438            ILL  EFFECTS  OF DELAY                [pt. ii.
squadron took in the Kuban's message and communicated it to the flagship. To-day the Suvdroff tried in vain to call up the Rion, which was out patrolling. Is the captain of the Rion quite clear in his mind as to how useless his patrolling service is if his wireless apparatus is not in working order?—Admirals and captains ! it is time to take the most energetic steps ! "
Of course the Admiral was not only justified, but in duty bound to issue orders like these, but did he himself believe in the possibility of his demands being complied with?   That is the question.    I do not think he did.
Again insubordination showed itself, discontent began to break out over the most trifling matters ; offences against discipline (which had almost ceased for a time) became more frequent. Whilst clearing steamers which had brought provisions from Saigon, there were scenes which bordered on open robbery; the working parties stove in wine-casks, broke open cases with liquor, became drunk and uproarious, and insulted even the officers who tried to restore order.
Notwithstanding the original assurance that the word "impossible" did not exist, its effect became more and more apparent.
On April 20 the Admiral said in General Order No. 196:
" So as to ease the work of the destroyers, and to give the captains the possibility of keeping their vessels in a complete state of readiness, two patrol-boats will be withdrawn. . . . Yesterday a destroyer on patrol duty lost an anchor; that means that she was either at anchor, or had the intention of anchoring, which is quite incompatible with the duty confided to her. ..."
With the commencement of our "wanderings" matters went downhill at a daily increasing rate.
By day we lay with engines stopped and watched the horizon unceasingly (for any smoke which might appear), as well as the surface of the water in our vicinity (for the periscope of any submarine which might be approaching). At night we steamed at 3 knots, a speed just sufficient to maintain  our formation, and in the event of a torpedo