Documents 59-89
MAY-JULY 1962: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, GENEVA, AND MOSCOW
59. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, May 30, 1962, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State Central Files, 762.00/5-3062. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 31. The conversation was held in Secretary Rusk's office at the Department of State. On May 23 Hillenbrand prepared a list of 19 talking points for this conversation. (Ibid., 762.00/5-2362) Seven supplementary points were included in a May 28 memorandum from Kohler to Rusk. (Ibid., 762.00/5-2862)
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs
After an initial exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary noted that the fact that he had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come in on an American national holiday had no special significance. He also pointed out, with reference to press reports about problems with our Allies, that these do not concern basic matters and thus were not related to the present discussion. One point discussed with our Allies involved something which Mr. Khrushchev had already rejected in his discussion with Mr. Salinger, namely, the composition of the Access Authority. The real issue is the central problem of our vital interests in Berlin, and this is between us and Moscow and not between the Western Allies.
After noting that the views of Chairman Khrushchev as expressed to Mr. Salinger had been fully reported to the President, the Secretary observed that nearly a year had gone by since the Vienna meeting between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. During this year a considerable number of talks had been held with the Soviet Union and various things had happened. Both sides seem to consider that these talks had been useful in clarifying respective points of view. However, we could not see that much real progress had been made. During this period two things have happened: (a) There had been a certain change in the de facto situation with the construction of the wall and the further incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany. We did not like these because they were contrary to four-power agreements, but taking account of the interests of both sides and the problem which East Germany constitutes for the Soviets, we did not do anything about them.
(b) In the talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko last fall, and subsequently, there has been mention of so-called broader questions. We had noted that, in regard to these, there seemed to be no real difficulty in coming to some sort of agreement and that they would fall into place if the central question of Berlin could be resolved. We did not find, however, any corresponding effort on the part of Moscow to take account of our vital interests. We have noted, for example, recent statements made in East Germany that agreement had been reached on a number of points such as nuclear non-diffusion, boundaries, and a non-aggression agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as if these were assured points to be stored away in the refrigerator. At the same time the Soviet Union's insistence on its original position with respect to West Berlin seems to be maintained.
The Secretary said he wanted to emphasize here that President Kennedy at Vienna had made completely clear that our commitments to West Berlin must be maintained. We could not accept the effects which a failure to do so would have on ourselves and the rest of the free world. A diminution of our position was not tolerable while, at the same time, the Soviets were consolidating their position in Germany. At Vienna, President Kennedy spelled out in considerable detail the relationship between West Berlin and US vital interests.He said that he had gained the impression that the USSR was presenting him with the alternatives either of accepting the Soviet position on Berlin or having a face-to-face confrontation. This led him to remark at one point that it appeared we were going to have a very cold winter, because a diminution of our position in West Berlin was simply not acceptable.
The Secretary noted that the Soviet Union had advanced various formulae as a substitute for the Western troop presence:
a. Having symbolic forces of the USSR, France, the UK and the US in West Berlin as guarantors of the so-called free city;
b. Having neutral troop contingents in West Berlin under UN aegis for a period of three to five years; and
c. Having symbolic forces in West Berlin of other smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for a period of three to five years.
These were simply variations of proposals that would eliminate the US in West Berlin, or reduce our position, and thus have the effect which President Kennedy had mentioned at Vienna.
We believe that both sides, the Secretary continued, have a serious rational interest in avoiding a head-on conflict over Berlin. It would be dangerous for the two sides to come to the table, with one thinking that under no circumstances would the other fight over Berlin. This might lead to the one side's passing beyond the limits of toleration. It was, of course, true that war was irrational, but other things were also irrational, such as failing to meet our elementary commitments. We were thus trying to talk out with the Soviet Government how this situation could be handled. On the basis of what had been said so far, it did not seem likely that any agreement could be reached on a permanent settlement of the German question. We believed that any settlement which did not rest on the basic attitudes and wishes of the German people was unlikely to be permanent. There were grave disadvantages in trying to make a lasting arrangement which would merely stimulate the worst aspects of German nationalism and unsettle central Europe. We have not pressed for such a permanent settlement because we saw no real prospect of agreement, given the Soviet position. If we were wrong in this judgment, we would be willing to look again.
It would also be possible, the Secretary went on, to proceed on the basis of the factual situation, provided that all facts of the situation are taken into account, not only those facts which satisfy the Soviets. Two facts are: that Germany is not united and that the West is in West Berlin. We see no reason why the situation could not be stabilized on the basis of these facts pending an eventual permanent settlement. There is nothing more abnormal in the Western presence in West Berlin than in any other aspect of the German situation. We would regret it if the geographic situation of West Berlin created any illusions. We are there and have a basic right to be there. We have not been able to put much content into the Soviet demand that our position in West Berlin be reduced or eliminated. It is not realistic to talk about West Berlin as a military base. The Soviet military would not pretend this to be true, surrounded as West Berlin is by many Soviet divisions. Our troops are there for the political purpose of underlining and demonstrating our commitment to the city. They are in no position to take aggressive action against anyone. We have heard the phrase frequently repeated by the Soviets that it is necessary to draw a line under World War II. If, in translation, this means the time had come to remove the West from West Berlin, this is something we could not accept. The time has not come for that. If we are unable to agree on a permanent settlement, and apparently so far on the factual situation, what is to be done? We have said that we are willing to proceed on the basis of existing facts, the Secretary pointed out, and also to take account of a number of other matters in which the Soviets and we have expressed some interest but which are not directly connected with Berlin. However, in our dealings with our Allies and our own people, we are unable to point to practically anything indicating that Moscow has made any effort to take our vital interests into account. We require a greater degree of reciprocity in these conversations. We cannot accept as a concession a mere reformulation of demands which amounts to the same thing, that is the reduction or elimination of the U.S. position in West Berlin. President Kennedy has more than once said that it is not compatible with the relationship between great powers for one to say that "What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable." We consider, therefore, that there must be a greater degree of recognition that U.S. vital interests are involved in Berlin.
The Ambassador would recall, the Secretary continued, that in an earlier meeting between them as well as at Geneva, we had suggested a framework within which we thought these discussions might profitably proceed. We had reduced this to a paper which might be called a modus vivendi, although the title was of secondary importance. We thought that this provided a way of handling how our disputes with the Soviets might be resolved. We had tried to avoid having either side subscribe to points which were publicly known to be contrary to the positions of either side. We have said that we cannot recognize the GDR. When Ambassador Thompson said this to Foreign Minister Gromyko, the latter responded that we already did recognize the GDR. It was true that we were prepared to act on the basis that the GDR is there. We do not pretend it does not exist, nor do our Allies. The GDR has trade offices in eleven Western countries and there are substantial trade relations between West and East Germany. We have tried to leave out of our paper points the acceptance of which would require either side to change its basic position. Chairman Khrushchev had said to Mr. Salinger that the Soviets would not recognize any right of the West to maintain troops in West Berlin. In our modus vivendi paper we did not ask that this be recognized, since this did not require recognition by the Soviets. We are there and not by any right granted by the Soviets, but for reasons which are well understood. Our modus vivendi paper was silent on this point. The paper left open the way, if the Soviets felt it to be necessary in the light of their public commitments to sign some agreement with the East Germans, for them to do so. It was not the signing of such an agreement which was of concern to us, but rather the practical consequences which it purported to have on our position in West Berlin. There was no way by which one-sided arrangements between Moscow and Pankow could affect our rights and positions in West Berlin, but the practical consequences of such an arrangement were important to us. We had supposed that, in a modus vivendi, certain points of agreement might be registered and others put into a process of discussion which would open the way to their solution by peaceful means. This might take some time, but time was less dangerous and expensive than haste if the latter were to involve a direct confrontation of the kind threatened over Berlin. We did not attach great importance to the precise wording of such a modus vivendi. There seemed to have been some confusion at Geneva as to precisely what we had in mind with our paper. Gromyko had handed us a working paper embodying the standard Soviet positions. This was not a paper designed to deal with the question of how we handled disagreement, but was a record of the elements which were disagreed and embodied in the Soviet position. Our paper was intended for another purpose: how to manage disagreement. It did not mention such matters as the Western occupation status or an all-Berlin solution, which would have been included in any full exposition of the Western point of view.
We consider, therefore, the Secretary went on, that our two Governments should think carefully about how they should deal with these matters and in which direction the discussions could be moved forward. We did not ask for a piece of paper recognizing our position in West Berlin. We are there. It ought to be possible to discuss and clarify some arrangements on access. The Secretary noted that he had said before that there was no inherent contradiction between free access and the authority of the East Germans in carrying out their responsibilities. This did not appear to be an insuperable problem.
The Secretary said he thought there might be an advantage in trying to find even some small point on which an advance could be made. This might be to devise some means to reduce the sense of tension existing in Berlin, which registered itself on both sides of the wall. Families were divided and could not visit each other and the flow of normal trade was made more difficult. Operation of the normal facilities of the city could best be worked out by arrangements between those responsible for the two sides of Berlin. We were interested in the possibility of increasing the well-being of the people of Berlin by facilitating their ability to work, to visit with each other, and to enjoy the cultural opportunities on both sides of the city. We could understand that the free flow of refugees that had previously taken place created great problems for the Soviets and the East Germans. It had never been our policy or that of the Federal Republic to stimulate this. When the refugees arrived in West Berlin we did what we could for them, consistent with our traditions. We did not consider it in our interest to have the flow proceed on the scale on which it proceeded. Without getting into the question of this kind of movement, we would like to see an improvement in the interchange between West and East Berlin. The Secretary then suggested a formula for the execution of an all-Berlin technical commission contained in the attachment to this memorandum of conversation, a copy of which he gave to Dobrynin at a slightly later point in the conversation.
The Secretary said he would like to add some comments on one or two other problems affecting the general situation. We did not fully understand why there seems to have been a tightening up of the situation. From our point of view, this seems to have been coming from the East, not from the attitudes or hopes of the West in these matters. Organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament. If there were movement on the one, there could be movement on the other in the sense that there would be mutual reinforcement for the effort to bring about normalization and reduction of tensions.
(See Separate Memoranda of Conversation dealing with subjects of disarmament and Laos for coverage of discussion at this point.)/2/
/2/Memoranda of these conversations are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Dobrynin Talks.
Resuming the general discussion, the Secretary stated that there was need to give serious thought to the broadest direction of our respective policies. In a period where Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy would have responsibilities for the policies of their two countries, they would have a chance to decide matters of the greatest importance. These would involve whether the two great social systems represented would be able to work out their long-range relationships leading to a normal relationship between states. On ideological grounds this did not appear easy, but on practical grounds and in terms of the interests of the two and of the countries associated with them the problem did not appear to be insuperable. However, the Eastern side must recognize and take account of what the other side considers its vital interests, and not merely of what it thought the vital interests of the other side ought to be. The possibilities ahead for a more normal relationship were very great, just as the tensions and dangers of an opposite course of action would be very great. If the latter development ensued, it would be cold comfort to know that so much history depended on these two countries.
On the subject of Berlin, the Secretary noted we had made an immediate suggestion regarding an establishment of an all-Berlin technical commission. We also hoped that the Soviet Government would try to review its position carefully in an effort to find a basis on which these questions could be taken up with better reciprocity. It was not a good situation to have the President report to the U.S. people and our allied leaders report to their people, that, despite the building of the wall, the absorption of East Berlin and the discussion of certain other broad points on which agreement might possibly be found, on matters of direct major concern to us, there was nothing to show that Moscow was interested in moving towards a settlement. We also hoped, the Secretary added, that the Soviets would give further attention to our modus vivendi paper looking at it as a possible means of handling the situation of disagreement.
Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the formula which the Secretary had handed him on the all-Berlin technical commission was intended as a response to the paper given the Secretary by Gromyko at Geneva. The Secretary said our modus vivendi paper, given to Gromyko at Geneva, was intended as our effort to deal with the general situation as we saw it, which we did not feel, for reasons already indicated, his principles paper adequately did. Dobrynin said that what the Secretary had mentioned today had already been discussed with Gromyko and contained nothing essentially new. His understanding had been that there would be a reply to the Gromyko paper on certain points. His impression had been that now was the time to obtain this reply. Or did the Secretary not feel free to discuss the Gromyko paper, but instead wished to make different points? The Secretary observed that he had not supposed from the Geneva discussions that Gromyko expected a written reply to his paper. Dobrynin said it was not a question of a written reply, but of a reply. The Secretary commented that, from his talks with him, Gromyko could identify those points which created the main difficulties between us. If he wanted comments in an informal working paper on his informal working paper, this could be considered. Dobrynin said that Gromyko had proposed a point-by- point discussion of his paper, but now the Secretary was suggesting a different approach. The Secretary pointed out that the purposes of the two papers had been different. Recalling the content of Mr. Gromyko's paper at Geneva, he did not believe we could carry any discussion very far without a greater element of reciprocity on the part of the Soviets. He did not see enough readiness to take account of our vital interests to promise that any discussion of the Gromyko paper would be profitable. Our paper was intended to advance the process of discussion.
The Secretary said he had been interested in one formulation of Chairman Khrushchev to Mr. Salinger. He had said that the Soviets could not recognize the right of the Western powers to maintain troops in West Berlin. If this were analogous to our statement that we could not recognize the GDR, that was one thing. In the context of the other remarks made by Chairman Khrushchev, we assumed that there was no significance to this formulation, but if there were, we would be glad to know about it. That would open up further possibilities.
With respect to the German question as a whole, Dobrynin stated, there were certain positive facts. The Soviets did attach some importance to the fact that exchanges on these matters were now going on. A peace settlement and a Berlin settlement were of great importance to the Soviet Union, which had fought together with the Western powers against Germany and had suffered much. The Soviet Union now wanted to draw a line under World War II. It was not trying to gain anything from the United States. What was desired was a recognition of the situation existing in Germany, that is the existence of two German states. During the War the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been allies, and had had the same aim of eliminating the Hitlerite aggressive forces. But now, the troops of the two countries have different aims. They were not allies any more. U.S. troops were in West Berlin not just as occupation troops, but as NATO troops. He was not speaking of the number of such troops, but of the fact that they were still there to fight the Soviets and against Soviet interests. It was, therefore, better to lessen tensions and to settle this matter so that relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. could be improved. Clearly, the Soviet Union wanted to have good relations with the United States, but certain circles in West Germany wanted the two countries to clash. Otherwise, their "Great German" schemes could not be carried out. The Soviet Union was not interested in such a clash. In response to the Secretary's query as to who precisely in West Germany wanted such a clash, Dobrynin said that many people demanded the restoration of the German borders as before, and he was sure the Secretary knew who they were as well as he did. Such a restoration could not be obtained without U.S. assistance; hence they wanted a clash between the Soviet Union and the U.S. A settlement of the situation in West Berlin would be good for both countries. If this could not be obtained, then we might come to the point where we would be confronted by a great test. The Soviet Union was trying to avoid this and to seek a solution. If one were to take the substance of the Secretary's statement, Dobrynin continued, and what is being discussed in the West German press, what the Western powers were trying to do was to find a settlement of the German and West Berlin problem within the framework of the old occupation situation, and without taking account of the new situation in the world and in Europe. The Secretary asked what he meant by the "new situation." Dobrynin responded the war has been over for more than 17 years, and we could not live forever in a state of war. It was necessary to draw a line under World War II in a legal sense. The Soviet Union wanted to legalize the situation of peace. Whether one liked it or not, there were two Germanies. The Secretary commented that when we talk of the fact of the two Germanies, we also must say that our presence in West Berlin and free access thereto are facts.
Dobrynin said that the general line of the Western approach was very clear; it was an open secret which could be read in the papers. The substance of the West German proposals as they had appeared in the press had the intention of spreading the occupation rights existing in West Berlin to the communications between West Berlin and the outside world. They wanted to continue four-power responsibility, but what responsibility did the four powers have? Ninety-five per cent of all traffic to West Berlin was the responsibility of the GDR. Five per cent was controlled by the Soviets under agreement with the East Germans. When the peace treaty was signed the Soviet Union would give that five per cent back to the East Germans. It could not be said that even now there was any four-power responsibility for access. The Secretary said he could not accept such a formulation. Dobrynin observed that the Secretary had spoken of facts. It was a fact that ninety-five per cent of all traffic to West Berlin was now the responsibility of the GDR. The Soviets had felt that it was a good idea, after the Geneva discussions, for him (Dobrynin) and the Secretary to now proceed with the positive points which had been discussed with Gromyko, but now three or four meetings had taken place in Washington and "we had not made a single move." The Secretary commented that he was glad that Dobrynin had said "we."
Dobrynin stated that in the respective positions of the two countries there were certain things in common which could be settled without too much difficulty. However, as Chairman Khrushchev had said to Mr. Salinger, and Gromyko and he to the Secretary, all these questions could be easily solved, but only if there were a settlement of the main question--liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. He referred to the fact that the Secretary had many times raised the question of guarantees of access. The Soviets had accepted the idea of an arbitration body or board. This had been a move on their part, after the President had first raised the subject of an access authority with Adzhubei. The Soviets were ready to discuss this but they could only accept the idea if there were agreement on the main point--ending the occupation regime in West Berlin. When speaking of an access authority, the Soviets had always made it clear this was not a control organ over access, for the access routes go through the sovereign territory of the GDR, which has the only real right to exercise the right of a sovereign state within its sovereign territory. It was difficult to expect that the GDR and the Soviets would agree to give rights which already belong to the GDR to an international body. When the peace treaty was signed, the GDR would have all its sovereign rights over access. The Soviet Government was not prepared to discuss suggestions aimed at strengthening the remnants of the occupation regime instead of its liquidation. Dobrynin noted that the so-called West German proposals had not been discussed, but as these had appeared in the press, they were completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union which was unwilling to consider anything aimed at strengthening the occupation regime. The Soviet Union still hoped that an agreement could be reached on West Berlin and a German peace settlement. It felt that there was a possibility of ending the occupation regime without inflicting moral damage on the U.S. or Soviet Governments. They could declare to their people that they had come to an agreement directed at achieving closer relations between both countries. He, therefore, had to say that while there was some glimmering of hope for an agreement, his Government could not accept the maintenance of occupation rights in West Berlin, and his Government could not agree on a settlement without a settlement of this question. As Chairman Khrushchev had said, this was the test of relations and if agreement were not reached, then a serious situation would result. "The key was in your hands."
Reviewing his notes, Dobrynin observed that the Secretary had today merely repeated once more what he had said to Gromyko. The Secretary said that he had suggested that the Soviet Foreign Minister come back to our Geneva suggestion and take a new look at this method of handling the problem. Paging through his notes, Dobrynin observed that the Secretary had mentioned U.S. relations with its Allies. The Soviet Union did not try to influence these relations and at their last meeting on April 27 the Secretary had said he was going to Athens to exchange views with his Allies. Did the Secretary's remarks reflect this exchange of views? The Secretary responded that there was no problem at the moment of any importance between the Allies affecting this discussion. The central problem is what Dobrynin had called the central problem.
Changing the subject again, Dobrynin said that, with reference to GDR recognition, the Soviet Union did not ask formal recognition, but recognition of the sovereignty of the GDR and that it must enjoy all sovereign powers within the limits of international law. The Soviet Union would like to sign a peace treaty after reaching an agreement with the Western powers and then put this agreement into the peace treaty.
As to the all-Berlin technical commission, Dobrynin continued, this was not a main issue between the Soviet Union and the U.S. This was a matter for the Germans to discuss among themselves. It was their business. If they wanted something of this sort, the Soviet Union would be prepared to help. It was not its job. As far as the wall was concerned, he added, the Soviet Union had no authority to discuss this matter on behalf of the GDR Government and it was not a proper subject for discussion with the Secretary.
Dobrynin stated that his Government likewise felt the seriousness of developments in other areas. The Secretary was aware of how the disarmament situation stood. The two countries agreed on one thing, namely that the security of both countries had to be respected. The basic concept was that when the first stage of disarmament had been completed, there would be no relationship of advantage or disadvantage and both sides would have the same amount of security. He could agree that there was no direct connection between disarmament and the Berlin problem, but that they were related. The settlement of the Berlin question would obviously have an effect on disarmament, since distrust between the two countries was an important element in the situation. If the Secretary wished to discuss any matters arising out of the Zorin-Dean talks, or if the Secretary had any concrete proposals how these matters could be handled better, he would be prepared to engage in such discussions.
Again referring to his notes, Dobrynin referred to the Secretary's remarks on co-existence and said that it was the Soviet Union's view that the two countries should really co-exist. In the ideological sphere this was more difficult, but in the factual sphere the Soviets felt that peaceful co-existence was both possible and required. There were no insuperable problems between the two.
The Secretary said he wanted to comment on a few points made by Dobrynin. The latter had referred to our troops in West Berlin as being there to fight the Soviets. They were not there to fight anyone if West Berlin was left alone. They were there to insure the safety of West Berlin. On the question of rights, he continued, neither in terms of international law nor the specific post-war arrangements was there any way by which the Soviet Union could create a situation in East Germany which modified our rights in West Berlin. If we differed on this, we wanted the Soviets to be clear on how we saw the situation. On the other hand, there was no need for practical interference with the authorities in East Germany in the maintenance of free access. This was something that could be resolved, but we did not want to leave the impression that we think East German sovereignty can in any way take over our rights in West Berlin.
On the central question, the Secretary continued, Dobrynin had said the key was in our hands. This was an expression of the lack of reciprocity which is at the heart of the problem. Far-reaching proposals for change have come from the Soviet side. It is not we who have developed the sense of crisis over West Berlin. We cannot accept the proposition that the Soviet Union should make such proposals and then claim that the key is in our hands in the sense that we must accept them. One cannot deal with the United States in that way. The key is in Soviet hands in that it has made the proposals. We are willing to try to find a common key. We require some reciprocal recognition that our vital interests are involved. In that sense the key is in the Soviet hands.
As to the technical commission in Berlin, the Secretary added, our thoughts were that anything that reduces tension between Germans in Berlin would be beneficial to us, since such a reduction of tension would be transmitted to us. Dobrynin said the two sides could not deal with this matter in the fashion suggested in the paper handed him. The Secretary said this was just a suggested formulation. Dobrynin said it was up to the Germans and not to us. The Secretary asked whether he did not think this was a matter where we could not exercise a certain influence. Dobrynin merely repeated that it was the Germans' job, not ours. Mr. Kohler noted that he had read that the wall had represented a decision of the Warsaw Pact powers.
Dobrynin said that, if the Secretary preferred to use the term "common key", the Soviets were prepared to accept this. He did not understand the Secretary's remarks, however, about GDR sovereignty. The Secretary said he had been referring to an article in an East German paper that we had already recognized the sovereignty of East Germany. Dobrynin commented that the U.S. may be overly sensitive on this. The Soviets understood this, but what they wanted was that the sovereign right of the GDR in its own territory be recognized. The Secretary noted that he had said the Soviets could not give East Germany something which the Soviets did not have. Dobrynin injected that, with the peace treaty, the GDR would enjoy full sovereignty. The Secretary said "Not without our consent." Dobrynin responded "This is where we differ."
Dobrynin said he had noted that the Secretary was planning another trip to Europe. The Secretary said he might make such a trip, but only for a few days. At Athens he had not had time to discuss many problems of interest to the West other than Berlin and Germany, and he wanted to deal with these, such as the common market. Dobrynin said he thought this was mainly Undersecretary Ball's subject.
As the conversation terminated, it was agreed that Dobrynin would report back to Moscow and when he received new instructions would request a further meeting with the Secretary.
Attachment
SUBJECT
Berlin
The two sides declare that they will seek the agreement of the authorities in West and East Berlin to establish an all-Berlin technical commission to be composed of officials appointed by the authorities in West and East Berlin to deal with such matters as the facilitation of the movement of persons, transport, and goods between West and East Berlin, and the regulation of public utilities and sewage.
60. National Security Action Memorandum No. 158/1/
Washington, May 31, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, and General Taylor.
TO
Secretary of State
SUBJECT
Contingency Plans for Berlin
The President has now approved the development of contingency plans for Berlin on the basis of acceptance of a requirement for passports for West German access to West Berlin, but rejection of any attempt by East German authorities to require visas for such access.
In approving such contingency planning, the President explicitly reserves the right of the United States Government to review its position in the light of the actual development of events. In particular, approval of this planning should imply no automatic American undertaking to extend military protection to civilian traffic under any specific set of circumstances.
McGeorge Bundy
61. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, June 5, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.54/6-562. Secret. Drafted by Day on June 4 and cleared by OSD/ISA and JCS.
SUBJECT
Proposed Directive for Meeting Harassment of Allied Autobahn Convoys
There are at present no explicitly stated US or tripartite rules to determine the conduct of convoys which are held up by the Soviets or East Germans on the autobahn except under the specific conditions envisaged in the Live Oak plans. General Norstad has believed that he has had sufficient authority in his capacity as commander of US Forces in Europe to order some employment by US convoys of forceful means (short of use of weapons except in self-defense). We considered it desirable, however, to make the rules explicit so that they could be reviewed in Washington and could be adopted by the UK and France. In response to requests for a plan embodying such rules, therefore, General Norstad prepared a directive which he at first submitted to the US alone. Now, in slightly modified form which takes into account the comments Embassy Bonn and our Mission in Berlin made concerning the first draft, he has submitted it to the US, UK, France and Germany through Live Oak. He has asked for consideration of all four governments on an urgent basis. A copy of this second draft is enclosed (SHLO 5-00288)./2/
/2/Not attached to the source text, but a copy is attached to another copy of Rusk's memorandum in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542. On July 17 Ausland retyped the text of SHLO 5-00288 and in between its paragraphs added comments and suggestions made on them by the Ambassadorial Group and various U.S. posts. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1862)
In essence the proposed directive would authorize the following actions by an Allied convoy:
1) If the convoy is denied passage by administrative resistance (e.g., refusal to clear it through a Soviet checkpoint), by undefended or passive obstacles which can be removed by means integral to the convoy (pioneer tools, unarmed personnel) or by a small group of troops bodily blocking the way, the convoy commander after a series of protests and warnings will proceed forward.
2) If initially, or after first proceeding as in paragraph 1 above, the convoy encounters defended obstacles or obstacles which cannot be removed or crossed with means integral to the convoy, if the troops blocking the way do not move aside, or if sizeable troop units are encountered disposed for defense, the convoy commander after a series of protests and demands for passage, will withdraw when ordered to do so by the Berlin Commandant concerned. During this operation the convoy will fire only in self-defense and only if fired upon. Follow-up action to withdrawal is provided in some detail.
A vital aspect of this plan is that it spells out the limitations on the degree of force a convoy will be authorized to use in these circumstances. However, the course of action envisaged should not be considered as leading to use of force in all or most cases. Actually, we are dealing with Soviet efforts to harass, not block, Allied access. Our threat and evident willingness to proceed in the face of this harassment can be expected to demonstrate to the Soviets that harassment will if persisted in bring upon them the full consequences of blockage, which we do not believe they are at this time willing to incur. A plan for following up our threat is necessary, but only for the unlikely event the Soviets either do not believe it or are willing to go farther than harassment.
I consider that, if you approve the proposed course of action, it should be adopted for US use pending tripartite approval. If the British and French will not adopt it, but have no objection to our doing so, we should retain it. We have the greatest number of convoys and hence have greater need for such a plan. However, we should reconsider the plan in the face of British or French objections of such a nature that their cooperation, following US failure to obtain access with the plan, would be doubtful. Lack of Allied support at that stage would leave the US in the difficult position of having failed in a forceful and public test of will, but without suitable measures to press the matter further. We should make very effort to avoid significant weakening of the plan in such reconsideration, however.
It should be noted in this regard that there has been scheduled for June 9 a US convoy movement which, given its character and the recent pattern of Soviet harassment, may be held up at the checkpoint. Even if US consideration of the plan is completed by that time, tripartite study will likely still be in progress. As pointed out in the first paragraph above, however, General Norstad considers he has sufficient authority to order action along the lines of the plan even if formal approval has not been given to it by that time. If prior to June 9 it is evident that the British or French object so strongly to the proposed directive that unilateral use of this course of action by the US would jeopardize their future cooperation, we should consider whether General Norstad should be instructed not to authorize action along those lines while the problem is being reexamined.
I recommend that you approve the course of action proposed by General Norstad, together with the above considerations concerning its unilateral adoption by the US. This recommendation has the concurrence of the JCS and Defense./3/
/3/On June 25 Bundy transmitted to Secretaries McNamara and Rusk NSAM No. 167, which reads: "The President has approved the course of action for dealing with Soviet and/or East German harassment of Allied autobahn convoys which the Secretary of State proposed in his memorandum of June 5, 1962." (Ibid., NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316)
62. Editorial Note
On June 7 the Soviet Union transmitted to the Embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in Moscow notes protesting "a series of dangerous provocations" by the West Berlin police and "Fascistic elements" against the German Democratic Republic. In particular the Soviet Union protested the firing by West Berlin police into the Soviet Sector. In their June 25 reply the Western powers stated that the West Berlin police were responding to shots fired by Eastern zone guards attempting to stop refugees from fleeing the Soviet Sector and noted that the difficulties in Berlin were due exclusively to East Berlin authorities acting with the full consent of the Soviet Union. For texts of the notes, see Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1962, pages 97-99.
63. Editorial Note
In a footnote to his biography of Robert Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger stated:
"On June 18, 1962, Bolshakov gave Robert Kennedy a message from Khrushchev. Khrushchev said that, if the United States continued to insist on occupation rights in West Berlin, `the Soviet Union will face the necessity of signing a peace treaty with the GDR and the question of liquidation of war remnants will be solved and on this basis the situation in West Berlin--a free demilitarized city--would be normalized.'" (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, page 535)
Although Schlesinger cites the Robert Kennedy papers as a source for this quote, no record of the message has been found at the Kennedy Library.
64. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 18, 1962, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1862. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on June 19. The conversation was held in Secretary Rusk's office at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs, EUR
Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had brought the Secretary's remarks at their last meeting/2/ to the attention of his Government and had now received appropriate instructions. He then read from an English text along the following lines:
/2/See Document 59.
(Mr. Hillenbrand was able after the meeting to check a number of points with Counselor Kornienko, who had the Russian text of Dobrynin's instructions, but no aide-memoire or other written document was handed over.)
The Soviet Union has agreed to an exchange of views with the United States Government on a peace settlement with the aim in mind of reaching a wide agreement which would contribute towards mutual understanding consistent with the interests of both sides. The Secretary's statement had been a repetition of what had already been said many times: That the United States would not participate in a German peace treaty, whether in a single treaty with the two German states or in separate treaties with the two German states. At the same time the United States is evading an agreement which could be concluded on such a basis that thereafter the Soviet Union could complete its peace treaty with the GDR and thus effect a mutually beneficial solution of the West Berlin and other related problems.
We now face the task of concluding a peace treaty and eliminating the vestiges of World War II. The most urgent situation requiring normalizing is that of West Berlin. This cannot be on the basis of the preservation of occupation rights, that is on the basis of the continuing presence of the occupation forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France. It is impossible to continue a useful discussion of the German problem by attempting to lay aside the basic question of West Berlin and the liquidation of the occupation regime therein. To do this would be to preserve a dangerous hot-bed which could blow up the entire world.
If nothing was said about ending the occupation regime and withdrawing the occupation forces in the draft principles paper which the Secretary gave Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva, this was a weakness not a strength of this paper. It seeks to fix the present abnormal situation of West Berlin for an indefinite period and to engage both sides in indefinite talks. It would thus not lead to an arrangement which would draw a line under World War II.
The Soviet Union cannot accept any agreement perpetuating the occupation regime which is now constituted by NATO troops. The forces in West Berlin are not the same kind of forces as were there in 1945. Then they were directed at the elimination of German militarism and Nazism and at averting a further threat of World War. The occupation of West Berlin today constitutes a specific kind of NATO military base in which NATO forces are stationed.
The Soviet Government has made a number of concessions in its various proposals to have token forces of the four occupying powers in West Berlin, or to have neutral or UN troops in West Berlin. To these has been added the suggestion that symbolic forces of certain smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries might be stationed there. In the latter case these forces should naturally operate under the UN flag and not as representatives of the two blocs. They would be in West Berlin on the basis of a new treaty. Thus a clash between the US and the USSR would be avoided and account would be taken of prestige considerations on both sides. These troops would be a kind of symbol of the will of the participants not to allow outside interference in the affairs of West Berlin.
The Soviet Union had a right to expect that the United States would approach the Soviet proposals objectively, but the US has shown no willingness to compromise or to take account of the interests of both sides. The Secretary of State has said that the United States does not require recognition of the presence of its occupation forces since this is a fact. This presence allegedly gives the United States the right to stay indefinitely in Berlin. The Secretary has indicated that this is not a subject for discussion at all. But if the United States does not want to discuss this subject, then what is there to discuss? The continuing presence of occupation troops contradicts the aim of seeking a mutually acceptable solution and bringing an end to World War II. The US has also referred to its rights under the quadripartite agreements and the unconditional surrender of Germany. But these did not establish a basis for the indefinite occupation of any part of Germany. They envisaged a peace treaty and drawing a line under World War II. The US assumes unilaterally that it has an obligation to defend West Berlin and the rights of its population. This cannot, however, create additional rights with respect to presence or access. As is known, the Soviet Union and the GDR acknowledge the right of West Berlin to determine its own life. They are also willing to give international guarantees either by having UN troops there or under the most recent formula of troops from the two blocs under the UN flag. Any unbiased person would have to admit that these would be an improvement over occupation troops which are a constant cause of friction.
When the United States insists on the maintenance of the occupation, it is difficult not to get the impression that it cares less for the rights of the population of West Berlin than it does for NATO military interests. The US has said that it does not recognize any GDR right to control traffic to West Berlin. The GDR does not need such a right. Even now it controls 95% of all such traffic. When speaking of access therefore, one is talking only of 5% of the total traffic. The only basis for an agreement on such access would be one combining the principles of freedom with respect for the rights of the GDR. The Soviet Union is surprised, therefore, that the US has thought of the idea of some sort of international body, with a membership of thirteen states, which would exercise rights in and crossing the territory of the GDR. Such a proposal is unacceptable in view of its inconsistency with respect for the rights and sovereignty of the GDR. How could one expect the GDR to give up what it has to a body devised to deprive the GDR of its sovereignty over a part of its territory? This would not better but worsen relations between countries.
The Soviet Union has put forward its proposal for an international organ to act as an arbiter. This was a step towards the US position. It would not control access, however, but be an arbitral body to pronounce judgments. It would not play master over the territory of the GDR or interfere with its sovereignty.
It will be impossible to come to an agreement if the Western Powers try to force through Adenauer's claim to Berlin as a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany or his ideas on an access treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany is aggressive and threatening. Every delay in achieving a peace settlement encourages the Federal Republic to new provocations organized in West Berlin, for example, such hostile actions against the Socialist countries as those planned in West Berlin for the middle of July. (When queried by the Secretary as to his reference to the middle of July, Dobrynin checked with Kornienko's Russian text and corrected his statement to "the middle of June".)
As for the US suggestion regarding an all-Berlin technical commission, it had to be pointed out that, after having taken certain defensive measures, the GDR made certain proposals to the West Berlin Senat for agreement on measures to facilitate movement between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR. No favorable response was received. This could not be a subject for talks between the US and the USSR since it concerned a matter within the exclusive competence of the GDR. Its solution was an internal matter for the Germans themselves.
On a number of items some basis for understanding did seem to be emerging.The Soviet Government did not underestimate these. If the US were reasonable, agreement could be reached on them, but the principal task in connection with drawing a line under World War II is to settle the West Berlin question. As the Warsaw Pact powers had recently stated, they were willing to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. If the Western Powers did not show a similar desire, then the Warsaw Pact countries would conclude a peace treaty with the GDR with all the ensuing consequences. This would mean that the GDR would acquire all the rights of a sovereign state and the vestiges of war would be completely liquidated. West Berlin would become a free demilitarized city and the rights of the occupation troops to remain there would not be recognized. All countries wishing to have contact with West Berlin would have normal negotiations with the GDR.
As Chairman Khrushchev had said recently to Mr. Salinger, it was unwise for the two sides to try to frighten each other. They both have ample power. To threaten to resort to the argument of force does not help understanding. If anyone tries to threaten, he should realize that he is doomed to failure. It was believed that the US Government was aware of this.
Returning to the analogy of the Japanese Peace Treaty, it had to be pointed out that the US and the USSR had fought together against Japan and that the Japanese had also surrendered to the USSR. Nevertheless, a separate peace treaty had been signed with Japan depriving the Soviet Union of its rights as an occupying power. Now the US wants to keep its occupation troops in West Berlin despite such a peace treaty, even though this would merely lead to tensions and prevent the elimination of the vestiges of the war. If it is true that at the time of the San Francisco conference the US had certain ground to believe that it enjoyed a military advantage over other powers; this time has now passed. As the President recently said, there is now an equality of power. Regard must, therefore, be taken for the position of other sides. This must be understood. If in fact the Western Powers force the Soviet Union to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, they will find themselves in the same position as the USSR after the Japanese treaty.
The Soviet Union does not want to see the glimpse of hope and understanding between it and the US fade. It, therefore, hopes that the US Government will not yield to those who are trying to force a collision.
(This concluded the formal statement of Dobrynin's instructions.)
The Secretary said he was going to address a rather curious question to Dobrynin as Ambassador. He wondered what his answer would be if he were to ask the Ambassador whether he saw anything new in what he had just said. Dobrynin responded that his remarks were intended as a summary of the Soviet position. The Soviets had received no reply to the proposal which Chairman Khrushchev had made as to the possibility of having troops in Berlin from the two pacts. The Secretary stated he believed from what had been said earlier that Dobrynin knew we could not accept this proposal. Dobrynin asked whether our definite reply was that this was not acceptable. The Secretary said "yes".
The Secretary then gave his first observations on Dobrynin's statements. He said that he did not think we could accept full responsibility for the phenomenon of repetition. In its essential aspects the Soviet position which had just been outlined had been regularly repeated since 1958. We do not believe that constant repetition will of itself produce a series of proposals from the West which could involve continuous attempts at compromise leading to erosion of the central necessity of our position in West Berlin. It is true that we have repeated this central point over and over, but there has been repetition on both sides. With reference to Dobrynin's statement about our remarks as to attempting to perpetuate the presence of our troops in West Berlin, we have not used this term. We hope that in time it will be possible to reach a permanent settlement of all outstanding German questions. We do not believe that we can reach such an agreement under present circumstances. We cannot seem to reach agreement either on a permanent settlement or on a definition of the de facto situation. Perpetuity is a very long time and we have not ourselves thought of the question in terms of perpetuity. With respect to a question like that of Berlin which is extremely difficult and central, time can have a useful effect. As the President had indicated to Chairman Khrushchev in his communication, he was encouraged to think that a way was opening to a settlement of the issues of Southeast Asia with particular reference to Laos. We hoped the Geneva conference would resume and achieve this result. This would be an important step. We also hoped that there were other points, such as outer space and disarmament, where improvements in our relations could occur. The more the general atmosphere improves, the more possible it will be to sort out the relationships between the two countries and the more manageable the central issue of West Berlin might become. An improvement of conditions in East Berlin and East Germany might make this more manageable.
The Secretary said he found it difficult to attach importance to the charge that the occupation troops in West Berlin were NATO troops. Western Europe and the United States united in the NATO agreement under circumstances with which Dobrynin was familiar. In an analogous sense the Warsaw Pact organization had been formed. The facts that our troops are in West Berlin and that we are members of NATO does not change the reality that our troops are there under earlier arrangements and that these arrangements cannot be changed and still have us meet our commitment to West Berlin. When in our modus vivendi paper we said we were not asking the Soviets to recognize the occupation status, we were trying to take the prestige question into account. Dobrynin had mentioned it was true that our prestige was heavily involved. If Soviet prestige is involved in the removal of Western forces from West Berlin, this was a problem created by the USSR for itself. Under these circumstances, it was not easy for us to solve the problem of Soviet prestige on the basis which the USSR proposed. Our modus vivendi did try to take account of Soviet prestige.
The Secretary went on to say that he was disappointed not to recognize in what Dobrynin had said any element of reciprocity in taking account of the other's vital interests which, in their last talk, he had requested the Soviets attempt to do. Dobrynin kept using the words "concession" and "compromise". The lack of reciprocity was disturbing in the Soviet reference to certain things which were stated not to be open for discussion. Such subjects as German reunification or solution of the Berlin problem on an all-Berlin basis seemed to be beyond discussion. We cannot accept that only the diminution of our rights and commitments is open to discussion. We do not see that necessary reciprocity here which would open the way to handling this admittedly complicated but at the same time simple and potentially dangerous problem. If Moscow were attempting to consider how things look from our side, its reference to relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic could not be made as it is made. After all, the Soviets maintain that East Berlin is part of the GDR. In the face of this, it would be perfectly normal for us to say that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic. Years ago, we entered a reservation which prevented an application of the Federal Republic's constitution to Berlin in order to be in a position to deal with these matters on a four-power basis. Now the Soviets say that East Berlin is part of the GDR and that is the end of it.
With reference to Dobrynin's mention of the discussion of force, the Secretary continued, he thought it right that neither the US nor the USSR should attempt to settle questions with each other by threats or reference to a war which the few survivors would never be able to understand. But the pressure of force comes from what the Soviets have said and from what Dobrynin had repeated today with respect to the consequences of the proposed agreement with the GDR. It was this pressure, intimidation and attempt to frighten which had given an atmosphere of crisis to the Berlin situation. This was dangerous and unnecessary, the Secretary added, but he wanted to identify that this pressure had been exerted by the Soviets on one of the key problems from the very beginning.
The Secretary said he would not go into any detail on the Soviet attempt to draw an analogy with the Japanese Peace Treaty. We could provide extensive notes as to why we did not consider this really relevant. Soviet forces had not been in occupation in Japan. Soviet cooperation with us in the Japanese war had been of three days' duration, although we had made strenuous efforts to enlist Soviet cooperation in that war at a time when we were also fighting Nazi Germany. There had been no quadripartite occupation of Japan, no zones of occupation and no Soviet presence. There had been general agreement among the community of states as to the terms of the Japanese treaty, although the Indians thought they were too severe and the Burmese thought them not to be severe enough. The Secretary added that he believed Chairman Khrushchev had told the President at Vienna that the Soviets should have signed the Japanese treaty. Thus, there were many differences which do not make the Japanese analogy relevant to the present situation.
As to access, the Secretary continued, the Soviets are aware from the newspapers that we have had some thoughts which had been under discussion among us on an International Access Authority. At an earlier point, Ambassador Thompson had indicated some general ideas on the subject to Foreign Minister Gromyko. We were, of course, familiar with what Gromyko had said at Geneva on a four-power arbitral group. The Secretary said he thought there were matters involving access which could perhaps be worked out, but what makes them secondary is to link the access question with the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. It did not seem profitable to try to find out whether such a four-power body would act unilaterally or what precise authority it would have as long as the link with troop withdrawal were maintained. At Geneva there seemed to be a time when this did not appear to be a fundamental point in Soviet thinking, but this now does seem to have been clarified as a fundamental point. Therefore, there did not seem to be much prospect in going down this trail.
These were his first observations, the Secretary concluded. He would report to the President and would be seeing his colleagues among the Western Foreign Ministers on his forthcoming visit to Europe. We would review the whole situation and presumed the Soviet side would do likewise, but he thought the central point continued to be the one which Dobrynin had indicated. It was the key that would unlock these other doors. The Secretary could also repeat arguments one through twenty, but did not feel any need to do so.
Dobrynin said he would like to reverse the Secretary's question and ask what is new in the US position. The Secretary commented that this was an important point. If one looked back on the past year of discussions between the two governments, one noted that we had made a considerable effort to draw attention to certain points we thought of interest and of importance to the Soviets and on which we considered some form of agreement might be possible. We have thus over the past year been injecting new elements. The Soviets, on the other hand, seemed to be putting them in a bag, tying the noose and then asking, "what's new?" Then when we get to the point of West Berlin, they continue to ask "what's new?"
Dobrynin here reviewed what he called the four Soviet variations for replacement of Western occupation troops in West Berlin: symbolic units of the four former occupying powers, of neutral countries, of UN forces and of certain countries of the NATO and Warsaw Pact groupings.
(Subsequently, Mr. Hillenbrand queried Kornienkov as to whether the second and third above were really variants. It was confirmed that they were, although the neutral units would be there under UN aegis.) Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union wanted to lessen tensions in the middle of Europe. Yesterday Adenauer had been in Berlin. This would probably lead to a further exchange of notes. Did we think that this would help relations? The Soviets were trying to find a way, but the Secretary said only "No, No". The US had also given an ultimatum in saying it had no answer but to maintain the presence of Western troops. While the situation in Laos contained many elements that were not parallel, one advantage was that the US and the USSR were not confronting each other there. The Secretary commented that he was not sure that this applied in Germany. Dobrynin observed that it would be better if troops could be withdrawn to some extent. He did not want to emphasize the point which was linked to the concept of zones, but ending the confrontation would be a good thing in Berlin. The Secretary asked why, if this were so, the Soviets were not prepared to have the four powers accept the responsibility for all of Berlin. Dobrynin said that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR. This was not just an announcement, but there was a completely different social life there. The Secretary commented that there was no reason why East Berlin could not continue to be the locale for the small Soviet contingent just as West Berlin was the locale for the small Western contingents. The fact is, he continued, now that all these other things are in the Soviet basket, they are reaching out to deprive us. Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary believed that a UN presence would put West Berlin in a Soviet bag. The Secretary answered in the affirmative, noting that the reactions of the West Berliners and of our Allies would be just what President Kennedy had explained at Vienna. Dobrynin said the proposal for symbolic troops from the two Blocs was fair. The Secretary asked what the two Blocs had to do with West Berlin. Dobrynin responded by saying that it was not the capital of the Federal Republic. The Secretary observed that we were holding it in trust until the day when Berlin became the capital of a reunited Germany. He did not see why the Soviets could not keep their troops in East Berlin simply because of their effort to make East Berlin capital of the GDR. After all there were some twenty odd Soviet divisions in the GDR.
Dobrynin said the Soviet Union had nothing against German reunification, but the situation had changed much since the end of the war. If after World War II the West had wanted unification, it could have had it on one condition--the neutralization of Germany. The US could scarcely expect the Soviets to permit the reunification of Germany under such conditions as would have it end up in the Western camp. At that time the Soviet Union was quite prepared to have a united but neutral Germany. Then came Bizonia and subsequent developments. Now there were two German states. Surely the US did not believe that unification was possible now. It was true that such a powerful people would eventually have to be united. But the Soviet Union could not wait until then. As to the Japanese analogy, Dobrynin continued, the question was not one of how long the Soviets had fought in the war against Japan. After all, their contribution in the war against Germany and their losses had been much greater. As a matter of fact, the question was not one of counting the days of fighting but simply that the US did not wish to take consideration of Soviet interests in the Far East. The Secretary observed that a lot of history was involved, but it could not be forgotten that the Japanese treaty came at a time when practically every agreement we had made with the Soviets during and after the war had turned sour, for example that on China. Dobrynin commented that there was no China in 1949. The Secretary said that one of the reasons for this was that the Soviets had not kept their agreement on the disposal of Japanese arms. Dobrynin said he could not accept this, but in any event this was not the question.
Coming back to West Berlin, Dobrynin claimed that he could not understand why the US insisted on one-hundred per cent of its position, that is only presence of troops of the three powers. Any of the various Soviet proposals would permit the West Berliners to have their way of life. Why did the Secretary insist on keeping US troops there permanently? The Secretary said he should qualify "permanently". After all, Dobrynin continued, the US is fond of UN troops elsewhere and the Soviets are not. Therefore, they thought UN troops in West Berlin should be acceptable. If UN troops were accepted there, an agreement could be reached on their composition. The main question from the beginning has been that of the Western troops. Other questions were interesting, but were not primary. The Soviets had never tried to give the impression that this was not the principal question in order to get a little more out of the US. Yet the US always said "no" to Soviet attempts to provide a formula. The Secretary observed that we have tried to find some answer to the question of prestige. It had been unnecessary for the Soviets to make a point which they knew was impossible for us a matter of their prestige. This had been imprudent from a diplomatic point of view. We have tried to suggest how this problem of prestige might be dealt with. The Soviet line in rejecting our suggestion leads to the conclusion that their purpose is to get us out of Berlin and thus bring about a fundamental change in the situation in West Berlin. Dobrynin said the Soviets wanted West Berlin to live as it did now. They believed that it was not necessary to have US troops there to guarantee this. But the US insisted there was only one way. This is the agreed way, the Secretary commented. We agreed that the Soviets would be in East Berlin and the Western Powers in West Berlin. Dobrynin said that seventeen years after the end of the war had brought a new situation. The Secretary asked what the new elements were. Dobrynin responded that there were now two German states which were members respectively of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Any collisions between those two states would inevitably reflect on their respective Allies.
The Secretary commented that the problem of West Berlin had no bearing on this relationship of the two parties if the Soviets left West Berlin alone. Dobrynin observed that West Berlin was a source of danger. Today Adenauer was there, tomorrow there would be more clashes at the borders. The Secretary said that perhaps if someone other than Ulbricht were there, these frictions would decline. Dobrynin said that he would not make the same remark about Adenauer or Brandt. It was not a question of only one man. It would be far better if there were no opportunities for these daily clashes. The Secretary observed that they were not necessary. Dobrynin said that people thought they could do anything they liked in West Berlin because they could hide behind the "big boy". The US said its prestige was involved. But if the US were not there, then the Germans could not run and hide behind "big boy". It was hard for the US to say "keep quiet" to the Germans. Neutral representatives or UN representatives would not permit these things. They would say "keep quiet". Why was the US so stubborn in keeping its troops there? The Secretary observed that Dobrynin and the Soviets continued to be just as insistent that we abandon our responsibilities in West Berlin. What after all do the Czechs and the Poles know about the so-called way of life in West Berlin? They have had no experience in guaranteeing this way of life to West Berlin. Dobrynin said they would know what to do and not allow activities in West Berlin which would jeopardize relations between the US and the USSR.
The Secretary asked why there should be a problem from the Soviet view in having an agreement filed with the UN, with our staying in West Berlin. Why could we not agree that pending final settlement of the German question, the Western Powers would continue to accept responsibility for the security of West Berlin. The access question could be worked out. This agreement could be filed at the UN and the UN could approve it and establish some sort of presence in West Berlin. Dobrynin commented that unless this means UN troops, there would be no change from the present situation. The Secretary said that it would give the Soviets a change to refer to something which they could say was better than occupation status. If there were other issues of the sort about which Dobrynin had expressed concern, these could be taken up in the UN. Dobrynin stated that with UN troops in Berlin, the situation would be different. The UN can follow a line more gracefully than could the US. The Gaza Strip experience had worked out pretty well. The Secretary observed that different parties were involved. Dobrynin said the Secretary was too suspicious. The Soviets had made a serious offer. It was not just a trick to get something from the US. The Secretary commented that there had been a lot of history since 1949. A lot of experience in mutual confidence was required. Dobrynin said that Laos was a good experience. The Secretary added that we have told Moscow that July 2 is agreeable to us for the opening of the Geneva meeting. Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary would be going to Geneva. The Secretary observed that what might be done was that Harriman and Pushkin could get the matter settled. Dobrynin commented that then the Foreign Ministers could come along and sign.
65. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Paris, June 20, 1962, midnight.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2062. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, and London. Secretary Rusk visited Europe June 18-28 for discussions on topics of mutual concern.
Secto 20. Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation which being pouched./2/
During meeting with Couve afternoon June 20, Secretary briefly reviewed recent talk with Dobrynin on June 18/3/ and made following general observations:
/2/SET/MC/10. (Ibid., 110.11-RU/6-2062)
/3/See Document 64.
1. Soviets now seem to be concentrating on point of direct interest and confrontation: presence of Western forces in West Berlin.
2. Soviets have shown interest in other matters such as Warsaw-NATO non-aggression pact, nuclear non-diffusion and mixed German commissions, but key point remains question of troop presence.
3. In talk with Dobrynin of May 30, Secretary had urged need for Soviets to bring more reciprocity into discussions in recognition vital interests of West. In latest conversation Dobrynin merely repeated stand-ard position in systematic form and urged US to bring forward new ideas. US accused of repetition and Dobrynin referred to Soviet concessions, i.e. various formulae to get US out of Berlin.
4. There has then been no advance on substance, but we did not have impression Soviets are moving toward early military crisis, although this might change tomorrow.
5. As Secretary has indicated at Athens, Soviets also do not seem to want register complete diplomatic impasse.
6. While exchanges with Soviets therefore becoming increasingly sterile, we believe they have been worthwhile and have served purpose. Khrushchev has pointed to them as justification for elimination of time table and of harassments. Should Berlin situation come to crisis no one could say we had neglected any resources of diplomacy. In discussion of present Soviet intentions, both Secretary and Couve agreed that while these highly relevant to Western position evidence lacking on basis of which any definite conclusions could be drawn beyond those noted above. There was also agreement that situation in East Germany was threatening and might lead Soviets to apply further pressures and threats similar to those in pre-wall period last summer. Secretary said that if we were not sure what Soviets up to, we were also not sure that Khrushchev was certain which course to take. On one hand, he made relatively subdued statement such as recently in Bucharest./4/ On other hand, Soviets seem to have caught themselves on prestige problem of separate peace treaty. They also seem to be going ahead with rather active military buildup in missile and nuclear field, and they may just be waiting until they attain stronger military position.
/4/For text of Khrushchev's June 24 speech at Bucharest, see Pravda, June 25, 1962.
In commenting on French position, Secretary said we seem to be in general agreement on substance and that French views as to whether any headway could be made on substance had so far proved correct. We felt it necessary to go ahead with talks, and would welcome greater French participation.
Our differences might well be resolved by events themselves. Couve said he agreed much of drama had disappeared since December NATO meeting, but maintained position that, while French take it as a fact that the US will go ahead in talks with Soviets, they could not approve or participate.
In response to Couve's query as to whether we still had idea of giving new paper to Soviets, Secretary said that we had put in no further paper since Geneva. However, we did not want to exclude possibility of revising paper. At present this did not seem useful, since Soviets have remained adamant on troop presence. We did believe there would be some advantage to putting access question into some sort of framework so that great issues of prestige were not raised on either side.
After further discussion of central issue of Western troop presence, Couve asked whether Secretary did not think that at some point Soviets would change position. Secretary indicated that there was time at Geneva when this possibility seemed to be opening up, but Soviets had since then shown no further flexibility in discussion of Berlin.
After discussion of present Fed Rep attitude on relations with East Germans, Secretary said that, with respect credit request by GDR, we were inclined to think positive response might be a good idea. Couve said French had no real views on subject, and he did not know whether East Germans would insist further on credits in view of publicity.
Rusk
66. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SET/MC/13
Berlin, June 21, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.00-RU/6-2162. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on June 22 and approved in S on June 25. The conversation was held in Mayor Brandt's office.
SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
(June 18-28, 1962)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Manning
Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Lightner, et al.
Germany
Governing Mayor Brandt
Mayor Amrehn
Senator Schiller
Senator Kielinger
(other Berlin officials)
SUBJECT
Berlin
Mayor Brandt began by expressing his appreciation for the Secretary's visit. He then gave a report on the local situation noting particularly that:
(1) Morale was better now than at the end of 1961;
(2) This contrasts with the mood of desperation in the GDR which led to a heightened flow of refugees despite the difficulties of crossing the border;
(3) The economic condition of West Berlin is good with production 5% greater than last August despite the loss of 60,000 members of the labor force;
(4) The flow of people into West Berlin was still not sufficient to offset the losses normally incurred because of the unfavorable population structure, but the outflow had been halted;
(5) Berlin was going ahead on economic programs under the Senator for Economics, Professor Schiller;
(6) Security problems at the sector border were causing concern and more shooting was possible (this might lead to a request that Allied personnel be brought closer to the wall in view of the orders in the Eastern side not to fire at Allied uniforms).
The Secretary then gave his general impression of discussions which he had been having with the Soviets. He pointed out that our commitment to Berlin was beyond question. Our troops were not in Berlin as tourists; they represented the US presence. We had told the Soviets we are here and will stay here. If they try to drive us out they have been told this would mean war and all the destruction which war would bring. Because of the seriousness with which we view our commitment, we feel we must maintain responsible contact with the other side.
Frankly speaking, the Secretary said, he could not report any significant progress in his talks with the Soviets. No agreement was in sight. The simple issue which had emerged was the presence of our forces in Berlin. At the same time we do not believe that the Soviets wish to precipitate a crisis or to create a diplomatic impasse. This may, of course, change at any time. If the Soviets continue to repeat their position we will continue to repeat ours. We had nothing to trade in Berlin with since our vital interests represent fundamental commitments to Berlin.
On one aspect of the situation, the Secretary continued, the West Berliners could help. If there were any sign among the population of a lack of confidence, the danger arose that this would give the wrong signals to Khrushchev, who might think we are weaker than we are and overreach himself. Hence, the confidence of the West Berliners was important.
We were concerned about the situation in the GDR, the Secretary noted. Berlin is involved because a crisis in the GDR enables the Ulbricht Regime to put pressure on Khrushchev, who in turn puts pressure on us. Another point, the Secretary said, which he wanted to make was there was no disarray on principle among the Allies. He had told de Gaulle in Paris/2/ that he must confess that the French had been right so far about the difficulty of finding a basis for negotiations with the Soviets. On the other hand, de Gaulle had confessed that the talks had not produced the kind of disturbances and collapse of morale which he had thought might be possible. Our differences, therefore, are essentially on tactics and procedures, and there is an underlying agreement on policy.
/2/A record of Rusk's conversation with de Gaulle on June 20, transmitted in Secto 13 from Paris, June 20, is printed in vol. XIII, Document 255.
As to the press leaks on the makeup of the International Access Authority, the Secretary said, we had not put this proposal to the Soviets but had been discussing it with our Allies. When Khrushchev read about it in the newspapers, he rejected it because of the provision for West German membership. We are not going to argue about a hypothetical question with the West Germans. So far the Soviets have been talking about access to a Berlin from which we are removed.
In response to Brandt's question as to whether the Berliners feel that the recent Warsaw Pact Declaration/3/ might portend a stronger engagement of the Warsaw Pact Powers and a pushing ahead towards a peace settlement, the Secretary commented that we could not, of course, stop the Soviets from signing a peace treaty. What was important was the alleged consequences for us. The question was whether they would have a sort of Bolz-Zorin arrangement,/4/ or tell the GDR to do nothing, or let the GDR attempt to control our access. We were a little inclined, on balance, to think they should not proceed with their peace treaty at the present time. He did not think the other Warsaw Pact members, with the exception of the GDR, played much of a role in this situation. Mr. Bohlen suggested that a more likely interpretation of the Warsaw Pact Declaration was that this obtained the endorsement of the Pact countries for further deferral of the peace treaty deadline.
/3/For text of the June 7 Warsaw Pact declaration, see Pravda, June 10, 1962.
/4/Regarding the Bolz-Zorin letters, exchanged on September 15, 1955, see footnote 3, Document 8.
Mayor Amrehn stated that the danger of such declarations is that it raises the prestige factor. He wondered whether the question of status had arisen in the Secretary's talks with the Soviets with particular reference to the ties of the West Berliners with the Federal Republic as they have developed over the past thirteen years. The Secretary said that, on the latter point, the matter of these ties had been referred to briefly some times before. We, of course, had made our legal situation clear long ago in terms of the reservation we had entered on certain articles of the Bonn Constitution. However, we have always insisted that the West Berliners, as far as the other side is concerned, must have freedom to establish whatever relations they wish with the outside world, including the Federal Republic, and that this is intimately linked to the viability question. Because the discussion had centered on other matters, this question has not arisen with the Soviets in any direct way. As to the question of status proper the Soviets are, of course, talking about eliminating the occupation status. Since this is unacceptable, other aspects of status have not arisen.
Mayor Brandt thanked the Secretary for his presentation and added that he would like to emphasize the necessity to take some action to create holes in the wall by political means. This might be done within the framework of the Federal Republic trade negotiations with the GDR, through the International Red Cross, through some action by the Western Powers vis-a-vis the Soviets, or finally by some effort to mobilize world opinion, e.g., using the Human Rights Commission of the UN (Brandt added that the last point was not the position of the Federal Government in Bonn). The Secretary said we would discuss this matter in Bonn. We have not come forward with any proposals on the wall because we did not want to seem to give the wall status by accepting its presence. When he had raised the question with Dobrynin, the latter had said this is not a subject for the Soviets but for the GDR.
At this point the discussion terminated and the participants left for the Golden Book Ceremony.
67. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, June 21, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 101 Soviet Buildup. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Two annexes entitled "Comparative Data Soviet-US Forces 1 Jan 61-1 July 62" and "Major Measures Taken To Improve Readiness of Soviet-US Forces" are not printed.
SUBJECT
US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin Situation
REFERENCE
General Taylor's Memorandum of 14 June to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Director Central Intelligence/2/
/2/Not found.
General Taylor's memorandum asked for a comparison of the military buildup of Soviet forces with that of United States forces over the past eighteen months and for our views of the probable effect of the current relative strengths on Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation in the coming months. I shall treat these as two separate but related subjects in this report which has been prepared with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency and has the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Joint Staff.
Forces Buildup
The size and composition of the USSR's military forces have been influenced importantly by Soviet policy decisions of the past year and a half, in which the Berlin crisis has been an important factor. A programmed reduction in military manpower and in older air and naval equipment was underway in 1960 and had cut total military strength to 3,000,000 men in the first part of 1961. In response to our reaction to the Berlin pressures, the process was reversed in the summer of 1961 by calling some key reserves and delaying the discharge of conscripts in the Fall of 1961. We believe that the force level now stands at about 3.25 to 3.5 million men. The increase in personnel strength seems to have been used to bring existing units up to strength and provide needed combat and service support units rather than to raise the number of divisions. We believe Soviet Army strength is now approximately 145 divisions, of which 79 are at 70% or higher strength and have an immediate combat capability. The remaining 66 vary in strength and training status but are essentially cadre units of 40% or less strength.
During the same period the United States armed forces have been increased by 325,000 to 2,825,000. More significant than the number is the form which our buildup has taken. We have made a major increase in operational missiles, both tactical and strategic. We have filled out skeleton combat units, relieved tactical forces of basic training missions, added needed support units, reequipped with modern weapons, increased mobility, improved the alert status of both strategic and tactical forces, eliminated critical shortages of equipment, and raised forward stockage levels--in sum, we have put our forces on an increased war readiness basis.
It is difficult to be precise in cataloging specific measures taken by the Soviets and particularly in determining the timing of their moves. However, the Soviets have made important qualitative improvements, notably in mechanizing their ground forces, adding to their formidable submarine fleet, and in expanding their strategic nuclear capabilities. Soviet missile capabilities for nuclear delivery and air defense have continued to increase in the past 18 months, and the tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. At present, the USSR possesses a ballistic missile force capable of delivering massive nuclear attacks against targets in the European area, and a much more limited force of missiles and bombers suitable for attacking the United States.
In sum, we believe that the measures it has adopted since 1 January 1961 mean that the USSR is now retaining ground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than originally planned, while at the same time proceeding with an expansion of capabilities with advanced weapon systems. But, on balance, we believe there is no question that the relative improvement has been in our favor and that the Soviet leadership knows it. I have attached to this report two annexes, one showing, for both sides, strengths and changes in personnel and in key organizations and weapons and another describing measures taken to improve combat readiness in critical categories.
Implications for Berlin
With reference to Berlin, I feel certain that our improved military position and our firm response to provocation have had a major influence on Soviet attitudes. From the beginning Khrushchev has sought to develop his campaign against Berlin in such a way as to avoid serious risk of general war. At the same time, he evidently believed that Allied concern over a military confrontation would lead the West to compromise its position in Berlin.
While the Soviet leadership has received a firmer reaction than expected from the West, it has been beset with mounting internal and intra-Bloc problems. In the wake of the October Party Congress, the Kremlin has had to deal with problems raised by the renewed attack on Stalin and the anti-Party group and with a widening rift in its relations with Peiping and Tirana. Another factor that may be inducing caution is the status of the East German regime which continues to be plagued with economic problems and a resentful, hostile population. It is a singularly unstable Satellite upon which to base a major political issue. The Soviets also apparently intend to continue their efforts to woo West Germany, as a possible alternative to negotiating with the Allied Powers and as a device for driving a wedge between Bonn and its NATO partners.
Another important factor which contributes to the USSR's hesitancy in pushing its Berlin objectives by precipitate action is that the Soviet leaders appear now to realize that the shift in the political-military relation of forces in the world has been less significant than they anticipated two or three years ago. The United States acceleration of military programs beginning in 1961 has clearly impressed them as a manifestation of United States determination and has also forced them to confront the economic implications of a new round of arms competition. At the same time, they have had to recognize that the West cannot be persuaded to accept their inflated strategic claims. Perhaps equally important, they have become aware that their real accomplishments in strategic weapons cannot be so readily translated into concessions by the West as they had earlier imagined.
We recently estimated (in NIE 11-9-62),/3/ in conjunction with the other USIB agencies, that it is unlikely that the Soviets are resolved to bring the Berlin issue to a head in some fixed period of time, and that they will probably continue their effort to obtain concessions through negotiations. We believe it likely that the Soviets will not sign a separate peace treaty in the near future, but we do not exclude this possibility. At the same time, we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets regard Berlin as an issue to be settled by a genuine or lasting compromise; they aim at eventual incorporation of the western sectors of the city into East Germany. We see no evidence that the Soviets feel able either to reduce their basic objectives or to abandon negotiations and seek these objectives by unilateral action.
/3/"Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," dated May 2, 1962. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)
Accordingly, in the more recent NIE 11-13-62/4/ we concluded that for the near future at least, the Soviets are not likely to moderate their demands in order to take the negotiations off dead center. However, we think they are more likely to do this than to resort to major unilateral action, such as a separate treaty. Most likely of all is a continuation for the present of the same rigidity in negotiations without at the same time any serious move to break them off. While this judgment in the NIE is derived from an interpretation of recent Soviet behavior, rather than from any significant body of intelligence data, we feel that it is the best evaluation which can be made at the present time. The chances are good that there will be a new round of Berlin harassments, intended primarily to keep pressure on West Berlin morale and on Western negotiators.
Robert S. McNamara/5/
/4/"Soviet Intentions With Respect to Berlin," dated June 13, 1962. (Ibid.)
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
68. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
SET/MC/24
Bonn, June 22, 1962, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/6-2262. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on June 25 and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held in Chancellor Adenauer's Conference Room at the Palais Schaumburg. A detailed summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 39 from Bonn, June 22. (Ibid., 611.62A/6-2262)
SECRETARY'S EUROPEAN TRIP
(June 18-28, 1962)
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Manning
Mr. Morris
Mr. Hillenbrand
Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Dr. von Eckhardt
Dr. Carstens
Dr. Krapf
Dr. von Hase
Dr. von Braun
Dr. Osterheld
Dr. Reinkemeyer
SUBJECT
Berlin
After the private meeting had terminated between the Chancellor and the Secretary,/2/ with only an interpreter present, the discussion resumed in a larger group including Foreign Minister Schroeder and other senior officials. The Chancellor announced he had had a good and frank talk with the Secretary. Mutual trust had been increased "if this were possible". The Chancellor repeated, "if this were possible" (wenn dies moeglich waere). The Secretary expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor's words and indicated the primary purpose of his visit to Europe was to consult with the Federal Republic and to make sure that no accidental misunderstandings persisted which could be eliminated by discussions. He noted that this was his first visit to Bonn.
/2/For a brief report on the private meeting, see Document 69.
Schroeder said he also wanted to express his gratitude that the promise which the Secretary had made at Athens about the visit had been carried out. While this had started out as "a little promise", the way the trip had developed it had turned into a considerable commitment of time and energy by the Secretary. He was therefore all the more grateful that the Bonn visit had remained possible.
The Secretary then reviewed his recent talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. He said it was not always pleasant to talk with the Soviets, but this was always easier when the Western Powers are united and going together on the policies involved. He was grateful for the basic unity which existed. He had initiated these additional talks with Dobrynin because his Geneva talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko had arrived at a point of no agreement on the most elementary Western vital interest: our troop presence in West Berlin. Other subjects had been discussed with the Soviets but there had been no real exploration of these. We kept coming back to the fact that the Soviets were trying to eliminate or cripple the Western forces in Berlin. At one stage in Geneva the Soviets did not seem to be completely adamant on this point. They hinted that they might abandon their position. The Secretary had now seen Dobrynin four times; the talk on June 18 had been at the Soviet Ambassador's initiative. Dobrynin, in effect, admitted that he had nothing new to say, and the Secretary said he had nothing new to add. Dobrynin complained that there were no new ideas from us, but that the Soviets keep coming up with new ideas, for example, the various formulae for replacing the Western troop presence in Berlin. The Secretary noted that he had pointed out to Dobrynin that it was not very helpful to produce a number of variations to accomplish what was not acceptable to us. This did not amount to putting forward new ideas. However, the Secretary added, we did not have the impression that the Soviets now wanted a military crisis or a diplomatic impasse, although we could not be sure of this. We seemed to be getting to the point where there was not much more to say unless we get into details which are attractive to both sides and which might help to ease tensions while the basic disagreements continue, for example, easing of border incidents in Berlin by a meeting of the commandants, procedures so that families and friends could meet with one another, et cetera. There is no reason to think that any agreement on the broad issues of Berlin and Germany is likely in the near future.
The Secretary noted that, in his talks in Paris, he had found the French much more relaxed on Berlin than previously. The differences with the French were proving much narrower than had been feared. He indicated that he had to admit to President de Gaulle that the French view on the impossibility of finding a satisfactory basis for negotiations had so far proved correct. In return, de Gaulle admitted that the Secretary's talks had not caused the disturbance and crisis within the Alliance which he had feared.
There seemed to be general agreement on policy with the French although not on tactics. The French had not said they would join the activities of the Washington Ambassadorial Group for consultation on our talks with the Soviets, but they are, of course, fully participating in Berlin contingency planning.
Reporting on his trip to Berlin, the Secretary said he had been gratified by the good morale and the steadiness of the Berliners. He noted that the German NATO representative, Von Walther, during the recent NAC meeting, and Mayor Brandt during their discussions in Berlin, had expressed concern about the possibility of a build-up in pressures in East Germany which might lead to renewed pressures on Berlin itself. If the pressures in the GDR could be relieved somehow, this might reduce the crisis in the Berlin area.
Schroeder said that his impression of the Dobrynin talks was that they had gone on in a good atmosphere without bringing any real change. The Soviet concentration in recent talks on the point of the Western troop presence and their general stress on Berlin proper rather than on broader subjects might be a Soviet tactic so they could say this was the really important issue which had to be solved first when the East Germans applied pressure on them to move ahead with signature of the peace treaty. He referred to a recent talk which he had with Ambassador Smirnov in which the latter had placed stress on Berlin, and also to a more recent talk with FDP leader Mende and Smirnov which, if correctly reported, indicated continued Soviet interest in some form of access authority. This to him seemed to confirm the limited nature of the present Soviet interest in concluding a peace treaty. It seemed clear that the Soviets would have little purpose in signing such a treaty without prior agreement on a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. If they did go ahead and sign such a treaty, then they would presumably have to consider inserting some separate Berlin clause in the peace treaty. He thought therefore there was a possibility the Soviets might eventually accept the unavoidability of continued Allied presence in West Berlin; hence their interest in possible access arrangements. This spoke for the probability of drawn-out discussions.
As to the situation in the GDR, Schroeder expressed the view that despite the increasing unrest which reflected stronger refugee pressure, he believed it unlikely that the regime would lose control in view of the overwhelming Soviet military presence in the GDR. He outlined West German thinking on the East German request for credits. The basic considerations were to do as much as possible to preserve the economic ties of the GDR with the Federal Republic and favorably to affect Berlin access. The population of the GDR, to the extent this could be determined, would argue against extension of credits as further strengthening the regime preferring to suffer rather than to see this happen. However, this would not be an obstacle to a positive decision if other factors were in favor of it. Extension of long-term credits also had the disadvantage of seeming to accept the long-term existence of the GDR and would also create an incentive, after the period of initial deliveries was over and the period of repayment of credits starting, for the GDR to upset any arrangements. The Federal Republic had the problem under active consideration. It was clear that the GDR was very greatly interested in these credits. The economic interest of the Federal Republic was minimal, and the political interest was not yet precisely defined.
The Secretary said we appreciated Bonn's assurance that we would be consulted before a final answer was given to the East Germans. While such credits would be important politically, it was not easy to know in what direction they would go. Khrushchev had used the existence of talks between Moscow and Washington as a pretext and possible reason for the postponement of the deadline on the peace treaty and the ending of further harassments. Whether an additional trade relationship between the Federal Republic and the East Germans would serve as a further pretext to defer signing of the peace treaty was a relevant question. Moreover, if these credits were as important to the GDR as they seemed to be against the background of economic difficulties in the Bloc, then an extension of credits might create a value which the East Germans would feel it important to protect and thus give them a stake in calm relations. He was inclined to discount somewhat the argument that credits would support a regime from those who prefer hardship to loss of freedom, since no amount of hardship was likely to overthrow the regime unless the West were prepared to fight a war. In summarizing he said we would be generally sympathetic to the idea of credits if the Federal Republic thought they were a good idea, if they did not involve highly disadvantageous trade features, and if they did maintain pressure on the other side to keep the situation peaceful because of its interest in continuing deliveries. Schroeder said the Federal Republic still wanted to consider the various arguments pro and con, and felt no need to begin formal negotiations today or tomorrow. It would discuss the matter with its Allies when the Germans knew their own minds better.
Schroeder raised the possibility of dramatizing the incidents at the Berlin wall and demarcation line by bringing the situation before the UN Human Rights Commission. While the Federal Republic did not categorically reject this up to now it had generally not favored it on the ground that the other side would try to bring the whole Berlin question as well as the question of the peace treaty and the German problem before the UN, once an opening were provided. The UN as now constituted could not be relied upon to consider the issue favorably. The Secretary said there were two separate questions involved: What can be done to help the people of East Germany and how can we make the Communists pay for what they are doing? He did not believe that conditions could be improved by a propaganda approach. Hence the question might first be explored through International Red Cross contacts. If we had determined that improvement was not possible, then we could decide how to achieve a maximum propaganda effect. He agreed that, once the question got into the UN it would be unpredictable what many UN countries would do, particularly in the light of the Soviet position that UN forces might be substituted for Western occupation troops./3/
/3/At 3 p.m. on June 22 Rusk and Schroeder discussed various aspects of the positions to be taken in continued talks with the Soviet Union on Berlin. A memorandum of this conversation (SET/MC/27) is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/6-2262.
69. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Rome, June 23, 1962, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/6-2362. Secret. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk and cleared by Kohler. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2122)
Secto 48. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. No other distribution. I am satisfied that the visit to Berlin and Bonn was a good investment.
(1) Despite the deliberate restraint and relative brevity of my arrival statement and speech at the Golden Book ceremony,/2/ both the Berliners and the West Germans seemed to accept without question my presence perhaps even more than my words as a reassuring reaffirmation of US commitments.
/2/For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 707-708.
The only criticism I have heard came from American correspondents who considered there was not enough fire and brimstone.
(2) My report on and discussion of the talks with the Soviets with the Berlin Senat indicated that they would go considerably farther than the Federal Republic in proposing practical arrangements to alleviate the situation both in Berlin and on the access routes and that they have fewer illusions about what we can get without paying the price of some practical political concessions.
(3) In Bonn I followed the deliberate tactic of first bolstering personal relations with the Chancellor and then building up Schroeder. It seemed to have had the desired result. The Chancellor was effusive in his expressions of confidence and Schroeder was clearly well satisfied.
(4) I had an hour's talk with the Chancellor alone. I found him far more lively and mentally alert than I had expected. Indeed his mood, including two full evenings of friendly and animated discussions with him and other German leaders, surprised his own colleagues. In our private conversation he expressed his concern about the stubborn strength of Communism in Western Europe especially in France and Italy; he was obviously distressed that there are still some thirty thousand Communists in the Federal Republic. He spent some time on Red China, beginning with the repetition of his story about Khrushchev having asked him for help against the Chinese during his Moscow visit in 1956. Yoshida, who recently visited Bonn, had underlined to him the "national" character of what was happening in China and had expressed the view that the path of safety lies in developing somewhat more normal relations. The Chancellor asked me about reports that a change in US policy toward China might be in the making. I told him that we had no completely dogmatic view but that any such opportunity was severely limited by Peiping's attitude that the sine qua non of any improvement must be the turning over of Formosa and its ten million people. I pointed out that this presented us with an issue similar to that of West Berlin. The Chancellor then introduced his relations with de Gaulle by saying that he was deeply aware of the fact that the memories of Nazism made it impossible for Germany to assume a leading role in Europe. He then recalled de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in 1944 to sign a Franco-Russian agreement against Germany. Diagramming the geographical relationship between the USSR, Germany and France he said Germany must do everything possible to prevent a Franco-Russian arrangement against Germany. Therefore complete intimacy between Germany and France was utterly fundamental. This, incidentally, was Adenauer's reflection of the same underlying longer range Franco-German distrust which I saw from the other end in Paris.
I told the Chancellor that I thought he had greatly overestimated the obstacles to a leading role on Germany's part deriving from the Hitler period. I told him that he personally could now see his bold and statesmanlike dreams for Europe on the edge of realization. I emphasized that it was a fundamental interest and policy of the US that Germany and France be intimately associated but that we saw this within the framework of joint leadership and a united Europe and in an Atlantic Community with ever closer associations with North America. I pointed out that the Atlantic Community is a nexus of interlocking special relationships reaching around the globe, including the inter-American system, the Commonwealth, French associations in Africa and the welcome development of German interests outside Europe.
The Chancellor then repeated a view I have heard in Paris that the entry of Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland into the Common Market would change the entire character of Europe. Again I told him that I thought this was an exaggerated fear; since World War Britain has become increasingly European in its orientation and far less involved, for example, in that vast area from California to Suez. From across the Atlantic, we found it at least as natural that Britain could become an integral part of Europe as that Germany and France could set aside so much history and become the closest partners. I told him that he could write his name in the largest letters in history if he could achieve a situation in which it could finally be said, after several centuries, that war would not break out over inter-Western European issues. I emphasized to him that I was not in Bonn to create any problems between him and de Gaulle but that I thought that both of us would have a temporary and minor problem if de Gaulle's understandable campaign to increase the prestige of France should be undertaken at the expense of his friends rather than of the enemies of the free world.
Adenauer made no reference to the irritations of recent weeks nor to any personality problems within the present German Govt.
He concluded by saying that he had occasionally felt that he would like to write an informal personal letter about one or another matter to President Kennedy but that he had been reluctant to do so because of the President's obvious heavy responsibilities. I told him that I thought informal and very private exchanges of that sort would be welcome.
(5) My visit to Bonn removed any doubt I might have had as to the inevitable growth of German pressure for nuclear weapons unless there are multilateral arrangements in NATO or Europe or unless there are significant steps toward disarmament in this field. The Chancellor asserted in the most positive terms that his 1954 declaration renouncing the production of nuclear weapons was made under and subject to then prevailing conditions (rebus sic stantibus) and that, indeed, this interpretation was offered by Dulles on the latter's initiative. Schroeder wrestled very hard to get a flat commitment that we would not refer to the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons in any paper we submitted to the Russians on Berlin. This I refused to do but simply pointed out that the matter might become moot because the US and USSR have agreed to discuss non-diffusion in Geneva immediately upon return in mid-July from the current recess.
(6) How effective the Chancellor will be with President de Gaulle next week remains to be seen. The German officials and politicians here obviously have great fears that he will be seduced. I cannot help but share the fear that the Chancellor will not stand up well, if the two statesmen do much business alone. Schroeder, for example, is as conscious of the deficiencies of the French contribution to collective defense, especially by providing conventional forces for the standing strategy, as Strauss showed himself to be in Washington. However when I brought the subject up with the Chancellor he referred to de Gaulle's troubles with his Generals and need to rebuild the morale of the French armed forces. He appeared to accept this as justification from [for] the lack of an effective French conventional contribution to the central front and not to be aware of the diversion of French resources involved in the financing of the force de frappe. He tended to dismiss the subject with the confident assertion that if trouble came de Gaulle could be counted on to put everything France had into the fray.
(7) Despite a certain restraint on the part of the Chancellor himself about the Common Market, I found general support in Bonn for UK accession and the confident expectation that the present negotiations will succeed; this from men like Schroeder, Erhard, Abs, Rosenberg and others.
(8) I also got the impression that political leaders such as Schroeder, Mende, Dehler and Brandt went out of their way to let me know that there is more flexibility in Germany about a Berlin settlement than one would suppose in talking with people like von Brentano.
(9) Above is too long but gives background prior to Adenauer visit to Paris where de Gaulle will undoubtedly make a major effort. I took some satisfaction from Adenauer's volunteered assurance that he would write me a long letter after his visit to Paris.
Rusk
70. Memorandum From the President's Press Secretary (Salinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, June 25, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Attached to a July 5 memorandum of transmittal from Bundy to Kohler.
I had lunch with Mike Sagatelyan, the chief TASS correspondent here, which had several interesting parts to it.
Sagatelyan spent most of the early part of lunch telling me that while I might think his conversations with me reflected the official Soviet line he wanted me to know that he was speaking to me personally and not as a representative of the Soviet Government. He made this point three or four times and then got on to the subject of Berlin. Sagatelyan said he thought the Berlin problem could be solved on the basis of allowing Western troops to remain there but changing the status of the city into a United Nations mandate or some other form. He said that this was so because the Russians did not consider the Western troops in Berlin to be an aggressive force. Despite Sagatelyan's protestations, this would seem to be an effort on the part of the Soviets to launch another feeler, particularly in view of my own discussions with Khrushchev on Western troops in Berlin. The part about Western troops not being an aggressive force is almost a verbatim quote of what I told Khrushchev. Later in the discussion Sagatelyan told me he had read the latest account of the Dobrynin-Rusk talks at the Embassy which again reinforces my opinion that this is a feeler.
Pierre Salinger
71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, June 30, 1962, 1:39 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/6-3062. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Fessenden, cleared by Kohler and Knight, and approved by Rusk.
3591. Please deliver to Chancellor following letter from Secretary as soon as possible and prior to former's departure for Paris:
Begin Text.
Dear Mr. Chancellor:
I would like to take this opportunity, shortly after my return to Washington, to tell you that the friendly reception and valuable talks which we had in Bonn have been a source of great satisfaction to me. They were the highlight of what proved to be a useful, if somewhat exhausting, trip to five countries. The success of our talks has shown once again that there is no real substitute for personal contact in eliminating misunderstandings and differences of emphasis which may arise when communication is limited to the written word and speculative discussion in the press creates false impressions.
I was moved by the warmth of the reception accorded us in Bonn and by the generous hospitality which you and Foreign Minister Schroeder extended. We covered a wide range of subjects of importance to both our countries, and I came away from them ever more convinced that there is a strong and basic mutuality of interest between the United States and the Federal Republic on all the issues that really matter. This is a fact in which we may not only take heart in the present but assurance for the future.
I was much encouraged not only in Bonn but in Paris, Rome and London to find an atmosphere favorable for the success of the Common Market. Fortunately, our own legislative action also seems to be going forward in a favorable way, which will enable us to play a full and positive share in the development of an Atlantic partnership.
I have the impression that, on the subject of Berlin, we are agreed on the basic principles involved and as to what we should do both to strengthen our position and to continue efforts directed at a possible modus vivendi. We should be able to work out details at the official level as we go along within this framework of general agreement. In a related area, I know how much you have been concerned about the sad lot of the population of East Germany and East Berlin, and how important you consider it that no legitimate possibility be left unexplored which might help to alleviate their situation. As you know, I have already hinted to Dobrynin that we are aware that a major source of the Soviet problem arises out of the nature of the regime in East Germany and the general dissatisfaction which its oppressive practices must inevitably create in the population. We cannot expect that the Soviets will admit the truth of this to us, but I would hope that the point might at least make some sort of impression on their own thinking. I believe with you that we must continue to seek ways and means to help the people of East Germany but in such a manner as not to arouse premature or false hopes. Here again the officials of your Foreign Office and the Department of State concerned with these matters should keep in close touch exchanging both information and ideas. In this connection, we shall be particularly interested in receiving the views of the Federal Government as they develop on the proper attitude to be taken towards the East German request for credits.
May I once again thank you for your hospitality and reaffirm my satisfaction that my visit to Bonn proved possible and that its results were so gratifying.
With warm personal regards and esteem,
Sincerely,
Dean Rusk. End Text.
Rusk
72. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/
Washington, July 3, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7-361. No classification marking. Drafted by McCloy. The full text is printed in volume VI.
[Here follows discussion of China.]
Another discussion took place in regard to Berlin. I said I was gaining the impression that Mr. Khrushchev was digging himself in deeper on the removal of United States troops in Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev must know how important a factor this was in our position and the position of all the Allies. To keep emphasizing this point was endangering a real settlement on Berlin which could be part of a package which might include a number of points of real advantage in the relief of tensions.
If Mr. Khrushchev wanted to diminish the prestige of the United States by demanding the withdrawal of United States troops and the insertion of other troops in West Berlin with no penetration of East Berlin by any foreign troops we would not be getting anywhere according to my view. This is not the time to crystallize positions on this important issue. Mr. Dobrynin must remember we did not throw the challenge to Mr. Khrushchev on Berlin. He did, and he heated it up so much we felt impelled to build up our military position. This annoyed Mr. Khrushchev very much and he stepped up his armament and all this leads us nowhere. There is a real opportunity to work out a solution on Berlin which may not suit Ulbricht but which would relieve tensions but they can't be relieved if Mr. Khrushchev is really trying to get us to back down in Berlin which we will not do. I said this was a matter on which I certainly felt very deeply and I felt the American people did. There was, in my judgment, real danger of war over Berlin if it were not handled temperately and there should never be an effort to force the issue. It carried a terrible danger everytime it was attempted. Mr. Dobrynin said he knew this was a sensitive element in our position over Berlin but he did not see why it was that we objected to neutral occupation of West Berlin. The United Nations could do this as it had in the case of the Suez, for example. The danger in Berlin was the confrontation of our two forces. It was the only place in the world where this was so. The necessity was to remove this danger. The fact that Berlin was surrounded by East Germany did not mean that they would ever be disposed to attempt to overrun the United Nations forces in Berlin. They could never agree to any presence of foreign troops in East Berlin because such a repudiation of the Communist regime by the Soviet Union makes it impracticable.
Then, I said, leave the situation as it is with no further attempts to maneuver us out of position. It was not "intolerable." It was not challenging; people could very well get on in Berlin if it were not for the new challenge. It was, of course, annoying to Ulbricht but who was Ulbricht to allow him to play with fire. If Ulbricht could be gotten rid of, I had the idea the whole situation would be improved greatly.
The West Germans would be much more forthcoming in regard to East Germany, etc. He suggested we get rid of Adenauer. I said this might be possible if we had controlled the elections in West Germany as they did in East Germany.
I referred to the Wall as a terrible acknowledgment of weakness. This symbol of war and concentration camps was sinister, out of place and a dreadful admission of weakness in that people had to be locked in their own home country to keep them there.
He said that it was only natural to erect such a Wall--there were barriers at every border crossing. I said I knew of only one such penitentiary wall on any boundary. He said a number of people in the United States Government had indicated to him that the Wall was a welcome stabilizing factor.
I said I did not agree. It was just too unnatural and sinister. It induced violence and hatred. It should be disposed of soon.
[Here follows discussion of disarmament.]
73. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, undated.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Translation. Handwritten notes at the top of the source text read: "Original and copy of translation retained by Kohler" and "Received at White House July 5/1962. Copy to Amb Thompson 7/7/62." The source text bears no salutation or signature, but in a conversation with Rusk on July 12 (see Document 76), Dobrynin stated that when he delivered the message to the White House on July 5, he had indicated that it was intended as a message from Khrushchev to the President. (Memorandum of conversation, July 12; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)
We are following with great attention the development of the Soviet-American exchange of opinions on German peace treaty and normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin and we are carefully weighing considerations being expressed by the President, the Secretary of State or on behalf of the President through unofficial channels.
On the other hand, we, naturally, cannot but take notice of the facts which indicate sharpening of the situation in West Berlin caused by activities of certain circles not interested in a German peace settlement. Other facts of recent past also support repeatedly voiced apprehensions that the absence of a final peace settlement in Germany not only keeps up the existing tension in Europe but can also cause unforeseen, undesirable consequences for European and world peace.
All this prompts the conclusion that further delay in solving the questions connected with a German peace settlement would involve such a threat to peace which must be averted already now when it is not too late.
Unfortunately in the course of the Soviet-American exchange of opinions there has not been achieved any noticeable progress since the meetings in Geneva. The whole matter has come to a standstill because of the differences in the main outstanding question--that of withdrawal of the occupation troops of the U.S., Great Britain and France from West Berlin and of abolition there of the occupation status. Motives were more than once given in detail on our side why we by no means can accept continuation of the present unsatisfactory and dangerous situation in West Berlin, the reason which lies in the presence there of occupation troops and occupation regime covering in effect the existence of a NATO military base in the centre of the G.D.R. territory.
We have set forth a number of concrete proposals which took into account the official position and motives of prestige of the U.S. on this main subject of disagreement. The President's considerations on the necessity to search for drawing nearer our points of view have thus been meeting with a favorable response in Moscow. Unfortunately, however, no proposal has been put forward by the American side which would enhance the possibility for solving the question of drawing a line through World War II by abolishing the occupation regime in West Berlin and by giving it the status of a free city. The expressed considerations about some temporary settlement of the question, so far as they do not provide for abolition of the occupation regime and withdrawal of the occupation troops of the three powers from West Berlin, cannot, naturally, make an agreement easier. Since the whole matter is that of eliminating the vestiges of the war it is absolutely impossible to accept mere formal changes in West Berlin without really changing the existing abnormal situation there which is fraught with possibility of a sudden explosion.
Both we and you had enough time for thinking this over. And if both of us are ready to really search for a solution then there are no reasons not to find it in the nearest future, without further procrastination. There is absolutely no sense in postponing until fall, and from fall until spring what should and can be done already now.
It can be seen from the last talk of Mr. Salinger with our Ambassador/2/ that the President shares the view that it is not expedient to postpone solution of the German problem and that he takes interest in finding a mutually acceptable solution on the main unresolved question--that of the foreign troops in West Berlin. Those proposals which we set forth before in our conviction fully correspond to the interests of both sides. But in order to speed up the solution and make a choice out of the alternatives that we face we are ready to make another effort that in the greatest possible degree takes into account the wishes of the United States on the question of the presence of its troops in West Berlin so far as those wishes are compatible with the task of completing a German peace settlement.
/2/This conversation has not been further identified.
Our proposal is as follows.
The occupation regime in West Berlin will be abolished and during the first years the troops of the United Nations will be stationed there which will act as guarantors of independence and security of West Berlin.
Those U.N. troops must not, naturally, either taken as whole or in any of their parts, represent this or that military group opposing each other and their status as guarantors acting in the name of the UN should be defined on the basis of a special agreement. They would symbolize the determination of the parties to the agreement not to permit outside interference into the affairs and life of the population of West Berlin. Those troops by their nature would be police formations and not combatant troops, what should be agreed upon.
The UN police military formations, the initial strength of which should not exceed the combined strength of the troops of the three powers stationed there as of July 1, 1962, would be composed of police military formations of the U.S., Great Britain and France which combined will make one half of such formations in West Berlin; the other half of UN police military formations will consist in an equal proportion of contingents of troops of one or two neutral states, one or two states of the Warsaw treaty (for example, Poland, Czechoslovakia), one or two small NATO states.
Subsequently the numerical strength of UN police military formations in West Berlin will gradually diminish, namely: during the first year after the abolition of the occupation status those UN formations will be cut by 25 per cent of the initial strength, during the second year--by another 25 per cent and during the third year by next 25 per cent of that number. The above mentioned gradual reduction of the numerical strength of the UN formations will be carried on in the same proportion both with regard to the police military formations of the three powers and the formations that will be provided by other states.
Since the sides agree that the presence of foreign troops in West Berlin should be of temporary nature they make an arrangement that by the end of the fourth year the remaining 25 per cent of the UN police formations will be withdrawn from West Berlin, and West Berlin will be free of the presence of foreign troops. We proceed from an assumption that after the withdrawal of those formations the guarantees by the UN in respect to independence of West Berlin that would guard that city from outside interference into its domestic affairs, should remain fully in force.
With the abolition of occupation status West Berlin will be considered as an independent political entity, that is, as a free city. Subversive activities must not be carried on from West Berlin against the GDR or other socialist countries.
Naturally, any claims by the FRG on West Berlin must be declined for they constitute a manifestation of the policy of aggression and revanche in practice. We are generally satisfied that our positions regarding groundlessness of any claims by the FRG on West Berlin are in effect the same. An appropriate agreement will also be achieved on free access to and from West Berlin with due respect for the sovereignty of the GDR on the basis of generally established international practice. The German Democratic Republic, as it has already stated, will assume appropriate commitments on this question. We on our part again reaffirm that we have stood and continue to stand for an unimpeded access provided the requirement to respect the lawful sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic is observed.
If differences or frictions arise on practical questions of access they will be considered by a special temporary international body--an arbitrator about which the Soviet side put forward corresponding proposals.
Simultaneously with the normalization of the situation in West Berlin and abolition there of the occupation regime other questions of a German peace settlement should be finally solved, such as: fixation and juridical formalization of the existing borders of the German states, the border between the G.D.R. and F.R.G. included, nonarming of the G.D.R. and F.R.G. with nuclear weapons (either directly, or through third countries, or through military-political groups in which they are participants), due respect for the sovereignty of the G.D.R., conclusion in one form or another of a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw treaty organization. An understanding on all those questions should, naturally, be formalized in appropriate agreements.
The agreement achieved by the sides on appropriate questions will find its reflection in a peace treaty which the Soviet Union and other interested states will conclude with the German Democratic Republic.
Setting forth the new proposal on the question of foreign troops in West Berlin which we believe is paving the way to a mutually acceptable agreement and which we hope the President will duly appreciate, we proceed from an assumption that as the American side has repeatedly emphasized a solution of all other questions of a German peace settlement which were discussed will not run into obstacles.
We would like the American side to correctly understand the motives and aims of this new proposal. We deem it necessary before taking steps with regard to conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic with all ensuing consequences which were earlier mentioned more than once to exhaust the possibilities to achieve a mutual agreement. We believe that in a question so important as that of a German peace settlement not a single unused opportunity should be left aside if, of course, all the interested sides are guided by good intentions, if they strive not for an increase of tension in Europe and in the whole world, not for encouragement of forces of revanche and aggression, not for war, but for a relaxation of tension, for peace.
The success of peaceful settlement in Laos gives all of us an encouraging example. The President once expressed an idea that if a mutually acceptable solution of the Laotian problem could be reached it would make easier for the United States to find ways to peaceful settlement of the German problem. We also believe that now it is the turn of the German problem.
In Laos we moved step by step and now it seems that we are close to a final settlement. Our proposals that were set forth above also provide for settlement of the problem of foreign troops in West Berlin during a certain transitional period, by several stages up to the complete withdrawal of those troops.
We want to draw the attention of the President that we are putting forward our proposals on problems of a German peace settlement with due regard for the considerations and position of the American side and we seriously count on the possibility of an agreement. If the President reacts positively to our new proposal, the Foreign Minister of the USSR could at a meeting with the Secretary of State in Geneva come to a final agreement. Thus a meeting between the President of the US and the Chairman of Council of Ministers of the USSR would be prepared, during which it would be possible to fix an achieved understanding and, provided there is an agreement between the parties, to sign appropriate documents.
The achievement of an agreement on the problems of a German peace settlement, including the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, would have a profound impact on all the peoples as an example of effective cooperation between the powers in the field of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. This would be a major victory for the policy both of the Soviet Union and the United States and, we are sure, of all those who stand for peace and condemn war. This would create a basis for a fruitful cooperation of the two powers also in the solution of other more cardinal problems relating to the main international problem of our time--that of general and complete disarmament and developing on its basis peaceful cooperation among all states and peoples.
Naturally, this would open a new chapter in the history of Soviet-American relations in which undoubtedly are vitally interested not only the peoples of our countries but also the peoples of the whole world. And the first steps of our countries along a new road could be consolidated by a state visit of the President of the United States to the Soviet Union who would be a welcome guest of the peoples and the government of our country.
74. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, July 6, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. A copy was
sent to Kohler.
The Soviet communication received at the White House on July fifth/2/ does not, in the slightest degree, represent any shift in the Soviet basic position. It merely provides a new formula to achieve the same result; namely, the total withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin. It provides that this should be done during a period of four years but in the first year, the Western troops, which will constitute only half of the total contingent, would, in effect, be UN forces and, specifically stated, would not be under the command of the United States, United Kingdom, or France. The other fifty percent would also be UN forces but made up of contingents from the smaller NATO powers and Warsaw Pact powers. These troops would be progressively reduced by twenty-five percent a year, so that at the end of four years, there would be no forces at all in Berlin. The paper makes no advance on the subject of access, and refers, in regard to the all-German questions, to all of the points the Soviet Union would like to see accepted.
/2/Document 73.
Since the Soviet document offers no advance from our point of view and is obviously completely unacceptable to us, and certainly to our Allies, the most important question concerning it is what does it mean from the point of view of future Soviet action? Since, in itself, it does not provide any specific clue on this point, it could quite well be the last Soviet attempt to reach some form of agreement before proceeding with the signature of a separate peace treaty. It could equally well be a means of just heightening the pressure on us in connection with the negotiations. It is fairly certain that the Soviets do not expect any Allied acceptance of this proposal and, therefore, it is either a move for the record to clear the way for a signature of a separate peace treaty--which still leaves very much open the question of the effect of any such treaty on the Western rights and obligations in regard in Berlin--or, as indicated earlier, it is merely a further pressure move on their part.
This document is not addressed, officially, to the President, and may, indeed, have been sent to the Attorney General. The question, therefore, arises as to how best to handle its receipt. Since the manner of its delivery is informal, and to some extent unofficial, I would question whether or not we would wish to discuss it with our Allies. To do so would be to depart from the confidential nature of these communications and it would almost certainly leak during the process. The only difficulty with not making our Allies privy to its contents is that it conceivably might be a prelude to moves towards the signature of a peace treaty. I think the manner of a reply, if any, and whether or not to inform our Allies should be given most careful consideration, and I certainly would not feel under any compulsion to get off any quick answer.
75. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Weiss) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Johnson)/1/
Washington, July 11, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1162. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Weiss.
SUBJECT
Berlin
1. At the Task Force Meeting this morning/2/ a considerable portion of the time was devoted to discussing various signs of renewed Soviet threats to sign a peace treaty. Mr. Kohler is obviously disturbed, though his basis is more intuitive than intellectual. The Khrushchev speech and the message from Vienna reporting Kreisky's impression of his Soviet visit are the two most tangible sources of information (Tab A)./3/
/2/No other record of this meeting has been found.
/3/Neither printed. For text of Khrushchev's July 10 speech at Moscow, see Pravda, July 11, 1962. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 710. Telegram 48 from Vienna, July 10, transmitted Kreisky's impressions of his visit to Moscow and his view that the Soviet Union was preparing to take action leading to an East German peace treaty.
2. The Secretary is meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow afternoon which may be utilized to set the stage for more significant discussions with Gromyko at Geneva next week.
3. There seems to be considerable Allied apprehension over the possibility of new Soviet moves. The British have requested an Ambassadorial Group Meeting for this afternoon (this being very short notice) to discuss London's concerns./4/
/4/At the meeting at 3:30 p.m. Ormsby Gore began by saying he had requested the session because the United Kingdom believed the Soviet Union "might be moving toward a crisis situation in Berlin in the near future." After extended discussion the Ambassadorial Group concluded that the Soviet Union was probably not moving toward a crisis over Berlin, but that increased harassment of access to Berlin could be expected. (Memorandum of conversation, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1162)
4. As a follow-up from yesterday's meeting between Nitze and Kohler,/5/ which was called for the purpose of discussing various Berlin problems, EUR has undertaken the drafting of a memorandum to Defense which would provide guidance as to probable military moves which would be required in the event of Soviet signing of a peace treaty. We have worked with EUR on this paper, however, I believe that it would be well for you to give it your personal attention since, as I mentioned to Kohler, we clearly should not consider these military actions in solely a Berlin context. He, of course, agrees. If you have any guidance with regard to the proposed memorandum to Defense (Tab B),/6/ I would appreciate receiving it. If you wish to discuss it, I am, of course, at your disposal.
/5/No other record of this meeting has been found.
/6/Not printed.
76. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 12, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1262. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Germany and Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs
After an initial exchange, Ambassador Dobrynin said he had been authorized to transmit a proposal along the following lines:
(1) The occupation regime in West Berlin will be abolished. During the initial years United Nations troops will be stationed there to act as guarantors of the independence and security of West Berlin.
(2) The status of these troops as guarantors acting in the name of the UN should be defined in a special agreement. They must not, either in whole or in part, represent this or that opposing military group. The troops would symbolize the determination of the parties to the agreement not to permit outside interference in the affairs and life of West Berlin's population. By their nature, these troops would be police formations and not combatant troops.
(3) The UN police military formations would be composed one-half of police military formations of the US, Great Britain and France and one-half of an equal proportion of contingents of troops of one or two neutral states, one or two states of the Warsaw Treaty (e.g. Poland and Czechoslovakia), and one or two small NATO states. The initial strength of the UN police military formations should not exceed the combined strength of the troops of the three powers stationed there as of July 1, 1962.
(4) Thereafter, the numerical strength of the UN police military formation in West Berlin will be decreased as follows: During the first year after abolition of the occupation status, reduction by twenty-five percent of initial strength; during the second year a further twenty-five percent; during the third year a further twenty-five percent; and by the end of the fourth year the remaining twenty-five percent, after which West Berlin will be free of the presence of foreign troops. The indicated gradual reduction in strength in UN formations will be carried out in the same proportions both with respect to the police military formations provided by the three powers and the formations provided by other states. After withdrawal of these police formations, the UN guarantees with respect to the independence of West Berlin, guarding the city from outside interference in its domestic affairs, should remain fully in force.
(5) With the abolition of occupation status West Berlin will be considered as an independent entity, i.e., a free city. Subversive activities against the GDR or other socialist countries must not be carried on from West Berlin.
(6) Any claims by the Federal Republic of Germany on West Berlin must be rejected as manifestations of the policy of aggression and revanchism.
(7) An appropriate agreement will be concluded on free access to and from West Berlin, with due respect to GDR sovereignty on the basis of generally established international practice. As already stated, the GDR will make appropriate commitments on this question. The Soviet Union again reaffirms that it has stood and continues to stand for unimpeded access, provided that respect is accorded to the lawful sovereign rights of the GDR.
(8) Differences or frictions relating to practical questions of access will be considered by a special temporary international body--an arbitrator as to which the Soviet Union has already put forward appropriate proposals.
(9) Concomitant with the abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin and the normalization of the situation there, other questions relating to the German peace settlement should be finally solved, as for example (a) fixing and juridically formalizing the existing borders of the German states, including the border between the GDR and FRG; (b) non-arming of the GDR and FRG with nuclear weapons (either directly, or through third countries, or through military-political groups in which they are participants); (c) due respect for GDR sovereignty; (d) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty organizations in one form or another. An understanding on these questions should be formalized in appropriate agreements.
(10) The agreement reached on appropriate questions will be reflected in the peace treaty which the Soviet Union and other interested states will conclude with the GDR.
The Secretary said that, on his recent visit to Europe, he had talked to the French, British and Germans, as well as the NATO Council, on the German and Berlin question. In summary he might draw two general conclusions: (1) the United States and its Allies are in complete unity with respect to what we continue to describe as the vital interests of the West in the situation. One sign of this has been the recent identical response of all Governments to the proposal of Chairman Khrushchev for mixed troops in West Berlin of certain countries of the Warsaw and NATO organizations. There had been no consultation on this, but a vital point for the West is involved. (2) There was a real hope that these issues could be resolved by peaceful means and that, over time, the two sides could work into a more normal relationship.
One point which, the Secretary said, had not been discussed on his trip and which he would like to stress in view of certain remarks in Khrushchev's recent speech, was the fallacy of the idea that the US is in some sense a prisoner of West Germany and is merely parrotting German views on the subject of Berlin. If one goes back to the discussions of last June between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, it is clear that we have been talking consistently about US vital interests, not borrowed interests. These are related to our interests in the security and peace of the West, and the consequences to these if our commitments to Berlin should be shown to be empty and meaningless. We are speaking for ourselves in this matter, and we hope there will be no misunderstanding on this point.
Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary had any comments on the new Soviet proposals. The Secretary said he would not attempt to comment at length but these proposals seemed to be merely a variation on the same point, with the same objective as previous formulae--the elimination of the Western presence in West Berlin. To use the US vernacular, the Soviet proposals were simply "not on".
Looking back to the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the Secretary continued, we seem to be in a dilemma. The President came into office as one of the few young men in high position at the present time among the great powers. He was looking ahead for decades, taking a broad historical view. The Secretary observed parenthetically that, allowing for obviously unacceptable ideological points, he had found the wide historical range of Khrushchev's last speech in Moscow interesting. President Kennedy felt that there were two broad paths which might be followed: That of implacable hostility and inevitable catastrophe, and that of improved understanding leading to a more normal relationship. The latter was the one we should take.
As we have discussed Berlin, the Secretary went on, we have mentioned a number of points on which there seemed to be a possibility of agreement and which need not be troublesome. If, however, on the Soviet side these were put into a framework of some sort of stylized diplomatic technique, or regarded as signs of weakness, as compromises or concessions which were obtainable anyway if the Soviets just pressed hard enough, this created a dilemma for us. How can we proceed on the road to normalization when we are pressed on a point relative to which we cannot make concessions? On the one side we see points which could fall into place; on the other side we see the Soviets becoming more and more insistent on the point of Western troop presence.
Ambassador Dobrynin observed that the most recent Soviet proposals should be interesting. The Soviet Union obviously was trying to find a way out. It did not want a military catastrophe. However, it believed that the matter of occupation troops in West Berlin was a source of permanent danger in Europe which must be solved.
The Secretary said that the Soviets applied their formulae only to West Berlin. If they were willing to think in terms of Berlin as a whole, so that the confidence in our commitments to West Berlin would not be diminished, this could be talked about. But it put us on a slippery slope to confine the discussion to West Berlin, after saying that East Berlin and the GDR were not subject to discussion. Dobrynin questioned the Secretary's use of the expression "slippery slope". The Secretary said that, if the Soviets did not feel that it existed, they would not be pressing. Dobrynin said that this was not really the case.
There was a brief discussion as to whether the Soviet expression "drawing a line" should be "under" or "through World War II" which concluded that either expression conveyed the meaning adequately. The Secretary commented that the Soviets have talked about drawing this line and the dangers in the Berlin situation. We simply did not understand what the Soviets had in mind. The danger actually had not appeared until the Soviets started pressing the vital interests of the West in West Berlin. What is the real content of drawing a line under World War II?
Dobrynin said that, after a war must come peace, and this meant a peace treaty. If a peace treaty could not be had with both German States, then it should be had with one German State. West Berlin, which was in the middle of an existing German State, was a source of perpetual danger. Every day there were frictions and new incidents. These had to be stopped. Separately, perhaps, each issue was not so important, as for example, the recent humiliating treatment of Soviet citizens connected with the Soviet Tourist Agency, but the cumulative effect was. The presence of Western troops in West Berlin was the presence of NATO troops. The Secretary asked if the various troops around West Berlin were not also Warsaw Pact troops. Dobrynin said that this was not a real argument, since they were on East German territory. The mere presence of Western troops in West Berlin causes elements in West Germany and Berlin to act provocatively in a way which might lead to conflict. The Secretary asked whether the twenty Soviet divisions in East Germany did not have some influence on Ulbricht's attitude. Dobrynin did not respond directly, but said the Soviets had offered to withdraw their troops in old proposals. Coming back to those old proposals, this subject could be discussed.
Referring to the split of the city, the Secretary said that he could see the desire of the East Berliners to come over to West Berlin might have caused embarrassment, but the situation should be improved locally. Dobrynin asked why the West Berlin Senat had refused to come over and have talks with the East German authorities. The Secretary commented that the West Berlin authorities should talk with the authorities of East Berlin and not of the GDR, as he had proposed in their last conversation. Dobrynin said it was up to the Germans to do this; there had been no answer to the last proposal from the GDR. The Secretary said the contact should be between the city authorities. Dobrynin stated that East Berlin was the capital of the GDR and anyway this was not the real issue. The Secretary observed that, if Dobrynin were in West Berlin and listened to some of Ulbricht's speeches, he would not be very comfortable. Dobrynin said that he did not think that Ulbricht would be involved personally in any discussions with any West Berliners.
The Secretary asked when we could expect a response to our note of June 25./2/ Dobrynin observed that it had been delivered in Moscow and he was not in the act. Up to the present he had received no indication of a reply.
/2/See Document 62. For text of the July 14 Soviet reply, see Pravda, July 17, 1962. An extract is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 711-712.
After a number of other subjects had been discussed at this point, reported in separate memoranda of conversation,/3/ the Secretary returned to the subject of Berlin by inquiring as to whether there was any indication what Gromyko's attitude on Berlin was likely to be if a meeting took place at Geneva./4/ Dobrynin said that he had the impression that the Soviet Foreign Minister would expect to discuss the newest Soviet proposal with the Secretary. Did the latter have something particular in mind on this or other questions? The Secretary observed that what we need is evidence of that sense of reciprocity about which he had previously spoken. The one-sided character of the talks on West Berlin on which the Soviets were insisting would not lead anywhere.
/3/Memoranda of the parts of the conversation on nuclear testing, use of nuclear forces against the Soviet Union, the Common Market, and captive nations are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Rusk/Dobrynin. Regarding the memorandum of conversation about Khrushchev's message to the President, see the source note, Document 73.
/4/Rusk visited Geneva July 19-25 to sign the neutrality agreements on Laos.
Dobrynin asked how long the Secretary expected to be in Geneva. The Secretary responded that this was a matter which he was holding a little open. If the Laos meetings began on Saturday, he might expect to arrive on Friday afternoon. If the signing took place on Monday he might stay on into Tuesday, but there was no specific limitation. In the article which he had written, the Secretary continued, he had suggested that he ought to stay at home. Dobrynin suggested that he take a copy along on his trip to refresh his memory. In response to the Secretary's query, Dobrynin said he was not aware when Gromyko was arriving. He did know that the Soviet Foreign Minister was looking forward to seeing the Secretary.
The Secretary said he did not know whether there was much point in going over with the Ambassador positions which had already been repeated over and over again. What we need is a real indication that our vital interests are recognized, not necessarily in a formal sense, but are understood as they exist in this situation. He did not know that there were any fresh arguments on either side, but he was concerned that, despite the fact we had tried to clarify our attitude and that of the West, the Soviet Government has again put its position on the public record, thus building up the prestige factor. This had been self-manufactured and we did not see much we could do about it. Making a public proposal as in Khrushchev's recent speech, which the Soviet Government knows does not fit our view of our vital interests, does not help to find an answer to the question.
Dobrynin commented that, in the last four or five months, the Soviet Union had put forward several proposals. The United States had put forward no proposals on the occupation regime question. The Soviet Union wanted to find a solution. If it did not, it would simply have signed the peace treaty. The Secretary observed that these so called "fresh" proposals are just a series of variations to reduce or eliminate our position in Berlin. Dobrynin again asked what the US proposals were. The Secretary responded that the Soviets know that, if they want forces in Berlin, they can have them in East Berlin. They also know that we think the presence of Western forces provided a stabilizing element in the situation. We had suggested a statement of principles to handle the fact of disagreement as well as to provide a forum for continuing discussion.
Dobrynin stated that an interesting stage had now been reached. Both sides knew the arguments of the other side very well. The time had come to find a solution, not merely to repeat well-known arguments. This required proposals in concrete terms. The Secretary commented that the Soviets surely did not expect us to make proposals to get ourselves out of West Berlin. Dobrynin said the US had made no proposals in the last year and a half. The Secretary observed that he thought the Soviet Ambassador underestimated the exchanges between the two Governments. We had made so many proposals that even Ulbricht had recently listed four or five points on which agreement had been reached./5/ Dobrynin said he was thinking of the central issue. The Secretary went on to say that the only proposals the Soviets had made would reduce our position and enlarge the Soviet position. When the US tried to find a fair solution, or to improve its position, the Soviets said these matters were not to be discussed. In effect, they were in the bag.
/5/For text of Ulbricht's July 7 speech at Rostock, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 809-816.
Dobrynin said his Government still hoped that a way out could be found on the main and central issue, and that thereafter a solution of the German question as a whole could be found. The main issue is the abolition of occupation troops.
The Secretary said that he would like to ask on what basis the Soviets considered that they had an interest in West Berlin except in terms of the occupation rights derived from the defeat of Nazi Germany. Dobrynin responded that his Government held that, 17 years after the war, troops must cease to have the status of occupation forces. The Secretary noted the Soviets were saying a great deal more than that the Western troops should be there on another basis than occupation. They are saying that the troops should not be there at all, or should share their position with Soviet troops or Warsaw Pact troops. Dobrynin said it was not a question of sharing possession but just of guaranteeing the status of West Berlin. West Berlin must be an independent entity. The question is how to guarantee this. The Western troops would not provide a good guarantee; they are already a source of friction. The guarantee provided by a UN troop presence would be better. Why could it not be accepted? The Secretary said there was no objection to a UN presence of some sort in Berlin, not just West Berlin. The Western forces are in fact surrounded by Ulbricht and his men (Dobrynin protested at this). We cannot ourselves see how the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin can be maintained without the three Western Powers. If Ambassador Dobrynin were a West Berliner, he would feel the same way. Dobrynin commented that, if he were a responsible citizen of West Berlin, he would not want these troops which were a source of so much friction. The Secretary commented that the only case in the free world where we would find such unanimity as is found in elections in the Soviet Union would be a West Berlin vote on the continued presence of the Western powers. Dobrynin said that, if the UN troop question were put up to the population, he was not sure that it would not be supported. Mr. Kohler asked whether if the question were put to the vote the Soviets would accept the verdict of the West Berliners.
Dobrynin said he was not a Berliner. This was a matter in which the national interests of the Soviet Union were involved. The Soviets had not asked German permission when they came to Berlin, and they did not want the Germans to decide on a matter where their national interests were involved.
During a discussion which then ensued of the Common Market (reported in separate memorandum of conversation), Dobrynin asked about the future of US trade with the Soviet Union in view of Congressional attitudes. The Secretary observed that the prejudice of our policy favors trade. We are a trading nation, and we trade unless there is a reason not to. In his recent speech Khrushchev had referred to post-1946 military expenditures. He wished that there were some people in the Soviet Union assigned, perhaps as war-gamers, to the task of telling the Soviet leaders how Americans thought about things. In 1946 we had greatly reduced the US armed forces. Not a division or air unit was ready for combat. Our Defense budget was about 10 billion dollars. Now it is over four times that much. Why did this come about? It started with Soviet policies during the Stalinist period, the Greek experience, etc. The major jump had come at the time of the Korean war. If Khrushchev had not insisted on greatly reducing or eliminating our position in Berlin last summer, the subsequent increase in our forces would not have occurred. If Stalin had not pushed in his time, the US would be disarmed today for all practical purposes. Because of pressures on Berlin, we have strengthened our forces. The Soviets became alarmed and strengthened their forces, and all this in relation to Berlin.
The President would like to move on trade but people who are opposed to trade with the Soviets are nourished by pressures on Berlin.
The Secretary repeated that he hoped that Gromyko would come to Geneva with a basis on which a solution on some of these problems could be found. He noted that he had referred to the two different roads that the US and the Soviet Union could take. The choice of alternatives was extremely important. We wanted to improve our relations if possible. This was the President's view. If you removed from Khrushchev's recent speech the ideological elements, which we could not, of course, accept, there was an undertone of seriousness in what he said. His remarks about the diversion of resources to the arms race provided a basis on which we could agree.
The Secretary said he supposed Dobrynin had been a little surprised that he had been so moderate during his visit to Berlin. Dobrynin said that he had noticed this, and that the Secretary observed that one thing that had surprised him, in returning by helicopter from the City Hall to the Airport, was the emptiness of East Berlin, not merely at the Wall but for a considerable distance behind it.
77. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 17, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Attached to a July 18 memorandum of transmittal from Bundy to Rusk, which stated that Bundy had prepared the memorandum of conversation at the direction of the President who had approved it. Bundy also instructed Rusk to limit access to the memorandum "to those who really must know about it," since the President wanted "Dobrynin to have confidence in the privacy of such talks."
Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin, Tuesday, July 17, 1962, 6:00 p.m. (prepared from the President's account and approved by the President July 18)
The President met alone with Ambassador Dobrynin and talked with him for just under an hour. The atmosphere of the conversation was agreeable. After some pleasantries the conversation turned on three subjects: Berlin, nuclear testing, and developments in Southeast Asia.
On Berlin, the President told Dobrynin that he had prepared and would soon have delivered a reply/2/ to Chairman Khrushchev's recent communication./3/ The President emphasized that the presence of Allied troops in West Berlin is a vital interest of the United States. For this reason none of the Soviet proposals for alternative arrangements could be accepted; all of them, in one way or another, implied the departure of Western troops--they would get us out, and without so much as a fig leaf of concealment. This would mean a major retreat. Europe would lose confidence in U.S. leadership. It would be a major victory for the Soviet Union and a major defeat for the West.
/2/Document 78.
/3/Document 73.
Ambassador Dobrynin said that Chairman Khrushchev would be greatly disappointed in this response to his most recent proposal. He asked whether the American position was related to German interests or American interests. The President said again that he was speaking of a vital U.S. interest. There might well be other issues on which we would be willing to press the Germans quite hard--as, for example, on the structure of an access authority. But on the question of our presence in Berlin, there was no argument among the Western Allies; it was of vital interest to all. The President remarked that he had made this point clear to Foreign Minister Gromyko in the fall of 1961./4/
/4/For a memorandum of the President's conversation with Gromyko, October 6, 1961, see vol. XIV, Document 170.
Ambassador Dobrynin argued that in its present condition Berlin is a potential source of dangerous friction and conflict and that a removal of Western troops would lessen the dangers. The President stated that while he could understand Soviet objections to the presence of Western troops, he must emphasize again that the removal of Western troops would be a disaster for us, while their presence was not a disaster for the Soviet Union.
The President also emphasized that Soviet-created tensions in Berlin had caused increases in Western rearmament and that any new crisis would have a similar effect. The President noted the disagreement which the United States has with its Allies on the diffusion of nuclear weapons, and said that Soviet-created tensions could only increase the danger of results which the Soviet Government would not like. Ambassador Dobrynin argued in reply that it was the fact of Western troops in West Berlin which created these dangers. This was the one point of direct confrontation between opposing great powers, and it was naturally a source of danger. If the confrontation could be ended, the dangers would be reduced. The President repeated that the real cause of danger was the Soviet effort to change the existing situation, that the way to reduce tension was to reach an understanding, and that the presence of Allied troops was a vital interest. The Ambassador repeated that the Chairman would be disappointed.
(Comments on nuclear testing are on page 3, and on developments in Southeast Asia on page 4)/5/
/5/Neither printed.
78. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev/1/
Washington, July 17, 1962.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The source text bears no drafting information.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am responding to the communication received through Ambassador Dobrynin on July 5, 1962./2/ Secretary of State Rusk made certain preliminary comments on this communication during his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 9th [12th],/3/ since its contents related directly to the subject of their discussion, but I should also like to take this opportunity to add my personal views. I believe that in a matter of such seriousness and potential danger to peace, we must take advantage of any legitimate channel in an effort to clarify our respective positions.
/2/Document 73.
/3/See Document 76.
As heads of government we are naturally interested in the welfare of our peoples, but we also have a certain obligation to history and to humanity as a whole. This dual responsibility demands that each of us make an effort to understand the position of the other and to see whether accommodations cannot be made, consistent with the basic interests of both parties, directed toward finding peaceful solutions to outstanding differences. This seems particularly important in the case of Germany and Berlin where the vital interests of great nations are involved at a major point of friction.
What we, therefore, find especially troubling in the present Soviet position is the consistent failure, even in the very formulation of the problem, to take any real account of what we have made clear are the vital interests of the United States and its Allies. For example, the Soviet Government has on a number of occasions, as in your most recent communication, complained that it has put forward a number of concrete proposals which take into account "the official position and motives of prestige of the United States," but that "unfortunately, no proposal has been put forward by the American side which would enhance the possibility of solving the question of drawing a line through World War II by abolishing the occupation regime in West Berlin and giving it the status of a free city." Such a formulation is, in effect, the very crux of the problem, because it states the issue in a way which embodies all of the Soviet premises and none of the Western premises in this evaluation of the current situation.
We have gone to some pains over the past year to define to you what we consider to be our vital interests in the Berlin situation. These do not take away anything from the Soviet Union which it now enjoys. On the contrary, we have attempted to show that an arrangement mindful of these interests could lead to a chain of developments of mutual benefit to both sides. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, consistently states the problem in terms which completely ignore our vital interests and proposes an outcome under the shadow of a threatened fait accompli which the Western Powers can either accept in advance or in the actual fact.
In your recent communication, you note that the "main outstanding question is that of the withdrawal of the occupation troops of the United States, Great Britain and France from West Berlin and of the abolition there of the occupation status." To accept this formulation would be to accept the Soviet position one hundred per cent. We find it difficult to see even the slightest element of compromise here on the part of the Soviet Government. The various formulae which the Soviet Government has put forward all have the same objective--the total withdrawal or a severe reduction in the position of Western forces in Berlin. Merely mixing the same ingredients together in different proportions does not change the basic fact that the result is impossible from our point of view. We cannot, therefore, accept as accurate the statement that these formulae attempt to take into account the "official position and motives of prestige of the United States." They run directly counter to them. Does the Soviet Government really believe that our acceptance of any of them, including the most recent, would not be interpreted throughout the world as a complete capitulation? We know that it would be, not only by the West Berliners who would immediately begin to abandon the city and leave it a hollow shell, but by all governments and informed peoples. It was for this reason that, at our meeting in Vienna now more than a year ago, we placed such stress on the commitment of the United States to Berlin in terms of our national prestige and vital interests. Nothing that has happened since then has affected the meaning of our remarks.
The question of Western troop presence is central. Surface changes in the Soviet position which do not really take account of this fact do not provide a real basis for serious negotiations. Without this recognition of our vital interests it is difficult to see how other aspects of the situation can usefully be considered.
Having said this much about the Soviet position, I feel that I must also comment on your description of our position. To say that the American side has not put forward a proposal "which would enhance the possibility of solving the question of drawing a line through World War II by abolishing the occupation regime in West Berlin and by giving it the status of a free city" is, as I have indicated, to state the problem without the most minimum elements of reciprocity. We are not opposed to drawing a line through World War II (though we believe it more important to avoid World War III), but drawing such a line to us cannot mean accepting the position of one of the victors of World War II at the complete expense of three of the other victors. Our views as to how appropriately to draw a line through World War II are well known. We understand that these views are unacceptable to the Soviet Government. Because we know this we have not insisted on pressing our views to the point of conflict and crisis, although we believe them to be correct. We could not, of course, be expected to put forward proposals eliminating ourselves from West Berlin.
We have instead tried to be practical in our approach and in the specific proposals we have put forward. These have not proceeded from the assumption that one side must be prepared to abandon its position entirely. We have instead been motivated by the desire to eliminate the Berlin issue as a source of major conflict, which it is in the interest of both sides to avoid. We have attempted, therefore, to provide a means of dealing with the fact of disagreement in such a way as to serve the broader common interest of both sides in the avoidance of head-on collision and in the preservation of peace. We have also made a number of suggestions for relaxing the sense of crisis in the Berlin area.
You are, of course, familiar with the informal working paper which Secretary Rusk gave Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva on March 22, 1962./4/ We have never felt that the merits of our suggested approach have really adequately been considered by the Soviet Government or dealt with in subsequent discussions. The language of this paper was not meant to be sacrosanct, but it reflected a sincere effort to find points on which there seemed to be at least some agreement in terms of previous statements made by both sides. We would, therefore, hope that you would review the explanations which Secretary Rusk has given to see whether our approach does not suggest an acceptable way out of the present impasse.
/4/See Documents 19 and 20.
In a recent speech,/5/ you pointed to the example of Laos as showing that, given a desire for agreement, ways can be found to settle the most challenging and complicated international problems. We can agree entirely with this. In the case of Berlin, there is also undoubtedly a desire for agreement. What seems to be lacking so far, however, is any common ground as to what might be required in order to achieve agreement. Desire for agreement is important as a necessary beginning, but it cannot suffice in itself unless a spirit of patience and of respect for the vital interests of the other party is also present. We feel confident that, if these factors are present, we will also be able to work out something on Berlin which will contribute a resolution satisfactory to both sides.
/5/See footnote 2, Document 75.
In your same speech you pointed out that the German question did not have a direct bearing on disarmament but was closely related to it. Here again we can agree. Even a quieting of the Berlin question on the basis of respect for the mutual interests of both sides could not help but markedly improve the entire atmosphere of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. As the two major nuclear powers, we have an overriding common interest, deriving from our troubling knowledge of the destructive potentialities of the new weapons, in preventing their spread into the control of other countries. We are certain that one of the major factors in recent years, not only in the general acceleration of arms preparations but also in focusing attention on nuclear weapons, has been the almost continuous crisis over Berlin since November, 1958. Further threats to Berlin and continued heightening of the crisis can only lead to additional measures in this direction.
We feel, therefore, that we have an additional strong and common interest in arriving at a solution of the Berlin problem, consistent with our mutual interests and prestige, in order to relieve the continuing pressures for an arms race including the piling up and diffusion of nuclear weapons. We might add that the enlarged U.S. military preparations which began last summer took place only after the renewal of Soviet threats against our position in Berlin. Our efforts in the military field, and those of our Allies, were a sign of the seriousness which which we all regard the defense of our vital interests in Berlin. This military build-up, however, was not something we wanted, or something which would have happened in the absence of the developments of last summer. If it is true that the threats to our position in Berlin remain a serious source of difference between our two countries, it is just as obvious that some satisfactory arrangement on Berlin would greatly improve the atmosphere and remove an important motive for increased Western effort in the armaments field. This is a consideration to which we hope you will give deep personal thought. Further pressures on Berlin can only exacerbate the situation and enhance the danger of an arms race which we assume neither of us basically desires.
We undoubtedly live in a climactic age. Science has now given man a capacity for destruction which, for the first time, could threaten the very existence of the race itself. This fact makes it imperative that, as rational men, we attempt to resolve our differences rather than move step-by-step towards a major confrontation. In reading the history of past wars and how they began, we cannot help but be impressed how frequently the failure of communication, misunderstanding and mutual irritation have played an important role in the events leading up to fateful decisions for war. In the nuclear age, we cannot be resigned to passive acceptance of a chain of causation which seems to determine the course of history from the outset. We know from your own willingness to discuss these matters that you do not hold to the view that what is happening now is predetermined, and cannot be affected by the decisions which our governments take. I write with this in mind, and urge that you give serious thought to the reflections and suggestions which this communication contains. I have not tried here to deal with every aspect of your communication, but have limited our comment to what seems to be the heart of the issue between us. We would not, however, want silence on these other points to be interpreted as complete agreement on our part with your formulation of the problems and suggested solutions.
If I may summarize, the following lines of approach have seemed to us to be open in seeking a satisfactory resolution of the German and Berlin question:
1. We might join in a real attempt to draw a line through World War II by agreeing on a German settlement based on the freely expressed wish of the German people. As you know, this is in our view the best solution to the problems of Germany and Berlin. We have not pressed in these private exchanges for your agreement to this solution because you have emphasized that it is unacceptable to you--as unacceptable as your proposals for the removal of our troops from Berlin are to us.
2. Short of an all-German settlement, we might agree on new and improved arrangements for all of Berlin.
3. We might deal with the present situation as a factual matter, including the fact of the Western presence in West Berlin. This could mean proceeding on the basis of our informal working paper of March 22, 1962. It would essentially reflect a recognition that there are basic elements in the Berlin situation on which there cannot now be agreement. With such recognition, steps might be taken to ease tensions in the immediate area of Berlin, and it might perhaps be less difficult thereafter to deal with other aspects of the Berlin question while moving ahead with the reduction of tensions in other fields. We have in mind here particularly steps toward disarmament.
It is now expected that our Foreign Ministers will be meeting shortly in Geneva to sign an agreement on Laos. They will undoubtedly find the occasion to discuss further the question of Berlin. We hope that Foreign Minister Gromyko will come to Geneva with a position embodying genuine elements of reciprocity and taking account of our vital interests in the Berlin situation. If this should prove to be the case, we feel certain that much progress can be made in removing a major source of contention--an accomplishment which would surely have a remarkable and heartening effect in improving the atmosphere and making possible progress in other related areas.
Sincerely,/6/
/6/Printed from an unsigned copy.
79. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, July 19, 1962.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 506 Bercon/Marcon. Secret. Drafted by Legere. Klein's notes on this meeting are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin.
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on Berlin Planning, 1000 hours, 19 July 1962
1. At 1000 hours, July 19, 1962, the President met with representatives of State-Defense-JCS-the White House staff, in order to consider approval of a US position on BERCON/MARCON contingency planning concerning Berlin, specifically BQD-M-27 dated 12 July 1962 and its enclosure./2/ What follows is the result of an informal debriefing by General Taylor. Among others who attended were Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Assistant Secretaries Kohler and Nitze, Generals Lemnitzer and Gray, and Messrs. Bundy and Klein.
/2/On July 16 Rusk and McNamara had sent the President a joint memorandum outlining the status of Berlin contingency (BERCON) and maritime contingency (MARCON) planning and the steps needed to coordinate this planning with NATO. Attached to this memorandum was BQD-M-27, "Report to Washington Ambassadorial Group on Politico-Military Consultation on Bercon/Marcon Plans." In describing the Western aims in a Berlin crisis this paper stated:
"(1) There is a compelling necessity for the Allies to succeed in protecting their vital interests relating to Berlin and to ensure that this success is recognized in the Free World.
"(2) The purpose of Allied operation, however, should not be to overpower the Soviet Union or to disintegrate the Satellite area, but to make the Soviet Government change their policy on Berlin. Therefore, the Allies should give the Soviet Union opportunity to draw back and even (without creating the appearance of failure on our part) help them to cover up this retreat." (Ibid., President's Office Files, NATO General)
On July 24 Bundy sent Rusk and McNamara a memorandum in which he stated that the President approved the general position taken in their joint memorandum and the specific recommendation that U.S. contingency plans for Berlin be discussed with NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2462)
2. The discussion did not proceed in a particularly orderly manner and it was only with some difficulty that Mr. Nitze was eventually able to direct the attention of the meeting to its constituted purpose of discussing and approving the BERCON/MARCON planning positions embodied in BQD-M-27. He was eventually, however, able to do this and the President has given his approval to the paper.
3. In general, the apparent impression conveyed to the President by the extensive discussion was that months would be required before any substantial operative plans came into existence, that not very much had been accomplished with our Allies--especially at NATO level since last year, and that a great deal of time seemed to have been expended on planning for unlikely contingencies. Although the meeting was not supposed to address the subject of a separate peace treaty until after the consideration of BERCONs/MARCONs, the President's early questions apparently brought this subject into the arena right away. Secretary Rusk reported the fact of many agreed papers, draft notes and announcements, etc. He also said that when in Europe later this week he would propose to the other Quadripartite Foreign Ministers the advisability of reviewing their contingency plans for a separate peace treaty in the light of developments during the past several months; he also thought that it might now be appropriate to encourage the French to return actively into the Berlin planning forum. The President's questions brought out the fact that there did not exist any genuine counterproposal for action in the event of a separate peace treaty, but rather only plans for using selected mechanics designed to accommodate to the separate treaty. The President strongly felt that the Western reaction to a separate peace treaty should not be such as to imply great concern over the treaty (this, of course, is in fact the sense of the agreed Allied position).
4. After the above early discussion, Mr. Nitze proceeded to outline briefly and generally the place of the BERCONs/MARCONs in over-all Berlin planning. General Lemnitzer then followed, as planned, with a useful explanation of the specific BERCONs and MARCONs proposed for approval, but the President kept intervening with questions. In answer to one of them, General Gray said that on his recent trip to Europe he had discovered the BERCON planning activity had not yet even descended to the level of Armies, and that therefore some months would undoubtedly be required before fully prepared operational plans would be available up and down the entire line.
5. At one point in the discussion the briefers mentioned that the Allies, including the United States, would enter into some mobilization activity. The President thereupon asked what the US plan was for mobilizing whom on what time schedule, but no ready answer was forthcoming from the group.
6. Comment. It would seem that the President never clearly understood the exact place occupied by the BERCON/MARCON plans in the over-all picture of Berlin contingency planning which may be said to begin with certain unilateral plans, proceed through tripartite and quadripartite agreed plans or catalogues of plans, and feed at some point into the full context of NATO plans and catalogues of plans. The one basic Berlin planning "Bible" with which the President is, or at least was at one time, reasonably familiar is the so-called "Poodle Blanket"/3/ with its four preferred phases or sequences. A review of this Poodle Blanket, highlighted by a demonstration of how, where and when the BERCONs and MARCONs fit into it, would almost surely have led to greater understanding by the President and therefore a more orderly consideration of the paper which formed the subject of the meeting.
/3/For text of NSAM No. 109 (U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Crisis, "Poodle Blanket"), October 23, 1961, see vol. XIV, Document 185.
LJL
80. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, July 20, 1962.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears the handwritten note: "Taken from Pres Week-end reading dtd 7/20/62."
SUBJECT
NATO Contingency Planning for Berlin (BERCON/MARCON Plans) and the Conceptual Framework of Poodle Blanket
During yesterday's discussions of Berlin contingency planning (BERCON/MARCON Plans), General Gray (JCS) made a statement to the effect that the State Department considered it necessary to have a pause--about 60 days--before the West would respond militarily to Soviet interference with Western access to Berlin. Unfortunately, General Gray did not make clear the context in which he was speaking, nor did he define precisely what he meant by the pause or the reasons for it.
The fact is that the period between Soviet/GDR blockage of access to Berlin and the outbreak of hostilities--Phase II in the conceptual framework spelled out in NSAM 109 ("Poodle Blanket")/2/--is not a pause at all. It is a time during which most intensive diplomatic efforts--backstopped by appropriate military and economic measures--will be made to avoid the outbreak of hostilities and reach a political rather than a military solution to the Berlin problem. It is the period during which the West will bring into play a progressive series of moves, designed to impress the Kremlin with its determination to protect its position, but yet providing the Soviet leadership with the opportunity to modify its behavior in time to avert a clash beyond the level of no return. This may take 60 days; it may take several months. At this juncture it is clearly impossible to estimate the period with any kind of precision. However, the consensus is that unless the Soviets either by miscalculation or deliberate decision resort to force to impose their solution on Berlin, the odds are in favor of a longer rather than a shorter Phase II. And as Secretary McNamara indicated, there is no difference of view on this score between the Departments of State and Defense.
/2/See footnote 2, Document 79.
"Poodle Blanket", you will remember, divides Berlin planning into four phases:
(a) Phase I--the period in which there is Soviet and GDR interference with access to Berlin, but this interference falls short of definitive blockage;
(b) Phase II--when there is significant blockage of one or more means of access to Berlin and the Allies take a variety of noncombatant measures to protect their vital interests--the basic right of access to and the Western presence in Berlin;
(c) Phase III--the beginning of non-nuclear military action to deal with the problem; and
(d) Phase IV--the onset of nuclear military action.
In essence, then, Phases I and II are noncombatant, while Phases III and IV are combatant periods, so that the critical point in the Allied effort to end Soviet/GDR interference with the exercise of basic Allied rights in Berlin is just prior to Phase III.
The underlying assumption in all this is that the Soviets, as we, wish to avoid general war. This of course will not stop the Soviets from pressing on for their objectives in Berlin. Nor does it mean that we will not have to face up to periodic increase in tensions, with varying degrees of heat. But unless there is a radical shift in Soviet policy, or miscalculation by the Soviet leadership, the critical point in the Berlin exercise will be reached just short of Phase III.
For all practical purposes, we are now in Phase I. Intermittently, since the end of the 1948-1949 blockade, both German and Allied access, in the air and on the ground, have been subjected to Communist harassment of one sort or other. Over the years, however, we and the Soviets have found methods for dealing with these harassments sometimes by facing each other down as during the air corridor harassments of last spring; more often by patient and protracted negotiations, such as the efforts which finally produced the existing Autobahn identification procedures.
The Soviet tacticians at some time may consider it necessary for the Kremlin to strike a more threatening and aggressive pose in Berlin and interrupt Allied and/or German traffic to Berlin, all or in part. This in effect is Phase II. And present planning for this Phase envisages intensified diplomatic efforts and maneuvers, backstopped by a NATO military build-up and the imposition of economic countermeasures ranging from limited restrictions up to and including a total embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and its Satellites.
The most difficult and critical problem in the exercise is communicating our position and intentions to the Soviet leadership to induce, persuade, or compel it to agree or acquiesce, and to provide it with the means to do either gracefully.
By the same token, the Soviet response to our move will be determined largely by what they believe our purposes to be, our ability to achieve these purposes, and our resolve and capability to assume the risks in raising the threshhold. This in fact is the rationale for the graduated increases in commitments of force--to demonstrate clearly our readiness to assume the necessary risks of war.
This brings us back to the time requirement affecting the duration of Phase II. Time is needed for the NATO military build-up--which is intended to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets as well as prepare NATO for a possible Phase III. The build-up itself is likely to have a deterrent effect, and time is needed to measure its impact on Kremlin thinking. And clearly, as tension mounts or the possibility of war increases, both we and the Soviets will be under increasing pressures from all sides to attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem. This will take a variety of forms, including possibly a UN involvement, and can go on for some time. At this juncture, two months would appear to be a most conservative estimate. The probability is that this exercise will be of much longer duration. Phase II is really intended to induce the Soviets to agree to an acceptable modus vivendi; it is not merely preparation time for Phase III when the NATO contingency plans--the BERCON/MARCON Plans--came into play, although this is always a possible eventuality.
What is involved then is not a 60-day pause before active military operations are undertaken, but rather a period in which major efforts will be made backed by all possible means to achieve a political solution to the Berlin problem. And as long as both sides seek to avoid a military solution, Phase II need not be accelerated. Moreover, in so far as Berlin itself is concerned, we can cope with an extended Phase II for the stockpile and airlift capacities give us a cushion which permits us to withstand substantial Soviet pressure.
McG. Bundy
81. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 20, 1962, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2135. Secret; Limit Distribution.
187. Re Schnippenkoetter's statement to Ambassadorial Group meeting that Khrushchev's threat to Austrians to cut Allied military access to Berlin was new, wish point out Khrushchev on previous occasions has made clear this Soviet intention, although perhaps not so explicitly./2/
/2/A memorandum of the conversation of the Ambassadorial Group on July 11, during which Counselor Schnippenkoetter made this statement, is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-1162.
I agree that serious crisis over Berlin unlikely before late fall although gradual buildup of tension probable. Timing may be related to next round Soviet atomic tests as they may hope soften up Western position by exploding large bomb. I have not changed my views on probable course of developments Berlin question, namely: increased tension; at some stage serious attempt negotiate with US which probably unsuccessful; direct approach to West Germans, also unsuccessful; signature of peace treaty but with some steps to avoid or at least reduce danger of military conflict. At some stage along way, consider play for summit conference or bilateral meeting with President Kennedy likely. I find difficult to assess reasons for Khrushchev's publicly emphasizing issue of troop withdrawal. He must surely know our position is firm and while possible he is building this up for bargaining purposes it does not seem reasonable that he would wish further to commit his personal prestige which already deeply engaged. I am more inclined to think he considers successful negotiations impossible and is building up his position for signature of treaty.
Am inclined think Soviet position on test ban may have changed in recent months in manner to make possibility agreement more likely. Believe possible Soviets may have concluded that in view strain on their resources continuation of competition in this field more likely to result in breakthrough by us than by them. They would in any event insist upon further Soviet round of tests before agreement became effective.
Thompson
82. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 22, 1962, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2262. Secret; Priority. Passed to the White House. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk and cleared by Kohler. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2134) Rusk was in Geneva July 20-25 to attend the Conference on Laos.
Secto 13. Eyes only President and Acting Secretary. No other distribution. Memos conversation with Gromyko and four Western Foreign Ministers coming separate telegrams./2/
/2/Sectos 14 and 16 from Geneva, July 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2262 and 110.11-RU/7-2262) The memoranda of conversation on which the telegrams are based are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2136. At 8 p.m. Kohler, who was also in Geneva, telephoned Ball to say that they had just come out of a 2-hour and 40-minute meeting with Gromyko. When Ball asked if the meeting had been good or otherwise, Kohler replied "otherwise, quite seriously." (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations) Ball relayed this message to Bundy at 4:30 p.m. Washington time. (Ibid.)
After considerable general discussion with Gromyko along well known lines, he wound up with rather stiff statement read from a piece of paper about Soviet determination to sign separate peace treaty. When his apparent threats were sharply rebuffed he retreated to statement that he had come to Geneva to attempt agreed solution. Same stiff line had been taken by him with Couve de Murville earlier in day. Gromyko did not offer a piece of paper but kept his remarks on oral plane.
I expect see Gromyko again tomorrow evening for more considered reply to his closing remarks. Four Foreign Ministers agreed we should not take excessively serious view Gromyko's statements today but should continue talks. Soviet sources are hinting that Gromyko will make new proposals about Tuesday but no reliable indication thus far.
Do not believe I can report any significant change in regard to Berlin nor do I need further instructions at this point. It was consensus of Foreign Ministers that Soviets are maximizing pressures at this point to discover any chink in our armor on troop question and that it is essential to stand completely firm on this point. This seemed only chance to pull Soviets off separate peace treaty line. If despite this they should go ahead with separate peace treaty it was agreed firm stand on troops now would make them more cautious as to accompanying measures affecting our vital interests.
Four Western Foreign Ministers agreed to urgent review both political planning and sequence of events prior to military confrontation. I drew their attention specifically to consideration of Western political initiatives prior to possible separate peace treaty such as three-power demarche to Moscow pointing out that publicly announced separate peace treaty could in no way affect rights of West in West Berlin. Encouraging to find Couve participating fully in our discussion and got impression he continues to want to move toward rejoining Allies on Berlin and German questions.
83. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 23, 1962, 10 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2362. Secret; Niact. Eyes Only. Passed to the White House. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2134)
Secto 25. Eyes only President and Acting Secy. No other distribution. Full record on conversation last evening with Gromyko coming separate telegram./2/ My guess is that we shall have at least one more talk here. I clearly got impression that they expect additional discussions here or later but this is no guarantee that they will not make sudden move to press sudden and separate peace treaty. However, Gromyko last evening both in manner and words seemed to emphasize their preference for an agreed solution and this I reciprocated.
/2/Secto 30 from Geneva, July 23. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2362) A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2136.
Most important point arose when I, after consultation with Western FonMins, asked him very directly and specifically what he meant day before when he said that they "would sign peace treaty with GDR and would carry out necessary measures to provide for undeviating respect for GDR sovereignty." His first reply was that this meant that after peace treaty Western Powers would have to make their arrangements with GDR. I flatly rejected this as an answer saying that he was merely saying "go ask the ventriloquist's dummy" and that I knew that Soviets would not be so insane as to transfer such vital matter into the hands of Ulbricht. He refused to answer again except to repeat what he had said earlier. I suspect this means either that he had no instructions at all or that Soviet Govt has not really made up its mind.
In general, tone of meeting last evening was somewhat better than day before and I got no impression that Gromyko was here to deliver us an ultimatum involving war or peace.
Would greatly appreciate highest level Departmental reaction, including Bohlen's, to two conversations held thus far as assistance my thinking for possible third round.
Rusk
84. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Geneva/1/
Washington, July 23, 1962, 7:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2362. Secret; Niact. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen, cleared by Hilsman and Davis, and approved and initialed by Ball.
Tosec 36. Eyes only for the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Re Secto 25./2/ The following comments have been prepared by senior officers of the Department, including Bohlen:
/2/Document 83.
In view of shortage of time and necessity of it reaching you before your next meeting with Gromyko, it has not had White House clearance, therefore represents only Department view.
Gromyko's comments in your two meetings do not add any factual material or any new arguments which would be of assistance in making a new evaluation of Soviet intentions. General tenor of the conversation seems to us to stick squarely on previous positions but is presented in a somewhat more definitive way in regard to the signature of a separate peace treaty. It is likewise noticed that Gromyko read from a paper which would indicate that he was operating under instructions from highest authority, but it is also noted that he tended to back away at end of first conversation on the threat aspect of his remarks. It is also significant that he put no time limit or date in regard to the signature of a peace treaty and was even more evasive when pressed as to exactly what would be its consequences other than implication of his remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with Soviet Union.
Despite generally tougher line, it is no more possible now than it was earlier to make any accurate prediction as to course of Soviet future action and we are still inclined to believe that Soviets have not definitely made up their mind on this aspect.
The threat of Soviet action and the constant repetition about the necessity of removal of Western troops would seem to be in line with recent indications from Moscow of Soviet position. It is possible that this line is dictated by a desire to probe in depth the Western position and when satisfied that there is no give to use this as a justification for an eventual separate peace treaty.
Another conceivable but less likely motivation is that a strong negative Western attitude might be utilized by the Soviets as an argument against those elements within the communist bloc (in particular East Germans) or even within the Soviet Government who have been pressing for a radical solution of Berlin question. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical solution carries with it a great risk of war. We are unable to carry the analysis any farther.
It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at noon, Geneva time, tomorrow. We have noted that Gromyko has referred to the removal of Western forces as the "crucial point" of discussion. You might care at the next session if he sticks to this point to say that you had already given all the arguments as to why this was quite inconceivable for Western acceptance and in general shorten the conversation if there seems to be no Soviet give and tell Gromyko you would report his attitude to the President on your return and suggest that he should do the same with Khrushchev./3/
Ball
/3/On July 23 Davis had sent Bohlen a similar evaluation adding that Rusk might press Gromyko on what would happen to access controls if the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with East Germany. Rusk might also try to explore designating the Western troops in Berlin something other than NATO forces. (Memorandum from Davis; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2362) On July 24 the Department of State sent Bundy a 2-page INR assessment of the first two talks with Gromyko, which stated that the talks confirmed the U.S. expectation "of a Soviet effort at this time to increase pressure on the West over Berlin." (Ibid., 762.00/7-2462)
85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 24, 1962, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2462. Secret; Niact. Passed to the White House.
Secto 48. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary. Eyes only for Ambassador Thompson. No other distribution. Detailed report my luncheon and third session with Gromyko coming separate telegram./2/ Following are my personal comments on three sessions taken together in an attempt to help judge where we are.
/2/Document 86.
1. Stiffest moment was at end first session when Gromyko read from his piece of paper. Otherwise our discussions in all three sessions were in more relaxed tones even if business-like atmosphere. This means that what Gromyko has said in his own formulations has been more moderate than language used publicly by Soviets in this past month.
2. As you will see from record I threw two ideas into the pot in third session. First, that Soviets use with East Germans same techniques we used in 1949 with West Germans in reserving our rights with respect to Berlin, a German peace treaty and Germany as a whole. Gromyko seemed to reject this suggestion, claiming that in absence of prior agreement West would have to deal with East Germans. At later stage, however, he showed some interest in more information on this point and I am not at all sure that this approach is foreclosed.
3. My second point was to refer to the use of Deputy Foreign Ministers for further discussion on German-Berlin questions along lines our "principles" paper. Fortunately I was able to tie this to an earlier remark he had dropped at luncheon table that they thought it was important to talk these matters out with US or "better still with the US, UK and France". He inquired whether by Deputy Foreign Ministers we meant bilateral or quadripartite and what they would talk about. I told him I could not today speak officially for other governments but our own idea was that these should be quadripartite, that some of the questions to be discussed have been formulated in our "principles" paper but that we could review agenda of Deputies if that seemed desirable or necessary. He said that he would not wish to comment on that suggestion today, thereby leaving door open either for instructions or later discussion.
4. Note that insistence by Soviets that, after East German peace treaty, the Western Powers would be required to deal with East Germans is a proposition that seems to assume the continued presence of the West in West Berlin. I do not, therefore, believe that we should think that we are being presented with ultimatum which makes the actual presence of the West the breaking point.
5. He told me today that, upon returning from our last session in Geneva, he had gone directly to Khrushchev and had obtained the suspension of harassments in Berlin. This may be of some interest as indication possible Gromyko influence and effect of his judgment as to whether it is possible to back us down in negotiations on presence Western troops.
6. Today I returned to a formulation I used some months ago with Gromyko, namely, to try to imagine the situation if Khrushchev and Kennedy were to say to each other what we both had been saying. I pointed out that it would be very bad to reach such an unsatisfactory result. You will see from detailed record that matter again came up at the end in terms of keeping contact between our two governments. Gromyko seemed genuinely disturbed when he, through a complete misunderstanding, thought I was suggesting that even diplomatic or indirect contacts not be maintained. I promptly reassured him on that point but his anxiety, linked with other things he has been saying, reinforces our analysis that he was under instructions to see how far he could go in talking us out of Berlin but not to let the matter come to a complete impasse. I also added, of course, that on the matter of possible meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy I would not add any comments, without the instructions of the President, to what had been said publicly and privately. He did not himself raise or pursue "summit."
7. I have tried to be very direct and very clear about the point of Western forces in West Berlin and reminded him today that the President had told Mr. Khrushchev that "no President of the United States could make such a concession." Such direct statements made more than once did not bring further threatening language from Gromyko. Indeed, the only threats he used were those in his prepared portion of our first session.
8. It seems to me that there may be a possibility to work out an arrangement with the Russians governing a post peace treaty situation which the Russians themselves would agree with the East Germans. They could claim that East German agreement was an exercise of GDR sovereignty and our rights would remain intact. Alternatively, I think our modus vivendi approach may have a breath of life. Further, there is always "Solution C"/3/ to fall back upon if going gets tougher.
/3/For a description of "Solution C," see the Report by Dean Acheson, June 28, 1961, in vol. XIV, Document 49.
9. Home, Couve de Murville, and Schroeder have all left Geneva. Gromyko is tentatively planning to return to Moscow on the 26th. I am under the definite impression that these talks at Geneva are not our last opportunity for a settlement and that further communication would precede drastic act on their part. I therefore told him that I would tentatively plan to leave late tomorrow but that I would be in touch with him tomorrow morning to see whether either one of us felt that there were any other points we might profitably cover here. My guess is that it would be a good thing for both Moscow and Washington to do a little fresh thinking about these three sessions. It is unlikely that Gromyko will receive different instructions while Khrushchev is away from Moscow.
10. I regret inability to button up this problem at this point but I suspect that Soviets have not made their final decisions and have been trying to find out whether additional public and private pressure could produce significant Western concessions. I could be wrong and Soviets could move toward a peace treaty at almost any time but it does not feel that way to me.
11. Of some interest is my very private remark to Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki that now is a good time for those who have influence in Moscow to counsel moderation and he replied "you may be sure that is being done." Today, after a rather sharp retort to Gromyko during my brief remarks in the disarmament conference, the Polish chief delegate remarked privately to one of my colleagues that I had made a "fine statement."
12. There has been good feeling among four Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva and unity on the line to take at this point as well as on necessary urgent review of Western position on contingency planning. This plus fact that Gromyko keeps door open encourages me to think that additional patience may work this out, distressing as it is to listen to and to play certain long-playing records ad nauseam.
13. Of course, if it is felt that I should take several more days here to pursue particular points I should be glad to do so but I am inclined to think that they would cause Russians to expect some major concession on presence of Western forces, would make our Allied consultation more awkward, and, on basis of Gromyko's apparent present instructions, would promise little result.
Rusk
86. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Geneva, July 25, 1962, 1 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-RU/7-2562. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
Secto 50. Following based on uncleared memcon Secretary-Gromyko conversation July 24./2/
/2/A copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2136.
Secretary, Kohler, Hillenbrand had two and half hour session with Gromyko, Ilyichev, and Kovalev following lunch hosted by Gromyko. Gromyko invited Secretary speak first.
Secretary opened saying he little puzzled as to what Gromyko and he could profitably say to each other at this point. Problems at hand had been discussed at considerable length here and US point of view had also been expressed by President on number occasions. Secretary noted he had reported to President what had been said in Geneva and that he personally did not see any prospect for satisfactory progress on issues at this time, unless Sovs advance in one of two directions: (A) To make clear that whatever they thought needs were with respect East Germany these would not interfere with Western presence in West Berlin and access to that city. On larger questions in which there is common interest between US and USSR, West had made clear to West Germany that all-German problems and Berlin reserved from full sovereignty West Germany. We saw no reason why Sovs could not do same with respect East Germany. (B) Alternatively, we could try to sit down and see how to handle fact of disagreement without conflict. US general principles paper suggested one way to dealing with it. If there were other suggestions re handling this matter in similar fashion, we would be happy think about them.
Secretary expressed view great deal of time had been spent in these discussions reviewing respective points of view and it was not necessary go over them again since they well known. Problem is where we should go from here.
Secretary observed that in terms of longer-run future, if there was no permanent settlement German problems on agreed basis, that was likely cause restiveness and be source of danger Central Europe. Sincerely, as we saw situation, if Germans stood against Germans and if Germans on both sides were to indulge in adventures, that would gravely affect peace Central Europe. We regard effective presence US and indeed USSR as stabilizing factor in this situation.
Secretary recalled Gromyko's remark at lunch it good idea if US and USSR, and preferably also UK and France, tried discuss these problems and find solution. US had made suggestion along these lines in its general principles paper. Noting he was unable speak with full authority for two additional countries, particularly since--as Gromyko aware from reading newspapers--de Gaulle had his own views this subject, Secretary stated that if Sovs had any ideas for quadripartite discussions along lines we had been talking about, we would see what could be done to get cooperation others concerned.
Secretary said he wished add one word re President and Khrushchev. Noting he had already exchanged some comments on this point with Gromyko, Secretary said he believed great deal depended on whether these two men could find some basis on which our two countries, in spite their different social systems, could move toward better relations. However, he also believed it would be unfortunate if President and Khrushchev just exchanged views on this subject without coming to any apparent result. US had tried be imaginative as to how circumstances could be created where direct contact between these two men could take place fruitfully. However, Secretary said, he did not think such circumstances existed now, and there was danger two leaders reaching same point where we were now, which would not be satisfactory to either side. Secretary pointed out that he was making these comments only in connection his earlier conversation on this subject, and that he had no direct instructions from President in this respect.
Gromyko agreed both he and Secretary had set forth in detail and in clear manner positions their respective govts during these meetings in Geneva. He wished once more emphasize that Sovs regretted US Govt had taken such position re main problems, i.e., withdrawal Western forces from West Berlin. He contended this was further evidence US Govt's desire maintain occupation status in West Berlin and keep that city in hands three Western Powers as NATO mil base. This conclusion had not been arrived at today; USSR had thought so before, but today Western intentions this respect were even clearer than before. Gromyko observed he had made this comment in view Secretary's remark at earlier meeting Sovs had only recently started talking about West Berlin's being NATO base. Gromyko continued USSR would never agree to perpetuation occupation regime in West Berlin and to that city's remaining NATO base eternally. USSR could not agree to that because that ran counter interests of peace in Europe--and not only in Europe--but also counter interests relaxation tensions in Europe and Germany. If Sovs were to agree to this they would be helping those who were pouring oil on fire and thus would be accomplices of West German revanchists and militarists. It was impossible expect Sov Union to agree to this. USSR would not agree and regretted US Govt, and apparently its Allies, failed duly appreciate this position.
Gromyko recalled that on more than one occasion Western, including US leaders, for example Macmillan, de Gaulle, President Kennedy, and Secretary himself, had stated West understood Sov desire ensure its security, particularly in light lessons past history, when Hitler had attacked USSR and latter had lost millions of lives in defeating Nazis. However, while saying this, West failed draw necessary conclusions which would lend substance to these words. USSR position re German peace treaty and other questions to be settled in connection such treaty was based on desire prevent events in Europe from taking tragic turn and causing new disaster in world. Sov Govt and Sov people were resolved to go through with this and they believed this was in accord with interests peace in Europe and in world at large, as well as with US interests, if such interests were correctly understood. If US was seeking peace and good relations with USSR, this should not be in conflict with its interests. USSR, just as US, was great power and if it was interested--as it had to be--in matters of war and peace in all corners of world, including Africa and Asia, then it was easy to understand reasons why it was doubly interested in events in Europe.
Gromyko went on, saying another aspect problem was that in pres-ent situation where there was no German peace treaty and West Berlin was occupied city in hands Western Powers, sovereign rights of GDR were being crudely flouted. USSR was fully aware of US dislike for GDR, its system, its govt, and Ulbricht personally. However, this was something that did not depend on US; fact was that GDR, its govt, and Ulbricht existed. Admitting he might be repetitive, Gromyko stated West Berlin did not belong to West and there was no reason why US, UK and France should stay as bosses of West Berlin. Neither USSR, nor GDR, nor some other states could reconcile themselves with present state of affairs. It appeared to Sovs West failed appreciate duly these arguments which USSR had been advancing in its quest for mutually agreeable solution.
Gromyko observed that every once in a while US attempted link question German peace treaty and normalization situation West Berlin with question German reunification. He supposed that was done only for record. In his view this was waste of time and energy. New situation existed in Germany today; two German states had emerged from ruins Hitler's Reich and it was from this fact that one must proceed. USSR was convinced unification would be resolved only between two German states. On other hand question German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation could not be postponed indefinitely. It was this that he had wanted particularly emphasized in his conversations with Secy here in Geneva. It was regrettable US failed draw necessary conclusions from this. USSR was convinced its position correct and in full accord with interests peace and detente in Europe.
Referring to Secy's remark it would be well if USSR made clear in one or two directions what situation would exist with regard to presence Western Powers and Western forces West Berlin in event Sovs went through with their intentions re German peace settlement, Gromyko contended he had spoken on this during his meetings with Secy in New York and later in Geneva. During present conversations, he had also twice replied to this question. He continued that, if understanding was reached on appropriate questions connected with German peace settlement, situation would be simple: Access would be unrestricted and it would be ensured by all parties concerned, including GDR fulfilling its obligations; it would be ensured on basis respect GDR sovereignty, including its sovereignty with regard transit. A different situation would exist if peace treaty with GDR were signed unilaterally, i.e., without Western Powers' participation or without agreement with those powers; then West would have to deal with GDR Govt re all questions, including transit arrangements; USSR would have nothing to do with these. Only GDR would be responsible and Western Powers would have to deal with GDR.
As to Secretary's remarks about desirability avoid conflict, Gromyko asserted Sov Govt had always proceeded on that basis. Sov Govt believed both sides must do their utmost to avoid conflict. Sov Govt believed conflict could be caused only by Western Powers, US in particular, due to their position. If USSR wanted create conflict for sake of conflict it would have acted differently, and it would have had no prolonged negotiations with US in order seek possibility agreed solution.
Gromyko recalled that, last March in Geneva, Secy had spoken to him about Sovt flights in air corridors to West Berlin. Secy had said these flights were complicating matters and it would be better if they stopped. Gromyko continued that, although USSR categorically rejected assertion that such flights were illegal, upon his return to Moscow he had reported Secy's remarks on this point to Sov Govt and Khrushchev personally. He had told his govt that President apparently shared Secy's views on this matter, but although both of them were wrong, they did appear feel this was complicating factor for them. Khrushchev had then replied that suspension such flights might perhaps facilitate negotiations, and had ordered them suspended (at this point Gromyko told his interpreter not to use "stopped" but rather "suspended" in this sentence). Gromyko said Sovs had not expected US to express special gratitude to USSR for this. US had taken this for granted, although perhaps it had noted this in its own mind. He had made these remarks by way of reply to Secretary's comment re need not do anything to heighten conflict. Gromyko reiterated that if Sovs had wanted conflict they would have been acting differently. However, not to want conflict for sake of conflict was one thing; it was another thing when legitimate interests of USSR and legitimate interests of GDR as sovereign state were affected, interests which were in full accord with interests of peace.
Commenting on Secy's remark that present circumstances did not favor direct contact between President and Khrushchev, Gromyko noted that this was apparently Secy's view on this point and that Secy was of course free draw conclusions from situation as he saw it. US knew Sov positions, including its latest proposal re Western forces West Berlin, well enough and there was nothing he, Gromyko, could add. He did wish repeat however that he regretted very much US was taking such position re Western forces West Berlin. He wished emphasize with all vigor Sov Govt would never, never agree with that position and would never accept perpetuation presence Western troops West Berlin.
Secy said he wished make observation re Gromyko's very last point, because he believed he should draw distinction between contacts, i.e., communication, and a situation where we would have to imagine what the two leaders could say if they met face to face. This was of course up to the President, but he thought that contacts, i.e., communication, were of very considerable importance.
Referring to Gromyko's remark that Western attitude on presence forces West Berlin had been distinct in past but not as distinct as it was today, Secy first observed he understood word today to mean recent days. He then recalled that pressure on this point had come from Sov side in most recent conversations. Of course insistence on part USSR clarified and made more distinct basis attitude Western Powers. Secy pointed out President had said in Vienna no US President was in position make this kind of surrender Western position in present circumstances.
Secy said he was again sorry hear words such as "eternal" and "perpetual" being used in connection presence Western forces. No one had said such presence should be eternal or perpetual. What we had said was that USSR could not unilaterally, by itself, say when it should end. To say West insisting on staying perpetually in Berlin was incorrect and misrepresentation Western position.
Recalling Gromyko's comment Western leaders had expressed understanding USSR desire ensure its security, Secy stressed this understanding did not mean that, if Sovs alleged basic rights of West were some kind of vague threat to their security, they could expect US move out at risk of catastrophe to West with regard to its security. Secy said he wished assure genuine understanding Sov security did not mean West would lie down and play dead when alleged Sov security at stake.
As to Gromyko's remark that talk about unification was waste time and energy, Secy stated Sov position today inevitably led to conclusion Sovs wanted brush aside all agreements they had concluded with West between World War II and middle "fifties" and that apparently their solemn assurances were valueless because they wished change situation to their advantage in spite of fact that would violate Western vital interests. Secy strongly emphasized we were not children and understood situation. If Sovs intended throw existing agreements into junk heap, no one could expect West to think any new agreement re presence and access West Berlin would have solid backing unless Western Powers were in West Berlin. As to Gromyko's assertion there was new situation in Germany characterized particularly by existence GDR and Ulbricht, Secy stressed there was another element in that situation, i.e., presence Western Powers in West Berlin with access thereto, which had not changed, was part of situation, and was as much of a fact as any other facts cited. Sovs said that when peace treaty was signed by them, these questions would be for GDR to deal with and Sovs would have no relation to them. Surely this was not accurate description their position. We could not believe Sovs would indeed turn over what they say are their security interests to Ulbricht. Gromyko himself had said USSR would be involved in situation in case of trouble. In any event concern with situation must remain between signatories to agreements. As far as we were concerned USSR and West continue be responsible for situation. We see no way Sovs could, would or would want to transfer this responsibility to another entity.
Re Gromyko's assertion there was dangerous situation in Berlin, Secretary pointed out source of danger easy to identify. There had been no source of war in that area for a number of years, even since Jessup-Malik agreement, which had relieved dangerous tensions and which Sovs now want throw out window. Danger or threat did not come from our side but from East, because Sovs said unless you do this we will make situation dangerous. West made no demands and was not asking anything. Source of danger came from source of demands. If that was peace or peaceful coexistence, Secretary emphasized, then he did not understand those words. This lack of regard for interests and position other side was element lack of reciprocity we had been concerned about in recent discussions. Secretary agreed Berlin was serious problem.
However, he pointed out, it was also true there were other problems, some connected with Germany and some not. Prudence required not to translate Berlin problem into sole determining issue in US-USSR relations. It was not only issue on US-USSR agenda. Perhaps progress could be made on other problems. However, if Berlin problem was treated without any element reciprocity, then indeed it was major issue between US-USSR.
As to corridor flights, Secretary said he had been very much aware of difference in situation this respect after his departure Geneva. However, since he had no way of knowing Gromyko had intervened, and since he was not sure Gromyko wanted to be personally cognizant of situation--something the Sov FonMin did not want in Geneva--he had not communicated with Gromyko on this point. However, Secretary wished express gratification at hearing Gromyko's remarks, and thought this had been positive and helpful act on his part.
Secretary recalled he had made two remarks re possible ways dealing with matters at hand.
One way would be for USSR to make clear its possible actions re East Germany would not affect rights Western Powers and access. From what Gromyko had said he apparently did not think well of this suggestion. However, Secretary pointed out, Gromyko was trying make East Germany more sovereign than West Germany. Gromyko had said USSR would back up East Germany with regard steps East Germany would take in exercising that kind of sovereignty. Of course that would lead to very dangerous situation, and was unwise on part USSR. The second way--possible discussions including UK and France--US had made certain suggestions re Deputy Foreign Ministers. Secretary wondered whether Gromyko had any suggestions of his own.
Secretary then expressed view point had been reached where, unless there were new instructions received, both sides should report in detail to their governments, give serious thought to what had been said, and be in touch again, as he was sure two Heads of Government would want them to be. Secretary expressed regret it had so far been impossible make serious advance in Geneva, despite demonstration great efforts on our side during past months find mutually acceptable solution. Sovs now concentrating on point of most vital interest to West. Western position on this had been made clear to Khrushchev by President in Vienna. Indeed it had been clear since events of 1948/49, and therefore our attitude could not possibly be surprise to USSR. Secretary continued that, in view what had been said, he saw no direction in which Gromyko and he could go ahead here in Geneva. He wondered what Gromyko's view was on this.
Gromyko rejoined by referring to Secretary's remark USSR security considerations with regard German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation were vague and represented very free and easy interpretation Sov arguments in favor German peace treaty and normalization West Berlin situation on basis free city.
There was nothing vague or nebulous in this. In fact everything was crystal clear. There was this intolerable situation where West Berlin was held by Western Powers in their fists and maintained as NATO base, and where GDR legitimate interests were being crudely flouted. All of this was nothing nebulous; these represented weighty arguments militating in favor solution this problem. This situation will unquestionably be changed, with or without prior understanding with Western Powers. However, USSR believed it would be best have solution with prior understanding with Western Powers.
Gromyko said Secretary had tried present situation in such way as to make it look as if creation two Germanies had been caused by USSR's violation its solemn obligations. This was inaccurate. It had been Western Powers, and only Western Powers which had torn up agreements between Allies and had split Germany. It was on this basis that two German states had emerged. Gromyko said there was no need reminding Secretary of creation such things as Bizonia or Trizonia, nor of creation of revanchist, militarist, but independent FRG. There was no need to review history. USSR had been from very outset in favor creation single, peaceful Germany, but that had not been possible due to Western Powers. Apparently no common language could be found on this point. Secretary repeated himself and so apparently did he, Gromyko, too. However, since Secretary had raised point, it was necessary to restore history, i.e., truth.
Gromyko contended USSR would always remember how its Allies in war had acted with respect their commitments as Allies. Hardly was ink dry on those agreements and hardly had first grass grown on graves millions of dead, when West started crudely to flout all its agreements with USSR, which duty bound remember this and draw necessary conclusions. Gromyko asserted this was road that had led to present situation. This all a very sad story, but must be taken into account.
Recalling Secretary's statement about transfer USSR security interests to GDR, Gromyko asserted this question did not arise at all. USSR did not intend to transfer its security. However, USSR had mutual obligations to certain states, including those under Warsaw Pact, and in event any aggression against GDR, USSR would meet its obligation under Warsaw Pact. As to USSR, its security was firmly in its own hands.
Gromyko then referred to Secretary's remark Sovs trying make GDR more sovereign than FRG and wondered why Secretary thought FRG should be yardstick of sovereignty for GDR. If FRG not fully sovereign, if West had pocketed part its sovereignty, why should GDR take its cue from that? In any event question of greater or lesser sovereignty out of place. Sovereignty was sovereignty, and could not be cut up in pieces and placed on different shelves. It had been known for a long time that, if any sovereign state agreed yield some of its sovereign rights by voluntarily entering into international agreements to this effect, this was exercise of sovereignty.
Gromyko then observed Secretary had for second time advanced idea continuation discussion by Deputy Foreign Ministers. Gromyko said he had two comments: He was not clear what Secretary had in mind--bilateral or broader discussions? Also he was not clear what Deputy Foreign Ministers would have to do. He said this suggestion would remain unanswered by USSR here in Geneva for time being. Secretary wondered whether Gromyko's last sentence referred to four Deputy Foreign Ministers or to bilateral contacts. Gromyko replied he was talking about Secretary's specific reference to Deputy Foreign Ministers. As to contacts, Secretary had said present circumstances not conducive to direct contact Heads of Government, but he understood this did not mean indirect contacts should not continue.
Secretary confirmed Gromyko's understanding on latter point, while noting he could not speak for President formally. Re Deputy Foreign Ministers, US had made some general suggestions as to what Deputy Foreign Ministers could discuss. We had in mind Four Powers responsible for questions relating to Germany; however, Secretary noted, he would have be in touch with those not present here. Secretary expressed view it was important in not too distant future agree on appropriate tasks for Deputy Foreign Ministers. Some such tasks were contained in US general principles paper given to Gromyko during previous meeting in Geneva.
Secretary then noted Gromyko had referred to Sov insistence re "GDR interests." He wished to remind Gromyko there were number other interests, such as those of US and its Allies, Germany and German people as whole, West Berliners, and peoples of USSR and US, all of whom interested in not allowing major crisis develop. It was clear GDR interests not paramount when vast interests were at stake in this situation. Secretary agreed there was no use in talking about degrees of sovereignty. However, point he had wished make was that Western Powers reserved re West Germany certain points with regard this situation, and Gromyko had in fact praised this as something constructive. We had also reserved re West Germany points regarding settlement German problem as whole. In reply Gromyko's inquiry re specific points, Kohler pointed out Western Powers in their agreement with West Germany had reserved all matters relating to Berlin, peace settlement, and Germany as whole. Secretary said he wished simply point out this possibility was open to USSR as well.
Re Gromyko's remark grant of rights also represented exercise of sovereignty Secretary said he agreed with this and recalled that US had told USSR that, if it signed treaty with East Germany and if East Germany said to USSR what was in Zorin-Bolz agreement, that would also be exercise of sovereignty. If, e.g., France agreed to flights by aircraft from London to Rome, even if such aircraft did not touch ground in France, that was also exercise of sovereignty. Secretary observed he understood Gromyko not in position comment on question Deputy Foreign Ministers today. Meanwhile we would give more precise thought this question and we would be in touch with other side.
Secretary then raised question schedule. Said in normal course he would return to Washington tomorrow, to be there in time for his dinner for Souvanna Phouma July 26. This was not categorical imperative for him. However, he had rather gathered impression both sides had said all they could here, and perhaps it would be desirable for each to consult own government. It would be useful if Gromyko could say when he was leaving for Moscow, and whether he thought they should be in touch again before he left. Secretary noted he would be able to stay if Gromyko thought he would have anything further from Moscow to discuss before leaving Geneva, and of course would be in touch if he had anything new from Washington.
Gromyko referred to Secretary's comment GDR interests could not be compared with Western interests, and thought Secretary probably regarded Western interests as big mountain and GDR interests as small pebble. While it true US great power and bigger than GDR, any state, even small, considered its own interests, close and vital to it. Moreover when Sovs spoke of GDR interests, they had in mind vital, fundamental interests GDR, since West Berlin in center GDR and all air, land and water communications to West Berlin ran through GDR territory. Gromyko reiterated suggestion re Deputy Foreign Ministers would remain unanswered for time being. Re schedule, Gromyko indicated he tentatively planning leave July 26. However, if interests negotiations warranted longer stay and if further meeting agreed, he would not object. Thus whether further meeting will take place depended not only on him but on Secretary as well. Meeting closed with agreement two delegations would check in morning whether anything new on either side.
Rusk
87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 25, 1962, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2562. Top Secret; Priority.
225. Eyes only Secretary. Khrushchev suggested that when I got home/2/ I personally ask President--not through State Department--whether it would be better for him if Berlin question brought to a head before or after our Congressional elections. He did not want to make things more difficult for President--and in fact would like to help him.
/2/On July 5 President Kennedy announced that Kohler would be replacing Thompson as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Thompson left Moscow on July 27.
I said I would of course inform President but I could tell him that any crisis--and particularly one as dangerous as would arise over Berlin--would unite both parties in a demonstration of their patriotism. He then asked if settlement of such a question as Berlin would not be helpful to President politically. I said that in my opinion there was no doubt that it would. He then observed that it was of course not necessary to hold to any fixed date--and that it was even not necessarily essential that matter be settled before end of this year.
Thompson
88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, July 26, 1962, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7-2662. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
228. My conversation with Khrushchev--Berlin.
I started to take my leave of K but he said he had additional subject to discuss even though he disliked bringing up unpleasant matter on my last visit. He had read report first Rusk-Gromyko conversation and half of second but it was already clear our dialogue was coming to end. He would have no choice but to proceed with signature of treaty after which our rights there, including right of access, would end. He emphasized that East Germans were allies and Soviets would stand by them. On this occasion and others in conversation he showed great sensitivity to what he considered threats and said Soviet Union great power, not small country which could be threatened with impunity. President had suggested time would make solution easier but he could not wait indefinitely. From some things Secretary Rusk had said, we apparently had idea of unending talks, but this not acceptable. Soviet Govt had tried many different proposals to find solution but we insisted on maintaining occupation in center of sovereign GDR.
I replied Secretary discussing this matter with Gromyko and in any event our position had been made so clear there was little I could add. I pointed out however that in 1959 we had endeavored to meet Soviet problem and find ways to take Berlin out of cold war. These proposals had not been accepted. It was Soviet side and not we that had focused world attention on Berlin to point where smallest thing became test of our intentions. I pointed out that psychology of people of Berlin and West Germany had become very important. Many people on our side felt that acceptance of Soviet proposals meant we would lose not only Berlin but rest of Germany and consequently all of Europe. I said that they and we knew what Ulbricht wanted in West Berlin. K had himself said that our troops in Berlin had no military value and we agreed with this appraisal, but they were essential to maintain confidence of people of Berlin.
K said we often referred to prestige but did not take into account prestige of Soviet Union. Continuance of occupation would be humiliating to East Germany and Soviet Union. He said we also referred to our commitment to people of Berlin but we had no right to make such commitment when it involved interests of Allies who had made enormous sacrifices in war. I said I thought in matters of this kind it was important to try to get other person's point of view. I asked him what he would do if he had Soviet troops in similar situation and we said we would cut them off. I knew he would respond that he would sign treaty and withdraw (before interpreter reached this sentence K interjected to say exactly that). I got impression that this remark had some effect. K said he was considering bringing matter before UN and in this connection made some vague reference to possible commission of jurists--in order that Soviet Union could make clear its position before signing treaty. He said he was discussing this possibility with his colleagues but no decision had been taken and he had not made up his own mind whether this was best course but it had certain appeal for him.
K took usual line on German reunification.
This part of conversation ended by my telling him he should find way to give us better choice of alternatives than those now before us and I illustrated this with a long anecdote. He was cordial throughout discussion and I had impression he considered he had to move ahead but deeply troubled. He emphasized many times this was the one problem standing in way of good relations between us and I believe he is sincere in this.
I said I hoped he would study carefully reports Rusk-Gromyko conversations as Secretary had fully set forth our position. At dacha in afternoon he had Semenov, their German expert, present, indicating he expected continue Berlin talk, but did not do so in any specific way.
Thompson
89. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State/1/
Copenhagen, July 28, 1962, noon.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2862. Secret.
76. Eyes only for the Secretary from Ambassador Thompson. Reflecting upon my talk with Khrushchev have following conclusions:
(1) Am more convinced than ever that he at least does not intend push Berlin question to point of real risk of war. Much will depend, however, upon attitude his colleagues and allies as well as upon how we handle the matter. Believe line taken by President and your representation of our case at Geneva was just right but suggest we must be extremely careful on the one hand to show we are serious in our determination to defend Berlin and on other to avoid engaging their prestige particularly in the military field as they are unbelievably sensitive about this. I think, for example, we should for the present play down any boasts about our military superiority and in Berlin itself avoid any action that could be considered by them as annoyance on our part. At same time we should proceed vigorously with contingency planning which they will know about but without publicity.
I believe Khrushchev is likely to bring Berlin problem before UN and probably will personally present Soviet case. Suggest we should be thinking about how to prevent neutrals from proposing compromise solutions unacceptable to us and from giving him impression he can proceed with his plans with strong support from world opinion. I have some thoughts on this to put before you upon my return.
[Here follow paragraphs 2 and 3 in which Thompson gave his assessment of the Soviet position on disarmament.]
Blair
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