Documents 302-342
The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and the Vance Mediation
September-December 1967
302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, September 15, 1967, 0019Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Horner, cleared by NEA, and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Nicosia, London, and Paris.
37758. NATUS. Ref: Athens' 1266; Ankara's 1220./2/
/2/These telegrams, both dated September 12, reported Greek and Turkish impressions of the September 9-10 meetings of Prime Ministers Demirel and Kollias. Telegram 1266 from Athens is ibid., POL GREECE-TUR; telegram 1220 from Ankara is ibid., POL 27 CYP.
1. While Department had not expected weekend talks between Greek and Turk Prime Ministers would lead to immediate or dramatic results, we are disappointed learn that two parties were so far apart. We had felt earlier Toumbas-Caglayangil conversations were leading in direction "compensated enosis" and had believed GOG willingness offer GOT sovereign base area on Cyprus would be main ingredient in Turkish acceptance enosis. On other hand, Greek delegation probably went Kesan/Alexandropolis meeting with somewhat exaggerated expectations. One can speculate that becoming aware of Greek junta's desire achieve settlement for political reasons, GOT has somewhat raised its price for agreement. We would appreciate views Embassies Athens and Ankara this point.
2. We are concerned lest this setback could lead to loss momentum and dissipation of favorable atmosphere which has existed. Both sides seem be weary of prolonged stalemate since December 1963. In talking with senior officials of GOG and GOT, we hope you will convey our strong belief that Prime Ministerial meeting, although lacking in concrete results, represents act of statesmanship and sincere endeavor to frankly come to grips with Cyprus problem. We hope that both countries will avoid taking rigid or intransigent positions, and will not rake over past grievances. Important thing now is that talks continue, and that real effort be made compromise on differences which, if substantial, do not seem be irreconcilable.
Rusk
303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
Washington, September 18, 1967, 2249Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Horner, cleared by NEA and L, and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Athens and Nicosia.
39286. 1. NEA is considering recommending to the Secretary that in his forthcoming talks with Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers at 22nd GA he raise the possibility of an approach to Cyprus problem which might by-pass the major difficulties which we believe Greeks and Turks have been encountering in their bilateral talks. We would suggest that if this initiative seemed to evoke interest on the part of the two Foreign Ministers, the Secretary might agree to the discreet presentation of such possibility in more concrete form at a time and place to be mutually agreed upon. It would be made clear we not offering to mediate, but rather to assist efforts of parties concerned which we continue to regard as best road to solution.
2. Substance of the proposal we have in mind is the creation of a form of commonwealth relationship between Greece and Cyprus, with substantial guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots and advantages for Turkey. This follows along the lines of Wehmeyer paper which you have seen.
3. If our calculation is correct, the atmosphere making for a settlement is better now than it has been for some time. We believe there is mounting weariness on the part of all concerned with the existing stalemate, the expense involved and the damage to the Greek and Turkish security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time we think we detect disappointment and uncertainty on the part of the GOG. A proffer of good offices on our part would, we think, be well received, although we cannot of course predict that it would have tangible results. It should be emphasized that we are thinking of a careful, discreet and cautious approach to the matter, so as minimize possibility misinterpretation of our motives. On balance we tend to think possible gains overbalance predictable disadvantages.
4. Department would appreciate comments of three Ambassadors by C.O.B. Tuesday, September 19./2/
/2/Telegram 1364 from Athens, September 19, reported that the Greek Government would welcome active U.S. intervention in the Cyprus negotiation process. (Ibid.) Telegram 355 from Nicosia, September 19, responded that while Makarios and other Greek Cypriots would welcome a more active U.S. role, the Turkish Cypriots would be highly mistrustful. (Ibid.) No reply from Ankara has been found.
Rusk
304. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, September 20, 1967, 1525Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris, and USUN.
1382. NATUS Info.
1. King Constantine last night expressed to me his "fed-upness" with hardened Turkish position which had brought to naught Prime Ministerial meeting on which he had pinned strong hopes. Acknowledging Greek side might have bungled discussions, King doubted even extreme Greek ineptness could have caused such sharp change in Turkish position. He could not understand how Turkish side could say enosis had not been contemplated when even word enosis was included in paper jointly signed by Toumbas and Caglayangil last December. Col. Papadopoulos and his associates now believe British probably responsible for Turkish intransigence./2/ (I expressed doubt British could or would have played that role.) King himself could think of no reason except Turkish desire to trim sails to Soviet winds on eve of Demirel's Moscow visit. In any case, King saw no point in further efforts to deal with Turkish Government at this stage. Perhaps when Turkish reasoning clarified, somebody (presumably meaning U.S.) could help get Turks back on rails. In meantime King would have no further interest in "this kind of game."
/2/Queried by the Department of State in telegram 41302 to Athens, September 21, about the apparent discrepancies in Greek versions of this meeting, Talbot responded in telegram 1431 from Athens, September 22, that enosis was mentioned in the "Basic Principles" document initialed by the Foreign Ministers at the beginning of the meeting and that this had been inserted by the Greek side as one of its objectives. In initialing, the Turkish Foreign Minister was simply acknowledging he understood the other side's basic principles. (Both ibid.)
2. I commented that out of our own sad experiences with international disputes we had repeatedly been taught necessity for patience and persistence. Continuation of dialogue could be very important. King heard me out but without further comment turned to other subjects.
Talbot
305. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC-16
New York, September 28, 1967, 4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Stein and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office in the U.S. Mission. Memoranda of other portions of this conversation dealing with trade with Cuba, the Middle East, U.S. facilities in Cyprus, and United Nations affairs are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 216.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1967
SUBJECT
Cyprus Problem (Part I of V)
PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Robert A. Stein, NEA Adviser
Cyprus
Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou
Ambassador Zenon Rossides, Permanent Representative to UN
Mr. Andreas Jacovides, Director of Political Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicosia
The Foreign Minister declared at the outset that the Cyprus problem, of course, was by far the major issue for them. He said that Cyprus was not surprised at the result of the Evros talks, because the Cypriots had always had reservations with regard to the Greek-Turkish dialogue. He said that now that the dialogue is ended Cyprus is considering what should be done next. He said that the situation in Cyprus is improved over what it was a year ago, and it is time to strengthen efforts for peace by finding another procedure to follow. Could common ground be found within a UN framework? He commented that the Cyprus Government is thinking in terms of "good offices". Possibly something along this line might make it easier for the Greeks and the Turks. A vacuum may be dangerous, he said. We are in a period of reconsideration, and are ready to consider anything.
The Secretary said that he knew that U Thant was concerned about the cost of the UN force on Cyprus. He said that U Thant had mentioned it at his dinner for the Big Four Foreign Ministers but there was not much reaction from the Ministers. The Foreign Minister said that the annual cost is about $8 million.
The Secretary said that the US has no fresh ideas on the subject, and asked the Foreign Minister if the Cyprus Government is in a hurry for action. The Foreign Minister replied that there is no particular hurry, but the situation cannot continue on indefinitely. He observed that some procedure such as good offices would have a calming effect. He mentioned that the UN force on the island had a peacemaking as well as peacekeeping role. The Secretary asked if the presence of the force causes problems, and the Foreign Minister replied in the negative, saying that an absence of the force would, however.
The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister thought that a new procedure would lead quickly to a solution. Mr. Kyprianou did not think so, but he believed it would be helpful in eliminating impractical ideas. The Turks, for instance, are thinking of a condominium. In reply to a question the Foreign Minister said he believed there is a consensus among the people of the island for enosis. He thought the use of good offices would be a way of clarifying many of the issues involved. The Cyprus problem is affected by the situation in Greece, he said. With regard to the Turks, is it a problem for them of security or of the Turkish Cypriots? Do the Turks want partition? Under good offices this could all be discussed in a logical way.
The Secretary told the Foreign Minister that in his meeting yesterday with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil/2/ the word Cyprus did not come up once. The Secretary added that it would be convenient if the US could take the same position the British did for three years back in the 40's with regard to the Palestine question. Their position was that Britain would go along with anything the parties concerned decided.
/2/Memoranda of Rusk's conversations with Caglayangil are ibid.
The Secretary ascertained that the Foreign Minister had spoken to U Thant about the possibility of a new procedure being adopted. He said that U Thant would like to stop spending that $8 million a year, and he is certainly entitled to try to do so. The Secretary commented that there might be two or three procedures: to find a solution, to keep things in hand until a solution is found, or to keep things in hand without anything further in mind. He said he would talk with his colleagues in the Department on the subject of a new procedure.
306. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SecDel/MC-17
New York, September 29, 1967, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US. Confidential. Drafted by Stein and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office in the U.S. Mission. Memoranda of other portions of this conversation dealing with Cyprus and Vietnam are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 216.
SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September-October 1967
SUBJECT
US-Greek Relations (Part II of III)
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The Secretary
Robert A. Stein, NEA Adviser
Greece
Foreign Minister Paul Economou-Gouras
Ambassador to the US Christian Palamas
The Foreign Minister said that work was going forward on drafting a Greek Constitution. When the Secretary asked if there was something on paper, the Foreign Minister said it is too early since work is now only in the pre-draft stage. It is hoped that a working draft will be available in about a month and that there will be a final draft before the end of the year. He said that the Greek Government would be sending a committee to the US, France, and the Scandinavian countries to consult with constitutional experts.
The Foreign Minister declared that the Greeks are concerned about the weakening of the security situation in their area. He said that in addition to the threat from the north, Soviet naval forces now in the Mediterranean to the south make the country feel insecure. He mentioned that Greece has a long border--850 miles--with communist territory. He said that he would like to see NATO concentrate not only on the defense of its flanks but also on the interior lines. The Secretary said that there should be no worry in a military sense because of the Soviet naval force. They are in an exposed position, and would go back into the Black Sea if trouble were in the offing. The Foreign Minister agreed that the Soviet naval force was more serious from a political than from a military aspect.
The Foreign Minister declared that Greece wanted to be helped by its friends. The Secretary said that the Greek regime caused a big problem in US, and our whole aid bill is having difficult passage in Congress as a result. The Secretary explained that the President and the Executive branch of our government get no money at all to spend that is not authorized by the Congress. The King's visit and his discussions with members of Congress helped, but we will not know for a while what funds will be authorized. Perhaps we will have more of an idea in two weeks or so.
The Foreign Minister said that the Greek leaders are not ambitious. They are patriotic men who want to see Greece out of the mess it is in. The Foreign Minister said that he is afraid they would become desperate when Greece's friends do not show an understanding attitude. He pointed out that Greece had voted with the United States yesterday in the debate in the General Assembly on the question of defining aggression. Turkey and Cyprus had abstained in the vote.
The Secretary said that the Greek coup d'etat was the sixty-fourth to occur in the world since he became Secretary of State. He observed that there had been no prior consultation with us, and the coup had created serious problems for us. While we recognize that the matter is an internal one for Greece, it does cause the US problems. The Secretary said that we are friends and allies, and both of us would like to see our relations improve, but it will take time.
The Foreign Minister remarked that he and Ambassador Palamas continue to have hope, and that is why they are serving this government. The Secretary replied that we take note of the fact that men like the Minister and the Ambassador are in the Greek Government and draw encouragement from this fact. The Foreign Minister mentioned that he and others are fighting to keep Greece in NATO. He asked why there was so much criticism against Greece and not Portugal. The Secretary answered that probably people expect more of Greece.
307. Editorial Note
Fighting between Turkish Cypriot military formations and Greek Cypriot police and National Guard units broke out on November 15, 1967, at Agios Theodoros and nearby Kophinou. On November 16, the Turkish Government demanded that Greek Cypriots immediately cease their attacks and threatened military intervention. The following day, a Turkish note to the Greek Government demanded the removal of its troops on Cyprus, the recall of General Grivas, compensation for victims of Greek Cypriot attacks, and the end of restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. After consultations with the involved states and at the United Nations, the United States decided to send a special envoy to the area to support the efforts of U.N. and NATO representatives to avoid a military clash over the island.
On November 22, President Johnson asked former Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to serve as his envoy. Vance arrived in Ankara at noon the following day. Between November 23 and December 4, Vance shuttled among Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia in an effort to secure a peaceful settlement. Documentation on the Vance mission is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYPRUS, and ibid., POL 7 US-VANCE, and Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings.
Also on November 22, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant announced that he was sending Jose Rolz-Bennett to the three capitals as his Special Representative to convey directly to the governments his grave concern and his "urgent appeal for utmost restraint." For text of his statement (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.3), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 365-366.
308. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation/1/
November 15, 1967, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Draper.
SUBJECT
Cyprus Situation
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Parker T. Hart, Ankara, Turkey
Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Rockwell said that the highest authorities here were very much concerned by developments on Cyprus. He asked the Ambassador whether there were any recent indications of what the Turks intended to do.
Ambassador Hart explained that his last information was that the Turkish Government was still trying to decide what to do. He, Hart, had informed (Turkish Foreign Ministry Secretary General) Kuneralp that the fighting had stopped in accord with orders from Athens. Kuneralp was "very happy" at this news. He was also gratified by information that UNFICYP was endeavoring to bring the situation at the "villages" back to the status quo ante. The Ambassador had also informed Kuneralp that UNFICYP wished to remove the National Guard from the villages. Of course, he said, we did not know how future developments might emerge, and we therefore could not be certain how the Turkish Government would behave.
Ambassador Hart said there was a good deal of activity and meetings in Ankara. The heads of the Turkish military forces had been meeting that night, for example. He did expect, he said, certain precautionary moves. The Ambassador thought it rather unlikely that the Turks would take any "particular action" with matters quiet on the island. He reiterated that he did not now anticipate "forceful action" but quickly made clear that this estimate was good only as long as there was quiet and no further spread of fighting.
The Ambassador went on to mention that some 30 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population was in the Nicosia triangle and that an estimated 10,000 Turks were in the region affected by the fighting. Whether quiet would remain in that region was still a question, he admitted. He said that, sharing what he understood was also the US opinion, the Turks were firmly convinced that General Grivas was behind all the trouble. Cabinet meetings had taken place on this subject and he understood that the Cabinet Ministers and the service chiefs had held a joint meeting.
Mr. Rockwell at this juncture said he had just received a message from Athens (Athens 2148)/2/ concerning the GOG request to the GOC to withdraw the National Guard. He conveyed the substance of this message to the Ambassador. He reiterated that the point of his call was to register the real concern in the highest quarters in Washington over these developments. These quarters were gravely concerned that the interests of all parties were endangered. Ambassador Hart said that this message from Athens was most welcome and he thought it would assist him in his own efforts.
/2/Dated November 16. (Ibid.)
Note: The telephone call was made in the expectation (and hope) that the Turks would monitor it.
309. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 17, 1967, 1452Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 1602Z and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Brussels for the Mission to NATO, USUN, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2186. NATUS.
1. I took occasion of delivery of Secretary's message to Prime Minister (State 70871)/2/ to weigh in heavily with him (and later with King) on potential further serious explosion unless Grivas is removed from Cyprus scene immediately, even though temporarily.
/2/Telegram 70871 to Athens, November 17, transmitted a message from Rusk for Kollias congratulating Greece on its restraint over the Cyprus issue. (Ibid.)
2. PriMin thanked me for Secretary's message and said that GOG is determined to show greatest wisdom and restraint in order to preserve peace between two countries. He reverted to his suspicions of Turkish intentions, referring to following: Turk overflights, Turk armored brig being moved towards Everos triangle and demonstrations in Istanbul when anti-Greek and anti-American slogans heard. GOG had strictly forbidden any intervention of RHAF in connection overflights and movement of Greek troops toward Evros from Alexandropoulis had been halted. I congratulated him on this restraint and said that as one who is deeply concerned about situation I must say that today looks worse than yesterday did, particularly with the renewal of patrolling in Agios Theodoros. He did not appear aware of this development. I passed on our reports from Nicosia (Nicosia 638 and previous)./3/
/3/Telegram 638 from Nicosia, November 17, reported on further fighting in Cyprus. (Ibid.)
3. I said I was afraid that this resumption would not be taken by Ankara as indication of restraint and peaceful inclinations on part Cypriot Govt.
4. I then turned to Grivas problem and said that I did not like to refer to individuals when discussing policy matters yet as one who had lived through Cyprus difficulties in 1964, I felt that Turks would no doubt take the traditional attitudes and look upon Grivas actions as having been ordered by GOG since both Grivas and other Greek officers serving in Cyprus are all active officers of Greek forces. PriMin insisted this was not correct because as soon as GOG had learned of Grivas actions it had at once made strong recommendation and on next day requested GOC to refrain from any further action re Agios Theodoros. Grivas and other regular Greek officers in Cyprus take their orders from GOC not Athens govt. I said I was not speaking under instructions but had been mulling over ways which might help reduce tension. It had occurred to me that one way might be to invite Grivas to Athens for consultations. Such gesture could be taken in Ankara as sign of good faith of GOG and its desire to reduce tension on island. I continued that there are hawks and doves in Ankara and we do not know what decisions and discussions are being held there nor what has been said during last 24 hours that GNA has been meeting behind closed doors. PriMin promptly replied that GOG had already thought of this. He regrets that his thoughts coincided with those of the American Ambassador. Now if this action is taken it will be presumed that it is result of American pressure. I replied I would be more than glad to withdraw suggestion at once.
5. I assured PriMin I was aware that many people feel that American recommendations for restraint are made only in Athens. All one could say to them is that they do not know what has been happening in Ankara during the last week. PriMin said he understood that and certainly recommendations for moderation from US to two allies who are in difficulty cannot be interpreted as intervention. He reverted to another recount of his suspicions of intentions of Turks to create yet another pocket and cut off Nicosia-Limassol-Larnaca road. He then appealed to US to use all possible means to convince Turkish side of good intentions of GOG because he feels that good faith on part GOG only may not be enough. I assured him that USG is well aware of good intentions of GOG and we would be happy to help in any way that PriMin feels would be helpful to both parties.
6. Although our conversation laid sensitive problem on the line in frank tones, PriMin did not react in scratchy, near irascible manner he sometimes does. He appeared to be deeply worried man seeking way out of dilemma./4/
/4/In telegram 2182 from Athens, November 17, Talbot reported that King Constantine had informed him that the Greek Government had ordered Grivas' withdrawal. (Ibid.)
Talbot
310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, November 17, 1967, 1846Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Drafted by Howison; cleared by Battle, Rockwell, and Rostow; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, the Mission to NATO, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
70960. NATUS. Please deliver following message from President Johnson to President Makarios by fastest available means:
"Your Beatitude: Developments on and relating to the Island of Cyprus during the last few days have created a situation of utmost gravity. As I see it, the issue is war or peace and not the rights and wrongs of any specific problem. I appeal to you, as I am appealing to King Constantine and President Sunay,/2/ to do everything within the power of your Government to reduce the threat to peace now hanging over your region. In particular it seems to me that in this explosive situation the continuation of patrols in the areas of the current conflict is extremely dangerous, for peace in Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean./3/
/2/A similar message was transmitted to the Embassy in Ankara in telegram 70962, November 17, and to the Embassy in Athens in telegram 70961, November 17. (Both ibid.) King Constantine's reply, pledging his efforts to ensure peace, was transmitted in telegram 2215 from Athens, November 18. (Ibid.) President Sunay's reply, outlining the Turkish position including its fundamental demand for the withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus, was transmitted in telegram 2407 from Ankara, November 18. (Ibid.) See also Document 311.
/3/In telegram 650 from Nicosia, November 17, Belcher reported that he had delivered the President's message and believed that Makarios would attempt to reduce tensions by calling off patrols by Greek Cypriot police. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"
Rusk
311. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, November 18, 1967, 0200Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 0332Z and repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, USUN, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2393. Ref: State 70962./2/ Subj: President's message to Sunay.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 310.
1. Delivered President's message to Caglayangil at FonMin at earliest he could receive me, approx 1235 am. Kuneralp and Turkmen were present. I delivered it verbally but left them copy at their request. (I did it this way so that if necessary they could say technically that I had not delivered a "letter" or note or any formal written communication which could be subject of controversy within govt or between govt and Parliament as was case from June 1964 to Jan 1966)./3/ Turkmen translated immediately into Turkish and Caglayangil immediately dictated following provisional reaction:
/3/In telegram 2396 from Ankara, November 18, Hart amplified on the reasons for delivering the message orally. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
"I would like to thank President Johnson and the US Govt for the interest they have shown in the matter but I would like to point out that the problem is no longer a problem of passions or good will. You know that the incident of the Greek patrols to Bogazici (Ayios Theodoros) has caused very tragic events. Twenty-four of my kinsmen have been killed. One thousand Turks had to flee their homes and live under deprivation. An 80-year old man, a Turk, has been burned alive in Gecitkale (Kophinou). Tortures like the ones used in the Middle Ages have been applied against the Turkish community, and after all these tragic events we have seen that the Greeks have again sent their patrol yesterday and today in a very ostentatious manner. This example of the 80-year old man who was burned alive which has shocked you (he referred to my facial expression) is only one incident among many others. If you can read them without being shocked and without feeling nausea, I can give you other accounts of events which have been witnessed by the UN forces. The Turkish public opinion and the Turkish community have been incurably aroused against the Turkish Govt. We have sent today to the people of Gecitkale some relief goods through the Turkish Red Crescent and these people are people whose houses have been destroyed, whose belongings have been pillaged and who had barely escaped a massacre. They were all hungry and despite the fact that they were hungry they have refused all the relief goods and they said:
"'We don't want anything from Turkey. Get out of here.' This is not a sad story I am telling you, it is what happened today in the island.
"We, as the Turkish people, have a love for the American people because we feel they are our friends, because we share their philosophy and their democratic principles and it is for this reason that we have formed our destiny with that of the United States. Because we believe that it would bring no good to the world we are struggling together against an ideology and since many years we are the sentinels of the struggle on the very frontier. At such an hour I had expected that a message coming from a country with which we have a common destiny would be different. Since 10:00 PM today Erenkoy (Kokkina) has been surrounded by Greek forces and subjected to heavy firing. I had expected that given this situation (the entire present situation) our American friends would come and tell us that they regret that they have prevented in the past a Turkish initiative and that they would say: `Now the decision is yours.'
"This message, the message you have brought is addressed to our head of state. We will, of course, convey this message to its high destination. We will, of course, study it and evaluate it, bearing in mind its importance and in the spirit of Turkish-American friendship. We shall weigh carefully each word. During the time we have worked together I have seen, Excellency, how much value you attach to Turkish-American friendship and I know also your tireless efforts to promote this friendship. I would like to thank you for the interest you have shown for our national issue.
"Some one and half hours ago I have called in the Greek Ambassador. I told him that we were holding the Greek Govt responsible for everything that happened. I told him that we were definitely determined not to allow the Greek Govt and its puppet in Cyprus to continue to undermine the interests and prestige of the Turkish state.
"Seeing that these brutal actions in Gecitkala have not received any reaction the Greeks do not any longer recognize the influence of any authority and all of them by individual initiatives are attacking at any occasion our innocent people. The Turkish Govt cannot condemn its 120,000 kinsmen to live like cattle while waiting their turn in a slaughter house. I believe that from now on it's not what we want but what God wants that will happen. This, Mr. Ambassador, is what I wanted to tell you." (It is interesting that there was no mention of Czech arms.)
2. I commented that I much appreciated his remarks concerning my devotion to Turkish-American friendship. I would continue to apply myself with all my energies to furtherance of this relationship and to assistance in finding some way out from fearful problem which Turkey faces today in such manner as to avoid further loss of human life. I deeply admired statesmanship and restraint shown by FonMin in present crisis, as well as his attitude and attitude of rest of govt throughout last two years. Prospect of a war between two allies was a nightmare for us all. It was in spirit of foregoing that President's message should be read and understood. As I had indicated, messages had been sent to King Constantine and to Archbishop Makarios. These were strong messages. Up to time these messages had been sent tremendous efforts had been spent to stop patrolling in stricken villages of Cyprus and otherwise ease situation by every means. Some progress being registered, as shown by fact, still very secret, Grivas being recalled to Athens and due to depart 2:00 AM or 10:00 AM today. We hoped very much his recall would be permanent. Patrols also had been suspended temporarily and we hoped suspensions could be made indefinite.
Caglayangil replied: "You have rightly referred to the prospect of a war between two allies as a nightmare, but to go through this nightmare once and for all is preferable to seeing a nightmare every night." At this point I felt Caglayangil was not being quite as serious as before.
I said that without trying just to have the last word I must say that he and I both knew that a war would not be a nightmare for one night but for an indefinite number of days and nights and with incalculable consequences.
Caglayangil who had been very tense at start of meeting, appeared much more relaxed as I left. He and I agreed I would refuse all comment to press and I did so when they surrounded my car a few minutes later./4/
/4/In telegram 2224 from Athens, November 20, Talbot commented that he believed Turkey was trying to force the United States to adopt its position on the troop issue by the use of an ultimatum. (Ibid.)
Hart
312. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 22, 1967, 0205Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 0327Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, the Mission to NATO, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2296. Ref: 2294, 2295./2/
/2/Telegram 2294 from Athens, November 21, reported that the King had suggested that President Johnson invite himself and President Sunay to Washington for talks designed to head off a clash over Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 2295 from Athens, November 21, reported that King Constantine assured Talbot that Greece would not launch a preemptive strike against Turkish invasion forces but warned that the time for effective diplomatic intervention was short. (Ibid.)
1. At 0230 local King summoned me to Greek Pentagon where he meeting with senior Cabinet members and Chiefs of Staff. He asked that I urgently inform USG that GOG had reached several conclusions tonight:
A. PriMin and FonMin now completing draft reply to Turkish note of Nov 17. Reply which hopefully will hold door open for Greek-Turk talks expected to be ready for delivery in morning.
B. GOG will welcome Brosio's injecting himself more actively in relieving Greek-Turkish differences and is so informing him./3/
/3/On November 24, NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio announced that he would go to the crisis area in an effort to find a solution.
C. Idea of joint GOG-GOC approach to UNSYG was considered but discarded for tonight because of doubt UN would act fast enough or that Turkey would agree to participate in talks at this stage with GOC as well as GOG.
D. GOG would welcome invitation from President Johnson to King Constantine and President Sunay, with their Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, to meet together in United States to discuss peace between Greece and Turkey.
2. In course of evening King had grown enthusiastic about this last idea. I suggested that since I could not know how President would feel about this suggestion or whether it would be realistic in relation to all other considerations he must have in mind perhaps we could start by exploring idea hypothetically. For example, could Greece accept not just simple invitation but something suggesting specific direction of talks? Earlier in evening, King had mentioned demilitarization of Cyprus. Turks talking about removal of Greek forces before bilateral talks. Would it be feasible for President, if he should extend invitation, to indicate he understood Greece and presumably Turkey looking toward demilitarization of Cyprus and was inviting their highest representatives to talks on how to achieve this and other steps necessary to resolve current difficulties and restore friendly Greek-Turkish relations?
3. King felt this might give GOG difficulties but excused himself for few moments to consult PriMin and FonMin. On his return he said government shared his feeling it would not be appropriate to have agreement to demilitarization as a condition of meeting, which should be called to discuss urgent issue of peace between Greece and Turkey. However, acceptance of demilitarization would certainly be important question for discussion, along with adjustment of treaty provisions relating to unilateral intervention and other questions. He said again that most of his Ministers and Chiefs of Staff want to get Greek forces out of Cyprus.
4. I promised to convey his ideas to Washington immediately. He hoped that response could be prompt.
5. In absence of Canadian and British colleagues I made no reference to Turkish ideas of basis for settlement that we expect to put to Foreign Minister in morning. Perhaps phrasing can be found which will meet Turkish minimum needs for indication for action before talks but also get top level talks going rapidly.
6. On another subject, King mentioned that Makarios has proposed plans which GOG studying tonight for partial mobilization and full mobilization in Cyprus.
Talbot
313. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, November 22, 1967, 1245Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 1347Z. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and Ottawa.
710. Reference: State 73069./2/
/2/Telegram 73069 to Nicosia, November 22, instructed Belcher to press Makarios to take action that would facilitate the removal of excess Greek forces from Cyprus. (Ibid.)
1. As suggested reftel saw Makarios noon today local to present modified draft message (text septel)/3/ for his consideration. Made somewhat lengthy introductory remarks enlarging para 2 reftel and referring in particular to his oft repeated remarks desire see reduction of military forces on island and indeed eventual demilitarization. Also referred our expressed desire play useful role as non-aligned power and suggested he might add to his stature as statesman by some timely action in keeping with his acceptance speech of December 1959. At critical juncture in history of Cyprus and of Greece and Turkey, if he could take initiative in calling for reduction, if not elimination of military forces in Cyprus, he would be making real contribution to defusing present crisis which of utmost gravity and at same time make significant contribution to overall settlement of Cyprus problem. I then gave him text describing draft message as combination State Department and Embassy thinking which I had no time to clear with Washington and therefore had no official USG status but was merely an effort put down some thoughts which might be useful if he considered concept our suggestion valuable.
/3/Telegram 711 from Nicosia, November 22. (Ibid.)
2. Makarios commented that we were correct in our assumption that he favored demilitarization through a phased reduction of forces but that for him to take the initiative without reference to Athens was out of the question. He said he personally would have no hesitation in telling me that he agreed with the concept and indeed the text of the proposed message. However in view of present crisis and state of public opinion both here and in Greece, he feared he would be accused of being a traitor and selling out Greece. I attempted argue that a private and confidential message of this sort might actually assist Greece in reaching decision regarding reply to Turkish note. The injection of a statesmanlike suggestion such as this at this time might have most significant bearing on outcome of crisis. He agreed but again said he could not take initiative. Archbishop then said he could, however, respond affirmatively to any Greek initiative along these lines and asked that we consider making presentation in Athens along lines mine to him. I said I would pass his observations back to Department and to Embassy Athens and I assumed I would hear something further which I would then communicate later today or this evening. In meantime I urged him give further thought to our proposal. He replied that he intended discuss it with Clerides and Kyprianou and in event of any change in his view as result these discussions, he would call me.
3. Comment: I think significant point to come out of somewhat discouraging conversation is that Makarios and his government would not only oppose reduction and eventual withdrawal of Greek forces, and indeed further steps toward demilitarization, but that he willing respond affirmatively to any possible GOG proposals along lines reftel. Realize that initiative along these lines in Athens would complicate if not counter efforts now being made there on wider concept of Turk five points. However, certainly in event Greek rejection present tripartite initiative, foregoing could conceivably be used as next move in our efforts avoid conflict. Prior to seeing Makarios discussed proposed approach with Canadian HICOMer and he very much in accord. Had no time inform UK HICOMer but doing so now.
Belcher
314. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, November 22, 1967, 2030Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 0100Z on November 23. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Ottawa, USUN, the Mission to NATO, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
717. Ref: Nicosia 716./2/
/2/Telegram 716, November 22, transmitted the text of the paper read to Makarios. (Ibid.)
1. During 45 minute meeting with Makarios UK and Canadian HICOMers and myself, Canadian was spokesman and read prepared text including Turkish five points/3/ (being sent reftel).
/3/Presented to the Greek Government on November 22, the five points were: 1)Turkish reaffirmation of the inviolability and integrity of the Cyprus Republic, 2)withdrawal of Greek armed forces on Cyprus in excess of the numbers permitted by the London-Zurich Agreements, 3)expansion of UNFICYP's role to pacify the island, 4)payment of indemnities to Turkish Cypriots, and 5)security arrangements for Turkish Cypriots not dependent on Greek Cypriot police or military formation. (Telegram 2303 from Athens, November 22; ibid.)
2. Makarios commented that first three Turkish points were acceptable to him if accepted by GOG. Speaking to me he remarked that as he had said earlier today (Nicosia 710)/4/ he was in favor of complete demilitarization including removal of Greek and Turk contingents. He went on to say that presence of any foreign military troops would be source of constant friction and suspicion and therefore would be best include them in withdrawal as well. UK HICOMer remarked that for time being perhaps Turks would feel their contingent's presence required in order give some sense of additional security to Turkish community. I remarked that this aspect of course could be included as one of items to be discussed further as suggested in last paragraph of document which Canadian HICOMer had given him.
/4/Document 313.
3. After first saying that if five points acceptable to GOG he could accept also, Archbishop expressed reservations with regard (D) and (E) which he felt were matters purely concerning the GOC. He would require time to discuss these two points with his Ministers. He said he would call in Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis for further discussion of five points. I reminded him that these five points and numerous other aspects of problem had been discussed at great length in Ankara by our three colleagues and GOT representatives. These had emerged as basic points in Turkish position. They had been presented today noon by our three colleagues in Athens to FonMin Pipinelis who had said he would refer them at once to Greek Cabinet. I doubted whether Alexandrakis would have word as yet although at some point hopefully very soon, there would be some consultation, at least on last two points. I said that we would be informing Athens at once of his favorable views on reduction of forces covered in points (2) and (3) and I felt sure this would be major factor to be taken into consideration by Greek Cabinet in reaching its decision. Speed was of the utmost importance at this most critical time and he could be assured we would send this word by the fastest possible means.
4. Makarios closed meeting by commenting that ref in last para of document to "other interested parties" meant primarily Cyprus. Said that presumably discussions between Greece and Turkey could not go further into ultimate solution without involvement of GOC at early date.
Belcher
315. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash. Received at 1206Z. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, Ottawa, the Mission to NATO, and USUN.
Nicosia, November 23, 1967, 1020Z.
723. Reference: State 74021./2/ Subject: Possible Makarios-King Constantine message.
/2/Telegram 74021 to Nicosia, November 23, instructed Belcher to make the strongest presentation possible to Makarios to ensure a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (Ibid.)
1. Makarios saw me 9:30 AM (local). As expected, however, he reiterated his position as set forth Nicosia 710/3/ that he could not get out in front by sending unilateral message. I then urged him consider proposing to GOG that joint message be sent. This would avoid either King or Makarios being singled out as one who "sold out Hellenism". Makarios' initial reaction was that this idea had merit. He wondered if message might be sent by himself and King jointly to UNSYG who then could take further action on it. I said that such a proposal could well fit in with presence of Rolz-Bennett in Ankara later today. If offer inherent in proposed text could be made to U Thant as response SYG's appeal and then forwarded by him to Rolz-Bennett in Ankara, latter might be able make excellent use of it in his conversations with Turks. This might well be instrument for defusing situation and getting Turk finger off the button.
/3/Document 313.
2. Makarios asked if I thought presence of high-level emissaries in Ankara might result in defusing situation. I had feared Vance and Rolz-Bennett Missions might be seized upon by him as excuse for further procrastination. I am sure this is what was in his mind. I told him in very strong terms that we convinced all they could do was buy some time by their presence and that Turks would require some sort of response from Greeks. I said we convinced that reduction of armed confrontation on island was central to their basic position as set forth in five points./4/ If no move made at least in this direction, I could see no hope in situation. Since he accepted in principle concept set forth in proposed message and King accepted in principle and since concept of demilitarization encompassed points two and three of Turk five points, surely sensible thing to do at this stage was to move along these lines. He said he would have to consult his advisers and I asked him notify me perhaps through Clerides as soon as possible since time was of the essence. Also offered transmit any message for him if this would facilitate matter.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 314.
3. I immediately called on Clerides and Alexandrakis and made similar presentation and believe have won their support. Also tried impress on both of them need for swift action in order take advantage Rolz-Bennett presence Ankara. Alexandrakis had one important modification to suggest in proposal. He believes that message if agreed to by Makarios and his government should be from Kollias and Makarios rather than from King. He fears that public reaction in Greece to message would be very adverse and he did not want to risk institution of monarchy in this connection. As he put it, we can sacrifice Kollias in the interests of peace but not the King.
4. Ambassador Talbot may wish proceed put these same ideas to GOG without awaiting for Makarios' final reaction. Could be that Greeks might wish take initiative in developing joint message. Believe they may be more aware of need for speed than is Archbishop who is characteristically a procrastinator.
Belcher
316. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 23, 1967, 0330Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Received at 1221Z and repeated to Ankara for Vance, Nicosia, London, Ottawa, USUN, and the Mission to NATO.
2330. Ref: Ankara 2501./2/ For the Secretary from Talbot.
/2/Telegram 2501 from Ankara, November 23, suggested that the Greek Government inform Turkey of its interest in a speedy and effective mutual demilitarization. (Ibid.)
1. With all respect, another way to stop war is for Turkey not to start it. I do not now comment on specific plan suggested reftel, which I assume being studied in Ottawa, London, and Washington, but rather on general idea that only way to keep peace is for Greece to meet Turkey's terms within hours.
2. For full week now Turkey has been bullying Greeks to accept capitulation on an issue that all sides now believe could be resolved by negotiation not under gun. In process, Turkish actions and demands have engaged maximum energies of USG, British, Canadians, NATO, and now UNSYG. Virtually total resources of major Western powers and international organizations created since World War II to provide alternatives to war for settlement of international disputes are now available to Turkey and Greece. If wrongs have been committed by Greek and Cypriot forces (and they have), Turkey has access to full panoply of international machinery for redress. If in these circumstances it nonetheless concludes that its case can be carried only by its own military power, case must be weak indeed. Especially as in present circumstances Turkey has no treaty justification for military action in another sovereign country, since Article 4 of Treaty of Guarantee which Turkey usually cites authorizes unilateral action only in absence of common or concerted action, which certainly is now occurring and could be complete if Turkey itself would join.
I well understand Turkish rationale for present course is "Turkish honor." When in history of aggression has national honor not been reason advanced for military attack on another country? One week ago Greece through Grivas-led Cyprus National Guard attack had lost any claim to international support of its position. Today I suspect Turkey by its tactics has raised doubts in many governments about justness of its cause. Has not time come to make this fact plain to Turks?
Knowing importance of our interests and delicacy of current relations with Turkey, I am full of admiration for way Ambassador Hart has been handling task which substantially more difficult than mine here. Nonetheless, I hope instructions given Vance Mission will permit him to make forceful case to GOT that this dispute must now be committed to international machinery designed to deal with threats of war. Against this, who can argue that there is excuse for escalation to war actions whose inescapable result would be killing of many more Turk Cypriots than have yet been casualties of communal strike on Cyprus, not to mention anticipated Turk and Greek casualties and other costs?
Talbot
317. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 23, 1967, 1220Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Received at 1331Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Ottawa, USUN, the Mission to NATO, CINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2338. NATUS. Ref: State 74022./2/
/2/Telegram 74022 to Athens, November 23, instructed Talbot to suggest to the King that Greece immediately offer to withdraw 500 troops from Cyprus and indicate its readiness to discuss further withdrawals. (Ibid.)
1. I called on King at 1200 local just before meeting convened at Palace of "little Cabinet" (PriMin, FinMin, 5 military Ministers) and outlined points in paras 2 and 3 reftel. King grimaced at idea of recalling Greek military personnel under heat of Turkish military pressure. I suggested Makarios initiative, if it forthcoming as we now urgently recommending, ought give good basis for Greek token withdrawal as earnest of good will. Discussion revealed Royal firmness on point that any Greek action would have to be matched by comparable Turkish de-escalation action. I came away with impression that if Vance can get Turkish pledge of some visible pullback we can expect to be able to persuade Greeks to order withdrawal of some troops. However, in matters such as these King both influences Ministers and is influenced by them. I may be able to get better reading of Greek mood today after Cabinet meeting.
2. I have impression mood developing in Palace and "little Cabinet" to go for complete demilitarization of Cyprus as part of settlement this crisis if war avoided. In [King?] says military Ministers now tending to want to get rid of Greek and Turkish contingents as well as all forces put on island since 1963. In their developing view, internal security could then be maintained either by reinforced UNFICYP or by merging Cypriot National Guard and Turkish-Cypriot military and paramilitary units into single national Cyprus force.
3. I mentioned USG concern over protection of minorities in Greece and Turkey as tensions heightened. King immediately suggested Greece would welcome American or other international observers during period of crisis in areas where Turkish ethnics congregated, on assumption Turkey would offer similar facilities.
4. I also noted importance of obtaining from GOG assurance that Greeks will not initiate military action during period of discussions, and said I had already communicated his pledge that there would be no preemptive strike by Greek forces. "Never", he replied.
Talbot
318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus/1/
Washington, November 23, 1967, 1857Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Rusk.
74061. Literally eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I wish to express to each of you my deep appreciation for the round-the-clock effort you have been making to avoid catastrophe over the Cyprus question. I need not emphasize the scope of the catastrophe for all of us and for NATO if Turkey and Greece should get into a war with each other. What we should keep in mind is that such an event would mean that our bilateral relations with both countries would approach zero for the foreseeable future. Therefore, in dealing with your host country about these issues, you should concentrate on what your host country can do to prevent war and not be unduly worried about whether subsequent bilateral relations will be as comfortable as you would hope. Each one of you should concentrate on how you can persuade your own host government to make a maximum effort to preserve the peace. The stakes are such that the future of our bilateral relations is secondary to the prevention of hostilities between Greece and Turkey. My colleagues back here could write memoranda explaining why this is not necessarily so. Indeed, I admit that I have in mind certain irrational factors which ought not to be there. But the events themselves and the predictable reactions of the American people and the American Congress will take the play away from us diplomats. We need not apologize to any of your host governments for the harshest pressures we may put on in the interest of maintaining peace. The issues in Cyprus itself are, strictly from the point of view of the US national interest, trivial compared to peace between Greece and Turkey. Our responsibility is to support that central US national interest.
My personal regards to all three of you. The President and I are grateful for your dedicated effort in these trying moments.
Rusk
319. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 23, 1967, 2322Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Immediate. Received at 0434Z on November 24 and repeated to Ankara.
2354. Vanto 6. For the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.
1. I have completed my first round of talks in Ankara with President Sunay, Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Caglayangil./2/ Throughout the Turks maintained a consistently hard position which apparently reflects a concerted Cabinet decision.
/2/A complete record of these talks was transmitted in Vanto 9 from Athens, November 24. (Ibid.)
2. While the dangers of a military confrontation are acute, none of us believe the Turks will attack while my mission remains in the area, thus, we probably have some time to try to find an effective handle to this problem but the grip is short.
3. The Turks are clearly in a dangerous, fatalistic mood. After four years of what they consider to have [garble] painful salami tactics on Cyprus, they claim they will pay no more. The situation is described in simplistic terms of Greek illegality and villainy and Turkish suffering. They assert that their honor is at stake, and popular passions in the country are so high that a catalytic explosion is in the offing. The only possible way out, in their opinion, is a virtually immediate Greek decision to commence withdrawing its "illegal" military units on Cyprus.
4. This is heady stuff. Yet, throughout we were received with courtesy and friendship. Beneath the harsh description of the imperatives of the situation we sense a Turkish hope that we can pull a rabbit out of the essentially ultimative hat they have presented to us. This is going to take some doing but we are still in the ball game.
5. Detailed account of conversations follows. Septel submitted from Ankara in Vanto series on Sunay conversation.
Talbot
320. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 24, 1967, 1718Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1824Z and also sent to Ankara and Nicosia.
2395. Vanto 11. Subject: Vance's meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis November 24. Secretary Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Talbot and John Walsh, had lengthy discussion with Foreign Minister Pipinellis this morning. Throughout conversation Pipinellis was courteous, calm, thoughtful, and somewhat fatalistic.
In response to Pipinellis' inquiry, Vance frankly outlined his impression of the mood and position of the GOT and the Turkish people. He summarized situation as very grave with war fever running and GOT flatly insisting on immediate withdrawal of illegal Greek forces as sine qua non for easing of tensions. He pointed out that he had been rebuffed when he suggested that solution might be found in simultaneous Greek withdrawal and GOT steps to lower mobilization levels. While some moderate forces exist within GOT, he was uncertain whether they could withstand mounting war pressures.
Pipinellis said he was not surprised by Vance's assessment. Greece and her allies were faced by gravest dangers. All Greek information pointed to probability of Turk attack. He had taken position as Foreign Minister determined to find peaceful solution but not at the price of national humiliation. What Turkey asks, he said, no self-respecting government could accept. They wish Greece to give up all its assets before talking. If Greek forces are withdrawn from Cyprus, he predicted communal clashes would occur followed by a Turkish landing. Turkey would then exercise its will without hindrance on Cyprus. If clash with Turkey is unavoidable, he preferred it to occur under existing circumstances. Despite his conviction that Greek forces are factor of stability on island and their elimination would create vacuum inviting Turkish intervention, he was prepared consider phased withdrawal connected with establishment of some other type policing force, providing Turks would accept formula which would not humiliate Greece. This, he said, is all Greece can do. If it is not acceptable to Turkey, situation is hopeless.
Vance then turned to possibility of solution to impasse if U Thant issued call to Greeks to start withdrawing and to Turks to take action reduce tensions. He felt this plan could prevent war without humiliation and stated he authorized to inform Pipinellis that UKG shared this view. Greeks would respond first to SYG and then Turks would respond. Under this plan SYG would provide umbrella protecting dignity each country. In eyes of world, Greece would benefit if it responded first to SYG. Furthermore, chances of peaceful settlement are slight unless Greece moves first, since GOT has presented complete stonewall when we raised possibility simultaneity in decisions both countries.
Vance pointed out that his proposal had not been discussed as yet with U Thant but he would raise it with his Special Representative Rolz-Bennett, if Pipinellis considered plan had merit.
Pipinellis responded that idea appeared reasonable, but felt GOG would require at least simultaneity in notifications to SYG and timing of commencement of specific actions. Furthermore, there would be no Greek withdrawal from Cyprus unless Turks withdraw. Movement outwards must be on staged basis and accompanied by build-up of UN or other replacement forces. Ensuing discussion indicated Pipinellis unaware numbers of Greek and Turkish illegal forces on island and apparently assumed approximate equality these forces. He emphasized that principle of complete withdrawal must be accepted by both sides. This should not be linked, however, to London-Zurich Accords because of Makarios.
Pipinellis said he would work out written statement for consideration with Vance in afternoon and subsequently with Cabinet.
He then summed up his views by saying he was prepared to go far in search for peace but he would not yield to Turkish pressure. If Turks not prepared make slightest gesture of understanding feelings of a free people, war will result. Finally, any Turk landing on Cyprus would speedily escalate into full war between Greece and Turkey./2/
/2/Following the meeting with Vance, Pipinellis submitted a draft paper for submission to Turkey. The paper, with modifications suggested by Vance and his comments on the draft, was transmitted to the Department of State in Vanto 13 from Athens, November 24. (Ibid.)
Talbot
321. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 25, 1967, 0317Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Exdis. Received at 0356Z and also sent to Ankara.
2410. Vanto 16. For Secretary Rusk and McNamara. In the course of a busy day I have met with King Constantine, Prime Minister Kollias, Foreign Minister Pipinellis, and the UN Special Representative, Rolz-Bennett. I have found in Athens none of the raucous war hysteria which prevails in Ankara. There is no evidence of panic by the people or the government.
In my opinion, the Greek Government remains cool and determined as the war clouds thicken. They have a real desire to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. The King again today reaffirmed his commitment that there would be no preventive military actions by Greek forces. The Greek Government has also accepted certain military risks in limiting military call-ups and military movements in order to avoid provocation of the Turks and exciting the populace. They have leaned over backwards in an effort to formulate a proposition for me to convey to the Turks tomorrow which would be compatible with Greek national dignity and Turkish demands for Greek troop withdrawals. I could not ask them to do more. Signed Vance.
Addendum by Talbot:
Revisions of Greek statement which we declared necessary encountered considerable resistance in lengthy "little Cabinet" meeting with King tonight. We understand Greek military command--but in end not military Ministers--strongly resisted compromises they described as capitulation. When Vance and Talbot met King, PriMin, FonMin at 0115 local, GOG still wanted simultaneity in public announcement of acceptance of UNSYG appeal by GOG and GOT. Nearly two hours of discussion ensued, with King's decisive interventions finally turning tide./2/ At last Vance headed for airport at 0330 with documents he could fairly present to Turks./3/
/2/The Embassy reported on this meeting in telegram 2419 from Athens, November 25. (Ibid.)
/3/The text of the Greek proposal was transmitted in Vanto 17 from Ankara, November 25. (Ibid.)
Talbot
322. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, November 25, 1967, 1445Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1525Z and also sent to Athens and Nicosia.
2561. Vanto 24. Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Caglayangil--November 25. At 0800 Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil to discuss results of mission's discussions in Athens. Implications of meeting were ugly. Caglayangil was churlish in manner and cavalier in his comments on various aspects of the mission's proposals. It was difficult to avoid conclusion during meeting that USG had been tricked into a Turkish charade which would come to an abrupt end at Turkish National Security Council meeting scheduled later in morning. As Caglayangil left for NSC meeting, he told Ambassador Hart that our proposals were hopeless.
Vance opened session with description his activities in Athens, including problems persuading Greeks to agree to formulation which would satisfy Turk demands that Greeks take initiative in accepting proposal plea by YG [SYG?] and in beginning withdrawal Greek units. After considerable persuasion this had been accomplished in form of draft action paper (Vanto 17)/2/ and side minute signed by FonMin Pipinellis./3/
/2/See footnote 3, Document 321.
/3/Transmitted in telegram 2408 from Athens, November 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE)
After glancing at documents presented by Vance and briefly discussing them with his FonOff colleagues, Caglayangil's subsequent comments quickly chilled the atmosphere.
The Vance products were not, he said, as good as the five points presented by the US-UK-Can Ambassadors./4/ In his opinion, they seemed to represent an effort to save Greek prestige without regard for Turkish prestige. The provision for total demilitarization was unacceptable to him because it conflicted with the London/Zurich Accords establishing fixed levels for Greek and Turkish contingents. The interrelation between paras and the balanced relationship between Greek and Turkish actions seemed incomprehensible to him. Furthermore the Pipinellis side note to Vance cited above was surprisingly described as a Greek ultimatum. When Vance proposed to clarify individual points Caglayangil opined that it might be helpful but would not change his assessment that Vance proposals were not acceptable to GOT.
/4/See Document 314.
Speaking in a more general sense, he launched series of rockets. Turkey, he said, is not faced with simple choice of peace or war. If at present acute phase of crisis, GOT is unable safeguard its kinsmen on Cyprus the damage to its social structure will far exceed costs of war. Country would collapse in anarchy if people lost confidence in army and government.
Evidently responding to yesterday's strictures by Ambassador Hart that a Turkish war decision would seriously affect US-Turkish relations, he said he did not share this point of view. Nobody with sound mind would be shocked by Turkish use of MAP equipment against ally after the events of November 14-15. Vance responded vigorously at this point, outlining inevitable American reactions to such an event.
After Caglayangil's departure for Cabinet meeting, Vance requested FonOff pass message to him requesting urgent meeting with President Sunay and informing Caglayangil that, if Cabinet took decision turn down Vance proposals, USG would conclude it had been tricked by GOT and entire exercise had been Turkish charade. This resulted in quick response that President would see Vance at 1230 today.
Hart
323. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, November 25, 1967, 0810Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 2057Z. Also sent to Athens for Vance as Tovan 4 and repeated to Ankara, USUN, London, and the Mission to NATO.
770. 1. I hesitated use this precedence for following message but it will give you all some indication what we are up against in dealing with Byzantine mentality so prevalent in GOC.
2. Makarios called me to Palace 8:00 P.M. local. Foreign Minister was present. Makarios said that they had information to indicate that Caglayangil had made what purported be serious proposal: GOT would land troops in Cyprus but with no intention open hostilities unless opposed. Their idea would be to secure a beachhead and hold it and then negotiate from a position of greater equality vis-Ã -vis Greece and Cyprus. President wanted me to know and get word to GOT that such an action would be considered an act of war and would of course be opposed with whatever forces GOC could muster.
2. I told the Archbishop that we had had similar information but from military contacts and not from anyone in authority on the civilian side of the government and we had already commented from this Embassy that such a hope on the part of the Turks was out of the question. He asked nevertheless to report this information and to make clear the position of his government.
3. Our discussion then turned to the Vance Mission and the central theme of demilitarization. I reminded His Beatitude of our conversation when the UK and Canadian HICOMers were present the other night/2/ at which time I had said that I doubted very much whether the Turks would be willing to go the whole way and remove their contingent. I understood that the Greek position was similar to his and that they both supported complete demilitarization and the removal of the contingent was an integral part of this concept. Kyprianou interjected that unless the Turks could agree to removal of their contingent, the whole proposition was hopeless. I turned to the Archbishop saying that his words to me the other day were graphic in describing the situation as not merely one of war or peace but rather one of peace or survival. This being the case would it not be better for the time being to accept a limited demilitarization which would involve the removal of non-Cypriot forces in excess to the London/Zurich treaty levels? Surely this was a question which could be decided in the talks which must take place subsequent to settlement of the present grave crisis. The modification of London/Zurich would be central to any such talks--even the Turks agreed to this. For the sake of preserving peace could this aspect of the problem not be postponed? Both the Archbishop and Kyprianou said this was out of the question.
/2/Reported in telegram 699 from Nicosia, November 21. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)
4. Our conversation then turned to other aspects of the Turkish five points with emphasis on internal security. We discussed at some length the problem of policing and whether there would be joint UN-Greek and Turkish patrols. I had the strange feeling of being somewhere else engrossed in [garble--irrelevancies?] while the central point of avoiding war was being argued. I could not seem to impress upon them their fate hung in the balance no matter how many times I tried to bring the conversation back to the central issue.
5. As I took my leave I reminded them that Mr. Vance's first conversations in Ankara had been discouraging and that we were now awaiting a report of his conversations with President Sunay. In response to Makarios' question I assumed the reason Mr. Vance was not coming here at the present time was that the Turks had not accepted the Greek position as he had presented it after his consultations in Athens yesterday. I reminded him that I did not know any of the details except that the Turks had objected to the removal of the two contingents but that I would try to keep him informed if we learned of any other points of issue. In the meantime, what was needed was a miracle and I wished them good luck in finding one.
6. For the first time in my five years of knowing Makarios he was using his worry beads (I might add that the Foreign Minister and I had ours out too!).
Belcher
324. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 25, 1967, 2057Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 2119Z and repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
2431. Vanto 29. For Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. Vance meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil--November 25.
1. Secretary Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil late afternoon. By end of one and one-half hours frank exchanges, Vance had obtained GOT concurrence to revised draft text containing both advantages and serious problems for GOG viewpoint. While process formulating accord agreeable GOT and GOG is painfully slow and mission has no illusions about capacity Makarios government to place spanner in works, it has impression after long and hard day with Turks that they may have turned the corner in a policy sense in the direction of trying to obtain peace.
2. Mission returns to Athens with flat assurance of President Sunay, with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister hearing his words, that no military action will be taken while mission efforts continue./2/ Furthermore, in course of day, Caglayangil's mood and manner shifted dramatically. In morning session he verged on rudeness and ugliness, with much dark muttering about potential collapse of Turkish society unless war decision were made. At productive noon session with President Sunay he said nothing. In late afternoon he was again courteous and friendly, speaking of desire for peace, cooperatively working out textual changes, voicing confidence in Greek intent carry out withdrawal pledges, and warmly praising peace efforts our mission./3/ Why this shift occurred is not clear but we suspect that it reflects the personal intervention of President Sunay and the weight of persistent U.S. and international pressure to hold the Turkish hand. In addition, there may be a growing belief in GOT that arrangements short of war can be made for departure Greek forces. While not sanguine about final results, we remain hopeful./4/
/2/The meeting with Sunay was described in Vanto 28 from Athens, November 26. (Ibid.)
/3/Discussions with Caglayangil were the subject of Vanto 32 from Athens, November 26. (Ibid.)
/4/Ambassador Hart transmitted a summary of Vance's discussions in airgram A-292 from Ankara, December 7. (Ibid.)
Talbot
325. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 27, 1967, 0105Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 0157Z and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.
2446. Vanto. Subj: Vance meeting with FonMin Pipinelis, November 26./2/
/2/When Vance met with Pipinellis shortly after midnight on November 26, he reported on his talks with the Turks and offered a revised draft of an accord on troop withdrawals. Vance carried a letter from Caglayangil containing assurances that Turkey would reduce its mobilization levels parallel with Greek force withdrawals. (Vanto 30 from Athens, November 25; ibid.)
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Talbot and John Walsh, called on FonMin to receive Greek reactions to draft accord as modified in November 25 meetings in Ankara. Pipinelis reported Cabinet had reviewed draft in long and difficult session and had prepared revised draft which he requested Vance to present to GOT tomorrow. Text contained in immediately following cable./3/
/3/Telegram 2445 from Athens, November 27. (Ibid.)
2. After quick review Vance said he would of course carry out wishes of GOG but it was his judgment that their draft could not be sold to GOT. With time running out, it is imperative to minimize textual changes. With this thought in mind he had prepared draft which represents fair balance between desires of two countries and which has reasonable chance of acceptance in Ankara. Text follows:
"1. The Secretary General of the United Nations would address an appeal to the Governments of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, such an appeal to include, inter alia:
a. An invitation to the Governments of Turkey and Greece to reaffirm the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
b. A request that the Governments of Turkey and Greece take immediate steps to remove any threat to the security of each other and of Cyprus and as a first step along the line of my previous appeal to bring about an expeditious withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces, in excess of those present in 1963.
2. The Governments of Greece and Turkey would declare their readiness to comply forthwith with the appeal of the Secretary General.
3. Thereupon the Greek Government will withdraw expeditiously its military forces from Cyprus. Accompanying this, the Turkish Government will take all the necessary measures for removing the crisis.
4. In response to the appeal of the Secretary General, the three countries undertake to seek from the Security Council an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP giving it an increased pacification role and calling upon it to assist in setting up expeditiously new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security (including the safety of all citizens) and the supervision of disarmament."
3. In explaining text, Vance emphasized that his object was to stop outbreak of war and not to solve all problems of Cyprus. Therefore, text could not be as inclusive as either party might wish. On other hand, text seems fair to both and could provide medium for resolution present crisis.
4. After discussion number elements of Vance draft, Pipinelis said it would not be feasible to reassemble the Cabinet to review paper before Vance's departure. He then proposed a "gentlemen's agreement." Vance should present the Greek draft to GOT tomorrow. If it is rejected, Vance should then present his draft. If Turk concurrence is obtained, Pipinelis pledged himself to support the draft in Cabinet. He also authorized Vance to inform GOT that he had reasonable confidence that GOG would approve the draft.
5. In discussing GOT plans for reduction mobilization levels, Pipinelis said GOG placed high priority on removal invasion fleet which had been assembled in Turk ports and would like to obtain letter from GOT covering reduction schedules comparable to their letter on withdrawal schedules. Vance said he would urge GOT to provide such a letter.
Talbot
326. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State/1/
Ankara, November 27, 1967, 1625Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1717Z and also sent to Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.
2589. Vanto 33. Subj: Vance meeting with FonMin Caglayangil--November 27. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, met at 0800 with FonMin Caglayangil and Turkmen. Although speaking in somewhat bewildering rococo style, Caglayangil was courteous and friendly throughout the two-hour session. Vance opened the substantive section of the talks by conveying to Caglayangil the deep appreciation of Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis for the personal message from Caglayangil./2/ He then said that he had discussed with Pipinellis the GOT concern about the schedule for Greek force removals. In an effort to meet this problem, Pipinellis had written letter to Vance containing a specific schedule which would move all Greek forces in excess of London-Zurich levels within a three-month period. He had authorized Vance to pass this letter to Caglayangil./3/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 325.
/3/Not found.
Having established a favorable frame of reference, Vance then turned over a document containing the GOG's formulation of a draft accord, which he had received from Pipinellis on the previous evening./4/
/4/Quoted in Document 325.
After carefully reading the document, Caglayangil said he would take it to his government. He went on to say that Greece and Turkey were faced with two problems, the Cyprus question and the crisis born out of that question. In the past hectic week the GOT, aided by the US, had tried to resolve the crisis and had not wished to bog down in the vast ramifications of the Cyprus question. Vance had convinced him that, while the GOT had not given an ultimatum, world opinion believed that the GOT had cornered Greece.
Vance had found an ingenious way out in the form of a response to an appeal from the SYG. This idea would have solved the crisis. Greece could have reacted positively, contributing to an eventual atmosphere in which the basic question of Cyprus could have been solved. However, the Greek document is designed to show the public that the GOT has renounced the London/Zurich Accords, thus prejudging the Cyprus question. This is unacceptable to the GOT.
In response, Vance said that when he first came to the area he had felt that it would be wise to let the parties find a solution within the concept of an appeal by the Secretary General. In a sense, he had acted as a postman.
After reading the Greek draft last evening, it was clear to him that it would not be acceptable to the GOT. He felt the time had come for him to synthesize the ideas of both sides. The object of the document which he had prepared was to solve the immediate problem, and to leave to future negotiations the overall problem of Cyprus./5/ He could contribute little to the solution of that complex issue.
/5/The Vance draft was transmitted in Vanto 34 from Ankara, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE)
While largely based on the GOT draft of November 25, it does not include certain elements included in the Greek and Turk drafts. It is, however, a fair and honorable formulation which, if approved, would resolve the immediate crisis.
In response to Caglayangil's question, Vance said the GOG had [garble--not?] seen the draft text presented to him but he has discussed the concept in the draft with the Greek Foreign Minister. Vance said he believed there was a reasonable chance that it would be accepted by the Greeks and he would bring all his energy to bear on the Greeks if the text were accepted by the GOT.
At the conclusion of certain clarifying comments by Vance, Caglayangil said he could easily discuss Vance's draft and would take it promptly to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet. However, he was troubled by the Greek three month time table.
Vance said the important thing is the written Greek commitment to withdraw. Since it takes time to move troops, a three-month broad schedule was not unreasonable. When Vance asked what the GOT schedule was for reducing the mobilization rate, Caglayangil stated there is no time-table. However, if the Greeks begin to withdraw, the GOT could return to the November 15 levels immediately.
President and Prime Minister have been meeting with party leaders. We will not receive any word before 2000 local.
Hart
327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Washington, November 27, 1967, 2110Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Wehmeyer and approved by Rockwell. Also sent to Ankara, London, Ottawa, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, and USUN.
75051. Tovan 30.
1. We have hesitated to offer any specific comments re tactics your negotiations on assumption those officers on spot who are advising you are in position best fulfill this function.
2. As we follow evolution of draft proposal however we are impressed with extent to which ultimate success your mission could depend on reaction in Nicosia in view built-in veto Makarios might have by declining join proposed tripartite approach to SYG. We unaware whether you have discussed this Makarios problem with GOG.
3. For what it may be worth as supplement to what you may have heard and may hear, consensus here among officers experienced Cyprus affairs, is that even if you go to island with draft omitting express reference to London-Zurich and without direct reference to Turkish contingent you will not be able avoid substantive discussion with Makarios in which it will presumably become clear to him that settlement envisaged will include continuance Turkish contingent on island and Turkish insistence on validity London-Zurich agreements.
Belief here is that in such situation Makarios can be expected either reject proposal outright or attempt finesse by counter proposals. Unless Greek Cypriots have been intimidated by assigning high degree credibility danger Turkish attack, which appears not to be case, officers here consider Makarios likely will continue rely on his basic assets, namely, (a) status of Cyprus as sovereign independent state with all that implies; (b) membership in UN giving Makarios access to SYG and UN organs for protection; (c) psychological ties with Greece which can be exploited to inhibit action by GOG in connection such matters as unilateral withdrawal Greek forces from Cyprus over opposition of Makarios.
4. There arises accordingly question whether tactics can be developed to deter Makarios from reverting to his classic waltz around ring tightly clutching the UN. Only approach which has occurred to us is based on premise Makarios more likely attempt torpedo or evade your proposal if he is in doubt about ultimate political consequences than if he has fairly clear idea where it would lead. If he can be persuaded that political situation beyond your immediate proposal would be satisfactory from his standpoint he may be willing accept proposal. Our thought is that you might discuss this aspect of the problem frankly with Makarios and refer to Declaration of Reconciliation/2/ as type of settlement which would appear possible in near future and which would establish political environment in which GOC, its officials, and its people could prosper, politically, economically, and socially. Ambassador Belcher would have coordinated this ahead of time with Canadian Ambassador, and you would say Declaration is Canadian proposal.
/2/Reference is to a proposed appeal by the U.N. Secretary-General to the involved parties.
Rusk
328. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 28, 1967, 0930Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1131Z and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, the Mission to NATO, USUN, and CINCEUR.
2473. Vanto 36. Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Caglayangil and Prime Minister Demirel--November 28.
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, had a five and one-half hour meeting beginning at 0200 this morning with FonMin Caglayangil who was assisted by Turkmen and Bulak./2/ At 0900 the mission departed for Athens, carrying a draft to be presented to the GOG on an "accept it or accept war" basis. This paper is final Turkish position which you will note rejects most of my draft.
/2/Vance reported on his meeting with Caglayangil, in which he requested and received an audience with Demirel, in Vanto 39, November 28. (Ibid.)
2. We have grave doubt Greeks will agree to this document. Even if they do paragraph #4 as insisted upon by Turks does not provide basis for SYG to act unless three countries agree to paragraph #4 and Makarios would agree. In addition time running out and if Makarios did not agree within very short period of time Turks may move. We are trying to find some way around this problem but have no answer yet. Perhaps SYG could issue appeal based on points 1, 2, and 3 of current draft and act unilaterally along lines of paragraph #4 of draft Vance presented to Turks which was rejected. This would take great courage on part of SYG and would carry risk that it would not be accepted by Turks who already have rejected it, or by Cypriots. (Request flash comments of Department and Goldberg.) Will continue to seek better alternative.
3. In addition Turks rejected Greek time table and have insisted on total withdrawal within 45 days. (Text of pertinent Caglayangil letter to me is attached.) We do not know whether Greeks can swallow this.
4. Plan to meet with Greek Foreign Minister immediately on arrival. Then plan to see Rolz-Bennett to get his views and help.
5. As result of last night's session which will be reported in detail in cable to follow we have question as to Demirel's ability to control his Cabinet. He appeared shaken and under great strain. We were informed he was turned down on more than one occasion in urging acceptance by Turks of some of points in Vance draft.
Text of GOT draft accord handed Vance Nov 28 as follows:
"1. The Secretary General of the United Nations would address an appeal to the Governments of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, such an appeal to include:
A request that the Governments of Turkey and Greece take immediate steps to remove any threat to the security of each other and of Cyprus and as a first step along the lines of the Secretary General's previous appeal to bring about an expeditious withdrawal of those forces in excess of the Turkish and Greek contingents.
2. The Governments of Greece and Turkey would declare their readiness to comply forthwith with the appeal of the Secretary General.
3. Thereupon the Greek Government would withdraw expeditiously its military forces and military personnel and equipment from Cyprus. Accompanying this, the Turkish Government will take all the necessary measures for removing the crisis.
4. In response to the appeal of the Secretary General, there should be an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP giving it an increased pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens."
6. Following accompanying letter dated Nov 28 from FonMin Caglayangil also given Vance:
"Dear Mr. Vance:
Recognizing the great importance of reducing tensions between Greece and Turkey expeditiously, it is suggested that the proposed timetable for the withdrawal of the Greek forces contained in the letter of the Greek Foreign Minister to you be reduced from three months to 45 days. It is also stressed that this withdrawal should take place in a continuing process and carried out in good faith.
On its part the Government of Turkey will take in parallel all the necessary measures for reducing the crisis. This means that with the commencement of the withdrawal of Greek forces the Government of Turkey will stand down the current state of readiness of its forces, and in parallel with further Greek withdrawals will reduce the military preparedness of its forces to levels in effect prior to November 15, 1967.
Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil"
Talbot
329. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 28, 1967, 1215Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1457Z and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
2475. Vanto 38. Ref: Vanto 37./2/ Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Pipinelis--November 28.
/2/Vanto 37, November 28, reported on negotiations with the Turks on Vance's proposals for a settlement. At the end of the discussion, Caglayangil stated that the U.S. effort was at the "end of the line" and that Turkey would accept no further modifications of the proposal. (Ibid.)
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Talbot and John Walsh, called on FonMin Pipinelis at 1130, shortly after their return to Athens. Theodoropoulos also present.
2. Vance opened discussion with statement situation very grave. He then ran through events and meetings in Ankara reported septel, reporting that Greek draft accord had been badly received. After summarizing the very difficult meeting that he had in early morning hours with Caglayangil/3/ he handed over the two GOT documents emitting from that session, namely letter to him from Caglayangil limiting Greek withdrawal period to 45 days and GOT draft accord representing "final" Turk position.
/3/See Document 328.
3. Vance said honesty compelled him to state time is very short and Turks will not accept any change in draft. This is fact of life.
4. Pipinelis said this was ultimatum which he instinctively inclined reject. From beginning to end of Vance process he had tried to settle issue. With each exchange, however, Turks had raised the price.
5. While he did not seem to boggle over 45-day limit on withdrawal and did not have particular difficulties with operative paras affecting Greece-Turkey relations, para 4 concerning UNFICYP operations appeared impossible to him. Greece, he said, could take steps on its own but it cannot make decisions for Cyprus. Furthermore, he was convinced that chaos would result if Greek forces were withdrawn and the National Guard was disbanded before some other force were constituted. He said he could not recommend this to his government, since it makes no sense. Furthermore it would be impossible to carry the Cabinet with this proposition or to get Makarios to accept it.
6. Talbot then pointed out that para 4 as drafted by Turks was not operative and furthermore language implied parallelism between phasing out National Guard and constituting new force. Vance pointed out that provisions of para would be implemented by UN not by GOT. Therefore, parallelism and timing was in hands of UN. In addition, he had made perfectly clear to Turks that para as drafted was not operative. Turks have also specifically stated they have no time limits in mind re [garble--para 4].
7. This exchange somewhat buoyed Pipinelis who said he would discuss letter and draft accord with Cabinet. At Vance's urging he agreed withhold negative decision until he talked to Brosio and to us. Vance told him we had some ideas which might help.
Talbot
330. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 28, 1967, 2143Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 2227Z and also sent to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and CINCEUR.
2486. Vanto 43. Subject: Vance meeting with FonMin Pipinelis--November 28.
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Talbot and John Walsh, met with FonMin Pipinelis at 2130. Pipinelis came directly to the issue. He said Cabinet had accepted GOT proposals and he would present letter to that effect to Vance. Decision was reached after moving scene in Cabinet. It was not easy but it was right. He hoped this would be the beginning of end of sad story of conflict with Turks over Cyprus.
2. Pipinelis said he also hoped Turks would not try score propaganda victory as result GOG decision. Said he had prepared lengthy statement emphasizing no value in winning or losing in Greek-Turk relations, and pointing out agreement will not settle everything but it will open the door to direct contacts between two countries.
3. Vance said he wished express his deep personal admiration for Minister. His decision had been very courageous.
4. Pipinelis said GOG wished seek certain clarifications and would request Brosio visit Ankara tomorrow morning. First of these concerned Makarios. GOG accepted Turk proposals in good faith but could not commit Makarios re para 4. Government was prepared, however, to try bring him aboard. Second concerned relationship in some paras between elimination of National Guard and constituting new force. Government believed these actions should be parallel. Third concerned definition of military personnel in para 3. Vance interrupted at that point to express belief each side should hold own interpretation that issue. Fourth was GOG desire stretch withdrawal period from 45 to 60 days in order provide logistical and elbow room.
5. Vance suggested that once withdrawals began issues like this should be practical subjects of discussion with Turks. Pipinelis ended discussion by expressing firm conviction that war would have occurred [had not] President Johnson sent the Vance Mission to search for a peaceful solution. On behalf his government he expressed deep appreciation to President.
6. Text of letter from Pipinelis to Vance follows: "I have the honour to inform you that the Greek Government accept the proposals contained in the attached text, on the understanding that the measures to be taken by the Turkish Government to remove the crisis in accordance with the letter of the Foreign Minister of Turkey, dated November 28, 1967, shall be implemented in good faith.
The Greek Government wish to point out that, as far as the provisions of paragraph 4 are concerned, which they read as also covering the question of the National Guard, they cannot engage the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus, whose rights must remain by necessity reserved."/2/
/2/In Vanto 41, November 28, Vance requested that Hart inform the Turkish Government of Greek acceptance. (Ibid.) In Vanto 42, November 28, Vance reported that he was flying to Nicosia to secure Makarios' agreement. (Ibid.)
Talbot
331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus/1/
Washington, November 29, 1967, 0113Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Rockwell; cleared by Sisco, Katzenbach, and Battle; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.
76019. Tovan 37. Ref.: Vanto 41./2/ For Vance from Secretary.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 330.
1. Problem all along with Makarios has been that US does not have much of a handle on him. We have no economic or military aid program, and communications facilities, for which we are to pay rent, are distinctly to our advantage.
2. Makarios has never wavered in his conviction that US will not permit Turkey to invade Cyprus. Your present mission is probably seen by him as further convincing evidence of this. In current crisis Russians have complicated matters by telling GOC that Turks are bluffing. You would wish to disabuse him on this--in fact, if you can scare him it might be helpful.
3. In circumstances best tactic would appear be to attempt play on Makarios' vanity by stressing his positive role as champion of peace. If this fails, you should try convince Makarios that if he tries torpedo Greek-Turkey accord, and Turks invade as result, GOC would be considered as bearing the principal responsibility for failure to avert a catastrophe. In such circumstances world opinion would be turned against GOC, and would regard GOC as having set political objective above peace. In such circumstances, moreover, GOC should not be assuming that US would intervene militarily. GOC will have noted that there has been no change in routine disposition of Sixth Fleet throughout this crisis.
4. Above is best strategy I can think of view lack of the instrumentalities of support we possess in other countries. In general you could stress that lack of cooperative action will inevitably have effect on our future relations, without being specific. I would caution you against suggesting any specific US action to help Makarios if he behaves, beyond renewed willingness to be helpful in attempt solve general Cyprus problem, in view well-known tendency of Makarios to use such gestures to his own advantage.
5. In the event you get indications that Makarios feels that he can disregard the Greek-Turk agreement by going to the Security Council on the assumption he could get a better deal, you should tell him bluntly that we would use every possible means at our disposal to prevent this and to ensure that any action there would not go beyond the substance of the Greek-Turk agreement.
6. We would prefer that you use the above only if Makarios refers to this possibility; otherwise, we see no particular advantage in your taking the initiative in this regard.
7. The following points may be useful to you, subject to Ambassador Belcher's views. (He is real expert on Makarios.)
(a) I understand that Makarios reacts badly to strong words and a forceful approach.
(b) It should be made very clear to him that GOG has made a difficult decision and requires his support.
(c) Makarios does value his relations with the US, and could be encouraged anticipate more active effort on our part to tackle general Cyprus problem once this crisis over.
8. Congratulations on a superb job so far, and good luck!
9. By separate telegram we are sending revised text Presidential message to Makarios/3/ which we have toned down somewhat in belief this likely be more effective and to make letter less susceptible of being used against us should Makarios decide complain in Security Council that he being pressed by US to give in to Turkish demands.
/3/Transmitted in telegram 76018 to Nicosia, November 29. It called on Makarios to make the concessions needed to ensure a peaceful settlement of the confrontation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
Rusk
332. Summary Notes of the 579th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/
Washington, November 29, 1967, 12:05-12:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 4. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Smith.
Cyprus
The President opened the meeting by requesting Secretary Rusk to give a summary of the current situation in Cyprus.
Secretary Rusk: Cyrus Vance, the President's special emissary, has done a superb job and has warded off war between Turkey and Greece. He did not want to embarrass Luke Battle but said that he was delighted to have had him as Assistant Secretary working on this problem on an hourly basis. He asked Mr. Battle to outline where we now are in our effort to end the Crisis over Cyprus.
Assistant Secretary Battle: Is optimistic that war between Greece and Turkey would be avoided. To Mr. Vance belongs the credit for the astonishing progress which has been made in keeping the Turkish-Greek crisis over Cyprus from turning into hostilities. Provisions of a statement which both Greece and Turkey have accepted (copy attached)/2/ were summarized. Mr. Vance is now in Cyprus trying to persuade Cyprus President Makarios to accept this agreement. Makarios could cause trouble in many ways, but the expectation is that he will not block the Vance effort.
/2/Not found.
The problem of Cyprus will be with us for some time to come, difficulties will rise in the future, for example, reaching an agreement to expand the role of the United Nations, but for the moment a Greek-Turkish war has been avoided.
Secretary Rusk: Turkey wants the United Nations Security Council to approve a new and expanded UN mandate covering Cyprus. We do not think Council action is necessary but the problem is in the hands of the Secretary General and the heat is off us. The Turks can more easily live with the failure of the Secretary General to obtain a new mandate from the UN Security Council than they could if we had agreed to get a new mandate and had been unsuccessful.
Everyone is appreciative that the President made Vance available for this assignment, adding that without his activity, Turkey would now be at war with Greece.
The President: Asked General Wheeler to summarize the military situation.
General Wheeler: Tension between the two countries has somewhat abated, pending the outcome of the Vance negotiations.
1. Turkey had an advantage over Greece in the air and on land. The Greeks have an advantage at sea because of their greater naval strength.
2. If Greeks [Turks?] chose to invade Greek Thrace, they could advance rapidly, probably as far as Salonika.
3. The Turks could put several divisions in Cyprus, probably on the north side in the Kyrenia area, in two to three weeks. They could gain control of the island, only some 40 miles from Turkey, despite Greek opposition.
4. If the Turks attack, it would take them 24 hours to gain air superiority by pre-emptive air strikes on Greek bases. They would probably invade Cyprus but probably would not invade Greece from Thrace.
CIA Director Helms: We have no reports of Soviet military activity in the area. However, the Russians are fishing in troubled waters by egging on the Turks and telling the Cypriots that Turkey was bluffing.
[Here follows brief discussion of the Soviet Union and Vietnam.]
Bromley Smith
333. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, November 29, 1967, 1700Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1759Z and also sent to Ankara, Athens, USUN, London, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
817. Vanto 50. Reference: Vanto 46 (Nicosia 812)./2/ Subject: Vance's meeting with Archbishop Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou--November 29. Vance, accompanied by Amb. Belcher and John Walsh, met at 0930 with Archbishop Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou for 75 minutes. Vance again reviewed the events of the past week, stating that his mission is to prevent a war and not to solve all the complex issues of Cyprus. War has been very close this week. Had he not reached Ankara on November 23, the Turks would have gone to war. In the course of intensive discussions with the GOT, President Sunay had assured him that Turkey would not invade Cyprus. However, time ran out last night and, if Greece had not accepted the proposals, the Turkish units would have been on shores of Cyprus this morning. Intelligence estimates indicate they could put close to 50,000 men ashore with heavy equipment in 48-hours under cover of complete air control. Carnage would result.
/2/Vanto 46, November 29, reported on Vance's 8:30 a.m. meeting with Kyprianou, during which Kyprianou outlined his government's objections to the proposed accord. (Ibid.)
In response, Makarios expressed his deep gratitude for the U.S. effort to preserve the peace. He fully understood the critical nature of recent days and was happy that war had not occurred. He had slept while Vance worked in Ankara, confident that nothing would happen.
Makarios said he understood the Greek Government had accepted the agreement document but he had not heard directly from Athens as yet. While GOG could properly make its own decisions, he had, of course, difficulties with the document, particularly para. 4.
Cyprus, he said, is plagued by the presence of foreign troops. His basic objective is the total demilitarization of the island, including the Greek and Turk contingents. Under those circumstances he would also disband the National Guard which was costing too much money. With help of UNFICYP, he would try to disarm everyone. Only police force would remain and his government would have talks with Turkish community about this.
In view of need for total demilitarization it would be difficult for him to agree that Greek and Turk contingents could remain on the island. They were source of infection and should be rooted out now.
Vance said he realized the Archbishop's view this subject and had insisted that language relating to the withdrawal of Greek and Turk forces be qualified "as a first step along the lines of the SYG's previous appeal." Since the SYG's appeal called for ultimate demilitarization, acceptance of the document in no way impeded movement toward final goal of elimination of all military forces. Therefore, removal of contingents was in no way precluded by language of document. However, GOT will not agree discuss this issue at this time. Approval of document as it stands is vital step in avoidance bloody war.
Makarios then shifted to dangers of foreign intervention, saying he hoped guarantee could be obtained from U.S. and UK on behalf of Security Council. Vance responded, saying he had no authority to give USG security commitments. He suggested Makarios look to Security Council in this respect.
Turning to para. 4, Makarios said UNFICYP already had adequate mandate and call for enlarged and improved mandate unnecessary. Vance agreed and emphasized that GOT had insisted on this language over his strong objections. Makarios then said that the para could not be accepted unless a reference were made to elimination two contingents. Vance responded that GOT would not agree and that war would be certain outcome of GOC unwillingness accept agreement. Progress on broader issues possible if war is avoided.
Vance then gave Makarios message from President Johnson. Although Archbishop read carefully and made wry comment about reference to his wisdom, he did not respond substantively.
Vance then suggested Makarios could write letter to him, stating GOC approved proposal but reserved views re removal of contingents and ultimate demilitarization. Makarios said he would draft a letter clearly indicating his views these matters. Vance pointed out that message would have to be restrained in tone or it would be read as rejection by GOT. This might trigger invasion with dire consequences.
Session ended with Makarios statement that he would take proposals to Cabinet and would meet with Vance later in day.
We now have 2000 local appointment with Makarios.
Belcher
334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State/1/
Athens, November 30, 1967, 0405Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 0946Z and also sent to Nicosia, Ankara, London, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and CINCEUR.
2501. Vanto 53. Subject: Vance meeting with Archbishop Makarios--Nov 29-30. Vance, accompanied by Amb. Belcher and John Walsh, met with Archbishop Makarios, President of the Parliament Clerides and FonMin Kyprianou in 6 and 3/4 hour marathon session, ending at 0245. Mission left for Athens at 0345.
Makarios stubbornly and cleverly defended a defective GOC written commentary into the early morning hours.
Finally, His Beatitude gave way sufficiently to permit the completion of a draft which seems sufficiently forthcoming to contribute to the overall defusing effort. Negotiating with him under circumstances threatening existence of his country can be fairly described as unique experience.
Text of the secret written GOC comment signed by Spyros Kyprianou, Minister of Foreign Affairs, follows:
"Dear Mr. Vance
We welcome the many and strenuous efforts which have been made in recent days to preserve peace in this area.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, referring to the proposals contained in the attached text, wishes to state its position as follows:
1. The first three paragraphs of the said proposals concern primarily the Governments of Greece and Turkey and have already been agreed upon by them. The Government of Cyprus acknowledging the aforesaid agreement between the Governments of Greece and Turkey considers it as a first step on the lines of the Secretary-General's appeal of November 24, 1967, for the phased withdrawal of all forces and complete demilitarisation./2/ It, therefore, maintains that such phased withdrawal should include the Greek and Turkish contingents because it firmly believes that, in this way, the cause of peace would be best served.
/2/U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.5; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 367-368. This was Secretary-General Thant's second appeal; his first was on November 22 (see Document 307).
2. The pacification measures stated in paragraph 4 are objectives of the Cyprus Government.
3. The Cyprus Government questions the need for 'an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP.' It suggests that the three governments discuss this issue with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York.
4. The Government of Cyprus will ask the Security Council for guarantees against military intervention in accordance with the last paragraph of the Secretary-General's appeal of November 24, 1967. Yours sincerely, Spyros Kyprianou, Minister of Foreign Affairs."
Detailed report on meeting will be submitted in septel./3/
/3/Not further identified.
Talbot
335. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 2240Z. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, London, Ottawa, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
New York, November 30, 1967, 2144Z.
2672. From Goldberg for Vance. Rossides, Cyprus Rep at UN has advised SYG that Kyprianou letter to you constitutes rejection by Government of Cyprus of the agreement. I have been at Rossides myself for two hours telling him that he is absolutely wrong and insisting that he go back immediately to his government for positive instructions to advise SYG that Kyprianou acknowledgment language means GOC supports agreement as Kyprianou stated to you before you left Palace in Nicosia. I have also insisted that SYG not accept this statement as final.
I shall advise you again upon hearing from Rossides having impressed upon him necessity for affirmative response forthwith.
Rossides action here is in character. In handling of Cyprus problem at UN he has consistently been more hawkish than Makarios or Kyprianou. It will be highly important to get to Makarios and Kyprianou so that Rossides can be instructed to consent to SYG issuing his appeal tonight.
If it will help with Makarios you can advise that both Turks and Greeks are willing to revise para 4 to meet Makarios view, as well as our own, that new and enlarged mandate is not required. Governments of Turkey and Greece are willing to agree to following revision of para 4:
"In response to the appeal of the SYG, UNFICYP, under its existing mandate, would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens."/2/
/2/In telegram 77716 to Nicosia, December 1, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to convey its strong request that Makarios correct the mistaken impression created by Rossides, warning that his actions might be placing his nation in danger of attack. (Ibid.)
Goldberg
336. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Embassy in Greece/1/
Ankara, November 30, 1967, 1515Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 2317Z. Also sent to the Department of State, Nicosia, and USUN and repeated to London, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2638. NATUS. Ref: Ankara 2637./2/
/2/Telegram 2637, November 30, reported on the meeting at which Hart presented Caglayangil with a summary of the Vance-Makarios talks and reported on the draft text agreed to by Makarios. (Ibid.)
1. FonMin asked me to call at 1500 Nov 30 and reading from notes conveyed following points representing decisions of Cabinet.
A. GOT will accept substitute language for para 4 of agreement as recommended by Ambassador Eralp and reading: "In response to the appeal of Secretary General, UNFICYP under its existing mandate would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens".
B. GOT reserves right to return to Security Council to seek enlarged improved mandate for UNFICYP if operations under existing mandate prove unsatisfactory.
C. Turkey's NATO allies and especially US, UK and Canada should declare immediately after appeal issued by SYG that they support appeal as a whole but giving particular support to para 4.
D. At Security Council meeting on Dec 15 concerned with prolongation of UNFICYP consensus of members should be sought by Turkey's allies to obtain approval of new role for UNFICYP envisaged para 4 SYG's appeal. (This most important to box in Makarios.)
E. GOT insists that withdrawal of Greek forces start in shortest possible time and be carried out in continuous and uninterrupted fashion and in good faith. (FonMin explained this is essential to avoid complications and to establish a basis for an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.)
F. Repetition of incidents such as those of Nov 15-16 on Cyprus must be avoided at all costs. Absolute security must be maintained on island.
G. Greek Cypriots must avoid provocative acts. GOT has given like instructions to Turkish Cypriots.
H. Makarios must be prevented from playing role in New York in connection with SYG's appeal that would sabotage Turkish-Greek agreement. NATO allies, especially representatives of US, UK and Canada, who took part in working out "five points", should play efficacious role to this end in Nicosia. Interval during which SYG's appeal issued and replies given is especially critical. Makarios should not say appeal is unacceptable to GOC, should not be allowed to interpret it so as to sabotage it.
2. FonMin then said that under above conditions, and once agreement with SYG on new formula for para 4 seemed assured, he saw no need for Vance to hurry to New York. On the contrary, he could usefully remain in Athens and endeavor to plan with Greeks accelerated withdrawal of Greek troops in manner indicated above. (Implication was GOT would do its part on standdown.)
3. Caglayangil said that as soon as SYG makes his appeal GOT would like to have clear affirmative answer from GOG without qualifications or interpretations. Makarios could say GOC accepts appeal of SYG reserving always its own viewpoint regarding final solution. He should say nothing more. If style and content SYG's appeal conforms to agreement GOT will immediately respond that it accepts and is ready to conform to it. GOT will point especially to para 4 saying that it approves and supports this provision.
4. I said would immediately report FonMin's remarks.
5. Septel follows on conversation and supplementary points./3/
/3/Not found.
Hart
337. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 1, 1967, 0220Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Athens, USUN, and Ankara and repeated to London, Ottawa, the Mission to NATO, and CINCEUR.
831. Tovan. Ref: USUN 2672./2/ For Goldberg and Vance from Belcher.
/2/Document 335.
1. I have just come from meeting with Makarios and Kyprianou. Kyprianou has spoken with Rossides on telephone and given instructions on following lines: he is to support an appeal by the Secretary General based on para one of the GOG-GOT agreement. He told Rossides that he and Makarios agree as set forth in para one of his letter to Vance./3/ He told Rossides on phone (in my presence) that they could not agree to have anything in this first appeal on the basis of para four. He said that the Secretary General should do as suggested in para one USUN 2673./4/ That is to discuss with the three governments the question of para four or as he put it, "This question of additional pacification measures and the role of UNFICYP".
/3/The text of the letter is included in Document 334.
/4/Telegram 2673 from USUN, November 3, requested an immediate approach by the Secretary-General to the Turkish Government and transmitted an agreed text of the Turkish reply. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
2. While waiting for call to Rossides Kyprianou had suggested this course of action prior to our receipt of USUN 2673. When I received word by phone by Embassy along lines USUN 2673, I explained Vance and Goldberg apparently now thinking along these lines too. I warned him however that we had no indication as yet that Turks would be willing go along with this suggestion. I reminded him that originally GOT had informed Vance that document stood or fell as a unit. Whether they could be persuaded to follow this suggestion was matter we could not answer at this time. We would try get their concurrence.
3. I showed Kyprianou new text para four per last para USUN 2672. He commented that if GOC accepted the revised language, would mean that GOC would agree that what the Turks want can be accomplished under the present mandate. He said in presence of Makarios GOC would reject language of para four unless qualified as per letter to Vance.
4. With regard to Kyprianou's commitment to Vance as latter was leaving Palace, Kyprianou claims that what he said was that Rossides would be instructed not to oppose the Secretary General's appeal as it was his understanding that para four would be subject to further discussion between Secretary General and three governments and would not be included in appeal./5/
/5/Vanto 55 from Athens, November 30, reads: "Prior leaving Palace in Nicosia early this morning, ForMin Kyprianou commented to Vance that reference in para 1 to GOC 'acknowledging' the agreement between Greece and Turkey should be construed to mean that GOC will support the agreement." (Ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE)
5. Rossides instructed contact Goldberg and SYG along these lines at once. He is also to give copy of Vance letter to SYG.
6. Additional re para four Kyprianou went over same ground as in our lengthy discussions with you night of 29th in Nicosia. Said if they had to give categoric reply to question of accepting or rejecting para four as then drafted (or as presently revised) they would have to reject. "For this reason we devised formula which appeared in letter to Vance".
7. "GOC could not 'sign away sovereignty' by giving to UNFICYP undefined powers over internal security and other concepts included para four. For this reason they could only go along with statement accepting objectives of para four as being those of GOC too and agreeing to discussions in New York of role of UNFICYP in meeting between GOC, GOT, GOG and SYG."
Belcher
338. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Embassy in Turkey/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Nicosia, USUN, and the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.
Athens, December 1, 1967, 0625Z.
2531. Vanto 62. We are manifestly in a dangerous bind. At this early morning hour, our options appear limited in numbers and attractiveness. Unless we get some glue into the situation in a hurry, the agreements between the Greeks and Turks which we brought about may quickly fall apart and the Turks may proceed with their landing plans.
We seem to have two possibilities: (1) US, UK, and GOG make combined, or separate, effort to persuade GOC to agree to an SYG appeal which includes the revised para 4 language, contained USUN 2672./2/ We would inform GOT of this attempt. We would provide GOC assurances that we would be conscious of their sovereignty problems. (2) Same combination would exert maximum pressure on GOC to agree that SYG issue appeal, which includes request that interested parties meet with him to work out improved pacification measures. GOT would have to be brought aboard on this approach expeditiously. US, UK, and GOG would promise GOT we would use our full influence to reach agreement in New York on those measures.
/2/Document 335.
Request comments soonest from addressees on these or other possibilities./3/
/3/In telegram 841 from Nicosia, December 1, Belcher suggested that Vance return to Cyprus in an effort both to increase pressure for settlement on Makarios and to avoid a military intervention. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 CYP)
Talbot
339. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 2, 1967, 0222Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, USUN, London, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.
848. Vanto 72. Ref: Vanto 71 (Nicosia 847)./2/ Subj: Vance meeting with Archbishop Makarios--December 1-2.
/2/Vanto 71, December 1, forwarded a Cypriot proposed redraft of paragraph 4 of the agreement. (Ibid.)
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Belcher and John Walsh, had 4-hour meeting 0215, December 2, with Archbishop Makarios, Parliamentary President Clerides, and FonMin Kyprianou. Although maintaining his customary stubbornness in face of pressure from any quarter, Makarios was less dominating figure than in previous meetings. Kyprianou and Clerides tended to dominate the discussions on the Cypriot side. As in Ankara, the Cabinet was in session in an adjoining room and was reported by Kyprianou to be in negative mood. Ministerial opinion showed signs of stiffening against Turkish pressures, probably reflecting irritation at Turkish overflights of Nicosia and a growing belief that the US would hold the Turks in check.
2. Vance opened the discussion by endeavoring to impress the Archbishop with the sincerity of the US peace effort, the seriousness of the Turkish threat, and the necessity for Cyprus to pay for the events of November 14-15. This set the stage for the presentation to Makarios of the revised draft of para 4 and a draft letter of confirmation. Text follows:
"Dear Mr. Vance: You have informed me that the Governments of Greece and Turkey would be prepared to revise the language of paragraph 4 of the document, annexed to my previous letter to you, dated November 30, 1967, as follows:
'In response to the appeal of the Secretary General, UNFICYP, under its existing mandate, would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted, after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General's good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties.'
If this language were approved by the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and the Secretary General were to address an appeal along the following general lines:
'On November 24 I emphasized the need for the UN through its appropriate organs to do all it can to reverse the trend toward war resulting from the Cyprus question. The Security Council met and on November 25 called upon all the parties concerned to show the utmost moderation and restraint and to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation in Cyprus and constitute a threat to the peace. The Security Council further requested all concerned urgently to assist and cooperate in keeping the peace and arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964./3/
/3/For text of the November 25 Security Council statement (U.N. Doc. S/8266), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 368-369.
'In the light of the Security Council consensus and the continuing tension in the area, as Secretary General of the United Nations, I now urge the Governments of Greece and Turkey to take immediate steps to remove any threat to the security of each other and of Cyprus, and as a first step along the lines of my previous appeal to bring about an expeditious withdrawal of those forces in excess of the Turkish and Greek contingents. In addition UNFICYP under its existing mandate would be available to undertake an enhanced and broader pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General's good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties.'
The Government of Cyprus would accept such appeal."
3. Vance said the revised para 4 had been approved by the GOT, GOG, and SYG. Furthermore, it satisfactorily met the GOC belief that it would be unnecessary to request a new and broader mandate for UNFICYP and also would clarify for the GOC the extent of an enhanced and broader role for UNFICYP since it called for discussions with the SYG of the specifics of the new effort.
4. Makarios replied in his customary loving style. He was grateful for US assistance but could not accept ultimatum. If a "yes or no" answer was required, the answer was "no". The revised draft was somewhat worse than the earlier draft with which he had had serious difficulties. If asked what the GOC response was to para 4, it was clear "unacceptable." Furthermore, he could not understand why the SYG did not issue an appeal limited to the first three paragraphs.
5. After this opening salvo, it was clear that the mission's expectations of a long and difficult evening had been fully justified. Having made his mark, the Archbishop was relatively quiet thereafter.
6. Kyprianou was center stage through most of the remaining period, worrying the draft and the problem like a terrier gnawing a bone. Occasionally, Clerides joined the game.
7. Fundamentally, Vance tried to explain to them that his mission was to prevent a war, not to solve the overall problems of Cyprus. It was understandable that the Cyprus Government resented discussions conducted under the pressure of a gun. But the revised agreement, if approved, could put an end to the guns, and could set the stage for subsequent discussions of the basic issues of the island.
8. Finally, Kyprianou drafted a bare-boned para 4 which he asked us to try out with the Greek and Turk Perm Reps in New York (see reftel).
9. It was agreed the group would reconvene at 08:30 for further discussions. Clearly it was going to be very difficult to obtain agreement of Makarios to a para 4 which makes sense./4/
/4/In Vanto 76, December 2, Vance reported that if Makarios remained adamant, he intended to tell him he would be returning immediately to Athens for passage to the United States, effectively ending the mediation effort. (Ibid.) In a December 2 memorandum to the President, 10:45 a.m., Bromley Smith explained that while Vance remained in Athens to prevent an outbreak of war, U Thant would issue a short appeal that would serve as the basis for an immediate token withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus. The United States hoped this approach could avoid recourse to force. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President--Walt Rostow, Box 26, Vol. 53)
Belcher
340. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 3, 1967, 1517Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to USUN, Ankara, Athens, London, the Mission to NATO, and CINCEUR.
875. Vanto 86. Subject: Vance meeting with Archbishop Makarios--December 3.
1. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Belcher and John Walsh, had a two-hour meeting beginning 1300 with Archbishop Makarios, President of Parliament Clerides, and FonMin Kyprianou. Makarios was adamant, rejecting para 4 as revised during the night, and refusing any further efforts at compromise. He said Greece and Turkey can do what they want but it was impossible for him to accept anything that resembled commitment prior to discussion in Security Council. He said during course of our meeting Greek Government had urged him not to reject the draft para 4 but he had refused. In final statement, he expressed great appreciation to President Johnson, Vance, and USG for untiring effort to safeguard the peace. You have done the utmost, he said, and we will always be grateful no matter what the future may bring. When Vance pressed him to ponder again and to withhold a final decision, he responded negatively. He did, however, agree to refrain from press comment, although GOC had already begun to circulate background statement that it would never knuckle under Turk pressure. Thus there was no give in the rigid GOC position as time ran out in Nicosia for the Vance Mission. Vance will leave approximately 1800 for Athens.
2. Vance opened the discussion by reading the following prepared statement:
"We have been working throughout the night and this morning in a desperate attempt to get acceptance of the proposal which we transmitted on your behalf yesterday to the Government of Turkey.
In the early morning hours the Government of Turkey flatly rejected your proposal.
Through the rest of the night our Ambassadors in Ankara and New York with almost superhuman effort endeavored to get the Turks to change their position. They have been successful in getting the Turks to agree to the fundamental issues contained in your proposal, namely, that the matter should be considered by the Security Council and that the Secretary General's good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties. In doing this the United States has made great sacrifices. In June 1964 the United States at great political cost sent a letter from our President to the Government of Turkey in order to preserve the peace at that time. Last night in obtaining the concessions that I have referred to from the Turks, the United States again expended an important element of its influence and prestige.
The situation as we see it is as follows:
A. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey have publicly announced that Greece and Turkey have reached an agreement./2/
/2/Greece and Turkey each stated on December 2 that they had reached an agreement on a settlement to the Cyprus crisis; see The New York Times, December 3, 1967.
B. Therefore, insofar as the world is concerned an agreement for peace has been reached subject only to the possibility that it may be frustrated by the unwillingness of the Government of Cyprus to permit that agreement to be implemented. This all hangs on paragraph 4.
C. With respect to paragraph 4, the Government of Turkey has said that it will return to the original language of paragraph 4 as contained in the document attached to your letter to me, and will also agree to the addition of the last sentence with respect to the good offices of the Secretary General.
D. Thus we are faced with a situation where the decision for war or peace hangs on the difference between the words 'should be' and 'will discuss in the Security Council'.
You and your government are thus faced with the opportunity to go down in history as the man and the government which made the decision which preserved the peace in this area, or the decision which plunged it into war."
3. At the end of this statement, Vance handed to the Archbishop the following revised text of para 4 negotiated during the late night hours in Ankara:
"In response to the appeal of the Secretary General there should be an enlarged and improved mandate for UNFICYP giving it an increased pacification role, which would include supervision of disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963 and new practical arrangements for the safeguarding of internal security including the safety of all citizens. The Secretary General's good offices would be available to work out the specifics with the interested parties."
4. He pointed out that last night the GOT had flatly refused to accept the text of para 4 proposed by the GOC. Under our heavy and politically costly pressure, the GOT had agreed to revised para 4, cited above, which would meet GOC desires to debate issue in Security Council and to act under good offices of SYG. Turks had accepted this despite their fears that GOC would have enormous advantage in SC. We firmly believe this would protect GOC interests and would lift the terrible threat of war from the region.
5. This statement ran into a stonewall of Cypriot opposition. The Archbishop said he could not accept it because it would only create misunderstandings in the future. Greece and Turkey could do whatever they wished but he would not agree to do more than discuss the issues encompassed in para 4.
6. Kyprianou stated the Turks wished the GOC to accept certain principles and then to discuss them. Why, he asked, should the GOC make concessions. Furthermore, if the GOC agreed to the formulation as presented it would limit its freedom in the Security Council. This was a matter of substance and not merely protocol.
7. Vance then restated the familiar line of argumentation for GOC acceptance: The agreement between Greece and Turkey was a three-legged stool which would fall without GOC cooperation; the differences between the GOC and GOT drafts were largely semantical in nature; the position of the GOC in the SC would be fully protected and the GOC would have an enormous advantage in any SC debates on this issue; and finally, the world would never understand if this opportunity to prevent war were not seized.
8. This was not persuasive to the Cypriots. When Clerides, who had played a helpful role throughout the discussions, said that the world should not be surprised if the GOC does not agree, we decided to take a walk in the rose garden in search of inspiration and to buy time for Ambassador Goldberg's efforts in New York. As we stepped into the garden, the Archbishop sweetly advised us not to work very hard since he had already made up his mind.
9. After 45 minutes, Vance resumed his advocacy of peace, re- working the argumentation and hammering at the point that the GOC was refusing the safe path to the SC and away from war simply over a matter of words which were of little consequence.
10. He went on to say that the Turks and the Cypriots were locked into rigid positions over words, and, tragically, they were going to go to war. He emphasized that, while not defending or condoning Turkish war hysteria, the GOC had to recognize that the present situation developed from the tragic incidents of November 14-15. A price must be paid by the GOC for those events. He beseeched the Archbishop to show the flexibility now required to prevent the misery of war and the loss of countless innocent lives.
11. Kyprianou then said the GOC could not accept. Their only recourse now was to go promptly to the Security Council to show the world who the aggressor was.
12. At that point, there was little more to say. Vance expressed great personal sadness about the evident failure of the search for peace in which so many people have engaged. President Johnson and he had been convinced that a just settlement was imminent and now it appeared that no one in the world would understand or appreciate.
13. He then asked with great solemnity that the Archbishop not give him a final negative answer but rather to ponder once again. Our plane would depart for Athens in a few hours and Vance could be reached there.
14. Makarios then said he had no need to ponder. He had made up his mind. Vance's words had raised a delicate issue for him, since he was deeply grateful to President Johnson, to Vance, and to the USG who had done their utmost to preserve the peace.
Whatever the outcome of the present situation he would never forget what the United States has done. He then concluded with the words: "I know my answer".
15. In departing the Palace, Vance, by agreement, limited his comments to the assertion that he was returning to Athens./3/
/3/In Vanto 85, December 3, Vance requested that the Secretary-General be asked to immediately release his appeal. (Ibid.) For text of this appeal (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.6), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 369-370. The decision to request the release of the Secretary-General's appeal was made after a telephone conference among Rusk, Vance, and Goldberg. A transcript of their discussion is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 4.On December 3, the Greek Government, in a brief note, accepted the Secretary-General's appeal. The Turkish Government also accepted on the same day. (U.N. Doc. S/8258/Add.7)
Belcher
341. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State/1/
Nicosia, December 4, 1967, 1414Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to USUN, Ankara, and Athens and repeated to London, Ottawa, and the Mission to NATO.
888. Subject: GOC reply to SYG appeal. Reference: Nicosia 883./2/
/2/Telegram 883, December 4, transmitted the text of the Cypriot reply to the Secretary-General's appeal. (Ibid.)
1. Issuance SYG appeal without prior GOC approval forced Makarios' hand tactically. Archbishop was required to respond in apparently positive manner since he could not very well reject UN initiative for peace once such initiative was taken. However, tone of GOC letter to SYG is guardedly affirmative at best and clearly reserves GOC positions on fundamental problems that plagued Vance discussions./3/
/3/On December 3, the Cypriot Government made an interim reply to the Secretary-General's appeal. (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.7)
2. Letter highlights GOC positions which will be basis for SC battle that is shaping up, viz:
A. GOC goal is "ultimate and complete withdrawal from Republic of Cyprus of all non-Cypriot armed forces" (other than UNFICYP). This includes both Greek and Turk contingents and doubtless GOC will seek tie disarming and disbanding of National Guard to withdrawal of contingents.
B. GOC will demand "effective guarantees against military intervention in affairs of Cyprus" probably from SC. Makarios will not miss opportunity to seize upon SC discussions of Cyprus problem to bring into question Turkish treaty right of intervention in Cyprus.
C. Expanded role for UNFICYP must be considered in terms of GOC "sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence." This raises question of who is going to be policeman on Cyprus: GOC with sovereignty over whole island or expanded UNFICYP to which some of GOC sovereignty would be given in trust at least temporarily.
D. Pacification and permanent peaceful solution are to be "within framework of Charter and relevant resolutions on Cyprus by SC and GA" (an obvious reference to GA resolution of December 1965 inter alia)./4/
/4/General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX).
3. In above points we can see emerging general lines of GOC strategy. Building case on sovereignty of government, UN Charter and favorable UN statements on Cyprus (March '64 SC Resolution, December '65 GA Resolution, Galo-Plaza Report), Makarios through his forensic Foreign Minister, Kyprianou, will attempt to achieve complete demilitarization of Cyprus, effective guarantee for inviolability of the Republic, and extension of sovereignty of his government to all parts of island including Turkish enclaves where his writ does not now run.
4. Intensity of Turk and Turk Cypriot reaction to such GOC strategy in SC can easily be imagined. Basing legal position on London/Zurich Turks will wage bitter fight for what they regard as basic elements permitting peaceful existence of Turk Cypriots on Cyprus. We have already had full plate of suspicions from Kuchukery, even before they had read letter of "acceptance." Our next meeting, after they have digested in full the GOC reply, should be even more revealing of Turk and Turk Cypriot fears./5/
/5/The Cypriot Government, in a December 4 note, accepted the Secretary-General's appeal and offer of good offices. The note specifically accepted the proposal for demilitarization and withdrawal of unauthorized military forces. (U.N. Doc. S/8248/Add.8)
Belcher
342. Notes of Meeting/1/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held at the White House. These notes are printed with the permission of Tom Johnson.
Washington, December 5, 1967, 1:18-2:37 p.m.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
THE VICE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY McNAMARA
SECRETARY RUSK
CYRUS VANCE
CIA DIRECTOR HELMS
WALT ROSTOW
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
TOM JOHNSON
The President congratulated Mr. Vance for an excellent job and an excellent report.
Secretary Rusk said a case study should be made of this. He called Cyrus Vance's actions an example of diplomatic excellence.
The President explained that he thought General Chapman would make an excellent Marine Corps Commandant. Dick Helms called it the "right" man for the job.
Mr. Vance then reviewed his report to the President, stressing the need that the report not be made public or any acknowledgement that a written report was submitted. (A single copy of this report is attached./2/ It is not for redistribution.)
/2/Not printed.
Secretary Rusk said the most important impression that Mr. Vance brought back from his trip was that both Greece and Turkey were anxious to reduce their commitment to Cyprus. The Secretary said Greece could do this only under a dictatorship so we should try to get this disengagement from Cyprus before a democratically elected government comes into office in Greece. Otherwise, the Secretary said public opinion would not permit a democratically elected government to reduce its commitment.
Mr. Vance said he appreciated the fact the President gave the widest latitude possible in handling this situation./3/
/3/For text of President Johnson's statement issued after the meeting with Vance, and of Vance's remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 370-371.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
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