

The Department of Energy has been working with our international colleagues to share both perspectives and experiences in nuclear materials and waste management and disposition. Forums such as this Plutonium Disposition Forum, where a French perspective and experience was discussed on plutonium utilization in French reactors, could be included in future National Dialogue activities if there is a stakeholder interest in an international perspective.

The Department of Energy (DOE) is currently taking actions to address the nuclear materials and waste management problems at DOE sites. From a local perspective, a recent significant action is the start of vitrification of high level waste at the Savannah River Site. Other significant ongoing actions throughout the DOE complex include: stabilization of plutonium and other surplus nuclear materials, treatment of wastes, disposal of low level waste, and providing the safe storage of nuclear materials and wastes. In addition, the ongoing Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements and the accompanying policy, technical and cost analyses are actions that will support near term decisions to be made on nuclear materials and waste management and disposition. The Nuclear Materials and Waste National Dialogue will not detract from or delay ongoing actions, rather, it will provide stakeholders an opportunity to understand and influence the pending programmatic decisions.

DOE has found that its recent stakeholder and public outreach activities, such as establishment and utilization of the site specific advisory boards, have provided improved stakeholder understanding, input and acceptance of DOE activities. Related to the National Dialogue, the states and other stakeholders have called for DOE to develop an integrated approach to communication and decision making related to nuclear materials and waste. By better understanding stakeholder concerns and providing them an opportunity to influence decisions, DOE believes we will achieve broader acceptance of the decisions, and therefore implementation will be successful.

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Undirected questions answered by DOE Office of Fissile Materials

In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation Policy that precludes the United States from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Although these materials could be recycled into new fuel to produce energy in nuclear reactors, they would also have the potential to be used in nuclear weapons. The United States has therefore made a commitment not to recycle these materials.

Several technical options are being evaluated for the immobilization of plutonium in a glass or ceramic form. Each technology involves processes that can be performed safely and that meet all applicable federal, state, and local environment, safety and health requirements

The technology, processes and facilities for fabricating MOX fuel have been successfully demonstrated through operation of MOX facilities in France, Britian, and Belgium. Other nations in the world are in the process of developing this capability as well. The design, construction and operation of a MOX facility in the United States for plutonium disposition would utilize this experience and would emphasize the safely of both the public and facility workforce.

All of the processes being considered for plutonium disposition will meet applicable federal, state and local environment, safety and health requirements.

Canisters used to transport plutonium and other special nuclear materials are specifically designed and tested to withstand the accidents that could potentially occur during handling and shipping. Included in this process are impact tests to verify that the canisters will not break open and release nuclear material under an accident condition. Canisters are transported in special trucks that are designed to provide protection against attack and are provided with communications and monitoring equipment to enhance safety and security enroute. Each shipment is also accompanied by armed nuclear materials couriers.

Approximately 8 to 10 years would be required to design and construct a vitrification facility and an additional 8 to 10 years would be required to process all of the surplus uranium into a vitrified form.

All light water reactors in operation today utilize uranium oxide fuel, which is, comprised of approximately 4% uranium-235 and 96% uranium-238. In MOX fuel, plutonium oxide would replace the 4% uranium-235 oxide.

The spent fuel rods that would result from burning MOX fuel in a nuclear reactor are essentially the same as spent fuel rods resulting from all the uranium fuel normally used in commercial reactors. Since the MOX fuel would displace the all uranium fuel that is normally used, there would be no additional spent fuel or waste beyond what is normally produced by a commercial reactor.

The spent fuel from burning MOX in an existing commercial reactor will be essentially the same as all the uranium spent fuel normally discharged from those same reactors. Consequently, no rack modifications are anticipated. However, if a new reactor were constructed to burn MOX fuel, higher plutonium loadings may be used and the racks used to store spent fuel may require larger spacing than those used for existing reactors.

The costs of burning plutonium in existing reactors using MOX fuel and the cost of immobilizing plutonium in a ceramic or glass form are roughly the same (approximately 1 to 2 billion dollars). The cost of extracting plutonium after it has been vitrified into glass has not been analyzed and as a result, no cost data are available.

It is difficult to identify an alternative with the least impact because the specific environmental impacts for each alternative are different. For example, the water usage and air emissions for one alternative may be low but the waste streams may be slightly higher than for other alternatives. Despite these differences in specific environmental impacts, the overall impacts of all disposition alternatives under consideration are well within acceptable limits

The United States is not insisting on a solution that does not utilize plutonium burning. In fact, the Department is evaluating four different options for burning plutonium in reactors. However, unlike some other nations, these options will burn plutonium on a once through fuel cycle and will not recycle the spent fuel to recover residual plutonium for reuse. DOE has a serious credibility problem with its historic resistance to being open with the public on health effects of radiation and plutonium handling.

The Department has worked very hard over the past several years to "declassify" previously classified material and to make information more available to the general public. There has also been an increase in the number of meetings held with the public on new and existing missions and on analyses and decisions related to those missions. The selection of alternatives for plutonium storage and disposition and their related analyses have been the subject of over 50 meetings with the public and non government organizations. Information including environmental analyses have been made available to the public in advance of these meetings for review and discussion. All comments, written and oral, provided during and after these public meetings have been reviewed and will be considered as part of the Department's decisions.

The United States does not have an existing capability to manufacture MOX fuel. However, the technology required to construct and operate such facilities is available both domestically and internationally and will be utilized if a decision is made to use MOX fuel in reactors. Facilities of this type have been built and are operating successfully in several European countries. Approximately nine to twelve years would be required to design and construct such a facility in the United States.

The heavy water reactors built at Savannah River were designed to produce tritium and would not be well suited for burning plutonium in the form of MOX fuel. Furthermore, the cost of placing these reactors back into operation would be very high. Commercial reactors on the other hand, are capable of burning plutonium in the form of MOX with little or no modification. Commercial reactors operating in Europe today already burn MOX fuel.

The United States currently has programs in place in Russia to improve the control and accountability of weapons-usable materials in storage. These programs are being paid for with Nunn-Lugar funds. The programs are utilizing United States companies who have extensive experience and modern proven equipment designed specifically for this purpose.

Russian facilities used to process weapons materials are not open to routine United States inspection. However, the United States does have limited access to facilities being used by the Russians to blend down the 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium that is being sold to the U.S.

Plutonium is man-made and therefore cannot be diluted back to a natural state. Although the burning of plutonium in light water reactors as MOX fuel will reduce the amount of plutonium available and create a radiological barrier; it will not totally eliminate the material. Other technologies require further development and demonstration, would be very costly to deploy and would substantially delay the start of deposition.

A disposition technology which meets the spent fuel standard will make weapons plutonium as difficult to retrieve for reuse in weapons as the much larger inventory of plutonium already contained in spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors. Material meeting this standard would be inaccessible for about 100 years.

The attached maps provide information on the location of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the U.S. that has been declassified by the Department. Plutonium contained in commercial reactor spent fuel is located in storage facilities around the U.S. adjacent to the reactors that produced it. Because of the high radiation fields associated with this spent fuel, it is not considered a threat for potential use in weapons.

The use of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors will not require that those reactors be substantially modified. Commercial light water reactors utilizing MOX fuel are currently being operated in Europe. Sixteen domestic utilities have indicated interest in burning MOX fuel in their reactors in response to a request for "Expressions of Interest" from the Department. MOX made from U.S. weapons plutonium will not be burned in any foreign reactors. Review Europe, Russia, Japan, and China's activities in plutonium disposition.

The U.S. and Russia have formed a joint technical working group that is actively evaluating alternatives for plutonium disposition in the two countries. It is our hope that the results of this evaluation will provide the basis for both countries to move forward with disposition activities. The Department is not aware of any disposition activities being undertaken by Europe, Japan, or China.

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Comments

From Fred Davison...

Most accept the fact that once one develops a fissile (radioactive) material, there is no going back.

Before we got there, we didn't know how this is true for all forms of R&D breakthroughs. I submit that we still not know enough. I suggest an option to stimulate (fund) R&D studies in universities and industries to find a way to neuter the materials by reversing the process that was used to create radioactive materials or find a new way. When we know more, we will find a way.

from the audience...

• Storage is OK for near-term, but over the long-term we should dispose of materials by using them for some good to society.

• The citizen who wanted a dialogue on cost and schedule was told that the cost and schedule were not a part of the NEPA process. I would, therefore, recommend to Jill that as part of her national dialogue, all aspects of these decisions be shared with a concerned public.

• The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) should be used solely for processing the 34 M gallons of waste presently on hand (if and when it comes "on-line" to do this job) and should not be considered for encapsulating plutonium, because I do not believe it possesses the necessary nuclear controls to do this.

• The MOX fuel use/reuse appears the way to go as outlined by Dr. Herve' Bernard. France is already a leader of producing electricity from nuclear reactors and they already have the expertise for the MOX program.

• Why not just place the excess plutonium problem in above ground, long-term safe storage? Fort Knox storing of gold is a good example. The experience of trying to get deep geologic disposal at Yucca Mountain indicates that lots of money could be spent with little results in a reasonable time.

• I do not want to see plutonium put in the ground or have plutonium made into ceramic buttons.

• The comment that "nuclear energy is a technology of the 1950's" suggests that technology is static, that nuclear technology has not improved since its conception, and that nuclear technology will not improve in the future. This comment seems to me to follow the same errors in thinking made by Marxist analysts on capitalism, in that their belief was that capitalism is unable to revitalize itself.

• My question is this, how different is nuclear technology today from was the 1950's and how different from today will it be in the foreseeable future? Can nuclear power using plutonium-based fuels be made to operate safely and securely?

• I was very impressed with everything I heard this evening at the forum. I really feel that I learned a lot from all of the informative speakers. I would like to know if the Savannah River Site is still considering building a multi-purpose reactor? I know the subject has been brought up before. I feel it would bring a much needed project to this area and like the man from France stated, France is also producing power from their light water reactor system. A multi-purpose reactor would also produce electricity and it would burn up the plutonium. It sounds like it could be the answer. Anyway, best of luck in coming up with a solution to a very timely problem.

• We can't waste any time because the time has come to face this decision, and we should move ahead like France and other nations are doing. Let's get going.

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Questions not directed to any individual, which have not been answered

• Separately, review fissile and renewable energy sources worldwide, global warning, funding resources, and the mining impacts to finance a commercial industry operating with plutonium fuels, including military and commercial plutonium. Discuss spent fuel storage, geologic storage, reprocessing, fuel fabrication, fueling and defueling reactors, and transportation; include the expenditures for each activity. Review the DOE's policy and strategy for secure a U.S. energy supply over the next 20 to 40 years while protecting the environment.

• As presently fueled, commercial reactors create more plutonium. Discuss the advantages, disadvantages, and the likelihood of a fuel blanket with non-fissile material that would not create additional plutonium. Include costs. Would this approach provide a viable transition away from a plutonium-based economy?

• Discuss the geologic disposal of military and civilian plutonium for HLW and TRU wastes; include planning limits, constraints, and acceptance criteria for the disposition of fissile materials; and compare vitrified HLW vs. commercial spent fuels.

• Discuss the geologic disposal of spent fuel.

• Considering the age of our reprocessing facilities, discuss the operational readiness of reprocessing in the U.S from a technological and an intellectual resource perspective.

• Wouldn't there be decreased risks and costs to store plutonium at a limited number of sites? If stored at many sites, we will need many facilities to put the material into "the" disposable form. Then, we must clean up these facilities when done. How will we ever be done (since plutonium will continue to be produced through commercial reactors)? Therefore, the option to make MOX in one (or two at most) location(s) and burn up in reactors seems to make the most of a bad situation.

• Cost of the different methods for reducing plutonium storage should be addressed. Also, isn't cost the bottom line (including safety)?

• We have heard this afternoon some speakers who state that MOX use would be uneconomic. This evening, Dr. Bernard showed how France has developed a fuel cycle that is economically viable. Since the U.S. policy is to do no commercial reprocessing, we do not have to consider the costs for reprocessing, yet we are told that simply using plutonium that is already reprocessed is not economically viable. Can we not effectively recruit the MOX opponents and give its use a fair evaluation?

• What is the impact of any or all alternatives on non-renewable resource availability to future generations?

• What is the timeframe to use up stockpile of plutonium in MOX fuel and what is timeframe to turn stockpile into glass vitrification storage?

• How does the U.S.-Russian agreement reach (today's) resolve or impact the plutonium proliferation potential with other Nation states (which were formerly part of the former USSR) that possess or potentially possess plutonium or other weapons usable fissionable material?

• What is the long-term "solubility loss" from glass with and without a high sodium content? What is the variability in glass "solubility" (material loss) in water at temperatures expected in canister storage conditions?

• Can a U.S. utility contract with a foreign MOX fuel fabricator to reprocess spent fuel and build MOX fuel assemblies for use in a U.S. commercial reactor?

• What is the feasibility and advisability of the use of major DOE sites as centralized nuclear power production centers with complete fuel cycle management? Using MOX fuels? Using non-fertile plutonium fuels to reduce the production of plutonium?

• Are there any studies being made to divert the uranium and plutonium to peaceful purposes?

• What is the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China doing to stop nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of country's like Iran, Libya and Iraq?

• I would like to know if the Savannah River Site is still considering building a multi-purpose reactor?

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