1. HAZMAT Security Risks and Technology Solutions
This synthesis document provides an overview of the Field Operational Test (FOT) and the processes, analytical frameworks and methods used to evaluate the Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Safety and Security Technology FOT. Also described are the approaches to assessing the operational efficiency and security benefits and costs, and findings and conclusions regarding potential benefits, costs, market potential, and deployment issues associated with the test technologies. Detailed information on the evaluation is contained within the reference Volume III: Evaluation Final Report Detail, Sections 1–5.
1.1 Project Context
The HAZMAT movement chain presents an attractive target for terrorists due to multiple points of vulnerability that exist at manufacturing facilities, shippers, motor carriers, and shipment receivers. Hazardous materials are an especially sought after target since the nature of the cargo serves as a dangerous and ready-made weapon. Several hundred thousand HAZMAT shipments originate, travel en route, and are received every day, so the exposure to these vulnerabilities is very broad. Manufacturers and shippers may become terrorist targets due to potential HAZMAT production or storage at their facilities.
Motor carriers control the HAZMAT shipment en route between shipper and receiver. Since they transport 95 percent of hazardous materials, motor carriers are potentially targets for direct attack or hijacking for use as a weapon during en-route HAZMAT movements.
The immediate damage from a terrorist attack could be severe in terms of both human and economic losses. Human losses could include both injuries and death, with up to 10,000 casualties predicted under the most severe scenario considered in this study.
Economic losses could also be substantial. These losses would accrue most immediately to the affected shipper, motor carrier, receiver, and surrounding community. However, significant and perhaps even greater secondary economic impacts also may occur. These impacts may include disruption of the transportation industry; continuing business restrictions on HAZMAT manufacturers; potential damage to financial markets; and demoralization of the general public.
Myriad technology products are commercially available that are designed to enhance HAZMAT and transport security by making HAZMAT cargo more secure, less desirable to terrorists, and by reducing the consequences of intentional and non-intentional releases. Many of these technologies were tested and evaluated during the course of this HAZMAT FOT.
1.2 Response to Increased National Security Threats
The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 and the ongoing war on terrorism have heightened the level of concern from Federal government officials and the transportation industry regarding the secure transport of hazardous materials. Security concerns focus on the potential of HAZMAT shipments as targets for terrorists. HAZMAT shipments through intermodal connectors, modes, and facilities are all attractive targets for terrorists, and pose a much greater concern to public safety than most other shipment types. HAZMAT shipments, especially fuels and chemicals, are especially attractive targets due to the multiple points of vulnerability. These vulnerabilities exist at shipper, motor carrier, and shipment recipient facilities, and during shipment movement en route throughout the nation's roadway infrastructure.
Numerous international and domestic incidents occurred over the past several years that demonstrate the real threat potential that HAZMAT shipments pose. For example, the following events all occurred in a 2-month period in 2002:
- March 31, 2002: A 29-year-old driver for a propane distributor drove away with a 3,000-gallon bobtail. He made a telephone threat stating that he wanted to kill President George W. Bush and that he would use the bobtail as a "3,000-lb bomb".
- April 11, 2002: A terrorist driving a truck carrying liquefied natural gas ignited his cargo in front of a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, killing 17 people, mainly German and French tourists. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the blast.
- May 16, 2002: A tractor-trailer carrying 10 tons of deadly cyanide in 96 drums was stolen after three armed men held up the vehicle north of Mexico City. Six drums were never found.
- May 2002: A fully loaded tanker truck pulled into Israel's largest fuel depot and suddenly caught fire due to an explosive charge connected to a cellular phone. The fire was extinguished, but had the truck exploded, destruction and death would have resulted.
Events such as these demonstrate the security and safety risks associated with HAZMAT shipments. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), working in close cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has attempted to proactively address public and private sector HAZMAT security concerns by identifying potential security risks related to HAZMAT transportation and proposing solutions to minimize those risks. FMCSA embarked on a program to improve HAZMAT security and safety by using regulatory measures, security assessments, and outreach efforts.
Part of this effort was to sponsor an industry competitive procurement. This led to FMCSA awarding a contract for a team led by the Battelle Memorial Institute (Battelle) (Deployment Team) to test currently existing major technologies that could offer solutions to minimize security risks of truck-based HAZMAT shipments. Supporting Deployment Team members included: QUALCOMM; the American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI); the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA); SAVI Technologies; the Biometrics Solutions Group (BSG); and the Spill Center.
To evaluate the technologies tested in this FOT, their costs, benefits, and the operational processes require to be performed, the FMCSA, supported by the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)-Joint Program Office (JPO), awarded an Independent Evaluation contract in August 2002. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) (Evaluation Team) led the Independent Evaluation for this HAZMAT FOT. The Evaluation Team also performed a key role in performing independent data collection and analysis activities for this effort.
1.3 Project Rationale
The FMCSA is actively investigating methods to improve HAZMAT security. In parallel, the private sector has developed, or is currently developing a number of technological solutions that may offer security benefits. While several of these potential technological solutions have demonstrated efficiency benefits and some limited security benefits, most are not yet in widespread usage within the HAZMAT transportation industry. As such, the need existed for a national field operational test comprising complete suites of technology to address typical, specific HAZMAT operational scenarios.
The FMCSA sponsored this national FOT to demonstrate the effectiveness of technological system solutions to enhance safety and security. The FOT and accompanying evaluation may lead to the development of policies and incentives to promote deployment of the most promising technologies throughout the HAZMAT industry.
The purpose of this evaluation is to quantify all the relative costs of the deployed components and systems, and independently assess related security and efficiency benefits. While the functionality for various technologies was considered and tested during this FOT, it was not the Evaluation Team's intent to endorse any vendors for products tested during the evaluation process.
SAIC led the Evaluation Team effort with assistance from Cambridge Systematics, Inc. (CSI). The Evaluation Team coordinated activities with the Deployment Team to obtain quantitative and qualitative test-generated data and information. This data and information was used to independently develop the benefit-cost assessments for security and operational efficiency impacts on the HAZMAT delivery chain.
