Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

Unit VIII (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer TIME 75 minutes 
UNIT TITLE Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the five possible protective actions for a building and its 
occupants. 

2. Compare filtration system efficacy relative to the particles present 
in CBR agents. 
3. Explain the key issues with CBR detection. 
4. Identify the indications of CBR contamination. 
SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. Five protective actions for a building and its occupants: 
evacuation; sheltering in place; personal protective equipment; air 
filtration and pressurization; and exhausting and purging. 
2. Air filtration and cleaning principles and its application. 
3. CBR detection technology currently available. 
4. Indications of CBR contamination that do not use technology. 
REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 5 

2. FEMA 426, Appendix C, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
Glossary 
3. FEMA 453, Design Guidance for Shelters and Safe Rooms, 
Chapters 1 and 3 
4. Case Study – Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 
5. Student Manual, Unit VIII (C) (info only – not listed in SM) 
6. Unit VIII (C) visuals (info only – not listed in SM) 
REQUIREMENTS 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 

2. Instructor Guide, Unit VIII (C) 
3. Student Manual, COOP Case Study (C) (one per student) 
4. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
IG VIII-C-1 



Unit VIII (C) 

5. Unit VIII (C) visuals 
6. Chart paper, easel, and markers (one per team) 
UNIT VIII (C) OUTLINE Time Page
VIII. CBR Measures 75 minutes IG VIII-C-1 
1. Introduction and Unit Overview 8 minutes IG VIII-C-5 
2. Chemical Agents 5.5 minutes IG VIII-C-10 
3. Biological Agents 6 minutes IG VIII-C-14 
4. Nuclear / Radiological Materials 4.5 minutes IG VIII-C-18 
5. CBR Detection and Technology 5.5 minutes IG VIII-C-21 
6. CBR Protection Strategies 15 minutes IG VIII-C-25 
7. Other Issues for Consideration 8 minutes IG VIII-C-39 
8. Summary, Student Activity, and Transition 2 minutes IG VIII-C-44 
9. Activity: CBR Measures 20 minutes IG VIII-C-47 
(15 minutes for students, 5 minutes for review) 
PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 

• Tailoring Content to the Local Area: This is a generic instruction unit that does not have 
any specific capability for linking to the Local Area. However, Units IX, Site and Layout 
Design Guidance, and X, Building Design Guidance are excellent opportunities to illustrate 
the concepts in this instruction unit as applied to the Local Area. 
• Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
• Activity: The students will answer questions in the Student Activity exercises using the 
Case Study to identify prevalent CBR threats (Design Basis Threat and others) and using 
FEMA 426 to answer selected filtration and mitigation measure questions. 
• Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 
• Direct students to the appropriate page (Unit #) in the Student Manual. 
• Instruct the students to read the activity instructions found in the Student Manual. 
• Tell students how long they have to work on the requirements. 
IG VIII-C-2 



Unit VIII (C) 

• While students are working, all instructors should closely observe the groups’ process and 
progress. If any groups are struggling, immediately assist them by clarifying the assignment 
and providing as much help as is necessary for the groups to complete the requirement in the 
allotted time. Also, monitor each group for full participation of all members. For example, 
ask any student who is not fully engaged a question that requires his/her viewpoint to be 
presented to the group. 
• At the end of the working period, reconvene the class. 
• After the students have completed the assignment, “walk through” the activity with the 
students during the plenary session. Call on different teams to provide the answer(s) for each 
question. Display the charts applicable to the respective question to illustrate the answer. 
• If time is short, simply provide the “school solution” and ask for questions. Do not end the 
activity without ensuring that students know if their answers are correct or at least on the 
right track. 
• Ask for and answer questions. 
Editor Note: Two methods have been used in Instructor Guides to ensure the slide designation 
and slide thumbnail in the left column aligns with the Content/Activity in the right 
column. 

(1) Highlight row by placing cursor in left column until arrow shifts to right, Tab 
<Insert>, <Break>, <select Page Break>, <OK> 
(2) Highlight row as in (1), right click on highlighted row for menu, <Table Properties>, 
Tab <Row>, remove check in box <Allow row to break across pages> 
(3) Alternate for (2), highlight row, click on <Table> at top of screen, <Table 
Properties> and continue like (2) 
IG VIII-C-3 



Unit VIII (C) 

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IG VIII-C-4 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-1 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII
Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological (CBR)
Measures



VISUAL VIII-C-2 


Unit Objectives 

Explain the five possible protective actions 
for a building and its occupants. 

Compare filtration system efficacy relative 
to the particles present in CBR agents. 

Explain the key issues with CBR detection. 

Identify the indications of CBR 
contamination. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-2 

Introduction and Unit Overview 

This is Unit VIII CBR Measures. In this 
unit, CBR protective measures and actions 
to safeguard the occupants of a building 
from CBR threats are presented. The unit is 
based largely on CDC/NIOSH and DoD 
guidance. 

NOTE to instructor: Do not dwell upon the 
technical nature of CBR up to Visual VIIIC-
41. Go over this front end quickly. Then 
concentrate on the mitigation measures in C41 
and beyond. However, actual incidents 
could receive additional explanation to 
better understand the threat. 

Unit Objectives 

At the end of this unit, the students should 
be able to: 

1. Explain the five possible protective 
actions for a building and its occupants. 
2. Compare filtration system efficacy 
relative to the particles present in CBR 
agents. 
3. Explain the key issues with CBR 
detection. 
4. Identify the indications of CBR 
contamination. 
NOTE to instructor: Emphasize that if your 
COOP facility’s threats and hazards include 
CBR as nearby Hazardous Material or as 
Terrorist Attack, then this instruction unit 
provides what you need to know to make an 
initial assessment. 

IG VIII-C-5 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-3 


Unit VIII: CBR Measures 

Units I-VI covered the Risk Assessment 
Process 

Units VII and VIII explain Explosive Blast, 
CBR Agents, and their effects 

Units IX and X demonstrate techniques for 
site layout and building design to counter or 
mitigate manmade threats and similar 
technological hazards 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-3 

CBR Measures 

This unit is based on guidance from the 
CDC/NIOSH and the DoD and presents 
protective measures and actions to safeguard 
the occupants of a building from CBR 
threats. The following will be discussed: 

• Evacuation 
• Sheltering in place 
• Personal protective equipment 
• Air filtration and pressurization 
• Exhausting and purging 
• CBR detection 
Additionally, CBR design and mitigation 
measures are discussed in: 

• Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 
• Appendix C of FEMA 426 contains a 
glossary of CBR terms and a summary 
of CBR agent characteristics 
Recent terrorist events have increased 
interest in the vulnerability of buildings to 
CBR threats. Of particular concern are 
building HVAC systems, because they can 
become an entry point and distribution 
system for airborne hazardous contaminants. 
Even without special protective systems, 
buildings can provide protection in varying 
degrees against airborne hazards that 
originate outdoors. 

IG VIII-C-6 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-4 


CBR Measures: An Overview 

FEMA 426, Chapter 5 is based on best practices for 
safeguarding building occupants from CBR threats. Thismodule is organized into four sections : 

. Protective Actions for Buildings
and Occupants
. Air Filtration and Cleaning
Principles and Technology
. CBR Detection and Current 
Technology
. Non-Technology CBR 
SOURCE: SENSIR TECHNOLOGIES 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-4 

Contamination Indications 
VISUAL VIII-C-5 


CBR Terrorist Incidents Since 1970 

1972 
Typhoid 
70 75 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-5 
1984 
Botulinum 
0095908580 
November 1995 
Radioactive Cesium 
December 1995 
Ricin 
June 1996 
Uranium 
1992 Cyanide 
March 1995 Ricin 
April 1995 
Sarin 
April-June 1995 
Cyanide, Phosgene, 
Pepper Spray 
February 1997 
Chlorine 
14 Injured, 
500 Evacuated 
June 1994 
Sarin 
7 Dead, 
200 Injured 
May 1995 
Plague 
April 1997 
U235 
1984 
Salmonella 
200 Injured 
1985 
Cyanide 
March 1998 
Cesium-137 
2001 
Anthrax 
March 1995 Sarin 
CBR Measures: FEMA 426 Chapter 5 
Overview 

This Unit draws on the latest research from 
CDC/NIOSH to present the best practices 
for detecting CBR agents, and safeguarding 
building occupants from the effects of CBR 
contamination. 

Chapter 5 of FEMA 426 provides an 
overview on CBR Detection and Current 
Technology; and Indications of CBR 
Contamination, Evacuation, Sheltering in 
Place, Air Filtration and Pressurization, and 
Exhausting and Purging. 

CBR Terrorist Incidents Since 1970 

CBR attacks have been used since ancient 
times and, in the past 20 years, over 50 
attacks have occurred. 

CBR attacks require the right weather, 
population, and dispersion to be effective. 

Recent attacks have had limited 
effectiveness or have been conducted on a 
relatively small scale. 

Future attacks with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction could occur on a regional or 
global scale. 

IG VIII-C-7 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-6 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-6 
What is the CBR Threat Today? 
POTENTIAL 
IMPACT 
PROBABILITY/LIKELIHOOD 
NUCLEAR 
WEAPON 
IMPROVISED 
NUCLEAR 
DEVICE 
RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL 
CHEMICAL AGENT 
OR TOXIC 
INDUSTRIAL 
CHEMICAL 
BIOLOGICAL 
AGENT 
VISUAL VIII-C-7 


Why Would Terrorists Use CBR? 

. Available and relatively easy to manufacture 
. Large amounts not needed in an enclosed space 
. Easily spread over large areas 
. Potential for mass casualties 
. Strong psychological impact 
. Overwhelms resources 
. Difficult to recognize (contagious or spread by victims) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-7 

What is the CBR Threat? 

A fundamental question, What is the CBR 
threat today? This slide shows the 
relationship between the probability or 
likelihood of threats, and their potential 
impacts. 

Why Would Terrorists Use CBR? 

• Available and relatively easy to 
manufacture 
• Large amounts not needed in an enclosed 
space 
• Easily spread over large areas 
• Potential for mass casualties 
o Strong psychological impact 
o Overwhelms resources 
o Difficult to recognize (contagious or 
spread by victims 
Recent events have shown that people not 
directly affected by the attack, but nearby, 
will seek medical confirmation of health / 
non-contamination and quickly overwhelm 
medical resources. 

IG VIII-C-8 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-8 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-8 
CBR Sources 
• Laboratory/commercial 
• Industrial facilities 
• Foreign military sources 
..At least 26 countries possesschemical agents or weapons 
..10 countries are suspected topossess biological agents or 
weapons 
• Medical/university research facilities 
• Nuclear facilities 
• Home production 
VISUAL VIII-C-9 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-9 
Limitations of CBR Materials 
• Targeted dissemination is difficult 
• Delayed effects can detract from impact 
• Counterproductive to terrorists’ support 
• Potentially hazardous to the terrorist 
• Development and use require time 
and expertise 
The slide shows the cover of Ben Laden’s 
Terrorism Bible and The Mujahideen Poisons 
Handbook by Abdel Aziz. “Majahideen” -
Arabic word meaning “holy warriors.” This 
book is part of the Encyclopedia Jihad. The 
aim of this book is to further the military/ 
political preparations, skills and knowledge of 
Mujahideen the world over. 

CBR Sources 

There are many potential sources of 
chemical and biological agents, including 
laboratory and commercial production; and 
home production in those cases involving 
low concentrations of impure and 
inexpensive materials. Other sources 
include: 

• Industrial facilities 
• Foreign military sources 
• Medical/university research facilities 
• Nuclear facilities 
The next series of slides will examine in 
more detail the properties of chemical and 
biological agents, with implications for 
building design. 

Limitations of CBR Materials 

• Targeted dissemination is difficult. 
While agents can be spread over a wide 
area with relative ease, targeting with 
sufficient concentration is much more 
difficult. 
• Delayed effects can detract from impact. 
Terrorist seek immediate media impact, 
but many agents take time to result in 
impact 
• Counterproductive to terrorists’ support. 
Indiscriminate use of any WMD 
(Weapon of Mass Destruction), 
especially ones difficult to target with 
success, can attack innocents and those 
in the support base, thus reducing 
support of the populace for the 
terrorists’ objectives. 
• Potentially hazardous to the terrorist. 
Lack of expertise among terrorists can 
result in deadly contact with the CBR 
agents being produced, or premature 
IG VIII-C-9 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-10 


Chemical Agents: 
Characteristics and Behavior 

• Generally liquid (when containerized) 
• Normally disseminated as aerosol or gas 
• Present both a respiratory and skin contact hazard 
• May be detectable by the senses (especially smell) 
• Influenced by weather conditions 
Subway riders injured in Aum Shinrikyo sarin 
gas attack, Tokyo, March 20, 1995. 
(AP Photo/Chikumo Chiaki ) 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-10 

Subway riders injured in Aum Shinrikyo Sarin 
gas attack, in Tokyo, March 20, 1995. 

VISUAL VIII-C-11 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-11 
Classes of Chemical Agents 
Chemical Warfare Agents 
Choking 
Agents 
Blood 
Agents 
Blister 
Agents 
Lethal 
Nerve 
Agents 
Incapacitating 
and 
Riot Control 
Industrial Chemicals Warfare Agents 
explosion of bombs during the bomb 

making process with deadly 

consequences 

• Development and use require skill. 
More than one terrorist has produced 
bombs that will not explode and CBR 
agents that will not impact upon human 
beings to the level desired. 
Chemical Agents: Characteristics and 
Behavior 

These are the general characteristics of 
chemical agents 

• Liquids that are spread as aerosols or 
gases 
• Impact breathing and attack exposed skin 
• May have a distinct odor that allow 
detection 
• Greatly influenced by the weather – rain, 
wind, sunlight, including its own physical 
characteristics – heavier or lighter than 
air 
Classes of Chemical Agents 

Chemical agents are classified as either 
lethal or incapacitating and “riot control,” 
according to their intended use. For the 
purposes of this presentation, the emphasis 
has been placed on lethal agents as a 
consequence of their greater capacity for 
terrorist mischief. 

• Lethal: These have been subdivided into 
two categories: industrial materials used 
or considered as chemical warfare agents, 
and chemical warfare agents, which have 
little or no other purpose beyond their 
intended use as weapons of mass 
IG VIII-C-10 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-12 

Industrial Chemicals 

Industrial chemicals 
previously used as 
chemical warfare agents


Blood Agents 
Hydrogen Cyanide/ 
Cyanogen Choking Agents 
Chloride Chlorine/Phosgene 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-12 
Aeration, cyanide kit Aeration Treatment 
Respiratory Respiratory Protection 
Gasping for airRed eyes, lips, skin 
Coughing, choking,
tightness in chest 
Signs and 
Symptoms 
Bitter almonds Bleach/mown hay Odor 
Colorless vapor Greenish-yellow vapor/
colorless vapor 
Physical 
Appearance 
Four industrial chemicals previously used as chemical warfare agents 
destruction on the battlefield. 

• Incapacitating and Riot Control: Not 
considered as primary terrorist threats, 
due primarily to their relatively short 
duration of effects and minimal toxicity. 
Therefore, they are not discussed in detail 
in this unit. 
Industrial Chemicals 

This chart lists four industrial chemicals that 
were previously used as chemical warfare 
agents. These chemicals are used in the: 

• Sanitation industry 
• Plastics industry 
• Pesticide industry. 
All of these agents are generally respiratory 
agents and can be protected against by 
effective respiratory protection (i.e., self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)). 

Skin contact with concentrated material 
may cause chemical burns and contact with 
eyes has similar effects as indicated by the 
MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheets) for 
these chemicals. However the main tactic 
for use of these chemicals does not seek this 
effect. 

They are all exceedingly volatile and 

dissipate rapidly outdoors. 

IG VIII-C-11 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-13 


Comparative Toxicity 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-13 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 
Chlorine 
Phosgene 
Hydrogen Cyanide 
Parathion 
Mustard 
Sarin 
VX 
Note: At this point, reinforce the following: 
…as we collectively examine and identify 
opportunities to improve building safety from 
CBR, it is important to understand the 
characteristics of CBR, and their potential 
consequences for the public, and first 
responders…. detailed information on the 
properties of these agents can be found in 
Appendix C of FEMA 426. 

VISUAL VIII-C-14 

How Much Sarin Does it Take? 

Lethal Amount Structure 
107 kg (26 gals) 

Domed Stadium 

Movie Theater 

1.2 kg (5 cups) 
52 g (1/4 cup) 

Auditorium 

Conference Room 

33 g (1 shot glass) 

(50-100 seating) 

LD50 amounts for 1 minute 
exposure to Sarin aerosol 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-14 

Comparative Toxicity 

This is a graphical comparison of the 
approximate lethalities of some chemical 
agents. They are based relative to Chlorine 
(CL or Cl) in terms of respiratory toxicity. If 
we use Chlorine as a baseline (1.0 on the 
graph): 

• Phosgene (CG) is about 6 times more 
toxic. 
• Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) is about 7 times 
more toxic. 
• Parathion, an insecticide ingredient, is 
about 12 times more toxic. 
• Mustard (H) is about 13 times more toxic. 
• Sarin (GB) is about 200 times more toxic. 
• VX (nerve agent) is about 600 times more 
toxic. 
For skin toxicity, less than a pinhead of 
mustard agent is required to achieve a small 
blister. Less than a pinhead of VX can be 
lethal. 

How Much Sarin Does it Take? 

We have all heard of Sarin, which is among 
the most lethal of chemical agents. It is both 
odorless and colorless in pure form. 

These numbers are the Lethal Doses 50 
(LD50) amounts for 1 minute of exposure to 
Sarin aerosolized liquid. This means that, in 
a 1-minute period, it would take 
approximately 26 gallons of Sarin to kill 50 
percent of the people in a domed stadium, 5 
cups of Sarin to kill 50 percent of the people 
in a movie theater, only about Ό cup of 
Sarin to kill 50 percent of the people in an 
auditorium, and the equivalent of a shot 

IG VIII-C-12 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-15 


Chemical Agents Key Points 

• Chemical agents are super toxic 
• Relative toxicity: industrial chemicals < 
mustard < nerve 
• Normal states are as a liquid or a vapor 
• Inhalation hazard is of greatest concern 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-15 

glass to kill 50 percent of the people in a 50100 
person conference room. 

It is the aerosol that is most often fatal. For 
example, the Tokyo subway attack used 
Sarin liquid and the liquid caused very few 
deaths. Most casualties were from the closed 
subway environment where the Sarin 
aerosolized (evaporated) on its own in the 
confined space of the subway reaching toxic 
levels. 

Chemical Agents Key Points 

• Chemical agents are supertoxic. These 
agents were deliberately developed to 
cause injury or death to individuals. 
• Relative toxicity: industrial chemicals < 
mustard < nerve. In terms of relative 
toxicity, the same amount of an industrial 
chemical is less toxic than a blister agent, 
and both are less toxic than a nerve agent. 
• Normal states are as a liquid or a vapor. 
These agents are either a liquid or a vapor 
in their normal state. But the vapor is a 
more effective WMD. 
• Inhalation hazard is of greatest concern. 
Nerve and blister agents pose both a skin 
and inhalation hazard. The inhalation 
hazard is of greater concern. 
IG VIII-C-13 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 
Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
IG VIII-C-14 
VISUAL VIII-C-16 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-16 
Biological Warfare Agents 
Biological Warfare Agents 
Emphasize differences between chemical 
and biological agents: 
• Delayed effects: The biggest difference 
is time. Unlike chemical agents, most of 
which have an immediate effect, most 
biological agents have a delayed effect 
ranging from several hours to days, and 
in some cases, weeks. In the event of a 
biological incident, there may be no 
casualties and nothing significant 
initially. 
• Toxicity: By weight, biological agents 
are generally more toxic than chemical 
agents. For example, Ricin is 6 to 9 times 
more toxic than Sarin, and Botulinum, 
another toxin, is 15,000 to 30,000 times 
more toxic than Sarin. 
• Human detection: Biological agents are 
undetectable by the human senses. 
VISUAL VIII-C-17 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-17 
Classes of Biological Agents 
Bacteria 
Viruses 
Toxins 
FEMA 426 - Appendix C contains a CBR glossary and 
characteristics of biological agents 
Note: As we look at biological agents, you will see 
some similarities with what we discussed earlier 
with chemical agents, but you will also note some 
significant differences. Selected bacterial, viral, 
and toxin agents, their characteristics, and 
treatment are of particular concern when preparing 
Classes of Biological Agents 
• Both bacteria and viruses are living 
organisms and, as such, require an 
environment in which to live and 
reproduce. 
• They can enter the body through 
inhalation or ingestion, through a break in 
the skin, or through other body openings 
or orifices. 
• Once the organisms invade the body, they 
begin to grow and reproduce. They can 
also produce toxins that may poison the 
body. 
• Toxins are poisonous substances 
produced as a byproduct of pathogens or 
plants and even some animals. 

Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

for biological terrorism. 
VISUAL VIII-C-18 

Bacteria 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-18 
Antibiotics and vaccines Antibiotics and vaccines Treatment 
Standard Precautions 
and Droplet Precautions 
Standard Precautions Protection 
Chills, high fever, headache,
spitting up blood, shortnessof breath 
Chills, fever, nausea, 
swollen lymph nodes 
Signs and 
Symptoms 
YES (pneumonic)
NO (bubonic) 
NOContagious 
2 to 3 days for pneumonic2 to 10 days for bubonic 
1 to 6 days Incubation 
Period 
Plague Anthrax 
VISUAL VIII-C-19 

Viruses 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-19 
Vaccine, supportivetherapy 
Treatment 
Standard Precautions + 
Droplet + Airborne + 
Contact Precautions 
Standard Precautions + 
Droplet + Airborne + 
Contact Precautions 
Protection 
Fever, vomiting, diarrhea, 
mottled/blotchy skin 
Fever, rigors, vomiting, 
headache, pustules Signs and 
Symptoms 
YESYES Contagious 
Viral HemorrhagicFevers 
Smallpox 
Vaccines available for 
some 
Bacteria 

Anthrax and plague are two examples of 
diseases caused by bacteria. This chart 
highlights the important characteristics of 
each, including: 

• Incubation period 
• Whether they are contagious or not 
• Signs and symptoms 
• Protection 
• Treatment 
Again, a basic understanding of these 
characteristics will be valuable in 
developing an appropriate and effective 
protective action strategy for your 
facility. 

Viruses 

Two viruses are highlighted: Smallpox and 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. Both are 
contagious, and protective actions include 
the use of standard, airborne, and contact 
precautions. 

For example, most contagion in smallpox is 
from people inhaling small droplets from the 
coughing of infected/contagious persons. 

IG VIII-C-15 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-20 


Toxins 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-20 
Supportive oxygenationand hydration 
Supportive care,
antitoxins, and vaccines 
Treatment 
Standard Precautions Standard Precautions Protection 
Chills, high fever, headache,
spitting up blood, shortnessof breath 
Weakness, dizziness, dry 
mouth and throat, blurredvision, paralysis 
Signs and 
Symptoms 
NONOContagious 
4-8 hours after ingestion12-24 hours after inhalation 
1 to 3 days Onset of 
Symptoms 
Cytotoxin(Ricin) 
Neurotoxin 
(Botulinum) 
Note: There are numerous naturally-occurring toxins. 
For our purposes, we will group them into two categories. 
VISUAL VIII-C-21 


Biological Agents Key Points 

Onset of symptoms 
Potentially contagious 
Signs and symptoms 
Protection 
Treatment 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-21 

Biological weapons are considered the 
emerging mass weapon of destruction of choice 
for terrorists because many agents can be made 
with standard commercial laboratory or 
brewing equipment. 

Toxins 

Finally, there are numerous naturally-
occurring toxins. For our purposes, we will 
group them into two categories: 

• Neurotoxins: Neurotoxins attack the 
nervous system. They are fairly fast-
acting and can act in a manner opposite to 
that of the nerve agents because they 
prevent nerve-to-muscle stimulation. 
• Cytotoxins: Cytotoxins are cell poisons. 
They are slower acting and can have a 
variety of symptoms, including vomiting, 
diarrhea, rashes, blisters, jaundice, 
bleeding, or general tissue deterioration. 
There are numerous other modes of action 
of toxins, which are beyond our need to 
discuss here. 

Biological Agents Key Points 

NOTE: A very low dose of a biological 
agent can cause infection and spread 
disease, thus detection requires high 
sensitivity, but because there are many 
biologicals in the environment, detection 
requires selectivity, and since biological 
agents are very complex molecules making 
them difficult to identify/detect. 

• Onset of symptoms: Most biological 
agents have an incubation period. 
Delayed effects will make identifying a 
biological attack more difficult. 
• Potentially Contagious: Only a few 
biological agents are contagious: plague, 
smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers 
(VHF), such as Ebola. 
• Signs and symptoms: Signs and 
symptoms of many biological attacks 
initially manifest themselves as flu-like; 
therefore, it may be difficult to identify 
that an attack has occurred. 
IG VIII-C-16 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-22 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

Biological Agent Categories 

Some Biological agent(s) Disease 

Category A Category A 

• Variola major • Smallpox 
• Bacillus anthracis • Anthrax 
• Yersinia pestis • Plague 
• Clostridium botulinum • Botulism 
• Ebola, Marburg • Tularemia
Category B • Viral hemorrhagic fevers
• Coxiella burnetii Category B 
• Brucella spp. • Q Fever 
• Burkholderia mallei • Brucellosis 
• Burkholderia pseudomallei • Glanders 
• Toxins • Melioidosis 
• Food/Water safety threats • Psittacosis
Category C • Ricin toxin
• Emerging threat agents • Typhus 
• Cholera 
• Shigellosis 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-22 

• Protection: Standard precautions will be 
adequate protection against most 
biological agents. 
• Treatment: Some biological agents can 
be treated with antibiotics, vaccines, and 
antitoxins; for agents for which there are 
none of the aforementioned treatments, 
supportive care should be administered, 
such as treating the symptoms. 
The recent SARS and Avian Flu outbreaks 
demonstrate the relative ease by which 
naturally-occurring biological agents can 
quickly transmutate and spread across the 
globe. The flu strain that caused the Flu 
Pandemic of 1918 is still an active strain. 

Biological Agent Categories 

Agents are placed in one of three priority 
categories for initial public health 
Preparedness efforts based on the overall 
criteria and weighting of each agent. 

Category A: Carry the highest priority 
because they: 

• Can be easily disseminated or spread 
person-to-person 
• Can be highly lethal 
• Have the potential for serious public 
health impact 
• Can potentially cause public panic and 
lead to social disruption 
Category B: Carry the second-highest 
priority because they: 

• Are moderately easy to disseminate 
• Usually result in moderate morbidity 
• Are generally less lethal 
Category C: They include emerging 
pathogens that could potentially be 
engineered for future mass dissemination. 

• Nipah virus 
IG VIII-C-17 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-23 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-23 
Nuclear/Radiological Materials 
Improvised Nuclear Devices 
Nuclear Plants 
Radiological Dispersal Device 
VISUAL VIII-C-24 


Ionizing Radiation 

Alpha particles 
Beta particles 
Gamma rays 
Neutrons 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-24 

There are also non-ionizing types of radiation – fluorescent lights, lasers, and microwaves. In 
these examples, the radiation can cause burns, but it does not cause molecular change or 
ionization 
Note: In its simplest definition, radiation can be 
defined as either electromagnetic or particulate 
emissions of energy from the disintegration of 
the nucleus of an atom. This energy, when 
impacting on or passing through material, 

• Hantavirus 
Not believed to present a high bio terrorism 
risk to the public health today, but could 
emerge as future threats. 
Nuclear/Radiological Materials 

Of the three types of threats (chemical, 
biological, or nuclear/radiological), a 
nuclear weapon explosion is considered the 
least likely for terrorist use; however, the 
potential exists for it to happen and even 
more potential exists for the use of 
radiological materials. 

Possible scenarios: 

• Detonation of an improvised nuclear 
device (IND) 
• Terrorist attack on a nuclear plant 
• Use of a radiological dispersal device 
(RDD), or “dirty” bomb – the simple 
act of spreading the materials 
Ionizing Radiation 

Ionizing radiation is either particle radiation 
or electromagnetic radiation in which an 
individual particle/photon carries enough 
energy to ionize an atom or molecule by 
completely removing an electron from its 
orbit. If the individual particles do not carry 
this amount of energy, it is essentially 
impossible for even a large flood of particles 
to cause ionization. These ionizations, if 
enough occur, can be very destructive to 
living tissue, and can cause DNA damage 
and mutations. 

For our purposes, ionizing radiation 
includes: 

• Alpha particles 
• Beta particles 
• Gamma rays 
• Neutrons 
IG VIII-C-18 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

including humans, can cause some form of 
reaction. 

Radioactive material: Any material that is 
giving off some form of ionizing radiation. 

VISUAL VIII-C-25 


Common Radiation Exposures 

Average annual exposure 360 mrem per year 
Chest x-ray 10 to 30 mrem 
Flight 0.5 mrem every hour 
Smoking 1.5 packs per day 16,000 mrem per year 
Mild radiation sickness* 200,000 mrem 
Lethal dose* 450,000 mrem 
* single acute exposure 
Chronic 


Acute 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-25 

Note: Mild radiation sickness (i.e., nausea, 
vomiting, and diarrhea) may onset after 
receiving a whole body dose of approximately 
200,000 mrem in a short amount of time 
(generally less than 24 hours). The Lethal Dose 
(LD), known as the LD50/60, is a single, acute, 
whole body exposure of around 450,000 mrem. 
The LD50/60 is defined when 50 percent of all 
people present at an incident receive 450,000 
mrem and die after 60 days after receiving no 
medical treatment. 

Dose in rem = RBE x dose in rad 
RBE = 1 for gamma radiation and beta 

radiation above 30,000 electron volts 
RBE = 0.7 for photons above 4 million electron 

volts (minimum found) 

Again, for the purposes of this course, we 
are primarily concerned with the hazard, the 
detection of the hazard, and protective 
actions that we can take. 

Ionizing radiation is what causes injury or 
death, and is also a characteristic by which 
nuclear materials can be measured and 
identified. 

Common Radiation Exposures 

This chart reflects naturally-occurring 
radiation doses (and doses received during 
normal activities) to provide a point of 
reference and for comparison. The threshold 
for any real consequences begins around 
200,000 mrem. 

The average annual radiation exposure has 

been calculated as: 
Naturally occurring 
Medical 
Consumer products 
Other 
Total 
295 mrem 
52 mrem 
10 mrem 
3 mrem 
360 mrem 
mrem = millirem 

milli- = 10-3 or “one thousandth of” 

rem = rφntgen (roentgen) equivalent in 
man Pronounced “rho – ent – gen” 
with a long “o” and the two “e” are 
short 

rem is a unit of equivalent dose, much like 
TNT equivalent for explosives. Rem 
relates the absorbed dose in human 
tissue to the effective biological 
damage of the radiation. Not all 
radiation has the same biological 
effect, even for the same amount of 
absorbed dose. 

rad is the unit of absorbed dose equal to 100 
ergs per gram or 0.01 joule per kg. 

IG VIII-C-19 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

RBE = 20 for heavy ions (maximum found) 

Source of radioactivity in smoking is Lead 210 
(beta radiation) and Polonium 210 (alpha 
radiation) which comes as Radon 222 gas from 
the soil and is absorbed by the tobacco plant’s 
leaves. While the tobacco plant takes up little 
radioactivity from the soil directly like it draws 
other nutrients, it turns out that “developed” 
countries usually fertilize their tobacco fields 
with chemically manufactured fertilizer high in 
phosphate content to make the tobacco more 
“flavorful” than if nitrogen based fertilizer is 
used as in poorer countries. The phosphate 
portion of this fertilizer is made from a rock 
mineral, apatite, which is ground to powder, 
dissolved in acid and further processed. Apatite 
rock contains Radium 226 (the precursor of 
Radon 222). 

VISUAL VIII-C-26 

Health Hazards in an Incident 

• Exposure to radiation source (external) 
• Contamination (possible internal and/or external) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-26 

Note: Internal exposure through wounds or 
broken skin is also possible. Responders should 
take extra precautions when sharp objects, such 
as broken glass or jagged metal, are at the 
scene. 

Left Photo - This image shows the cut-away of 
an actual Radioisotope Thermoelectric 
Generators (RTG) Unit which produces 

(Energy and mass, but not biological 
damage) 

Health Hazards 

The two radiation concerns at an incident 
are exposure and contamination by 
radioactive material. External irradiation 
occurs when all or part of the body is 
exposed to penetrating radiation from an 
external source. Contamination means that 
radioactive materials in the form of gases, 
liquids, or solids are released into the 
environment and get on people externally, 
get in them internally, or both. 

Incidents involving either an explosion or 
fire will elevate the potential for internal or 
external contamination due to the spreading 
of the radioactive material in the form of 
small fragments (dust) or smoke. These 
materials can often be carried long distances 
downwind. 

Radiological materials are both colorless 
and odorless. 

IG VIII-C-20 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

electricity via the thermoelectric effect. 
Center Photo - RTG from the Cassini program. 
Right Photo - RTG abandoned on the Kola 
Peninsula, Russia 

VISUAL VIII-C-27 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-27 
Protection from Radiation Exposure 
Time 
Distance 
Shielding Alpha 
Beta 
Gamma 
Neutron 
paper lead book water 
Note: Do not shield neutron-producing sources 
with lead or dense materials as the neutrons 
react with the material to produce gamma rays. 
Use wax, water, or plastic instead. 

VISUAL VIII-C-28 

CBR Detection 

?Biological 
Chemical 
Radiological 
SOURCE: BAE SYSTEMS 
SOURCE: BRUKER DALTRONICS 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-28 

Protection from Radiation Exposure 

The radiation exposure received will depend 
on the type and strength of radiation source. 
This exposure can be reduced by effective 
use of: 

• Time: The radiation dose is reduced in 
proportion to reduction in exposure time. 
• Distance: Distance is also critical for 
reducing radiation exposure dose. 
Although alpha particles only travel a 
little over an inch in air, and beta 
particles will travel only a few yards in 
air, gamma rays can travel extensive 
distances. 
• Shielding: Radiation can also be 
blocked or reduced by various materials. 
Alpha radiation is stopped by a sheet of 
paper, beta radiation is stopped by 
aluminum foil or clothing, gamma rays 
are only reduced by dense materials such 
as lead or earth, and neutrons are slowed 
or stopped by hydrogenous materials, 
such as wax or water. 
CBR Detection 

The underlying theme of this chapter is that 
effective protection against potential 
releases of CBR is a function of: 

1) Effective and timely detection of the 

agent(s); and 

2) A public that is knowledgeable of the 

most appropriate protective actions to 

take in the event of a CBR release. 

The discussion on CBR detection includes: 

• CBR detection technology currently 
available. 
IG VIII-C-21 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Sources of useful technical information: 

• NBC Products and Services Handbook 
contains a catalogue of CBR detection 
equipment. 

• Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent 
and Toxic Industrial Material Detection 
Equipment for Emergency First 
Responders, published by the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) (Guide 100-00, 
Vols 1 & 2), June 2000. 
• An Introduction to Biological Agent 
Detection Equipment for Emergency First 
Responders, published by the NIJ (Guide 
101-00): December 2001. 
• Indications of CBR contamination. 
• Mass spectrometry. (can positively 
identify a chemical agent at very low 
concentrations) 
• Most strategies for protecting people 
from airborne hazards require a means of 
detection (determining that a hazard 
exists). 
• Chemical detection technology has 
improved vastly since Operation Desert 
Storm (when many military detection 
systems experienced high false-alarm 
rates). Current chemical detectors work in 
about 10 seconds. 
• Biological detection technology has not 
matured as fast; generally require trained 
specialists to administer; biological 
signatures can take 30 minutes to detect. 
Biological detection requires sensitivity 
(very low effective dose must be 
detected), selectivity (there are many 
biologicals in the environment, thus must 
discern the contagious/deadly ones), and 
identification of very complex molecules 
(the complexity makes them difficult to 
identify). 
A variety of radiological detectors have 
been developed for the nuclear industry and 
are commercially available. 

IG VIII-C-22 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-29 


CBR Incident Indicators 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-29 
Heat Emitting or Glowing 
Spray Mechanisms 
Unusual Metal Debris/Canisters 
Unexplained Odors 
Unusual Liquids 
Mass Casualties 
Physical Symptoms 
Lack of Insect life 
Dead Animals 
Radiological Biological Chemical Indicator 
In general, chemical agents will typically have 
a rapid onset of symptoms, while the response 
to biological or radiological agents can be 
delayed. Potential indicators of threats include 
suspicious packages or containers or unusual 
powders or liquids, droplets, mists, or clouds 
found near air-intake, in air-ventilation 
ductwork, and HVAC systems. 

VISUAL VIII-C-30 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-30 
Chemical Incident Indicators (1) 
Chemical agents have a rapid onset of symptoms 
FEMA 426, Table 5-2: Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident, p. 5-34 
CBR Incident Indicators 

This is a summary table indicating warning 
properties of CBR agents in terms of dead 
animals, lack of insect life, physical 
symptoms, mass casualties, unusual liquids, 
unexplained odors, unusual metal debris, 
heat emitting or glowing, and spray 
mechanisms. 

Details provided in visuals VIII-C-30, -31, 32, 
and -33. 

Chemical Incident Indicators (1) 

Most hazardous chemicals have warning 
properties that provide a practical means for 
detecting a hazard and initiating protective 
actions. Such warning properties make 
chemicals perceptible; for example, vapors 
or gases can be perceived by the human 
senses (i.e., smell, sight, taste, or irritation of 
the eyes, skin, or respiratory tract) before 
serious effects occur. 

In the absence of a warning property, people 
can be alerted to some airborne hazards by 
observing symptoms or effects in others. 
This provides a practical means for initiating 
protective actions, because the susceptibility 
to hazardous materials varies from person to 
person. 

IG VIII-C-23 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-31 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-31 
Chemical Incident Indicators (2) 
FEMA 426, Table 5-2: Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident, p. 5-34 
VISUAL VIII-C-32 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-32 
Biological Incident Indicators 
Biological agents will typically have a more delayed effect 
FEMA 426, Table 5-3: Indicators of Possible Biological Incident, p. 5-35 
Chemical Incident Indicators (2) 

Chart 2 depicts the following chemical 
indicators: 

• Definite pattern of casualties 
• Illness associated with a confined 
geographic area 
• Unusual liquid droplets 
• Areas that look different in appearance 
• Unexplained odors 
• Low-flying clouds 
• Unusual metal debris 
Biological Incident Indicators 

In the case of a biological incident, the onset 
of symptoms takes days to weeks and, 
typically, there will be no characteristic 
indicators. Because of the delayed onset of 
symptoms in a biological incident, the area 
affected may be greater due to the migration 
of infected individuals. 

The indicators of biological attack easiest to 
identify are unscheduled and unusual 
spraying and abandoned spray devices. 

Let’s make a distinction between 
bioterrorism against people and against 
animals: 

People: Farmers might see 
cows/livestock get anthrax after an 
anthrax biological attack (but not cats and 
dogs). No other commonly discussed 
biological agents used for people will 
affect animals. Alternately, rats carry 
fleas that spread plague, but the rats don’t 
get plague. 
Animals: Unlikely to happen and if it 
does few people are going to see it for 
what it is. It makes another distinction 
between biological and chemical 

IG VIII-C-24 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-33 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-33 
Radiological Incident Indicators 
Radiological agents will typically have a more delayed effect 
FEMA 426, Table 5-4: Indicators of a Possible Radiological Incident, p. 5-36 
VISUAL VIII-C-34 


CBR Protection Strategies 

Protective Actions: 

• Evacuation 
• Sheltering in Place 
• Personal Protective Equipment 
• Air Filtration, Pressurization, and 
Ultraviolet Light 
• Exhausting and Purging 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-34 

indicators. However, if the attack is 
against animals, then animal effects are 
indications. For example foot and mouth 
disease or pseudo rabies or swine flu or 
bird flu would cause huge animal loses 
but no human deaths (unless you count 
the recent bird flu deaths by people 
handling infected poultry and this in 
contact). But these latter instances are not 
bioterrorism yet. 

Radiological Incident Indicators 

In the case of a radiological incident, the 
onset of symptoms also takes days to weeks 
to occur and typically there will be no 
characteristic indicators. Radiological 
materials are not recognizable by the senses 
because they are colorless and odorless. 

It is fortunate the radiological detectors are 
so mature to detect radiation sources and 
residual radiation. 

CBR Protection Strategies 

Once the presence of an airborne hazard is 
detected, there are five possible protective 
actions for a building and its occupants. In 
increasing order of complexity and cost, 
these actions are: 

• Evacuation 
• Sheltering in Place 
• Personal Protective Equipment 
• Air Filtration and Pressurization 
• Exhausting and Purging 
To ensure the protective actions are effective 
you must have: 

IG VIII-C-25 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-35 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-35 
Evacuation 
..Determine airborne hazard source --internal or external 
..Determine if evacuation will make things better or worse 
..Assembly should be upwind, at least 1,000 feet away, 
and three different locations (A, B, C plan) 
..In most cases, existing plans for fire evacuation apply – 
follow through -exercise 
This map displays 1,000 foot radius to 
determine minimum evacuation distance, 2,000 
feet would be better. 

VISUAL VIII-C-36 

• A protective action plan specific to 
each building 
• Training and familiarization for 
occupants 
Protective actions are discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 

Evacuation 

• Evacuation is the most common 
protective action taken when an airborne 
hazard, such as smoke or an unusual 
odor, is perceived in a building. 
• There must be some detection method or 
knowledgeable personnel in place to 
make the determination of what to do – 
evacuate or some other action. This may 
be trained first responders, but even their 
response time can be too long depending 
upon the situation. 
• Orderly evacuation is the simplest and 
most reliable action for an internal 
airborne hazard, but may not be the best 
action in all situations, especially in the 
case of an external CBR release, 
particularly one that is widespread. 
• If some agent has infiltrated the building 
and evacuation is deemed not to be safe, 
the use of protective hoods may be 
appropriate. 
• The evacuation plan should list each 
contingency and the decision process. 
Sheltering in Place 

Interrupting the flow of fresh air is the 
principal applied in the protective action 
known as sheltering in place. 

Advantage: It can be implemented rapidly. 

Disadvantage: Protection is variable and 

IG VIII-C-26 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Sheltering in Place 

A building can provide substantial protection against 
agents released outside if uptake of contaminated air can 
be halted or reduced and/or if uptake of fresh/filtered air 
can be increased. 

The amount of protection varies with: 

. How tight the building is 
. Level of exposure (dose x time) 
. Purging or period of occupancy 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-36 

. Natural filtering 
In most cases, air conditioners and combustion 
heaters cannot be operated while sheltering in 
place because operating them increases the 
outdoor-indoor exchange of air. 

Sheltering in place is, therefore, suitable only 
for exposures of short duration, roughly 2 
hours or less, depending on conditions. 

Because the building slowly releases 
contaminants that have entered, at some point 
during cloud passage the concentration inside 
exceeds the concentration outside. Maximum 
protection is attained by increasing the air 
exchange rate after cloud passage or by exiting 
the building into clean air. The tighter the 
building, the greater the effect of this natural 
filtering. 

FEMA 453 covers square footage required per 
person for various short and long term 
situations for people of various capabilities. 

diminishes with the duration of the hazard. 

The level of protection that can be attained 
by sheltering in place is substantial, but it is 
less than can be provided by high-efficiency 
filtration of the fresh air introduced into the 
building. 

The amount of protection varies with: 

The building's air exchange rate. The 
tighter the building (i.e., the lower the air 
exchange rate), the greater the protection 
it provides. 

o Sealing dampers on air intakes 
o Previously sealed all identifiable air 
leakage in building envelope (smoke 
test or infrared survey on very hot or 
very cold day) 
o This presupposes that all HVAC and 
other mechanical means that move air, 
including bathroom exhausts and 
elevators, are shutdown to not draw 
outside air into the building 
The level of exposure. Protection varies 
with agent concentration and time, 
diminishing as the time of exposure 
increases or as concentration of agent 
increases. Thus a high-concentration 
plume passing quickly over a building 
would indicate sheltering in place to be 
the best option. 

Purging or period of occupancy. How long 
occupants remain in the building after the 
hazardous cloud has passed also affects 
the level of protection. However, after the 
high-concentration plume passes, there 
will be some inleakage of agent that does 
occur and the longer one stays in the 
building the higher the exposure, unless 
the building is purged or aired out. 

Natural filtering. Some filtering occurs 
when the agent is deposited in the 
building shell or upon interior surfaces as 
air passes into and out of the building. 

IG VIII-C-27 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-37 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit VIII-C-37 
Sheltering in Place 
Sheltering Plan should: 
• Identify all air handlingequipment to deactivate 
• Identify cracks, seams, joints,
and doors to seal (with method) 
• Preposition needed supplies 
• Identify safe rooms/safe havens 
• Identify procedures for purgingor airing out building 
• Identify procedures for 
voluntary occupant participation 
• Maintain comms -TV or radio 
FEMA 453, Design Guidance for Shelters and Safe Rooms 
Note: Although sheltering is for protection 
against an external release, it is possible, but 
more complex, to shelter in place in one or 
more floors of a multi-story building after an 
internal release has occurred. In these 
circumstances, it is critical to turn off all air 
handling equipment, isolate stairwells, and not 
use elevators. 

Sheltering in Place 

If the office environment is complex, 
planning and exercises are important. The 
sheltering plan should include: 

• Identifying all air handling units, fans, 
bathroom exhausts, and the switches 
needed to deactivate them 
• Identifying cracks, seams, and joints in 
the building shell to be permanently 
sealed or temporarily sealed, along with 
sealing doors with duct tape 
• Prepositioning supplies that are needed to 
initiate and sustain sheltering in place 
• Identifying safe rooms or safe havens 
• Identifying procedures for purging or 
airing out after an internal release 
o This must be done on a case-by-case 
basis for the agent involved and the 
agent concentration to be spread 
during the purging. 
o Competent first responder authority 
may best make this determination. 
o Sealing the release area and 
evacuating the building may be a 
better option and do not touch those 
purge fans! 
• Identifying procedures for voluntary 
occupant participation 
o During an event, the decision to 
shelter in place is voluntary
o Current law does not require people 
to use the shelter 
o People should enter the designated 
shelter area within 3-5 minutes. 
Depending upon plume speed and 
distance to travel, even this may be 
too long. 
• Maintaining communications to 
understand what is occurring by 
monitoring TV or radio 
IG VIII-C-28 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-38 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-38 
Personal Protective Equipment 
SOURCE: MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY (USA) 
SOURCE: BROOKDALE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS INC (CANADA) 
SOURCE: BARDAS CHILD PROTECTIVE WRAP (ISRAEL) 
Note: This slide depicts individuals wearing 
universal-fit escape hoods (upper left-hand 
corner picture and middle picture on the slide) 
that have been developed for short-duration 
"escape-only" wear to protect against chemical 
agents, aerosols (including biological agents), 
and some toxic industrial chemicals. The hoods 
are compact enough to be stored in desks (see 
picture in upper left-hand corner of the slide) or 
to be carried on the belt. 

Personal Protective Equipment 

• A wide range of individual protection 
equipment is available, including 
respirators, protective hoods, protective 
suits, CBR detectors, decontamination 
equipment, etc. 
• If masks have been issued, ensure that 
training is conducted on how to put on 
and wear the masks. 
• No selection of personal protective 
equipment is effective against every 
possible threat. Selection must be tied to 
specific threat/hazard characteristics. 
• Universal hoods designed for short 
duration escape wear only protect against 
chemical agents by using both HEPA and 
carbon filters. 
o Carbon filters are designed to filter a 
broad range of toxic chemicals, but 
not all chemicals. 
o The EVAC-U8 hood was recalled in 
April 2006 due to a problem with 
removing carbon monoxide, which 
was a stated claim, applicable to its 
use as a fire escape hood, but it is 
NOT a CBR hood. 
IG VIII-C-29 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-39 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-39 
Aftermath of Tragic Events 
Assembly should be to the upwind side of the building at least 1,000 feet 
away since any airborne hazard escaping the building during an internal 
release will be carried downwind. 
Shows pictures of aftermath of the tragic 9-11 
events. 

VISUAL VIII-C-40 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-40 
Casualty Collection Point 
FEMA 453, Figure 1-18, p. 1-57, and Figure 1-13, p. 1-52 
9-11 Dramatic Events 

Assembly should be to the upwind side of 
the building and at least 1,000 feet away, 
since any airborne hazard escaping the 
building will be carried downwind. 


Starting from top left:
Photo 1 - Remains Recovery 


Photo 2 - Evacuation by Helicopter 

Photo 3 - Arlington County EMS 
(Emergency Medical Services) unit 

Photo 4 – NMRT (National Medical 
Response Team) decontamination 
corridor 

Bottom left: 

Photo 5 - Evidence Collector 

Photo 6 - Man covered in debris from the 
Twin Towers collapse 

Photo 7 - FEMA Urban Search and Rescue 
(US&R) Team from Montgomery 
County, MD is briefed before beginning 
work at Pentagon following 9-11 attacks. 

Photo 8 - FBI and US&R 

Casualty Collection Point 

Emergency operations need to be designed 
to allow law, fire, and medical vehicles and 
personnel access for mass decontamination 
operations. 

The Contamination Control Area is located 
on the boundary of the Cold Zone and Warm 
Zone and used by the rescue and 
decontamination personnel to enter and exit 
the Warm Zone. There are several 
processing stations, a resupply and 
refurbishment area, and a contaminated 
waste storage area. Runoff from 

IG VIII-C-30 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

To summarize the right column:
During planning, you need to identify the 
following on your site as part of your OEP 
(Occupant Emergency Plan): 


. Areas for victims that require transportation 
. Areas for rescue and decontamination 
personnel 
. Areas for survivors that require 
decontamination 
decontamination operations must be 
controlled or contained to prevent further 
site contamination. 

Casualty Collection Point is a critical 
element to save lives. The following 
operations may take place during an 
emergency operation. 

• The Patient Staging Area (PSA) is 
located in the Cold Zone and is the 
transfer point for victims that have been 
stabilized for transport to higher care 
medical facilities or for fatalities to be 
transported to morgue facilities. The PSA 
area must be large enough to 
accommodate helicopter operations and a 
large number of ambulances. 
• The Casualty Collection Point is located 
in the Warm Zone and will have typically 
have three processing stations: 
o Station 1 – Litter decontamination 
and non-ambulatory delayed 
treatment patients 
o Station 2 – Litter decontamination 
and immediate treatment patients 
o Station 3 – Ambulatory 
decontamination, minimal treatment 
patients, and ambulatory delayed 
treatment patients 
• Mass casualty decontamination occurs in 
the Warm Zone. The Safe Refuge Area is 
located in the Warm Zone and is used to 
assemble individuals who were witness to 
the incident and separation of 
contaminated from non-contaminated 
persons. 
IG VIII-C-31 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-41 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-41 
Air Filtration and Pressurization 
• Requires modifications to HVAC and electrical 
systems – significant initial and life-cycle costs 
• Introduces filtered air at a rate sufficient to produce 
an overpressure and create an outward flow through 
leaks and cracks 
FEMA 426, Figures 5-5 and 5-12: Bag Filter and HEPA Filter; Commercial 
Air Filtration Unit, p. 5-12 and 5-22 
SOURCE: TRION INCORPORATED 
Note: Applying external filtration to a building 
requires modification to the building’s heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system 
and electrical system. These changes are necessary 
to ensure that, when the protective system is in 
operation, all outside air enters the building 
through filters. The air exchange that normally 
occurs due to wind pressure, chimney effect, and 
operation of fans must be reduced to zero. 

VISUAL VIII-C-42 

Air Filtration and Cleaning 

Two Types of Collection Systems: 

• Particulate air filtration 
. Principles of collection 
. Types of particulate filters 
. Filter testing and efficiency ratings 
• Gas-phase air filtration 
. Principles of collection 
. Types of gas-phase filters 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-42 

See CDC/NIOSH Guidance for Filtration and 
Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building 
Environments from Airborne Chemical, 

Air Filtration and Pressurization 

• Two basic methods of applying air 
filtration to a building are external 
filtration and internal filtration. External 
filtration involves filtering and/or 
cleaning of the air drawn from the 
outside, while internal filtration involves 
filtering and/or cleaning of the air drawn 
from inside the building. Both methods 
require HVAC modifications that can be 
costly. 
• Among the various protective measures 
for buildings, high efficiency air 
filtration/cleaning provides the highest 
level of protection against an outdoor 
release of hazardous materials. 
NOTE to instructor: Emphasize to students 
that from this slide on the information will 
help the student to understand CBR issues 
and how to mitigate HVAC Systems when 
vulnerabilities are noted. 

Air Filtration and Cleaning 

Air filtration is the removal of particulate 
contaminants from the air. Air cleaning is 
the removal of gases or vapors from the air. 
The collection mechanisms for these two 
types of systems are very different. 

Particulate air filtration consists of fibrous 
materials, which capture aerosols. Their 
efficiency will depend on the size of the 
aerosol, the type of filter, the velocity of the 
air, and the type of microbe. The basic 
principle of particulate air filtration is not to 
restrict the passage of particles by the gap 
between fibers, but by altering the airflow 
streamlines. The airflow will slip around the 
fiber, but higher density aerosols and 
particulates will not change direction as 

IG VIII-C-32 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Biological, or Radiological Attacks. 
Publication No. 2003-136, April 2003 for good 
explanations of these two types of filtration. 

VISUAL VIII-C-43 

Air Contaminant Sizes 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-43 

rapidly. Particulate filters are not intended to 
remove gases and vapors. 

Gas-phase air filtration sorbent filters use 
one of two mechanisms for capturing and 
controlling gas-phase air contaminants: 
physical adsorption and chemisorption. Both 
mechanisms remove specific types of gas-
phase contaminants in indoor air. Unlike 
particulate filters, sorbents cover a wide 
range of highly porous materials, ranging 
from simple clays and carbons to complex 
engineered polymers. Activated carbon is 
the most common sorbent, but does not 
capture all chemicals. 

Sorbent filtration needs adequate residence 
time to ensure adsorption of the gas or 
vapors; that is adequate contact time for the 
flow rate of the air passing through the 
filters. In some cases, two sorbent filters 
may be needed in series to achieve needed 
residence time. 

Air Contaminant Sizes 

This chart illustrates the particle size for a 
number of the chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents of concern. Viruses are 
the smallest and most difficult to protect 
against. 

In FEMA 426, Table 5-1, page 5-12, lists 
the new ASHRAE 52.2 Standards for 
particulate filter ratings to remove a given 
particle size. In most cases, new generation 

Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value 

(MERV) 11 to MERV 13 [removal down to 

0.3 to 1 micron] filters can be used in 
commercial buildings and effectively 
remove most particulates of CBR 
concern. 
IG VIII-C-33 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-44 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-44 
SOURCE: FLANDERS CORPORATION 
Pleated Panel Filters 
Carbon Filters 
HEPA Filters 
Various Filter Types 
FEMA 426, Figure 5-9: Charcoal Filter Beds (center), p. 5-17 
SOURCE: FLANDERS CORPORATION 
SOURCE: AMERICAN FILTER 
VISUAL VIII-C-45 

ASHRAE Standards 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-45 
25 -30% > 95% --> 70%8 
20 -25% > 90% --50 -70% 7 
< 20% > 90% --35 -50% 6 Industrial, 
Dust, Molds, 
Spores 
3.0 -10 
< 20% 80 -85% --20 -35% 5 
< 20% > 75% --< 20%4 
< 20% 70 -75% --< 20%3 
< 20% 65 -70% --< 20%2 Residential, 
light, pollen,
dust mites > 10 
< 20% < 65% --< 20%1 
Dust Spot Arrestance .3 to 1 ΅m 1 to 3 ΅m 3 to 10 ΅m 
MERV 
Test Particle Size Range Applications Particle Size 
Range, ΅m 
ASHRAE 52.1 ASHRAE 52.2 
FEMA 426, Table 5-1: Comparison of ASHRAE Standards 52.1 and 52.2, 
p. 5-12 
Various Filter Types 

A wide variety of filters are available to 
meet many specialized needs: 

HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) 
Filters - high performance filters that are 
typically rated as 99.97 percent effective 
in removing dust and particulate matter 
greater than 0.3 micron in size. 

Carbon Filters - sorbent filters (gas-phase) 
that remove gas and vapors using the 
thousands of bonding sites on the huge 
surface area of activated carbon. 

Pleated Panel Filters - particulate air filters 
consisting of fibrous materials that 
capture aerosols. 

ASHRAE Standards 

The new ASHRAE Standard 52.2 is a more 
descriptive test than ASHRAE Standard 

52.1. Standard 52.2 quantifies filtration 
efficiency in different particle size ranges 
and is more applicable in determining a 
filter's effectiveness to capture a specific 
agent. Standard 52.2 reports the particle size 
efficiency results as a MERV rating between 
1 and 20. A higher MERV rating indicates a 
more efficient filter. 
IG VIII-C-34 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-46 

ASHRAE Standards 

--= 99.9999% --20 
--= 99.999% --19 
--= 99.99% --18 Clean rooms, 
Surgery,
Chembio, 
Viruses 
< 0.3 
--= 99.97% --17 
> 95%> 98% > 95% > 95% > 95%16 
~95% > 98% 85 -95% > 90% > 90%15 
90 -95% > 98% 75 -85% > 90% > 90%14 Hospitals,
Smoke removal, 
Bacteria 
0.3 – 1.0 
80 -90% > 98% < 75% > 90% > 90%13 
70 -75% > 98% -> 80% > 90%12 
60 -65% > 98% -65 -80% > 85%11 
50 -55% > 95% -50 -65% > 85%10 Industrial, 
Legionella,
dust 
1.0 – 3.0 
40 -45% > 95% -< 50% > 85%9 
FEMA 426, Table 5-1: Comparison of ASHRAE Standards 52.1 and 52.2, 
p. 5-12 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-46 

VISUAL VIII-C-47 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-47 
Typical Performance of a HEPA Filter 
FEMA 426, Figure 5-7: Typical HEPA Filter Performance p. 5-14 
ASHRAE Standards 

The standard provides a table (depicted on 
the slide) that shows minimum Particle Size 
Efficiency (PSE) for three size ranges for 
each of the MERV numbers 1 through 16. 
Thus, if the size of a contaminant is known, 
an appropriate filter with the desired PSE for 
that particular particle size can be identified. 

Typical Performance of a HEPA Filter 

HEPA filters are typically rated as 99.97 
percent effective in removing dust and 
particulate matter greater than 0.3 micron in 
size. 

A typical HEPA performance curve is 
depicted on this slide. The dip between 0.1 
and 0.3 micron represents the most 
penetrating particle size. Many bacteria and 
viruses fall into this size range. Fortunately, 
microbes in this range are also vulnerable to 
ultraviolet radiation. For this reason, many 
facilities couple particulate air filters with 
ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). 
UVGI will be discussed on slide VIII-C-55. 

IG VIII-C-35 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-48 


Inside Versus Outside Releases 

Outside Release 

• Keep people inside building 
• Reduce indoor/outdoor air exchange – close dampers 
• Shut off air handling systems and equipment that moves air 
– HVAC, exhausts, combustion, computers, elevators 
• Close all windows and doors 
• Once the outdoor hazard has dissipated 
. Open all doors and windows 
. Turn on all fans, including purging systems 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-48 

Outside Versus Inside Releases 

Outside Release 

The intent is to limit exposure (dose x time) 
of individuals by keeping the agent and 
people separated to greatest extent possible. 
Use natural wind, sunlight, and agent 
material properties to allow the high-
concentration plume to pass the building and 
minimize the agent that gets into the 
building. 

• Keep individuals inside the building – use 
the building envelope as a protective 
enclosure 
• Reduce the indoor/outdoor air exchange 
(seal dampers – low leakage, fast acting 
(much less than 30 seconds to close) 
dampers) to prevent contaminated air 
from passing through the HVAC system 
by normal chimney and wind effects 
• Immediately shut off the air handling 
systems and any other system that has a 
fan that moves air – bathroom exhausts, 
combustion burners, computer cabinet 
cooling fans, etc. Note that elevator 
operation acts as a big air pump that 
changes air pressure throughout the 
building. Do not want to set up a pressure 
differential that pulls outside air into the 
building when this outside air is 
contaminated. 
• Close all windows and doors – Should 
have sealed all other leakage points 
throughout the building envelope as part 
of mitigation plan 
• Once the outdoor hazard has dissipated, 
open all doors and windows and turn on 
all fans to ventilate the building. While 
the amount of agent entering the building 
should be low (low dose) if you do not 
ventilate the building the exposure time 
IG VIII-C-36 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-49 


Inside Versus Outside Releases 

Inside Release 

• Turn off all air handling equipment if no special standalone 
systems installed 
• If special systems installed, i.e. mailroom 
. Place air handling system on full (or 100% outside air) to 
pressurize the space around release room 
. Turn off all air handling supplying release room 
• Consider activating fire sprinklers in release room if 
toxic chemicals involved 
• Evaluate evacuation routes for contamination 
• Evacuate building in accordance with emergency plan 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-49 

becomes great and the overall level of 

exposure can become dangerous. 

Outside Versus Inside Releases 

Inside Release 

The intent here is to keep the release 
contained to the greatest extent possible and 
prevent it from getting to the other parts of 
the building or outside the building. 

o This process must be well thought out, 
coordinated, and tested to ensure the 
building will function as desired. 
o If the building cannot be operated this 
way, then follow outside release 
procedures, but with evacuation. 
• If no special stand-alone systems, then 
shut down all air movement equipment 
• If release is in a room with a special 
stand-alone system, then shut down that 
system and place the rest of the building’s 
air handling system on "full (or 100%) 
outside air to keep the agent inside the 
release room. 
• If advised of an in-building release of 
hydrogen cyanide gas, chlorine gases, or 
other toxic industrial chemicals, consider 
activating the fire sprinklers (water) to 
help wash the contaminant from the air 
stream. This would probably help for 
particulate aerosols like anthrax but will 
probably not work for vapors such as 
hydrogen cyanide gas or chlorine gas. 
o The negative to this process is that the 
water is now contaminated and can 
spread throughout the building. 
o The runoff water will also contaminate 
building components to a greater 
extent that if the sprinklers were not 
used, necessitating a greater clean-up 
effort. 
o Note that this type of operation is not 
IG VIII-C-37 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-50 


Exhausting and Purging 

Basic Principles: 

• Use ventilation and smoke/purge fans to remove airborne 
hazards 
. Use primarily after an external release plume has 
passed 
. Selectively use for internal release – may spread 
contamination further 
• Purging should be carefully applied 
. Primarily when agent has spread throughout building 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-50 

Note: Mention that a ventilation system and 
smoke purge fans can be used to purge the 
building after an external release after the 
hazard outdoors has dissipated, and it has been 
confirmed that the agent is no longer present 
near the building. 

standard on fire sprinkler systems and 

would be very difficult to implement. 

• Evacuate the building in accordance with 
the building's emergency evacuation plan. 
Evacuation routes may be hazardous 
because they may take people through 
contaminated areas. It is necessary to 
evaluate the scenario prior to evacuating 
the building to prevent additional injuries 
from occurring. 
Exhausting and Purging 

The fifth protective measure for CBR 
covered in FEMA 426 is Exhausting and 
Purging. Turning on a building's ventilation 
fans and smoke-purge fans is a protective 
action for purging airborne hazards from the 
building and reducing the hazard to which 
building occupants are exposed. 

• Purging must be carefully applied with 
regard to the location of the source and 
the time of the release. The main action is 
final clean-out of the building to allow a 
return to occupancy. 
• If the hazardous material has been 
identified before release or immediately 
upon release, purging should not be 
employed, because it may spread the 
hazardous material throughout the 
building, the adjacent area, and to nearby 
buildings. In this case, all air handling 
units should be turned off to isolate the 
hazard while evacuating or temporarily 
sheltering in place. 
• When purging, the indoor-outdoor air 
exchange rate can be increased by 
opening all windows and energizing all 
other fans. 
IG VIII-C-38 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-51 


HVAC System Upgrade Issues 

• What is the threat? Toxic Industrial Chemicals, 
particulate, gaseous, chemical, biological? 
• How clean does the air need to be and what is the 
associated cost? 
• What is the current system capacity? 
• Is there filter bypass and how significant is air infiltrationinto the building envelope? 
• Will improved indoor air quality offset upgrade costs? 
• Is system maintenance addressed? 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-51 

VISUAL VIII-C-52 


Economic Issues to Consider 

Initial Costs 

. Filters, housing, blowers 
. Factors including flow rate, contaminant 
concentration 
Operating Costs 

. Maintenance, replacement filters, utilities, waste 
disposal 
Replacement Costs 

. Filter life (factors include continued concentration 
and particle size distribution, flow rates, etc.) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-52 

HVAC System Upgrade Issues 

• What is the threat? 
• How clean does the air need to be and 
what is the associated cost? 
• What is the current system capacity? 
[Cubic feet per minute (CFM) and 
pressure drop allowed across existing 
filters. Will upgraded filters result still 
achieving CFM required?] 
• Is there filter bypass and how significant 
is air filtration into the building 
envelope? 
• Will improved indoor air quality offset 
upgrade costs? 
• Is system maintenance addressed? 
Economic Issues to Consider 

In developing, implementing, and sustaining 
a program to reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
threats, there are economic issues to 
consider, including three categories of costs: 

• Initial costs 
• Operating costs 
• Replacement costs 
These need to be factored into protection 
strategies. 

IG VIII-C-39 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-53 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-53 
Access to 
Outdoor Intakes 
FEMA 426, Figure 3-8, Example of Protecting Outdoor Air Intakes, p. 3-36 and 
Figure 3-11, Example of Enclosing Existing Vulnerable Air Intake, p.3-38 
Note: The goal of this protective measure is to 
minimize public accessibility. In general, this 
means the higher the extensions, the better— 
as long as other design constraints (excessive 
pressure loss, dynamic and static loads on 
structure) are appropriately considered. 

VISUAL VIII-C-54 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-54 
Extension Design 
Recommendations 
• Lowest edge as high as possible (> 12ft) 
• Sloped intake (min. 45° recommended) 
• Metal mesh protecting intake 
From CDC/NIOSH 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments 
from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, p. 21 
Access to Outdoor Intakes 

• Several physical security measures can be 
applied to reduce the potential for 
hazardous materials entering a building 
through the HVAC system. 
• One of the most important steps in 
protecting a building's indoor 
environment is the security of the outdoor 
air intakes. Outdoor air enters the 
building through these intakes and is 
distributed throughout the building by the 
HVAC system. 
• If relocation of outdoor air intakes is not 
feasible, intake extensions can be 
constructed without creating adverse 
effects on HVAC performance. 
This is a good idea for other reasons, such as 
keeping grass clippings, lawnmower fumes, 
and/or traffic fumes from being pulled into 
the building because of a low intake. 

Extension Design Recommendations 

An extension height of 12 feet will place the 
intake out of reach of individuals without 
some assistance. Also, the entrance to the 
intake should be covered with a sloped 
metal mesh to reduce the threat of objects 
being tossed into the intake. A minimum 
slope of 45° is generally adequate. 
Extension height should be increased where 
existing platforms or building features (i.e., 
loading docks, retaining walls) might 
provide access to the outdoor air intakes. 

IG VIII-C-40 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-55 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-55 
UV lamps resemble ordinary fluorescent lamps, but are designed to emit 
germicidal UV 
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation 
All viruses and almost all bacteria (excluding spores) are 
vulnerable to moderate levels of UVGI exposure 
FEMA 426, Figure 5-10: UVGI Array with Reflective Surfaces, p. 5-19 
Note: UVGI has long been used in laboratories 
and health care facilities. Ultraviolet radiation 
in the range of 2,250-3,020 Angstroms is lethal 
to microorganisms. All viruses and almost all 
bacteria (excluding spores) are vulnerable to 
moderate levels of UVGI exposure. Spores, 
which are larger and more resistant to UVGI 
than most bacteria, can be effectively removed 
through high efficiency air filtration. 

Consequently, most UGVI systems are 
installed in conjunction with high efficiency 
filtration systems. 

A UVGI system is being tested under the 
sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA). For additional 
information consult: 
http://www.novatroninc.com/technology/. 

Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation 
(UVGI) 

A design utilizing a combination of filtration 
and UVGI can be very effective against 
biological agents. 

• Smaller microbes are difficult to filter 
out, but tend to be more susceptible to 
UVGI 
• Larger microbes, such as spores, which 
are more resistant to UVGI, tend to be 
easier to filter out. 
IG VIII-C-41 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-56 
HIDDEN SLIDE 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-56 
From “Immune Building Systems Technology”, Kowalski 2003 
URV AND UVGI INFORMATION 
URV = UVGI Rating Value 
UVGI = Ultraviolet 
Germicidal 
Irradiation 
VISUAL VIII-C-57 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-57 
Infiltration and Bypass 
Infiltration 
..Building envelope 
tightness and ventilationcontrol are critical 
Bypass 
..Filters should be airtight 
..Check gaskets and 
seals 
..Periodically check 
Note: Building envelopes in residential and 
commercial buildings are, in general, quite 
leaky, and significant quantities of air can 
infiltrate the building envelope with minimal 
filtration. Field studies have shown that, unless 
specific measures are taken to reduce 

URV and UVGI Information 

This table displays UVGI Rating Value 
(URV) for air disinfections systems that 
parallel the ASHRAE 52.2-1999 method for 
testing and rating filters known as MERV 
(minimum efficiency reporting value). The 
proposed URV rating system consists of 20 
separate levels of average UVGI intensity. 

Simulation Results for Air Intake Release 
Various simulations were run in the 
reference shown indicating the removal rates 
for three design basis pathogens for MERV 
11 filters, URV 11 UVGI systems, and both 
working together. Note the almost 100 % 
casualties if the agent is released into the air 
intake over an 8-hour period without any 
protective systems installed, and that about 1 
% casualties occur with MERV 11 and URV 
11 systems working together for the same 
release. 

Infiltration and Bypass 

Infiltration. Building managers should not 
expect filtration alone to protect a building 
from outdoor releases, particularly for 
systems in which no make-up air or 
inadequate overpressure is present. 
Filtration, in combination with other steps, 
such as building pressurization and 
tightening the building envelope, should be 
considered to increase the likelihood that the 
air entering the building actually passes 
through the filtration and air-cleaning 
systems. 

Bypass. Filter bypass is a common problem 
found in many HVAC filtration systems. It 
occurs when air, rather than moving through 
the filter, goes around it, decreasing 
collection efficiency and defeating the 
intended purpose of the filtration system. 

IG VIII-C-42 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

infiltration, as much air may enter a building 
through infiltration as through the mechanical 
ventilation system. 

NOTE to instructor: Emphasize to students 
that this slide is a good example of what looks 
like just poor maintenance actually creates a 
critical system flaw that will affect HVAC 
system performance in handling CBR 
situations. A filter is only good if ALL the air 
flows through it. 

VISUAL VIII-C-58 

Things Not to Do 

• Outdoor air intakes should not be permanently 
sealed. 
• HVAC systems (includes filter upgrades) should 
not be modified without understanding effects 
on building systems or occupants. 
• Fire protection and life safety systems should 
only be modified after careful analysis and 
review. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-58 

Filter bypass is often caused by poorly 
fitting filters, poor sealing of filters in their 
framing systems, missing filter panels, or 
leaks and openings in the air handling unit 
downstream of the filter bank and upstream 
of the blower. Simply improving filter 
efficiency without addressing filter 
bypass provides little, if any, improvement 
to system efficiency. As a mechanical 
system loads with particulates over time, its 
collection efficiency increases, but so does 
the pressure drop. 

Things Not to Do 

More than anything else, building owners 
and managers should ensure that any actions 
they take do not have a detrimental effect on 
the building systems (HVAC, fire 
protection, life safety, etc.) or the building 
occupants under normal building operation. 

Some efforts to protect the building from a 
CBR attack could have adverse effects on 
the building's indoor environmental quality. 
This can result in higher levels of illness 
among building occupants, much like “sick” 
building situations or long distance air 
travel. 

Building owners and managers should 
understand how the building systems 
operate and assess the impact of security 
measures on those systems. 

IG VIII-C-43 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-59 


Things to Do 

• Have a current emergency plan that addresses 
CBR concerns 
. Exercise plan 
. Revise plan based upon lessons learned 
• Understand your HVAC building vulnerabilities 
• Conduct periodic walk-through of system for 
evidence of irregularities or tampering
• Recognize that there are fundamental 
differences among various CBR events
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-59 

VISUAL VIII-C-60 


Summary 

• CBR threats are real and growing. 
• Industrial chemicals are readily available. 
• Military chemicals require specialty expertise. 
• Most buildings provide a reasonable level of 
protection. 
• Inside versus outside building release determines 
evacuation and other reaction decisions. 
• Develop an emergency plan and ensure it works. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-60 

Things to Do 

Facilities managers should have a current 
emergency plan that addresses chemical, 
biological, and radiological (CBR) attacks, 
know their building HVAC system 
vulnerabilities, and conduct periodic walkthrough 
inspections of the systems for 
evidence of irregularities or tampering. 

Individuals developing emergency plans and 
procedures should recognize that there are 
fundamental differences among various 
CBR agents. 

Summary 

• CBR threats are real and growing. 
• Industrial chemicals are readily available. 
• Military chemicals require specialty 
expertise. 
• Most buildings provide a reasonable level 
of protection. 
• Inside versus outside building release 
determines evacuation decision. 
Bottomline: Develop an emergency plan for 
CBR attacks, knowing what actions will be 
taken, exercise the capability and ensure it 
works. 

At worst, a thorough CBR analysis of 
HVAC systems will result in good 
recommendations for energy conservation 
and proper system maintenance. 

IG VIII-C-44 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL VIII-C-61 


Unit VIII Case Study Activity 

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

Background 

Purpose of activity: check on learning about the nature of 
chemical, biological, and radiological agents 

Requirements 

• Refer to Case Study and FEMA 426 
• Answer worksheet questions 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-TUnit VIII-C-61 

Refer participants to FEMA 426 and the Unit 
VIII Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 

Members of the instructor staff should be 
available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 

At the end of 10 minutes, reconvene the class 
and facilitate group reporting. 

Student Activity 

This activity provides a check on learning 
about the nature of chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents. 

Activity Requirements 

Working in your small groups, refer to the 
CI/BC Case Study and FEMA 426 to 
answer the worksheet questions. 

Take 10 minutes to complete this activity. 
Solutions will be reviewed in the plenary 
group. 

Transition 

This completes the background information 
in Units I through VIII. The next three units 
will cover vulnerabilities and mitigation 
measures. 

Unit IX will cover Site and Layout Design 
Guidance. 

IG VIII-C-45 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

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IG VIII-C-46 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

UNIT VIII (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) MEASURES 
(COOP Version) 


The requirements in this unit’s activity are intended to provide a check on learning about the 
nature of chemical, biological, and radiological agents and associated mitigation measures. 

Requirements 

1. Identify the prevalent CBR threat(s) that exist and/or are identified as the Design Basis 
Threat in the Case Study. 
Appendix C: Cooperville Information / Business Center 

Design Basis Threat 

Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank 
farm, small quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat 
materials (chlorine). 

Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by 
spray mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft around metropolitan 
area. 

Radiological: Small “dirty” bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the 
CI/BC building. 

Other: 

Chemical: 1) There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near 
proximity to the CI/BC building. The vast majority are small 
generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and other commercial 
businesses. 

2) CI/BC is surrounded by a number of commercial activities and key 
national critical infrastructure to include Hazardous Material 
(HazMat) facilities, HazMat being transported on the roads and 
rails, a nearby fuel tank farm, and an airport. 

3) There are two large manufacturing plants with large quantities of 
hazardous materials stored on site within 2 miles of the CI/BC 
Headquarters, one to the north and the other to the southwest. In 
addition, there are more than a dozen Tier II HazMat facilities 
within 3 miles of the building (in all directions) 

4) Approximately 5,000 trucks per day pass the CI/BC office on the 
nearby interstate highway. About 30 percent of these trucks (1,500 
trucks/day) carry placards indicating that HazMat is aboard, but 
only about 5 percent (250 trucks/day) carry sufficient HazMat to 
warrant placarding. 

5) Approximately 50 percent of the HazMat passing the CI/BC office is 
Class 3 (flammable and combustible liquids). Class 2 (gases) and 

IG VIII-C-47 



Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

Class 8 (corrosives) each constitute about 15 percent. 
Approximately 10 percent of the trucks carry more than one class of 
HazMat. 

6) It is estimated that approximately 10,000 railcars of HazMat move 
through this area each year. Hazardous materials range from liquid 
petroleum products to chlorine to anhydrous ammonia. 

7) A leg of the Piedmont Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) runs underneath the 
office park in the vicinity of CI/BC Headquarters. Part of Piedmont’s 
regional network, this portion of the pipeline normally carries a variety 
of refined products, including commercial and military jet fuels, diesel 
and three grades of gasoline, home heating fuels, etc. Four buried pipes 
carry approximately 20 million gallons per day. 

8) Connected to the pipeline, less than 1 mile from CI/BC, is a 20million gallon capacity fuel farm. Operated by the Shellexxico 
Company, this tank farm stores a variety of petroleum products, 
primarily gasoline. Thirteen tank trucks were observed leaving the 
tank farm in a 1- hour period, indicating a calculated movement 
rate of approximately 300 trucks per day (about 3 million gallons of 
fuel). 

Refer to Table 5-1 on page 5-12 of FEMA 426 and answer the following questions: 

2. What size filtration unit (MERV) is required to filter out 80 percent of Legionella and dust 
particulates (1 to 3 microns)? 12 
3. What range of MERV is required to remove 85 percent of smoke particles greater than 0.3 
micron in size? 15 or higher 
4. What mitigation measure can be used in HVAC system to destroy bacteria and viruses? 
UVGI lamps 

IG VIII-C-48