Part 4

National Park Ideas

Economic Aspirations and the Politics of National Park Creation in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 1919–1929

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Abstract

The twentieth-century history of Jackson Hole provides an opportunity to explore the development of modern tourism, the creation of a national park and its resulting impact, and conflicts between locals and outsiders over economic and environmental issues. These themes are highlighted by a short settled history and geographic isolation that made Jackson Hole a cohesive place long before its political organization as Teton County. The Tetons themselves serve as an excellent example of the commodification of a monumental western landscape transformed into an iconographic beacon for tourists worldwide. The town of Jackson, which grew from a struggling agrarian hamlet to an international tourist mecca in a matter of decades, provides a unique case study of the development of a national park "gateway" and skiing destination. It has separate significance as a largely artificial creation of eastern capital, a stage set masquerading as the "Last of the Old West."

This paper examines the public debate that led to the creation of the first small Grand Teton National Park in 1929. The paper focuses less on political wrangling than on the socioeconomic implications of park creation. More specifically, it examines how valley residents changed from vociferous park opponents to enthusiastic boosters due to economic conditions and changing local perceptions of tourism as a legitimate and sustainable method of economic survival. As the ranching economy of Jackson Hole faltered, tourism became a necessary source of income. This meant that the creation of Grand Teton National Park, initially viewed as a threat to local development, became the valley's best hope for survival.

Today, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, is one of the most famous and exclusive tourist destinations in the West. The Tetons, looming on the west side of the valley and reflected in a chain of mirror-like lakes, have become internationally known icons of the region. Celebrities maintain homes in the valley, and local government officials struggle with congestion, pollution, development, and a real estate market that has made home ownership increasingly unattainable for all but the most affluent. Seven decades ago, however, such a future could not have seemed more improbable. The story of this transformation, and the national park that precipitated it, illuminate local and regional perspectives on the politics of national park creation and the economics of tourism. More fundamentally, the saga of Jackson Hole provides an

excellent case study of the touristic commodification of the scenic West, and the far-reaching changes this process wrought.

In the 1920s, Jackson Hole remained scarcely populated and little visited. Locals suffered through a severe depression, their agricultural economy shattered by a combination of economic and environmental factors. Valley residents also had to cope with a contentious debate concerning the legal status of the Tetons, the mountains that towered on the west side of the Hole. Some, worried that the Tetons could be marred by overdevelopment, felt that the range should receive national park status, either as an annex of Yellowstone or as a new national park. Others felt that the mountains were sufficiently protected as part of Teton National Forest, and that national park status would end grazing and timbering in the range. When the national park debate began in 1919, most locals opposed the national park idea. By 1929, they embraced it. This reversal resulted from a combination of economic, environmental, and political factors.

Most fundamentally, however, locals ultimately supported the creation of Grand Teton National Park because they realized that their old dreams of ranching success could not be fulfilled. Instead, they found themselves resorting to tourism, an economic activity they promoted with ambivalence.

The settled history of Jackson Hole is short, even by Wyoming standards. For most of the nineteenth century the valley lay empty, visited only by Native American hunting parties and fur trappers, who left a legacy of names on the land. The first permanent white settlers did not appear until 1884. The first cattle, 100 head, arrived the same year, and wintered on wild grasses.[1] The simultaneous arrival of humans and cattle was a portent, for ranching would serve as the predominant economic activity in Jackson Hole for the first forty years of its settled history. With ample alpine grazing lands, reliable streams and rivers, and a modicum of annual rainfall, Jackson Hole seemed excellent ranching country. The number of cattle increased only incrementally until 1906, but then grew rapidly. By 1917, approximately 14,000 head of cattle grazed in the valley. Unfortunately for cattlemen, this represented their high tide. Only 8,000 would remain by 1931.[2]

Despite such a seemingly promising setting, ranches struggled to survive. The isolation imposed by the Tetons proved an insurmountable obstacle. Everything had to traverse Teton Pass to reach the railroad and larger towns to the west. All the necessities of ranch life and operation had to be hauled over the pass, and locally produced goods had to cross the mountains to reach markets far from the valley. This not only added expense, but made the shipment of anything other than live cattle difficult. The lengthy transportation time largely precluded the production and marketing of perishable goods like butchered meat, milk, and cheese. Moreover, the fertile guise of Jackson Hole belied a valley floor composed of coarse, stony glacial sediments. The porous soil contained few nutrients, and allowed rainfall to rapidly percolate deep underground.[3]

Climate compounded difficulties imposed by geography and geology. Temperatures varied wildly, resulting in short and unpredictable growing seasons.

For example, from 1920 to 1930, temperatures ranged from a high of 88 degrees to a low of -52 degrees.[4] At Moran, a settlement in the northern portion of Jackson Hole, the average date of the last killing spring frost fell on 18 July, while the average first killing fall frost occurred 12 August.[5] Rainfall, most of which actually fell as snow, normally totaled less than 22 inches a year.[6] The short growing seasons and subhumid conditions effectively limited agricultural production in the region to the growing of hay for winter forage. These environmental stresses led ranchers to try to obtain additional income from another unwieldy and sometimes unintelligent species: the Dude.

Tourism first appeared in Jackson Hole in the 1890s, in the form of a small number of wealthy hunters from the East and Europe. Locals quickly realized that outfitting and guiding hunting parties added a welcome supplementary income to their agricultural endeavors. Some hunters, like Owen Wister, author of *The Virginian*, later owned cabins or ranches in the valley.[7]

Although Jackson Hole ranchers originally dabbled in the tourist industry to serve the needs of hunters, they soon began attracting urbanites who wanted to experience daily life at a cattle ranch, and paid handsomely for it. This type of vacation seemed ideal to early-twentieth-century Americans searching for hardiness, virility, patriotism, and a reestablished bond with nature—attributes seemingly threatened by the teeming mechanized cities of the East, and purportedly endangered by immigrants and supposedly effeminate Victorian social mores.[8] The first Jackson Hole ranch designed expressly as a guest ranch appeared in 1908, when Henry Joy founded the JY Ranch on the shore of Phelps Lake. Four years later, Struthers Burt, a Philadelphia author who had been associated with Joy's endeavor, founded the Bar BC near Moose, on the west side of the Snake River.[9] Others followed soon after.

However, most ranches in Jackson Hole that took guests remained cattle ranches, focusing on beef as their primary source of income. This continuing reliance on agriculture, not tourists, had various causes. Dudes sought authenticity, and a ranch without cattle seemed hardly a ranch. For Jackson Hole ranchers, cattle had been a steady source of income since the 1880s. More fundamentally, a citizen who subsisted off of tourists instead of cattle seemed questionable. Whether due to America's longstanding glorification of agriculture or westerners' ideals of rugged independence, ranchers were loathe to admit that tourists might matter as much as cattle. Even Struthers Burt, the Philadelphian dude rancher, took great umbrage at assertions that his ranch was not "real," as when he was accused of drawing his income from tourists while a native "must look elsewhere for the larger part of his income."[10] Burt's son Nathaniel later conveyed the feelings of the period: "These were our mountains, and we gave them our names. These were our lakes, and we rode to them and swam in them at will….Dudes were allowed in as a special favor on our part. Tourists and strangers were not to be tolerated, despised on sight. The country belonged to God and us only."[11] While times were good, the residents of Jackson Hole could afford to harbor such sentiments. Locals would have to reconsider their views of tourists if the economy or climate faltered. After World War I, both would fail them.

Almost simultaneously, a conflict began over plans to include the Tetons and some portion of the valley floor within Yellowstone National Park. At the time of Yellowstone's creation in 1872, some argued for the inclusion of not only Jackson Hole and the Tetons but also the entire Wind River Range to the southeast. Proponents contended that since park animals wintered in mountain valleys to the south, it seemed logical to include their winter rangelands in Yellowstone. General Philip Sheridan supported this idea after he accompanied President Chester Arthur on a tour of the greater Yellowstone region in 1883.[12] In 1897, Colonel S. B. M. Young, acting superintendent of Yellowstone Park, argued for the same plan.[13] However, substantive attempts to expand Yellowstone or in some other way protect the Tetons and Jackson Hole did not materialize until the close of World War I. The first legislative effort to protect the Tetons began 24 April 1918, when Wyoming Congressman Frank Mondell quietly introduced a bill to include the Tetons, the glacial moraine lakes at their base, and the northern portion of Jackson Hole in an enlarged Yellowstone.[14]

Though Mondell sponsored the bill, Horace Albright and Stephen Mather had crafted it. Horace Albright, the first of these two, loomed large over not just Jackson Hole, but over national politics and dialogue for more than fifty years. Born in Owens Valley, California, Albright saw the place of his childhood engulfed by the power of Los Angeles, thirsty for water. After earning a law degree from the University of California, Albright headed east and became the protege of Stephen Mather, the first director of the National Park Service, founded in 1916. Mather, a consummate lobbyist with keen political instincts, organized an art display of western landscapes at the Smithsonian, arranged a pro-park conference, and led a gargantuan pack trip in Yosemite with influential journalists and Congressmen to secure funds for his new agency. Albright learned from his example.[15]

At first, the passage of the bill for an enlarged Yellowstone National Park seemed assured. Jackson Hole residents, preoccupied with the worldwide influenza epidemic, appeared largely unaware of the measure. However, Idaho Senator John Nugent killed the bill in February of 1919, bowing to the concerns of Idaho sheepmen who feared the loss of their grazing rights.[16] A chance to protect the Tetons without much travail had been lost. Instead, Jackson Hole would be torn by controversy for more than thirty years.

Mondell reintroduced the bill in the next session. In late summer, Albright traveled to Jackson Hole, where he spoke before a gathering of locals, primarily dude and cattle ranchers. Wyoming's Governor Robert D. Carey also attended. Albright, assuming these citizens resembled most rural westerners, promised that the expansion of Yellowstone would mean more and better roads for the area. This proved a crucial miscalculation. Dude ranchers depended on the valley's reputation as an authentic remnant of the unspoiled West. Indiscriminate road construction endangered this image.[17]

The meeting soon degenerated into a shouting match: "The crowd propounded the question, 'Who wants the extension of the park?' This question Mr. Albright endeavored to answer several times, but did not succeed in making it clear."[18]

Albright later admitted his error: "I had made a serious tactical mistake in not carefully checking the attitudes of the citizens before going to the meeting."[19] Mondell withdrew his bill, and Albright retreated to Yellowstone, inaugurating his tenure as superintendent.

Although Albright beat a hasty retreat, the battle, as far as locals were concerned, was now joined. The editorship of the *Jackson's Hole Courier*, perhaps hoping news of a Yellowstone conspiracy would sell papers, started printing above the paper's masthead: "WHO WANTS THE PARK EXTENDED?—The Unanswered Question."[20] The paper printed dire warnings of the dangers of eastern capital and federal power. Shortly after the conflict arose, the *Courier* ran an article cataloging the horrors visited upon residents in the vicinity of Colorado's Rocky Mountain National Park. The paper asserted that the park had been monopolized by eastern capital, eliminating the livelihoods of local hotel and tour operators. The article condemned Superintendent L. C. Way, who "entered into a twenty year contract with the Rocky Mountain Parks Transportation Company (representing eastern capital seeking the commercialization of our western scenery) giving them EXCLUSIVE rights to haul passengers."[21]

Another editorial condemned an individual favoring park creation for being "strongly in favor of the state ceding it [Jackson Hole] to the national government, forever, to be exploited by railroads and hotel and transportation companies."[22] The paper asserted that ranchers, innkeepers, tour guides, and dude ranchers faced economic extinction if Yellowstone absorbed the Tetons. This view, while extreme, had some basis. Park concessionaires had early gained a reputation for mercenary, monopolistic practices.[23] Struthers Burt, who later came to support the park idea, issued a blistering indictment of Yellowstone and its expansion:

> Yellowstone Park is a national park only in name; it is a farmed-out proposition, run by a corporation; and run exactly as that corporation wishes. There is just one logical reason for the extension of the park, and that reason is that it will make money for the transportation company, who will thus be enabled to increase the length of the tour of the park from three to four days longer than the present trip—the present trip having been greatly cut down by the introduction of automobiles.[24]

Anyone who did not virulently oppose the national park idea faced the wrath of the *Courier*. Sometimes this yielded unintended comic results. The paper flatteringly reported President Warren G. Harding's trip through the West in the summer of 1923. However, his sojourn in Yellowstone included a brief glimpse of the Tetons. Upon seeing this vista, Harding became an advocate of the mountains' protection. A *Courier* headline curtly reported this event: "President Harding Sees Tops of Grand Tetons. Decides 400,000 Acres Must Be Added to Yellowstone Park. Another Man for Park Extension Who Never Saw the Area."[25]

In addition to their general paranoia of eastern capital, many Jackson Hole residents, not just ranchers, exhibited another tendency still found in the West today:

a lingering aversion to tourism as a primary source of economic activity. Locals still harbored dreams of making Jackson Hole an agricultural center, or even a site for some form of industry. For example, locals reacted vehemently when an article appeared in the *New York Times* stating that Wyoming's Governor Robert D. Carey and Senator John B. Kendrick favored Yellowstone's expansion because "they know that Jackson's Hole (where snow fell this Summer on July 4th and Sept. 4th) can hardly be turned into an agricultural paradise like Central Idaho."[26] *Courier* editor Walter Perry even claimed that booming industry, not scenery, would ensure Wyoming's fame, meaning "Wyoming will not need the scraps of publicity emanating from the Yellowstone National Park."[27]

Despite ranchers' overwhelming opposition to park expansion, nature and economics soon conspired to make them reconsider their opinion. In the fall of 1919, a severe drought hit the region, making hay for winter feed both scarce and expensive. This coincided with the global collapse of the beef market after World War I. The commodity markets had soared during the war, and the federal government guaranteed high basic prices for staple goods. But, with Germany's surrender in November of 1918, these ended. Demand plummeted, and within a year prices did as well.[28] Ranchers had to pay up to fifty dollars a ton for feed, and found in the spring of 1920 that their cattle were not worth the price of the food they had consumed.[29] Plummeting prices led farmers and ranchers nationwide to produce more goods, only exacerbating the problem. This downward spiral continued through the 1920s, meaning that for many farmers and agricultural regions the Great Depression effectively began a full decade before the 1929 Wall Street crash. The agricultural depression hurt many Americans, but was especially devastating in Jackson Hole, where ranching had been a marginal enterprise in the best of times. Ranchers who ran dude operations on the side found themselves wholly dependent on their tourist income. For those worst hit, selling out to the park service suddenly seemed inestimably preferable to bankruptcy.[30]

The ranchers' difficulties rippled across the valley. The *Courier* printed notices of businesses changing hands and sales of ranching and farming equipment.[31] Ads placed by residents seeking employment and statements by local businesses politely reminding customers to pay outstanding accounts grew common.[32] More ominous portents appeared later. In the summer of 1923, the *Courier* carried an announcement for a government auction of land and possessions belonging to citizens unable to pay state and county taxes. The list included 279 individuals, families, and businesses.[33] Notices of mortgage foreclosures also appeared increasingly after this point.

As agriculture faltered, valley residents tried to attract new sources of income. Such boosterism often focused on the town of Jackson, the largest settlement in the valley, located at its southern end. Jackson incorporated in 1914, and remains the only incorporated town in the valley today. The same year had seen the founding of the Jackson State Bank by a group of prosperous settlers.[34] The bank's cashier, Harry Wagner, also served as Jackson's first mayor. Initially, the bank's assets grew fairly steadily. By 1915, the bank listed total deposits of $76,252, and $244,315 in 1920.

However, they dropped sharply after that point due to the hard economic times that gripped the valley, and did not substantially rise again until the end of the decade.[35] Despite these fluctuations, the bank helped cement Jackson's position as economic hub of the valley.

The *Jackson's Hole Courier*, founded in 1909, provided another element in the town's dominance. It served as the primary source of information in the area, and endlessly promoted the valley's scenery, society, and economic potential while reserving the limelight for the town of Jackson. Its endless boosterism for economic development of all kinds illuminates residents' hopes and dreams, but also stridently clashes with the harsh economic realities they faced.

For all of the *Courier's* efforts, new economic development happened slowly, or more often did not happen at all. Any agricultural enterprise, whether centered on crops or livestock, suffered from the unalterable climate and isolation of Jackson Hole. Even geology, which left the area with a wealth of spectacular scenery, did not provide valuable minerals or ores. Locals discovered deposits of coal and phosphate, but transporting them out of the valley proved impractical. Some coal mining did occur, but this employed only a few who supplied coal for local demand, an already small market made smaller by the abundance of readily available firewood. Prospectors even panned placer gold in the Snake River, but in such scant amounts that it did not warrant recovery efforts.[36] This undoubtedly disappointed locals, but the lack of sizable mining operations protected the Tetons from the disfiguring scars and pollution the industry left as its hallmarks in so many parts of the West.

Jackson did score a major victory when named the county seat of newly formed Teton County in 1921. Before 1921, Jackson Hole had been included in Lincoln County, leaving valley residents 180 miles north of their county seat, Kemmerer. They vocally petitioned for a better solution. Wyoming's legislature created Teton County 18 February 1921, drawing boundaries that roughly followed the outlines of the Jackson Hole watershed. After a close election, Jackson became the county seat. The same year, Jackson reelected its mayor and town council, the first entirely female city government in America. The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted suffrage to women, occurred in 1920. That same year, Jackson elected Grace Miller, wife of Jackson State Bank president Robert Miller, mayor, and Rose Crabtree, Mae Deloney, Faustina Haight, and Genevieve Van Vleck to the four seats on the town council. Jackson basked in positive media attention that presented it as a progressive, civil place, not just a county seat, but the most advanced town in "the equality state" of Wyoming.

The creation of Teton County warranted a poetic outburst in the *Courier*: "All hail Teton, county newest / Of Wyoming, favored state! All hail Teton, souls the fewest, / Starting out with cleanest slate!"[37] This trite stanza contains unintended ironies. The poem did not appear until 1923, because Teton County did not become an operating political entity until then. Lawsuits protesting the creation of the county delayed its inception for two years. The fact that the proposed county had "souls the fewest" constituted part of the problem. Teton County met neither the population

nor the economic standards required for county creation. Wyoming officials assented to the creation of what was, in truth, an illegal entity in part because Jackson Hole residents assured them that the new county would soon meet those requirements. It did not. In 1930, county population stood at 1,980 persons, well below the 3,000 persons required by the state.[38] Moreover, the state required a gross assessed taxable valuation of not less than $5 million. Teton County's assessed valuation subject to taxation did not reach even $2 million until 1931.[39] Teton County's creation, then, did not mark the triumph of prosperity and progress. It instead served as an act of political appeasement.

After the county's creation, locals focused on a new issue: the threatened destruction of the mirror-like moraine lakes at the Tetons' base. This concern has significance, for it demonstrates that Jackson Hole residents did not oppose a national park just as simple yokels in thrall to the frontier myth of endless resources and boundless development. The residents of Jackson Hole had exhibited their willingness to support conservation efforts two decades before, when they forced national action to protect one of the last large elk herds in the American Rockies. By 1885, large numbers of Yellowstone elk, cut off from their grazing areas in the Wind River mountains, wintered in Jackson Hole. They competed with cattle for winter forage, and also ate hay stored for livestock. This situation worsened as the cattle population increased. In the catastrophic winter of 1908–09, approximately 10,000 elk died of starvation, even though ranchers, who often profited from the hunting business, gave the animals what hay they could spare. Stephen Leek, one of the first full-time hunting guides, photographed grisly vistas of elk carcasses stretching to the horizon. He took the pictures east, hoping for governmental action. By 1912, a federal program commenced. The National Elk Refuge originated with 1,760 acres north of Jackson, and ultimately grew to 24,000 acres.[40] The refuge became one of the first major federal efforts to preserve not just scenery, but habitat and wildlife.[41] The refuge also signified cooperation between locals and government to protect a natural resource. Residents preserved their hunting business, and ranchers could even make a profit selling excess hay to the refuge.[42]

Dude ranchers knew that the moraine lakes, like the elk, provided natural amenities that drew tourists to the area, and many other locals appreciated the aesthetic values the lakes provided. For these reasons, out-of-state irrigation schemes engendered fearful speculation. Idaho announced its desire to draw water from the Fall River, located in the southwestern portion of Yellowstone National Park. Montana interests wished to dam Yellowstone Lake for hydroelectric power. While these plans later failed, Jackson Hole residents feared not only that they would pass, but that the extension of the park might allow similar projects on the Snake River, or on one of the moraine lakes at the base of the Tetons. Jackson Lake, the largest of these, had been dammed in 1906 and its dam enlarged in 1910, resulting in a reservoir storing water almost exclusively for the benefit of Idaho farmers downstream on the Snake.[43]

The conversion of Jackson Lake into a reservoir left it surrounded by dead,

inundated trees, and turned the Snake River into a muddy torrent during water releases. Locals complained of these results: "We…have seen and experienced the results of the damming of Jackson's lake, and the using of the Snake river for an irrigation ditch."[44] The state of Wyoming had already drawn up plans for the damming of Emma Matilda and Two Ocean lakes. Worse yet, officials of the Forest Service were considering the construction of saw mills on some of the lakes, and permitting timber companies to float logs down the Snake. The danger these and other Jackson Hole lakes faced made the park idea increasingly appealing to some residents. Struthers Burt, for example, transformed from a virulent enemy of the park service to one of its most eloquent supporters.

However, the scenic qualities of the lakes were threatened by more than just irrigation schemes. East of the lakes, new developments arose, constructed to cater to the needs of a new type of visitor: the auto tourist and auto camper. Car-bound recreation exploded in popularity nationwide as soon as cars became widely available. Auto tourists stayed in roadside cabins, while auto campers slept outdoors.

While locals normally welcomed visitation, their attitudes towards auto tourism proved complex. An anecdote told by Yellowstone Superintendent Horace Albright illuminates this ambivalence. In the 1920s, Albright often stayed at a Jackson inn operated by Rose Crabtree. On one occasion, she saw a car drive into Jackson, loaded with luggage and camping gear. Mrs. Crabtree ran out of her hotel and into the street, where she shook her fist and yelled, "There come the damn tourists!"[45]

ALBRIGHT FOUND THIS EVENT a humorous illustration of locals' contradictory attitudes, but it has a deeper meaning. Mrs. Crabtree resented the sight of that car with good reason. Locals had built guest cabins, gas stations, cafes, dance halls, and saloons east of the Tetons, particularly around the shores of the moraine lakes at their base. This tourist strip understandably upset preservationists, but also threatened tourist businesses in Jackson. The town lay several miles southeast of the central peaks of the range, and East Gros Ventre Butte, towering northwest of Jackson, blocked the Tetons from view. Hotel operators like Rose Crabtree had the most to lose. Visitors might still stop in Jackson for food or gasoline, but sought accommodations at more scenic spots. Worse yet, improving roads in Yellowstone might lead more tourists to enter Jackson Hole from the north, bypassing Jackson and other valley settlements entirely. Dude ranchers also feared the new car-bound tourists, for their presence impinged upon the rustic purity dude ranches sought to preserve, and auto campers, who camped in tents beside their cars, had no need for dude ranch accommodations.

Such concerns made their mark. While public opposition continued, some Jackson Hole residents privately decided that only some form of legal protection could preserve the Tetons, the moraine lakes, and the tourist industry that the valley increasingly depended upon. On 26 July 1923, dude ranchers Struthers Burt and Horace Carncross, cattle rancher Jack Enyon, former *Courier* editor Richard Winger, store owner Joe Jones, and affluent easterner turned Jackson Hole resident Maude Noble invited Horace Albright to Noble's cabin.[46] That evening, those assembled at the Noble cabin proposed to Albright a new plan to protect Jackson Hole, and established an alliance to further it.

All present wanted to preserve the spectacular scenery of the valley. How to best achieve this, whether through zoning, state protection, or by creation of a national park or recreation area, remained unclear.[47] Struthers Burt made the most intriguing proposal. He suggested creating a "museum on the hoof" to preserve both wilderness and culture. Habitat and wildlife would be protected as in a national park, but grazing, dude ranching, and some hunting would continue. Houses would remain log, and roads would stay unpaved. Open spaces would be kept undeveloped. The town of Jackson would be preserved and zoned to maintain a frontier ambiance.[48] Burt's proposal shared characteristics with Adirondack Park in New York, which enclosed preexisting towns within its boundaries, and also with Williamsburg, where strict zoning laws maintained a colonial atmosphere. The specific enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance remained unclear. This idea might have precluded much of the conflict that followed, as well as the unsightly sprawl that later engulfed Jackson.

However, Burt's proposal did not come to pass. Albright agreed to support it, but privately believed that only a traditional national park, with its regulations and resources, could effectively protect the area. Whenever possible, Albright continued to take influential visitors over "terrible roads" from Yellowstone south to see the Tetons, using these tours as boostering junkets to promote national park status for the range. On one of these tours, Albright convinced John D. Rockefeller Jr. to embark on a plan to aid in the creation and expansion of Grand Teton National Park. This plan, however, did not become widely known until after the creation of the park in 1929.[49]

Meanwhile, Jackson Hole's grinding economic difficulties continued. The *Courier* carried an announcement for another tax auction, and the amounts delinquent taxpayers owed had risen.[50] Bankruptcy notices appeared in almost every issue of the paper. Soon after, the newspaper announced: "No legals will be released from this office beginning August 1, until payment received. Please do no embarrass us by asking for exceptions."[51]

As the agricultural depression continued and new enterprises did not materialize, the *Courier*, in a marked change from earlier boosterism, increasingly labored to promote a more promising prospect, tourism. This marked a distinct change of tone from earlier reporting, which had dismissed those who suggested tourism might be the valley's best hope for survival. Walter D. Perry, who served as editor from 1923 to the early 1930s, proved particularly effusive, abandoning the pro-industry rhetoric he had previously employed. In one editorial, he even argued that the increased price of food caused by tourist consumption was beneficial, for it meant that farmers had more to gain by selling their goods in Jackson Hole than by shipping them to Idaho or Utah. However, Perry's conclusions proved more blunt: "Dude money, tourist money is cash. That is something worth considering. Each dude, tourist, or big game hunter who visits Jackson's Hole and finds here his ideal vacation land automatically becomes a booster, an advertiser."[52]

Some of this boosterism touted the scenery of Yellowstone National Park, but

most concerned the scenic and societal virtues of Jackson Hole itself. Articles hailed increasing visitation, as in 1924, when 600 "dudes" stayed at ranches through the course of the summer, and the valley had an estimated total visitation of 5,000 tourists, including automobile travelers and campers. However, the fact that 145,000 people visited Yellowstone the same year demonstrates that most tourists to America's oldest national park did not venture south to Jackson Hole.[53] Separated by terrible roads and little-known, Jackson Hole did not benefit from Yellowstone's visitation as it does today.

The favorable tone that now accompanied the discussion of tourism did not carry over to debates concerning national park status for the Tetons. In August 1925, the Coordinating Commission on National Parks and Forests, created by President Calvin Coolidge, held hearings in the area. Though pressured not to act by the Forest Service, which controlled the Tetons, the commission voted to advocate the creation of a separate unit of Yellowstone to protect the central Teton Range. The *Courier* printed lists of all the ranches and summer homes endangered by the proposal and protests against park extension.[54]

Despite the paper's continued opposition, an increasing number of Jackson Hole residents began to rethink their opinions. Continuing bad times forced some to accept the possibility of national park status for the Tetons, and the possible creation of a separate unit of Yellowstone or even an entirely new park made this prospect more bearable. Si Ferrin and Pierce Cunningham, two long-time ranchers, circulated a petition that ninety-seven landowners signed, and sent it to the Commission's hearings in Casper. Park proponent Richard Winger wrote the proposal, something most signatories apparently did not know. This petition publicly printed what had previously only been privately discussed. It enunciated the once unthinkable but now growing view that the destiny of Jackson Hole lay not with agriculture or industry, but tourism. The petition urged the creation of some sort of recreation area or park to protect the scenery of Jackson Hole. It went on to condemn the Forest Service for its continued attempts to promote both economic development and recreation in the Tetons: "By trying to do two things at once, with the same area, thereby trying to please those interested in stock and those interested in recreation, the Forest Service has succeeded only in making life miserable for all concerned."[55] The most revolutionary passage followed:

> We have tried ranching, stock raising, and from our experience have become of the firm belief that this region will find its highest use as a playground. That in this way it will become the greatest wealth-producing region of the State. The destiny of Jackson's Hole is as a playground, typical of the West, for the education and enjoyment of the Nation as a whole.[56]

After this point, opinions began to shift elsewhere. The *Courier* moderated its anti-park tone, printing stories without the usual editorial comment. Wyoming Congressman Charles Winter and Senator John Kendrick announced that they could support the enclosure of the Tetons in a new national park separate from

Yellowstone.[57] Not coincidentally, bad economic news continued. By July of 1927, Teton County reported a debt of $24,272.22, and the school district had to take out another in a series of loans.[58] More bankruptcy notices and reminders for payment followed.

In 1928, the Senate Committee on Public Lands held a hearing in Jackson, where they discussed park proposals and received a largely friendly reception. After committee members retired to their accommodations at the J.Y. Ranch, however, a small group demanded to meet with them. Led by Jackson's state senator William C. Deloney, the group tried to reverse the senators' pro-park stance. While they failed, they did convince the committee to support the creation of a smaller park independent of Yellowstone, consisting almost exclusively of alpine terrain and the moraine lakes at the base of the Tetons. These new boundary lines excluded Jackson Lake, pleasing purists who feared that the inclusion of a pre-existing reservoir might allow further such development in existing national parks. Furthermore, grazing and even limited timber harvesting could continue. The construction of hotels or even permanent camps was prohibited, allaying fears of dude ranchers and Jackson hotel operators. These compromises made the park acceptable to almost everyone. After all, it primarily protected bare rock lacking potential economic value. Its territory nominally protected the other moraine lakes, but meant that development could continue immediately adjacent to their eastern shores.[59] The creation of a park separate from Yellowstone meant that the new park would not be seen as an extension of Yellowstone's monopolistic transportation and hotel companies. The agreement eased tensions, but also led to the creation of what one historian condemned as "a stingy, skimpy, niggardly little park."[60]

By January of 1929, a new bill crafted through compromise and sponsored by Wyoming Senator John B. Kendrick called for the creation of a 100,000 acre park encompassing the Tetons but omitting Jackson Lake, with its western boundary at the summit of the range. Senators favorably reported the bill out of committee in exchange for a formal promise to examine Idaho's water claims in the southwestern portion of Yellowstone.[61] On 21 February 1929, Congress passed an act creating Grand Teton National Park.

Instead of the expected vituperation, the *Courier* expressed resigned optimism. Before the new park opened, the paper urged, "Jackson must be prepared to face a new condition or fade."[62] When President Herbert Hoover signed the bill creating the national park on 26 February, the *Courier* ran editorials from other Wyoming papers praising the new park's creation. Jackson Hole prepared for the park's dedication festivities, scheduled for 28 and 29 July. The newly formed Jackson's Hole Chamber of Commerce went into high gear, convincing the National Editorial Association (NEA), composed of the nation's newspaper editors, to come to the park's dedication after their annual convention, meeting that year in Cheyenne. The *Courier* later announced that the chamber planned to entertain the NEA at a Jenny Lake fish fry the evening of 28 July. The article concluded with a note from editor Walter Perry: "Alright folks, pledge your support so that this affair may go over big. It

means much toward the growth and development of the valley. In many ways it's the most important event of the season. Let's get busy."[63]

In the course of a decade, the prospect of a national park in Jackson Hole had changed from a subject of violent opposition to a reason for optimistic industriousness. Obviously, part of the moderation in tone came with the reduction of the proposed park's boundaries, and with the creation of a new park instead of a simple annexation by Yellowstone. However, the primary reason remained economic. For Teton County, what had been anathema in 1919 seemed the only hope by 1929. Dreams of industry or agribusiness had gone unfulfilled. Only the hope of tourist dollars remained.

At the dedication ceremony, held 29 July 1929 on the eastern shore of String Lake, approximately 1,000 spectators witnessed Wyoming Governor Frank C. Emerson present a spectacular "gift" to the park service and the nation. Horace Albright, recently named director of the park service, happily accepted it. Spectators heard speeches and songs, and a group of mountaineers scaled the Grand Teton, leaving at its summit a bronze tablet commemorating the occasion. Dude ranchers, politicians, journalists, preservationists, and ordinary residents all came together, forgetting, if not forgiving, the animosities of the past decade.[64]

Unfortunately, this amicability proved short-lived. The plan that Horace Albright had fomented in secrecy with John D. Rockefeller Jr. unraveled, revealing a pro-park land buy-out plan that infuriated many locals. Further in the future lay a contentious debate over the creation of Jackson Hole National Monument and the ultimate expansion of Grand Teton National Park. In addition to these local travails, residents would also have to suffer through the Great Depression and World War II along with the rest of America. Only after these ordeals ended would the citizens of Jackson Hole finally begin to enjoy increased tourist visitation, the most lasting and ultimately most influential result of Grand Teton's creation.

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The Influence of the American Concept of a National Park on Japan's National Park Movement

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Abstract

Japan's national park system was established under a strong influence of American parks. Information on establishing Yellowstone Park could have been heard of by Japanese delegates to the United States who were visiting when the park bill was signed by President Grant on March 1, 1872. However, interest in American national parks was boosted by early Japanese visitors' essays and other documents that gradually appeared in the 1890s. Among such visitors, Yoshio Kinoshita, a capable railroad manager with a background in civil engineering, viewed national parks as a potential resource to bring foreign tourists to Japan, and then to improve international understanding of Japan. He was interested in park management and supported the Japanese park movement through the Japan Tourist Bureau and its official publication. Complementing Kinoshita's realistic ideas, Tsuyoshi Tamura, a landscape architect as well as a forester, promoted national parks by stressing scenic quality and railroad access. Recognizing the fact that excluding private lands from a national park was impossible in Japan, Tamura and other park supporters adapted German land-use zoning methods in the National Park Law of 1931. Then, they determined park boundaries including private lands, though national forests and other public lands were preferred as core areas.

Introduction

The National Park Law of 1931 was successful in Japan thanks to the devoted efforts of national park supporters, many of whose overseas experiences led to an understanding of the importance of national parks. The American national parks had an especially strong influence on the establishment of their Japanese counterparts, although park promoters such as Yoshio Kinoshita and Tsuyoshi Tamura were well aware of the cultural and environmental differences between Japan and the United States, and tried hard to adjust the American idea of a park to a Japanese setting.

This paper traces the influence of the American parks on Japan's national parks movement before World War II, based on documents found in Japan and the United States. At the same time, the process of adapting the national park idea to Japan's environment is revealed. Then, characteristics of Japan's national park development will be discussed.

Establishment of Public Parks in Japan

The Meiji Restoration in 1868 opened Japan to the world, a change in policy after a long period of national isolation. The new government tried to introduce everything that was available in modern Western countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. One such desired Western facility was the public park. However, it was difficult to construct public parks in already crowded cities, and budgets were limited. Consequently, in January of 1873, the new government designated shrines, temples, and other traditional recreational areas as public parks. Since the ordinance did not distinguish city parks from other categories such as nature preserves, historic sites, or national parks, the areas designated were a mixture of various types of open space. However, it should be noted that the previous Shogun government had already protected a variety of areas. These were not only urban recreational areas intended for public enjoyment, but also de facto nature preserves intended for watershed management and other conservation purposes. These areas were later utilized as city parks or nature reserves.

In addition to these feudal regulations, Buddhism and Shintoism also played an important role in preserving the natural environment of Japan. However, although feudal governments had protected traditional scenic spots that were well known to the public, preserving nature for recreational purposes was a new idea. It therefore took a little time for the national park movement to develop, after initially supporters obtained relevant information from abroad.

The Iwakura Embassy and the Yellowstone Park Act

On December 23, 1871, the first major government mission to the United States and Europe following the Meiji Restoration was organized. It had three purposes: to pay courtesy calls to the countries that had ratified treaties with Japan; to amend the one-sided treaties that Japan had been forced to ratify in the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate; and to study everything that there was to learn about in advanced countries. The Iwakura Embassy, named after Tomomi Iwakura, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, consisted of about fifty important members of the government. It had an enormous influence on Japan's later national policy. This mission visited twelve countries over a period of one year and ten months, and returned to Japan in October 1873. During this long journey, the majority of the time was spent in the United States and the United Kingdom, revealing the mission's special interest in those countries.

Kume's detailed report[1] of the Iwakura Embassy reveals that the mission was also interested in public parks. They observed not only city parks, such as Central Park in New York City on June 10, 1872, and Boston Common in Boston on June 18, but also visited summer resorts, such as Saratoga Springs on June 15 and Niagara Falls in New York State on June 14. There is even a paragraph reporting on Yosemite Valley and the Giant Sequoias, though the mission did not have the chance to visit those areas.

Of more interest is the fact that the mission met with important figures involved

in the establishment of Yellowstone National Park when the park act was being enacted. The party arrived in Chicago on February 27, 1872, and was welcomed at the hotel by the governor of Illinois and General Philip H. Sheridan. On February 29, they finally reached Washington, D.C., and were greeted by the governor of the District of Columbia, who was Jay Cooke's brother. On March 4, President Ulysses S. Grant received Iwakura and his Embassy at the White House. On July 22, the Iwakura Mission left Washington, D.C., and visited Jay Cooke's mansion. They stayed overnight, as Jay Cooke could not return home before nightfall. The next morning, Cooke talked with the mission about the proposed transcontinental railroad to Seattle, and its influence on relations with Japan.

Thus, the mission not only arrived in Washington, D.C., on the day before the president signed the Yellowstone Park Act, but also met General Sheridan, President Grant, and Jay Cooke. Furthermore, the articles reporting the birth of Yellowstone appeared in several newspapers while the mission was staying in the United States.[2] It therefore seems quite possible that some members of the mission were well informed about Yellowstone. However, the journey through the territories of Montana and Wyoming was an exotic event for most of the Easterners, and even if mission members did hear of these things, they could not relate them to Japan. Besides, by the time that the party returned to Japan, the above-mentioned Japanese public park ordinance had already been proclaimed in early 1873, during their absence.

Early Japanese Visitors to American National Parks

The Iwakura Embassy did not leave any record of Yellowstone Park in their report, but retired General Grant visited Nikko in 1879 and suggested that the area should be protected.[3] Local people in Nikko petitioned the Imperial Diet to designate the area that included the Toshogu Shrine as an Imperial Park in 1911, when the park proposal was introduced. Nikko later became one of the first national parks in 1934, after the enactment of the National Park Law of 1931.

Reports on Yellowstone National Park were first published in Japanese in 1888, and subsequently articles on American national parks written by Japanese visitors began to appear in several magazines.[4] However, many articles were merely translations of English material, and not based on Japanese personal experience.

It is difficult to identify the first Japanese visitors to the American national parks. However, with the end of the isolationist policy many Japanese had emigrated to California, and Yosemite was one of the parks accessible to them, especially after the opening of the railroad to El Portal. For example, Zenshiro Tsuboya and Masaharu Anezaki visited Yosemite Valley in September 1907, using the Yosemite Railroad, which had been opened only a few months. Both wrote essays describing the grandeur of the Valley. Most important, Anezaki proposed the establishment of national parks in Japan from an ultra-nationalistic viewpoint.[5] Among such early Japanese visitors, Iesato Tokugawa (1863–1940) and his party are well recorded. Iesato was the legitimate successor of the last Tokugawa Shogunate, and was the speaker of the House of Peers in the Imperial Diet at that time.

Yellowstone became more accessible in 1903, when a branch line from

the Northern Pacific Railroad reached Gardiner, Montana, at the park's North Entrance, followed in 1907 by the Union Pacific branch line to West Yellowstone, at the West Entrance. Tokugawa's party arrived at the depot at West Yellowstone on the morning of July 7, 1918. They must have been on their way back to Japan following negotiations related to World War I, since they came to the United States as a mission of the Japanese Red Cross. Ninagawa,[6] one of the members of the mission, recorded the visit in a magazine and his account provides insights into the Yellowstone of those days. They spent three days in the park, enjoying fishing and swimming. J. E. Haynes, official photographer of the park, took their pictures.[7] His photographs reveal the transitional state of the park's management in 1918, with the superintendent, Chester A. Lindsley, in civilian attire, while other staff are in military uniform (Fig. 1).

Iesato Tokugawa, as the House Speaker, received the first national park proposal and petitions in 1911. His relatives were serious promoters of the conservation of historic sites and national monuments[8] and he may therefore have had some influence on the later national park movement in Japan.[9] However, records to support this have not yet been found.

Kinoshita's View of National Parks as a Railroad Manager

The above-mentioned individuals visited and enjoyed American national parks as tourists. However, Yoshio Kinoshita (1874–1923, Fig. 2), then a railroad engineer for the Ministry of Transportation, recognized the value of national parks as a tool for the promotion of international tourism and mutual understanding, from his viewpoint as a railroad manager.[10]

Figure 1. Iesato Tokugawa at Yellowstone with the superintendent, Chester A. Linsley and his staff (J. E. Haynes Collection).

Kinoshita left Japan on September 16, 1904, to study railroads and related facilities and services. After his arrival in Philadelphia early in December of that same year, he became a special student at the University of Pennsylvania, and studied traffic management under Professor Emory R. Johnson.

During the summer of 1905, he stayed at Crawford House in White Mountain, New Hampshire, and inspected the railroads in the region, including the cog rail that ran to the summit of Mt. Washington. His reminiscences reveal that while he was in the area he had the idea of establishing a national park at Mt. Fuji, funded by some of the compensation expected from a defeated Russia. He did not visit the western national parks, but his experiences in eastern resorts, such as the White Mountains, must have convinced him that a national park combined with railroad service was a powerful tool, one that could boost international tourism in Japan. In addition, he was an extensive reader, and might have read Nathaniel Langford's *The Discovery of Yellowstone Park, 1870*, or Hiram Chittenden's *The Yellowstone National Park* (fifth edition) both published in 1905.

Figure 2. Yoshio Kinoshita (Courtesy of Ms. Emiko Shingu, Daughter of Yoshio Kinoshita).

In March 1906, Kinoshita left for the United Kingdom to further study transportation. Along with his railroad study, he tried to visit as many scenic areas as possible, such as the Lake District. After visiting other European countries, he finally returned to Japan, via Siberia, on October 21, 1907, and then worked hard to improve railroad service in Japan.

Less than four years after his return, a proposal to establish a national park at Mt. Fuji was introduced to the Imperial Diet. Kinoshita was invited to attend a committee on the national park proposal in the House of Representatives, to explain the park system in the United States and Canada. His detailed lecture stressed the importance of good park management, taking advantage of his on-site experience in the United States. Thanks to his precise explanation, the proposal was adopted on March 14, 1911, and Kinoshita then dispatched letters to major American national parks, asking for detailed information on park management.

For example, the acting superintendent of Yellowstone, Colonel Lloyd M. Brett, answered Kinoshita's requests by sending the annual report and the park rules, and arranged the cooperation of F. J. Haynes and the Northern Pacific Railways.[11] These documents reveal that Kinoshita was interested in the economic benefits of national

parks and the role of railroads in introducing more foreign tourists. At that time Japan was suffering a depression, and was eager to obtain foreign exchange. One of his men recalled that they initiated a survey of the proposed Mt. Fuji National Park, although no evidence has been found of that work.

At the same time, Kinoshita recognized the importance of supplying information on Japan, to dispel hard feelings following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. In late 1911, in parallel with the national park study, he proposed the establishment of the Japan Tourist Bureau (JTB), an organization to promote international tourism and to assist foreign tourists. Established in 1912, JTB introduced a bilingual "Tourist" magazine the following year. The Japan Tourist Bureau and this magazine played an important role in promoting both the national park movement and international tourism in Japan.

A full-scale national park movement had to wait until the 1920s, when Tamura initiated a park survey. The nine-year period of stagnation after the passage of the first national park proposals in 1911 can be attributed to several causes. First, Kinoshita was occupied with railroad business after 1913, as the Director of Transportation at the Railroad Agency. For instance, he introduced around-the-world railroad tickets with the help of Thomas Cook in the United Kingdom. However, his right-hand men in JTB contributed articles on national parks to "Tourist" magazine. In 1916, JTB also hosted a lecture by Mark Daniels, the General Superintendent and Landscape Engineer for National Park in the United States, before the establishment of the National Park Service, in an effort to promote national parks in Japan. Thus, efforts to boost support for parks continued.

Second, after 1911 the government was inclined to protect historic sites and natural monuments, rather than to establish national parks.[12] Almost at the same time that the first national park proposals were discussed in the Imperial Diet, a proposal to protect historic sites and natural monuments was also under consideration. The idea had been introduced by a professor of the Imperial University, Manabu Miyoshi, who had studied botany for three years in Germany, beginning in 1891. In 1906, Germany established the National Natural Monument Protection Bureau, and its director, H. Conwentz, impressed Miyoshi with his outstanding conservation achievements. Miyoshi's idea gained the support of influential members of the House of Peers, who were concerned about the destruction of historic sites following the Meiji Restoration. Such strong support led to the enactment of the Historic Sites, Scenic Beauty and Natural Monument Preservation Law in 1919. The Division of Geography in the Minister's Secretariat of the Ministry of Home Affairs was responsible for such sites.

Third, the Forest Law of 1897 already provided some protection for twelve types of Protected Forest, including scenic protection. About 20 percent of the Protected Forests were private forests. Furthermore, the Forestry Bureau started to designate Preservation Forests within the national forests, based on scientific and cultural considerations. Thus, some of the likely national park areas were already under protection after 1897. This regulation seems to have acted as the reasonable excuse to shelve the national park proposals until the passage of the Historic Sites, Scenic Beauty and Natural Monument Preservation Law of 1919.

Unfortunately, Kinoshita succumbed to tuberculosis following a trip to Siberia, where he was negotiating a Trans-Siberian Railroad route from Japan. He died on September 8, 1923, amidst the confusion caused by the Great Tokyo Earthquake. However, his thoughts on national parks and on the role of the railroads in tourism influenced succeeding national park promoters, such as Tamura.

Tamura's Emergence as a Principal Park Maker

Tsuyoshi Tamura (1890–1979, Fig. 3), landscape architect and conservationist, is internationally reputed to have made the first proposal for a World Conference on National Parks, at a General Assembly of the IUCN meeting in Athens in 1958. He received the Keystone Medal at the Second World Congress on National Parks, held at Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks in September 1972.

His interest in national parks is evident in his first book entitled *Introduction to Landscape Architecture*, published in 1918. This led to his involvement in a field survey to identify suitable national park areas, which was commissioned by the Sanitary Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The bureau had been in charge of public parks since 1873, in the belief that parks maintain public health. However, Tamura later recollected that he had a hard time understanding what national parks really were, since little information about them was available in Japan in those days. Nevertheless, he gained some knowledge of national parks from books by Frank A. Waugh, Professor of Landscape Gardening at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Tamura's first encounter with American national parks was in the summer of 1923. He left for the United States on March 20, to study national parks and forest recreation. He visited Yellowstone from August 17 to 22, following visits to Yosemite, Mt. Rainier, Glacier, and Canadian national parks in the Rocky Mountains. Then he headed for Washington D.C., to visit the headquarters of the National Park Service, where he had the opportunity to meet with the director, Stephen Mather. He also visited western national forests and met the area's first recreation engineer,

Figure 3. Tsuyoshi Tamura with Harold J. Coolidge at the International Conference on Marine Parks, Tokyo, 1975 (National Park Association of Japan).

Arthur Carhart, in Denver, although by that time Carhart had already left the Forest Service.[13]

While the Sanitary Bureau had hired Tamura to investigate proposed national parks and obtain park information from the United States, the Division of Geography was also interested in national parks and had a book on American national parks translated in 1920. Its author, Dr. T. Ahrens, was born in Baltimore and emigrated to Germany to work for the National Natural Monument Protection Bureau. This meant that the Division of Geography, in charge of historic sites, scenic beauty, and natural monuments, obtained information on American national parks via Germany. Consequently, their view of national parks reflected the protection-oriented German approach to the natural environment, which recognized national parks as nature preserves rather than as recreational areas.

On the other hand, Tamura and the Sanitary Bureau stressed the recreational and scenic value of parks, and appealed to the public that national parks could bring international tourists and income to Japan. Naturally, both local politicians and the public in the proposed park areas supported the kind of park proposed by the Sanitary Bureau, especially as the recession following World War I was becoming serious.

Thus, the national park movement promoted by the Sanitary Bureau gained public support. However, after studying abroad Tamura became more realistic and recognized that Japan could not establish national parks like Yellowstone or Yosemite, since it no longer had large areas of public domain. The fact that his magazine articles introducing the American national parks started in Hot Springs National Park, and then followed with Lafayette National Park (now Acadia) reflects his penetrating consideration. These two parks contained many private inholdings, similar to the proposed Japanese national parks.

The draft national park bill of 1930 proposed that parks be created by designating specific areas, including private land, and that land-use be controlled by zoning.[14] This idea came from the Forest Law of 1897 and the City Planning Law of 1919, both of which were drafted after studying similar laws in Germany. The resulting National Park Law of 1931 included articles on the regulation of land use by zoning, and compensation to private landowners for economic loss was stipulated. However, it was an era of global business depression, and no budget was allocated. Therefore, they deliberately avoided the inclusion of private land in park lands, especially in Special Areas with stronger forestry restrictions. Public areas such as national forests and semi-public land owned by temples and shrines were preferred. The resulting twelve original national parks included on average only 13 percent private land.

Discussion

The American national parks had a strong influence on the national park movement in Japan, especially through Kinoshita and Tamura, each of whom studied American national parks independently. However, in the process of assimilating national parks into Japanese culture and land ownership systems, various adjustments were made.

First, just as Japan learned from both the United States and from Europe after the Meiji Restoration, so the national park movement also shows clear evidence of

the influence of not only the United States but also of Germany. Especially, the Division of Geography supported the German protection system, and the Forest Law shows a strong German influence.

Tamura was impressed by the American national parks, and promoted national parks as recreational areas. He thought that Italian parks, which included both private land and national forests, were more practical, but he also had information on the Adirondack Park, which was established in 1892. This park, with extensive private lands within the so-called "blue line" border, could be a model of Japan's national parks. However, the boundary was marked simply for future land purchase, and the park had no land-use zoning regulations in those days. Japanese park promoters therefore referred to existing domestic laws that included zoning regulations. In short, the idea of national parks came from the United States, while practical adjustments were made by consulting German-influenced laws.

Second, discussions in the National Park Commission revealed that forestry was a major force behind zoning regulations in Japanese national parks, and that the Forestry Agency supported designating national forests as national parks. This is in sharp contrast to the conflict in America between the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service. From the beginning, the Forestry Agency was also interested in parks, as shown by the fact that Tamura was commissioned for a field study abroad by the Forestry Agency, as well as by the Sanitary Bureau. Tamura himself was not sure which agency could best take care of the parks. He had a doctoral degree in forestry, and his advisor was a leading forestry professor, Seiroku Honda. However, after visiting the United States, and especially after meeting Carhart, Tamura was convinced that management by the Sanitary Bureau, with its experience of city parks, would be better. The Forestry Agency found no problems with the possible restrictions imposed by the National Park Law. For these reasons, management of the national parks by the Sanitary Bureau was settled by the time the park bill was drafted, and the Forestry Agency accepted the double agency management of national forests in national parks.

Third, although nationalism had some influence over the park movement in Japan, promotion of international tourism was a much more crucial motivation than it was in the United States. Alfred Runte pointed to the influence of American nationalism and a national inferiority complex in the face of overwhelming European culture as principal forces behind the American national park movement.[15] While the "See America First" campaign tried to bring back the American tourists that were heading for Europe, Kinoshita and other promoters were eager to secure foreign exchange and to alleviate the depression and poverty in Japan. In addition, at a local level, residents of the proposed park areas enthusiastically supported the parks, in expectation of the beneficial economic effects incidental to the parks' establishment. Thus, regionalism, rather than nationalism, was the prevailing force behind the park movement for individuals in Japan.

Fourth, facing pre-existing industrial land use, Japan's national parks accepted private inholdings from their inception. Runte also developed the so-called "worthless land theory" as a prerequisite to being a national park in the United States. In contrast, Japanese national parks were established with the condition that they



Figure 4. National Park System of Japan (adapted from J. Amishima's The National Parks of Japan*, 1938).*

must coexist with forestry and other industrial uses.

Fifth, Japan's national parks began as a system stipulated by the National Park Law, while American parks were established by individual acts. This is partly because the promoters learned from the American precedent. However, the regional support for local park proposals forced the park-makers to consider distribution and geographical balance when they were at the drafting stage of the National Park Law. Consequently, the original twelve national parks are scattered all over Japan (Fig. 4).

Finally, although the twelve national parks were designated by 1936, Japan was struggling desperately with economic depression and gradually became involved in World War II before a management system was established. In real terms, it wasn't until after the war that a management system was formed, under the absolute influence of the Occupation Army. The National Park Service dispatched Charles A. Richey, then the Assistant Chief, Land and Recreational Planning, to Japan in April 1948, to make a master plan for the Japanese national parks. He visited the proposed park sites with Tamura and other park supporters for five months, and submitted a report[16] to the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on November 18, 1948. Many of his suggestions in this report were deeply influenced by Tamura's ideas, which definitely affected post-war Japanese national park policy. Thus, Tamura is regarded as father of national parks of Japan.

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Roundtable Remarks

The Greater Yellowstone Idea

Robert Keiter

Let me start by applauding, while also questioning, the organizers' decision to place an attorney as the final regular speaker on the conference program. They must have had great confidence that I would hold the audience with penetrating legal analysis, or, perhaps, there were other reasons for that selection. Anyway I appreciate the opportunity to talk about the Greater Yellowstone idea.

Let me begin by quoting Paul Schullery from his wonderful new book *Searching for Yellowstone*. Just briefly, Paul makes the point on page 197 that "the emergence, especially in the 1970s, of the widespread public consciousness of Yellowstone National Park as part of a greater ecosystem is probably the most important conceptual shift in public understanding of the park since it became a formal wildlife preserve in the late 1800s," thus suggesting the power of the notion of the Greater Yellowstone concept itself. Historically, the concept of Greater Yellowstone can be traced to 1917 when Emerson Hough coined the phrase in noting and endorsing various repeated efforts to expand the park to include related adjacent lands. The modern coinage of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem term is traced by most observers to the Craighead brothers who employed it during their 1970s grizzly bear studies, which have been alluded to earlier. We also should note the creation in the mid-1960s of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee which was established among the principal federal land management agencies in the region to address common management problems. And, we should note the establishment in the early 1980s of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition, an environmental advocacy organization with a region-wide focus dedicated to promoting the notion of coordinated, ecosystem-based management for the region. That organization has not only achieved some significant success in this arena, but it also has served and continues to serve as something of a prototype for regional organizations in other locations around the west and elsewhere. That's a very brief sketch of the history or evolution of the Greater Yellowstone concept, at least as an institutional matter.

There is an inherent logic to the idea of Greater Yellowstone. Economically, the communities located in the region that surrounds Yellowstone National Park have understood, virtually from the beginning, that they are linked both to the national park and to the nearby national forests, that there is a sort of umbilical cord that attaches these communities to the surrounding federal lands for economic reasons. You can see that connection in the various policies that have been pursued over the years by individuals, businesses, and governmental entities seeking to protect those economic interests, which range from tourism to the extraction of lumber, and beyond. More recently, we've begun to understand, as the other speakers alluded to,

the ecological connections between the various lands that are defined individually on the map of this region, including the national parks, the national forests, and the other lands. These ecological connections include such phenomena as grizzly bear range, bison and elk range, the presence and impact of fire, other natural processes including geothermal activity, and the watersheds located within the region. As a result, it has been suggested that the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem ought to be defined as roughly twenty million acres in size, embracing two national parks, three national wildlife refuges, and six or seven national forests that fall within three states, as well as twenty or more counties and at least as many local governmental entities. That's a very rough sketch of the practical origins of the concept and a definition, at least one of the definitions, that has been applied to it.

But what does it mean? What does Greater Yellowstone or the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem mean? Is it just a nice convenient identifying phrase and nothing much more? Is it merely a federal concept that has no relevance to local communities or that garners no support among state and local governmental entities? Is it simply an effort de facto to expand Yellowstone National Park boundaries? Or does it instead suggest the need for a brand new type of coordinated ecosystem-based management for the region? Or even more grandiosely, does it envision a sort of vast, nature-first wildland complex here in the Greater Yellowstone Area? All of these are possibilities; all of these have been suggested as what the concept means or ought to mean, and, they all have been, and will continue to be, the focus of argument over the Greater Yellowstone concept. Having now raised those issues, let me offer four primary observations about the Greater Yellowstone idea. I've divided or characterized them as conceptual observations, institutional observations, strategic observations, and what I refer to as more universal observations.

On the conceptual level (and we've heard a fair amount about this already), it seems to me significant that there has been surprisingly rapid progress towards acceptance of the Greater Yellowstone concept. You have in the 1960s, as I've mentioned, the creation of the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC). That group moved on to endorse the idea of a Greater Yellowstone Area during the vision process in the 1980s, and, more recently, those federal agencies have endorsed the notion a Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. You also have, as I mentioned, a regional environmental organization—the Greater Yellowstone Coalition—that continues to promote this concept at every opportunity. And you have the conservancy districts in the area organized under the banner of Greater Yellowstone. On the ground, the Greater Yellowstone concept and the connections that it implies played a role, perhaps even a major one, in the organizing effort that recently thwarted establishment of the controversial Noranda mine. What I'm suggesting, then, is that conceptually there has been a significant amount of progress toward legitimizing the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem idea.

Let me finish this point by reading something that I wrote almost ten years ago: "the ecosystem concept interjects a provocative new image into the debates that are now influencing and molding public lands policy. Scientifically, the concept demonstrates the indisputable interconnectedness of jurisdictionally fragmented pubic lands. The concept also has great power as a metaphorical device; rooted in

scientific fact yet evocative enough to stir the hearts and minds of an American public now strongly committed to the preservationist ideal and its national park heritage. Already the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem concept has fused two world-renowned national parks, several well known wilderness areas and the adjoining national forest lands into a regional entity that has engaged public attention at national and international levels. It has broadened the perspective of land managers beyond their own borders and it is transforming traditional land management policies. In short, the ecosystem concept provides the fundamental premise for regional management and thus brings a compelling new vision to the ongoing debate over the future of the public domain." I'll stand by those words notwithstanding the events of the last ten years since they were written.

Now some further observations that are institutional in nature. Here, both within Greater Yellowstone and elsewhere, the shift toward thinking in greater ecosystem terms has been a more gradual and evolutionary—rather than revolutionary—process toward giving some real institutional meaning to the notion of ecosystem-based management. Currently, several important issues are being addressed through interagency, ecosystem-based management initiatives. The GYCC is still in place and functioning. It is reexamining, on a coordinated basis, both fire policy and winter–use policy. It plays a role, along with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the relevant state agencies, in grizzly bear and wolf recovery efforts. A separate regional entity—the Greater Yellowstone Interagency Brucellosis Committee—is engaged in attempting to resolve the current bison controversy. Having noted this progress toward ecosystem-based management, let me also say that it's a difficult and often frustrating process. The institutional arrangements are difficult; they're not necessarily efficient; they don't always work that well; and the players are continuing still to feel their way along the path toward ecosystem-based management. On that note, the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee's vision process is regarded rather widely as a failed exercise in federal interagency coordination. And although the Noranda dispute was framed in terms of the impact that the mine might have on Yellowstone Park and although various ecological connections were made evident in the arena of public debate, it is clear that resolution of that issue was not a comfortable or coordinated interagency solution between the park service, the forest service, and the other involved federal and state resource management agencies. So, as an institutional matter, implementation of a Greater Yellowstone management regime is progressing in fits and starts.

Let me turn to my third point, and it's a strategic point that seems to emerge from the notion of a Greater Yellowstone. Despite the frustrations and difficulties that I've alluded to in management, it seems to me that there is more to be gained than lost by acknowledging and building upon the idea of a Greater Yellowstone community. Numerous commonalities exist within the region's communities and within all three of the states that are reached by the Greater Yellowstone concept. Politically and institutionally, there is much to be gained by acknowledging these commonalties, both within the federal agency structure and at the state level. Particularly for the states, rather than individual states going it alone, a united Greater Yellowstone approach to and recognition of shared problems might lead, in many instances, to a

saner and more satisfactory resolution of common problems. If somehow we can bring the shared interests of all the communities and states within the Greater Yellowstone area to bear on common problems, then we can figure out solutions that work on a regional basis and leverage the strength of this commonality to achieve better and more durable solutions. As an example, consider the bison-brucellosis controversy. The parties have fragmented off the different states in the bison controversy, and they are addressing the issues piecemeal in Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho, rather than on a joint basis where there are common and shared interests with respect to this important resource. Instead of having the issue framed and resolved by statewide livestock and wildlife concerns, if we can get Greater Yellowstone's wildlife and livestock concerns to the forefront in this issue, then we might make more progress in resolving the matter. And to do this—and here I think Susan has hit the nail squarely on the head—will require engaging and involving all of Greater Yellowstone's citizens and communities in these region-wide issues and problems.

Moving on to my final point, I have some universal observations about the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem concept. The basic idea is of great importance for national parks, which today stand to benefit immensely from the greater ecosystem concept. Paul Schullery put it quite well, I think, in the passage that I read to begin this talk. It is significant that the ecosystem management concept was pioneered in Greater Yellowstone, but it has now, as most of you are aware, been transported afield and taken hold elsewhere. In the Pacific Northwest, ecosystem management has been endorsed in the regional forest plan designed by the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management to address the timber harvesting-spotted owl controversy. The federal court that reviewed that plan legitimized the notion of ecosystem management on public lands. The White House has now convened an interagency task force that has endorsed the notion of ecosystem management. Virtually all that is lacking, at least at the federal level, is explicit congressional endorsement of the concept. That will take awhile for reasons that are probably obvious to all.

Although the vision process that I alluded to earlier is widely regarded as a failed GYCC initiative from the 1980s, it actually spawned some interesting offshoots that are really outgrowths of that vision process. If you examine what is occurring in the Upper Columbia Basin EIS ecosystem project, it emulates rather closely what was done by the GYCC. First the U.S. Forest Service and BLM did a regional inventory or assessment of ecosystem resources, which was then followed by recommended revisions to the management plans for the area—all done on a large ecosystem scale. There are some differences: the National Environmental Policy Act was used in that process, while it wasn't used in the GYCC process. But the basic approach was still quite similar to the GYCC's vision process. You can also see parallels in other both smaller and larger ecosystem initiatives around the West. The Sierra Nevada ecosystem project is another example that bears a resemblance to the GYCC vision process.

More grandiosely, and perhaps more optimistically, it seems to me that the ecosystem management process offers an opportunity to repair the longstanding schism between the utilitarians and the preservationists. Ecosystem management is

a concept that could merge these divergent traditions in natural resource philosophy together into a shared approach to resource management in regions like Greater Yellowstone and elsewhere. As I suggested, it is therefore vitally important for the National Park Service to be involved in this debate, not only in Greater Yellowstone but throughout the federal bureaucracy. It must be actively engaged in defining what ecosystem management might mean and how it can be used to promote park resource protection.

Let me conclude with an anecdote about the power of the idea of the greater ecosystem concept. Four years ago, I served as a Fulbright scholar in Kathmandu, Nepal. Among other things, I studied the national park system in Nepal. One of the things that really struck me was the commitment that the Nepalese and Chinese governments had made to creating a Greater Everest Ecosystem conservation area. This Himalayan "greater ecosystem" includes a series of national parks, nature reserves, and conservation areas surrounding the tallest mountain in the world, itself another major and world famous landmark like Yellowstone. And that, I think, vividly illustrates the potential power and reach of this concept. Thank you.

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A House Divided: The National Park Service and Environmental Leadership

Richard West Sellars

In 1991, a conference on national parks held in Vail, Colorado, focused on what it termed "environmental leadership"—asking by what means should the National Park Service establish itself as a leader in sound ecological land management. On the surface, it seems strange to raise such a question about a bureau that for three-quarters of a century had managed special public lands under the mandate to leave them "unimpaired." Yet the park service had always emphasized a kind of tourism and scenery management. And its response to demands to become more ecologically informed—especially outspoken since the early 1960s—had been, as a Vail conference document noted, "sporadic and inconsistent, characterized by alternating cycles of commitment and decline." The question then arises: What historical factors limited the National Park Service's success in this regard?

With the Northern Pacific Railroad Company as its chief lobbyist, the 1872 Yellowstone Park Act made a commitment to nature preservation—but it also, in effect, heralded the emergence of tourism as an important part of the economy of the American West. In the parks, economic benefits derived from public lands would be based on a low-impact utilitarian use—tourism—rather than on the more customary extraction of natural resources. Products of their times, the early national parks were not intended to be inaccessible nature preserves. The public was encouraged to visit the parks and to stay for a while—an obvious factor, but one which had enormous implications for the future of the national parks.

By the early twentieth century, for example, more than 400 miles of roads had been built in Yellowstone, along with hotels, horse corrals, and trails. Yosemite, Sequoia, and other early parks were similarly developed for tourism. Such development came also to include maintenance facilities, electrical plants, employee housing, campgrounds, garbage dumps, and extensive water supply and sewage systems.

The treatment of natural resources also reflected the desire to ensure that the public enjoyed the parks. To protect popular species of wildlife, predators such as mountain lions, wolves, and coyotes were killed. Naturally occurring forest fires were suppressed to protect beautiful green landscapes. And to please anglers, millions of fish—native and non-native species—were planted in lakes and streams, many of which had previously been fishless.

Reflecting the utilitarian nature of national park affairs, the principal proponents of the 1916 National Park Service Act were a former borax mining executive (Stephen T. Mather), a landscape architect (Frederic Law Olmsted, Jr.), a horticulturalist

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(J. Horace McFarland), and a young lawyer (Horace Albright). Like the other founders, Olmsted, who drafted the act's principal statement of purpose—that the national parks be left "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations"—gave no indication in his correspondence that "unimpaired" required an exacting biological preservation within the parks. Rather, as one whose profession involved the aesthetic enhancement of landscapes for public enjoyment, Olmsted was concerned about keeping national park *scenery* unimpaired—maintaining the beauty, dignity, and nobility of the parks' majestic landscapes.

The 1916 act thus mandated no changes whatsoever for previously established policies dealing with predators, forests, fish, and other natural resources. Instead, the act consolidated a dispersed park management by creating an assertive new bureau within the Department of the Interior—one that was backed by advocates of outdoor recreation, tourism, and landscape preservation, and one that could promote the national park idea with Congress and the public.

Guided by the 1916 act, development to accommodate tourism in the national parks continued with few interruptions. Several periods of construction and development stand out: the Mather years (1916–1929); the New Deal era, when President Franklin Roosevelt's emergency work-relief funds meant flush times for the park service; the billion-dollar Mission 66 development program (1956–1966); and the Bicentennial era.

Through most of the 1950s, it could be argued (and was assumed by National Park Service leadership) that with decades of scenery protection and tourism management in the parks the park service was meeting its original mandate. Mission 66 alone, totaling a billion dollars of appropriated funds over a decade, provided substantial evidence that ensuring accessibility and public enjoyment of the parks was exactly what Congress and the people wanted. Meanwhile, more than half-way through Mission 66, the budget for biological research in the parks amounted to less than $30,000 per year—a factor of no concern to Congress or the public at large.

Concerns about the national parks were expressed, however, and during the Mission 66 era these concerns underwent important changes. They were first focused on deteriorated postwar conditions of park facilities (this was blamed mostly on Congress). Criticism then shifted toward the park service for the appearance and the extent of its modernistic, intrusive Mission 66 development. Finally, by the early 1960s, critics targeted the park service's refusal to consider the ecological impacts of park development or to use science in park management. Like many of today's critics, they began to define the most crucial park needs in terms of ecological preservation and science.

Significantly, however, the drive to develop the parks for tourism had propelled developmental professions into commanding roles within the park service. Landscape architecture, because it formed the crucial link between park development and the protection of scenery, became the single most influential profession in the park service (a position that, arguably, it maintains today). Early on, the landscape architects had joined with engineers, foresters, and park superintendents and rangers in establishing a loosely allied but enduring park service leadership, whose values and perceptions formed the dominant culture within the park service. These leaders were deeply committed to public enjoyment of the parks, valued park scenery much more

than ecology, and evidenced little interest in acquiring a scientific understanding of the parks. With minimal internal opposition, the leadership imposed its values and principles on a receptive park service rank and file, and established managerial traditions that, in part because of their success with the public, became taken for granted as right and proper for the parks.

THROUGHOUT NATIONAL PARK HISTORY, biological science has been the only important program to have been initiated with private funding. Indeed, during Stephen Mather's directorship the park service established a firm policy of borrowing scientific expertise from such bureaus as the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Plant Industry, and the U.S. Biological Survey. In 1929, however—thirteen years after the park service was created—George Wright, an independently wealthy biologist stationed in Yosemite, used his own funds to launch a survey of wildlife in the national parks and to establish a park service office of wildlife biology. Later funded through the park service's own appropriations, this office grew by the mid-1930s to a maximum of about twenty-seven biologists who conducted research and reviewed park development projects for possible impacts on natural resources.

In the context of prevailing park service values, the wildlife biologists' vision was truly revolutionary, penetrating beyond the parks' scenic facades to comprehend the significance of the complex natural world and challenge the managerial status quo. The biologists, for example, opposed the killing of predators and voiced concern about the ecological impacts of park development. With no true botanists in the park service's resource management programs (the foresters were mainly "timber men"), the wildlife biologists sought to maintain natural conditions in national park forests, adamantly opposing the policy of total fire suppression, arguing that in a national park a blackened forest is just as valuable as a green forest. And they charged that chemical spraying to kill native insects in the forests violated the very purpose of the national parks.

Without George Wright's leadership, the park service may have waited decades to create a science program—there is no evidence to indicate otherwise. Indeed, when Wright's leadership was ended by his untimely death in 1936, the program declined, reduced to about nine biologists by 1939. By comparison, in the late 1930s the park service had an estimated 400 employees classified as landscape architects—part of an overall total of about 2,400 landscape architects, engineers, foresters, and other technicians, and a clear indication of fundamental park service values. Without a vocal public constituency that could overcome prevailing park service indifference, the wildlife biology program languished for more than two decades.

Unlike in the 1930s, increasing public environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s brought outside pressure for scientific resource management in the parks. This was manifested especially in two 1963 studies, the "Leopold Report" (principally authored by biologist A. Starker Leopold) and a subsequent report by the National Academy of Sciences. Both argued for creating strong, scientifically based natural resource management programs. In effect, they challenged the park service to reinterpret in scientific and ecological terms its long-standing mandate to leave the parks unimpaired. But a full and committed response would require park

service leaders to share their control of policies, programs, staffing, and funding with science, which had long been marginalized. Moreover, the reports' insistence on scientifically informed decision making (grounded in research) threatened traditional park management with a more costly, difficult, and time-consuming process. The reports thus precipitated a struggle within the park service between the ecologically oriented factions and the far more powerful leadership establishment.

Since the Leopold and National Academy reports, there have been about two dozen similarly critical studies of national park science and resource management, each with comparable recommendations. While science and natural resource management programs have certainly grown well beyond what they were at the time of the Leopold Report, the very fact that so many critical reports have appeared since 1963 suggests that the park service's response has indeed been, as the Vail document stated, "sporadic and inconsistent, characterized by alternating cycles of commitment and decline."

THE PARK SERVICE'S ORIGINAL LEGISLATIVE MANDATE had fostered the emphasis on use and enjoyment of the parks—yet it certainly did not exclude close scientific management of the parks when that became a recognized option. Still, the park service has never had, as the Vail conference report acknowledged, "any specific statutory language directing it to engage in science as part of its assigned mission." Thus, without a scientific mandate, the park service has refused to seize the initiative to build sufficient science programs on its own. And a 1993 park service document entitled "Science and the National Parks II: Adapting to Change," stated that, despite "repeated authoritative urging," there is "no assurance that [the park service will build such programs] now, on a long-term sustained basis, without statutory direction."

A 1992 National Academy report stated that such resistance was "rooted" in park service culture, but it did not identify cultural traits. The Vail conference report, however, stated that the culture was exemplified by employees who are "creative and embrace responsibility, [do] not avoid accountability and [do not] play it safe" and who are imaginative, committed, and have initiative—altogether a definition so conventional that it provided no clues as to the dominant values and perceptions of the organization.

In truth, the dominant culture of the park service has in large degree evolved in response to the demands of tourism. Since the nineteenth century, park managers have had to deal not only with the planning, construction, and maintenance of park facilities and roads and trails, but also with such increasingly difficult concerns as concession operations, visitor services, law enforcement (including, in more recent times, drug and crowd control), and the political pressure from tourism and other interests outside the parks.

Out of this evolving set of circumstances, certain shared basic assumptions began to emerge before the park service was created; they gained strength under Mather and his successors, and endured—some of them into the present. These dominant assumptions have included: With public enjoyment of the parks and the protection of scenery being the overriding concerns, management even of vast natural parks required little scientific information and therefore few, if any, highly trained

biologists—the unscientifically trained eye could judge park conditions adequately. Moreover, park managers should have independence of action, and scientific findings could restrict managerial discretion. Each park was a superintendent's realm, to be subjected to minimal interference. Similarly, the park service was the right-thinking authority on national parks—it could manage the parks properly with little or no involvement from outside groups. Thus, environmental activism was often unwelcome; and legislation such as the Wilderness Act or the National Environmental Policy Act should not interfere unduly with traditional management and operations of the park service.

Overall, the park service developed a highly pragmatic management style that emphasized expediency, resisted information-gathering through long-term research, and disliked interference from groups inside or outside the park service. And when ecological concerns inspired a different perception of the national parks, many individuals who had risen to power embracing the dominant cultural assumptions of the park service adhered to tradition and resisted changing the perceptions and policies they had long taken for granted and upon which their careers and their influence and authority within the organization had been built.

ON THE OTHER HAND, although it admits to a deficiency in scientific management, the park service—as host to millions of tourists who come to the parks to enjoy nature and majestic scenery—has earnestly sought to inspire a greater public appreciation and understanding of the complexities of natural history. In so doing, the park service has encouraged the development of an environmental ethic nationwide, fostering greater knowledge and concern about ecological issues—a truly major contribution to our national life. This influence has been evolving especially since campfire talks, nature walks, and museum displays spread throughout the park system in the 1920s and 1930s. The effort expanded over the years to include a huge and varied array of museum and visitor center exhibits, interpretive talks, guided hikes, and trailside exhibits, augmented by brochures, films, book sales, and other means of enlightening the public. Begun in the 1960s, Director George Hartzog's environmental education programs reached out to thousands of schoolchildren, many of them underprivileged and without access to parks outside of urban areas. Also, through its involvement with state and local parks and the more recent partnership programs, the park service has advanced nature appreciation and understanding. Thus, despite limitations in scientifically based ecological management, the national parks, the National Park Service, and the uniformed ranger have become symbols of a conservation and environmental ethic.

Surely, given the protection they receive, the national parks will always be beautiful places to visit. Park service leaders such as Mather, Horace Albright, and Conrad Wirth successfully championed development of the parks for public enjoyment of park scenery. Moreover, they were builders of the system. They worked with conservation groups, politicians, and private citizens to help create a large and impressive array of national parks—a legacy of inestimable value. Without their determined efforts, many of the very areas which are the focus of contentious debates over management strategies may not even exist today in a protected condition.

Yet, although highly effective leaders, such directors showed little concern for ecological matters. In a classic example of disregard for science, Director Wirth wrote to Horace Albright in November 1956, expressing the need to "slant a practical eye" toward the issue of elk grazing in Yellowstone. In a telling comment, Wirth added that: "Sometimes I find, Horace, and I am sure you will agree with this, that you can get too scientific on these things and cause a lot of harm." Clearly reflecting the views of park service leadership, these remarks came at a time when there was almost no park service research underway in Yellowstone. The director's remarks fell on receptive ears, given Albright's record of opposition to the biologists on numerous wildlife management issues. Albright displayed attitudes similar to Wirth's when he later told a gathering of the National Parks Advisory Board that in the parks "there should not be too much emphasis laid on biology." After all, he added, the people were "the ones who are going to enjoy the parks." The former director asserted that "ninety-nine percent" of the people who visit the parks are "not interested in biological research."

But the wildlife biologists had long held broader, more comprehensive views of the purpose of the national parks. They had written in their 1933 landmark report, *Fauna of the National Parks of the United States* (known as Fauna No. 1), that America's heritage is greater than just scenery, that it is "nature itself, with all its complexity and its abundance of life, which, when combined with great scenic beauty as it is in the national parks, becomes of unlimited value." "This," they concluded, "is what we would attain in the national parks." It should be noted also that the biologists' recommendation for perpetuating and even restoring natural conditions was, in 1934, accepted by the park service as official, systemwide policy—a policy that was unprecedented in the history of national parks and, likely, in the history of American public land management.

At the same time, the wildlife biologists also recognized the ecological changes that had occurred in the national parks and the impossibility of regaining truly primeval conditions. But they believed, as George Wright stated in 1934, that there were "reasonable aspects to [such a goal] and reasonable objectives that [the park service] can strive for." And they knew that ecological preservation—far more complex than scenery management—requires in-depth scientific knowledge.

But for decades the park service's dominant cultural traditions and assumptions have formed the chief impediment to a full acceptance of science. Nevertheless, the park service has persistently claimed that preservation is its primary goal. If this assertion were valid—and if it had long been reflected in policies and organizational structure, and in such matters as staffing, funding, and programming priorities to establish an overall record of excellence in scientific natural resource management—there would have been no need for the 1991 Vail conference to ponder how the National Park Service could attain "environmental leadership." By example of its own resource management, the park service would already have achieved such status had it faithfully adhered to the recommendations of George Wright and his fellow wildlife biologists made official policy more than six decades ago.

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Driven Wild: The Origins of Wilderness Advocacy during the Interwar Years

Paul S. Sutter

In January of 1935, eight conservationists founded the Wilderness Society, the first national organization explicitly dedicated to the protection of wilderness.[1] Among the founders were such prominent environmental thinkers and activists as Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall, Benton MacKaye, and Robert Sterling Yard. Most historians of the environmental movement cite this group's formation as a watershed, a point at which wilderness advocacy in this country first achieved a concerted organizational voice.[2] Few, however, have fully appreciated what they were advocating when they talked about wilderness or how they came to their advocacy. This essay examines some of the founders' major concerns and puts them in the context of recent critiques of the wilderness idea.

In the first issue of the *Living Wilderness*, the founders explained their program in language that initially surprised me. In a front-page essay entitled "A Summons to Save the Wilderness," the founders wrote:

> Ten years of warfare in Congress saved the National Park System from water power and irrigation, but left the primitive decimated elsewhere. What little of it is left is passing before a popular craze and an administrative fashion. The craze is to build all the highways possible everywhere while billions may yet be borrowed from the unlucky future. The fashion is to barber and manicure wild America as smartly as the modern girl. Our duty is clear.[3]

The entire issue resounded with concerns about automobiles, road building, and other busy efforts on federal lands, particularly New Deal projects, that were transforming many of the nation's remaining wild areas, often in the name of recreational development and access. Rather than finding a group roundly opposed to resource extraction and the industrial transformation of American nature, I found one with deep-seated concerns about modernization, and the automobile and road building in particular. These advocates, I argue, were driven wild. We cannot understand the origins of wilderness advocacy (defined here somewhat narrowly as advocacy that led up to the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the creation

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of a distinct system of Wilderness Areas) until we grapple with the changes produced by automobility.

In a recent essay entitled "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," William Cronon ignited a debate about the usefulness of the wilderness ideal. To put it briefly, Cronon argues that wilderness has come to function as something of an opiate—that in the process of saving discrete areas of supposedly wild nature, environmentalists have ignored or abdicated their responsibility for dealing with the nature that is worked and inhabited. Wilderness, Cronon suggests, is an escapist ideal that is incapable of informing our daily interactions with nature. Environmentalists, Cronon intimates, are being led astray by this constructed ideal of a nature that is always "out there," unworked, uninhabited, a day's drive away.[4]

I sympathize with what I see as the spirit of Cronon's piece, or at least part of the spirit: that we need to understand how we have constructed ideals of nature that are based in leisure-time patterns of consumption. But the "trouble," I want to suggest, counter to Cronon, is not necessarily with wilderness, at least as it was conceptualized by the Wilderness Society's founders. Indeed, for them, wilderness was a solution to some of the very concerns expressed by Cronon. The founders of the Wilderness Society proposed wilderness as a new land designation at precisely the time when more and more Americans were coming to know nature through leisure; it was largely in reaction to this process, in all its manifestations, that the founders proposed wilderness preservation.

Cronon's argument represents the climax of a growing critical response to the wilderness ideal. Perhaps the first blows taken at the wilderness ideal were delivered by those who sought to debunk the equation between wilderness and pristine nature. Today, it is almost an article of faith among environmental historians that wilderness is a poor, and ideologically charged, way of describing the ecological conditions of almost any area. Wilderness is a cultural ideal.[5]

More recently, and in a related critique, a number of scholars have suggested the profoundly ethnocentric nature of wilderness. Mark Spence, for instance, has argued that the wilderness ideal was a critical component in the dispossession of Indians and the transformation of their lands into national parks.[6] Mark extends some of the important insights of Francis Jennings's work on colonial New England—that seeing or willing "wilderness" was a convenient way of ignoring Indian ownership, tenure, and history, and that the ideal has worked to erase Native Americans from historical memory.[7] In an extension of Jennings, however, Spence shows how the park ideal (which he equates with the wilderness ideal) continued to dispossess even after it became linked to preservation.

In a sense, the combined insights of ecology, social history, and cultural history have given wilderness a pretty good working over. All of these arguments have tremendous merit. But they also tend to assume that wilderness has been a singular ideal and that those who push wilderness preservation do not understand its constructed nature. In fact, I argue that the founders of the Wilderness Society were doing something quite different with wilderness than were the people Spence talks about, or even those who Cronon discusses. Their idea was less focused on pristine nature—a nature untouched by human activities, unaffected by work or resource

extraction or human management (though it contained these elements)—and more one of a nature resistant to the modern world. Indeed, though Aldo Leopold would later make a plea for the ecological value of wilderness, ecological concerns were but a minor component in the birth of this particular brand of wilderness advocacy. Wilderness, for the founders, was a nature that lacked roads, automobiles, and the commercial structures that catered to the modern tourist and outdoor recreationist. It was a place, these advocates hoped, that would preserve nature and the recreational appreciation of it from the consumer tendencies of the era.

The intellectual histories of these activists belie the easy correlation between wilderness advocacy and a lack of concern for the exigencies of work in nature. A number of the society's founders were trained foresters who gave considerable intellectual and political attention to issues of human labor in nature. Aldo Leopold, for instance, wrote extensively about nurturing the wild fringes of America's agricultural landscape, and he thought critically throughout his career about wise resource stewardship. Bob Marshall combined his wilderness advocacy with strong concerns for sustainable forestry and radical social reform. Benton MacKaye was perhaps the most innovative thinker on this subject. In a 1919 Labor Department report, MacKaye suggested the colonization of portions of the public domain and the creation of sustainable communities based in cooperative resource stewardship and government land ownership.[8] In his famous 1921 article advocating the creation of an Appalachian Trail, MacKaye portrayed the trail as a backbone for regional development and as "a retreat from profit."[9] For none of these three trained foresters was the wilderness ideal an escape from the problems of work in nature.[10]

Finally, I think many critics of wilderness have lost touch with the notion that wilderness activism has almost always been about what to do with *public* lands. It is imperative that we see wilderness as an idea for managing public nature, offered in response to other such political claims, during a period when the remaining public domain was being closed and put under federal stewardship. Wilderness, in other words, was and is a political ideal as well as a cultural ideal, and wilderness advocacy needs to be understood within this political context. The founders of the Wilderness Society deployed the wilderness ideal to make claims on portions of the public domain whose undeveloped status seemed particularly threatened. And during the interwar years the major threat—the main "other idea"—was the development of public lands for mechanized forms of outdoor recreation.

To understand the particular brand of wilderness advocacy put forward by the founders of the Wilderness Society, it is imperative that we understand the contours of the interwar period. Indeed, one of the arguments of my larger work is that we have missed the broader significance of the founding of the Wilderness Society precisely because we have not appreciated the context within which it occurred.

The interwar years were crucial, for a number of reasons, to the rise of outdoor recreation in the United States. The single most important factor was the increasing availability and affordability of the automobile, and its corollary, improved roads. Together, the automobile and improved roads spread the ability to get "back to nature" to a much broader swath of the American populace. Numerous

contemporary commentators referred to the automobile as a "democratizing" force in this regard, as a technology that broke down class barriers that had kept national parks the playgrounds of the rich. In sheer numbers, visitation to the national parks and national forests soared after 1915. From 1915 to 1920, park visitation tripled, from 300,000 to almost a million a year; by 1932, there were 3 million visitors a year to the parks. The national forests saw a similarly rapid increase in recreational visitation.

Much of this increased visitation was due to the rapid introduction of the automobile into the park experience. The coming of the automobile to Yellowstone provides a case in point. As late as 1915, automobiles were not allowed into Yellowstone; horses and horse-drawn vehicles remained the major mode of transportation. The first auto to enter the park did so on August 1, 1915, and, in one of the better ironies of this story, Robert Sterling Yard was one of its passengers. For the 1916 season, park officials conducted an experiment in coexistence. Yellowstone's Grand Loop was made a one-way road, and through the use of newly strung telephone lines and checking stations, park officials kept motorists to a tight schedule so that they would remain at least thirty minutes ahead of stages. Permits for private automobiles in Yellowstone cost $10 that summer, a steep rate for that time. But for all its ingenuity, the system turned out to be too cumbersome. By 1917, the concessionaires had sold their horses and Yellowstone was entirely motorized.[11] By 1920, over 13,000 private automobiles entered the park, and people who came to the park by train usually saw the park by motorized jitney.[12] By 1930, the number of private automobiles entering the park was close to 70,000.[13]

A second important aspect of the interwar period was the willingness of the federal government to fund both road building and recreational development on the public lands—and often these initiatives were one in the same. The creation of the National Park Service in 1916 gave the national parks a policy voice and a strong lobby. The National Park Service embarked almost immediately on a major publicity campaign to attract visitors, a campaign spear-headed by Robert Sterling Yard. By all accounts, it was a tremendous success. The service would also insist on more government funding for the improvement of roads and the extension of the road system within the parks. A series of Federal Aid Highway Acts brought unprecedented federal funding to road building generally. More specifically, these acts provided a disproportionate amount of funding for building roads in and through the national forests and other portions of the public domain.[14] These roads effectively opened these areas to increased recreational use. The Term Permit Act of 1915 facilitated a process of recreational homesteading on the national forests. Americans could apply to the forest service for leases, lasting up to thirty years, for building vacation cottages, hotels, and other recreational structures on public lands.[15] Finally, the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation, which held major meetings in Washington, D.C., in 1924 and 1926, brought together hundreds of delegates in an effort to forge a national recreational policy. All of these phenomena marked a growing federal commitment to sponsor and underwrite recreational development on the public lands.[16]

A third factor that made this era unique was the relationship between nature and

the consumer culture that solidified after World War I. The shifting federal emphasis from resource conservation to outdoor recreation mirrored a shift from a producer to a consumer culture. Outdoor recreation rhetoric was rife with the therapeutic claims characteristic of this shift. The natural world, moreover, was an important source of the authenticity that so many of the era craved, and a contested space in battles over meaningful leisure. With work degraded by the machine and time-discipline, or by bureaucratic office routines, leisure in nature became a new potential source of virtue. In many ways, outdoor recreation replaced the frontier experience as the sculptor of American character.[17]

Critics, among them Benton MacKaye and to a lesser extent Aldo Leopold, noted strong tensions between mass consumer culture and folk cultures supposedly based in local or regional relationships with nature. They were among a number of contemporaries concerned with what they saw as the replacement of nature as a source of community culture with nature as a source of mass leisure. In a modern world, the cultural centrality of intimate working relationships with the land seemed to be slipping away.[18] The interwar craze for outdoor recreation may have struck many as a national effort to reclaim this intimacy, but to the founders of the Wilderness Society it seemed part of the problem. Modern outdoor recreation involved a very different relationship with nature, one increasingly mediated by machines and consumer trappings.[19] Wilderness preservation, as the founders saw it, was a solution—though only a partial one—to these problems.

I TRY TO FOCUS MUCH OF MY ANALYSIS of this period on the rise of automobile tourism and its connection to the preservation of nature because I think many of the era's tensions emerged in the logic and dynamics of tourism. Let me say just a few brief, quasi-theoretical words about tourism. For the tourist, the natural world, like any other tourist site, is something that one visits or goes to see; tourism requires a nature that is separate, distant, and exotic. It also relies on forms of cultural production that work to collapse nature into a manageable canon of sights. It involves, in short, relationships between tourists, sites, and markers. We need to pay more attention to the roles of the many markers in defining a nature "out there," particularly as they were being produced during the interwar period. The cultural production of markers —whether they were postcards, magazine articles, photographs, guidebooks, maps, advertisements, titles of distinction, or literally signs by the side of the road—played a decisive role in structuring nature tourism and outdoor recreation after World War I. Indeed, such production was an integral part of the consumer culture that developed after the war.[20]

I also think it is important to take an understanding of tourist dynamics and turn it on environmentalism in general. How have our tourist and consumer impulses shaped the natural ideals we use to urge preservation? This, it seems to me, was ultimately what William Cronon was after in his piece on wilderness: that we are always working to preserve a nature that is distant and other, a nature that often is part and parcel of consumer habits rather than a challenge to them. The "trouble," Cronon intimated, is that we tend to idealize nature as a tourist destination. Cronon's mistake, I maintain, was to assume that this process and the wilderness ideal were

always one in the same. The wilderness ideal that came out of the interwar period was much more about saving wilderness from tourism than saving it for tourism.

Having said these few words about tourism, let me return to the automobile and road building. How did the automobile and improved roads shape the American experience in nature? What, in terms of outdoor recreation and contact with nature, did the automobile allow? It allowed a lot more Americans a much greater radius in reaching a nature "out there." The automobile also came with a tangible sense of freedom, in particular a freedom from the strictures of hotel-rail tourism and its genteel conventions. Automobility allowed Americans to design their own itineraries, to stop and stay wherever they wanted, and to enjoy an equation of nature and the open road. In a sense, it allowed tourists to escape the strictures of tourism itself—to get beyond the marked sites and experience a "real" nature.

It is difficult for us today, who are so conditioned by the circumscribed nature of roads as public space, to appreciate how open and liberating roads seemed to the first generation of auto tourists. Early auto touring was based in the myth of an open countryside, the notion that the landscape beyond the bounds of town and city was, in a sense, public. In large part, this was because rural roads rarely had the trappings that today mark roads as separate from what are usually private lands surrounding them: fences, signs, landscaped rights of way. In short, in what Warren Belasco has called the "squatter-anarchist phase" of auto touring, motorists before 1920 tended to treat the rural roadside as if it was free and open, as if it was nature itself. Roughing it meant packing up the car with camping gear and heading out to camp wherever the auto left you at the end of the day.[21]

This "squatter-anarchist phase" created a variety of problems almost immediately. Conflicts arose in the countryside between automobiles and horses as a new mechanized form of transport challenged an older, biological form. Discourteous use of private property was a common experience for rural land-owners whose fields were set upon by auto campers. Scenic roadside areas received heavy use and particularly sloppy treatment, and litter (which, I would argue, traditionally has been defined as a roadside phenomenon) became a major problem. There were also problems with water pollution from poor sanitary practices, forest and brush fires, soil compaction, and general wear and tear. This motorized return to nature took its toll on the roadside environment.

Responses to these problems generally involved a sort of broad contractual effort to discipline the behavior of auto campers and delimit the freedom of the roadside. There were a couple of important implications. Contemporaries suggest the era saw the increased posting of the privately owned countryside against trespass. Others responded to the commercial possibilities of this new activity, and the nation saw the rapid rise of provisioning for motor tourists. Of particular interest were the municipal auto camps that sprung up throughout the United States, but most particularly in the West. Other roadside development followed. By 1934, *Fortune* announced that the "Great American Roadside" had become a $3 billion/year industry.[22] All of this—from tin cans to billboard advertising—contributed to the perception of the roadside as a polluted place. The open road slowly creaked shut after World War I.

If the countryside was increasingly off-limits and/or developed and polluted, then auto campers had to find somewhere else to get that pristine experience they often were after. Increasingly, that meant relying on the nation's national parks, national forests, and other public lands. Thus, the excesses of the "squatter-anarchist phase," which worked to limit roadside use and construct a whole new tourist landscape, increased demands for recreational access to, and development of, public lands—places protected from the sprawling commercialism of the privately owned roadside. Thus, the developments along the nation's roads were not only pushing more visitors into the few remaining publicly owned wild areas, but they were also contributing to the hardening of the division between publicly owned wild nature and privately owned worked nature. The intellectual split between working nature and recreational nature that Cronon and other critics of wilderness take to task thus had a physical analogue in a landscape increasingly divided because of automobility.

Hiking enthusiasts, for instance, who had long relied on rural roads for their recreation, found themselves driven into the woods by noisy and dangerous automobiles. Automobility heightened the distinction between the worlds of road and hiking trail. It also played an important role in the conflict that precipitated the formation of the Wilderness Society—the conflict between Benton MacKaye's Appalachian Trail, nearing completion by the early 1930s, and a series of skyline road developments in Appalachia—particularly the skyline drive in Shenandoah National Park and the Blue Ridge Parkway. Automobility forced a definition of what was and was not wild, a definition that often revolved around the automobile's presence or absence.

And lest we think auto camping was a marginal activity, various sources estimated that there were 10–15 million Americans going auto camping every year by the mid-1920s, a considerable number considering there were only about 20 million registered autos in 1925.[23] As national parks and other public lands became the preferred destinations for auto tourists, various boosters demanded the development of these areas for automobiles. This meant roads and campgrounds since auto tourists tended not to stay in the rustic hotels. And there were conflicting calls to either preserve the nature of these places, and/or to develop them in line with the growing attractions on the outskirts of the parks. The dual mandate of the National Park Service—to promote and develop the parks for use while also protecting their natural features for the enjoyment of future generations—was immediately put to the test by a newly mobile nation. Indeed, I would suggest that this was not such a serious conflict until the automobile entered the parks.

Automobility was the essential component in the creation of this new preservationist ideal. It also had a considerable and noticeable impact on the natural world—particularly the public lands—which we should not lose sight of. Though Frederick Jackson Turner had ceremoniously declared the frontier, that identifiable line between civilization and wilderness, deceased as of the 1890 census, there remained as of about 1915 huge areas, many of which were in public ownership, that were wild, undeveloped, and virtually untouched by the modern world. They may not have been pristine, unpopulated, or even unworked, but they were roadless. And, by and large, the greatest threat to the wild condition of these areas, in the late

teens and throughout the 1920s, came from road building and the popularity of outdoor recreation. As recreational boosters called for more roads into these places and more development for tourists, and as the federal government became more and more willing to sponsor these developments, the founders of the Wilderness Society responded with calls to preserve these areas from such forces. These developments became even more of a threat as the energies of a nation in the midst of a depression were redirected to the public lands. More than anything else, the overwhelming New Deal activity on the public lands produced a sense of crisis that forced the hands of wilderness advocates.

More than a decade and a half after Aldo Leopold first proposed that the Forest Service preserve wilderness areas, he published his most biting and thorough critique of modern outdoor recreation and the type of relationship with the natural world it encouraged. "Conservation Esthetic," which first appeared in *Bird-Lore* in 1938 and was subsequently reprinted in *A Sand County Almanac*, was Leopold's most trenchant statement on the irony that defined conservation during the interwar years—that a growing cultural fascination with and appreciation of wild nature was one of the gravest threats to it. The essay was an indictment of a type of nature appreciation that had developed in the company of increased leisure, mechanization, commercial tourism, advertising, and boosterism.[24] It provides a fitting conclusion to this overview.

Recreation became an issue during the days of "the elder Roosevelt," according to Leopold, when urban Americans began turning "*en masse*, to the countryside." "The automobile," Leopold continued, "has spread this once mild and local predicament to the outermost limit of good roads—it has made scarce in the hinterlands what was once abundant on the back forty." He continued:

> Like ions shot from the sun, the week-enders radiate from every town, generating heat and friction as they go. A tourist industry purveys bed and board to bait more ions, faster, further. Advertisements on rock and rill confide to all and sundry the whereabouts of new retreats, landscapes, hunting-grounds, and fishing-lakes just beyond those recently overrun. Bureaus build roads into new hinterlands, then buy more hinterlands to absorb the exodus accelerated by the roads. A gadget industry pads the bumps against nature-in-the-raw; woodcraft becomes the art of using gadgets. And now, to cap the pyramid of banalities, the trailer. To him who seeks in the woods and mountains only those things obtainable from travel or golf, the present situation is tolerable. But to him who seeks something more, recreation has become a self-destructive process of seeking but never quite finding, a major frustration of mechanized society.[25]

In this brief paragraph, Leopold concisely listed the origins and components of his critique of outdoor recreation and its impact on the nation's hinterlands. Here in brief was the etiology of interwar concerns for wilderness.

Recreation had become big business, and increasingly the business imperatives were overtaking the very purpose of outdoor recreation. "In short, the very scarcity

of wild places," Leopold theorized, "reacting with the *mores* of advertising and promotion, tends to defeat any deliberate effort to prevent their growing still more scarce." Perhaps the scarcity of such places made Americans appreciate them all the more, but such scarcity also made these areas desirable and commercially exploitable. Calls for development of such recreational resources were bound to follow. "[W]hen we speak of roads, campgrounds, trails, and toilets as 'development' of recreational resources," Leopold continued, "we speak falsely in respect of this component. Such accommodations for the crowd are not developing (in the sense of adding or creating) anything." True development involved increasing opportunities for perception. And the "outstanding characteristic of perception," Leopold pointed out, "is that it entails no consumption and no dilution of any resource."[26]

"To promote perception," Leopold suggested, "is the only truly creative part of recreational engineering."[27] For Leopold, the most disturbing aspect of modernized forms of outdoor recreation, as they manifest themselves during the interwar years, was that they offered few opportunities to deepen one's perceptive capacities. "The trophy-recreationist has peculiarities that contribute in subtle ways to his own undoing," Leopold posited. "To enjoy he must possess, invade, appropriate." The modern recreationist, according to Leopold, was little more than a "motorized ant who swarms to continents before learning to see his own backyard, who consumes but never creates outdoor opportunities." Such were Leopold's concerns about the aesthetic limitations of modern recreation in nature.[28]

"It is the expansion of transport," Leopold proffered at the conclusion of the piece, "without a corresponding growth of perception that threatens us with qualitative bankruptcy of the recreational process. Recreational development is a job not of building roads into lovely country, but of building receptivity into the still unlovely human mind."[29] It was this "qualitative bankruptcy of the recreational process," particularly as it was manifesting itself on the national forests during the interwar years, which led Aldo Leopold to propose wilderness preservation. And it was his critique of outdoor recreation itself, the very force that undergirded a rising environmental consciousness, that make his early wilderness thought, and the thought of his colleagues at the Wilderness Society, an important example for contemporary wilderness advocates and critics.

Endnotes

1. This paper was a quick overview of my dissertation, "Driven Wild: The Intellectual and Cultural Origins of Wilderness Advocacy during the Interwar Years" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 1997). I have since published a revised version of that dissertation, *Driven Wild: How the Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
2. See Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, third edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 206–208; Stephen Fox, *The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 210–217.
3. "Summons to Save the Wilderness," *The Living Wilderness* 1, 1 (September 1935): 1.
4. William Cronon, "The Trouble with

Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," in *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: Norton, 1995), 69–90.

5. William Cronon's *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of Early New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983) is perhaps the best example of this effort.
6. See Mark Spence, "Dispossessing the Wilderness: Yosemite Indians and the Wilderness Ideal, 1864–1930," *Pacific Historical Review* 65, 1 (February 1996): 27–59; "Crown of the Continent, Backbone of the World: The American Wilderness Ideal and Blackfeet Exclusion from Glacier National Park," *Environmental History* 1, 3 (July 1996): 29–49. Spence has since published a book on the subject, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
7. Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: Norton, 1975). See also Cronon, *Changes in the Land*.
8. Benton MacKaye, *Employment and Natural Resources: Possibilities for Making New Opportunities for Employment through the Settlement and Development of Agricultural and Forest Lands and Other Resource*s (Washington, D.C.: Department of Labor, GPO, 1919).
9. MacKaye, "An Appalachian Trail," *Journal of the American Institute of Architects* 9 (October 1921): 325–330.
10. Along with Cronon's essay, another essay that suggests that wilderness is an ideal held by those ignorant of work in nature is Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in *Uncommon Ground*, 171–185.
11. Robert Shankland, *Steve Mather of the National Parks*, third edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 66; Stephen Mather, "Progress in the Development of the National Parks" (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1916), 10.
12. *Report of the Director of the National Park Service* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1916), 83.
13. *Report of the Director of the National Park Service* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1930), 64.
14. See Bruce Seely, *Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy-Makers* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
15. See William Tweed, *Recreation Site Planning and Improvement in the National Forest*s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Forest Service, GPO, 1981).
16. See "Proceedings of the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation," 68th Congress, 1st Session (December 1924); and "Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Outdoor Recreation," 69th Congress, 1st Session (January 1926).
17. On these themes, see Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds., *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980* (New York: Pantheon, 1983).
18. On this theme and its relation with various regional ideologies, see Robert Dorman, *Revolt of the Provinces: The Regionalist Movement in America, 1920–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
19. For an example of these concerns, see Aldo Leopold's essay, "Wildlife in American Culture," in *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987[1949]), 177–187.
20. On tourism, see Dean MacCannell, *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976); Jonathan Culler, "The Semiotics of Tourism," in Culler, *Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its Institutions* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 153–167.
21. The best source on auto camping and motor touring during this period is Warren Belasco, *Americans on the Road:*

From Autocamp to Motel, 1910–1945 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979). Much of my discussion on auto camping is indebted to Belasco's work.

22. "The Great American Roadside," *Fortune* (September 1934): 53–63, 172, 174, 177.
23. Belasco, 74.
24. Leopold, "Conservation Esthetic," *Bird-Lore* 40, 2 (March–April 1938): 101–109. Reprinted in *A Sand County Almanac*, 165–177.
25. Leopold, "Conservation Esthetic," 165–166.
26. Ibid., 172–173.
27. Ibid., 173.
28. Ibid., 176.
29. Ibid., 176–177.

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Yellowstone's Creation Myth

Lee Whittlesey and Paul Schullery

According to a still-popular tradition presented in literally thousands of publications and public speeches during the past ninety years, the idea for Yellowstone National Park originated with one man on a specific day. As this tradition has come down to us, on September 19, 1870, members of the Washburn exploring party, during a discussion around a campfire at the junction of the Gibbon and Firehole rivers, developed the idea of setting aside the geyser basins and surrounding country as a national park. According to Nathaniel Langford, who published his edited "diary" of this expedition in 1905, party member Cornelius Hedges proposed the idea and his companions heartily embraced it. This "campfire story," promoted and celebrated by several generations of conservation writers and historians, became well established in the popular mind as the way Yellowstone and national parks in general originated.[1]

But as early as the 1940s, historians doubted the tale. Its belief required ignoring known pre-1870 proposals that Yellowstone should be set aside as a public park, as well as ignoring that the process by which the park was established seemed to spring from a number of sources, and denying that the public-spirited sentiments attributed to the park's founders were only one of the impulses driving their actions. In the 1960s and 1970s, Yellowstone National Park's staff historian, Aubrey Haines, and an academic historian, Richard Bartlett, cast further doubt on the story by suggesting, among other things, that even the campfire conversation itself was a historically doubtful episode.[2]

These revelations set off a round of debate and reconsideration in the National Park Service over the validity of the story and its usefulness to park staff as an educational device. In both the National Park Service and among the larger community of managers, scholars, and the public, the credibility of the campfire story has since gradually declined, though it is still often invoked, especially by public speakers and in informal publications and other media about Yellowstone. On August 17, 1997, during his speech at Mammoth Hot Springs as part of the 125th anniversary celebrations, Vice President Al Gore referred to the campfire story, and, though acknowledging that there was some debate over it, invoked its symbolic power. We can't let it go.

The persistence of the campfire story as a part of the culture of conservation should not be surprising. For one thing, though the story has been shown to be simplistic and not at all fair to the complexities of history, it has not, and probably cannot, be conclusively proven untrue in *some* of its specifics. For another, stories this

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deeply embedded in the thinking and self-perception of so many people, true or not, do not yield themselves to easy disregard. Their existence depends upon much more than mere provability: the Madison campfire story has become a part of the historic and even the spiritual fabric of the National Park Service and of the conservation community. And, like any good story, it reveals greater complexities the harder we look at it.

As Aubrey Haines has pointed out, not only were ideas of preserving natural areas a part of the regional consciousness, but also Yellowstone itself had been considered as a possible candidate for such action well before the Washburn party set out. As early as 1865, Cornelius Hedges himself had heard another Montana citizen propose the idea of setting Yellowstone aside.[3]

We have reviewed the twenty or so first-hand contemporary accounts left by members of the Washburn party: a wealth of unpublished diaries and letters, as well as numerous articles and reports published shortly after the expedition returned to Montana settlements. As Aubrey Haines has showed and we confirm, none even mention the conversation or the idea of creating a national park, a term that Langford, many years later, claimed the group used that night.

In his diary, the following morning, Cornelius Hedges himself said only, "Didnt sleep well last night. got thinking of home & business."[4] But in 1904, when Hedges' diary was finally published in an edited version, he added the following critical passage as part of a larger footnote:

> It was at the first camp after leaving the lower Geyser basin when all were speculating which point in the region we had been through, would become most notable that I first suggested the uniting all our efforts to get it made a National Park, little dreaming that such a thing were possible.[5]

Langford's own account appeared the next year, reinforcing Hedges in several paragraphs that contained actual dialogue of the conversation. Langford's diary, now available in a paperback edition from the University of Nebraska, has long been one of the most popular early accounts of Yellowstone, and his account of the campfire story has served as the primary source for almost all later renditions of the tale. But what actually happened that night?

Only four party members left diary entries covering that night, and none mentioned any such conversation. This might seem odd, but is not in itself persuasive proof no conversation occurred; presumably these men talked around the fire on many evenings without feeling compelled to leave an account of it. These diaries, unlike Langford's, were quite brief, generally limited to distance traveled and a few outstanding sights seen; they were not ruminative or conversational. On the other hand, according to Langford, this must have been one of the most, if not the most, energizing, far-reaching conversations of the entire trip, so we might have hoped for some diarist to comment on it. In any case, by June of 1871, members of the Washburn party had published at least fifteen articles, letters, and extended episodes in newspapers and magazines. None of these publications said a word about this great idea that, according to Langford, had them all so excited, and, also according to

Langford, filled them with a sense of mission to spread the word about the national park idea. This is hardly the sort of ardent advocacy that Langford would later claim existed among these men as a result of their 19 September campfire conversation. These publications were their foremost opportunity to convince the public of the importance of protecting Yellowstone, and they completely missed their chance.

Besides this curious lack of talk about the national park idea, there are a host of other minor circumstantial and contextual problems with the story, most discovered and outlined by Haines in his official correspondence as Yellowstone historian in the 1960s and summarized in his book *The Yellowstone Story*. This book was published in 1977 after a several-year delay that seems primarily have been due to the discomfort his challenge to the campfire story caused among powerful National Park Service officials and alumni. These other problems include irregularities in Langford's later behavior relative to the campfire story. For example, in the extensive Langford collections in the Minnesota Historical Society, among the conspicuously missing items is the one diary covering his 1871 Yellowstone trip; it is thus impossible to check to see if he actually wrote his very long diary on the trip, or if some of it, including the discussion of the campfire conversation, was added later. Haines suspected that this was an all-too-convenient gap in the record, and so do we.

But besides this and other irregularities, we must also assert that Langford's discussion of the campfire conversation in his published "diary" of 1905 (which we prefer to think of as a reconstructed account) simply does not ring true. It has a contrived, hindsighted tone about it, as if manufactured later with a thematic tidiness that probably would not have characterized an authentic diary entry. The repeated use of the term "National Park" by participants in the conversation is suspect. No members of the party (including Langford) were to use the term even once in the spate of articles and letters they produced over the course of the next year. It all seems too perfect.

Though historians and other observers are perhaps too blithe and ready to call historical figures liars, such accusations should be made no more lightly than they would be made against living persons fully able to look you in the eye and defend themselves. And yet, we simply do not believe Langford in this case. Perhaps the years between 1870 and 1905 magnified the conversation in his mind until it was more than it had been, and he elaborated on it in his diary. Or, perhaps, to put the most cynical cast on it, Langford was what some have suspected him of being: a dishonest self-promoter. It is impossible to know at this point. But it is also impossible for us to believe his tale.

The evidence that the campfire conversation did *not* occur is all negative. That is, we may lack convincing evidence that it happened as Langford claimed, but we have no proof that it did *not* occur. For support of the existence of the conversation, we are entirely dependent on reminiscences from many years later by two people: one of whom, Cornelius Hedges, stood to gain great glory for originating such an important idea, and the other, Nathaniel Langford, who stood to bask in the considerable reflection of that glory. But while no early Yellowstone booster ultimately proved more energetic at promoting his own heroic image than did Langford, none of the others was more retiring in the face of promotion of his name than was Hedges.

Thanks to Haines's sleuthing, we know Langford to have been a fairly slippery and self-promotional character otherwise, and know Hedges to have been a remarkably trustworthy man.

Based on our review, not only of the sources and of Haines's analysis but also of the sometimes bitter debate over this issue in the National Park Service in the 1960s and 1970s, it seems most likely to us (as it did to Haines) that there may well have been some kind of conversation that evening that dealt with the question of the fate of the wonders of Yellowstone, but that it was not perceived as momentous by the participants.

What matters historically is the impact of that conversation. Did it lead to the establishment of Yellowstone National Park? It is in answering this question that Langford's self-promotion is most revealed and the campfire story most clearly transformed into a myth, or at least a legend:

> Langford and the generations who believed him portrayed the Washburn Party that night as public-spirited altruists, forgoing personal profit in favor of public service. The story portrayed the park idea as having such intuitive force of rightness that it was immediately embraced by all who heard it. For park defenders seeking to justify or enlarge their meager budgets, the campfire story provided a rhetorical position of moral unassailability. It also provided the park movement with perfect heroes: altruists who were so committed to protecting wonder and beauty that they would forgo all thought of personal gain. And it put the creation of the park movement in the hands of the people whose possession of it would have the most symbolic power: regular citizens.[6]

In fact, by the time of the campfire, Langford himself was already at least a part-time employee of the Northern Pacific Railroad, specifically hired to speak publicly on behalf of railroad promotion in his region. His Yellowstone talks in the East the following winter were funded by the Northern Pacific, and said nothing about the park idea; they described and thereby promoted the wonder, not the protection.[7] Hedges did not even vaguely refer in print to setting aside a reservation until early 1872, when he wrote about it in a similarly economically oriented vein, as part of a territorial resolution designed to convince Congress to transfer the Yellowstone region from Wyoming Territory to Montana Territory.[8]

A spirited defense of the campfire story by an assortment of National Park Service staff in the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasized that it was the publicity given Yellowstone by the Washburn party that led to the creation of the park: that, for example and most important, federal geologist Ferdinand Hayden only decided to explore Yellowstone in 1871 because he heard Langford speak in Washington, D.C.[9] Hayden's report on Yellowstone, including William Henry Jackson's stunning photography of features that were only rumored or verbally described before, is regarded as an important factor in persuading Congress to create the park the year after his 1871 survey. But a variety of historical evidence now suggests that Hayden had known about the rumored wonders of Yellowstone for several years, and was already well along in planning the Yellowstone survey by the time he heard Langford speak.[10]

Again and again, the simplistic traditional tale faces complications like these. These were real people, leading lives as complicated as our own, full of conflicting and sometimes complementary impulses:

> The only hope for a reasonable understanding of the origin of Yellowstone National Park is in admitting that none of this was simple. Human nature was not on holiday. The people who created Yellowstone were not exempt from greed, any more than they were immune to wonder. Some cared more for the money, some for the beauty. Some were scoundrels, some may have been saints.[11]

All of this is to say that they sound a lot like us.

The Madison campfire story is a kind of creation myth, which is to say that though it is not true in any strict historical sense, it is still very important, and in its way a valid and even essential part of the life of its adherents. According to one definition, "a creation myth conveys a society's sense of its particular identity….It becomes, in effect, a symbolic model for the society's way of life, its world view—a model that is reflected in such other areas of experience as ritual, culture heroes, ethics, and even art and architecture."[12] In the nearly venerable subculture of the National Park Service, and even in the greater society of the conservation movement, the Madison campfire story is such a model. Like many seminal events seen through romantic filters, it has in it a kind of truth, a loftier vision of human nature than those who admire it would ever expect themselves to sustain, and thus it offers us ideals that are no less admirable for being unattainable.

But even the best myths can wear out. We do not for a minute blame all those loyal, sincere people who happily believed the campfire story and made such good use of it in generating public support and affection for the national parks. They had no reason to believe otherwise. Today we do. Like the famous environmentalist speech attributed to Chief Seattle, the myth of the Kaibab deer population irruption and collapse, and other environmental fables, the Madison campfire story does not do justice to the complex realities we now know to characterize historical, ecological, or political process.[13]

The strongest criticism we received of earlier drafts of this manuscript, and of the more detailed analysis in a much longer paper we are also preparing, was that we are much too easy on the people who knowingly perpetuated the campfire story's inaccuracies. The greatest blame here goes to Langford, of course, who gets the lion's share of blame for the whole mess, but others contributed, especially those who persisted in pretending the story was true long after Haines's work should have convinced anyone to be more cautious. Indeed, Langford's version of the campfire story is alive and well today, in many public pronouncements in the conservation community, often from well-intentioned people who do not know any better. We do not know how to alert the ignorant that they are parroting bad history, any more than we know how to convince the people who simply prefer the story to historical truth that they are doing a disservice to their audiences and to the park. We hope, however, that the saga of the campfire myth will serve as a cautionary tale when all of us encounter similar situations and are tempted to fall back on simplistic views.

Just as national parks struggle constantly to reconcile the realities of scientific findings with the even more pressing realities of social preference, so do they face similar conflicts between historical scholarship, agency folklore, and popular understanding. The Madison campfire story promises to be with us, in one form or another—as historical fact for some people, as heroic metaphor for others—for many years to come.

The appearance of the long-lost 1870 expedition diary of Henry Washburn, unveiled at the humanities conference in Yellowstone National Park in October 1997, should warn us that there may yet be more evidence out there.[14] And whether or not new evidence ever surfaces, some day new analytical techniques may appear and existing evidence may yield new insights. But just as the evidence may grow or become more cooperative, so too will change the cultural temperament of the society that embraced and now doubts the campfire story. In the dynamic state of such things, the campfire story will be replaced or supplemented by other tales, some perhaps no more trustworthy but more appealing to the modern ear and sensibilities.

Endnotes

1. Hiram Chittenden, *The Yellowstone National Park, Historical and Descriptive* (Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company, 1915), 74, provides a stereotype of most later accounts of the campfire story, though quite often the tale was fancifully embellished and given extensive dialogue. Nathaniel Langford, *The Discovery of Yellowstone Park* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 117–118, provides the published version of Langford's account.
2. Hans Huth, "Yosemite: The Story of an Idea," *Sierra Club Bulletin* 33 (March 1948), 72. Carl P. Russell, "Madison Junction Museum Prospectus," typescript dated June 3, 1960, at Orinda, California, 19, cited in Aubrey Haines, letter to Robert Utley, stamped January 8, 1972, 2, authors' collection, courtesy of Aubrey Haines and Richard Sellars. Richard Bartlett, *Nature's Yellowstone* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), 198–208. Among the many documents relating to this subject and produced by Haines in his role as park historian in the 1960s, one of the first was his memo to the Assistant Superintendent, June 5, 1963, Yellowstone National Park Archives, Box H-3, "Madison Jct. Pageant." This was his first critique of the then-popular annual theatrical pageant held at Madison Junction ever year to celebrate the campfire story. Haines's more complete telling of the real story of the campfire and how it fit in the creation of the park is in the first volume of his book *The Yellowstone Story* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press and the Yellowstone Library and Museum Association, 1977), 1:129–130, 1:163–173.
3. Haines, *The Yellowstone Story*, 1:90.
4. Cornelius Hedges, "Excerpts from the Diary of Cornelius Hedges (July 6, 1870 to January 29, 1871), with a verbatim transcript of that portion concerned with the 'Yellowstone Expedition' from the time it left Helena, Montana Territory on August 17 until the return of the pack train to that city on September 27, Transcribed from the original diary in the Montana State Historical Society Library, Helena, Montana, by Aubrey Haines, Park Historian, November 5, 1962." Yellowstone National Park Research Library, manuscript file, 12.
5. Cornelius Hedges, "Journal of Judge Cornelius Hedges," *Contributions to the*

Historical Society of Montana, 5 (1904), 372.
6. Paul Schullery, *Searching for Yellowstone: Ecology and Wonder in the Last Wilderness* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 56.
7. Haines, *The Yellowstone Story*, 1:105, 1:165; *Yellowstone National Park: Its Exploration and Establishment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 59.
8. Louis Cramton, *Early History of Yellowstone National Park and its Relationship to National Park Policies* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932), 107.
9. E. T. Scoyen, letter to Superintendent Jack Anderson, March 23, 1971, Yellowstone National Park Archives, Box H-1, File 196.1.
10. Aubrey Haines, ed., *The Valley of the Upper Yellowstone* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965), xxix. Mike Foster, *Strange Genius: The Life of Ferdinand Vandeveer Hayden* (Niwot, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart, 1994), 202–204.
11. Schullery, *Searching for Yellowstone*, 61.
12. David Leeming and Margaret Leeming, *A Dictionary of Creation Myths* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), vii.
13. Randy Adams, "Chief Seattle & The Puget Sound Buffalo Wallow," *Borealis* 5(1), Spring 1994, 50–54. C. John Burk, "The Kaibab Deer Incident: A Long-persisting Myth," *BioScience* 23 no. 2 (February 1973), 113–114.
14. Lee Parsons, "The Diary of Henry Dana Washburn for the 1870 Exploration of the Yellowstone Wilderness," paper presented at "People and Place: The Human Experience in Greater Yellowstone," the Fourth Biennial Conference on the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, October 12–15, 1997, Mammoth Hot Springs, Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming. Proceedings in press.

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