April 18, 2007

 

STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN

Chairman

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON

 

 

            A bit more than two years ago, on February 15, 2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, along with 22 other people, was killed by a massive car bomb.

            Nothing in Lebanon has been the same since. Aroused from their torpor and disorganization, the assassination of Rafik Hariri, prompted the Lebanese people to undertake a long overdue democratic revolution and reassertion of their national independence. Syria's brutal gamble on assassination was intended to reinforce its domination of Lebanon. But rather than solidifying the system of foreign control, the murder of Hariri instead led to the expulsion of the Syrian military and intelligence forces which had occupied Lebanon for a generation, and the democratic election of a modern, liberal, Western-oriented Lebanese government.

            Only a year ago, Syrian President Asad was answering questions posed by the chief UN investigator. The new government of Lebanon, led by the March 14th Movement, with a majority of 72 out of 128 seats was, if not gaining in strength, at least gaining its sea legs, and was working to build consensus on the most difficult and divisive issues in Lebanon.

            But over the summer of 2006, Lebanon's hopes were nearly extinguished due to the war initiated by Hezbollah's unprovoked cross-border aggression against Israel. Though power in Beirut had shifted, Iranian and Syrian ambitions had not been extinguished, and Hezbollah, their terrorist attack dog, was more than ready to plunge Lebanon into war for the sake of its own greater glory and thirst for political power.

            Yet again, Lebanese interests were sacrificed in a gamble on violence. And, yet again, it is the ordinary people of Lebanon who came out the losers. The summer war was materially devastating for Lebanon, but the damage to Lebanon's democracy remains to this day unhealed.

            Beginning in December of last year, and continuing to this day, Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian forces within Lebanon have been engaged in an extralegal attempt to bring down the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora through massive street protests and targeted acts of violence. The proximate cause was the Lebanese government's decision not to shield the Asad regime in Syria, and to support the international tribunal investigating the death of Rafik Hariri.

            In truth, the struggle in Lebanon is much more fundamental. It is about whether the majority or the minority will rule. It is about whether the democratically elected government or a foreign-backed terrorist mob will govern. It is about whether legitimacy in Lebanon derives from the consent of the governed, or from the whims of foreign interests expressed through murder.

            The United States has an enormous stake in the outcome of this struggle, and I am sorry to note that since the donors conference in January, the Bush Administration has been excruciatingly quiet about Lebanon. Based on their history, the Lebanese people have a deep-seated and well-founded fear abandonment. Unfortunately, the lack of regularized public attention to Lebanon by the Executive branch has done much to validate their concerns.

            Clearly, the $1 billion dollars of assistance the United States has pledged to Lebanon is nothing to take lightly. I am proud that the House, when it passed the FY-07 supplemental included the $770 million the President requested for assistance to the government and armed forces of Lebanon. But more important than our money–though it is vital–is our steady and clear commitment to Lebanon's democratically elected government, to Lebanon's  independence and to Lebanon's sovereignty. I have called this hearing for just this reason.

            It is also true that there is a limit to how close Lebanon's leaders can come to the United States. Thanks in large measure to the policies of the Bush Administration, the extent of our nation's unpopularity makes an American embrace more like a kiss of death for any Lebanese, or indeed, any Arab, politician.

            But there are still ways for us to show our support without tainting those we mean to help. The most obvious is for the United States to make greater use of the broad international consensus in support of the Lebanese government. With the Secretary of State now committed to regular travel to the Middle East, it would be more than appropriate for her, while in the region, to arrange regular consultations with other interested nations on the question of how to continue to support the government of Prime Minister Siniora.

            Moreover, strong consideration should be given to establishing a formal contact group on Lebanon that would include the all of the donor nations, the moderate Arab states, the United Nations and the international financial institutions supporting Lebanon's financial and economic reform process.

This group should have regularly scheduled high-level meetings to review and coordinate the provision of aid pledged to Lebanon, to monitor political developments within Lebanon, and to consult on ways to improve the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

            I would note here that while the Lebanese Armed Forces are finally operating in South Lebanon, the regular reports of rearming by Hezbollah should give us, and the entire international community, additional motivation to work aggressively in the present in order to prevent a repeat of last summer's horror show.

            The situation in Lebanon is dire, but it is not too late to help save the Cedar Revolution. Our money is important, but our leadership is vital. Millions throughout Lebanon, the Middle East, and the rest of the world are watching Lebanon to see who will prevail.

            Will it be the freely elected government of Lebanon in a constructive alliance with the international community? Or will it be Hezbollah and its Syrian and Iranian patrons?

            There should be no doubt that Hezbollah, the Iranians and the Syrians are committed to winning. The massive street protests and targeted killings, the rapid, illicit rearmament of Hezbollah, and the provision of millions and millions of dollars of cash handouts for reconstruction and social welfare in south Lebanon show their commitment with unmistakable clarity.

            The simple question we are here to discuss today is, what are we going to do in response?

 

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