Headquarters Daily Report
JANUARY 10, 2001
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REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I JANUARY 10, 2001
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Entergy Nuclear Generation Company MR Number: 1-01-0001
Pilgrim 1 Date: 01/05/01
Plymouth,Massachusetts RI PC
Dockets: 50-293
BWR/GE-3
Subject: THIRD PARTY DEDICATOR (TRENTEC) MISSED IDENTIFICATION OF
INCORRECTLY ASSEMBLED JOSLYN CLARK TIME DELAY RELAYS
Discussion:
On January 2, 2001, the licensee identified improperly configured relays
installed in the B-6 (480 volt AC) emergency load center transfer logic
scheme. The specific application required a time delay function on four
contacts in the relays, however, the installed relays had a time delay
function on only two of the four contacts as specified.
The licensee had installed the 125 volt DC time delay relays for the B-6
load center during RFO-12 (5/8/99 - 7/13/99). A total of five relays,
manufactured by Joslyn Clark Controls, were purchased commercially and
dedicated by a third party vendor (Trentec) for the safety-related
application in the plant. The relays can be configured for different
applications specified by the purchaser. In this case, the relays
required a time delay on four contacts. The relays were delivered,
labeled to indicate that the time delay was installed on the specified
contacts (indicated by an "E" suffix on the part number X 714UPD E).
Trentec, Inc., performed the dedication of the relays, however, the
functional testing did not physically verify the time delay functionality
for all four contacts. As a result, the dedication process did not reveal
that four of the five relays were missing the right hand time pole
contact opening link (part KPMT-1), which provides the time delay
function on two of the four contacts. The licensee subsequently installed
two of the relays that were improperly configured in the B-6 load center
transfer logic.
This configuration could have resulted in load center B-6 remaining
de-energized on certain loss of offsite power (LOOP) sequences. In turn,
this could have caused a loss of low pressure coolant injection (LPCI),
since load center B-6 powers several LPCI supply valves.
As an immediate corrective action, the licensee declared LPCI inoperable
and tagged open one of two vital bus feeder breakers to the B-6 load
center to prevent the improperly configured relays from having the
potential to cause a loss of load center B-6 on a LOOP. On January 7,
2001, the licensee installed the missing piece for the relays and
successfully tested the relays to show the plant design was met. The
licensee is reviewing the issue for reportability under 10 CFR 21.
Regional Action:
For information only.
Contact: James Linville (610)337-5129
Russell Arrighi (508)747-0565
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