From ntia Mon Nov 14 09:07:56 1994 Received: (from ntia@localhost) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) id JAA06933; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:07:56 -0800 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:07:56 -0800 From: NTIA Virtual Conference Message-Id: <199411141707.JAA06933@virtconf.digex.net> To: avail, intellec, opnacces, privacy, redefus, standard Subject: NTIA Virtual Conference KeyNote Address WELCOMING STATEMENT FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE DAVID BARRAM Welcome to the Virtual Conference on Universal Service and Open Access to the Telecommunications Network. In hosting this conference we seek to broaden our reach beyond the physical limits of any conference room or auditorium. The NII will tear down the barriers of time and distance. This conference, like the NII itself, is meant to be inclusive and your ideas are welcome and encouraged. Your participation will help make it a success. This effort is jointly sponsored by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), as part of the Administration's National Information Infrastructure initiative. Through the NII, the Administration is focusing on the ability of computer mediated communications to enhance the life and work of every American. The NII is a harbinger of change, both economic and political, and holds great promise for the future of America. Some benefits of the NII include telecommuting, distance learning and active life-long education, remote consultations with expert medical professionals, as well as new forms of art, entertainment and culture. This conference continues the dialog started by NTIA's five field hearings, held over the past nine months in cities throughout America. Unlike the field hearings, this conference allows for a much wider participation, and more in-depth discussion on the issues. There are over 80 public access points in 25 states. With this conference we are hoping to:  Garner opinions and views on universal telecommunications service that may shape the legislative and regulatory debate.  Demonstrate how networking technology can broaden participation in the development of government policies, specifically, universal service telecommunications policy.  Illustrate the potential for using the NII to create an electronic commons.  Create a network of individuals and institutions that will continue the dialog started by the conference, once the formal sponsorship is over. This conference is an experiment in a new form of dialog among citizens and with their government. The conference is not a one- way, top down approach, it is a conversation. It holds the promise of reworking the compact between citizens and their government. I thank you once again for your participation. From jholman@ns.onramp.net Mon Nov 14 09:50:34 1994 Received: from ns.onramp.net (ns.onramp.net [199.1.11.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA09998 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:50:34 -0800 Received: from .onramp.net (dal08.onramp.net [199.1.11.108]) by ns.onramp.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) with SMTP id IAA05222 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 08:42:41 -0600 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 08:26:27 PST From: "Jimmie L. Holman" Subject: suscribe virtconf jholman@onramp.net To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov X-Mailer: Chameleon - TCP/IP for Windows by NetManage, Inc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > >You may subscribe to the privacy discussion by sending email to: > > privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu Mon Nov 14 09:53:30 1994 Received: from urvax.urich.edu (urvax.urich.edu [141.166.36.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA10168 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:53:29 -0800 Received: from UOFRLAW (uofrlaw.urich.edu) by urvax.urich.edu (PMDF V4.3-11 #7506) id <01HJGR7R93PS004K9O@urvax.urich.edu>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:45:31 -0500 (EST) Received: from UOFRLAW/MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 9:45:09 EST Received: from MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 9:44:59 EST Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:44:53 -0500 (EST) From: Jeffrey Millican Subject: RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Message-id: <43C1A6E37B3@UOFRLAW> Organization: University of Richmond X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.22 Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal As a law student, it is hard to believe that I will: 1.) attend a prestigious conference; 2.) discuss issues of privacy law with a wide diversity of scholars; 3.) attend all my scheduled classes; and 4.) go home for supper tonight. It is like an AT&T commercial with Tom Selleck except instead of saying "You Will" were saying "You ARE!" It is a real pleasure for me to be part of this. PRVACY IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMONS It will be tough to answer questions posed here for many reasons. Not the least of which is: 1.) Issues of National (US) sovereignty and security are juxtaposed against a SEAMLESS electronic network; 2.) Issues of Federalism arise over a court's jurisdiction in this environment - is it for the states or for the federal government; 3.) Issues of personal privacy - what's to stop me from getting pornography I do not want or unsolicited advertisments. First: Issues of US national sovereignty. If anyone has claim to this net it is us (US). Internet is the regulated and permitted outgrowth of the ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency NETwork). Literally, a spinoff of the Cold War, in which the Free World was victorious, the Internet moves to encompass a much larger Free World. Issues of security for all nations must be questionned, and the US must ask itself: "Shall we be the Eagle which provides its own feather?" I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with Congressional oversight. This will allow for privacy encoding to be established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. In an era of defense cuts and "rightsizing" we cannot allow for us to play "catch-up" in times of crises. Second: Whose courts, within the US, will resolve conflicts of litigatable proportions? While the Internet is clearly a federal matter, what about connected Local Area Networks or Electronic Bulletin Boards. Will the development of an "Electronic Common Law" become applicable to the "Electronic Commons?" I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction. Similar to a state long arm statute any transaction on the Internet is, for that transaction, under federal jurisdiction. Local networks will be subject to state law unless the transaction in question was on the Internet. Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in this increasingly penetrating multi-media world? When Tom Selleck says I can send a fax from the beach - I get scared!!! Won't I be able to relax in privacy on the beach? If I can send, will I not also recieve? What will be sent me? If I am relaxing on the beach with my family, the last thing I want is to recieve is a fax. Worse, is getting a fax from an impersonal advertiser who wants to sell me something. Or, God forbid, a high resolution pornographic fax advertising a phone sex line. I propose that tight restrictions on the commercial use of Internet addresses be implemented, and that Internet users have an easy, low cost dispute resolution tool with which to enforce their privacy. An online Internet Arbitrator who may award money or equitable damages to complaintants against commercial entities who violate privacy laws may be the answer. I look forward to further participating. I am off to class! Take Care, Jeffrey Millican milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance. From jholman@ns.onramp.net Mon Nov 14 09:55:55 1994 Received: from ns.onramp.net (ns.onramp.net [199.1.11.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id JAA10323 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:55:55 -0800 Received: from .onramp.net (dal08.onramp.net [199.1.11.108]) by ns.onramp.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) with SMTP id IAA05422 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 08:48:03 -0600 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 08:37:52 PST From: "Jimmie L. Holman" Subject: suscribe privacy jholman@onramp.net To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov X-Mailer: Chameleon - TCP/IP for Windows by NetManage, Inc. Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII suscribe privacy jholman@onramp.net From <@QUCDN.QueensU.CA:andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA> Mon Nov 14 10:36:43 1994 Received: from QUCDN.QueensU.CA (QUCDN.QueensU.CA [130.15.126.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA14797 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:36:42 -0800 Received: from cspo.QueensU.CA by QUCDN.QueensU.CA (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP; Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:27:57 EST Received: by cspo.QueensU.CA (5.0/SMI-SVR4) id AA14535; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:29:32 +0600 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:29:32 -0600 (CST) From: Alison Andrukow X-Sender: andrukow@cspo To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Subject: Subscribe Alison Andrukow Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII content-length: 26 Subscribe Alison Andrukow From <@QUCDN.QueensU.CA:andrukow@cspo.QueensU.CA> Mon Nov 14 10:38:13 1994 Received: from QUCDN.QueensU.CA (QUCDN.QueensU.CA [130.15.126.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15036 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:38:12 -0800 Received: from cspo.QueensU.CA by QUCDN.QueensU.CA (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP; Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:29:17 EST Received: by cspo.QueensU.CA (5.0/SMI-SVR4) id AA14348; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:54:39 +0600 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 09:54:39 -0600 (CST) From: Alison Andrukow X-Sender: andrukow@cspo To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII content-length: 0 sign me up.alison. From freedman.richard@mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com Mon Nov 14 10:39:08 1994 Received: from eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com (eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com [155.95.155.166]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15129 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:39:08 -0800 Received: from mail.ndhm.gtegsc.com by eagle.ndhm.gtegsc.com with SMTP; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:31:41 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: 14 Nov 1994 10:28:37 -0500 From: "Freedman Richard" Subject: To: "privacy conference" X-Mailer: Mail*Link SMTP/MS 3.0.0 subscribe property Richard Freedman From geoffrey@vt.edu Mon Nov 14 10:51:02 1994 Received: from vtucs.cc.vt.edu (vtucs.cc.vt.edu [128.173.4.72]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id KAA15810 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:51:01 -0800 Message-Id: <199411141851.KAA15810@virtconf.digex.net> Received: from geoffrey.beva.blacksburg.va.us by vtucs.cc.vt.edu with SMTP (1.37.109.8/16.2) id AA00417; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:43:01 -0500 X-Sender: geoffrey@mail.vt.edu Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:42:41 +0500 To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From: geoffrey@vt.edu (Geoffrey C. Chapman) Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:4] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference X-Mailer: It seems to me, sir, that you may have one or two priorities out of order. Re your concern about receiving what you do not wish to receive, I would argue (as I do with regard to sex and violence on TV) that you STILL have an on-off switch; i.e., if you don't turn the darn thing on--or just don't take it to the beach--it isn't going to interrupt your privacy. This, by contrast to the telephone, which unless you take it off the hook, will invariably interrupt you at dinnertime by someone trying to sell you something, survey you for something--or try to sell you another phone service. One can always, later, delete incoming faxes or email without reading it if one chooses. My concern with privacy is simply this: Who is reading over my shoulder without my knowledge and why? And if the net, as you suggest, is in the hand of the military or federal government in some other form, what's to prevent blatent abuse there? If someone sends me unwanted porn, I can always wipe it out without even looking at it. But if Big Brother is watching what I send and to whom, there's nothing I can do about it, and undoubtedly no way I could know in the first place. This is a frightening issue and one I hope will be seriously addressed here. > As a law student, it is hard to believe that I will: 1.) attend a >prestigious conference; 2.) discuss issues of privacy law with a wide >diversity of scholars; 3.) attend all my scheduled classes; and 4.) >go home for supper tonight. It is like an AT&T commercial with Tom >Selleck except instead of saying "You Will" were saying "You ARE!" >It is a real pleasure for me to be part of this. > >PRVACY IN AN ELECTRONIC COMMONS > > It will be tough to answer questions posed here for many reasons. > Not the least of which is: 1.) Issues of National (US) sovereignty >and security are juxtaposed against a SEAMLESS electronic network; >2.) Issues of Federalism arise over a court's jurisdiction in this >environment - is it for the states or for the federal government; 3.) >Issues of personal privacy - what's to stop me from getting >pornography I do not want or unsolicited advertisments. > > First: Issues of US national sovereignty. If anyone has claim to >this net it is us (US). Internet is the regulated and permitted >outgrowth of the ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency NETwork). >Literally, a spinoff of the Cold War, in which the Free World was >victorious, the Internet moves to encompass a much larger Free World. >Issues of security for all nations must be questionned, and the US >must ask itself: "Shall we be the Eagle which provides its own >feather?" > I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security >remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with >Congressional oversight. This will allow for privacy encoding to be >established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. >In an era of defense cuts and "rightsizing" we cannot allow for us to >play "catch-up" in times of crises. > > Second: Whose courts, within the US, will resolve conflicts of >litigatable proportions? While the Internet is clearly a federal >matter, what about connected Local Area Networks or Electronic >Bulletin Boards. Will the development of an "Electronic Common Law" >become applicable to the "Electronic Commons?" > I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the >Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction. Similar to a state long arm >statute any transaction on the Internet is, for that transaction, >under federal jurisdiction. Local networks will be subject to state >law unless the transaction in question was on the Internet. > > Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in >this increasingly penetrating multi-media world? When Tom Selleck >says I can send a fax from the beach - I get scared!!! Won't I be >able to relax in privacy on the beach? If I can send, will I not >also recieve? What will be sent me? If I am relaxing on the beach >with my family, the last thing I want is to recieve is a fax. Worse, >is getting a fax from an impersonal advertiser who wants to sell me >something. Or, God forbid, a high resolution pornographic fax >advertising a phone sex line. > I propose that tight restrictions on the commercial use of >Internet addresses be implemented, and that Internet users have an >easy, low cost dispute resolution tool with which to enforce their >privacy. An online Internet Arbitrator who may award money or >equitable damages to complaintants against commercial entities who >violate privacy laws may be the answer. > > I look forward to further participating. I am off to class! > Take Care, > Jeffrey Millican > milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu > >The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From BEVR@ksgrsch.harvard.edu Mon Nov 14 11:05:31 1994 Received: from shango.harvard.edu (shango.harvard.edu [128.103.190.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA16867 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:05:30 -0800 Received: from ksgrsch.harvard.edu by shango.harvard.edu with smtp (Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0r73qr-000FBSC; Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:01 EST Received: from RESEARCH/MAILQUEUE by ksgrsch.harvard.edu (Mercury 1.13); Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:57:30 -500 Received: from MAILQUEUE by RESEARCH (Mercury 1.13); Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:57:29 -500 From: Organization: Kennedy School of Government To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:57:26 EST Subject: privacy Priority: normal X-mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.1 (R1a) Message-ID: <2DFB297084A@ksgrsch.harvard.edu> NTIA Virtual Conference Nov.14-18: I would like to subscribe. Thanks. From KLRAPER@ISCEMS.remnet.rockwell.com Mon Nov 14 11:30:04 1994 Received: from ns1.mke.ab.com (ns1.mke.ab.com [130.151.82.121]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA18768 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:30:03 -0800 Received: from ABSSW.REMNET.AB.COM (mkeibm.mke.ab.com) by ns1.mke.ab.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA24449; Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:22:48 CST Received: from ISCEMS.REMNET.AB.COM by ABSSW.REMNET.AB.COM (Soft*Switch Central V4L380P5) id 105021100094318FISCEMS; 14 Nov 1994 08:20:08 CST Message-Id: Date: 14 Nov 1994 08:20:08 CST From: "Karen Raper" Subject: Privacy in Internet Communications To: privacy@VIRTCONF.NTIA.DOC.GOV Comment: ISCEMS KLRAPER 11/14/94 08:20:46 WORLD In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and agree to encoding/decoding methods. The problem with this technique, however, is that encryption/decryption requires additional hardware and/or software which is not necessarily cheap and accessible to all. Also, there's likely some problems with securing the encryption/decryption mechanisms themselves. It also limits the communications to directed only, not "broadcasted" messages. Should the use of the "internet common" be limited to only those applications which are not sensitive to privacy? What would those applications be? Kindest regards, -KLR From JQIANG@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU Mon Nov 14 11:36:28 1994 Received: from CENTER.COLGATE.EDU (colgate.edu [149.43.1.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id LAA19174 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:35:47 -0800 From: JQIANG@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU Received: from CENTER.COLGATE.EDU by CENTER.COLGATE.EDU (PMDF #3157 ) id <01HJGTO9KHN48WYF0L@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:56:42 EDT Date: 14 Nov 1994 10:56:42 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Passord To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Message-id: <01HJGTO9KRAA8WYF0L@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU> X-VMS-To: IN%"privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov" MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Why do we need to change the password? From donbrown@rain.org Mon Nov 14 13:55:52 1994 Received: from coyote.rain.org (root@coyote.rain.org [198.68.144.2]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA24707 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:55:51 -0800 Received: by coyote.rain.org(4.1/SMI-RAIN) with id AA22651 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov on Mon, 14 Nov 94 10:17:18 PST Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 10:17:17 -0800 (PST) From: Donald Brown To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Cc: Multiple recipients of list Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:11] Privacy in Internet Communications In-Reply-To: Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII I believe that Karen is correct. On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Karen Raper wrote: > > In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be > assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and > agree to encoding/decoding methods. The problem with this technique, however, > is that encryption/decryption requires additional hardware and/or software > which is not necessarily cheap and accessible to all. Also, there's likely > some problems with securing the encryption/decryption mechanisms themselves. > It also limits the communications to directed only, not "broadcasted" messages. > Should the use of the "internet common" be limited to only those applications > which are not sensitive to privacy? What would those applications be? > > Kindest regards, -KLR > > From mcintosh@cs.rice.edu Mon Nov 14 13:57:12 1994 Received: from cs.rice.edu (cs.rice.edu [128.42.1.30]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA24894 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:57:11 -0800 Received: from helena.cs.rice.edu by cs.rice.edu (AA15216); Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:26:13 CST Received: by helena.cs.rice.edu (AA08324); Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:26:10 CST From: mcintosh@cs.rice.edu (Nathaniel McIntosh) Message-Id: <9411141726.AA08324@helena.cs.rice.edu> Subject: Privacy on the Internet To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:26:09 -0600 (CST) In-Reply-To: from "Karen Raper" at Nov 14, 94 11:30:21 am X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 1241 >From: "Karen Raper" > >In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be >assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and >agree to encoding/decoding methods. ... I agree -- encryption seems like it will be very important. In addition to simply insuring that private communications can't be read by third parties, though, there is the issue of whether vendors can pass on "incidental" information that is obtained as a side effect of communication. For example, if I download a file on prescription drugs from an archive server somewhere, the owner of that archive could sell my user ID to a company which sells drugs by mail. Or suppose I send email to a travel agent to buy some plane tickets, and the travel agent saves my mail message and sells it to some third party. The third party then analyzes the mail headers and determines that the program used to send the message was running on a Mac, so in two weeks I get "junk" email advertising Mac software. Nat --- Nathaniel McIntosh | Department of Computer Science mcintosh@cs.rice.edu | Rice University, P.O. Box 1892 713-527-8101 x2740 | Houston, Texas 77251 USA From DMASSON@ucs.indiana.edu Mon Nov 14 13:59:06 1994 Received: from geneva.ucs.indiana.edu (portal.ucs.indiana.edu [129.79.4.21]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id NAA25524 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:59:05 -0800 Message-Id: <199411142159.NAA25524@virtconf.digex.net> Received: from PRISM.DECnet by geneva.ucs.indiana.edu (5.65c+/9.6jsm) id AA02364; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:13:51 -0500 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:14:42 EST From: DOUG MASSON X-To: PO%"privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov" Subject: Subscribe To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov subscribe dmasson@ucs.indiana.edu privacy virtual conference From XCPTRS%TAO1@amdahl.oryx.com Mon Nov 14 14:07:12 1994 Received: from amdahl.oryx.com (amdahl.oryx.COM [147.223.1.5]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA26996 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:07:11 -0800 Message-Id: <199411142207.OAA26996@virtconf.digex.net> Received: from TAO1 by amdahl.oryx.com (IBM MVS SMTP V2R2.1) with BSMTP id 0135; Mon, 14 Nov 94 11:30:42 EST Date: Mon 14 Nov 1994 11:29 CT To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From: Tom.Sullivan@oryx.com Subject: Electonic Privacy and Regulation In the words of a great man, (my father), locks and laws were designed to keep honest people honest, neither will stop a criminal. To suggest that our national security will be compromised on the net underestimates the ingenuity of the perpeTRAITORS. Any legislation to provide the government the ability to monitor communications amounts to a sacrifice of privacy for all to provide marginal benefits and a huge opportunity for abuse. Not a good tradeoff! The authorities have as much right to peek into my windows as it does to intercept my communications, electronic or otherwise. That doesn't mean I have to leave my curtains open. I would like the capability to unsubscribe or block communications from specific addresses to keep the unsolicited mail to a manageable level. If there is some questionable content in a communication, a disclaimer on the first page would be adequate. I would think most advertisers would be happy to voluntarily comply with this request as a courtesy. Tom Sullivan From levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu Mon Nov 14 14:12:58 1994 Received: from blatz.cs.uwm.edu (blatz.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.2.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA27863 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:12:55 -0800 Received: (from levine@localhost) by blatz.cs.uwm.edu (8.6.9/8.6.9) id NAA01934 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:05:00 -0600 From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Message-Id: <199411141905.NAA01934@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> Subject: Some topics for discussion To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 13:05:00 -0600 (CST) Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Phones: 1-414-229-5170 office; -229-6958 fax Return-Receipt-To: llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL21] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 8594 Mark Rotenberg and I have been asked to produce a running review of what appears here on a daily basis. We will try to use this review to center each days discussion based on the previous day's work. As a beginning let us consider the following: One approach to personal privacy is to consider it is a concept that permits each individual to deny to others certain facts about his or her life. Its definition may depend upon the social attitude of a particular group. Salary, for example, might be considered private for one group and public for another. Sometimes individuals barter part of their privacy in order to obtain other advantages that are important to them. As long as the bartering is on an even footing, as long as what each person gets for the privacy lost is viewed by that person as a fair trade, and as long as the bartering is done with free will the loss of privacy that occurs is generally not considered a problem. For example, anyone might have purchased some office supplies at a shop and paid with a personal check. Before the clerk would accept such a check she might well ask to see the purchaser's driver's license, checked the picture against his face, and copied the license number onto the check. The purchaser effectively gave the shop a copy of his license number in exchange for them trusting the check, a deal that many would consider fair. Furthermore, had the customer been concerned, he could have gone to a cash machine, taken some cash out of his checking account and then paid the shop with anonymous cash. At some small cost of personal time he could have maintained his anonymity at the shop. A second example: Anyone might well have purchased a can opener manufactured by a major corporation. She might find enclosed a registration card asking for her name, address, phone number, shopping and reading habits, life style, birth date, marital status, annual income, number and age of children, home ownership status, occupation, credit card type, and a selection of her hobbies chosen from a list of fifty items. A final check box even might allowed her to refuse mailings from a "multi company marketing program". She would also be expected to pay the postage costs for returning the registration card. In return for this the manufacturer would offer to contact her about any safety notifications dealing with the can opener. Many people would judge that the barter of that level of intrusion for that advantage was not in their best interest. In many social interactions there is an exchange of personal information for other advantages. In the two examples above the benefit to the individual can be shown to vary. Both of them, however, were voluntary in that subject had the choice of paying by cash or check and of accepting or rejecting a potential safety notice. Other transactions are not voluntary. These transactions involve information extracted from an individual by a government via an act of law and by large conglomerates or corporations pooling otherwise voluntarily submitted data. An example of the first might be driver's license data. A driver's license and car registration are appropriate tradeoffs of private information to the state affirming our individual acceptance of responsibility for our actions in return for the improved mobility afforded by being able to drive anywhere in the nation. But the public disclosure of these records has raised problems, ranging from excessive junk mail to the murder of a licensee. Recent federal legislation, aimed at increasing the privacy of driver's license information is still to be tested to see if it establishes appropriate boundaries. An example of the second might be data collected and sold by credit reporting agencies combining publicly available bankruptcy data with credit card purchases and medical data. There is a good deal of controversy in the United States about exactly who owns such data collected by grocery stores, hospitals, credit agencies and the like. Another example might be if the local telephone company decided to start selling the records of the telephone calls of its customers. As a practical matter, a telephone customer might have difficulty finding another local carrier who didn't sell the records. In this sense the disclosure would be involuntary. A different approach to privacy is to think about principles that generally make good sense for social well-being. For example, the legal principle that protects the confidentiality of what a patient tells a doctor is based on the belief that if the patient is assured confidentiality he or she is more likely to be forthcoming with the doctor. This leads to more accurate diagnosis and better medical care. Similar legal privileges exist for communications between spouses, between attorneys and clients, and between priests and parishioners. Other privacy principles are based on concerns about specific types of abuse. The Privacy Act of 1974 limits the sharing of private records by government agencies. This law was passed in response to concerns about the creation of a centralized Big Brother database that many believe would threaten the freedom of American citizens. There is, at present, no such limitation on the equivalent action on the part of corporations. Other laws exist to protect the privacy of telephone communications and even the privacy of video rental records. In the example of cashing the check above, we might decide as a matter of policy that stores should not ask individuals for their licenses when they cash checks because of concern that the stores might misuse the license information. This policy may have the effect of requiring stores to rely on check verification services (which many do) or simply accepting the risk of bad debts. Whether the policy makes sense depends on how we balance the privacy concern against the potential costs. We might also have a policy that says that companies should not sell a person's name unless the company receives the person's affirmative consent. This "opt-in" approach is generally not followed in the United States, although it is followed in Europe. Some people believe it would be a good way to protect privacy here. Other privacy issues are less related to laws and principles and more tied specifically to recent developments in technology. Encryption provides a method for very private communications. Policies for encryption may have a great impact on the level of privacy for future users of the information highway. Encryption also creates a capability for "pseudononymous" transactions. These are transactions where the actual identity of the buyer is kept hidden but sufficient information is available to the seller to verify the transaction. Such systems may well be suited for network environments such as the Internet. Anonymity can also be maintained by simple debit cards, such as the metro cards in some of the large metropolitan areas like San Francisco or Washington, or by telephone cards. With these electronic cash cards, it is possible to pay for services and to keep absolute anonymity. Returning to our example of buying the office supplies, if our subject carried an electronic cash card and the store was equipped to read the card, he would have been able to purchase the supplies without disclosing his identity. The privacy issues facing users of the information infrastructure are likely to combine aspects of several of the approaches described above. Of course, not all of these ideas work equally well. And that's where the decisions have to be made. Here are a few questions to consider: - Is privacy really that important? Couldn't we get by with less focus on privacy issues? - What are the most serious privacy concerns that will face the users of the information highway? What specifically is the problem? - Who are likely to pose the greatest threats to privacy? Is it the government? Is it the private sector? - Can you think of an example where your privacy or the privacy of someone you know was violated? What did you (or the other person) do? - What policies do you think are best for privacy protection? Do you favor barter systems, new laws, technology, or some combination? Prof. Leonard Levine Marc Rotenberg, Director University of Wisconsin- Electronic Privacy Information Milwaukee Center Milwaukee, WI Washington, DC From Richmeyer_Joseph/GHQ_RAPA@rapa1.sbc.com Mon Nov 14 14:19:06 1994 Received: from rutgers.edu (RUTGERS.EDU [128.6.21.9]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA29119; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:19:05 -0800 From: Richmeyer_Joseph/GHQ_RAPA@rapa1.sbc.com Received: from texbell.sbc.com by rutgers.edu (5.59/SMI4.0/RU1.5/3.08) id AA19885; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:11:10 EST Received: from rapa1 (rapa1.sbc.com) by texbell.sbc.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA25288; Mon, 14 Nov 94 12:58:47 CST Received: from by rapa1 with SMTP (1.37.109.4/16.2) id AA03566; Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:09:00 -0600 X-Openmail-Hops: 1 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 13:08:07 -0600 Message-Id: Subject: Untitled To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov, standard@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov unsubscribe jr9283@rapa1.sbc.com privacy virtual conference From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us Mon Nov 14 14:20:48 1994 Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA29388 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:20:47 -0800 Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA05556 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:12:56 -0500 Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2) id AA07332; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:14:26 EST Message-Id: <9411141914.AA07332@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:13:09 -0500 To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA) Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:16] Electonic Privacy and Regulation >In the words of a great man, (my father), locks and laws were designed to keep >honest people honest, neither will stop a criminal. To suggest that our >national security will be compromised on the net underestimates the ingenuity >of the perpeTRAITORS. Any legislation to provide the government the ability to >monitor communications amounts to a sacrifice of privacy for all to provide >marginal benefits and a huge opportunity for abuse. Not a good tradeoff! >The authorities have as much right to peek into my windows as it does to >intercept my communications, electronic or otherwise. That doesn't mean I >have to leave my curtains open. > >I would like the capability to unsubscribe or block communications from >specific addresses to keep the unsolicited mail to a manageable level. If >there is some questionable content in a communication, a disclaimer on the >first page would be adequate. I would think most advertisers would be happy >to voluntarily comply with this request as a courtesy. > >Tom Sullivan The latest incident of spying didn't involve high tech. It was one intelligence guy stealing info and letting his Russian connection know by marking an "X" on a mailbox. Not very high tech but effective. Privacy is paramount in a democratic society. The ability to communicate freely and share information helps everyone. From MILLJEFF@uofrlaw.urich.edu Mon Nov 14 14:36:06 1994 Received: from urvax.urich.edu (urvax.urich.edu [141.166.36.6]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA01460 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:36:05 -0800 Received: from UOFRLAW (uofrlaw.urich.edu) by urvax.urich.edu (PMDF V4.3-11 #7506) id <01HJGXR5IZJK003AFF@urvax.urich.edu>; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 12:52:57 -0500 (EST) Received: from UOFRLAW/MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 12:52:35 EST Received: from MERCQ by UOFRLAW (Mercury 1.11); Mon, 14 Nov 94 12:52:10 EST Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 12:52:10 -0500 (EST) From: Jeffrey Millican Subject: RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Cc: geoffrey@vt.edu Message-id: <43F392405AC@UOFRLAW> Organization: University of Richmond X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail v3.22 Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Priority: normal OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman} I agree that abuse of this system to monitor citizens is of concern, but one must remember that this "electronic common" is one created by the government, and therefore under its control. Further, unlike landowners we are users with lisence from the owner. In this case we must submit to the owners rules and regulations. Our rights in the lisence are circumscribed by the owner through his grant of that lisence. [see concepts of lisence, and sovereign immunity]. This then comes to the heart of my proposal: Regulation by the Department of Defense (DOD) with Congressional oversight. There are two basic limitations which will benefit the citizen-user of the Internet. First, DOD may not conduct inteligence activities against US citizens (EO 12333), therefore the DOD may never become the thought police which maintain the system and oppress its users. It also makes it tougher for law enforcement (state, FBI, IRS, etc) to get onto the net to conduct such operations, since they MUST, under my idea, get DOD approval. Second, Congress, the elected representatives of the people, would have oversight. Like Intelligence Oversight, Congressional oversight would be a strong one especially when Congress would use the Internet to communicate with other government agencies, commercial entities, and, most importantly, their CONSTITUTIENTS! OF THE ON/OFF SWITCH: {Response to Mr. Chapman} When I saw your message in my queue I knew this: 1.) it was about this conference, and 2.) your name. I HAD to open my mail to conduct the housekeeping on my account and partake in this Conference. Therein lies the rub, unless you open and process your e-mail, or read your faxes, you can't manage your information. Turning the switch to off, tuning out, doesn't work; and we find our selves more akin to a phone then the TV. I, then, propose strict disclosure laws for pornographers on the Internet. Similar to the ones for the current Postal System. Would that work? OF USING CODING UNITS {Response to Ms. Raper} As noted above we are here under lisence, and will the owner let us talk without him knowing? Not for a Big Brother purpose but for security. For example, you and I talk over this net in code which the owner can't read. If we only talk about the weather, business, etc. there is no problem, but if you start passing government secrets to me so that my government, or radical group may use them then the owner wants to know. This is why I think that under DOD control, as above, users be allowed to participate using approved ecoding units. It reaches your goal of keeping out your neighbor, but accomodates the owners desire not to see a terrorist attack facilitated by the Internet occur. OF RESPONSE I look forward to hearing from you. Enjoy the Conference. Take Care, Jeffrey Millican milljeff@uofrlaw.urich.edu The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance. From cnewmark@crl.com Mon Nov 14 14:47:46 1994 Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id OAA02241 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:47:45 -0800 Received: from crl3.crl.com by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA20623 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for ); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:18 -0800 Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07572 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:42 -0800 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:39:42 -0800 (PST) From: Craig Newmark To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:14] Privacy on the Internet In-Reply-To: <9411141726.AA08324@helena.cs.rice.edu> Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Nathaniel McIntosh wrote: > >From: "Karen Raper" > > > >In my own humble opinion, privacy in network communications can only be > >assured if we as senders work with the intended recipients to develop and > >agree to encoding/decoding methods. ... > > I'm the security architect at a major financial services firm. I'm already proposing the use of public key methods to insure privacy when people use our home-oriented investment programs. I can't speak for other companies, but the whole Clipper controversy has sensitized a lot people to the need for consumer privacy. (More on that later.) ___________________________________________ Craig Newmark cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us cnewmark@crl.com From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us Mon Nov 14 14:51:28 1994 Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA02736 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:27 -0800 Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA09896 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:43:23 -0500 Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2) id AA07520; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:44:52 EST Message-Id: <9411141944.AA07520@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:43:36 -0500 To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA) Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:20] RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch > OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman} >The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance. I rather see the commercialization of the internet than see the internet under DOD and Congressional Oversight neither of which are very reliable or harbingers of freedom. The price of freedom is incurred risk.I'm not worried about radicals of the left or the right utilizing the internet for nefarious means but I am concerned about government using that fear to exercise more control. The State does not own the internet. We do or should. I think the ability to exchange ideas without fear of big brother is a better safeguard for our political freedoms than giving the authority to the State that says it will take care of this for us. Granted there are risks involved but I think they are minimal. Technology in the hands of the people be it a selected few because of economics or demographics is better than in the arms of a monolith. I think the real issue is educating people about the importance of privacy. The importance of access to information and that information is power. Federico Acerri From wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us Mon Nov 14 14:55:50 1994 Received: from merit.edu (merit.edu [35.1.1.42]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA03035 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:55:49 -0800 Received: from server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us [198.108.4.7]) by merit.edu (8.6.8.1/merit-1.0) with SMTP id OAA10103 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:47:57 -0500 Received: from [198.111.160.21] by server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (4.1/1123-1.2) id AA07547; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:49:29 EST Message-Id: <9411141949.AA07547@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:48:12 -0500 To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov From: wc_resa@server.greatlakes.k12.mi.us (Wayne County RESA) Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:21] Re: Privacy on the Internet The clipper controversy demonstrated the weak arguement that the government presented. We have less to fear from spies and flaming eyed radicals utilizing the internet than a government that uses it as a subterfuge for implementing all kinds of restrictions on access, what is to be accessed, and who are the people that are providing the information. Federico Acerri From sryan@sils.umich.edu Mon Nov 14 14:57:41 1994 Received: from sils.umich.edu (sils.umich.edu [141.211.203.30]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id OAA03249 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:57:41 -0800 Received: by sils.umich.edu (8.6.8/2.0) id OAA03557; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:39 -0500 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 14:51:38 -0500 (EST) From: Sara Louise Ryan Sender: Sara Louise Ryan Reply-To: Sara Louise Ryan Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:17] Some topics for discussion To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov cc: Multiple recipients of list In-Reply-To: <199411141905.NAA01934@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII My greatest concern about developing policies relating to privacy for the NII is that the policy makers understand *exactly*, not only in legislative terms but also in technological terms, what their policies are stating. Many "citizens of the Net" frequently express distrust of policy makers' ability to comprehend the systems and processes about which they are attempting to make policy decisions. Certainly privacy is important, and worthy of consideration. And there are models which can be considered when discussing "electronic privacy," as well. The Postal Service is one example. We have a certain amount of faith that any mail we send shall be delivered without being tampered with; to tamper with it is a federal offense. Tampering with electronic mail could similarly be considered a federal offense. The government is not authorized to intercept surface mail for its own purposes; neither should it be authorized to intercept electronic mail. So new laws, based on older laws, are part of what I think should be incorporated into a vision of electronic privacy. I am not sure that we can define who or what the *greatest* threats to electronic privacy will be; one could argue credibly for any number of sources of threats, from the government to hackers to overly aggressive marketers. What we must develop is a system which ensures privacy *regardless* of the source of the threat. That means not allowing government the capacity for an "electronic wiretap," that means forbidding companies from tracking electronic mail in the way another participant has outlined, and that means that we need penalties for hacking based on an understanding of what hacking *means* and the amount of harm it can and cannot do. I would also favor technological means of ensuring privacy, specifically public key encryption. Bartering, as defined by Professor Levine and Marc Rotenberg, also would have its place, because some people will want to have their names on electronic marketing mailing lists, as an example, just as some people want to receive many printed catalogs today. In sum, I favor a combination of methods to ensure privacy, based upon a real understanding of both the legislative and technological issues involved. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sara Ryan Library Associate University of Michigan Engineering Library phone: (313)763-4835 email: sryan@sils.umich.edu From cnewmark@crl.com Mon Nov 14 15:01:35 1994 Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03499 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:01:34 -0800 Received: from crl.crl.com (crl.com) by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA22581 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for ); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:53:02 -0800 Received: from crl3.crl.com by crl.crl.com with SMTP id AA23797 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for ); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:53:01 -0800 Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07770 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:52:11 -0800 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:52:10 -0800 (PST) From: Craig Newmark To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:4] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference In-Reply-To: <43C1A6E37B3@UOFRLAW> Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Jeffrey Millican wrote: > First: Issues of US national sovereignty. If anyone has claim to > this net it is us (US). Internet is the regulated and permitted You might do a little investigation on net culture and history and find that no one has any "claim" on the net. Everyone seems grateful for the ARPA work, but the concept of "claim" or ownership was abandoned years ago. > I, therefore, propose that the limits of the systems security > remain in the hands of the US Defense establishment with > Congressional oversight. This will allow for privacy encoding to be > established in the network without jeopardizing our nations security. This puts the foxes in charge of the henhouse, which has been overwhelmingly rejected. As for privacy encoding, this suggestion is almost unanimously considered a threat, not a solution. Take a look at the EFF or Wired archives for more info, and references to existing solutions. > I propose that the Internet and all related activity to the > Internet be under Federal Jurisdiction. Similar to a state long arm Not a great idea, but an improvement possibly. Witness the recent Memphis "pornography" decision. > > Third: How will my personal privacy, and sanity, be maintained in Like a previous respondent said, turn it off when you want to do so. I already have the time management problem you expect to have, but like lots of other people, you learn to deal with it. > > > > > > > > > > > ___________________________________________ Craig Newmark cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us cnewmark@crl.com From miriam@watson.ibm.com Mon Nov 14 15:05:31 1994 Received: from watson.ibm.com (watson.ibm.com [129.34.139.4]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03669 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:05:30 -0800 From: miriam@watson.ibm.com Message-Id: <199411142305.PAA03669@virtconf.digex.net> Received: from YKTVMV by watson.ibm.com (IBM VM SMTP V2R3) with BSMTP id 7409; Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:57:47 EST Date: Mon, 14 Nov 94 14:57:18 EST To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Subject: [PRIVACY:25] RE: My Opening Statement to the Virtual Conference Ref: Your note of Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:02:08 -0800 please cancel subscription From cnewmark@crl.com Mon Nov 14 15:07:10 1994 Received: from mail.crl.com (mail.crl.com [165.113.1.22]) by virtconf.digex.net (8.6.9/8.6.9) with SMTP id PAA03778 for ; Mon, 14 Nov 1994 15:07:09 -0800 Received: from crl3.crl.com by mail.crl.com with SMTP id AA23367 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for ); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:58:46 -0800 Received: by crl3.crl.com id AA07955 (5.65c/IDA-1.5 for privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov); Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:59:10 -0800 Date: Mon, 14 Nov 1994 11:59:10 -0800 (PST) From: Craig Newmark To: privacy@virtconf.ntia.doc.gov Subject: Re: [PRIVACY:20] RE: Of Big Brother, Phone Cops, and the On/Off Switch In-Reply-To: <43F392405AC@UOFRLAW> Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII On Mon, 14 Nov 1994, Jeffrey Millican wrote: > OF BIG BROTHER: {Response to Mr. Chapman} > I agree that abuse of this system to monitor citizens is of > concern, but one must remember that this "electronic common" is > one created by the government, and therefore under its control. "Created" true, but only of historical value at this point. No one "controls" the net. > Second, Congress, the elected > representatives of the people, would have oversight. Like > Intelligence Oversight, Congressional oversight would be a strong one > especially when Congress would use the Internet to communicate with > other government agencies, commercial entities, and, most > importantly, their CONSTITUTIENTS! Congressional oversight has been a consistent failure. The EFF and EPIC have been much better. Witness the passage of the recent telephony bill, export laws regarding encryption, and the entire banking crisis. ___________________________________________ Craig Newmark cnewmark@well.sf.ca.us cnewmark@crl.com