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SUMMARY CONTENTS Contents ix Abbreviations xxi 1. Introduction 1 2. Socrates 13 3. The Cyrenaics 45 4. The Cynics 57 5. Plato 69 6. Aristotle: Happiness 114 7. Aristotle: Nature 134 8. Aristotle: Virtue 153 9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality 198 10. The Sceptics 233 11. Epicurus 257 12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285 13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312 14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360 15. Augustine 397 16. Aquinas: Will 434 17. Aquinas: Action 456 18. Aquinas: Freedom 475 19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492 20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516 21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545 22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571 23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588 24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628 25. Scotus:Will, Freedom, and Reason 653 26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679 Irwin ftoc.tex V1 - 04/13/2007 4:34pm Page viii Summary Contents 27. Ockham 701 28. Machiavelli 725 29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744 Bibliography 775 Index 793 CONTENTS Abbreviations xxi 1. Introduction 1 1. Scope 1 2. The Socratic Tradition 2 3. Aristotelian Naturalism 4 4. Critics of Aristotelian Naturalism 5 5. Beginning and End 6 6. Progress, Optimism, and Pessimism 6 7. What this Book is Not 10 8. Level and Organization 11 2. Socrates 13 9. The Founder of Moral Philosophy? 13 10. Method 15 11. What is a Socratic Definition? 16 12. Basic Moral Principles 19 13. Knowledge of the Good: Eudaemonism 22 14. Why Virtue is Necessary for Happiness 23 15. Why is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? 25 16. Wisdom and its Product 27 17. The Supremacy of Virtue 28 18. Does Happiness give a Reason for being Virtuous? 29 19. What sort of Virtue is Supreme in Happiness? 30 20. Integrity and Socratic Virtue 32 21. The Nature of Happiness: Socratic Hedonism 33 22. Hedonism and Socratic Virtue 35 23. Objections to Hedonism: The Gorgias 37 24. Hedonism without Prudence? 38 25. An Adaptive Conception of Happiness 40 26. Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? 41 27. Reason and Desire 42 3. The Cyrenaics 45 28. The `One-Sided' Socratics 45 29. Aristippus and the Protagoras 47 30. Hedonism without Eudaemonism 48 31. For and against Eudaemonism 49 32. Epistemological and Metaphysical Objections to Eudaemonism 51 33. Doubts about the Continuing Self 53 34. A Conflict between Hedonism and Eudaemonism? 55 4. The Cynics 57 35. Socrates and the Cynics 57 36. Socratic Alternatives to Hedonism: Virtue or Self-Sufficiency? 58 37. Happiness and Adaptation 60 38. Do the Cynics Improve on Socrates? 62 39. Socrates and the Cynics: Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? 65 40. An Objection to Cynicism 67 5. Plato 69 41. Plato's Reflexions on Socrates 69 42. The Scope of Plato's Ethical Thought 70 43. Definitions and Disputes 71 44. Why Explanation Requires Non-sensible Forms 72 45. Appropriate Definitions 73 46. Non-rational Desires 75 47. Why a Tripartite Soul? 76 48. Why Parts of the Soul? 79 49. The Tripartite Soul, Virtue, and Vice 81 50. Why is Justice to be Chosen for Itself ? 84 51. How is Justice-A Non-instrumental Good? 87 52. Is Justice Sufficient for Happiness? 89 53. Inadequate Conceptions of Happiness 91 54. Cyrenaic Hedonism v. Eudaemonism 94 55. Why Intelligence is Not the Good 96 56. Responses to the Philebus 97 57. Why Justice is Insufficient for Happiness 98 58. Are Plato's Questions Reasonable? 100 59. What is Psychic Justice? 101 60. How Psychic Justice Fulfils the Human Function 103 61. The Philosopher as Ruler: A Conflict between Justice and Happiness? 105 62. The Philosopher as Ruler: No Sacrifice of Happiness? 107 63. Love, Self-Concern, and Concern for Others 109 64. Eudaemonism and Concern for Others 111 6. Aristotle: Happiness 114 65. Interpreting Aristotle 114 66. Aristotle's Main Contributions 115 67. Method 119 68. The Role of the Final Good 122 69. The Final Good and Happiness 123 70. The Final Good and the `Three Lives' 126 71. A Comprehensive Conception of Happiness 128 72. Happiness and Goodness 129 73. Implications of Eudaemonism 132 7. Aristotle: Nature 134 74. The Function Argument 134 75. Function, Essence, End, and Explanation 136 76. Function and Practical Reason 139 77. Aristotelian Naturalism? 140 78. A Non-naturalist Account of the Function Argument 142 79. Nature, Happiness, and External Goods 143 80. Naturalism and `Second Nature' 145 81. The Extent of Naturalism in the Ethics 147 82. Happiness, Function, and the Theoretical Life 149 8. Aristotle: Virtue 153 83. The Function Argument and the Virtues 153 84. Virtue, Continence, Incontinence, and Vice 154 85. The Doctrine of the Mean 155 86. Virtue and Harmony 157 87. Rationalist v. Anti-rationalist Accounts of Virtue 158 88. Anti-rationalism: Virtue and Pleasure 160 89. Anti-rationalism: Limits of Practical Reason 161 90. Anti-rationalism: Moral Virtue and Responsibility 162 91. Anti-rationalism: The Voluntary 164 92. Anti-rationalism and theWeakness of Practical Reason: Incontinence 165 93. Anti-rationalism: Vice 166 94. Virtue, Election, and Reason 167 95. Pleasure and Reason 168 96. Virtue, Election, and Deliberation 171 97. Wish andWill 173 98. Prudence and Deliberation 175 99. Virtue, Reason, and Responsibility 177 100. Voluntary Action in Rational Agents 179 101. Rational Agency and Character 181 102. Moral Responsibility and Morality 183 103. Questions about Incontinence and Responsibility 183 104. Incontinence, Ignorance, and Deliberation 185 105. Vice, Reason, and Appetite 187 106. Self-Love, Reason, and the Fine 189 107. How is the Fine Connected with Reason? 190 108. Vice and Pleasure 192 109. The Vicious Person's Regret 192 110. The Instability of the Vicious Person 194 111. Vice, Reason, and Nature 196 9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality 198 112. Why Virtues? 198 113. The Content of the Virtues 200 114. Are the Virtues of Character Moral Virtues? 202 115. Is Aristotle an Unsystematic Theorist? 204 116. Virtue and the Fine 206 117. Justice, the Common Good, and Concern for the Fine 208 118. The Fine and the Virtues of Character: Bravery 210 119. The Fine and the Virtues: Temperance 210 120. The Fine and the Virtues: Generosity and Magnificence 212 121. The Fine and the Virtues: Magnanimity 213 122. How can Friendship Justify Morality? 215 123. Friendship and Concern for Others 216 124. The Friend as Another Self 218 125. Why Other Selves? 220 126. The Extension of Friendship 224 127. Different Aspects of Friendship in the Political Community 226 128. Friendship and Morality 227 129. Aristotelian and other Conceptions of Morality 230 10. The Sceptics 233 130. Scepticism in the History of Greek Ethics 233 131. The Sceptic as an Investigator 234 132. Socrates as a Source of Scepticism 236 133. Protagoras and Plato 238 134. Aristotle and Conflicting Appearances 239 135. Aristotle on Nature and Convention 241 136. Arguments against Objective Goodness 243 137. Natural Goodness 244 138. Sceptical Tranquillity 245 139. Actions without Beliefs? 248 140. What kind of Life can we liveWithout Beliefs? 251 141. Scepticism, Belief, and Deliberation: Sextus, Hobbes, and Hume 253 142. Do We Need Beliefs? 254 11. Epicurus 257 143. Epicurus' Aims 257 144. Hedonism 259 145. Epicurean Eudaemonism v. Cyrenaic Hedonism 260 146. Why Freedom Matters 262 147. Why we should Reject Compatibilism 263 148. Why we should Reject Determinism 264 149. Epicurus' Indeterminism 265 150. Indeterminism and Epicurus' Ethical Theory 266 151. Types of Pleasure 266 152. Fear of Death as the Source of Excessive Desires 267 153. Does Epicurus Show that Death is Not an Evil? 268 154. Kinetic Pleasure v. Freedom from Pain 270 155. Is Epicurus a Hedonist? 273 156. Hedonism and Good Pleasures 274 157. A Defence of Virtue? 276 158. Justice and its Consequences: Epicurus v. Plato 278 159. The Value of Friendship: Epicurus and Aristotle 280 160. Difficulties in Epicureanism 283 12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason 285 161. The Stoics and their Predecessors 285 162. Eudaemonism 287 163. Reactions to Stoic Ethics 289 164. Stoic Strategies 291 165. Preconceptions 292 166. Nature, Conciliation, and Appearances 295 167. Passions as Assents 297 168. How can we Correct our Assents? 300 169. Questions about Responsibility 300 170. Assent as Principal Cause 302 171. Fate v. Necessity 303 172. Incompatibilist Objections 305 173. Assent as the Basis for Responsibility 307 174. Passions, Assent, and Responsibility 308 175. Action and Practical Reason 309 13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness 312 176. Practical Reason and Preconceptions 312 177. Practical Reason, Consistency, and Agreement 313 178. The Use and the Value of Practical Reason 314 179. The Non-instrumental Value of Practical Reason 316 180. The Non-instrumental Value of Virtue 318 181. Virtue as the Only Good 321 182. Indifferents 323 183. Preferred Indifferents 325 184. Crafts, Ends, and Objectives 327 185. The Connexion of the Virtues 328 186. Concern for Preferred Indifferents 331 187. The Selective Value of Virtue and the Preferred Indifferents 332 188. Why Virtue is Praiseworthy 333 189. Why should Virtue be Identified with Happiness? 336 190. Two Roles of Aristotelian Happiness 338 191. Freedom from Passion 342 192. Appearances without Passions 345 193. Is the Sage really Free of Passion? 346 194. The Extent of Friendship 347 195. Expanding Circles of Friendship 350 196. The Characteristics of Friendship 351 197. Stoic Political Theory 352 198. The Community of Sages 354 199. The Community of Human Beings 356 200. Limitations of Stoic Friendship 357 201. Estimate of the Stoic Position 359 14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy 360 202. Christian Influences 360 203. Questions for Moral Theory 363 204. The Difference between the Moral and the Ceremonial Law 365 205. Law and Gospel 370 206. Natural Law 371 207. Perfectionism 373 208. The Moral Law and the Consciousness of Sin 375 209. Justification 379 210. Moral Implications 381 211. The Christian Conception of Morality 383 212. Moral Psychology 386 213. Free Will 389 214. Eudaemonism 392 215. The Virtues 393 15. Augustine 397 216. The Rejection of Greek Ethics? 397 217. The Importance of the Will: Rejection of Psychological Dualism 398 218. TheWill and Other Mental States 400 219. Will and Passion: Stoics v. Peripatetics 403 220. Augustine's Objections to the Stoics on Passions 404 221. Will and Passions 406 222. Platonists and Peripatetics on Passions 407 223. The Primacy of theWill 409 224. TheWill and the Good: Eudaemonism and Intellectualism 411 225. Freewill and Determination 412 226. Pagan Morality and Natural Law 414 227. The Character of Happiness 416 228. Pagan Virtue 418 229. The Direction of theWill 420 230. Pagan Virtues and Misdirected Will 422 231. The Aim of Pagan Virtue 425 232. Are Pagan Virtues Genuine Virtues? 427 233. Pagan Arrogance 429 234. Self-Love, Arrogance, and the Earthly City 431 16. Aquinas: Will 434 235. Aims 434 236. Interpretations of Aristotle 435 237. The Form of Aquinas' Argument 437 238. Aquinas and Naturalism 438 239. The Structure of Aquinas' Ethical Theory 439 240. Augustine and Aristotle 441 241. Rational Agency, Voluntary Action, and Freedom 442 242. Will and Properly Human Actions 443 243. Rational v. Non-rational Agents 444 244. The Passivity of the Passions 447 245. The Passions and Sensory Desire 449 246. Criticism of the Stoics on the Passions 451 247. Will and the Ultimate Good 452 248. The Influence of the Ultimate End 453 17. Aquinas: Action 456 249. Will and Action 456 250. Aiming at Ends 456 251. Deliberation 458 252. Consent and Election 459 253. The Influence of the Passions on theWill 461 254. The Influence of the Will on the Passions 462 255. Action without Deliberation? 465 256. The Inter-dependence ofWill and Practical Reason 466 257. How is the Will Rational? 468 258. The Influence ofWill on Intellect 470 259. Will, Reason, and Desire 473 18. Aquinas: Freedom 475 260. Voluntary Action and theWill 475 261. How Action on Passions is Voluntary 476 262. TheWill as the Source of Virtue and Vice 478 263. The Connexion between Voluntariness and Freewill 481 264. Objections to an Aristotelian account of Freewill 482 265. Will as the Source of Freewill 483 266. Freewill as Absence of Necessitation 485 267. Freewill as Rational Agency 486 268. Freedom and External Reasons 487 269. The Place of Will and Intellect in Freedom 488 270. Freedom, Necessity, and Determination 489 19. Aquinas: The Ultimate End 492 271. Why Must the Will Pursue the Ultimate Good? 492 272. The Final Good and the Natural Law 493 273. Subordinate Ends 494 274. Aiming at Perfection 497 275. Intellectual Love 498 276. Reasons and Perfection 501 277. Is the Pursuit of Perfection Necessary? 502 278. The Place of Happiness in Aquinas' Argument 503 279. Criteria for Happiness 504 280. How is Happiness Self-Sufficient? 505 281. Two Grades of Happiness 508 282. The Complete Good 510 283. The Pursuit of the Two Grades of Happiness 513 20. Aquinas: Moral Virtue 516 284. Virtue and Freewill 516 285. Will and the Formation of Character 517 286. Reason, Passion, and Virtue 519 287. The Passions as Subjects of Virtues 520 288. Means, Ends, and the Virtues 521 289. The Positive Contribution of the Passions 522 290. Will, Passion, and Virtue 526 291. Moral and Intellectual Virtues 527 292. Vice and Sin 529 293. Virtue v. Continence 530 294. The Sources of Sin 532 295. Passion and sin: The Problem of Incontinence 533 296. How Incontinence is Based on Consent 535 297. Deliberate Fault 538 298. Sin and Vice 539 299. Sin and Virtue 541 300. The General Tendency of Aquinas' View of Virtue 543 21. Aquinas: Natural Law 545 301. Questions Raised by Natural Law 545 302. Questions about Law 546 303. Law and Obligation 548 304. Law, Reason, and Ends 549 305. Law and Publication 551 306. Eternal Law and Natural Law 552 307. The Natural Law and theWill of God 553 308. What is Natural about Natural Law? 556 309. The Relevance of Natural Law 558 310. The First Principle of Natural Law 560 311. Natural Inclinations and the Highest Precepts of Natural Law 561 312. Rational Agency and Social Nature 563 313. Derived Principles of Natural Law 565 314. Dispensations and Exceptions 567 315. Misunderstandings of Natural Law 569 22. Aquinas: Practical Reason and Prudence 571 316. Virtue,Will, and Practical Reason 571 317. Universal Conscience and the Ultimate End 573 318. How Universal Conscience Grasps Natural Law 576 319. Why Universal Conscience is Indestructible 577 320. How Prudence Discovers Ends 580 321. How Prudence Forms the Virtuous Motive 584 322. Objections to Aquinas' View 586 323. Natural Law, Universal Conscience, and Prudence 586 23. Aquinas: The Canon of the Virtues 588 324. The Unity of Prudence 588 325. The Reciprocity of the Virtues 589 326. Objections to the Reciprocity of the Virtues 590 327. From the Ultimate End to the Cardinal Virtues 591 328. The Nature of a Cardinal Virtue 592 329. `Principal' Displays of the Cardinal Virtues 593 330. The Range of a Cardinal Virtue 595 331. Subordinate Virtues 597 332. Moral Goodness in Latin Sources 599 333. The Honestum in Aquinas' Commentary 603 334. The Honestum in the Summa 606 335. Justice 608 336. Friendship 609 337. Friendship as a Basis for Justice 614 338. The Aims of Justice 615 339. Eudaemonism and Justice 619 340. Commands and Counsels 621 341. Self-Love, Sin, and Virtue 624 342. Success of the Argument for the Virtues 626 24. Aquinas: Sin and Grace 628 343. Questions for Aquinas 628 344. The External Causes of Sin 630 345. Sin and Causal Responsibility 631 346. God and Human Freewill 633 347. How God Causes Sin 634 348. Original Sin 635 349. The Effects of Original Sin 637 350. Natural and Supernatural Good 638 351. The Need for Grace 639 352. Grace, Freewill, and Merit 642 353. Infused Virtue 644 354. How the Infused Virtues Perfect the Acquired Virtues 647 355. Sin and Infused Virtues 648 356. Defence of Pagan Virtue 649 25. Scotus:Will, Freedom, and Reason 653 357. Alternatives to Aquinas 653 358. Early Critics of Aquinas 654 359. The Character of theWill 658 360. Psychological Objections to Eudaemonism 659 361. Defences of Eudaemonism 660 362. The Conflict between Eudaemonism and Freedom 661 363. Moral Objections to Eudaemonism: The Two Affections of theWill 663 364. Freedom Identified with the Affection for Justice 665 365. Sin and Self-Love 666 366. Sin and Freedom 668 367. Eudaemonism, Intellectualism, and Voluntarism 670 368. A Dualism of Practical Reason 672 369. Will as Rational Capacity 674 370. Rational Capacity and Contingency 676 371. Voluntarism and Indeterminism 677 26. Scotus: Virtue and Practical Reason 679 372. Passion, Will, and Virtue 679 373. Intellect,Will, and Virtue 680 374. Universal Conscience 682 375. Practical Reason and Prudence 684 376. The Unity of Prudence: Aquinas against Scotus 685 377. Eudaemonism and the Unity of Prudence 686 378. Knowledge of Natural Law 687 379. Divine Commands and Natural Law 689 380. Natural Law and the Will of God 690 381. God's Justice 691 382. Consonance with Natural Law 693 383. Biel on Consonance and Dispensations 695 384. The Extent of God's Freedom 697 385. God's Promises and God's Generosity 699 27. Ockham 701 386. Approaches to Ockham 701 387. How to Reject Happiness 702 388. Does Eudaemonism Exclude Freedom? 703 389. Moderate v. Extreme Voluntarism 704 390. Difficulties for Voluntarism 705 391. Developments of Voluntarism 707 392. Virtue and Passion 708 393. Correct Reason andWill 709 394. Separability of the Virtues 711 395. Non-positive v. Positive Morality 713 396. Divine Freedom and Divine Justice 716 397. Questions about God's Justice 718 398. Conflicts within Morality 719 399. God and Morality: Versions of Voluntarism 721 400. Voluntarism, Morality, and Reasons 724 28. Machiavelli 725 401. Questions about Moral Philosophy 725 402. Civic Virtues 726 403. Civic v. Christian Virtue 727 404. Machiavellian Virtue v. Moral Virtue 729 405. Civic Virtue and its End 731 406. Instrumental Practical Reason 732 407. Morality and Circumstances 735 408. Adaptation to Circumstances 736 409. Exceptions to Morality? 738 410. The Strength of Machiavelli's Objections to Morality 740 29. The Reformation and Scholastic Moral Philosophy 744 411. Objections to Scholasticism 744 412. Natural Law 746 413. Dispensations from Natural Law? 749 414. Hooker on Natural Law 751 415. The Effects of Sin 752 416. Objections to Self-Love 755 417. Pagan Virtue 757 418. Sin and Freewill 762 419. Justification, Grace, and Faith 767 420. Grace and Virtue 769 421. Natural Law and Ethics 771 422. Implications 773 Bibliography 775 Index 793
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Ethics -- History.