35 U.S.C.
112 REJECTIONS
NOT BASED ON PRIOR ART
PURPOSE
AND OBJECTIVES
OUTLINE
35 U.S.C. 112
- Background
- General Approach
CLAIMING THE SUBJECT MATTER WHICH APPLICANT
REGARDS AS HIS INVENTION - MPEP 2172
- Approach:
- Evidence To The Contrary:
- Relationship To Enablement Requirement (35 U.S.C. 112, First Paragraph
- MPEP 2174):
- Shift Permitted:
CLAIMS PARTICULARLY POINTING OUT AND DISTINCTLY
CLAIMING THE SUBJECT MATTER - DEFINITENESS - MPEP 2173-2173.06
- Essential Question:
- Pertinent Considerations:
- Functional Language - MPEP 2173.05(G):
- Alternative Expressions - MPEP 2173.05(H)
- Negative Limitations - MPEP 2173.05(I)
- Consideration of all Claim Limitations - MPEP 2143.03,2173.06:
- Words of Degree
ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT - MPEP 2164-2164.08(C)
- Essential Test:
- Pertinent Considerations:
- Burden of Proof - MPEP 2164.04:
- Examples of Enablement
- Additional Considerations:
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT - MPEP 2163-2163.07(B)
- Burden of Proof - MPEP 2163.04
- Statement of Rejection Requirements
- Response to Amendments
- Examples
- Notes
BEST MODE - MPEP 2165.04
- Policy
- Relevant Considerations -
MPEP 2165.01.
- Examples
- Additional Resources:
35 U.S.C. 112 - PARAGRAPH
6 MEANS OR STEP FOR PERFORMING A FUNCTION (MPEP 2181-2186)
- Uses
- Limitations
- Applicable To
- Interpretation
- Single Means Claim
NEW MATTER - 35 U.S.C.
112,132 AND 251
- The Statute
- The Rule - 37 CFR 1.118 Amendment
Of Disclosure:
- The Manual - MPEP 608.04, 706.03(O)and 2163.062
- Procedure For Handling
- Rephrasing - MPEP 2163.07
- Obvious Errors - MPEP 2163.07
- Inherent Function, Theory
or Advantage - MPEP 2163.07:
- Incorporation by Reference - MPEP
608.01(p) 2163.07 (b)
- Changes to the scope of the
Claims - MPEP 2163.05
- Broadening Claims:
- Narrowing or Subgeneric Claims:
- Range Limitations:
- Mechanisms old in the Art
- Claimed subject matter not disclosed
in remainder of the Specification:
- Burden of Proof:
- Prior Art Rejections - MPEP 2143.03:
SPECIALIZED SITUATIONS
- Aggregation - MPEP 2173.05(k)
- Incomplete Claims - MPEP
2172.01
- Old Combination - MPEP 2173.05(j)
- D. Res Judicata -
MPEP 706.03 (w)
- Multiplicity - 37 CFR 1.75(b);
MPEP 2173.05(n)
- Prolix - MPEP 2173.05(m)
- Nonstatutory
or Omnibus Claim - MPEP 2173.05(r)
MARKUSH PRACTICE - MPEP
2173.05(H)
- History of treatment of Markush
Claims:
- Present treatment of Markush
Claims:
- Practice:
CLAIM INTERPRETATION
- Words and Phrases
- Transitional Phrases - MPEP
2111.03:
- Relative terminology - MPEP 2173.05(b):
- Numerical ranges and amounts
limitations - MPEP 2173.05(c):
- Other Terms:
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS RELEVANT
MPEP SECTIONS: MPEP 2113,2173.05(P)
- Limitations:
- Patentability:
- Burden of Proof:
- Statutory basis for rejection:
FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
- MPEP 2114,2173.05(G) AND 2181
PREAMBLE - MPEP 2111.02
CLAIMS CONTAINING MULTIPLE
CATEGORIES OF INVENTION
- Product-by-Process Claims - MPEP 2173.05(p):
- Reference To Limitations In Another Claim - MPEP 2173.05(f):
- Product And Process In The Same Claim - MPEP 2173.05(p)
PURPOSE
The purpose
of this topic is to teach new examiners the principles involved in making
rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112, and how to treat special situations such
as old combinations, Markush groups and res judicata. Concepts
relating to claim interpretation are also included.
OBJECTIVES
After completion
of this topic, the new examiner will be better able to:
- Discuss the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112
- Description
- Enablement
- Best Mode
- Claims defining applicant's inventions
- Definiteness
- Further Limiting
- Define new matter and know how to treat it whether it is in the specification,
drawings or claims.
- Recognize specialized situations such as aggregation, old combination, res
judicata, multiplicity, prolixity, Markush groups, and nonstatutory
(omnibus) claims and know how to properly treat them.
- Interpret claim language in accordance with statutory provisions
and case law.
- Preamble
- 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraph 6
- Words and phrases
- Product-by-process claims
- Functional language
- Negative limitations
- Alternative expressions
- Claims containing multiple categories of invention
- Transitional phrases
- Open language (comprising)
- Closed language (consisting of)
- Intermediate language (consisting essentially of)
- Body of Claim
- 35 U.S.C. 112
- Background
- General Approach
- Paragraph 2 - Applicant's Invention
- Paragraph 2 - Definiteness
- Paragraph 1 - Enabling
- Paragraph 1 - Description
- Paragraph 1 - Best Mode
- Paragraph 6 - Means or Step for Performing a Specified Function
- NEW MATTER - 35 U.S.C. 112, 132, 251
- SPECIALIZED SITUATIONS
- Aggregation
- Old Combination
- Res judicata
- Multiplicity
- Prolix
- Nonstatutory (omnibus) claim
- Markush Practice
- CLAIM INTERPRETATION
- Words and Phrases
- Product-By-Process Claims
- Functional Language
- Preamble
- Claims containing multiple categories of invention
A. BACKGROUND
35 U.S.C.
112, first paragraph, deals with the specification, and requires that
it describe:
- the invention (description)
- the manner of making and using the invention (enablement), and
- best mode.
These items must be described "in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art" to understand them.
The second
and sixth paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 112 deal with the claims. The second
paragraph sets forth the requirement that there be one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention. The sixth paragraph deals
with permissible forms of claiming and rules of construction pertaining
to those forms.
B. GENERAL
APPROACH
Any analysis
under 35 U.S.C. 112 should begin with the determination of whether
the claims satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of ¤112
to determine whether the claims do, in fact, set out and circumscribe
a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity.
Once having determined that the subject matter defined by the claims
is definite and that the claims set forth what applicant regards as
his invention, analysis turns to the first paragraph of ¤112 to determine
whether the scope of protection sought is supported by the specification
disclosure. The pertinent inquiries include determining (l) whether
the subject matter defined in the claims is described in the specification,
(2) whether the specification disclosure, as a whole, is such as to
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention
and (3) whether the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out that invention is set forth. The two requirements, (a) how to make
and (b) how to use the claimed invention, are referred to as the enablement requirement
of ¤112. The invention, for the purpose of 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraph
one analysis, is defined by the claims.
C. REJECTION:
Each rejection
based on 35 U.S.C. 112 should specify the paragraph relied on in order
to be in full compliance with the spirit of 35 U.S.C. 132. In re Mayhew,
188 USPQ 356 (CCPA 1976).
A. APPROACH:
Any analysis
of claims for compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 must begin with an analysis
of the claims to determine exactly what subject matter they encompass.
The subject matter there set out must be presumed, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, to be that which the applicant regards as his invention. In
re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 169 USPQ 236 (CCPA 1971).
B. EVIDENCE
TO THE CONTRARY:
Evidence that
shows that a claim does not correspond in scope with what applicant regards
as his invention may be found in contentions or admissions contained in
briefs or remarks filed by applicant (In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1303,
162 USPQ 541, CCPA 1969) or in affidavits filed under 37 CFR 1.132 (In
re Cormany, 476 F.2d 998, 177 USPQ 450, CCPA 1973), but probably not
by statements or material contained in applicant's specification (In
re Conley, 490 F.2d 972, 180 USPQ 454, CCPA 1974); In re Ehrreich,
200 USPQ 504 (CCPA 1979). The concurring opinion (J. Baldwin) in In
re Mayhew, 188 USPQ 356 (CCPA 1976) presents an argument that material
contained in the specification can be relied on to support a 35 U.S.C.
112, second paragraph rejection that claims do not point out "what applicant
regards as his invention."
C. RELATIONSHIP
TO ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT (35 U.S.C. 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH - MPEP 2174):
If the specification
discloses that a particular feature or element is critical or essential
to the practice of the invention, failure to recite or include that particular
feature or element in the claims would support a rejection that those claims
are not supported by an enabling disclosure. In re Mayhew, 188 USPQ
356 (CCPA 1976). See also MPEP 2173.05(l).
D. SHIFT
PERMITTED:
The second
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 does not prohibit an applicant from changing
what he regards as his invention during the pendency of his application. In
re Saunders, 444 F.2d 599, 170 USPQ 213 (CCPA 1971) (Applicant was
permitted to claim and submit comparative evidence with respect to claimed
subject matter which was originally only the preferred class within much
broader claims (method claims).
The fact
that claims in a continuation application were directed to subject
matter which applicants had not regarded as part of their invention
when the parent application was filed was held not to prevent the continuation
application from receiving benefit of the parent application's filing
date. In re Brower, 433 F.2d 813, 167 USPQ 684 (CCPA 1970).
The essential
question under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, is whether the claims do,
in fact, set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree
of precision and particularity. Definiteness of claim language is analyzed,
not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art
and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted
by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art. In
re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 169 USPQ 236 (CCPA 1971). See also MPEP 2173.02.
Likewise,
reference to the specification disclosure or prior art teachings may
make an otherwise definite claim take on an unreasonable degree of
uncertainty. In re Cohen, 438 F.2d 989, 169 USPQ 45 (CCPA 1971); In
re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378, 166 USPQ 204 (CCPA 1970); In re Anderson,
176 USPQ 331 (CCPA 1973). See also MPEP 2173.03.
If the scope
of the invention sought to be patented cannot be determined from the
language of the claims, a 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph rejection
is appropriate. In re Wiggins, 179 USPQ 421 (CCPA 1973).
MPEP 2173.02:
If the disclosure and claims are sufficient for one skilled in the
art to understand, an examiner "should not reject claims or insist
on their own preferences if other modes of expression selected by applicants
satisfy the statutory requirements."
1. Claim
Interpretation and Construction - MPEP 2111-2111.06:
During patent
examination, the pending claims must be "given the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification." Reading a claim
in light of the specification to interpret limitations explicitly recited
in the claim is quite different than reading limitations of the specification
into a claim to narrow the scope of a claim by implicitly adding disclosed
limitations which have no express basis in the claim. In re Prater,
415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541, 550-551 (CCPA 1969). Applicant cannot
rely on the specification to impart to the claims limitations not recited
therein. Such reliance is ineffective to define over the prior art. In
re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 113 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1957); In re Winkhaus,
188 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1975).
The definiteness
of claim language must also be analyzed in light of the claim interpretation
that would be given by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in
the pertinent art at the time the invention was made. W. L. Gore & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Definiteness
of claim language is determined as of the filing date, and it is error
to rely on subsequent formula developments and publications to find
uncertainty as to terms used in a patent.)
Though applicant
has a right to claim what he regards as his invention under 35 U.S.C.
112, it is a function of the examiner to construe the claims presented.
A refusal to construe the claims more broadly than is considered warranted
by the claim language is not a rejection. In re Volk, 207 USPQ
1086 (CCPA 1980). Compare In re Priest, 199 USPQ 11 (CCPA 1978)
(The Board erred in adding an inferential limitation to the claims
in order to reach a particular decision; examination required by statute
is of the subject matter defined by the claims submitted by applicant.)
2. Breadth
Is Not Indefiniteness - MPEP 2173.04:
If the scope
of the subject matter embraced by the claim is clear (metes and bounds),
and if the applicant has not otherwise indicated that he intends the
invention to be of a different scope, then the claim complies with
the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. If the enabling disclosure of
the specification is not commensurate in scope with the subject matter
encompassed by a claim, that fact does not render the claim imprecise
or indefinite or otherwise not in compliance with the second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 164 USPQ 642
(CCPA 1970).
A claim
which referred to a chemical compound as a "polypeptide of at least
24 amino acids having the following sequence" and then recited 24 amino
acids in a particular order had been rejected under the second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. 112 as failing to "positively identify the entire chemical
structure of the compound desired to be claimed." The examiner and
the Board of Appeals had viewed the absence of a limitation as to amino
acids beyond the 24th position as rendering the claim indefinite. The
court held that "While the absence of such a limitation obviously broadens
the claim and raises questions of sufficiency of disclosure, it does not render
the claim indefinite. The absence of the limitation has a precise meaning.
Regardless of the specification, the claimed subject matter is in no
way limited by the presence, absence or sequence of amino acids beyond
the 24th position." In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18,
23 (CCPA 1970) (emphasis in original).
See also In
re Morisi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Process
claim specifying that component be "essentially free of alkali metal" was
not impermissibly indefinite when (l) prior art required use of such
metal, and (2) the claimed process contained an undesired minute
quantity of such metal. The specification provided adequate guidance
as to the level of the metal, and it would be unfair to require the
applicant to specify a cut-off number.)
3. Correspondence
between Specification and Claims:
The meaning
of every term used in the claims should be apparent from the descriptive
portion of the specification, with clear disclosure of its import.
MPEP 608.01(o); 2173.05(a). Remember that an original claim is part
of the original disclosure.
4. New Terminology
- MPEP 2173.05(a):
Courts have
recognized that it is not only permissible, but often desirable, to
use new terms that are frequently more precise in describing and defining
the new invention. This issue was considered by the CCPA in a case
in which the Board of Appeals had rejected claims to medicinal compositions
as indefinite because certain potency and purity limitations there
recited were inadequate to enable a decision to be made as to patentability
over the prior art. The court recognized that there might be a problem
in determining differences over the prior art where the claim uses
language which is now accepted and precise but which had not been used
in the art. The court also recognized that, were it to require that
claims speak in the language of the prior art, it would be prohibiting
the use of the newer and frequently more precise language of the present
art. The court's solution is to allow the use of new expressions when
they are definite, and to allow the Office to call for comparative
evidence when there is reason to believe that the prior art discloses
subject matter which renders the claimed subject matter old or obvious. In
re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18, 23 (CCPA 1970).
5. Special
Definitions - MPEP 2173.05(a):
A term used
in the claims may be given a special meaning in the description, but
no term may be given a meaning repugnant to the usual meaning of the
term. MPEP 608.01(o); 2173.05(a). For example, where an applicant's
claims used the language "a carbamide" and his specification defined
the term "carbamide" (i.e., urea) as including "urea, thiourea, melamine,
and other urea derivatives and substituted ureas," it was held that
the claims did not accurately define his invention. In re Hill,
161 F.2d 367, 73 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1947). In a more recent case, applicants'
claim 24 referred to "a phenyl radical" and claim 25 was drawn to:
A
photographic color coupler as described in claim 24 wherein the phenyl
radical is a 3-octadecylcarbanylphenyl radical.
The court
referred to Hockh's Chemical Dictionary which indicated that the term "phenyl" means "the
monovalent radical C6H5--" and concluded that
the meaning of the phrase "a phenyl radical" is "confined to a single
definite radical," and affirmed the rejection of claim 25 under the
second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re Barr, 170 USPQ 330,
339 (1971).
6. Lack
of Antecedent Basis in Claim - MPEP 2173.05(e):
- Non sequitur -- a claim is inferential and therefore indefinite when
it recites "said lever" and there was no earlier reference in the claim
to a lever.
- Indirect limitation -- a claim which first recites "lever" and later
recites "said aluminum lever" gives rise to a rejection based on the
second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112.
7. Trademark
or Tradename - MPEP 2173.05(u):
Trademarks
or tradenames identify sources of products and not the products themselves.
Although the presence of a trademark or tradename in a claim is not per
se improper, if the trademark or tradename is used in a claim
as a limitation to identify or describe a particular product, the claim
does not comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. Ex
parte Simpson, 218 USPQ 1020 (Bd. App. 1982). See also In re
Gebauer-Fuelnegg, 50 USPQ 125 (CCPA 1941) (presence of tradename
in a claim approved where accompanied by chemical description of material
(...a rubber resin (pliolite), ...)); Ex parte Kattwinkle, 12
USPQ 11 (Bd. App. 1931) (presence of trademark in a claim improper);
and MPEP 608.01(v).
8. Acceptable
Language - MPEP 2173.01:
A fundamental
principle contained in 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph is that applicants
are their own lexicographers. They can define in the claims that they
regard as their invention essentially in whatever terms they choose
so long as the selected terminology is clear and terms are not used
in ways that are contrary to accepted meanings in the art. See, for
example, In re Castaing, 429 F.2d 461, 166 USPQ 550 (CCPA 1970)
wherein claim terminology which was not conventional in the art was
nonetheless determined to be definite.
Generally,
the scope of a claim will be considered definite where each recited
limitation is definite. In re Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 164 USPQ
636 (CCPA 1970). A claim may not be rejected solely because of the
type of language used to define the subject matter for which patent
protection is sought. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 160 USPQ
226 (CCPA 1971). Accordingly, applicant may use functional language,
alternative expressions, negative limitations or any style of expression
which makes clear the metes and bounds of the subject matter for which
patent protection is sought.
A functional
limitation is an attempt to define something by what it does, rather than
by what it is (e.g., as evidenced by its specific structure or specific
ingredients). There is nothing inherently wrong with defining some part
of an invention in functional terms. Functional language does not, in and
of itself, render a claim improper. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210,
169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971).
A functional
limitation must be evaluated and considered, just like any other limitation
of the claim - for what it fairly conveys to a person of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art in the context in which it is used. A functional
limitation is often used in association with an element, ingredient
or step of a process to define a particular capability or purpose that
is served by the recited element, ingredient or step. See, for example, In
re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956, 189 USPQ 149 (CCPA 1976) wherein the
Court held that in a claim directed to a kit of component parts capable
of being assembled, limitations such as "members adapted to be positioned" and "portions
. . . being resiliently dilatable whereby said housing may be slidably
positioned" serve to precisely define present structural attributes
of interrelated component parts of the claimed assembly.
Alternative
expressions are permitted if they present no uncertainty or ambiguity with
respect to the question of scope or clarity of the claims. One acceptable
form of alternative expression is commonly referred to as a Markush group
which recites members as being "selected from the group consisting of A,
B, and C." Markush groups are discussed in detail near the end of the lecture.
Alternative expressions using "or" are also acceptable, such as "wherein
R is A, B, C, or D." In In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 187 USPQ 664
(CCPA 1975), the following phrases were each held to be acceptable and
not in violation of 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph: "made entirely or
in part of;" "at least one piece;" and "iron, steel or any other magnetic
material."
An alternative
format which requires some analysis before concluding whether or not
the language is indefinite involves the use of the term optionally.
In Ex parte Cordova, 10 USPQ2d 1949 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1989) the language "containing A, B, and optionally C" was considered
acceptable alternative language because there was no ambiguity as to
which alternatives are covered by the claim. A similar holding was
reached with regard to the term optionally in Ex parte
Wu, 10 USPQ2d 2031 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989). If the list
of potential alternatives can vary and ambiguity arises, then it is
proper to make a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph and
explain why there is confusion.
Negative limitations
define an invention in terms of what the invention is not, rather than
what it is. There is nothing inherently ambiguous or uncertain about a
negative limitation. So long as the boundaries of the patent protection
sought are set forth definitely, albeit negatively, the claim complies
with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. In re Barr,
170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971) (the negative functional limitation "incapable
of forming a dye with said oxidized developing agent" was definite because
the boundaries of the patent protection sought were clear). See also In
re Wakefield, 164 USPQ 636, 638, 640 (CCPA 1970) (A claim to synthetic
polyisoprene which recited the limitation "being free from the proteins,
soaps, resins and sugars present in natural Hevea rubber" in order to exclude
the characteristics of the prior art product was considered definite because
each recited limitation was definite.).
"All words
in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim
against the prior art." In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 165 USPQ 494,
496 (CCPA 1970). The fact that terms may be indefinite does not make the
claim obvious over the prior art.
If a claim
is subject to more than one interpretation, and at least one interpretation
would render the claim unpatentable over the prior art, the proper
course of action is for the examiner to enter two rejections: (1) a
rejection based on indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph,
and (2) a rejection over the prior art based on the interpretation
of the claim which renders the prior art applicable. Ex parte Ionescu,
222 USPQ 537 (Bd. App. 1984). However, if there is a great deal of
confusion and uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of the limitations
of a claim, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103 should not be made
based on considerable speculation about the meaning of terms employed
in a claim. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 134 USPQ 292 (CCPA 1962).
Words of degree
in claims (relative terminology such as "substantially equal to") are not
indefinite if the specification provides a standard for measuring that
degree. Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Industrial Crating & Packing Inc.
731 F.2d 818, 221 USPQ 568, 574 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also MPEP 2173.05(b).
ENABLEMENT
REQUIREMENT - MPEP 2164-2164.08(c)
A. ESSENTIAL
TEST
Any analysis
of whether a particular claim is supported by the disclosure in an
application requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when
filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter
of the claims as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make
and use the claimed invention. The examiner must also consider whether
the scope of enablement provided to one of ordinary skill in the art
by the disclosure is commensurate with the scope of protection sought
by the claims. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 169 USPQ 236 (CCPA
1971).
B. PERTINENT
CONSIDERATIONS
l-Undue
experimentation - MPEP 2164.01:
The test
of enablement is whether one skilled in the art could make and use
the claimed invention from the disclosure coupled with information
known in the art without undue experimentation. United Stated v.
Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 8 USPQ2d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In
re Stephens, 188 USPQ 659 (CCPA 1976). The test of enablement is
not whether any experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation
is necessary, it is undue. In re Angstadt, 190 USPQ 214 (CCPA
1976). An extended period of experimentation may not be undue if the
skilled artisan is given sufficient direction or guidance. In re
Colianni, 195 USPQ 150 (CCPA 1977) (Miller, J., concurring). The
experimentation required, in addition to not being undue, must not
require ingenuity beyond that expected of one of ordinary skill in
the art. In re Angstadt, supra. For example, in one instance
a "few hours" of experimentation to determine process parameters was
not considered to be undue in view of the nature of the invention (preparation
of oxygenated hydrocarbons). In re Borkowski, 164 USPQ 642 (CCPA
1970). In Tabuchi v. Nubel, 194 USPQ 521 (CCPA 1977) a screening
procedure which took 15 calendar days was not considered undue experimentation
because the test was both simple and straightforward and because of
its demonstrated success in producing the desired result.
Specific
factors which are to be considered in determining whether or not experimentation
required is undue are (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary
(time and expense); (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented;
(3) presence of absence of a working example; (4) nature of the invention;
(5) the state of the prior art; (6) the relative skills of those in
the art; (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art; and
(8) the breadth of the claims. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 8
USPQ 2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Non-critical features of the invention
may be supported by a more general disclosure than those at the heart
of the invention. In re Stephens, 180 USPQ 659 (CCPA 1976).
2-Burden
on the Examiner - MPEP 2164.04:
The examiner
has the initial burden to establish a reasonable basis to question
the enablement provided for the claimed invention. If an examiner can
provide reasons sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy
of a particular broad statement put forward by applicant as enabling
support for a claim, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph
can be made. A specification disclosure which contains a teaching of
the manner and process of making and using the invention in terms which
correspond in scope to those used in describing and defining the subject
matter sought to be patented must be taken as in compliance with the
enabling requirement of the first paragraph of ¤112 unless there is
reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained therein
which must be relied on for enabling support. Assuming that sufficient
reason for such doubt exists, a rejection for failure to teach how
to make and/or use will be proper on that basis. In re Marzocchi,
169 USPQ 367 (CCPA 1971).
3-Enablement
commensurate in scope with the claims - MPEP 2164.08:
As concerns
the breadth of a term in a claim, the only relevant concern should
be whether the scope of enablement provided to one skilled in the art
by the disclosure is commensurate with the scope of protection sought
by the claims. The first paragraph of ¤112 requires nothing more than
objective enablement. How such a teaching is set forth, by specific
example or broad terminology, is not important. In re Marzocchi,
supra. A rejection of a claim under ¤112 as broader than the enabling
disclosure is a first paragraph enablement rejection and not a second
paragraph definiteness rejection. Claims are not rejected as unduly
broad under 35 U.S.C. 112 for non-inclusion of limitations dealing
with factors which must be presumed to be within the level of ordinary
skill in the art; the claims need not recite such factors where one
of ordinary skill in the art to whom the specification and claims are
directed would consider them obvious. In re Skrivan, 166 USPQ
85 (CCPA 1970). It has been generally held that it is the function
of the specification and not the claims to set forth practical limits
of operation. In re Johnson, 194 USPQ 197 (CCPA 1977).
4-Working
example - MPEP 2164.02:
Compliance
with the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 does not turn on whether
a specific example or working example is disclosed. The specification
need not contain a working example if the invention is otherwise disclosed
in such a manner that one skilled in the art will be able to practice
it without an undue amount of experimentation. In re Borkowski,
164 USPQ 642 (CCPA 1970). Although there is no magical relationship
between the number of representable examples and the breadth of the
claims with respect to enablement, and compliance with ¤112 first paragraph
does not turn on whether a specific example is disclosed, the lack
of a working example is nonetheless a factor to be considered especially
in a case involving an unpredictable and undeveloped art. In re
Colianni (Miller, J., concurring), supra. See also MPEP 2164.03
5-Evidence
as a whole - MPEP 2164.05:
The specification
as a whole must be considered in determining whether the scope of enablement
provided by the specification is commensurate with the scope of the
claims. In re Johnson, supra. The evidence as a whole, for example,
including submitted factual affidavits, can negate a position that
one of ordinary skill in a given art, even given its unpredictability,
must engage in undue experimentation. In re Angstadt, supra.
6 - Specification
must be enabling as of the filing date - MPEP 2164.05(a):
The state
of the art existing at the filing date of the application is used to
determine whether a particular disclosure is enabling as of the filing
date. Publications dated after the filing date providing information
publicly first disclosed after the filing date generally cannot be
used to show what was known at the time of filing. In re Gunn,
537 F.2d 1123, 190 USPQ 402 (CCPA 1976). While a later dated publication
cannot supplement an insufficient disclosure in a prior dated application
to make it enabling, applicant can offer the testimony of an expert
based on the publication as evidence of the level of skill in the art
at the time the application was filed. Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d
1074, 3 USPQ2d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Likewise,
the examiner can use later appearing art as evidence of the state of
the art existing on the filing date of the application. In re Hogan,
559 F.2d 595, 194 USPQ 527 (CCPA 1977). In In re Wright, 27
USPQ2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1993) an article published 5 years after the
filing date of the application adequately supported the examiner's
position that the physiological activity of certain viruses was sufficiently
unpredictable so that a person skilled in the art would not have believed
that the success with one virus and one animal could be extrapolated
successfully to all viruses with all living organisms. Claims not directed
to the specific virus and the specific animal were held nonenabled.
Neither
an applicant nor the PTO can use a later publication disclosing a later
existing state of the art to determine whether an earlier application
complies with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph.
7 - Inoperative
species - MPEP 2164.08(b):
Although,
typically, inoperative embodiments are excluded by language in a claim
(e.g., preamble), claims reading on significant numbers of inoperative
embodiments may not be enabled when the specification does not clearly
identify the operative embodiments and undue experimentation is involved
in determining those embodiments that are operable. In re Cook,
439 F.2d 730, 169 USPQ 298 (CCPA 1971) (Claims are not broader than
the enabling disclosure even if they read on a very large number of
inoperative embodiments if "a person skilled in the relevant art could
determine which conceived but not-yet-fabricated embodiments would
be inoperative with expenditure of no more effort than is normally
required" in the art. 169 USPQ at 302.)
Later cases
follow this line of reasoning. In In re Anderson, 176 USPQ 331
(CCPA 1973), claims to a laminated dressing wherein the primary layer
contains a medicament were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph
as broader than the enabling disclosure because the term "medicament" was
not limited to operative or suitable medicaments. The court reversed
the rejection, reasoning it was common knowledge that some medicaments
would not work and applicant should not be limited to claiming to operative
medicaments in operative quantities. The claims "are inherently limited
-- by common sense if nothing else -- to such medication as would be
useful in the particular application." 176 USPQ at 334. Note also In
re Geerdes, 180 USPQ 790, 793 (CCPA 1974) in which the court stated
it was possible to argue that the claims encompass inoperative embodiments
on the premise of unrealistic or vague assumptions, but such arguments
are not a valid basis for a rejection under the first paragraph enablement
provisions of 35 U.S.C. 112. See also In re Dinh-Nguyen, 181
USPQ 46, 48 ("It is not a function of the claims to specifically
exclude either possible inoperative substances or ineffective reactant
proportions.") (emphasis in original); and In re Angstadt, 537
F.2d 498, 190 USPQ 214 (CCPA 1976) (A disclosure of a large number
of operable embodiments and the identification of a single inoperative
embodiment did not render a claim broader than the enabled scope because
undue experimentation was not involved in determining those embodiments
that were operable.) However, note In re Fisher, 166 USPQ 18,
20-21 (CCPA 1970) wherein the active ingredient in the claimed composition
was an adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) having at least 24 amino
acids in a specified sequence. The court held the claims were not enabled
by the specification which taught how to make ACTHs containing 39 amino
acids because the specification did not enable one skilled in the art
to make or obtain ACTHs with other than 39 amino acids, and there was
no showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known how
to make or obtain such other ACTHs without undue experimentation.
8 - Block
Diagrams - MPEP 2106.02, 2164.06:
Disclosure
of apparatus with diagrams describing the function but not the structure
of the apparatus is not, per se, fatal under the enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112 as long as the structure is conventional
or can be determined without undue experimentation. If the selection
of the apparatus from the prior art is well within the purview of persons
of ordinary skill in the art, "functional-type block diagrams may be
acceptable, and, in fact, preferable if they serve in conjunction
with the rest of the specification to enable a person skilled in the
art to make such a selection and practice the claimed invention with
only a reasonable degree of routine experimentation." In re Ghiron,
442 F.2d 985, 991, 169 USPQ 723, 727 (CCPA 1971) (emphasis in original).
For example,
a disclosure of an electrical circuit apparatus, depicted in the drawings
by block diagrams with functional labels, was held to be nonenabling
in In re Gunn, 537 F.2d 1123, 190 USPQ 402 (CCPA 1976). There
was no indication in the specification as to whether the parts represented
by boxes were "off the shelf" or must be specifically constructed or
modified for applicant's system. Also there were no details in the
specification of how the parts should be interconnected, timed and
controlled so as to obtain the specific operations desired by the applicant.
In In re Donohue, 550 F.2d 1269, 193 USPQ 136 (CCPA 1977), the
lack of enablement was caused by lack of information in the specification
about a single block labeled "LOGIC" in the drawings.
An applicant
may refer to an element of a claimed invention which is held as a trade
secret by name only and still satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
112 if equivalent elements are known, available to those skilled in
the art and known to be equivalents. White Consolidated Industries
v. Vega Servo-Control, 713 F.2d 788, 218 USPQ 961, 963 (Fed. Cir.
1983) The claimed control system required the use of a single pass
translator such as SPLIT (held as a trade secret) for the practice
of the invention. The claims where held invalid for failure to comply
with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph because
the evidence did not show that suitable substitutes for SPLIT were
known and widely available, however the evidence did show that it would
take undue experimentation for one of ordinary skill in the art to
develop a suitable single pass translator (about 1.5 person years of
work).
9-Critical
feature - MPEP 2164.08(c):
If a feature
which is taught as critical in the specification is not recited in
the claims, the claims should be rejected for lack of enablement under
35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. In determining whether an unclaimed
feature is critical, the entire disclosure must be considered. Broad
language in the disclosure (including the abstract) omitting an allegedly
critical feature tends to rebut the argument of criticality. Features
which are merely preferred are not to be considered critical. In
re Goffe, 191 USPQ 429 (CCPA 1976). For example, in the Mayhew case
the Court stated that since applicant's disclosure was limited to "special
cooling apparatus, specially located" as critical to obtaining the
desired results, claims failing to recite such limitations were not
supported by the enabling disclosure. In re Mayhew, 188 USPQ
356, 358 (CCPA 1976).
10-One skilled
in the art - MPEP 2164.05(b):
The specification
only needs to describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable
a person skilled in the most relevant art to make and use the invention.
When an invention, in its different aspects, involves distinct arts,
the specification is adequate if it enables the adepts of each art,
those who have the best chance of being enabled, to carry out the aspect
related to their specialty. In re Naquin, 158 USPQ 317 (CCPA
1968); Ex parte Zechnall, 194 USPQ 461 (Bd. of App. 1973); Ex
Parte Billottet, 192 USPQ 413 (Bd. of App. 1976). A factual basis
must be set forth to demonstrate that it would be beyond the level
of ordinary skill in a particular art to make and use the invention.
Mere conclusionary statements as to the level of ordinary skill in
the art are not a sufficient basis for a ¤112 first paragraph rejection. In
re Brebner, 173 USPQ 169 (CCPA 1972).
11-Single
means claim - MPEP 2164.08(a):
In re
Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 218 USPQ 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The proper
statutory rejection of a single means claims is the requirement of
the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 that the enabling disclosure
of the specification be commensurate in scope with the claim under
consideration. The long recognized problem with a single means claim
is that it covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated
result, while the specification discloses at most only those means
known to the inventor.
The Patent
and Trademark Office has the initial burden of giving reasons, supported
by the record as a whole, why the specification is not enabling. For
example, showing that the disclosure entails undue experimentation
is part of the initial burden. Also, concerning undue experimentation,
the courts have held that merely demonstrating that some experimentation
is necessary does not shift the burden to applicants to prove that
such experimentation is not undue. In re Angstadt, supra. All
assertions made that the enabling disclosure is not commensurate in
scope with the protection sought by the claims must be supported by
(l) evidence or (2) reasoning substantiating doubts so expressed. In
re Dinh-Nguyen, 181 USPQ 46 (CCPA 1974). Reasons and evidence sufficient
to create reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad
statement put forward as enabling support for a claim can take any
of the following forms: (l) statements on their face contrary to generally
accepted scientific principles; (2) teachings in pertinent references;
and (3) unpredictability of chemical reactions. In re Marzocchi,
supra. Assuming that sufficient reason for such doubt does exist, a
rejection for failure to teach how to make and/or use the invention
will be proper on that basis. Such rejection can be overcome by suitable
evidence that the teaching contained in the specification is truly
enabling. In re Marzocchi, supra. In any event, it is incumbent
upon the Patent and Trademark Office to explain why it doubts the truth
or accuracy of any statement in a supporting disclosure and to back
up assertions of its own with acceptable evidence or reasoning which
is inconsistent with the contested statement. In re Marzocchi,
supra. Once the examiner has advanced a reasonable basis for questioning
the adequacy of the disclosure, it is incumbent upon applicant to rebut
that challenge. That is, the applicant has the burden of supplying
adequate information from which the examiner could base a finding of
whether the examiner's challenge is correct, e.g. factual support as
to what would be required or what was actually done in carrying out
the invention. In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 179 USPQ 227 (CCPA
1973).
The Patent
and Trademark Office had rejected claims for lack of enablement in
a "Hot-Dip Metal Coating Method and Apparatus" because the cooling
means required by the invention was not claimed at the exit side of
the treatment bath as described by the specification. The Court stated
that the cooling means at the exit side of the treatment bath was merely
a preferred embodiment and the PTO had failed to substantiate its rejection
with evidence or reasoning that location of the cooling means elsewhere
would not achieve the desired result. In re Mayhew, 179 USPQ
43 (CCPA 1973).
In a case
involving the growth of linear crystals grown artificially from the
vapor phase of crystal producing materials, the Court held that the
general description in the specification of the temperature, pressure
and vapor saturation requirements, without the disclosure of a specific
example, was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the first paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. 112. The court further held that the sufficiency of an
application under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, must be judged as
of its filing date, and therefore, later publications cannot be relied
upon to supplement the disclosure. In re Glass, 181 USPQ 31
(CCPA 1974).
In Dinh-Nguyen,
applicants were claiming a method of deuterating an organic compound.
The Office alleged that because side reactions might occur, there was "at
least a strong probability that the invention as broadly claimed encompasses
significant areas wherein the process would be inoperative, or at the
least, inadequately disclosed." However, the Court found that since
there was a general discussion of the claimed process, as well as three
specific examples which demonstrated the general applicability of the
process, the disclosure satisfied the enablement requirement of 35
U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. In re Dinh-Nguyen, 181 USPQ 46,
47 (CCPA 1974). In a case involving the making of sugar from starch,
claims requiring an initial hydrolysis to a D.E. value of "less than
about 15" units were rejected as broader than the enabling disclosure
because the examples in the specification ranged between 5 and 15.
In reversing the first paragraph, 35 U.S.C. 112 rejection, the Court
stated that "less than 15" would merely inform one skilled in the art
that anything "less than 15" would be operable, and the specification
itself had demonstrated that values "between about 5 and about 15" would
work. Furthermore, applicant submitted an affidavit to demonstrate
that the teaching in the specification was truly enabling showing values
of "1.4" to "6.7" as operable. The Court held the evidence clearly
demonstrated that the lower limit of "about 5" specifically disclosed
was not critical, and that values below "5" were operable. In re
Armbruster, 185 USPQ 152 (CCPA 1975).
In the Angstadt decision,
involving a method of oxidizing hydrocarbons employing improved catalysts,
the issue was whether the claims were broader than the enabling disclosure
in view of evidence in the specification itself which disclosed that
not all of the complexes on which the claims read would produce the
desired results. The Board of Appeals held that to determine which
catalysts would work would require undue experimentation. The Court
held, however, that applicants had disclosed 39 complexes which would
work, and the amount of experimentation which would be required to
determine other complexes which read on the claims but were not specifically
disclosed as workable would not be undue. In re Angstadt,
19O USPQ 214 (CCPA 1976).
However,
in a case involving a method of using ultrasonic energy to mend broken
bones, the Court held that the mere disclosure of "sufficient" ultrasonic
energy to accomplish applicant's purpose without a single specific
example was not sufficient to meet the enablement requirements of 35
U.S.C. 112. The court noted that the specification did not provide
any guidance in selecting suitable operating parameters, and that one
skilled in the art would not be aware of any established criteria or
techniques. In re Colianni, 195 USPQ 150 (CCPA 1977).
In re
Gunn, 537 F.2d 1123, 190 USPQ 402 (CCPA 1976), discussed above
with regard to block diagrams, involved a device for computing the
amount of postage and for printing this amount and the zip code on
the mail. The examiner rejected the claims under the first paragraph
of ¤112 because the disclosure had only one figure of the apparatus
which showed only hollow rectangles, and the specification
described this apparatus only in terms of the function of the hollow
rectangles, with no evidence of how the rectangles could be interconnected,
timed or controlled. Applicant submitted patents and affidavit evidence
to show the conventionality of the components. However, the patents
issued after applicant's filing date and the affidavits did not address
what was known at the time the application was filed. Therefore,
applicant had not overcome the prima facie case of non-enablement
made out by the examiner. In re Gunn, 190 USPQ 402 (CCPA 1976).
In re
Howarth - In responding to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first
paragraph, for lack of enablement, applicant submitted copies of
patent applications which had been opened for public inspection in
Rhodesia, Panama and Luxembourg prior to the filing date and which
disclosed the critical preparation of the starting material. In holding
that the disclosure was non-enabling the court indicated that the
public availability of a source of information may be controlling.
When no guidance at all has been given, an applicant must show that
anyone skilled in the art would have actually possessed the requisite
knowledge or would reasonably be expected to check the source which
the applicant relies upon to complete his disclosure and would be
able to locate the information with no more than reasonable diligence. In
re Howarth, 210 USPQ 689 (CCPA 1931).
E. ADDITIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
1. The abstract
is part of the disclosure for enablement purposes. In re Armbruster,
185 USPQ 152 (CCPA 1975).
2. The scope
of enablement varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability
involved. In re Angstadt, supra. See also MPEP 2164.03.
3. To limit
applicant to claiming "preferred" materials under the first paragraph
of ¤112 in the absence of limiting prior art would not serve the constitutional
purpose of promoting progress in the useful arts. In re Johnson,
supra.
4. Each
case must be determined on its own facts in determining the adequacy
of the disclosure under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. In re Angstadt,
supra.
5. When
the specification disclosure as a whole would not enable one skilled
in the art to make and use the claimed invention, the examiner may
have reason to doubt the utility and operativeness of the claimed invention.
This may result not only in a ¤112 first paragraph rejection, but also
in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101. In re Eltgroth, 164 (CCPA
1970), In re Knowlton, 183 USPQ 33 (CCPA 1974). See also MPEP
2107, paragraph d, and MPEP 2164.07.
6. Applicants
must disclose apparatus for practicing a claimed method where the apparatus
would not be obvious to one skilled in the particular art involved. Ex
parte Gottzein, 168 USPQ 176 (Bd. App. 1969).
The description
requirement is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. In
re Barker, 194 USPQ 470 (CCPA 1977). The description requirement
is simply that the claimed subject matter must be described in the
specification. The function of the description requirement is to ensure
that the applicant had in his possession, as of the filing date of
the application relied on, the specific subject matter later claimed
by him. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976); In
re Blaser, 194 USPQ 122 (CCPA 1977). It is not necessary that the
application describe the claim limitations exactly, but only so clearly
that persons of ordinary skill in the art would recognize from the
disclosure that applicant's invention included those limitations. In
re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 178 USPQ 179 (CCPA 1973). The description
requirement is not met if the application does not expressly or inherently
disclose the claimed invention. In re Lukach, 169 USPQ 795 (CCPA
1971). For example, see In re Winkhaus, 188 USPQ 129 (CCPA 1975)
wherein the claims were amended to include a process step which was
not specifically described in the application as originally filed.
The applicant argued that the step would be apparent to a person of
ordinary skill in the art. The court held "That a person skilled in
the art might realize from reading the disclosure that such a step
is possible is not a sufficient indication to that person that that
step is part of appellants' invention. Such an indication is the least
that is required for a description of the invention under the first
paragraph of ¤112." The specification may disclose sufficient information
to enable a person skilled in the art to perform the process including
the step in question and still not meet the description requirement.
The written
description consists of the specification and the claims as originally
filed. In re Gardner, 178 USPQ 149 (CCPA 1973).
The written
description issue may be raised when the claims are amended or new
claims added during the prosecution of the application. A determination
must be made of whether the added subject matter is described in the
original specification and claims. The determination must also include
a consideration of whether the added subject matter constitutes new
matter under 35 U.S.C. 132. Most of the applications which contain
new matter require both a written description and new matter rejection.
The primary consideration for both is factual. In re Wertheim,
541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976). The issue may also be raised
under 35 U.S.C. 119 or 120 as to whether the application is entitled
to the benefit of the filing date of a parent application or foreign
priority document. For example, in In re Risse, 378 F.2d 949,
154 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1967), the application was rejected over a reference
under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 35 U.S.C. 103. The applicant attempted to remove
that reference by obtaining the benefit of the filing date of the parent
application. The issue becomes whether the invention being claimed
in the continuation application is described in the parent application
in the manner required by 35 U.S.C. 112. See also In re Lukach,
169 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1971).
A. BURDEN
OF PROOF - MPEP 2163.04
The inquiry
into whether the description requirement is met must be determined
on a case-by-case basis and is a question of fact. In re Wertheim,
541 F.2d 257, 262, 191 USPQ 90, 96 (CCPA 1976). The examiner has the
initial burden of presenting evidence or reasons why persons skilled
in the art would not recognize in an applicant's disclosure a description
of the invention defined by the claims. In re Wertheim, 541
F.2d 257, 265, 191 USPQ 90, 98 (CCPA 1976); Ex parte Sorenson,
3 USPQ2d 1462, 1463 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987).
In the Wertheim case,
the issue was whether the foreign priority document complied with the
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph as to the
claimed subject matter so that the application would be entitled to
the benefit of the foreign filing date under 35 U.S.C. 119. The examiner
met the burden of proof with respect to some claims, but not others.
The foreign priority document disclosed a range of "25 to 60%" and
specific examples of "36%" and "50%." A claim limitation of "at least
35%" did not meet the description requirement because the phrase "at
least" had no upper limit and caused the claim to read literally on
embodiments outside the "25% to 60%" range. However the court held
a limitation to "between 35% and 60%" did meet the description requirement
because "persons skilled in the art would consider processes employing
a 35-60% solids content range to be part of appellants' invention.
. . . The PTO has done nothing more than to argue lack of literal support,
which is not enough" to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first
paragraph. 191 USPQ at 98.
B. STATEMENT
OF REJECTION REQUIREMENTS
Any time
an examiner bases a rejection of a claim or the denial of the effect
of a filing date of a previously filed application on the lack of a
written description, the examiner should:
(1) identify
the claim limitation not described; and
(2) provide
reasons why persons skilled in the art at the time the application
was filed would not have recognized the description of this limitation
in the disclosure of the application as filed. A typical reason points
out the differences between what is disclosed and what is claimed.
A simple statement that "There does not appear to be a written description
of the claim limitation '______' in the application as filed." may
be sufficient where the support is not apparent and the applicant has
not pointed out where the limitation is supported.
C. RESPONSE
TO AMENDMENTS
If applicant
amends the claims and points out where and/or how the originally filed
disclosure supports the amendment(s), and the examiner finds that the
disclosure does not reasonably convey that the inventor had possession
of the subject matter of the amendment at the time of the filing of
the application, the examiner has the initial burden of presenting
evidence or reasoning to explain why persons skilled in the art would
not recognize in the disclosure a description of the invention defined
by the claims. Accordingly, the examiner should identify what portion(s)
of the amendment lack support in the originally filed disclosure, and
should fully explain the basis for the examiner's finding. The examiner
also should comment on the substance of applicant's remarks. Any affidavits
attesting to what one of ordinary skill in the art would consider disclosed
by the application as originally filed must be thoroughly analyzed
and discussed in the Office action.
D. EXAMPLES
In re
Ahlbrecht, 435 F.2d 908, 168 USPQ 293 (CCPA 1971) - In order
to comply with 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, the recitation of
a broad range must be described in full, clear concise and exact
terms. The court held the description of a range "from 3-12" did
not describe a claimed range of "from 2-12".
In re
Smith, 173 USPQ 679 (CCPA 1972) - Disclosure of a generic class
of compounds and one example of a compound within a subgeneric class
of compounds was not sufficient description to support claims to
the subgeneric class of compounds.
In re
Lukach, F.2d, 169 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1971) - Although there was no
actual disclosure of molecular weight ratios in the specification,
one example had an inherent molecular weight ratio of 2.6. The claims
contained a range of molecular weight ratios of 2.0 to 3.0. The inherent
single embodiment was not sufficient description to support the claimed
range.
In re
Welstead, 463 F.2d 1110, 174 USPQ 449 (CCPA 1972) - The description
did not support the claims because the specification did not contain
a description of the claimed subgenus or descriptions of species
thereof amounting, in the aggregate, to a description of the subgenus.
In re
Johnson, 194 USPQ 187 (CCPA 1977) - Appellant lost an interference
as to species within a generic claim, and thereafter filed an application
directed to subgeneric claims which excluded the subject matter of
the lost count. The court held that the appellant was entitled to
the filing date of the grandparent application because "the specification,
having described the whole, necessarily described the part remaining." 194
USPQ at 196. The court distinguished Welstead and Lukach stating
that "appellants' grandparent application contains a broad and complete
generic disclosure, coupled with extensive examples fully supportive
of the limited genus now claimed" and the "grandparent application
clearly describes the genus and the two classes of polymer materials
excluded therefrom." Id.
In re
Blaser, 194 USPQ 122 (CCPA 1977) - The parent specification disclosed
that water in an amount up to 1.6 mols must be present to practice
the invention, and exemplified the use of 1.2 and 1.5 mols of water.
Claims setting forth a range of 0.6 to 1.6 mols of water were not
entitled to the filing date of the parent application. "That a person
skilled in the art . . . might proceed to run a series of experiments
and derive a lower limit of 0.6 mols is not a sufficient indication
to that person that 0.6 is described as a parameter of appellants'
process." 194 USPQ at 125. However, the parent application did adequately
describe claimed ranges of 1.2 to 1.5 and 1.2 to 1.6 mols of water.
Furthermore, disclosure of a temperature range of 60oC
to 200 oC and specific disclosure of heating to 80 oC
was sufficient description for a claim containing a range of 80 oC
to 200 oC.
In re
Edwards, 196 USPQ 465 (CCPA 1978) - Under circumstances of this
case, the Court held that an adequate description of chemical reactions
which will inherently produce, as the predominant component, the
claimed compound is an adequate description of the compound.
McLaughlin
v. Roberts, 197 USPQ 831, 835 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1978) - Roberts'
claims required 10-25% propellant. The disclosure specified that
the propellant may be present from 10-79% of the product, preferably
40-79%, and more preferably 40-60%; the 25% upper limit of the claimed
range was not specifically disclosed. The Board held that one of
ordinary skill in the art, given appellant's disclosure, would consider
the use of the 10-25% range as a part of the invention (description
requirement satisfied); likewise, the disclosure was considered enabling
even though the 10-25% was not disclosed as the preferred part of
the range and there were no examples of percentages within the lower
range because one skilled in the art would be able to practice the
invention using compositions having a propellant content within that
range.
In re
Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984) - The description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112 is separate from the enablement requirement
of that section. Inquiry into the description requirement is a question
of fact. Because the specification and claims of the patent specified
that a certain scanning function be in synchronism, generic
claims added by a reissue application that eliminated the synchronism
requirement did comply with the description requirement. The broadly
worded title, customarily broad description of the drawing, and statement
of objects of the invention did not indicate that appellants had
possession of the generic invention as of the original filing date.
E. NOTES
"Although
[applicant's] claims are rejected on references that teach no more
than is disclosed in his earlier applications, that circumstance does
not entitle him to claim his earlier filing date under Section 120
for claims not supported [paragraph 1, 35 U.S.C. 112] in those applications. In
re Scheiber 199 USPQ 782, 784 (CCPA 1978).
There must
be a continuous chain of copending applications each of which satisfies
the
requirements
of 35 U.S.C. 112 with respect to the subject matter presently claimed
in order to secure the benefit of the earliest filing date. In re
Hogan, 194 USPQ 527 (CCPA 1977). This principle also applies to
the use of a patent as prior art where the patent was a result of two
or more applications. In re Wertheim, 209 USPQ 554 (CCPA 1981).
A third
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 is that: The specification
. . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
A. POLICY
The best
mode requirement is a safeguard against the desire on the part of some
people to obtain patent protection without making a full disclosure.
The requirement does not permit inventors to disclose only what they
know to be their second-best embodiment, retaining the best for themselves. In
re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 126 USPQ 242 (CCPA 1960).
The failure
to disclose a better method will not invalidate a patent if the inventor,
at the time of filing the application, did not know of the better method
OR did not appreciate that it is the best method. The applicant is
required to disclose the best mode contemplated by the inventor even
though applicant may not have been the discoverer of that mode. Benger
Laboratories Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 209 F Supp. 639, 135 USPQ
11 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Failure
to disclose the best mode need not rise to the level of active concealment
or grossly inequitable conduct in order to support a rejection or invalidate
a patent. Where an inventor knows of a specific material that will
make possible the successful reproduction of the effects claimed by
the patent, but does not disclose it, speaking instead in terms of
broad categories, the best mode requirement has not been satisfied. Union
Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner, 193 USPQ 1 (6th Cir., 1977).
B. RELEVANT
CONSIDERATIONS - 2165.01
a) What
is the invention? Determine what the invention is - the invention is
defined in the claims. The specification need not set forth details
not relating to the essence of the invention. In re Bosy, 360
F.2d 972, 149 USPQ 789 (CCPA 1966).
b) Specific
example is not required. There is no statutory requirement for the
disclosure of a specific example - a patent specification is not intended
nor required to be a production specification. In re Gay, 309
F.2d 768, 135 USPQ 311 (CCPA 1962 ). The absence of a specific working
example is not necessarily evidence that the best mode has not been
disclosed, nor is the presence of one evidence that it has. Best mode
may be represented by a preferred range of conditions or group of reactants. In
re Honn, 364 F.2d 454, 150 USPQ 652 (CCPA 1966).
c) Compared
to enablement requirement - MPEP 2165.02. Best mode is a separate and
distinct requirement from the enablement requirement of paragraph 1
of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re Newton, 414 F.2d 1400, 163 USPQ 34 (CCPA
1969). The best mode provision of Section 112 is not directed to a
situation where the application fails to set forth any mode - such
failure is equivalent to non-enablement. In re Glass, 492 F.2d
1228, 181 USPQ 31 (CCPA 1974).
d) CCPA
suggested, but did not hold, that the best mode requirement might necessitate
the inclusion of a greater degree of specificity than that necessary
to comply with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re
Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 169 USPQ 231 (CCPA 1971).
e) New Matter
- 35 U.S.C. 132, 35 U.S.C. 251. If the best mode contemplated by the
inventor at the time of filing the application is not disclosed, such
defect cannot be cured by submitting an amendment seeking to put into
the specification something required to be there when the patent application
was originally filed. In re Hay, 534 F.2d 917, 189 USPQ 790
(CCPA 1976). Any proposed amendment of this type should be treated
as new matter.
C. EXAMPLES
Thyssen
Plastik Auger KG v. Induplas, Inc., 195 USPQ 534 (D. Puerto Rico,
1977) - When invention is in a process, and the inventors know of
particular apparatus which forms the best means known to them for
carrying out that process, such apparatus constitutes the best mode.
Here, failure to disclose a specific second gear arrangement, instead
describing a blank box described as conventional, was held to be
a violation of the best mode requirement.
Weil
v. Fritz, 202 PQ 447, 451 (CCPA 1979) - Under the circumstances
of this case, the mere disclosure of a particular range of concentrations
as preferred was sufficient to satisfy the best mode requirement.
Although the enumeration of possible problems is not essential "unless
such a nondisclosure strikes at the truthfulness of the presumption
that the 'mode' described is indeed the 'best' contemplated." (applicants
did not disclose the pH sensitivity of a compound used in a method
for the inhibition of plant growth).
In re
Sherwood, 204 USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980) - In determining the
adequacy of a best mode disclosure, "only evidence of concealment
(accidental or intentional) is to be considered. That evidence, in
order to result in affirmance of a best mode rejection, must tend
to show that the quality of an applicant's best mode disclosure is
so poor as to effectively result in concealment." Here, the evidence
of concealment consisted of the specification's statement that use
of a digital computer was the best mode even though only an analog
method was described in detail and evidence showing the existence
of useable digital computer programs. Even though the inventor had
more information in his possession concerning the contemplated best
mode than was disclosed (a known computer program), the specification
was held to delineate the best mode in a manner sufficient to require
only the application of routine skill to produce a workable digital
computer program.
Honeywell
v. Diamond, 208 USPQ 452 (D.D.C. 1980) - Claimed subject matter
was a time controlled thermostat but the application did not disclose
the specific quartzmatic motor which was used in a commercial embodiment.
The court concluded that failure to disclose the commercial motor
did not amount to concealment since similar clock motors were widely
available and widely advertised. There was no evidence that the specific
Quartzmatic motor was superior except possibly in price.
In re
Bundy, 209 USPQ 48, 52 (CCPA 1981) - There was held to be no
violation of the best mode requirement where the Solicitor argued
that concealment could be inferred from disclosure in specification
that each analog is "surprisingly and unexpectedly more useful than
one of the corresponding prostaglandins . . . for at least one of
the pharmacological purposes." It was argued that appellant must
have had test results to substantiate this statement and this data
should have been disclosed. The court concluded that no withholding
could be inferred from general statements of increased selectivity
and narrower spectrum of potency for these novel analogs, conclusions
which could be drawn from the elementary pharmacological testing
of the analogs.
See MPEP
2165.04 for additional examples of evidence of concealment.
D. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
MPEP 608.01(h)
McDougall,
Dugald S., "The Courts Are Telling Us. Your Client's Best Mode Must
Be Disclosed" with Editorial Epilogue by Gerald H. Bjorge, JPOS,
Vol. 59, No. 5, pp. 321-338 (May 1977)
Carlson,
Dale L., "The Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in Patent Practice", JPOS,
Vol. 60, No. 3, p. 171 (March 1978)
A. USES
The sixth
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 permits a form of claiming and specifies
some of the parameters of the construction of such claims. If construction
is not required, there is no warrant for bringing the sixth paragraph
into play. The sixth paragraph does not provide a basis for rejecting
claims. In re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905, 178 USPQ 616 (CCPA 1973).
B. LIMITATIONS
The sixth
paragraph does not add any additional description requirement to that
set forth in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. BUT, while the sentence
is permissive, it CANNOT be read as creating an exception to either
the description requirement (first paragraph) or the definiteness requirement
(second paragraph) of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d
1357, 178 USPQ 486 (CCPA 1973).
Functional language,
in and of itself, does not render a claim improper. In re Swinehart,
439 F.2d 210, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971). See also MPEP 2173.05(g). The
sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 specifically allows the use of functional
language to define claim limitations. In re Roberts, 470 F.2d
1399, 176 USPQ 313 (CCPA 1973).
C. APPLICABLE
TO
An element
in a claim for a combination. . .
Combination referred
to in the sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 includes not only a combination
of mechanical elements, but also a combination of substances in a composition
claim or steps in a process claim. In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d
159, 138 USPQ 217 (CCPA 1963).
A radical
constituting an element of a claimed chemical compound is an element
in a claim for a combination within the meaning of the sixth paragraph
of Section 112. In re Barr, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA
1971).
The sixth
paragraph of Section 112 clearly sanctions the use of means-plus-function
limitations in claims drawn to a combination and does not distinguish
between claims drawn to an apparatus or articles of manufacture. In
re Farrow, 193 USPQ 689 (CCPA 1977)
D. INTERPRETATION
When making
a determination of patentability under 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103, a "means
or step plus function" limitation is interpreted by giving it the "broadest
reasonable interpretation." Per the holding in In re Donaldson Co.,
16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994), "the 'broadest reasonable
interpretation' that an examiner may give means-plus-function language
is that statutorily mandated in paragraph six [of 35 U.S.C. 112]. Accordingly,
the PTO may not disregard the structure disclosed in the specification
corresponding to such language when rendering a patentability determination." 29
USPQ2d at 1850.
The application
of a prior art reference to a means or step plus function limitation
requires that the prior art element perform the identical function
specified in the claim. However, if a prior art reference teaches identity
of function to that specified in a claim, then under Donaldson an
examiner carries the initial burden of proof for showing that
the prior art structure or step is the same as or equivalent to the
structure, material, or acts described in the specification which has
been identified as corresponding to the claimed means or step plus
function.
The "means
or step plus function" limitation should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the specification disclosure. If the specification
defines what is meant by the limitation for the purposes of the claimed
invention, the examiner should interpret the limitation as having that
meaning. If no definition is provided, some judgment must be exercised
in determining the scope of the limitation.
NOTE:
Cases
prior to 1975 will refer to the third paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. It
became the sixth paragraph in an amendment dated November 14, 1975.
E. SINGLE
MEANS CLAIM
The provisions
of the sixth paragraph of Section 112 do not apply to a claim drafted
in a means-plus-function format which is not drawn to a combination.
In other words, a single means claim drafted in a means-plus-function
format does not comply with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C.
112, first paragraph. See In re Hyatt 218 USPQ 195 (Fed. Cir.
1983) and MPEP 2181.
A. THE
STATUTE
35 U.S.C.
132 - No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of
the invention.
35 U.S.C.
251 - No new matter shall be introduced into the application for reissue.
B. THE
RULE - 37 CFR 1.118 AMENDMENT OF DISCLOSURE
(a) No amendment
shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of an application after
the filing date of the application (37 CFR 1.53(b)). All amendments
to the specification, including the claims, and the drawings filed
after the filing date of the application must conform to at least one
of them as it was at the time of the filing of the application. Matter
not found in either, involving a departure from or an addition to the
original disclosure, cannot be added to the application after its filing
date even though supported by an oath or declaration in accordance
with 37 CFR 1.63 or 37 CFR 1.67 filed after the filing date of the
application.
(b) If it
is determined that an amendment filed after the filing date of the
application introduces new matter, claims containing new matter will
be rejected and deletion of the new matter in the specification and
drawings will be required even if the amendment is accompanied by an
oath or declaration in accordance with 37 CFR 1.63 or 37 CFR 1.67.
C. THE
MANUAL - MPEP 608.04, 706.03(o) and 2163.06
Matter not
in the original specification, drawing, or claims is usually new matter.
By definition
new matter is material added by amendment which does not have clear
support in the original specification, claims, or drawings. It must
be emphasized that the issue of new matter can arise by applicants
either (l) adding material to the specification by amendment, or (2)
deleting original material from the specification by amendment. For
example, the addition of the term "PVC polymer" where the specification
only contains the term "polyethylene" would be new matter. However,
the deletion from the original specification of, for example, a lower
limit (e.g., at least about 20) so that the specification no longer
contains any lower limit would also be considered new matter.
The addition
of new matter to the specification or claims or drawing most likely
will occur in response to an Office action which rejects the claims
or objects to the specification. However, the examiner should also
be aware of the fact that new matter may also be added in a Preliminary
Amendment. See MPEP 608.04(b). A Preliminary Amendment (even if filed
concurrently with the application) does not enjoy the status as part
of the original disclosure unless it is referred to in the oath. Accordingly,
the amendment must be examined for new matter. A preliminary amendment
filed with a continuation-in-part application filed under the file
wrapper continuing procedure of 37 CFR 1.62(c) is considered to be
an integral part of the C-I-P application as filed.
D. PROCEDURE
FOR HANDLING
Specification
- If new matter is added to the specification, the examiner should
object to the specification under 35 U.S.C. 132, and require applicant
to cancel the material. Review of this objection is by way of petition.
The objection
may be made using Form paragraph 7.28
Claims -
If new matter is added to the claims, the examiner should reject the
claims under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph and require cancellation
of the new matter. Review of this rejection is by way of appeal. In
re Rasmussen, 211 USPQ 323 (CCPA 1981).
The rejection
may be made using form paragraph 7.31.01. If both the claims and specification
contain new matter (either by direct amendment or by inference) and
there has been both an objection and rejection by the examiner, the
issue becomes appealable and should not be decided by petition.
E. REPHRASING
- MPEP 2163.07
The examiner
must realize that a mere rephrasing of a passage does not constitute
new matter. Accordingly, a rewording of a passage where the same meaning
remains intact is permissible. See In re Anderson, 176 USPQ
331 (CCPA 1973). The mere inclusion of dictionary or art recognized
definitions known at the time of filing said application would not
be considered new matter.
Usually
the terminology of the original claims follows the nomenclature of
the specification, but sometimes new terms are introduced which do
not appear in the specification. The use of a confusing variety of
terms for the same thing should not be permitted. New claims and amendments
to the claims already in the case should be scrutinized not only for
new matter but also for new terminology. While an applicant is not
limited to the nomenclature utilized in the application as filed, when
by amendment of his claims he departs therefrom, he should generally
make appropriate amendment of his specification so as to have therein
clear support or antecedent basis for the new terms appearing in the
claims. MPEP 608.01(o).
F. OBVIOUS
ERRORS - MPEP 2163.07
An amendment
to correct an obvious error does not constitute new matter where one
skilled in the art would appreciate not only the existence of error
in the specification, but also the appropriate correction. In re
Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 170 USPQ 260 (CCPA 1971) (change from nitrous
to nitric acid in examples directed to methods of preparing a claimed
compound was not new matter since error and correction would be apparent
to one skilled in the art); Ex parte Brodbeck, 199 USPQ 230
(Bd. App. 1977) (An original claim limitation literally stated that
a given percentage of the catalyst pores must be larger than 45A in
radius, while the amended limitation stated that a given percentage
of the catalyst pore volume is from pores larger than 45A radius. The
former limitation implies a knowledge of the number of pores themselves,
while the latter limitation implies only a knowledge of pore volume
resulting from pores having the specified size. The Board was convinced
by 2 declarations that one skilled in the art would recognize both
the original limitation is in error, and what the erroneous expression
should be.).
But, in In
re Nelson, 126 USPQ 242 (CCPA 1960) a new matter rejection was
affirmed where applicants had added a paragraph which indicated how,
by well-known and obvious steps, applicants novel compounds could
be converted into known useful compounds. The process steps, although
well known and obvious in general, had never been applied to applicants'
novel compounds before. In Ex parte Bondiou, 132 USPQ 356
(Bd. App. 1961) a U.S. application claiming foreign priority had
been mistranslated (i.e., 4 days had been translated to 4 hours),
but the error was not apparent upon reading the original U.S. application.
The Board held that the amendment introduced prohibited new matter
since the error was not apparent on its face. Even an affidavit showing
that the priority document had been mistranslated was not sufficient
to avoid the new matter holding.
G. INHERENT
FUNCTION, THEORY OR ADVANTAGE - MPEP 2163.07
By disclosing
in a patent application a device that inherently performs a function,
operates according to a theory, or has an advantage, a patent application
necessarily discloses that function, theory or advantage even though
it says nothing explicit concerning it. The application may later be
amended to recite the function, theory or advantage without introducing
prohibited new matter. In re Reynolds, 443 F.2d 384, 170 USPQ
94 (CCPA 1971) (relationships clearly depicted in the drawings provided
sufficient disclosure to support claims). In In re Smythe, 480
F.2d 1376, 178 USPQ 279 (CCPA 1973), the court found that the described
properties and functions of the "air or other gas" set forth in the
specification would suggest to a person skilled in the art that the
invention included the use of "an inert fluid" broadly.
H. INCORPORATION
BY REFERENCE - MPEP 608.01(p), 2163.07(b)
The actual
text of material which was incorporated into the specification as originally
filed by reference to another document may be inserted into the specification.
Essential
material (i.e., material necessary to support the claims) may be incorporated
by reference to:
- A U.S. patent
- A pending U.S. application
Essential
material may not be incorporated by reference to:
- Foreign patents
- Non-patent publications
- A patent or application which itself incorporates essential material
by reference
- A foreign application
In re
Fouche, 169 USPQ 429 (CCPA 1971) - gives guidelines on when an
applicant may fill in a Serial No. ______________ left blank in a
specification as originally filed.
If improper
reference is made (e.g., to a foreign patent), applicant is required
to amend the
specification
to specifically include material improperly referenced AND the amendment
must be accompanied by an affidavit or declaration executed by the
applicant, attorney or agent stating that the amendatory material consists
of the same material incorporated by reference in the referencing application.
See the three Hawkins cases cited in MPEP 608.01(p), e.g. In
re Hawkins, 486 F.2d 569, 179 USPQ 157 (CCPA 1993).
Compare Quaker
City Gear Works Inc. v. Skil Corporation, 223 USPQ 1161 (Fed.
1984) wherein
reference to a helical wheel gear made according to "German Industrial
Standard 45800 draft September 1963," was held to be improper (does
not comply with 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, enablement requirement)
because incorporation by reference is not permissible where material
necessary for an adequate disclosure is unavailable to the public.
Patentee was unable to produce a copy of the referenced document.
"[M]ere reference to
another application, or patent or publication is not an incorporation of
anything therein into the application containing such reference for
the purposes of the disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. 112." In re
de Seversky, 474 F.2d 671 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (emphasis
in original).
I. CHANGES
TO THE SCOPE OF THE CLAIMS - MPEP 2163.05
The issues
of new matter and failure to meet the written description requirement
of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, commonly arise when the claims are
changed after filing to either broaden or narrow the breadth of the
claim limitations, or to alter a numerical range limitation.
J. BROADENING
CLAIMS
In In
re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 10 USPQ2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the
benefit of foreign priority was denied because claims in the U.S.
application were not supported in the foreign priority application.
In the claims of the U.S. application, chemical compounds representing
antibiotics were generically claimed via reference to a structure
with varying moieties and were also claimed subgenerically in a Markush
format. The foreign application disclosed only two of the species
presented in the broad generic claim and in the 21 compounds listed
in the Markush claims. The court concluded that the additional subject
matter in the U.S. application was not adequately described in the
foreign document.
K. NARROWING
OR SUBGENERIC CLAIMS
The introduction
of claim changes which involve narrowing the claims by introducing
elements or limitations which are not supported by the as-filed disclosure
is a violation of the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C.
112, first paragraph. Ex parte Ohshiro, 14 USPQ2d 1750 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (The Board affirmed the rejection under
35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, of claims to an internal combustion
engine which recited "at least one of said piston and said cylinder
(head) having a recessed channel" because the application which disclosed
a cylinder head with a recessed channel and a piston without a recessed
channel did not specifically disclose the "species" of a channeled
piston.); Ex parte Klager, 132 USPQ 206 (Bd. App. 1959) (The
Board held that a disclosure of 1-halo-1-nitroethylene was not an adequate
description of 1-chloro-1-nitroethylene because "an applicant cannot
include and claim a specific thing not originally described, merely
because it comes within the scope of the genus before disclosed." 132
USPQ at 206.).
Recitation
of an undisclosed species may violate the description requirement,
however a change involving subgeneric terminology may or may not be
acceptable. See, e.g., In re Welstead, 463 F.2d, 174
USPQ 449 (CCPA 1972) (specification did not contain a description of
the subgenus or descriptions of species thereof amounting, in the aggregate,
to a description of the subgenus); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967,
169 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1971) (a generic disclosure and a single example
which inherently disclosed a molecular weight ratio of 2.6 did not
provide support for a subgeneric molecular weight ratio range of 2.0
to 3.0). Subgeneric language (intermediate scope) may be supported
by broad generic language coupled with descriptions supportive of the
limited genus claimed. In re Johnson, 194 USPQ 187 (CCPA 1977)
(Appellant lost an interference as to species within a generic claim,
and thereafter filed an application directed to subgeneric claims which
excluded the subject matter of the lost count. The court held that
the appellant was entitled to the filing date of the grandparent application
because "the specification, having described the whole, necessarily
described the part remaining." 194 USPQ at 196. The court distinguished Welstead and Lukach stating
that "appellants' grandparent application contains a broad and complete
generic disclosure, coupled with extensive examples fully supportive
of the limited genus now claimed" and the "grandparent application
clearly describes the genus and the two classes of polymer materials
excluded therefrom." Id.).
Each case
must be decided on its own facts in terms of what is reasonably communicated
to those skilled in the art. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520,
222 USPQ 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
L. RANGE
LIMITATIONS
With respect
to changing numerical range limitations, the analysis must take into
account which ranges one skilled in the art would consider inherently
supported by the discussion in the original disclosure. In the decision
in In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976), the
ranges described in the original specification included a range of "25%-
60%" and specific examples of "36%" and "50%." A corresponding new
claim limitation to "at least 35%" did not meet the description requirement
because the phrase "at least" had no upper limit and caused the claim
to read literally on embodiments outside the "25% to 60%" range, however
a limitation to "between 35% and 60%" did meet the description requirement.
See also In
re Blaser, 194 USPQ 122 (CCPA 1977) wherein the parent specification
disclosed that water in an amount up to 1.6 mols must be present
to practice the invention, and exemplified the use of 1.2 and 1.5
mols of water. Claims setting forth a range of 0.6 to 1.6 mols of
water were not entitled to the filing date of the parent application. "That
a person skilled in the art . . . might proceed to run a series of
experiments and derive a lower limit of 0.6 mols is not a sufficient
indication to that person that 0.6 is described as a parameter of
appellants' process." 194 USPQ at 125. However, the parent application
did adequately describe claimed ranges of 1.2 to 1.5 and 1.2 to 1.6
mols of water. Furthermore, disclosure of a temperature range of
60oC to 200 oC and specific disclosure of heating
to 80 oC was sufficient description for a claim containing
a range of 80 oC to 200 oC.
M. MECHANISMS
OLD IN THE ART
In re
Chaplin, 168 F.2d 85, 77 USPQ 601 (CCPA 1948) - Amendment citing
issued patent numbers to show "These mechanisms are not shown as
they are well known in the art" would not be considered new matter
provided the patents disclosed mechanisms old in the art.
INTERRELATIONSHIP
WITH DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT (35 U.S.C. 112, 1ST PARAGRAPH) - MPEP
2163.06:
If new subject
matter is added to the disclosure, whether it be in the abstract, the
specification, or the drawings, the examiner should object to the introduction
of new matter under 35 U.S.C. 132 or 251 as appropriate, and require
applicant to cancel the new matter. If new matter is added to the claims,
the examiner should reject the claims under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph
- written description requirement. In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d
1212, 211 USPQ 323 (CCPA 1981). In an instance in which the claims
have not been amended, per se, but the specification has been
amended to add new matter, a rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C.
112, first paragraph should be made whenever any of the claim limitations
are affected by the added material.
N. CLAIMED
SUBJECT MATTER NOT DISCLOSED IN REMAINDER OF THE SPECIFICATION
The claims
as filed in the original specification are part of the disclosure and
therefore, if an application as originally filed contains a claim disclosing
material not disclosed in the remainder of the specification, the applicant
may amend the specification to include the claimed subject matter. In
re Benno, 768 F.2d 1340, 226 USPQ 683 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Form paragraph
7.44 may be used where originally claimed subject matter lacks proper
antecedent basis in the specification.
O. BURDEN
OF PROOF
PTO has
initial burden of presenting evidence or reasons why persons skilled
in the art would not recognize in the original disclosure a description
of the invention defined by the claims. In re Salem, 193 USPQ
513 (CCPA 1977). See the discussion of the burden of proof with regard
to the description requirement, supra.
P. PRIOR
ART REJECTIONS - MPEP 2143.03
"All words
in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that
claim against the prior art." In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 165
USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970). See also In re Miller, 169 USPQ 597
(CCPA 1971). New matter limitations must be anticipated by or obvious
over the prior art before a claim with new matter can be rejected as
being unpatentable over the prior art.
A. AGGREGATION
- MPEP 2173.05(k)
Definition:
refers to a situation where there is no cooperation between the elements
of a claim; e.g., washing machine associated with a dial telephone.
There is
limited applicability today unless it amounts to noncompliance with
the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112. In re Gustafson, 141
USPQ 585, 589 (CCPA 1964) (aggregation rejection does not comply with
spirit of 35 U.S.C. 132); Ex Parte Holden, 149 USPQ 378 (Bd.
App. 1965) (comments that CCPA suggested in Gustafson that aggregation has
no basis in 1952 Patent Act).
B. INCOMPLETE
CLAIMS - MPEP 2172.01
A claim
can be rejected as incomplete if it omits essential elements, steps
or necessary structural cooperative relationships of elements, such
omission amounting to a gap between the elements, steps or necessary
structural connections. See In re Collier, 397 F.2d 1003, 158
USPQ 266 (CCPA 1968) (Although the claim language recited intended
uses, capabilities, and structure which would result upon the performance
of future acts as indicated by the emphasized claim language, such
claim language was not a positive structural limitation on the claim.
Because appellant argued that the invention was not merely directed
to a crimpable perforated ferrule and a ground wire, the court held
that appellant failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the subject matter which appellant regarded as his invention.). Compare In
re Venezia, 530 F.2d 956, 189 USPQ 149 (CCPA 1976) (In a claim
that was directed to a kit of component parts capable of being assembled,
the Court held that limitations such as "members adapted to be positioned" and "portions
. . . being resiliently dilatable whereby said housing may be slidably
positioned" serve to precisely define present structural attributes
of interrelated component parts of the claimed assembly.).
An incomplete
claim should also be rejected under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
112 as based upon a disclosure which is not enabling. In re Mayhew,
527 F.2d 1229, 188 USPQ 356 (CCPA 1976). See MPEP § 2164.08(c).
Greater
latitude is permissible with respect to the definition in a claim of
matters not essential to novelty or operability than with respect to
matters essential thereto. Furthermore, the breadth of a claim is not
to be equated with indefiniteness. See MPEP 2173.04.
C. OLD
COMBINATION - MPEP 2173.05(j)
A claim
should not be rejected on the ground of old combination. See
MPEP 2173.05(j) for a brief history of the principle of old combination.
D. RES
JUDICATA - MPEP 706.03(w)
- Definition: a thing adjudicated.
- Policy: judicial policy designed to put an end to litigation once
an issue has been decided.
- Prerequisites
- Identity of parties in two actions - In re Szwarc, 126 USPQ
404 (CCPA 1960) .
- Issues must be the same - new issues can be raised, e.g., by:
- new affidavit evidence - In re Russell, 169 USPQ 426 (CCPA
1971); In re Herr, 153 USPQ 548 (CCPA 1967).
- different limitations in claims - In re Fisher, 166 USPQ
18 (CCPA 1970).
- Earlier decision must have been by PTO Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences or any one of the reviewing courts. In re Hitchings,
144 USPQ 637 (CCPA 1965) held that a res judicata rejection
is not applicable to an unappealed final rejection.
- No opportunity for further court review of the earlier decision.
- Other Considerations
- Should be accompanied by rejection on prior art or other appropriate
grounds.
- Timely filing of continuing case does not preclude res judicata rejection.
- Doctrine should not be used to:
- refuse claims which are otherwise patentable - In re Craig,
162 USPQ 157 (CCPA 1969).
- force allowance of claims that do not comply with the statutes
- In re Borkowski, 184 USPQ 29, 33 (CCPA 1975) (The Patent
Office must have the flexibility to reconsider and correct prior
decisions that it may find to have been in error."); In re Riddle,
169 USPQ 45 (CCPA 1975)(Allowance of a claim by an examiner in
a patent is not a bar to therejection of a pending claim to substantially
the same invention on substantially the same art considered in
the patent prosecution.)
E. MULTIPLICITY
- 37 CFR 1.75(b); MPEP 2173.05(n)
A. Unreasonable
number of claims in view of:
- Nature and scope of invention
- State of the art
B. Extremely
Limited Applicability
1. The earlier
views of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on multiplicity were
set forth in In re Chandler, 45 CCPA 911, 117 USPQ 361 (1958)
and In re Chandler, 50 CCPA 1422, 138 USPQ 138 (1963) (Applicants
latitude in stating their claims in regard to number and phraseology
employed "should not be extended to sanction that degree of repetition
and multiplicity which beclouds definition in a maze of confusion." 138
USPQ at 148.).
2. These
views have been somewhat revised by its views in In re Flint,
411 F.2d 1353, 162 USPQ 228 (CCPA 1969) ("The [ 42 ] claims differed
from one another and we have no difficulty in understanding the scope
of protection. Nor is it clear, on this record, that the examiner or
board was confused by the presentation of claims in this case or that
the public will be." 162 USPQ at 231) and In re Wakefield, 422
F.2d 897, 164 USPQ 636 (CCPA 1970) ("Examination of forty claims in
a single application may be tedious work, but this is no reason for
saying that the invention is obscured by the large number of claims.
We note that the claims were clear enough for the examiner to apply
references against all of them in his first action." 164 USPQ at 639.).
The court in Wakefield also noted "there is no statutory authority
for rejecting claims as being 'unnecessary.' " Id.
C. If rejection
is made:
- basis is 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph or 37 CFR 1.75(b).
- all claims should be included.
- applicant should be required to select a reasonable number (examiner
stipulates) for prosecution on merits.
- SSP of two months if only rejection made in action.
F. PROLIX
- MPEP 2173.05(m)
- Definition: long recitations of unimportant details which hide or
obscure invention.
- Test should be same as applied in metes and bounds requirement of
35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
- Picture claim, in itself, is insufficient justification for allowance
of claim - MPEP 706.
G. NONSTATUTORY
OR OMNIBUS CLAIM - MPEP 2173.05(r)
- Example: A device substantially as shown and described.
- Format of rejection: Rejection is based on 35 U.S.C. 112, second
paragraph.
- If case otherwise allowable, cancel by Examiner's Amendment - MPEP
1302.04(b).
Markush
Group - Definition - Ex Parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126 (Comm'r
Pat. 1924) - The term "Markush" as applied to claims denotes a claim
wherein a substance, substitute, agent, reactant, or material therein
is recited as being selected from the group consisting of certain specified
materials - e.g. "a material selected from the group consisting of
A, B, C and D." This type of expression was devised to meet the situation
presented by chemical cases for conveniently expressing a broad claim
involving of several chemical compounds which were not associated as
a recognized group but yet had a common property that rendered them
equivalent in the particular situation involved. A Markush group often
appears in a claim containing a structural formula - e.g. a 5-membered
ring structure containing two heterocyclic radicals wherein one heterocyclic
radical is N and the other is X wherein X is a bivalent radical selected
from the group consisting of 0,S and NH. In assessing the propriety
of this grouping, the complete compounds presented in the structural
formula rather than the substitutes per se must be considered. In other
words, the question for consideration is not whether "O, S and NH" constitutes
a proper group, but whether the "group consisting of oxazoles, thiazoles
and imidazoles" is proper. Application of prior art - Prior art which
teaches or suggests all the limitations of a claim as to only one member
of a Markush group is sufficient to render the claim unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. 102 or 103. If applicant limits the scope of a Markush group
to avoid a reference, in order for the examiner to maintain an obviousness
rejection over that reference, the equivalency of the members of the
Markush group must be recognized in the prior art; the equivalency
cannot be based on applicant's disclosure or the mere fact that the
components at issue are functional equivalents. In re Ruff,
256 F.2d 560, 118 USPQ 340 (CCPA 1958). See also MPEP 2144.06. Markush
Group Containing Independent and Distinct Inventions - 35 U.S.C. 121,
MPEP 802.01, 803.02 - A claim containing a Markush group is considered
to be directed to independent and distinct inventions where two or
more of the members of the Markush group are so unrelated and diverse
that a prior art reference anticipating the claim with respect to the
invention embracing one of the members would not render the claim obvious
under 35 U.S.C. 103 with regard to the invention embracing other member(s).
MPEP 803.02.
A. HISTORY
OF TREATMENT OF MARKUSH CLAIMS
At one time,
claims written in Markush style were rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112,
paragraph one, if they contained non-elected species. Before that,
Markush-type claims were held withdrawn from consideration. The withdrawal
was petitionable since there was no rejection. Just a few years ago,
a Markush claim with non-elected species was considered "improper" and
was rejected under 35 U.S.C. 121 for improper misjoinder of invention
because such a claim embraced more than one independent and distinct
invention. However, In re Weber, 198 USPQ 328 (CCPA 1978) and In
re Haas, 198 USPQ 334 (CCPA 1978) held that 35 U.S.C. 121 does
not provide a basis for the rejection of claims.
B. PRESENT
TREATMENT OF MARKUSH CLAIMS
In view
of the decision in In re Harnisch, 206 USPQ 300 (CCPA 1980),
a claim should not be rejected as claiming an "improper" Markush group
unless the examiner can show that the subject matter of the claim lacks
unity of invention. Broadly, unity of invention exists where compounds
included within a Markush group (1) share a common utility and (2)
share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential
to that utility. A claim having a Markush group which embraces compounds
which do not have a common utility (even in the generic sense) or do
not possess a commonly patentable nucleus or a single structural similarity
would be subject to a rejection as being based on an improper Markush
group. For the great majority of cases which are not as extreme, the
examiner will obtain what guidance can be gleaned from decisions which
have affirmed a rejection of claims having improper Markush groups
such as In re Swenson, 132 F.2d 336, 56 USPQ 180 (CCPA 1942); In
re Ruzicka, 150 F.2d 550, 66 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1945); and In re Winnek,
160 F.2d 572, 73 USPQ 225 (CCPA 1947), and those decisions where a
rejection of claims as being drawn to improper Markush groups have
been reversed such as In re Jones, 162 F.2d 479, 74 USPQ 149
(CCPA 1947); In re Schechter, 205 F.2d 185, 98 USPQ 144 (CCPA
1953); Ex parte Brouard, 201 USPQ 538 (Bd. Appeal 1976); and In
re Harnisch, supra, to determine whether such a rejection is appropriate
in any particular case.
C. PRACTICE
In each
case where a claim is presented containing a Markush group, and where
the subject matter of that claim is considered to contain independent
and distinct inventions within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 121, the examiner
may make a requirement for restriction unless the members of the Markush
group are sufficiently few in number or so closely related that a search
and examination of the entire claim can be made without serious burden
on the examiner. In this requirement, the examiner will identify the
inventions which are considered to be independent and distinct and
require applicant to elect a single invention even though this requirement
is traversed. After applicant's election, the examiner should search
the generic claim to the extent of the elected species only, along
with all specific claims directed to the elected species. If a prior
art rejection can be made, the appropriate claims are rejected and
the other species are held non-elected. Prosecution continues as in
any other application. If, however, a prior art rejection cannot be
made, the search is extended to the non-elected species to the extent
necessary to determine patentability (the examiner may request non-examining
time known as Markush time for the additional search time).
If prior art is found to reject a non-elected species, a rejection
is made while holding all non-examined species withdrawn from consideration.
If, after the rejection of an examined species, the applicant amends
the generic claim to delete the elected species, the search must be
extended to the extent that a non-elected species can be rejected over
prior art. If prior art is found for any non-elected species after
this amendment, a final rejection can be made. Amendments submitted
after final rejection further restricting the scope of the claim may
be denied entry as raising new issues which would require further consideration
and/or search.
A. WORDS
AND PHRASES BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AND PLAIN MEANING
- MPEP 2111 - 2111.01:
Words in
claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification where the patent has not yet issued and the
applicant has an opportunity to change them. In re Finsterwalder,
436 F.2d 1028, 168 USPQ 530 (1971). The interpretation must be reasonable,
since words or terms have to be given the meaning called for by the
specification of which they form a part. In re Rovka, 490 F.2d
981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1974). But, a specification may not distort
a term to mean something that it does not mean. In re Hill,
161 F.2d 367, 73 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1947). Words in a claim which have
not been clearly defined in the specification must be given their plain
meaning. In re Zletz 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
B. TRANSITIONAL
PHRASES - MPEP 2111.03
The term comprising, which
is synonymous with including, containing, or characterized
by, is inclusive or open-ended and permits the inclusion of unrecited
additional steps, elements, or materials. In re Baxter, 656
F.2d 679, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981); Ex parte Davis, 80
USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) ("comprising" leaves "the claim open
for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients even in major amounts").
The term consisting of excludes any element, step, or ingredient
not specified in the claim. In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520,
11 USPQ 225 (CCPA 1931); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd.
App. 1948) ("consisting of" defined as "closing the claim to the inclusion
of materials other than those recited except for impurities ordinarily
associated therewith."). The term consisting essentially of limits
the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps "and those
that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s)" of
the claimed invention. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-552, 190
USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976)(emphasis in original). See also Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317
F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963). When an applicant contends that
additional steps or materials in the prior art are excluded by the
recitation of "consisting essentially of," applicant has the burden
of showing that the introduction of additional steps or components
would materially change the characteristics of applicant's invention. In
re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). See also Ex
parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1989) ("consisting essentially of" may be used in the context of processes).
C. RELATIVE
TERMINOLOGY - MPEP 2173.05(b)
About permits
some tolerance. At least about 10% was held to be anticipated by a
teaching of a content not to exceed about 8%. In re Ayers, 154
F.2d 182, 69 USPQ 109 (CCPA 1946). A pressure limitation of 2-15 pounds
per square inch was held to be readable on a reference which taught
a pressure "of the order of about 15 pounds to the square inch." In
re Erickson, 343 F.2d 778, 145 USPQ 207 (CCPA 1965). Though the
term commercial scale is proper under 35 U.S.C. 112, second
paragraph, it is clear that the mere scaling up of a prior art process
capable of being scaled up would not establish patentability in a claim
to an old process so scaled. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048,
189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976) While generally and other similar
words are sometimes construed liberally to avoid unduly restricting
a patent claim, the imprecision of such a term cannot be allowed to
negate the meaning of the words it modifies. Thus, generally planar in
a claim was intended to allow for irregular deviations from perfectly
flat surface and not to broaden planar to encompass distinctly arcuate
surfaces. Arvin Industries v. Berns Air King Corp., 525 F.2d
182, 188 USPQ 49 (7th Cir. 1975). The terms thin and wide are
relative to the extent of being definitive only in regard to a particular
object referred to. It is necessary to look to the specification in
which such terms arise to determine their meaning. In re Miles,
463 F.2d 1401, 175 USPQ 33 (CCPA 1972). The term "or like material" in
the context of the limitation "coke, brick, or like material" was held
to render the claim indefinite since it was not clear how the materials
other than coke or brick had to resemble the two specified materials
to satisfy the limitations of the claim. Ex parte Caldwell,
1906 C.D. 58 (Comm'r Pat. 1906).
D. NUMERICAL
RANGES AND AMOUNTS LIMITATIONS - MPEP 2173.05(c)
The common
phrase "an effective amount" may or may not be indefinite. The proper
test is whether or not one skilled in the art could determine specific
values for the amount based on the disclosure. See In re Mattison,
509 F.2d 563, 184 USPQ 484 (CCPA 1975). The phrase "an effective amount
. . . for growth stimulation" was held to be definite where the amount
was not critical and those skilled in the art would be able to determine
from the written disclosure, including the examples, what an effective
amount is. In re Halleck, 422 F.2d 911, 164 USPQ 647 (CCPA 1970).
The phrase "an effective amount" has been held to be indefinite when
the claim fails to state the function which is to be achieved. In
re Fredericksen, 213 F.2d 547, 102 USPQ 35 (CCPA 1954); In re
Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 186 USPQ 11, 20 (CCPA 1975)("an effective
amount of a germicide suitable for use in oral hygiene" complied with
35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph). The more recent cases have tended
to accept a limitation such as "an effective amount" as being definite
when read in light of the supporting disclosure and in the absence
of any prior art which would give rise to uncertainty about the scope
of the claim. In Ex parte Skuballa, 12 USPQ2d 1570 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Inter. 1989), the Board held that a pharmaceutical composition
claim which recited an "effective amount of a compound of claim 1" without
stating the function to be achieved was definite, particularly when
read in light of the supporting disclosure which provided guidelines
as to the intended utilities and how the uses could be effected. Predominantly means
at least 50%. In re Thomas, 178 F.2d 412, 84 USPQ 132 (CCPA
1949). Up to includes 0 as a lower limit. In re Mochel,
470 F.2d 638, 176 USPQ 194 (CCPA 1974). The recitation of "a moisture
content of not more than 70% by weight" reads on dry material or material
containing no more moisture than is normally taken up from the atmosphere. Ex
parte Khusid, 174 USPQ 59 (Bd. App. 1971).
E. OTHER
TERMS
The term integral was
held not to be limited to a fabrication of the parts from a single
piece of metal, but was inclusive of other means for maintaining the
parts fixed together as a single unit. In re Larson, 340 F.2d
965, 144 USPQ 347 (CCPA 1965). "Integral" is sufficiently broad to
embrace constructions united by such means as fastening and welding. In
re Hotte, 475 F.2d 644, 177 USPQ 326 (CCPA 1973). The term separate does
not necessarily proscribe all connection between parts. In re Ruegg,
165 USPQ 711 (CCPA 1970). Invention - This term is used without
any implication of patentability and only to refer to the thing invented
regardless of its patentability. In re Borah, 354 F.2d 1009,
148 USPQ 213 (CCPA 1966). The recitation of "means requiring no other
input" than specific means does not mean that no other input can exist,
but only that no other input is needed or required. Stansbury v.
Bond, 482 F.2d 968, 179 USPQ 88 (CCPA 1973). Statement in patent
that extraction is preferably carried out in successive stages
implies that process may be carried out without separating the stages. In
re Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491, 168 USPQ 466 (CCPA 1971).
Relevant
MPEP Sections: MPEP 2113, 2173.05(p)
Product
claims may include process steps to wholly or partially define the
claimed product. In re Luck, 476 F.2d 650, 177 USPQ 523 (CCPA
1973). The fact that it is necessary for an applicant to describe his
product in product-by-process terms does not prevent the applicant
from presenting claims of varying scope. Ex parte Pantzer, 176
USPQ 141 (Bd. App. 1972).
A. LIMITATIONS:
Product-by-process
type of claims do not inherently conflict with the second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. 112, In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013, 156 USPQ 143
(CCPA 1967), but these claims must particularly point out and distinctly
claim the product or genus of products for which protection is sought. In
re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 173 USPQ 685 (CCPA 1972).
B.
PATENTABILITY:
The invention
defined in a product-by-process claim is a product, not a process. In
re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 149 USPQ 55 (CCPA 1966). It
is the patentability of the product claimed and NOT of the recited
process steps which must be established. In re Brown, 459 F.2d
531, 173 USPQ 685 (CCPA 1972); In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d, 191
USPQ (CCPA 1976) . A comparison of the recited process with the prior
art processes does NOT serve to resolve the issue concerning the patentability
of the product. In re Fessman, 489 F.2d 742, 180 USPQ 324 (CCPA
1974). Whether a product is patentable depends on whether it is known
in the art or it is obvious, and is not governed by whether the process
by which it is made is patentable. In re Rlug, 333 F.2d 905,
142 USPQ 161 (CCPA 1964). In an ex parte case, product-by-process
claims are NOT construed as being limited to the product formed by
the specific process recited. In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190
USPQ 15, f.n.3 (CCPA 1976). However, to the extent that the process
limitations distinguish the product over the prior art, they must be
given the same consideration and weight in assessing the differences
between the claimed subject matter and the prior art Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 US 1, 148 USPQ 523 (1973). That some of the products
covered by applicant's claims may not be disclosed or suggested by
the prior art is NOT relevant to patentability, where the claims embrace
other subject matter completely disclosed by the prior art. In re
Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 191 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1976).
C.
BURDEN OF PROOF:
PTO "bears
a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness
for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature" than
would be the case when a product is claimed in the more conventional
fashion. In re Fessman, 489 F.2d 742, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA
1974). When the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears
to be either identical with or only slightly different than a product
claimed in a product-by-process claim, the burden is on the applicant
to present evidence from which the examiner could reasonably conclude
that the claimed product is patentably distinct from the product of
the prior art. In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 173 USPQ 685 (CCPA
1972); In re Fessman, 489 F.2d 742, 180 USPQ 323 (CCPA 1974). In
re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 195 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This burden
is NOT discharged solely because the product was derived from a process
not known to the prior art. In re Fessman, 489 F.2d 742, 180
USPQ 324 (CCPA 1974). In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 195
(Fed. Cir. 1983) - Where a product-by-process claim is rejected over
a prior art product that appears to be identical, although produced
by a different process, the burden is upon the applicants to come forward
with evidence establishing an unobvious difference between the claimed
product and the prior art product. In re Thorpe, 227 USPQ 964
(Fed. Cir. 1985) - The practice and law related to product-by-process
claims has developed in response to the need to enable an applicant
to claim an otherwise patentable product that resists definition by
other than the process by which it is made. For this reason, even though
product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process,
determination of patentability is based on the product itself. Once
the PTO establishes a prima facie case that the claimed product
and prior art product are identical or not patentably distinct, the
burden shifts to applicant to prove that the prior art products do
not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of the claimed
product.
D.
STATUTORY BASIS FOR REJECTION:
When the
prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either
identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in
a product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either
35 U.S.C. 102 or 35 U.S.C. 103 is eminently fair and acceptable. PTO
is not equipped to make and then compare products. In re Brown,
459 F.2d 531, 173 USPQ 685 (CCPA 1972).
A. Definition:
an attempt to define something by what it does rather than by what
it is (as evidenced by specific structure or material, e.g.)
B. Permitted
- specifically authorized by paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. 112 in defining
an element of a combination
C. Burden
of Proof - Inherency
Where applicant
claims subject matter in terms of a function, property or characteristic
and the subject matter of the prior art appears to be the same as that
of the claim but the function is not explicitly disclosed by the reference,
the examiner may make a rejection under both 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103,
expressed as a 35 U.S.C. 102 / 103 rejection. "There is nothing inconsistent
in concurrent rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 and for
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102." In re Best, 195 USPQ 430,
433 (CCPA 1977).
"In relying
upon the theory of inherency, the examiner must provide a basis in
fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination
that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows
from the teachings of the applied prior art." Ex parte Levy,
17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (emphasis in
original) (The Board reversed the examiner's rejection because the
examiner did not provide objective evidence or cogent technical reasoning
to support the conclusion of inherency.).
Once the
examiner presents evidence or reasoning tending to show inherency,
the burden shifts to the applicant to show an unobvious difference. "[T]he
PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do
not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his [or
her] claimed product. . . . Whether the rejection is based on 'inherency'
under 35 U.S.C. 102, on 'prima facie obviousness' under 35
U.S.C. 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same." The
burden of proof is similar to that required with respect to product-by-process
claims. In re Fitzgerald , 205 USPQ 594, 596 (CCPA 1980) (quoting In
re Brown, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972)); In re Swinehart,
439 F.2d 210, 169 USPQ 226, 229 (CCPA 1971) ("[W]here the Patent Office
has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical
for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact,
be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority
to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to
be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on."); In
re Fisher, 166 USPQ 18, 23 (CCPA 1970) (where claims contain new
terminology, the PTO may require comparative evidence when there is
reason to believe that the prior art anticipates or renders obvious
the claimed subject matter). See also In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d
660, 169 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1971) (applicant failed to show that the prior
art parachute did not inherently possess the claimed functional limitations
of sequentially opening and gradually decelerating); In re Echerd,
176 USPQ 321 (CCPA 1973) (evidence showed that prior art material did
not possess the claimed flexibility, wet strength, and latent adhesive
characteristics).
See MPEP
2112-2112.02 for a general discussion of the requirements of rejections
based on inherency. See MPEP 2183-2184 for a discussion of the burden
of proof with regard to proving or disproving the equivalence of prior
art elements with claimed means plus function limitations.
- Definition: An introductory part of the claim which appears before
a recitation of the steps in a process, the elements of a machine or
manufacture, or the ingredients of a composition.
- Significance is determined on basis of the facts in each case - In
re Van Lint, 148 USPQ 285 (CCPA 1966)
- Weight of Preamble
- General Rule
The preamble is not given the effect of a limitation unless it breathes
life and meaning into the claim. In order to limit the claim, the preamble
must be "essential to point out the invention defined by the claim." Kropa
v. Robie, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951) (discussed below). In claims
directed to articles and apparatus, any phraseology in the preamble
that limits the structure of that article or apparatus must be given
weight. In re Stencel, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987). On the
other hand, a preamble is generally not accorded any patentable weight
where it merely recites the purpose of a process or the intended use
of a structure, and where the body of the claim does not depend on
the preamble for completeness but, instead, the process steps or structural
limitations are able to stand alone.In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67,
190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976); Kropa v. Robie, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA
1951).
In In
re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976), the claim
preamble set forth "A process for preparing foods and drinks
sweetened mildly, and protected against discoloration, Streckler's
reaction, and moisture absorption." The body of the claim recited
two steps directed to the formation of high purity maltose and
a third step of adding the maltose to foods and drinks as a sweetener.
The court held that the preamble was only directed to the purpose
of the process, and the steps could stand alone and did not depend
on the preamble for completeness.
In Kropa
v. Robie, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951), a preamble reciting "An
abrasive article" was deemed essential to point out the invention
defined by claims to an article comprising abrasive grains and
a hardened binder and the process of making it. The court said
that "it is only by that phrase that it can be known that the
subject matter defined by the claims is comprised as an abrasive
article. Every union of substances capable inter alia of
use as abrasive grains and a binder is not an 'abrasive article.'" Id.
at 481. Therefore, the preamble served to further define the
structure of the article produced.
2. Composition
claims
When
the claim is directed to a product, the preamble is generally nonlimiting
if the body of the claim is directed to an old composition and
the preamble merely recites a property inherent in the old composition. Kropa
v. Robie, 88 USPQ 478, 480 - 81 (CCPA 1951) (discussed above).
See also In re Duva, 156 USPQ 90 (CCPA 1967) (preamble "As
a composition for chemically depositing gold" given patentable
weight); In re Hack, 114 USPQ 161 (CCPA 1957) (preamble "a
brazing alloy" not given patentable weight).
3. Intended
use resulting in structural or manipulative difference
The
intended use set forth in the preamble may further limit the claim
if it does more than merely state the purpose or intended use.
In apparatus,
article, and composition claims, the intended use must result in
a structural difference between the claimed invention and the prior
art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from
the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing
the intended use, then it meets the claim. See, e.g., In
re Casey, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967) (the manner or method in
which a machine is used is not germane to the issue of the patentability
of the machine itself); In re Wertheim, 191 USPQ 90, 102
(CCPA 1976) (process limitations in the preamble may serve to distinguish
the subject matter of apparatus claims from the prior art; in this
case claims directed to apparatus "for carrying out the process
in claim 6" were not held to be limited by the process); In
re Finsterwalder, 168 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1971) (Appellant claimed
apparatus "which may be used in any method of construction to which
it is reasonably adaptable. Thus, the fact that appellant discloses
the apparatus as advantageous in the 'free cantilever' method of
construction will not save the claims if the apparatus defined
thereby would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
the bridge-construction art intending to use it in a somewhat different
construction method." 168
USPQ at 534.).
In a
claim drawn to a process, the intended use must result in a manipulative
difference as compared to the prior art. In re Otto, 136
USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963) (The claims were directed to a core member
for hair curlers and a process of making a core member for hair
curlers. Court held that the intended use of hair curling was of
no significance to the structure and process of making the structure.).
- Jepson Claims - 37 CFR 1.75(e)
- Elements set forth in preamble are part of the claimed combination
- MPEP 608.01(m)
- Wells Mfg. Co. v. Littlefuse Inc., 192 USPQ 256 (7th Cir.
1976) (discussion of history and interpretation of Jepson claims).
- Preamble elements in Jepson-type claim are impliedly admitted to
be old in the art - but only an implied admission - In re Ehrreich,
200 USPQ 504, 510 (CCPA 1979). Here none of art relied on by examiner
showed combination in preamble. See also MPEP 2129.
A. PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS
CLAIMS - MPEP 2173.05(p):
There are
many situations where claims are permissively drafted to include a
reference to more than one statutory class of invention. A product-by-process
claim, which is a product claim that defines the claimed product in
terms of the process by which it is made, is proper. In re Moeller,
117 F.2d 565, 48 USPQ 542 (CCPA 1941); In re Luck, 177 USPQ
523 (CCPA 1973); In re Steppan, 156 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1967); and In
re Pilkington, 162 USPQ 145 (CCPA 1969). A claim to a device, apparatus,
manufacture or composition of matter may contain a reference to the
process in which it is intended to be used without being objectionable
under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, so long as it is clear that
the claim is directed to the product and not the process.
B. REFERENCE
TO LIMITATIONS IN ANOTHER CLAIM - MPEP 2173.05(f):
A claim
which makes reference to a preceding claim to define a limitation is
an acceptable claim construction which should not necessarily be rejected
as improper or confusing under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. For
example, claims which read: "The product produced by the method of
claim 1." or "A method of producing ethanol comprising contacting amylose
with the culture of claim 1 under the following conditions ....." are
not indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, merely because
of the reference to another claim. See also Ex parte Porter,
25 USPQ2d 1144 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) where reference to "the
nozzle of claim 7" in a method claim was held to comply with 35 U.S.C.
112, second paragraph. However, where the format of making reference
to limitations recited in another claim results in confusion, then
a rejection would be proper under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
C. PRODUCT
AND PROCESS IN THE SAME CLAIM - MPEP 2173.05(p)
A single
claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of using
the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.
In Ex parte Lyell, 17 USPQ2d 1548 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter.
1990), a claim directed to an automatic transmission workstand and
the method steps of using it was held to be ambiguous and properly
rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. Such claims should
also be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 based on the theory that the claim
is directed to neither a "process" nor a "machine," but rather embraces
or overlaps two different statutory classes of invention set forth
in 35 U.S.C. 101 which is drafted so as to set forth the statutory
classes of invention in the alternative only. Id. at 1551. |
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