2001/08/17 - Transcript: Armitage Reaffirms U.S.-Australian Ties

Following is a transcript of the event:

(begin transcript)

Media Roundtable
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
U.S. Consulate General Sydney, Australia August 17, 2001

(Begin transcript)

Q: What are the essential principles or values of the alliance? As I understand it, you see [inaudible] these alliances going around and you see them as involving the quite fundamental choices and fundamental obligations of the countries involved, I wonder whether you can articulate? You mentioned this in your speech last night.

A: My own view is that we have had a very successful alliance of 50 years. I am not sure all our friends here in Australia understand the significance of an alliance to Americans. It's not a matter of political convenience or economic interaction, although some of that, inevitably. But for us, an alliance is an obligation, if necessary, to fight and die for each other. That's what it means. That's why an alliance is submitted to the U.S. Congress. It has to be debated. Because we're talking about, for the U.S. side, our sons and daughters fighting and dying if Australia comes under attack. And by the way, we're talking about Australian sons and daughters who would be willing to sacrifice their lives to help defend the United States. That's what an alliance means. But when you think about it in those terms -- I don't think many of us have very often -- but when we think about it in those terms, you realize that this is a very special, and indeed, potent confidence-building measure. I think that as we go into this new millennium, certainly for the first 50 years -- my crystal ball is a little cloudy after that but, for the first 50 years or so -- it seems to me we are ideally placed as nations to keep a firm hand on the tiller of our fates for our nations and for our peoples. We are democracies. We embrace free trade. We embrace human rights, respect for human dignity. We very often cooperate together. Occasionally we disagree, thank God for that. The United States can use the advice. This is not our neighborhood; it's yours. We need to have a robust dialogue with Australians to help guide us and, we hope, help guide you into this new millennium.

Q: There has been some talk recently about taking the alliances that the United States has in the region perhaps a step further, in consolidating perhaps more of an alliance between Australia, Japan, South Korea and the United States. China criticizes this as a creation of an East Asian NATO. What are your views on that?

ARMITAGE: I am completely uninformed about the quadripartite nature of the discussions you just mentioned. I saw that during the ANZUS talks, some discussion about the possibility of more robust relationship among Japan, Australia and the United States. I've noted that Australia has a very close, and primarily political and economical relationship, with Japan. The United States has a very close economic, political, military, and security relationship with Japan. It seems to me we are all democracies and we are all concerned with the fate of Asia. It seems to me a perfectly reasonable proposition that all get together and talk. Any talk -- and if we can do it tripartite way -- the United States is 100% willing to take part.

But I know you try to seek the views of your own Government and certainly our Japanese friends have their own views on this, but I suspect it is a very reasonable endeavor.

Q: Can I ask you about the possibility of a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Australia?

A: First of all, for the United States, our biggest emphasis -- I think it's in everyone's interest, by the way -- is to get what we call trade promotion authority, which has in the past been called fast track authority. This, I believe, is in every free trader's interest. It seems if we can get that TPA there should be absolutely no question of the willingness of our nations to agree to embark on a search for a free trade agreement. We have, I think, the duty to acknowledge that for me, the United States agricultural sector is a very vibrant part of our political discussion and economic discussions. That's exactly mirrored here in Australia, and we've got to understand that there are some tricky issues to be negotiated very skillfully by people who keep the interest of their countries foremost in their minds. Having said that, I would hope very strongly that we would be able to have such an agreement sometime.

Q: Will you be discussing that with the Prime Minister tomorrow?

A: Well, I am going to talk primarily about what the Bush administration is up to and what he will find when we're proud to be able to receive him in Washington. I suspect the Prime Minister will raise the free trade agreement and he will certainly get an open ear from me. I am very encouraged by the possibility of such a thing.

Q: Will you be raising it in the decision to purchase a European helicopter instead of an American helicopter?

A: First of all, I don't think that is something I would raise with Prime Minister. I am honored to be able to see him.

I know he has been out on a tough campaign trip. I think he is in Adelaide, someone told me recently, and just back. So I'm just honored to be able to see him and see how he is getting on, and to get his views, of most importantly, his recent discussions with Megawati, and see how he sees things in his neighborhood. Beyond that, I think I will speak to the Prime Minister about what I will speak to him about before I speak to you.

Q: Can I ask you, is the issue of the helicopters a problem?

A: I have to get to the bottom of it myself. I did note that there is a decision to buy European helicopters. I assume it was made for all the great and good reasons. I would note that the United States has a very robust military sales relationship with Australia. I think I heard both the Government and the Opposition talking about the need to be very interoperable as we move into the future. So it leads me to the conclusion that there is no - as you would say here, no worries mate

Q: On the free trade agreement, will [inaudible] if the lamb issue isn't solved [inaudible] to get a real free trade agreement? Or will is just be a pretend one?

A: Well, the short answer to that would be, of course. The longer answer would be, it seems to me, that there is every possibility of getting an agreement on lamb before we have to have any formal mechanisms kick in. From our part, it is not the main focus of a State Department official, but it is certainly something we're interested in, and our whole emphasis will be to try to get a solution before we have to do anything formal, before anything formal is enacted, and, I have every confidence that both sides are intent on doing just that.

Q: When you were in Australia last time you made a statement -- I think it was 1999 -- you made a statement that if there were trouble in the Taiwan Strait, Australia would be expected to involve itself --

A: I think it was a little more in-depth statement than that. It had to do with if the United States was involved in a military conflict.

Q: -- that Australia would be expected to play its part. Since then Alexander Downer has said that you made that comment when you were, in our sense, in opposition. Would you still make that comment now you are back in the Administration?

A: I would make a slightly different comment; I don't think it's changed the thrust. The comment would be that it would only be fair to bring up this comment if you recall what was about to happen immediately after I left Sydney. You were about to receive a visit by President Jiang Zemin. The United States' main effort -- and this is bipartisan in the United States -- has been to prevent conflict in the Taiwan Straits. Our overwhelming concern is for resolution of this question peacefully. How it is resolved is less important to us than that it is resolved peacefully. Jiang Zemin came and the Government raised, I am given to understand, in very direct terms, privately with the Chinese, the Australian view that a peaceful resolution of the question was absolutely essential. So first of all, I consider my mission a success. Second of all, it is very hard for me, beyond that, to imagine the United States would be involved militarily in this region in some conflict that wouldn't actually be seen as also acting in Australia's interest. I just can't imagine it. And if that is the case, then by the way, I can't imagine, great events in our time taking place without an Australian participation at some level. Now, if the Australian Government made a decision -- in the terrible event the United States was involved in a conflict -- that it was not in their interest to participate at some level, then we would have to take a look at where we are after the dust had settled. But as I say, I think the overwhelming view from the United States is that it is hard to imagine a military action of any sort here by the United States, which wouldn't, in large measure, also be in Australia's interest.

Q: You are probably aware that there has been some controversy about the Collins Class subs. But sections of the U.S. Navy think they perform extremely well as conventional subs in shallower water, rather than the U.S. Navy's nuclear subs in deeper water. If there were any trouble in the Taiwan Strait, the Collins Class subs, once they come up to speed, would be an important part of the combined force possibly, do you think?

A: Well, we've got to get the Collins Class subs up and running with their combat suites operating, and command control all squared away, and all of those things.

Those are not decisions that you ought to ask a civilian. I think those are things you need to ask a military officer -- particularly in this case, Admiral Barrie -- what the capabilities would be. My own view is, to the extent the United States and Australia, and other like-minded friends, are very concerned with preventing conflict in Asia, then we will have to be discussing what assets, and Australia may be involved in some hypothetical situation. That's what we want to concentrate on. It's what we wanted to concentrate on in 1999. I can see for myself by saying I think we were successful. Australia stood up very, as I understand, very well with the Chinese and made it very clear that a peaceful resolution was in everybody's interest. It was my very deep hope at the time and I am delighted to see it was fulfilled.

Q: Where do you see the level of threat across the Taiwan Straits is at the moment?

Q: Can I ask one more question about the helicopters? Did you raise that with anyone in the Government over the last two days? Do you see a difference in Australia opting for American systems for our submarines in the interest of interoperability and buying helicopters that are not American?

A: My discussions with government officials -- I'm here primarily as a private citizen. I'm here in that capacity. I didn't come on some mission for my government. I had discussions with both Opposition and sitting Government members about the issue. But they were not in depth, and they were not very heavy. Now the second part of your question was?

Q: When we opted for the American arms systems for the submarines in the interest of interoperability with the American armed services, [inaudible] argue that the same should apply with the helicopters?

A: My personal view -- and my strong personal view -- is that, to the extent possible, meeting your own Government's responsibilities for fiscal prudence, then you ought to stay as interoperable with the United States as possible. That would be my strong hope, and I'm going to do everything in the Department of State that's reasonable and legal to make access to technology for our Australian friends as ready as possible. But I must say, I don't think I would equate helicopters with submarines. I'd say if you looked at your force structure, it's overwhelmingly U.S. If we do our job in the United States and if it's the people's and the Government of Australia's desire to stay closely linked with us militarily, then that will continue to be the case. The force structure will have a very large U.S. content. Particularly in those items that are really force-multipliers, such as command and control and communications; battlefield management, battle space management, and all of those things.

Q: How are you seeing the situation in the Korean peninsula, say, over the last 12 months, with the change of administration?

A: I guess I'd say it's relatively stagnant. We've just announced another big shipment of food to the North Koreans. We sincerely hope that Kim Jong-Il would reciprocate the grand gesture of Kim Dae Jung and travel to Seoul and have a visit. I think it would help in some small degree to open his eyes. But I think, in military terms, there haven't been the incursions that have been so frequent in the past. The level of rhetoric that the sides trade back and forth with some regularity seems to be down to a more manageable and harmonious level. We have expressed, from the United States' point of view, a willingness to engage anyplace, anytime [inaudible]. They haven't chosen to find that acceptable as yet, but our offer stays on the table. We have no preconditions. We'll let it sit there. For us, the question of North Korea is one that primarily is management of our excellent relationship with the Republic of Korea.

Q: Research by the Peer Research Group in Europe claims to find that seventy percent of Europeans think the Bush Administration is unilateralist. Guilty as charged?

A: I noted that seventy percent of Europeans -- seventy percent of Europeans in four countries who were interviewed, to be more exact -- don't vote in U.S. elections, while sixty percent of our population, the day before our President went on vacation, found him to be doing a very good job. By the way, that's the poll that matters. I think the Europeans found several of the actions of the United States in the initial months of the Administration to be, in their view, unilateral. I have already expressed publicly my view. I think our decisions were correct, whether it was on BWC or Kyoto or, for that matter, the ABM Treaty. Perhaps the manner in which we approached this was lacking. I think we'll get better about that. So I reject the unilateralist tag. It's a caricature, and like most caricatures, it's exaggerated for effect.

Q: Let's go back to the Korean Peninsula. How long are you willing to wait? Next month you have your trilateral meeting in Tokyo. What is the position that the United States will take to that with regards to North Korea? What is the next step?

A: We'll just compare notes on where we are. We're not in a hurry. Our people are not starving, they're not desperate. We've made our offer. We're ready to engage without preconditions. We will listen to the Japanese view very carefully. We will listen to the Republic of Korea's view very carefully. I think one thing has been very beneficial from our point of view, out of this whole process regarding North Korea. There was even a time when Japan and the Republic of Korea were having some difficulties about historic neuralgia, that in the TCOG process, or the Trilateral Coordinating Group process, that we've been able to not only work together, but benefit from each other's views. I find that a pretty good state of play. I don't think I'm going to lay out publicly what were going to be talking about to allies.

Q: The strong indications from the Bush Administration appear to be that it's prepared only to wade ankle-deep into the Middle East crisis. I'm just wondering when, and under what circumstances, you would see the Administration lifting its [inaudible]?

A: Obviously, you would expect me to push back a little bit on the question of an "ankle-deep" wading into the Middle East morass. It seems to me, as far as I'm informed, that the only two plans out are there are Mitchell for peace, and the George Tenet plan for security. By the way, those are both Americans. It's been the Secretary of State of the United States, Colin Powell, who's been involved on a daily basis, not only with Mr. Sharon and Mr. Arafat, but with Middle Eastern leaders, European leaders, Kofi Annan, Mr. Solana, who is the EU representative, on a daily basis, as we search for peace. One thing I think we've all learned -- and you don't have to be a Middle East negotiator to take this lesson home -- is that you can't want peace more than two parties want peace. We will hopefully not miss an opportunity to exploit any sign of a willingness to have a lessening of the violence, to try to inject some positive movement into what is a very tragic situation. So it's a little more than ankle-deep. If you really think about it, what does Mr. Clinton think about having spent the waning days of his presidency locked at Camp David to no effect? Or Ehud Barak, who found himself losing and election because of it? Or four prime ministers of Israel, who in recent years have been perplexed by the search for peace? It's not an easily solved issue. It has confronted and confounded American presidents. It has confronted and confounded successive leaders in Israel. When the opportunity is right, we'll try to seize it. To describe it right now, I'm incapable, what exactly would be the right moment.

Q: As you'll be aware, in the recent Tandem Thrust exercises, Canadians came out with the U.S. and of course, the Australians. New Zealand was not there. Is there any prospect of New Zealand coming back into training with the U.S. while it continues to effectively bar U.S. ship visits? Is there any likelihood of change in Washington about that?

A: No.

Q: As you know, the Labor Party has had some reservations about missile defense. And although it agrees with the concept of a free trade agreement with the U.S., it has reservations there as well. You've had opportunities to talk to some Labor people in the last few days. What's your view, in the event that Labor should win election, of the future course of relations between the U.S. and Australia?

A: Let me give what I believe is a historical perspective. In 1983, there was an election here in Australia. Mr. Hawke and his colleagues were voted in. Many of us in the United States were frightened to death. We didn't know the Hawke government. We didn't know these people from Labor. We'd had a very good relationship with the previous government. When I say we were frightened to death, it's a bit hyperbolic, but we were nervous. How much things have changed in the intervening eighteen years. Opposition and the Government, they are all very well known to us. I think, whether we are Democrats or Republicans, the American side, we are much better known to the Australian side. One of the most comforting things about that is, it really doesn't matter, does it? It really doesn't matter who's in charge. The relationship has an intrinsic value that transcends, at least for the United States, political parties. And I believe, in large measure, transcends your parties here in Australia. The fact that we now know each other through such things as the AALD [Australian American Leadership Dialogue] is a major plus, and much more of an upside than I had anticipated when I began my process in this AALD nine years ago.

Q: We've seen much more engagement by the U.S. with India. To what extent should we interpret that as an attempt to establish a strategic counterweight to China?

A: You should put zero value on that. I think whenever you try to establish a relationship with a country, which is based on a third country, then you're doomed to failure. It's not a sustainable relationship. It's not a credible relationship. It's not something you can build on. We want a relationship with India for the following reasons. It would be unnatural for the world's oldest democracy to not have a more reasonable, in fact robust, relationship with the world's largest democracy, India. It would be unreasonable for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic federation like the United States not to have a more robust relationship with a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic federation like India. We've got everything going for it. In addition, for the United States, we have a very vibrant and active Indian-American population, very high-tech oriented, very organized, very politically astute. They've become a very helpful and new factor in American politics. India is a nuclear power. There are a lot of reasons we ought to engage with India, and we're going to. None of them are China.

Q: So the sanctions will come off soon?

A: In our system, it's not just a matter for the President to decide. It will be something that we'll consult with Congress. I've begun the consultations along with some of my colleagues. With the advice of Congress, they'll be coming off; this is some of the sanctions. I won't bore you to tears with the length and breadth and depth of the sanctions that apply, particularly to Pakistan, but certainly the post-May '98 nuclear detonations sanctions would be the first to go. We are looking forward, hopefully, to a meeting between our President and the Prime Minister of India at UNGA in New York. Beyond that, we'll have a series of meetings and exchanges and hopefully positive developments in our relationship. I just came from lunch with one of the excellent Members of the U.S. Congress. We have three excellent -- by the way, Republican -- Congressmen who are here with this delegation. Jim Kolbe, who is one of the most dedicated Members of Congress, just mentioned at lunch with Trade Minister Vaile that there are over 200 U.S. House Members in the India caucus. It's pretty amazing, isn't it? Two hundred. That's quite a center of gravity.

Q: Can your [inaudible] also apply to Pakistan?

A: I think they can. We have some similar sanctions on Pakistan and some different, because Pakistan is not a democracy. When Musharraf did away with the democratic process, no matter how shaky it was, then some other sanctions came into play. But clearly we have to move somewhere with Pakistan. The United States is not interested in Pakistan becoming more under the influence of Afghanistan. There has to be a way out for Pakistan. We're going to try to play an effective role.

Q: You indicated some enthusiasm for the possible trilateral security between Australia, Japan and the U.S. Is that [inaudible] Japan will take a more active role in security in the region?

A: That depends on how you define security. I'll be more explicit. If I answered that with a yes, people would be running for the shelters. It depends on what sort of active role. We are very interested in having a Japan, which, no matter its economic stagnation now, is still one of the few countries that is truly interested and has interests globally. They have interests and a global view. It's very important to have as a partner someone who has the ability to discuss things on a global basis, and Japan is that. We are very interested that Japan takes an appropriate role in peacekeeping endeavors and things of that nature. To that end, we would be encouraging a more robust role. But I think what we're really interested in is a Japan that is able to cooperate more fully with the United States in our alliance. It an inescapable fact that our access to Japanese bases is what allows the United States to effect security cooperation throughout all this region and all the way up to Kuwait in the Persian Gulf. It is access that Japan gives the United States. When you think about it in those terms, you realize how fundamentally important the Japanese relationship is to the United States, and how strongly we're going to do our part to try to support Prime Minister Koizumi in the monumental task of reforming the structure, so that Japan can play a regional and global role that's appropriate. And one that's also comfortable to all of the region.

Q: Is there any thought to lessening the points of friction, such as Okinawa, where there are large numbers of U.S. troops in a fairly small island chain? Maybe relocating some of those forces?

A: In the first instance, we are recognizing, through this [inaudible] process, that to have an airfield right in the center of a city in Okinawa is no longer appropriate. It's an accident waiting to happen. So in the first instance, we are desirous of moving to the north of Okinawa, which is relatively unpopulated, only about 200,000 people in the entire region. We believe such a move could have economic benefits to what is a relatively undeveloped area, and certainly could have military activities and operations and training outside of areas that are inhabited. That's the first step we're taking. Second, notwithstanding what I think are extraordinarily regrettable -- and in the most recent case, heinous crimes by U.S. servicemen -- the behavior of U.S. servicemen has been not only relatively good, it's been very good. It has been recognized by Governor [inaudible] and others as having not only improved over the years, but gotten markedly better. We have to continue that and we can't slack off. Third, I think it is very much in our interest, and we believe in the regional interest, to have a little more diversification -- and I don't mean forward bases in a lot more countries -- but perhaps the ability to operate in and out of places. I think over time that the United States will be looking for opportunities, but in a very general, and perhaps even subtle way. I see you smile when I mention subtlety; it's not our strong point [laughter].

Q: Is there any thought about greater base access in Australia?

A: No. Not that I'm aware of, I don't think so.

Q: In China, the U.S. congressmen who just visited there are calling on Washington to consider sanctions of the sale of missile components and technology to Pakistan. What's the position of the State Department?

A: We follow pretty closely the provision of technology to Pakistan, and by the way, to Iraq and other places. If we can determine that these are matters that the government is witting of, then there are strong possibilities of sanctions, and they are provided for already in the law. If, on the other hand, these are private companies, then our business is to bring this to the attention of the Chinese authorities and watch carefully how they respond. In some cases, we've had actually a fair response from the Chinese government, when we brought them inescapable, incontrovertible evidence of private companies engaged in activities, which they shouldn't, for instance, in Iraq.

Q: [inaudible]

A: I don't know to which you're referring. Was this Senator Biden and his group?

Q: [inaduble] a Washington Times story.

A: I'll have to see the story.

Q: On China generally, what do you think are the likely prospects of greater freedom opening up for the Chinese as a consequence of economic development? Do you think generational change is going to produce greater political space in China?

A: Clearly generational change will be a big factor in how it comes out. I noticed through the EP-3 incident recently that the Internet chatter in China was much more robust than I had expected. It was actually full of a lot of questions -- not full, but there were many references to questions about their own government's version of the events. Which indicates to me that there is a lot of information flowing back and forth. It seems to me that it's tough to put that kind of thing back in the bottle once the genie is out. So I think it will be a positive force. Now there is one thing, and I think all societies to a greater or lesser extent have to come to grips with, and that's intergenerational conflict. I don't mean active fighting conflict, but strong differences of opinion. China, like all of us, has a very large aging population. They are soon to have over 300 million over 65 years of age in China. Their views and their needs, and how those are prioritizing its needs of the younger generation are something that Chinese society is going to have to work out. That's the one thing out there that makes it difficult to make a full prognostication on which way generational change will come out. I think on balance, it's going to be positive.

Q: Is there a concern in Washington for the detained aid workers in Afghanistan? Could this influence U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in the future?

A: Of course. Obviously, when a nation doesn't give consular access, etc., of course it could have an effect. But you have to be beyond that. I think any American official has to note that there are several unique features of Afghanistan. The United States Government just made a decision recently to provide $124 million more in assistance to feed the refugees who are victims of mismanagement and bad government of the Taliban. Four million people moving around in Afghanistan, pushing up, in some cases, against Pakistan. So there is a very robust U.S. aid mission. That is not going to change. Food is not a weapon, at least as far as President Bush is concerned. Food is something to be used only to alleviate suffering. The Taliban itself -- it's very difficult to figure out what to do with a regime that, in a very real way, is self-sanctioning. What are you going to do that they haven't done to themselves? So the short answer is, of course, if this drags on much longer, it will have an effect on our views of the Taliban. On the other hand, what to do about it something I'm not prepared or able, at this point, to say.

Q: How do you see the current state of U.S.-Indonesian relationships after the change of government?

A: After having said to you that subtlety is not our long suit, I was glad that we resisted our impulse to interfere. As I think I said not too long ago, we followed the Hippocratic oath, which is to do no harm. We are pleased with the peaceful resolution of the question, and quite admiring of the political skill of Mrs. Megawati as she made this transition. We think, by and large, as we understand them, the cabinet selections are good. Following in the wake of your Prime Minister's excellent visit to Indonesia, our U.S. trade rep, Bob Zoellick, was our first official to go. Deliberately, because we want to make the point that there is an economic role that the United States can play, and we are intent on playing it. I think right now we are in pretty good shape. But there are some difficult issues. We are, as is Australia, keen doing our part to maintain the territorial integrity of Indonesia. At the same time, like Australia, we are very concerned with the possibility of human rights abuses, and return to even greater levels of violence. So this is going to be quite a balancing act for sometime to come. But right now we are pretty pleased with where we are.

Q: There are some moves in Asia to establish what some see as an Asian monetary fund, especially with the swap arrangements between central banks. Down the road, perhaps, it could be an Asian version of the IMF. I'm just wondering if Washington has any views on that?

A: I wouldn't consider myself an expert, but it doesn't seem to me to be a bad idea. I don't know that we have right now the excess capital floating around to bring such an idea into fruition. At one time, right after the 1997 devaluation of the Thai baht, followed by the crash of the Republic of Korean wan, there were some discussions, I think primarily from Japan, about having some sort of Asian bank. But it never got very much off the ground. At the time, I think that the U.S. administration was kind of negative on the idea. I would suggest that this administration thinks that there is plenty of work for everyone, and anyone who's got a good idea is welcome to the table, to include monetary ideas, or more to the point, access to funds.

Q: The man who ran against your president didn't have a very good relationship with Malaysia, an important country to us. Is there any chance of an improved U.S.-Malaysian relationship?

A: We certainly hope so. It's a slow and long process. At one time, we were on our way to a rather good relationship with Dr. Mahathir. He actually visited the Pentagon, something that our then-State Department officials thought would never happen. He came, and he stayed for several hours and we had quite a time with him. I don't suggest that we have any ability to get back to that situation. Out of the terrible trauma of Indonesia has been the opening of an ability for us to actually talk with Malaysia again, because they have some refugee concerns that we've got, and you certainly do. We're using it to involve ourselves with Malaysia a little bit, carefully. Some of our industrial leaders have recently visited KL, and were well treated and well received. The excellent Malaysian envoy searching for a solution to the problems of Myanmar, Ambassador [inaudible] -- he's a UN employee but he's very closely involved with the government -- is someone with whom we stay in very close touch. We find him an excellent diplomat and excellent envoy. We want to be as supportive of his efforts as possible, and we hope that this is understood in KL. We think it is.

Thank you very much.

(end transcript)