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Table 4-12. Summary of the Subissue Acceptance Criteria Addressed by Disruptive Events Analyses and/or the Calculation

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria

PMR Approach and AMR Support

KTI: TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATION (NRC 2000)
Subissue 1 System Description and Demonstration of Multiple Barriers

This subissue has two parts: system description which is traceability and transparency and demonstration of multiple barriers. Revision 2 of the IRSR only provides acceptance criteria for transparency and traceability, therefore there is no mapping to the second part of the subissue in this table. Discussion of this KTI and its subissues is found in Section 4.2 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
System Description: Transparency and Traceability For this part of the subissue acceptance criteria are grouped into categories related to ensuring transparency and traceability of the TSPA calculation and its supporting documentation. All disruptive events AMRs and the calculation support meeting the acceptance criteria by providing documentation for the work underlying portions of the TSPA models, assumptions, data, and other information.
Transparency and traceability category

TSPA documentation style, structure, and organization
Acceptance criteria here address ensuring that source documents underlying the TSPA are well structured and organized to support transparency and traceability.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1-Documents are complete, clear, and consistent. All disruptive events AMRs and the calculation support addressing this criterion by being complete (containing all sections required by applicable procedures) and by having content that has had several reviews for clarity and consistency.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2-Information is amply cross-referenced. All disruptive events AMRs and the calculation support addressing this criterion by clearly indicating the sources of information, particularly the flow of information between disruptive events AMRs and the calculation. The Disruptive Events PMR also supports addressing this criterion by providing a high-level framework for the AMRs and the calculation with relation to each other and other YMP documents.
Transparency and traceability category

Features, Events, and Processes Identification and Screening
This activity is supported by the TSPA FEPs analysis procedures described in Section 2.1.4 of the Disruptive Events PMR. The FEPs AMR that addresses disruptive events follows the procedures developed for the TSPA as a whole.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1-The screening process by which FEPs were included or excluded from the TSPA is fully described The AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) contains the information regarding include/exclude decisions for disruptive events FEPs.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2-Relationships between relevant FEPs are fully described. The AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) contains the information regarding relationships between relevant FEPs for disruptive events FEPs.
Transparency and traceability category

Abstraction Methodology
Meeting criteria under this category includes providing documentation that identifies the relationship of the site information and the actual repository design to the assumptions, models, and parameters used in the PA calculations.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1-The levels and method(s) of abstraction are described starting from assumptions defining the scope of the assessment down to assumptions concerning specific processes and the validity of given data. The disruptive events AMRs that provide documentation of the linkage from data to assumptions and conceptual models that describe the disruptive events and processes of concern in TSPA-SR are Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i), Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a), Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e), and Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l).
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2-A mapping (e.g., a road map diagram, a traceability matrix, a cross-reference matrix) is provided to show what conceptual features (e.g., patterns of volcanic events) and processes are represented in the abstracted models, and by what algorithms. All disruptive events AMRs provide this type of information; however, for application to the processes that were abstracted for TSPA-SR, the list is: Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i), Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a), Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e), and Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l).
Transparency and traceability category

Data Use and Validity
Data use and validity acceptance criteria focus on the transparency and traceability of data values and their pedigree and on parameter development, including disruptive events data.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1-The pedigree of data from laboratory tests, natural analogs, and the site is clearly identified. All disruptive events analyses and the calculation support addressing this criterion by providing the pedigree of data including natural analog data.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2-Input parameter development and basis for their selection is described. All disruptive events analyses and the calculation support addressing this criterion by providing a conceptual framework for development of parameters that links them to the disruptive geological event of importance. For TSPA-SR only igneous activity was modeled as a disruptive event, and the AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) provided support for TSPA input parameter development. This AMR received data from supporting AMRs as described in Section 3.1.5 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Transparency and traceability category

Assessment Results
Assessment of results acceptance criteria focus on making results transparent and traceable down through the level of individual components or subsystems of the repository, including disruptive events.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1-PA results (i.e., the peak expected annual dose within the compliance period) can be traced back to applicable analyses that identify the FEPs, assumptions, input parameters, and models in the PA. All disruptive events analyses and the calculation support addressing this by providing the underlying analyses documented in a clear manner. In particular, the disruptive events AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) provides information on assumptions, models, and parameters for igneous consequence modeling in the TSPA-SR, and the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) provides FEPs analysis disruptive events.
Subissue 2 – Scenario Analysis
Identification of an initial set of processes and events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - DOE has identified a comprehensive list of processes and events that: (1) are present or might occur in the Yucca Mountain region and (2) includes those processes and events that have the potential to influence repository performance. Review Method for this acceptance criterion says DOE should include processes and events related to igneous activity, seismic shaking (high frequency low magnitude and rare large magnitude events), tectonic evolution (slip on existing faults and formation of new faults), climatic change, and criticality.
The YMP FEPs database (CRWMS M&O 2000j) contains an initial list of comprehensive FEPs that cover natural and engineered components for the setting of the potential repository. Within each PMR, individual FEPs AMRs address portions of this list for completeness and evaluate FEPs. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h).
Classification of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - DOE has provided adequate documentation identifying how its initial list of processes and events has been grouped into categories.
A preliminary grouping of FEPs into primary and secondary categories was performed within the YMP FEPs database (CRWMS M&O 2000j). The entries in the YMP FEPs database were grouped into areas focused on those represented by the nine PMRs for TSPA-SR, and within the PMR group of analyses there was a FEPs AMR for each PMR. For disruptive events the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs documents these groupings (CRWMS M&O 2000h).
Classification of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 – Categorization of processes and events is compatible with the use of categories during the screening of processes and events.
Screening of categories of events and processes (i.e., of primary and secondary FEPs) is addressed in FEPs AMRs for each PMR. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h).
Screening of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Categories of processes and events that are not credible for the Yucca Mountain repository because of waste characteristics, repository design, or site characteristics are identified and sufficient justification is provided for DOE's conclusions.
Screening of FEPs, including the identification of any processes and events that are not credible for the potential repository is addressed in FEPs AMRs for each PMR. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h).
Screening of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 – The probability assigned to each category of processes and events not screened based on criterion T1 or T2 is consistent with site information, well documented, and appropriately considers uncertainty. The Review Method states that NRC staff will focus on those categories that have (1) probabilities close to the screening criteria on probability and (2) potentially significant probability-weighted consequences.
Probabilities for categories of processes and events are assigned only for those FEPs that are shown to be credible at Yucca Mountain and have a significant effect on overall performance. For potentially disruptive events, probabilities are less than one (i.e., the events are not certain to occur during the 10,000-year performance period). Disruptive event probabilities are described in the AMRs Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), and Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h).
Screening of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 – DOE has demonstrated that processes and events screened from the PA on the basis of their probability of occurrence, have a probability of less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.
Screening of categories of events and processes (i.e., of primary and secondary FEPs) is addressed in FEPs AMRs for each PMR. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Probability values used in TSPA-SR calculations are derived from expert elicitation in the areas of igneous activity (PVHA, CRWMS M&O 1996) and seismicity (PSHA, Wong and Stepp 1998).
Screening of Processes and Events

Technical Acceptance Criterion 4 – DOE has demonstrated that categories of processes and events omitted from the PA on the basis that their omission would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose, do not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose.
Screening of categories of events and processes (i.e., of primary and secondary FEPs) is addressed in FEPs AMRs for each PMR. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000 h). Demonstration that categories of processes and events omitted from the PA do not affect the calculated expected annual dose lies with the TSPA calculation and its documentation and is supported by the disruptive events FEPs AMR.
Formation of Scenarios

Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 – DOE has provided adequate documentation identifying: (1) whether processes and events have been addressed through consequence model abstraction or scenario analysis and (2) how the remaining categories of processes and events have been combined into scenario classes.
Documentation of how categories of events and processes have been included in the TSPA analysis is summarized for each PMR in the FEPs AMR. For disruptive events this criterion is addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Documentation of the construction of scenario classes for the TSPA-SR is provided in TSPA-SR documentation and is outside of the scope of the PMR.
Acceptance Criterion Screening of Scenario Classes

Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - DOE has provided adequate documentation identifying: (1) whether processes and events have been addressed through consequence model abstraction or scenario analysis and (2) how the remaining categories of processes and events have been combined into scenario classes.
Documentation of the construction of scenario classes for the TSPA-SR is provided in TSPA-SR documentation and is outside of the scope of the PMR. For disruptive events FEPs screening is addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Disruptive events analyses do not produce a process model that is abstracted.
Screening of Scenario Classes

Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - The probability assigned to each scenario class is consistent with site information, well documented, and appropriately considers uncertainty.
Documentation of the construction of scenario classes for the TSPA-SR is provided in TSPA-SR documentation and is outside of the scope of the PMR. Probability values used in TSPA-SR calculations are derived from expert elicitation in the areas of igneous activity (PVHA, CRWMS M&O 1996) and seismicity (PSHA, Wong and Stepp 1998) and are summarized in the disruptive events AMRs Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) and Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), respectively.
Screening of Scenario Classes

Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 – Scenario classes that combine categories of processes and events may be screened from the PA on the basis of their probability of occurrence, provided: (1) the probability used for screening the scenario class is defined from combinations of initiating processes and events and (2) DOE has demonstrated that they have a probability of less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.
Documentation of the construction of scenario classes for the TSPA-SR is provided in TSPA-SR documentation and is outside of the scope of the PMR. For disruptive events screening of FEPs is addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Probability values used in TSPA-SR calculations are derived from expert elicitation in the areas of igneous activity (PVHA, CRWMS M&O 1996) and seismicity (PSHA, Wong and Stepp 1998) and are summarized in the disruptive events AMRs Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) and Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), respectively.
Screening of Scenario Classes

Technical Acceptance Criterion 4 –Scenario classes may be omitted from the PA on the basis that their omission would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose, provided DOE has demonstrated that excluded categories of processes and events would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose.
Documentation of the construction of scenario classes for the TSPA-SR is provided in TSPA-SR documentation and is outside of the scope of the PMR. For disruptive events screening of FEPs is addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Demonstration that scenario classes omitted from the PA do not affect the calculated expected annual dose lies with the TSPA calculation and its documentation and is supported by the disruptive events FEPs AMR.
Subissue 3 – Model abstraction

Subsystem Component Engineered Barriers

Integrated subissue Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers
Dike intrusion disruption on the WP part of the engineered barrier was treated in the igneous intrusion groundwater transport analysis in the AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for the TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l). The AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) contained several FEPs screening arguments related to mechanical effects of WPs that could result from ground motion or fault displacement.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory and/or natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual model models necessary for developing mechanical disruption of the engineered barriers abstraction into the TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA. In all disruptive events AMRs and the calculation that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, h, i, k, l), analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitations summarized in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) were the source of the majority of data used and data from other sources was qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the mechanical disruption of engineered barriers abstraction, such as probabilistic seismic hazard curves, probability of dike intrusion, and the probability and amount of fault displacement, are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met for all technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs and the calculation is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and to justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the mechanical disruption of engineered barriers abstraction. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs were required to discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and to justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Subsystem Component UZ Flow and Transport

Integrated subissue Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Flow
For this subsystem integrated subissue, the effects of faulting as a disruptive event were analyzed in the AMR Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i), which examined the effects of fault movement on fractures that, in turn, could increase flow rates, change perched water distribution, or change the relative flux between fracture and matrix.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory and natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for developing the spatial and temporal distribution of flow abstraction in TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA. In all disruptive events AMRs and the calculation that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, h, i, k, l), analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitations summarized in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) were the source of the majority of data used and data from other sources was qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the spatial and temporal distribution of flow abstraction [such as the effects of climate change on infiltration, near surface influences (e.g., evapotranspiration and runoff) on infiltration, structural controls on the spatial distribution of deep percolation, and thermal reflux owing to repository heat load] are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met for all the technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs and the calculation is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and to justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the spatial and temporal distribution of flow abstraction. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs were required to discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and to justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Subsystem Component UZ Flow and Transport

Integrated subissue Flow Paths in the UZ
For this subsystem integrated subissue, the effects of faulting as a disruptive event are analyzed in the AMR Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i), which examines the effects of fault movement on fractures that, in turn, could increase flow rates, change perched water distribution, or change the relative flux between fracture and matrix.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, and natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for developing the flow paths in the UZ in the abstraction in TSPA. Where adequate data cannot be readily obtained, other information sources such as expert elicitation or bounding values have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA. In all disruptive events AMRs and the calculation that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, i, h, k, l), analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitations summarized in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) are the source of the majority of data used, and data from other sources is qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and/or bounding assumptions used in the flow paths in the UZ in the abstraction, such as hydrologic properties, stratigraphy, and infiltration rate, are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met for all technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs and the calculation is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and to justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the distribution on mass flux between fracture and matrix in the abstraction. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Subsystem Component Direct Release and Transport

Integrated Subissue Volcanic Disruption of WPs
This subsystem integrated subissue was addressed by several AMRs and the calculation, the results of which combine to arrive at the number of WPs contacted by an extrusive and intrusive volcanic event (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, k).
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, or natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for abstracting the volcanic disruption of WPs in TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA. In all disruptive events AMRs and the calculation that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, i, h, k, l), analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitations summarized in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) were the source of the majority of data used, and data from other sources is qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in abstracting the volcanic disruption of WPs are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variability. The technical basis for the parameter values used in the PA needs to be provided. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met for all technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs and the calculation is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and to justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the volcanic disruption of WPs abstraction. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Subsystem Component Direct Release and Transport

Integrated Subissue Abstraction Airborne Transport of Radionuclides
For this subsystem integrated subissue airborne transport is modeled by the code ASHPLUME in TSPA-SR, and parameters are developed by the AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA--SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l).
Technical Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, and/or natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for developing the airborne transport of radionuclides abstraction in TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA. In all disruptive events AMRs and the calculation that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, i, h, k, l), analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitations summarized in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) are the source of the majority of data used, and data from other sources is qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitations, as described in the two framework AMRs, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the airborne transport of radionuclides abstraction, such as the magnitude of eruption and deposition velocity, are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variability. The basis for selection of parameter values, such as magnitude of eruption, that are inputs to the igneous consequences modeling are described in AMR Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a). Deposition velocities used are described in the AMR Igneous Consequences Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l). Disruptive events AMRs support technical defensibility and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities for parameter values, assumed ranges, and/or bounding assumptions.
Technical Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the airborne transport of radionuclides abstraction. Consideration given to alternative modeling approaches is described in the AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l).
Subissue 4 – Demonstration of the Overall Performance Objective PMR approach to overall performance is the result of the TSPA analysis itself and cannot be addressed by individual AMRs. All of the Disruptive Events AMRs address some aspects of this subissue, given the stated caviat (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, h, j, k, and l).
KTI: IGNEOUS ACTIVITY (REAMER 1999)
Subissue 1 – Probability
Probability Acceptance Criterion 1 - The estimates are based on past patterns of igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region.
As discussed in the AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), conceptual models used in the PVHA are consistent with past patterns of igneous activity and incorporate a range of temporal and spatial models based on the timing and distribution of past eruptive centers. The AMR Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a) also discusses past patterns of igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region. Discussion of this KTI and its subissues is found in Section 4.3 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 2 - The definitions of igneous events are used consistently. Intrusive and extrusive events should be distinguished and their probabilities estimated separately. The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) discusses the definitions of igneous events used in the PVHA (CRWMS M&O 1996) and the implications of those definitions for probability calculations. The AMR also discusses event definitions used for TSPA-SR, and these definitions are used consistently. Intrusive and extrusive events are distinguished, and their probabilities are estimated separately for TSPA-SR.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 3 - The models are consistent with observed patterns of volcanic vents and related igneous features in the Yucca Mountain region. The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) provides a detailed explanation of conceptual models of volcanism and relates them to the formulation of probability models. Models used are consistent with observed patterns of volcanic vents and related igneous features in the Yucca Mountain region.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 4 - Parameters used in probabilistic volcanic hazard assessments, related to recurrence rate of igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region, spatial variation in frequency of igneous events, and area affected by igneous events are technically justified and documented by DOE. As noted in the AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), the technical basis and documentation of the alternative models and parameter values are described in the PVHA and documented in the PVHA (CRWMS M&O 1996). Based on the PVHA and summary statements in the AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000b), parameters related to recurrence rate of igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region, spatial variation in frequency of igneous events, and area affected by igneous events are technically justified and documented by DOE. The igneous framework AMR also discusses the potential impact of new data (Wernicke et al. 1998; Earthfield Technology 1995; Magsino et al. 1998) on estimates of recurrence rates and frequency of volcanic events.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 5 - The models are consistent with tectonic models proposed by NRC and DOE for the Yucca Mountain region. The PVHA experts (CRWMS M&O 1996) used a variety of spatial and temporal models that are consistent with the tectonic models for the Yucca Mountain region. The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) presented a conceptual framework for the probability calculations based on PVHA outputs and subsequent studies.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 6 - The probability values used by DOE in PAs reflect the uncertainty in DOE's probabilistic volcanic hazard estimates. Use of the expert elicitation process for the PVHA ensured that uncertainty was reflected in the resulting probabilistic hazard curves (CRWMS M&O 1996). Data from the PVHA form the basis for DOE’s volcanism PA calculations. The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) developed probability distributions related to dike properties that reflected uncertainty in the data.
Probability Acceptance Criterion 7 - The values used (single values, distributions, or bounds on probabilities) are technically justified and account for uncertainties in probability estimates. All of the volcanism AMRs, Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b), Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a), Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e), Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) and Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l), and the calculation Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (CRWMS M&O 2000k) contain justification for the values used in analyses and the calculation. All of the AMRs and the calculation rely on probability estimates from the PVHA (CRWMS M&O 1996).
Probability Acceptance Criterion 8 - If used, expert elicitations were conducted and documented using the guidance in the Branch Technical Position on Expert Elicitation (Kotra et al. 1996), or other acceptable approaches. The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) summarizes the PVHA (CRWMS M&O 1996) process, including documenting that the expert elicitation was conducted following Kotra et al. (1996).
Probability Acceptance Criterion 9 - The collection, documentation, and development of data and models have been performed under acceptable QA procedures, or if data was not collected under an established QA program, it has been qualified under appropriate QA procedures. All of the disruptive events AMRs and the calculation (CRWMS M&O 2000a, b, c, e, g, h, i, k, l) describe the QA procedures under which they were developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The YMP Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR captures information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities.
Subissue 2 - Consequences
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 1 - The models are consistent with the geologic record of basaltic igneous activity within the Yucca Mountain region.
The AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) provides a detailed explanation of conceptual models used, how probability models were formulated by the PVHA (CRWMS M&O 1996), and the history and characteristics of basaltic igneous activity in the Yucca Mountain region. The AMR Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a) provides data for conceptual model and parameter development that is consistent with the geologic record. The AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) collects data from the other disruptive events volcanism AMRs and develops a conceptual model and parameters for use by TSPA-SR that are consistent with the geologic record.
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 2 - The models are verified against igneous processes observed at active or recently active analog igneous systems and reflect the fundamental details of ash-plume dynamics. The AMRs Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) and Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a) discuss analog data used to develop conceptual models and parameters. The eruptive processes AMR also contributes to parameter value development for modeling ash-plume dynamics, as does the AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l).
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 3 - The models adequately account for changes in magma ascent characteristics and magma-rock interactions brought about by repository construction. The AMR Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a) provides a discussion of magma characteristics as it ascends including conduit properties and fragmentation behavior. Analysis of potential magma-rock interactions related to repository construction is described in the AMR Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e). Repository orientation is an important factor in dike or conduit interaction with drifts, and the AMR Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (CRWMS M&O 2000k) relates the current design to the impact of dike-conduit interaction. The AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) brings together the results of the other AMRs to summarize the effects of magma ascent characteristics and interaction with the repository for parameter development.
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 4 - The models account for the interactions of basaltic magma with engineered barriers and waste forms. The AMR Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000a) provides magma parameters, and the AMR Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e) uses those parameters and develops conceptualizations of potential interactions between magma, particles, gases, and the engineered system. The AMR Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (CRWMS M&O 2000k) relates the current design to the impact of dike-conduit interaction with the repository. The AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) brings together the results of the other AMRs and produces parameters for modeling the interactions of magma with engineered barriers and waste forms.
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 5 - The parameters are constrained by data from Yucca Mountain region igneous features and from appropriate analog systems such that the effects of igneous activity on waste containment and isolation are not underestimated. The discussions for Consequence Acceptance Criteria 1 through 3 describe how parameters are constrained by data from Yucca Mountain region features and analogs. The discussion for Consequence Acceptance Criterion 4 describes how data from an AMR and calculation outside of the disruptive events group of analyses were used to support conceptualization of waste containment in a magmatic environment. Use of the expert elicitation process supports ensuring that effects of igneous activity on waste containment and isolation are not under-estimated.
Consequence Acceptance Criterion 6 - If used, expert elicitations were conducted and documented using the guidance in the Branch Technical Position on Expert Elicitation (Kotra et al. 1996) or other acceptable approaches. To date there has been no DOE expert elicitation in the area of igneous consequences.
Consequences Acceptance Criterion 7 - The collection, documentation, and development of data and models have been performed under acceptable QA procedures or, if data was not collected under an established QA program, it has been qualified under appropriate QA procedures. Each disruptive events AMR and the calculation describe the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR capture information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is in Section 1.3
KTI: STRUCTURAL DEFORMATION AND SEISMICITY (NRC 1999a)
Subissue 1 – Faulting There are four components of this subissue and all are addressed by disruptive events AMRs. The fault displacement hazard component is addressed by results of the PSHA (Wong and Stepp 1998), which is discussed in the AMR Characterize Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c). This component is also addressed by the AMRs Effects of Fault Displacement on Emplacement Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000g), and Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i). The titles indicate the relevance to the component. Faulting causing WP failure and faulting exhuming WPs are two components, and both are addressed by the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h) in FEPs that analyze these scenarios. The component probability and consequences (risk) of faulting directly rupturing WPs is addressed in the AMRs Characterize Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), and Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). Discussion of this KTI and its subissues is found in Section 4.4 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient geological and geophysical data are acquired to adequately support conceptual models of faulting, attendant assumptions, and boundary conditions and to define relevant parameters implemented in process models, TSPA calculations, or both of the direct disruption of WPs from faulting. In all disruptive events AMRs that address the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000c, g, i), the analog data are described and used as appropriate. The expert elicitation summarized in the AMR Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c) was the source of the majority of data used, and data from other sources was qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the AMR, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probabilistic distributions, and bounding assumptions used to develop process models, TSPA, or both of faulting are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the AMR Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met for all technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators list assumptions and justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches for faulting are investigated, consistent with available data and current scientific understanding. Results and limitations are appropriately considered in the development of the probabilistic fault displacement hazard and included in abstractions for process, TSPA subsystem, or both models. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 4 - Results of PFDHA, TSPA subsystem, or both models are verified by comparison to output from detailed process models, emperical observations, or both. Disruptive events analysis contained no models for faulting; therefore, no model verification is required for models covering faulting.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 5 - Incorporation of faulting models and parameters into TSPA models adequately includes important design features, physical phenomena, and coupling and relies on consistent and appropriate assumptions throughout the abstraction process. The activity of model and parameter integration into TSPA, which is the topic of this acceptance criterion, is performed downstream of disruptive events analyses. This activity is performed by TSPA activities.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 6 - The collection, documentation, and development of data, models, and computer codes have been performed under acceptable QA procedures or, if the data, models, and computer codes were not subject to an acceptable QA procedure, they have been appropriately qualified. Each disruptive events AMR describes the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR captures information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is discussed in Section 1.3.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 7 - Formal expert elicitations can be used to support data synthesis and model development for the DOE's process models, TSPA, or both provided that the elicitations were conducted and documented under acceptable procedures (e.g., Kotra et al. 1996). The disruptive events AMR that summarizes the results of the PSHA expert elicitation for faulting (CRWMS M&O 2000c) contains a description of the conditions under which the elicitation was conducted and documented and references the PSHA documents that contain further detail (Wong and Stepp 1998).
Subissue 2 – Seismicity This subissue has four components, all of which are addressed by disruptive events analyses. The component seismic hazard is addressed by the PSHA (Wong and Stepp 1998), which is summarized in the AMR Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c). This component is also addressed by analyses in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h). The same two AMRs address the two components, type 1 faults and ground motion, in the same manner. The component probabilistic seismic hazard methodology and results of probabilistic seismic hazard is addressed by the PSHA (Wong and Stepp 1998), which is summarized in the AMR Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c).
Generic Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient geological and geophysical data are acquired to adequately define seismic sources, relevant earthquake and ground motion parameters, recurrence relationships, ground motion attenuation functions, and boundary conditions, and to support attendant assumptions and conceptual models implemented in the PSHA. In the disruptive events AMR that addresses the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000c), the use of analog data by PSHA experts (Wong and Stepp 1998) is discussed. The expert elicitation summarized in the seismic framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c) was the source of the majority of data used and data from other sources was qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probabilistic distributions, and/or bounding assumptions used to determine seismicity parameters are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met for all technical subjects contained in the criterion. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators list assumptions and justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches for seismicity model, such as recurrence relationships or ground motion attenuation relationships, are investigated. Results and limitations are considered in the development of the PSHA and included in the abstractions to TSPA subsystem models, consistent with available data and current scientific understanding of seismicity. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 6 - Quality Assurance. This criterion and its attendant review method are applied the same way for each subissue and are not repeated here. The detailed statements of criterion 6 and the review method are described in the faulting subissue, Section 4.1.1.1. Each disruptive events AMR describes the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR capture information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is discussed in Section 1.3.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 7 - Expert Elicitation. This criterion and its attendant review method are applied the same way for the faulting, seismicity and tectonic framework of the geologic setting subissues and are not repeated here. The detailed statements of criterion 7 and the review method are described in the Faulting Subissue, Section 4.1.1.1. The disruptive events AMR that summarizes the results of the PSHA expert elicitation for faulting (CRWMS M&O 2000c) contains a description of the conditions under which the elicitation was conducted and documented and references the PSHA documents that contain further detail (Wong and Stepp 1998).
Subissue 4 – Tectonic Framework of the Geologic Setting This subissue has four components, only one of which is addressed by disruptive events analysis. Crustal strain at Yucca Mountain is a component that is addressed by the AMR Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000b) in discussing new data from Wernicke et al. (1998).
Generic Acceptance Criterion 1 - Sufficient geological and geophysical data are acquired to adequately support conceptual models of tectonics, attendant assumptions, and boundary conditions and to define relevant parameters of tectonic models implemented in process, subsystem, or PA models and calculations. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMRs list assumptions and justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probabilistic distributions, and/or bounding assumptions used to develop viable tectonic models are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities. In the disruptive events AMR that addresses the subissue (CRWMS M&O 2000c) the use of analog data by PVHA experts (Wong and Stepp 1998) is discussed. The expert elicitation summarized in the seismic framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c) was the source of the majority of data used, and data from other sources was qualified as described in the individual AMRs. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR, ensured that relevant data were provided to the experts for consideration.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 3 - Alternative modeling approaches for tectonics are investigated, consistent with available data and current scientific understanding. Results and limitations of tectonic models are sufficiently considered in the development of process, subsystem and TSPA models. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and to justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 6 - Quality Assurance. This criterion and its attendant review method are applied the same way for each subissue and are not repeated here. The detailed statements of criterion 6 and the review method are described in the Faulting Subissue, Section 4.1.1.1. All disruptive events AMR originators in Chapter 6 of the AMRs discuss alternative conceptual models and data values and ranges consistent with current scientific understanding and justify use of the conceptual models selected. In addition, significant alternative conceptual models as presented in NRC IRSRs are discussed in this chapter (4) of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Generic Acceptance Criterion 7 - Expert Elicitation. This criterion and its attendant review method are applied the same way for the faulting, seismicity, and tectonic framework of the geologic setting subissues and is not repeated here. The detailed statements of criterion 7 and the review method are described in the Faulting Subissue, Section 4.1.1.1. Each disruptive events AMR describes the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR capture information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is discussed in Section 1.3.
KTI: CONTAINER LIFE AND SOURCE TERM (NRC 1999b)
Subissue 2 – Effects of Instability and Initial Defects on Mechanical Failure and Container Lifetime It is stated in the IRSR that consequences of disruptive events and their effects on this subissue will be considered in detail in a subsequent revision of the IRSR. Disruptive events (seismicity, volcanism, and faulting) are specifically mentioned as being a component of this subissue; therefore, disruptive events analyses must address this subissue when the NRC defines it in the future. The manner in which disruptive events analyses address the Programmatic and Technical acceptance described in Section 4.7.1 of this Disruptive Events PMR applies to this subissue also. Discussion of this KTI and its subissues is found in Section 4.5 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Subissue 6 – Effects of EBS Design Alternatives There are eight specific acceptance criteria for this subissue. Disruptive events analyses address two of them (criteria 1 and 4). There are nine general acceptance criteria that apply to all subissues for this IRSR. Seven of the nine overlap with regard to subject matter with the two Programmatic and seven general acceptance criteria (Section 4.5.1 of this PMR) described in Section 4.7.1 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Specific Acceptance Criterion 1 - DOE has identified and considered the effects of backfill, and the timing of its emplacement, on the thermal loading of the repository, WP lifetime (including container corrosion and mechanical failure), and the release of radionuclides from the EBS. The AMR Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e) considered the effects of backfill on the distance magma could run down drifts impacting WPs. The AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) passes data from the previous AMR to TSPA-SR with the assumption that all WPs contacted by magmatic material from a dike or a conduit are destroyed. The AMR Effects of Fault Displacement on Emplacement Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000g) considers the effects of backfill in its analysis of effects of fault displacement.
General Acceptance Criterion 1 - The collection and documentation of data, as well as development and documentation of analyses, methods, models, and codes, were accomplished under approved QA and control procedures and standards. Each disruptive events AMR and the calculation describe the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models, and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR captures information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is discussed in Section 1.3.
General Acceptance Criterion 2 - Expert elicitations, when used, were conducted and documented in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-1563 (Kotra et al. 1996) or other acceptable approaches. The disruptive events AMR that summarizes the results of the PSHA expert elicitation for faulting (CRWMS M&O 2000c) contains a description of the conditions under which the elicitation was conducted and documented and references the PSHA document that contains further detail (Wong and Stepp 1998).
General Acceptance Criterion 3 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, and natural analog) are available to adequately define relevant parameters for the models used to evaluate performance aspects of the subissues. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c) ensured that these conditions were met for development of hazard curves for geologic events impacting WP performance with or without backfill.
General Acceptance Criterion 4 - Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses (including consideration of alternative conceptual models) were used to determine whether additional data would be needed to better define ranges of input parameters. Performing disruptive events analyses contributes to iterative sensitivity and uncertainty analyses in TSPA-SR. Seismicity (which can impact WP performance without backfill) for TSPA-SR is treated through uncertainty analysis of nominal performance. Screening of some individual FEPs, as documented in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h), was supported by sensitivity calculations.
General Acceptance Criterion 5 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, test data, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the models are technically defensible and can reasonably account for known uncertainties. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
General Acceptance Criterion 6 - Mathematical model limitations and uncertainties in modeling were defined and documented. Disruptive events analyses related to backfill were limited to those discussed in the specific acceptance criterion section. AMR originators mentioned in the specific acceptance criterion section discuss model limitations and uncertainties in the analysis Section of their AMRs.
General Acceptance Criterion 7 - Primary and alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding were investigated and their results and limitations considered in evaluating the subissue. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met for development of hazard curves for geologic events impacting performance of WPs in the presence of backfill. AMR originators mentioned in the specific acceptance criterion section were required to list assumptions; justify data values, ranges, and distributions; and consider and discuss alternative models in their analysis sections.
General Acceptance Criterion 8 - Model outputs were validated through comparisons with outputs of detailed process models, empirical observations, or both. Validation of model outputs is an activity performed by TSPA-SR analysis; however, all disruptive events AMRs provide documentation of analyses that may be used when comparison with process models and empirical observations is required. In this manner all disruptive events analyses and the calculation provide support for meeting this criterion.
General Acceptance Criterion 9 - The structure and organization of process and abstracted models were found to adequately incorporate important design features, physical phenomena, and coupled processes. Responsibility for the structure and organization of abstracted models in the disruptive events area lies mostly within TSPA-SR activities; however, all disruptive events AMRs provide documentation of analyses that support abstracted models and demonstrate that important design features, physical phenomena, and coupled processes were considered. In this manner all disruptive events analyses and the calculation provide support for meeting this criterion.
Specific Acceptance Criterion 4 - DOE has identified and considered the effects of drip shields (with backfill) on WP lifetime, including extension of the humid-air corrosion regime, environmental effects, breakdown of drip shields and resulting mechanical impacts on WPs, the potential for crevice corrosion at the junction between the WP and the drip shield, and the potential for condensate formation and dripping on the underside of the shield. The AMR Dike Propagation Near Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000e) considers the effects of drip shields on the distance magma will flow down drifts where it can damage WPs. The AMR Igneous Consequence Modeling for TSPA-SR (CRWMS M&O 2000l) feeds data to TSPA-SR that includes the number of WPs compromised considering the effects of drip shields when magma flows down drifts. With drip shields included, rockfall damage to WPs is eliminated from analysis as a disruptive event in TSPA-SR. Damage to drip shields is analyzed in TSPA-SR using ground motion and fault displacement probability information from the PSHA, which is summarized in the AMR Characterize Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c).
General Acceptance Criterion 1 - The collection and documentation of data, as well as development and documentation of analyses, methods, models, and codes, were accomplished under approved QA and control procedures and standards. Each disruptive events AMR and the calculation describe the QA procedures under which it was developed (Chapter 2) and the qualification status of software, models and data used for the analysis (Chapters 3 and 4 for analyses and Chapter 4 for calculation). The Document Input Reference System entries for each AMR captures information used in tracking the completion of qualification and verification activities. For this PMR the QA framework under which it was developed is discussed in Section 1.3.
General Acceptance Criterion 2 - Expert elicitations, when used, were conducted and documented in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-1563 (Kotra et al. 1996) or other acceptable approaches. The disruptive events AMR that summarizes the results of the PSHA expert elicitation (CRWMS M&O 2000c) that produced hazard curves (for geologic events) used in analysis of drip shield performance contains a description of the conditions under which the elicitation was conducted and documented and references the PSHA document that contains further detail (Wong and Stepp 1998).
General Acceptance Criterion 3 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, and natural analog) are available to adequately define relevant parameters for the models used to evaluate performance aspects of the subissues. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000b, c), ensured that these conditions were met for development of hazard curves for geologic events impacting drip shield performance.
General Acceptance Criterion 4 - Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses (including consideration of alternative conceptual models) were used to determine whether additional data would be needed to better define ranges of input parameters. Performing disruptive events analyses contributes to iterative sensitivity and uncertainty analyses in TSPA-SR. Seismicity (which can impact drip shield performance) for TSPA-SR was treated through uncertainty analysis of nominal performance. Screening of some individual FEPs, as documented in the AMR Disruptive Events FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000h), was supported by sensitivity calculations.
General Acceptance Criterion 5 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, test data, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the models are technically defensible and can reasonably account for known uncertainties. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met. The methodology to ensure meeting this criterion for data from other sources used in disruptive events AMRs is described in each AMR in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 where parameter values, ranges, distributions, and bounding assumptions are described. AMR originators were required to list assumptions and justify data values, ranges, and distributions.
General Acceptance Criterion 6 - Mathematical model limitations and uncertainties in modeling were defined and documented. Disruptive events analyses related to backfill were limited to those discussed in the specific acceptance criterion section. AMR originators mentioned in the specific acceptance criterion section discuss model limitations and uncertainties in the analysis section of their AMRs.
General Acceptance Criterion 7 - Primary and alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding were investigated and their results and limitations considered in evaluating the subissue. The process followed for the expert elicitation, as described in the framework AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c), ensured that these conditions were met for development of hazard curves for geologic events impacting performance of drip shields with or without the presence of backfill. AMR originators mentioned in the specific acceptance criterion section were required to list assumptions; justify data values, ranges, and distributions and consider and discuss alternative models in their analysis Sections.
KTI: REPOSITORY DESIGN AND THERMAL MECHANICAL EFFECTS (NRC 1999c)
Subissue 2 – Seismic Design Methodology The NRC deals with the issues of seismicity and fault displacement through review of DOE Topical Reports (NRC 1999c, p. 23). Discussion of NRC response to DOE Topical Reports (YMP 1997a,b; CRWMS M&O 1999h) comprises the discussion of progress on resolving the subissue. There is only one seismic design that must serve both preclosure and postclosure needs. Disruptive events analyses, which focus on postclosure, contribute to the iterative process of TSPA by which seismic design evolves. It is stated in the Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects IRSR (NRC 1999c, p. 8) that this subissue provides inputs to the "mechanical disruption of engineered barriers" integrated subissue in the Total System Performance Assessment and Integration IRSR (NRC 2000, Figure 3). That integrated subissue is addressed by disruptive events analyses (see Total System Performance Assessment and Integration Entry in this table). Acceptance criteria for this subissue are provided in Revision 1 of the IRSR (NRC 1998c) and are not discussed again in Revision 2 (NRC 1999c). Discussion of this KTI and its subissues is found in Section 4.6 of this Disruptive Events PMR.
Acceptance Criterion 1 - The staff will find the methodology proposed in the Topical Report adequate for further review if, during an initial acceptance review of Topical Report 2, sufficient technical reasoning is provided for the proposed methodology. Acceptance criteria are not mapped to components of the subissue and are worded to apply to Topical Reports. Disruptive events AMRs Effect of Fault Displacement on Emplacement Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000g) and Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i) support analysis of fault displacement inputs to the design and PAs. The former examines effects of faulting on engineered barrier elements, and the latter analyzes effects on the natural barrier caused by fracture aperture effects from faulting.
Acceptance Criterion 4 - The staff will find the methodology proposed in the Topical Report adequate for further review if, during an initial acceptance review of Topical Report 2, uncertainties associated with the proposed methodology that would significantly affect or impede the repository design process and development of inputs to PAs have been considered adequately. Acceptance criteria are not mapped to components of the subissue and are worded to apply to Topical Reports. Disruptive events AMRs Effect of Fault Displacement on Emplacement Drifts (CRWMS M&O 2000g) and Fault Displacement Effects on Transport in the Unsaturated Zone (CRWMS M&O 2000i) support analysis of fault displacement inputs to the design and PAs. The former examines effects of faulting on engineered barrier elements, and the latter analyzes effects on the natural barrier caused by fracture aperture effects from faulting.
Subissue 3 – Thermal-Mechanical Effects The importance to postclosure analysis of this subissue is in the potential effects on rockfall, particularly seismically induced, from the change in the lithologic stresses caused by the excavation.
Acceptance Criterion 3 - The seismic hazard inputs used to estimate rockfall potential are consistent with the inputs used in the design and PAs as established in DOE’s Topical Report 3 (yet to be published). Disruptive events analyses and the Disruptive Events Workshop held February 9-11, 1999, partially support addressing this acceptance criteria. The workshop addressed refinement of the rockfall model in two areas: determination of rock size distribution and relationship between seismicity and size of rockfall using the Key Block theory; and reassessment of rockfall effects on WP damage. The disruptive events AMR Characterize Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (CRWMS M&O 2000c) summarized the expert elicitation and clarified the key points important for the seismicity component of rockfall. Disruptive events analyses are part of the iterative process by which conceptual models of seismicity and structural deformation evolve for use in PA.

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