UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x : PUBLIC HEARING IN THE MATTER OF: : : No. DCA COLLISION AND DERAILMENT OF : 99-MR-003 AMTRAK 59, THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, : WITH AN EASTBOUND TRACTOR, : Volume II SEMI-TRAILER AT RAILROAD/HIGHWAY : GRADE CROSSING NEAR BOURBONNAIS, : Day II ILLINOIS ON MARCH 15, 1999 : : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Tuesday, September 14, 1999 The Guildhall The Ambassador West Hotel The Wyndham Grand Hotel Chicago, Illinois The Public Hearing in the above-entitled matter resumed, at the Ambassador West Hotel, The Guildhall, 1300 North State Parkway, Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:00 a.m., before the Board of Inquiry of the National Transportation Safety Board. APPEARANCES: THE BOARD OF INQUIRY: GEORGE W. BLACK, JR., Chairman National Transportation Safety Board JAMES S. DUNN, Hearing Officer ROBERT C. LAUBY, Director Office of Railroad Safety BARRY SWEEDLER, Director Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments CLAUDE HARRIS, Deputy Director Office of Highway Safety APPEARANCES: (Continued) THE TECHNICAL PANEL: TED TURPIN, Operations Specialist Office of Railroad Safety DR. GERALD D. WEEKS, Chief Human Factors Division Office of Railroad Safety RICHARD DOWNS, Survival Factors Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety RUBEN PAYAN, Signal Specialist Office of Railroad Safety BURT SIMON, Human Performance Specialist Office of Highway Safety BYRD RABY, Heavy Vehicle Specialist, Office of Highway Safety THOMAS JACKY, Event Recorder Specialist Office of Research and Engineering MIRIAM KLOEPPEL, Transportation Research Analyst, Office of Research and Engineering PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER TERRY WILLIAMS ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT Evelyn Hemingway APPEARANCES: (Continued) PARTIES TO THE HEARING: NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK): LEE W. BULLOCK, President, Amtrak Intercity TRAVIS HINTON, Chief Operating Officer, Amtrak Intercity CHRIS BLACK, Director, Public Affairs T. MICHAEL KERRINE, Associate General Counsel, Tort Litigation GEORGE BINNS, General Manager, Standards and Compliance PETER HALL, Director of Safety, Amtrak Intercity MARK MEANA, Director of Safety, Corporate CLAYTON BROWN, Assistant Vice-President, Corporate Operations CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD: ED HARRIS, Vice-President, Midwest Division JOHN PRENDERGAST, Risk Manager CHARLES WEBSTER, General Counsel, U.S. JOHN SHARKEY, General Manager, Communications and Signals APPEARANCES (Continued) CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD: (Continued) MYLES TOBIN, Vice-President, U.S. Legal Affairs BOB KEENE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: DAVID BLACKMORE, Deputy Regional Administrator ALLAN HALSTROM, Principal Inspector, Indianapolis JEFF THOMAS, Signal and Train Control Inspector, Chicago ROBERT MYERS, Assistant Grade Crossing and Trespass Manager, Chicago PATTY SMITH, Grade Crossing and Trespass Manager, Chicago FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION: RUDY UMBS, Chief, Safety Design Division ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION: MICHAEL STEAD, Rail Safety Program Administrator JOHN BLAIR, Railroad Safety Specialist STAN MILEWSKI, Railroad Safety Specialist DON RICHARDSON, Railroad Safety Specialist, State Coordinator, Illinois Operation Lifesaver BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS: WILLIAM C. WALPERT, Vice-President JOHN P. TOLMAN, Special Representative, International Division LARRY JAMES, Coordinator, Education and Training Department CARL FIELDS, Safety Task Force TOM O'BRIEN APPEARANCES: (Continued) UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION: THOMAS P. DWYER III, Director MELCO TRANSFER, INC.: MELVIN MARSHALL JUDY MARSHALL BRAD PURCELL, Counsel for Melco Transfer, Inc. C O N T E N T S PAGE Opening Remarks 218 Sworn Testimony of John Sharkey 218 Examination by the Technical Panel 219 Examination by the United Transportation Union 265 Examination by the Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad 266 Examination by the Illinois Commerce Commission 270 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 271 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 275 Sworn Testimony of Mark R. Corbo 296 Examination by the Technical Panel 297 Examination by Melco Transfer, Inc. 323 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 325 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 327 Sworn Testimony of Michael Harshbarger 343 Examination by the Technical Panel 344 Examination by Amtrak 368 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 371 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 372 Further Examination by the Technical Panel 375 Sworn Testimony of Lee Bullock and Mark Meana 378 Examination by the Technical Panel 379 Examination by the Federal Railroad Administration 395 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 396 Examination by the United Transportation Union 398 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 399 C O N T E N T S (Continued) PAGE Sworn Testimony of John Blair 411 Examination by the Technical Panel 412 Examination by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 429 Examination by the United Transportation Union 430 Examination by Amtrak 431 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 431 Sworn Testimony of Clayton Brown, Bruce George, and Rudolph Umbs 451 Examination by the Technical Panel 453 Examination by the United Transportation Union 494 Examination by the Illinois Commerce Commission 496 Examination by the Board of Inquiry 501 Adjournment 529 P R O C E E D I N G S CHAIRMAN BLACK: Good morning. The good news is I don't have a long boilerplate the second day. The bad news is I have a long one to read at the end of tomorrow. I think we had a very productive day yesterday. We certainly got into the record some information we did not have before, and I think we got it in a more concise way than it was in some of the previously recorded and transcripted statements. So, are you ready, Mr. Dunn? MR. DUNN: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Proceed. MR. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Mr. John Sharkey. SWORN TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHARKEY MR. DUNN: Mr. Sharkey, for the record, would you state and spell your full name. MR. SHARKEY: John Sharkey; J-o-h-n, S-h-a-r-k-e-y. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. SHARKEY: The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad. MR. DUNN: For how long have you employed by the Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? MR. SHARKEY: We have just merged on July 1st of this year, but I have been with the railroad, Illinois Central, for 27 years. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities? MR. SHARKEY: I am General Manager of Communications and Signals. I direct the activities of the Signal Department at this time and at the time of the accident, I am active in engineering and engineering organizations. I am and charged with procedures; maintenance inspections; tests, compliance with those; and the design of signal systems. MR. DUNN: You were involved in the investigation of the accident at Bourbonnais? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, I was. MR. DUNN: You were a part of the signal crew? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. DUNN: At this time, I will turn the questioning over to our Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben Payan. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. PAYAN: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. PAYAN: Let's start off with a little history of the equipment at McKnight Road. Can you provide a history of the active warning devices that have been installed at McKnight Road? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. The original installation of the active warning devices was in December of the 1968 pursuant to an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission to install automatic flashing light signals and short arm gates. The term "short arm gates" was used at that time to differentiate what had been the previous practice of installing long gates which extended completely across a roadway. So, those were installed in 1968. There was a modification to the track circuits in 1987, whereby we changed an overlay type, an audio frequency overlay type circuit from a non-modulated circuit to a modulated circuit in 1987. In September of 1990, we installed 12 inch flashing lights at the location. Previous to that, the state standard was 8 3/8 inch bravos (phonetic). That was part of a state-wide program. Pursuant to a Commerce Commission order, we installed Clovis bravos (phonetic). In January of 1992, we changed the control equipment from a -- there was a constant warning timed device originally installed there. It was a GCP model 400. We changed those to the latest, the GCP Model 3000, in January of 1992 pursuant to a Commerce Commission order. That is the equipment that is there today. There has been some software upgrades in that microprocessor type equipment since its original installation in 1992. So, what we have there today is control circuits of GCP 3000s and flashing light signals and short arm gates. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned several other types of warning devices. Can you describe what other types the Illinois Central/Canadian National uses at their other railroad crossings that are not experimental and that are in actual use? MR. SHARKEY: Are you saying from an historical perspective? MR. PAYAN: Historical and currently being used. MR. SHARKEY: Historically, active warning devices began with what we call an auto flag, commonly referred to as a wig-wag. It was a device with a disk that had a red light in it that swung back and forth. Those began to be installed in the 1890s. The conventional flashing light signals began to be installed back in the early 1900s, 1910. The gates were patented in 1938, so the type of gate mechanisms we have -- the earlier models went back to the late 1930s. The conventional type flashing light signals are what is used at most crossings that are signal track crossings. Flashing light signals with gates are used at crossings where you have multiple main tracks or there is a possibility of a sight obstruction due to a train or a curve or something like this. Flashing light signals are used to warn the motorist, to get the motorist stopped, and the gate is used to supplement that to keep the motorist stopped. MR. PAYAN: Is that a railroad definition or a state law or do you know? MR. SHARKEY: Well, the state law in Illinois provides that flashing light signals for the motorist are analogous to the stop sign -- stop and then proceed if it is safe to do so -- and with gates, it is an absolute stop similar to a stop light. MR. PAYAN: As far as the age of technology, where does the equipment at McKnight Road fall into? MR. SHARKEY: It is the latest in current levels in technology. MR. PAYAN: State of the art? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned GCP. Can you explain what that means? MR. SHARKEY: It is a grade crossing predictor. It is what is generically called a constant warning timed device. It is a device that is a microprocessor-based electronic transceiver that is hooked up to the rails at the crossing. It puts a low frequency voltage out on to the track. It puts it out with a constant current transmitter, and it is tuned to a -- perhaps slide one might be appropriate. MR. PAYAN: Are the slides we are using now from the signal factual, from one the attachments? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. (Pause in the proceedings.) MR. PAYAN: Maybe we can come back to that. Can you explain what the process is that is used to determine which crossings will get active warning devices? You mentioned the ICC order in several places. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. The Illinois Commerce Commission is responsible for crossing devices in the State of Illinois in conjunction with the Illinois Department of Transportation. In accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the selection and determination of warning devices is determined by the highway authority with jurisdiction over the road. MR. PAYAN: Does the railroad have a say in this process? MR. SHARKEY: The railroads will participate in meetings at the crossing of diagnostic surveys under Federally funded projects or stipulated agreement meetings or meetings with the Illinois Commerce Commission. MR. PAYAN: Do you know what factors are used to determine which crossings and what equipment will be used? MR. SHARKEY: I believe the warrants would be that on multiple track railroads, for sure, you would have flashing light signals and gates. On single track railroads, it may depend on the speed. Each state has different warrants. In Illinois, right now, the projects are calling for gates. MR. PAYAN: How about warning time? How much warning time is required? How much warning time is provided for an approaching train? MR. SHARKEY: The minimal warning time recognized for any crossing would be 20 seconds minimum warning time. At this particular crossing, we achieved 25 seconds warning time. MR. PAYAN: Is that a railroad standard or ICC requirement to measure it by seconds? MR. SHARKEY: It started out as being an Association of American Railroads recommended practice, and it was adopted into the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices in, I believe, 1978. So, basically the HFWA adopted the railroad signal practices from the Association of American Railroads in 1978, and now, it is considered part of that standard to be 20 seconds minimum. MR. PAYAN: If we could get back now to the operation, could you give us a description of the operation of the warning devices? MR. SHARKEY: What we have here is a stretch of track. In the center here of the slide is McKnight Road. What we are showing is about a nine thousand foot stretch of track to the north left just towards Chicago, Illinois, and south goes down to the right. This is the stretch of traffic in the vicinity, and it is kind of a schematic diagram of the tracks at McKnight Road. We have Saint George Road to the north and Larry Powell Road to the south. If we could come in from this section right here possibly (indicating). What we have is a constant warning timed device at McKnight Road. It is an electronic transmitter, receiver located at the crossing; and it transmits out these signals. Here, it schematically represents a termination shunt that terminates the signal from that transceiver. So, with no train around, there is a voltage from the transmitter impressed on to the track. The microprocessor device, the constant warning timed device, the GCP-3000, looks at that signal on the track, and that is a normal condition with no train around. As the train passes these termination shunts on either side, the voltage that is on the track, due to the train wheels across the track circuit, forms basically a short circuit to the that signal. As the train approaches, there is this voltage level as this train would come in that would decrease linearly towards the crossing. There is a reference level of a hundred when everything is normal. That is what it is calibrated up to be. As the train approaches, that reference level goes down to zero at the crossing when it is linear. So, what that level does is it basically is proportional to the distance the train is away from the crossing. The rate of change of that level is proportional to the velocity of the train. So, by knowing distance and knowing velocity, we know when the train is going to arrive at the crossing. That is the way this device calculates when to activate the warning devices. MR. PAYAN: The voltage on the rail is always on there; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: What happens if it loses power? MR. SHARKEY: Then it will deactivate, which would be the same result as if it detected a train approaching. It is a closed circuit. It is a normally energized circuit that would de-energize in the event of a train. You would get the same indication if there is a malfunction, that same indication as if a train was coming. MR. PAYAN: Can the amount of warning time be affected in any way once a train is approaching? MR. SHARKEY: The devices today are devices of such a nature that the warning time is very consistent. If the train slows down, once it is detected and the unit says the train is going to be at the crossing in 25 seconds, if the train slows down, naturally, the warning time is going to get longer because it has already made its prediction. If the train speeds up, the warning times would get proportionally shorter for the change in speed. So, if there is acceleration or deceleration, warning times may be affected. MR. PAYAN: Can we get into how the gates operate? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: What activates the gate? Can you explain how that works? MR. SHARKEY: If we could back out a little bit. The lower track is the main track, the track that Train 59 was on that night. What we have is a track circuit that goes with our wayside signals, and we have signals about nine thousand feet north of the crossing and another set of signals about six thousand feet south of the crossing. We have a track circuit in there where you can employ that track circuit to as act as a redundant part of the system. What we do is from a circuit at the end, we repeat the information that there is no train on that track back to McKnight Road via an audio frequency overlay circuit. If we could zoom in on that center portion, the lower portion of McKnight Road. So primarily for Track One, the main track, we have the 1XR, which is the crossing relay for the one track; and in this, we have two paths that can hold up or energize this relay -- relay being an electromechanical device. It is part of our logic circuit. So, we have two paths that are holding this up. So, the first thing that happens is a southbound train would deactivate 1 WAR, which is a wrap circuit, that long wrap circuit. This contact would open, but the relay would remain energized through the outputs of our grade crossing predictor. When the grade crossing predictor detects that the train is going to be the prescribed time from the crossing, this contact would open thereby de-energizing the 1XR. That starts off basically -- can you turn that? (Adjustment of Diagram.) MR. SHARKEY: It starts somewhat of the chain reaction. Over here, to the right, over to this lower right portion, here, we have the 1XR on the top line. When that contact opens, it drops the crossing control relay to the main crossing. Basically, we have one relay for Track One and one relay for Track Two, the side track. When that de-energizes, it opens the two relays over here (indicating). In the lower right-hand corner is what is called the XR-GPR. That relay I am referring to, all these relays are normally energized, so if there is an open wire or if anything goes wrong in the circuitry, it will go to its restrictive state and cause the flashers to operate. So, this XR is normally energized. Then the XR one will start dropping or de-energizing so it starts the change. If a wire opened in that circuit, the same thing would happen. So what happens is when a train is detected at the 1-XR, we end up dropping the XR-GPR. With that de-energized, it turns on the lights. So, that is what starts the lights flashing, and at that point, the bell begins to ring. The relay above it, the XRPR, is what we refer to as a slow release relay. When you take the energy off of the coil of the relay, the XRPR remains energized for four seconds, and that is what gives us our gate delay time. So, the lights start flashing first, and then four seconds later, the gates start to descend. I think yesterday we saw some, I guess, some confusion and conflicting talk about gates going down or being down. What I prefer to talk about is the gate starting to descend, and that happens about four seconds after. The minimum prescribed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is three seconds. MR. PAYAN: Can you explain what an XR-1 monitors and the XPR and an XGR or XRGPR? MR. SHARKEY: The XR would be that the crossing control circuits, when it is energized and the crossing control circuits do not sense an approaching train. The XRPR would be to give our gate delay time, and when that relay de-energizes is when the gates start to descend. The XR-GPR is the relay that would, when it is de-energized, that would light the lights through a flash relay that alternates the lights back and forth. MR. PAYAN: The XR is the one that gets the signal from the controller, from the GCP? MR. SHARKEY: That is the one that is the main relay for sensing an approaching train. MR. PAYAN: Once the XGPR tells the gates to start, can you explain how they are finally put into a horizontal position? MR. SHARKEY: Okay. I believe that would be slide two. What we have here is some cables going from the control house out to the various flashing light signals, and the lower square on the bottom is the actual gate mechanism or the gate motor. How this operates, that XR relay actually keeps the motor control relay in the upper left-hand corner energized. When you de-energize the XR, it de-energizes this motor control relay which turns on the motor, and the motor starts to drive, from the 90 degree position, the gate arm to the horizontal position. Through a series of contacts on the rotating shaft inside the gate mechanism, we get various angular deflexions of the gate arm. When the motor drives the gate down, it starts to accelerate because it is going to accelerate from motor motion and from gravity because the gates are counter-weighted to be heavy to where they will fall; but normally, the gate is held in the up position. There is actually energy on a ratchet and gear train here that is called a hold-clear mechanism. So actually, we hold the gates in the up position and then allow them to descend when we take energy off of the motor control relay. MR. PAYAN: If you lose energy, would that affect the gate? MR. SHARKEY: If we lose energy completely, like if all the cables were severed, the gate would lower by gravity to a horizontal position. MR. PAYAN: So, you drive it down? MR. SHARKEY: We drive it from the 90 degree position to the 50 degree position. Then at that point, one of the contacts opens. Then what we do is the armature of the motor actually acts like a generator at that point, and it is turning and it is causing the electricity to flow through a resistor that is in the gate mechanism that actually acts as a braking motion. Then went it gets down to the final five degree position, there is a contact that opens up or closes, and then we actually put a short circuit across that armature to act like a brake. It is called a dynamic braking at that point, and that is why you see a gate mechanism come down fairly smoothly. Then when it gets down to the last five degrees, it seems to hesitate and then gradually lower down to the horizontal position. MR. PAYAN: Yesterday, we heard Mr. Nieves testify he saw the gate hit or strike the truck. How does that affect the gate operation if it hits something midway down? MR. SHARKEY: Well, below the 50 degree mark, it is going to be trying to go down by gravity at that point. So, it is going to strike it and not try to force its way down. If it is above the 50 degree, then the motor is going to drive and try to continue to push the gate down to at least the 50 degree mark. MR. PAYAN: There is no reset where it will automatically come on if it can't go down? MR. SHARKEY: No. It doesn't hit something and then restore it. It is not like a garage door. MR. PAYAN: It will just continue down? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: I would like to get into a little bit of the maintenance. How often does the Canadian National/Illinois Central inspect its railroad active warning devices? MR. SHARKEY: At least once a month. MR. PAYAN: When was the last inspection at McKnight Road? If you could, tell us what that consisted of. MR. SHARKEY: Let me refer to the Signal Factual Report. The last monthly inspection was on February 24th of 1999 at 1400 hours. The maintainer -- the signal personnel that are responsible for maintaining signals on the territory -- the maintainer would check the housings to make sure they were secure and padlocked; check the wire and cable for mechanical injury; check the signs to make sure they were in good condition and visible. The flashing light signals, he would activate the flashing light signals; look at the light units to make sure all the bulbs operated and that they were visible and properly aligned; that the units were clean. There is no traffic signal interconnected at this crossing, so that is not applicable. If a gate arm or gates are used, check the gate length to make sure it is proper out to the middle of the street; and that there is correct timing, in other words, that three seconds minimum gate delay time. Then he would check the stand-by power. Signal systems are backed up by battery back-up, so that there is a battery on the circuit at all times that is being charged. There would be an operating battery that would operate the grade crossing predictor equipment. Then there would be a light battery that would power the light circuits so if you have a power outage, you have stand-by power. He would check the power. He would check these reference levels on the GCP. In this case, the reference level was 97 on both tracks, and it remains true. That is what he checked. He did replace the flasher relay at that time. It is not noted exactly what the failure was, but he replaced the flasher relay at that time. Maybe there was something he found on his inspection, but it was not anything that was reported to the railroad. MR. PAYAN: Was that the only exception found? MR. SHARKEY: He did repair the belt. Again, he makes a notation that he repaired it. It doesn't say what was what the problem was. MR. PAYAN: He looks at that once a month you said? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. PAYAN: We go to post-accident. Do you recall what time you arrived on the scene on March 15th? MR. SHARKEY: It was a few minutes after midnight on the 16th. MR. PAYAN: Could you describe what you saw when you arrived. MR. SHARKEY: Well, the emergency operation was quiet. I came down Route 50 parallel to the tracks coming from the north. So, there was all of the ambulance activity staged at the Carter Lumber Company. I parked my car down on Route 50 and then walked. I identified myself when I walked in. Then I walked down the back road towards the crossing. The train was stopped on the crossing as we have seen in the exhibits. There were three or four cars on the crossing north. At that time, our maintenance personnel and the field management personnel had just completed a download of the data recorder. We had conversed on car phones while we were en route. I told them I wanted about three or four people to go into the signal house, download the event recorder, look but don't touch anything except for the process of downloading the event recorder, then do that, and lock the house back up. I got there, and they had just completed that and gave me the disk of the recorder print-out. MR. PAYAN: Can you explain what the event recorder print-out indicated? MR. SHARKEY: The event recorder indicated we had 26 seconds warning time on the grade crossing predictor and that the actual events indicated that there was 25 seconds operation between the time the XR de-energized and the time the island circuit was occupied. MR. PAYAN: You said 25 seconds. Is that the time the computer saw the train or the actual flashing of the lights? MR. SHARKEY: That would have been from the time that the XR relay de-energized, saying that the predictor saw the train, until the train occupied the island circuit, which was a short track circuit that extended about 60 feet north of the crossing. There is a positive section of the track circuit transmitter talking to the receiver at that point where it shunts that voltage to absolute zero, and that is called a 90 circuit. At that point, we just had to determine the elapsed time. MR. PAYAN: Can you give us a view of the post-accident testing and the results of that? MR. SHARKEY: Basically, nothing was done until later the next day after NTSB personnel arrived. We went back in and downloaded the event recorder again. Nothing had changed because there had been no subsequent train moves or trains at the crossing. We had considerable damage to one of the signals, so that had to be replaced before we were able to put the circuits back in service. We finally opened up the crossing Wednesday night. We went through our annual and our monthly inspection again as part of our post-accident tests. We checked the predictor. A rail was broken, so at that point, the predictor circuit was de-energized and the gates were down and the flashers were flashing. We also did a relay test. All those relays I referred to were individually tested to make sure they were within specifications. Wiring going to the gates were checked to make sure they had proper insulation and resistance and there wasn't heavily damaged cables. The relays and the cables all checked appropriate. MR. PAYAN: How about the unit itself, the predictor itself? What tests were done on it? MR. SHARKEY: We observed train movements after we put it back in service after train service was restored. Subsequently to that, the manufacturer sent engineers to the site to look at the location. The unit was taken out of service and sent back to the manufacturer's plant where each board was individually tested to see if it was compliant with their test procedures. MR. PAYAN: Were you notified of any exceptions taken? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. PAYAN: You mentioned some damage to the equipment. Can you briefly explain what kind of damage you found or that you witnessed when you arrived? MR. SHARKEY: What we see here is an end view of the west gate looking south. MR. PAYAN: The west gate, is that the first gate or the second gate the trucker would have encountered? MR. SHARKEY: This would have been the first gate the truck came to (indicating). To the south, we see the derailed Amtrak cars. When I arrived on the scene -- you cannot see it in this photo, but up above, up on the mast is where we have the flashing light signal units; there are two units, 12-inch flashing light units facing west, and two flashing light units facing east -- there was only one unit that was still intact. It was the front light, the south light. You can barely see the bottom both of it here. It was in its proper position. The other three flashing light units were broke off at the aluminum elbow that comes out the junction box. When I arrived, two of the lights were hanging by their wires and spinning in the wind. One of the light units was completely missing. It was later found about a hundred feet north of the crossing. The crossbuck sign, the X sign that is on the flashing light signal and gate mast, it has a cast bracket that holds it to the mast, and that cast bracket was broken, and the crossbuck was laying on the ground. The belt can be seen here laying on the ground. Let's see what else is at the top. The counter-weight arm. There is a counter-weight that extends on an arm, and it goes out horizontal when the gate is horizontal. That counter-weight arm was broken off. The counter-weight was laying on the ground just below the signal. It was noted that the counter-weight, except for the casting, the arm with it physically being cracked and broke off, that there was no other damage to counter-weight. I will get back to that in a moment. Further down on it, this is the gate mechanism that has the motor in the center mast, and there is a gate arm that comes out. This is the type of arm. There was a wooden gate arm. It was basically two boards that we refer to as baseboards that tied to a tongue. They bolt together in kind of a "V" shape. The baseboard on the field side -- I will refer to field side versus track side -- the baseboard on the field side was cracked through the first bolt holes which bolts it to the tongue and the field baseboard. The gate tongue, again, was cracked right here (indicating), but nothing had fallen off. What we see are the lights hanging down, and we see the board is broke, but we don't a gate arm laying on the ground. MR. PAYAN: Where is the light normally seated? MR. SHARKEY: There will be a light on the tip. It looks like there is a junction box there that you can barely see. Then there is another junction box. There are three lights on the gate arm. The one at the end of the gate stays on all the time, and the other two flashing units are seated with the flashing light signals up on the mast. There were signs where the -- there is a concrete foundation, and there is a junction box on the base where the mast fits in and then the base bolts to the foundation. There were signs of the base being struck by the rebar. The bolts were, where the base connects to the foundation, the bolts were bent so that when we knew it was time to replace the signal, we actually had to replace the foundation also. So, there was evidence of the whole signal being hit and the impact causing basically a shoving movement in the southwesterly direction. I think everybody was very good. I believe that, you know, it was the base being hit that caused all this fracture to the metal parts on top. That motion from the gate being shoved in a southwesterly direction could also have caused some of this fracture on the gate because if it would be an impact more or less of a whiplash that the tip would want to remain at rest, and it would brake in that same direction. One of things we were concerned about, and that we had testimony yesterday about, was gates possibly bouncing along the truck. We had visually observed the bottom of the gate, and we didn't appear to see any marks where the gate appeared to be bouncing along the rebar. Later in the week, we actually put wooden boards back on the gate and purposely dropped it on to a load of steel that the truck drove, and there were marks. Those similar type of marks were not on the gate that was in service after the accident or at the time of the accident. That pretty well describes the damage to this gate mechanism. It took severe impact at the base. We note that we still have a gate arm here, and I believe that with the base being struck directly below the gate arm, it somewhat indicates that the steel that hit came in on an arc, coming in underneath the gate arm rather than going down. Obviously, it didn't go down through gate arm to get to the base, so it had to go slowly on some arc. That may be able to help determine where the position of the rear of the truck was at the time of the accident. MR. PAYAN: Thank you. Mr. Jacky has some questions for you. MR. JACKY: Thank you. Good morning Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. JACKY: You mentioned before that the signal at McKnight Road has what you called an event recorder on there. Could you give us a general description of the recorder, what it records, and what it recorded on to? MR. SHARKEY: There are basically two types of devices within this constant warning time cabinet that gives us a recording. There is a keyboard display that is shown in the Signal Factual Report that actually is an LED type of print-out that shows this same information that we see down at the bottom. MR. JACKY: That is Attachment One of the Signal Factual, which is Exhibit 3A just for information. MR. SHARKEY: The information we see down at the bottom, 26, that is the warning time that would be shown on the keyboard display. There is a detected speed, island speed, and an average speed that is also shown on the keyboard display that is represented by the numbers 73, 71 and 68, these numbers down here (indicating). That is also shown on this keyboard display. That is an independent calculation within the unit. That information is fed over to a recorder. This information that we are seeing here is what is captured and recorded. So, we have different -- we have times shown here and different numbers, and what they represent right in here (indicating) is numbers on a recorder interface card that we use to input different relay positions into the recorder card. For instance, number one over here on the left, this line right here (pointing) indicates everything is back to normal. When the one disappears, that is the time that, that wrap circuit de-energized. Let's see; on pin two, it is the Track One GCP sensing the train. So here, we see two -- at that point in time, we see two, three, and four disappearing at the same time, the same seconds. That is basically our One Track constant warning time device, the 1XR, and what I have referred to as the XR disappearing. That is what would start the chain reaction of both the lights turning on, which is noted by this, actually, item ten. MR. JACKY: What would be the first indication to the recorder or to the signal that the train is approaching? MR. SHARKEY: Number one disappearing at 9:16:57. That indicates the clock on the recorder was slow by approximately 29 minutes. So, the times that we see here are really closer to 9:47. When we adjusted the time on the recording device, we found out it was 29 minutes and 18 seconds slow. So, 29 minutes and 18 seconds need to be added to all these times to come up with the actual. MR. JACKY: The elapsed time should be accurate? MR. SHARKEY: The elapsed time is accurate, yes. So at this point, we detect a train. So, at 41, we detect a train. At 45, item eight disappears, and eight happens to be the XRPR, which is the relay that de-energizes, to de-energize the relay in the gate mechanism which starts it now. So, there is a four second interval between when the flashers would start here and when the gate would start to descend. So, the next thing that we see disappear is five, and five is the One Track island circuit. So, that is the circuit that extends about 60 feet north of the crossing. When the train enters that circuit, then the five disappears here so there is, what, 21 seconds elapsed between when the gate starts to descend and the train gets to the island circuit, which is approximately the time of impact. MR. JACKY: How long would it take approximately for the gates to descend, assuming they were not obstructed by any obstacle? MR. SHARKEY: Normally within ten seconds. The reason we do not have a gate down indication on here is that the gate mechanisms are not set up to have that extra contact in them that could be used to record that the gate is down to a certain position. In fact, depending on which scenario you believe, if the gate bounced along the truck, the gate would have never got down. It never would have indicated that because it was obstructed. You know, it would have been prevented from getting down to, say, five degrees or whatever. So, at what point do we determine down is down? What we have to do is rely on the control circuitry and look at different failure mechanisms and probabilities. MR. JACKY: Which leads me to my next question: If there was something in the crossing such as a vehicle or an obstacle that was preventing the gates from coming all the way down, would the event recorder record that? How would that be recorded on the event recorder? MR. SHARKEY: All we know on this event recorder is that the energy was removed off of the control relay and the gate mechanism, which would cause it to start down. If the gate was obstructed, this would not detect it or record it. MR. JACKY: If there were a vehicle across the crossing without touching the gate or having the gates touching the vehicle, but if the vehicle, say, had its tires or something across the track, would that be indicated on the event recorder at all? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. JACKY: You mentioned that in this case for the accident train, the signal provided a 26 second warning time. Could you explain to us on the print-out where that comes from? MR. SHARKEY: The 26 is indicated right here as being the warning time that the predictor sensed its output disappearing to the time it sensed the island circuit disappearing, and that is 26 seconds there. The times along the left between when the XR relay dropped and the island relay dropped was 25 seconds. There could be a slight, because we are going through a chain of three relays energizing, there is a slight time delay in a fraction of a second. What is happening here is that the recording device is truncating the times. If something happened at 25.9, it rounds it down to 25. If something happened at 26.1, it is going to round it down to 26, so that is why we get a second deviation here. MR. JACKY: I think you mentioned previously the signal at McKnight Road is programmed or designed to provide a 25 second warning time; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. JACKY: In the Factual, it mentions there is a 30 second time that was programmed into signal computer. Could you explain the difference there? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. There is an equipment reaction time that is involved. When we designed it, I think we designed that equipment reaction time. It is supposed to take three or four seconds for the equipment to make its prediction. So, what we are saying by setting up our termination shunts at 30 seconds and we are setting up our programming at 30 seconds, it will give us at least 25, which gives us a buffer time above 20 seconds minimum that is prescribed by the MUDC. MR. JACKY: Ultimately, when you determine what warning time you would like to have for that individual signal or grade crossing predictor, how is that physically entered into the signal? MR. SHARKEY: The same keypad display that has the 26 seconds shown on it is used as a keypad, and it is used for programming the device. MR. JACKY: So, the maintenance person would enter in 30 seconds on the keypad? MR. SHARKEY: (Nonverbal response.) MR. JACKY: You also mentioned earlier something about average speeds for the train. Could you indicate to us on the event recorder print-out where that would come into play? MR. SHARKEY: We have the approach speed, the detected speed, island speed, and the average speed. Honestly, there is a three up there, and I think the next witness may be better able to talk to those, but there are three different speeds that the unit records. Two of them are snap shot in time, and one is an integration over time to get the average speed. What we are seeing here is some deceleration. Again, these are electronically derived from the slope of that line that I talked about, that reference point. So, it is not the same as the speed that you are going to see on the event recorder. This is generally used for maintenance. The idea was to be able to tell whether, if we had a shorter warning time or a longer warning time, we would see if it was accelerating train or a decelerating train. Unfortunately, it was never intended to be an accurate speed, but more of an indication of acceleration, deceleration or accident speed. It indicates a deceleration. MR. JACKY: Do you have any knowledge as to exactly how those speeds are calculated within the GCP? MR. SHARKEY: I think I would rather defer to the next witness. MR. JACKY: I asked you before about whether there were any cars or vehicles, if they were in the signal, how that would be handled by the recorder. You have mentioned the damage to the signal itself. If a vehicle were to, say, drive through the actual gate or break the gate, would that be indicated on the event recorder at all, to your knowledge? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. JACKY: Within the Signal Group Factual Report, it indicates that on the day of the accident, there was an incident of false activation. Are you aware of that or the nature of that? MR. SHARKEY: Do you know exactly where? MR. JACKY: Yes. It is on page nine in paragraph number four. The paragraph starts (reading) McKnight Road incident reports were reviewed for 1998 and 1999. MR. SHARKEY: I show that as paragraph three. MR. JACKY: I'm sorry. In yours, it would be paragraph number three? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Tom, what were you looking at? MR. JACKY: It is the, Signal Group Factual, 3A. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I have that here. It is a little thick. MR. JACKY: It is Exhibit 3A, paragraph number four. In the information Ruben has put in front of me, it shows it as being paragraph number three. MR. SHARKEY: Yes, I can explain that. MR. JACKY: Okay. MR. SHARKEY: What we did on Wednesday morning, the 17th, is we, Pat Sullivan (phonetic), of the NTSB and Dave Flower (phonetic) of Amtrak, and I, we went up to our Homewood offices, the railroad, and went to our CNS control center where we dispatch the maintainers out to sites that we receive a malfunction report. I went there the computer's database personally, and I looked at any report that we had about McKnight Road. They are shown in the subsequent pages. After the accident, we called our signal personnel through the CNS control center, so there was an entry in the computer saying that yes, there was an accident, and we called out all this personnel. It was not a malfunction report. It was just the fact we had a work out open on McKnight Road because of the incident. MR. JACKY: What history of false activations, to your knowledge, does the system or the signal system at McKnight Road have? MR. SHARKEY: Again, that is shown in the Signal Factual Report. I guess it says seven, including there was, then six previous, and they were all in the early part of 1998. We had a false activation due to a defective card, and the maintainer cleared it. That was January of 1998. We had a another incident in here that listed McKnight Road, and I included it. In fact, those are my handwritten notations on all these reports as I went through and analyzed the data. There was a report on March 14th of 1998. There was a tracking indication on. Since it stated that there was something found near McKnight Road, I included it. It was not an actual malfunction. On April 23rd of 1998, the west gate was down, and the maintainer replaced the armature brush in the motor of the gate mechanism. So, that was a false activation. May 20th of 1998, we had an alleged false activation. It was not confirmed. When the maintainer arrived, everything was working as intended. Frequently, we get those types of reports if there are switching moves or if somebody doesn't see a train go across a crossing, things like that. On June 10, 1998, there was a false activation. It was will open bond wire that had the island circuit out. That caused the high EC levels. So, that was the false activation. Then July 24th of 1998, we had a tripped circuit breaker. They had confirmed there was a false activation. We would have had the gates down and flashing or the gate down and the lights dark without a train on the crossing. That was a result of the tripped circuit breaker. So, the last malfunction that was reported at that crossing was July 24, 1998. MR. JACKY: Thank you. What programs does the Canadian National/Illinois Central have to do ensure the continued operation of the signal systems on the railroad? What I mean by that is, Are there any efforts by the railroad to go and look at the print-outs from the event recorders and determine that, based on the information that is recorded, the signal is operating properly and giving the requisite warning times? MR. SHARKEY: Well, as part of the of annual inspection and tests which we have to determine that the warning times are proper, that can either be given or done by recorders or it can be done by observation or it can be done through a calculated simulation type mode where you go out there and simulate it between the distances. So, on an annual basis, we have to confirm that. That is a part of the FRA regulations and the 234 rules. On a monthly basis, the maintainers will go on the reserve and fix them. If there are errors at all, if there have any been any problems, they would also show up as an error on this keypad display. As a practice of going through the recordings, they are time consuming, as you can see just going through this one, and generally, it would be done on an exceptional basis. If there was a malfunction reported, somebody would look back to determine it, they could find out from the recorder device. MR. JACKY: If there was a malfunction, if there was an incident reported, would the records from that signal recorder be kept on file? MR. SHARKEY: Not as a matter of record. MR. JACKY: Those are all the questions I have. Mr. Raby has a couple more questions. MR. RABY: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. MR. RABY: For a little clarification, if you could, please, the island circuit, you stated the island circuit extends some 60 foot north of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: For accident reconstruction and things, I need a reference point for the crossing. Is that the edge of the roadway or edge of the timbers, it would be in between the tracks? MR. SHARKEY: Generally, we refer it as clocking the center line of the crossing. MR. RABY: The center line of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, sir. MR. RABY: This island circuit, what is its function? MR. SHARKEY: It is what we refer to as a positives section of detection. There is a transmitter given the frequency of one hooked up to the wires one side of the track to a receiver hooked up to the wires on the other side of the crossing so that there is approximately 120 foot track circuit that, when it is de-energized, there is no time-out feature, that the gates would remain down. It is also used for resetting some internal calculations on the circuitry inside the flash. MR. RABY: The timing of the signals, I would like to get some clarification on that if I could. The Federal Railroad Administration says the lights or the signals must be activated for a minimum of 20 seconds before what? MR. SHARKEY: The arrival of the training at the crossing. MR. RABY: At what point is at the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: I take it to be the edge of the street. MR. RABY: The edge of the street? So regardless of the speed of the train approaching, the regulations say the warning lights must be on for a period of 20 seconds before the train arrives at the edge of the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: For a normal through train, yes. Under a switching condition, there are alternate means where the train crew -- MR. RABY: With the predictor system, that 20 seconds is to the edge of the crossing for a three train? MR. SHARKEY: For a three train, it would generally be to the edge of the island. MR. RABY: So, the 20 second FRA regulation really don't apply to the island circuit. MR. SHARKEY: I don't quite understand that. MR. RABY: If a switching engine was pulling a grain car out of that siding, when it hits the island circuits, the lights come on? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY; There is no timing sequence involved? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY: They come on, the gates come down? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. If a train stopped just outside the island circuits, the gates would recover. Then if it went to proceed across the crossing, it would be possible for it to get to the crossing in less than 20 seconds depending on the distance, but it would activate the signal at the edge of the island circuit. MR. RABY: That is kind of what I said. The 20 seconds doesn't apply in the island circuit? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. RABY: The timing sequence then outside of the island circuit is programmed into the computer, the predictors? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: For my understanding, I want a clarification. Then that timing sequence never changes regardless of train speed? MR. SHARKEY: It is designed to provide a relatively uniform warning time. If you have perfect conditions, perfect constant speed of the train, never varying conditions of the electrical circuit, yes, you would have a constant warning time. That is part of a theoretical within a practical. You are going to get some minor variations. MR. RABY: The variations would be result of relays or something like that or some kind of equipment lag? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. What we are talking about is an electrical circuit that uses two rails of the wires. So that would be two wires laying on the ground, and you are going to get variations in moisture content and things like that affect them slightly. We are just talking about in the one or two second range. MR. RABY: I was thinking that only applied to the computation of speed, the calculation of speed that the predictor makes. Once it determines a speed of the train, then it knows where that train started the computation at, the point of the tracks. From then on, it doesn't really pay too much attention to that. If it detects a 79 a mile an hour train, then its only next job is to know when to turn on that 20 second or whatever that timing signal is, 25 seconds, to start it so that the motorist has 26 seconds, 25 seconds before the front of that train reaches the edge of that crossing. MR. SHARKEY: I guess what I was trying to say is that there could be variations that were where it is trying to determine that distance, that can change by atmospheric conditions slightly in the train speed calculations. You know, it is not exact stop watch type of calculation that are used for the traffic signals. The yellow is four seconds, and the green is so many seconds. It is not that precise because it is making a calculation based on the track circuit conditions. MR. RABY: It is still not clear to me. I understand what you said, but it is not clear to me that, that applies the whole time that train is traveling down to that crossing. That would only apply at the beginning when it senses the train and it has to determine the speed and it knows how far up the tracks that its shunt is. So, it already knows that distance down to the crossing. It really only needs to know the speed of the train and the time, and then through computation and calculations, it says I got to turn the switch on in the next second or the next five seconds, or the next timing sequence. Then it starts a timing sequence. Isn't that independent of everything else or is that continually changed? MR. SHARKEY: When you said the shunt, are you talking about the termination shunt that is out there a fixed distance? MR. RABY: 3,400 feet or something. MR. SHARKEY: What it is actually doing is looking at the train shunt and making a calculation as to the distance to the train. It is not timing -- it is not saying the train is doing 79 miles an hour and once it gets past this point, I will count down. It is not making that type of calculation. What it is doing is looking at the distance to the train and the velocity of the train and making that calculation. So, that point can move slightly. It is not making an elapsed time calculation. It is not a five seconds after I sense him go by the termination shunt, I am going to drop the gate because he is going so fast. It is not making that type of calculation. Again, perhaps the next witness from the manufacturer of the equipment might be better able to answer your question. MR. RABY: The gates, on the monthly test, are these gates exercised; meaning are they each individual gate, or together? Are they turned on and looked at and watched, timed to see if they perform within specifications? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. RABY: You mentioned mechanical relays. It looks like you have quite a few mechanical relays. Is that the state of art today in railroad signaling, mechanical relays rather than solid state? MR. SHARKEY: They are both used. It depends on different philosophies of thought. An electromechanical relay gives you very excellent electrical isolation and some immunity from lightning damage and things like that where you can get some isolation. It is kind of a hybrid of electronic outputs and some mechanical relays for isolation. MR. RABY: I do understand sometimes mechanical relays do stick or fail to make contact. I was wondering if the reliability was still there and that you were satisfied, that the railroad is satisfied the mechanical relays have a reliability to satisfy to use the, to continue to use them. MR. SHARKEY: Yes, In fact, I believe it was about 15 years ago, with these same types of relays, the FRA Administration basically relaxed their testing interval because of the high degree of reliability of these types of relay. MR. RABY: Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Sharkey. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Anything on follow-up? (No response). CHAIRMAN BLACK: The United Transportation Union is up. Questions, sir? EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION MR. DWYER: Mr. Sharkey, is there a minimum or a maximum time from the time the light for the gates to come down? Is there a standard for that? MR. SHARKEY: The gate should not start its descent for a minute of three seconds. It can take longer for the gate to start to come down, and the gate must be down five seconds prior to the arrival of the train. So as long as things are working in that range -- that is the operating range. Those are minimums and maximums. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Marshall, MELCO? MR. MARSHALL: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, sir. Amtrak, Mr. Bullock? MR. BULLOCK: We don't have any questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? EXAMINATION BY THE CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD MR. ED HARRIS: Mr. Sharkey, you went through some of the description of the false activations that occurred earlier in 1998. Can you explain the difference between a false activation and an activation failure? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. A false activation is when the signals are activated without a train approaching. An activation failure is the failure of the signals to activate when a train is approaching. In other words, it doesn't give the 20 second warning or fails to give any warning at all. MR. ED HARRIS: Thank you. When you put up the chart indicating the times of the -- and we are talking basics here -- the circuitry changes and the activation of the lights and activation of the gates, you had mentioned the clock had not been properly set; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: The elapsed times when you did your retest and your team did their activities, the elapsed times remained accurate? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. Maybe I should clarify that what we did to reset the clock and establish what time this recording device determined impact to be or determined that the island circuit was occupied was the morning, the Wednesday morning. This was this would be the 17th. We were out with the signal team, and I used my cell phone to dial in through our switchboard to our National Bureau of Standard time, and with the keypad display, we could see what time the recording device was set to. We held up the phone and listened for the beep and determined we got the standard time, and that is where we determined the 29 minutes and some seconds that the clock was off. Then we recalibrated the unit to that time and changed, basically to be able to add that time on to the recorder time to come up with the 9:47 or the approximate time of 9:47. MR. ED HARRIS: Thanks for that clarification. As you were going through the times, based on Train Number 59's approach to the circuitry, the lights became or started flashing approximately 25 seconds prior to the train getting to the grade crossing; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: You also mentioned that four seconds later, after Train 59 hit the circuitry, the gates would have started to come down and your records indicate that as well? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: You also mentioned that after that four seconds and the gates began to come down, the gates would have been in the down position approximately nine or ten seconds after that? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: Based on the calculation of the initial 25 second warning or the activation of the lights, the gates would have been down approximately 10 seconds prior to the accident; correct? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. ED HARRIS: Mr. Sharkey, we have looked at the exhibit that indicated the tremendous force in which the rebar hit the signal mast, through which the west gates were attached to. There are two other exhibits on file that indicate some broken gates. Do you recall seeing those exhibits? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: In your opinion, in the regard to which the gates had been broken both on the west and east side of the grade crossing, particularly the east side, that the gates were broken while the trucks was going through the crossing or across the crossing? MR. SHARKEY: That was the appearance of the east gate right here, and there was the appearance it was broken in an easterly direction. MR. ED HARRIS: We heard Mr. Nieves yesterday give testimony that it was his opinion that the truck did, indeed, drive around the gates. Do you recall that? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. ED HARRIS: The way these gates are broken, is that indicative of the same comment Mr. Nieves made? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. MR. ED HARRIS: I have no further questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It was getting pretty close to lawyering there. I am not entirely sure I would characterize what Mr. Nieves said the way you did, but the record will speak for itself. The Federal Railroad Administration? MR. BLACKMORE: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions, thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Illinois Commerce Commission? EXAMINATION BY THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION MR. STEAD: Mr. Sharkey, you mentioned before that the typical crossing signal system is provided with battery back-up power; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: What would happen to the system is if all power was lost, both the primary commercial AC power and the back-up power? MR. SHARKEY: If all was lost, the gates would be not flashing, but the gate arms would lower to the horizontal position. MR. STEAD: They would go down? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: One other question: The relay that closes to provide power to the automatic flashing light signals, was that recorded by the event recorder? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. STEAD: What did the recorder show? MR. SHARKEY: It showed that we had the 1XR, the XR, all four of those relays, the three relays, the XR and the XR-GPR, which is the relay, that, when it de-energizes, it puts energy to the lights; that they are released at the same time. MR. STEAD: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: Mr. Sharkey, you have explained to us the difference between activation failures and false activations, and you have indicated there had been seven previous activation failures prior to the date of the accident; is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: No, it is not. MR. WALPERT: What is? MR. SHARKEY: We had seven total work orders in our control center. I think I will have to go through them again, but there were no activation failures. There were a couple of disk errors, at least one. We will go through it again. That is the best way to do it. We had a false activation in January of 1998. We had one report that was not a malfunction of the crossing at all, but a track light on the dispatcher's panel in March. We had a false activation in April due to the armature brush. That is two false activations. We had an alleged false activation that was not confirmed that was cleared on arrival in May. We had a confirmed false activation June 10th due to the time clock. That is three. We had a confirmed false due to a tripped breaker in July. So, we had four false activations in early 1998; no activation failures, and in three of the incident reports, one involved the accident itself and calling out maintainers for that. One was not confirmed, and the third had nothing do with the crossing. There were seven reports in our computer, but they were four false activations. MR. WALPERT: Thank you for clarifying that for me. Do I understand correctly then the only way of knowing of the false activations would be by the reports filed? There is no not being reported on the -- go ahead. MR. SHARKEY: They may be recorded, but what was difficult, what we -- you know, normally we would get a report if it was a false activation. Sometimes, what is difficult is to determine if it is a train move or switching move or something like that from the recording device. MR. WALPERT: Subsequent to the accident, do you have any reports of activation failures? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. WALPERT: Could you tell us how many? MR. SHARKEY: There were three. MR. WALPERT: Were those investigated? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. WALPERT: What was the determination of that investigation? MR. SHARKEY: There was one incident that involved a warning time that was shorter than normal due to a high resistance bond in the track panels that were put in place right after the derailment. Subsequently, the panels were welt welded back in. There was an incident while we were testing a circuit and making a change at the street. We were upgrading the control circuitry at a street, two streets to the north of a TR-37, which is a new circuit. During the test period, a switcher came out for something and thought the crossing was protected, and it was not. We filed that as an activation failure. Then there was a situation where a grain car was leaking soy meal. It has tendency to cause a coating on the subsequent axles in that car, and we had a momentary loss of shunt. While the train was transferring some crossings, the gates started up and went back down. MR. WALPERT: Subsequent to the accident, have there been any reports of false activations to your knowledge? MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall. MR. WALPERT: Let me ask you this question: How does the engineer on an approaching train determine if the warning devices are activated correctly? MR. SHARKEY: On the side of flashing light signal heads, there are, sometimes they are referred to as peep sites. That is basically a clear lens on the side of the flashing light signals where you can see the flashing lights. There is a white light coming through the side of the flashing light signal. MR. WALPERT: Are there any virtual cab signals the engineer could observe to ascertain that the signals are working properly upon approaching those signals? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. WALPERT: If a signal may malfunction, is there any way that an engineer, a locomotive engineer, could know that a signal had malfunctioned without actually observing the signal on approaching it? MR. SHARKEY: I am not sure I fully understand you. MR. WALPERT: Is there any visual observation in the cab or any signal that may be radio or otherwise that may be sent to the locomotive engineer or the cab to let him know that the signal at the crossing may have malfunctioned? MR. SHARKEY: No. MR. WALPERT: Those are all the questions I have. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, sir. Mr. Sweedler? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. SWEEDLER: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. Earlier in your testimony, you mentioned that after the accident, you had proceeded to the signal house and downloaded the event recorder and then locked the house or the cabinet; I am not sure which. MR. SHARKEY: I didn't personally do that. I instructed the field management personnel to proceed and do that. MR. SWEEDLER: I am just curious, and the reason I am asking this question is you are probably aware the Safety Board has had some difficulty with locomotive event recorders. We now have an understanding that with event recorders, nothing is to be done with them until the Safety Board or the FRA actually arrives on the scene and actually witnesses or actually do the downloading. I am wondering if anything could be done to the recording of what occurred with the signaling system by downloading it or doing anything else to it. My question is: Should it be locked until the authorities arrive so you can do this together with the authorities? MR. SHARKEY: Well, I guess fortunately or unfortunately, and I would say fortunately, I have never gone through a situation like this before to where I was involved in the NTSB coming out. It was a judgment call on my part to make sure we did preserve what evidence we did have in the event something else could have went wrong to eradicate the information. We were able to reproduce the exact same recording in the presence of the NTSB afterwards. MR. SWEEDLER: Do you think in the future it might be a good policy to not do that until the FRA or the NTSB is on the scene? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. SWEEDLER: Have there been any changes to the crossing equipment since the accident? MR. SHARKEY: As I stated, we removed the grade crossing predictor that was not in service and had it tested. Subsequently, we obviously put another one in its place, and that is the way it remains. MR. SWEEDLER: I understand you had video recorders or cameras at the crossing for a period of time. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. SWEEDLER: Could you tell us what their purpose was and are they still there or what did you learn from having them there? MR. SHARKEY: In the weeks and days after things were put back in service and everybody left town and the road was opened, we were getting various reports of various types of malfunctions at the crossing. It was at McKnight to the south or to the north. Basically, our field people were running out there all times of day or night doing downloads to find out that it was somebody complained four hours ago and it was the switcher switching, and that is what they saw. So, it became another way of recording what was going on. When a switching move occurs, the recorder just indicates that the train hit the island circuit. It doesn't indicate when the train hit the edge of the crossing, so an engine switching could pull up on the island circuit, and it shows a ten second warning. There were also reports of vandalism. We had reports of people throwing things at trains, and we were hoping to capture just anything. MR. SWEEDLER: Can you tell us what you did capture? MR. SHARKEY: We never captured anybody throwing anything. We did observe the one incident, the incident that I talked about with the loss of shunt with the grain car. By basically reviewing the films, that is how we determined that it was the grain car losing soy meal, and we were able to identify the car from the photograph and go back and verify that. MR. SWEEDLER: Were you able to pick up anybody driving around the gates? MR. SHARKEY: I personally did not review every film. I didn't refer to many at all. I don't recall. There were times when the county sheriff tried to ask us whether a person had stole a truck at the crossing. The police were starting to ask us to use it for other law enforcement purposes. MR. SWEEDLER: Are the cameras still in operation? MR. SHARKEY: I am not certain. MR. SWEEDLER: Are there any other plans to modify or upgrade the whole system at this particular crossing? MR. SHARKEY: Right now, I don't know of any. I don't know if the Commerce Commission has any plans or if the OT has any plans. Nobody has brought anything forward. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you. That is all I have. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Good morning, Mr. Sharkey. MR. SHARKEY: Morning. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: I want to ask you a couple of questions. Could you tell us a little bit about whether or not the east gate operates independent of the west gate? MR. SHARKEY: The east gate receives its control relay internal to -- that gate mechanism is energized off the same circuit as the west gate. So that relay, I am referring the XRPR, energizes it and sends the signal basically to both gates to be energized at the same time. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Is there separate information recorded for the operation or activation of each gate? MR. SHARKEY: No; it is working off one common control circuit. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Essentially, what you are saying is the information recorded would be applicable to both gates' operation? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Did now notice any discrepancies on the east gate in your review of the post-accident information? MR. SHARKEY: The only thing was a piece approximately a foot and a half long that was broke off at the tip. That was the only damage. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: No other items in terms of the operation of the gate at all? MR. SHARKEY: No; it operated correctly. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Let's talk a little bit about the west gate. Did you have an opportunity to review the gear box of the west gate? MR. SHARKEY: Briefly, yes. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Could you briefly describe what your observations were? MR. SHARKEY: It appeared that the gear train was okay, that it would rotate and things. It was not damaged beyond repair inside that we could tell. The counterweight arms and different parts of it were broke off, but the gear train appeared to be intact, and everything appeared in order inside. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Any witness marks on the gear teeth in the box itself? MR. SHARKEY: Not that I know of. I probably didn't look though. I am not familiar with what you are asking me. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: You mentioned earlier about the damage to the west gate. Would the event recorder identify damage that was made to it in any form or shape at this point? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Essentially, other than physical examination, there would be no mechanism that would record the damage beyond your visual observations? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Dunn? MR. DUNN: Exhibit 2D shows the west gate. What did all the destruction, not to the gate, but to the rest of the mechanism? What do you think hit it, the train truck or the rebar? MR. SHARKEY: I think the rebar hitting the base of the signal caused such a violent impact that it shook the signal and basically snapped all these parts. That scrap has been broke off. MR. DUNN: It was the rebar that hit the pole? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. DUNN: The problems that were shown on the video that you had, did the computer verify these as a problem? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; they correlated exactly. MR. DUNN: The last question is: With all your tests you did and your simulations and everything else that was down out there, did those gates, on March 15, 1999, work, from what your tests showed, as they should have? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; with a high degree of engineering certainty, I would say those gates operated as intended. MR. DUNN: Thank you. I have no further questions. MR. LAUBY: Mr. Sharkey, I have a couple of questions for clarification. I would like to know a little bit more about the gate mechanism. Specifically, can gates come down at different speeds? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. MR. LAUBY: What would affect them? MR. SHARKEY: There is the resistance units that I mentioned as an adjustment inside the gate, and when the gate is descending and the motor is driving it down, if those resistors were adjusted differently, they would have slightly different times. MR. LAUBY: How slight are we talking about? MR. SHARKEY: They would be adjusted so they would come down together within a second. MR. LAUBY: Do the gates come down by gravity for the most part? MR. SHARKEY: Well, they are driven down by the motor from 90 degrees to 50 degrees. Then below 50 degrees, it would be by gravity. The force exerted on it is controlled through that resistor network and how it acts as a dynamic snub on the armature of the motor, intended to brake it, act as a brake. MR. LAUBY: If you take power off the gates and they drop naturally, are they going to come down faster or slower than the programmed drop? MR. SHARKEY: Usually faster. MR. LAUBY: When you come up to the island circuit, you energize the island circuit or you shunt the island circuit with a switch engine, does the three or four second delay still apply to the gates after the flashing lights come on? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it does. MR. LAUBY: Yesterday you heard testimony from Mr. Fosburgh, who talked about the gates. He said he never noticed the gates or the lights activated. We also heard from Mr. Nieves, who indicated he felt the lights and the gates came on simultaneously after the truck was already up on the track. Is there any engineering explanation? Is there some failure or some reason that could happen that you know of in your experience? MR. SHARKEY: You want to maybe divide that into one scenario? It might be easier. MR. LAUBY: Sure; that would be fine. Let's start with the testimony of Mr. Fosburgh, that he witnessed no activation whatsoever. MR. SHARKEY: Actually, I thought what he clarified in one of your questions at the end was the fact that he didn't notice the signals on. I think he tried to -- MR. LAUBY: Let's back up. Let's go to Mr. Nieves who seemed a little bit more certain about what he saw. He came down to our display here and showed the position of the truck, and he indicated the position of the train. He felt he witnessed the lights come on. I believe he also said they came on, the gates dropped, and the lights came on simultaneously. My question is: As an engineer, is this possible, this scenario? MR. SHARKEY: I would say no. I think there was confusion as to what he observed. There is that relay delay time that is going to cause the gates to start down. That relay was tested afterwards, and it was consistent with those timers. The probability of something like that happening once and not being repeated, I would say that would be very rare from an engineering standpoint. I cannot really think of a scenario where that would have occurred. MR. LAUBY: To your knowledge, there is no failure of a relay or a component or a shunt that could cause this equipment to act in that manner? MR. SHARKEY: I would say that there would have to be so many things going wrong at once never to be repeated again. I believe there was a four second delay between the time that the lights activated and the gates started to descend. MR. LAUBY: Let me ask you a couple of questions about the event recorder. Basically, the information gathered from the signal event recorder, does this agree with the statements of the witnesses we heard yesterday? MR. SHARKEY: It I would say it completely agrees the Troy Schultz, the crane operator. Mr. Schultz talked about seeing the lights on, picking up his scrap, seeing the glow of the headlight; rotating to the right, dropping his load, and looking to the left and seeing the impact. In the tests we did that Friday night, I believe the times averaged somewhere in the 23 to 26 second range. Even if we compensate or try to compensate for cold oil versus hot oil, the fact that he didn't see the lights come on, he noticed the lights on. I was part of taking his statement that Friday afternoon, and he talked about not seeing the gate, but believed it was down. Some of his comments didn't come out on the tape that I recall. I was there. Even if the motions on Friday night were slower, I think it is totally consistent with what he said, that the 26 second warning was accurate. He also went on to talk about the glow of the headlight, of being up south of the grain elevator, and he said it was approximately a half mile. Well, the distance from the center line of McKnight Road to the center line of Saint George Road where that grain elevator is just south of is just over 2,700 feet. So, that is totally consistent with his statement. The statement of Mr. Fosburgh, I believe if we say that the truck was getting up close to the crossing when the lights came on, the truck would have obstructed Mr. Fosburgh's view of the signals on the east side of the crossing. I am not sure why he didn't see the signals on the west side of the crossing. There are several electric poles or whatever on the west side between approximately where he was according to one exhibit. So, I am not sure why he didn't notice the lights on. In the last questions you asked him, I believe he said that he did not see the gates not on. As far as Mr. Nieves' testimony, I think there is a little bit of difficulty in maybe sensing distance when you are looking down the road and trying to judge where the truck is compared to where the stopped cars or the signals are. So, I am not sure if it is totally out of character or inconsistent with what he said. I believe if we judge that the truck was probably going slower, that the timing is consistent with Mr. Nieves' testimony. MR. LAUBY: The event recorder we have on this system, have you ever known the event recorder not to agree with the physical movements or physical occurrences at a crossing? MR. SHARKEY: No, sir. MR. LAUBY: Have you ever seen a discrepancy in your career between what the event recorder says has happened at the crossing scene? MR. SHARKEY: No. That particular recording device has been available since early 1991 I believe. As far the times, especially the elapsed times of the events, it is consistent. MR. LAUBY: The incident we had, the two activation, I guess three activation failures we had since the accident at that crossing, did the event recorder reflect the occurrence as it was viewed on videotape? MR. SHARKEY: Yes and consistent with what the train crews reported, yes, the event recorder matched. If it was a short point in time, it matched. If it was a loss of shunts when the train was traversing the crossing, it matched. MR. LAUBY: There was no discrepancy between what physically happened and what the event recorder recorded? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, Mr. Lauby. What is the voltage that goes through this activation relay to turn on the lights and to activate the gate? I guess there are two different relays for that. What is the voltage? MR. SHARKEY: There is a 12 volt, a basic enamel 12 volt circuit. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Basically, everything operates at the crossing of 12 volts. Is it a DC circuit? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The reason for that is so you can have battery back up if you lose commercial power? MR. SHARKEY: Yes; that is correct. The battery chargers are, the crossing batteries are very similar to how a car works. Instead of an alternator, we have battery chargers that are keeping the batteries charged and supplying the majority of the motor. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So it always operates off the battery, and you use the AC, the commercial power, just to charge batteries? MR. SHARKEY: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: That is a fail safe operation? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. CHAIRMAN BLACK: With regard to this, Mr. Jacky got into this a little bit, and some of questions I had from the media and my own questions have to do what you were recording on the event recorder. I understand it is a lot easier to measure or to monitor these relays than it is to monitor the physical movement of something like a gate. That would require some kind of switch that is activated when the gate got all the way down out at the crossing, which means it would require two wires running back to the house, isn't that correct, if you wanted to monitor the gates? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. I would like to point out that the wiring going to the gate is consistent with the original gate design before recorders and stuff were ever conceived. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am talking about the future now. We are sort of progressing into what are we going to do in the future. It would seem to me it would be useful, certainly from an investigatory standpoint, but really even from a monitoring standpoint and maybe you could even use it in court, if you did have something that would physically sense the full extension of the gates and the activation of the lights. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Obviously, this opens up whole areas of discussion. We have already talked about the relays. It has been my experience as a traffic engineer, the traffic signals, that low voltage relays do last a long time as opposed to what we used to have when the same equipment as 110 volt relays, AC relays, which arced and caused problems. There was a question I had earlier about what you would not go to low switches like we did in traffic signals. I think I know the reason: It is cheaper and it is more reliable than a lower voltage is. Is that correct? MR. SHARKEY: Yes, it is. It is a very specially designed relay. The contact makeup does not fail and arc when you weld the contact shut and stuff like they do in a normal electrical contact. These are very fail safe devices. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I would suggest, however, this is great to have this event recorder, but if it doesn't actually sense the actuation, but rather just the impulses, that does leave always this question about did it really work. That is more an observation on my part than it is anything else. MR. SHARKEY: Yes. In fact, we have started to add a contact in the gate mechanisms now that closes at five degrees so that we could have a circuit. In our new installations, yes, we do have to run additional wire. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I saw when I was visiting there when we met on the crossing a few weeks ago that you did have video cameras. I believe you got them on the first crossing north. Was the Indian Oaks or something like that? MR. SHARKEY: Saint George Road. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Saint George Road is the one just past north of the grain elevator? MR. SHARKEY: That is correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Are they on that crossing to the south, just south of the steel mill also, the video cameras? I didn't look. MR. SHARKEY: They were, yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So, you have three? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I actually saw, when I was sitting watch the crossing, a man come out on Saturday or Sunday and change the videotapes. Did he save -- I guess I am trying to figure out what happens to those videotapes. Does anybody review them or do you not look at them unless you get a complaint? MR. SHARKEY: In general, it is based on a complaint basis. We just tape them over. We rotate them and over-write them. They last 24 hours by the way they are recorded. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You mentioned a few moments ago that something you used to monitor back home was the broken gate reports and their correlation to gate running. How many sets of broken gates did you say you have had in past years at this location? Do you recall? MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall there being one in that period of early 1998 where we had the malfunctions or any -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: Just any time. MR. SHARKEY: I don't recall that we have had any broken gates. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You have had no previous broken gates at this location? MR. SHARKEY: No. I mean I looked back. Our records went back to January of 1998. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Do you find that is usually a good indication there is a considerable problem with that at other crossings? MR. SHARKEY: Yes. If the control circuitry is doing what it is intended to do and consistent with type of train operations switching, that will minimize broken gates if you have properly designed circuitry at the location. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Where are the pieces of the gate now, the original the wooden pieces and the gear mechanism from the west gate? Where are they physically located? MR. SHARKEY: The wooden gate arm is on the west side, and the tip on the east side of it, I think a portion was cut off, and it was taken by the Illinois State Police. The gate mechanism itself on the west side, we asked if there was any need to keep it since it was damaged beyond repair for that type of equipment. It was indicated that there was no reason to keep it, so it has been disposed of. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Are you sure it is disposed of or is it just lying around somewhere? MR. SHARKEY: I don't know. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I would like to ask you, if you could find that, I would like for you to send it to us and let us look at it. MR. SHARKEY: I was told it was scrapped. Sometimes, there is a time delay. I can't verify the type of physical handling it has had in the meantime. CHAIRMAN BLACK: If you could find it -- it should be pretty easy to identify -- I would ask that you send that to us and let us complete this issue that Claude raised a minute ago. Since it has been raised, I think we need to look at it in Washington in our Metallurgic Department. MR. SHARKEY: You are looking for marks on the gear teeth? CHAIRMAN BLACK: We are looking for anything we could find. The gate arms, are they still in the possession of the police? MR. SHARKEY: Not to my knowledge. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you for your testimony. Are there any issues raised that either of the parties would like to talk more about or the technical panel here? (No response.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Hearing none, thank you. I think you helped me understand the track circuit better than I did before. You did a good job of explaining that. Thank you very much. (Witness excused.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Let's take a 20 minute break, please. (Recess from 10:58 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Would you like to swear the witness, please. SWORN TESTIMONY OF MARK R. CORBO MR. DUNN: Mr. Corbo, for the record, would you please state your full name and spell it for us. MR. CORBO: Yes, sir. My name is Mark Corbo. M-a-r-k is my first name, and C-o-r-b-o is my last name. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. CORBO: Safetran Systems Corporation. MR. DUNN: What do they do? MR. CORBO: Think manufacture railroad signaling electronics equipment. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities at Safetran? MR. CORBO: I manage the technical support engineering group at our electronics division. Our primary responsibility is to support crossing control products pretty much from the time they are released from product development through their entire life as a salable product and actually after we stop manufacturing them. MR. DUNN: Thank you very much. I will now turn the questioning over to our Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben Payan. EXAMINATION CONDUCED BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. PAYAN: Mr. Corbo -- MR. CORBO: Good morning. MR. PAYAN: Good morning. I would like to start with if you could tell us approximately how many units of this type are currently in operation? MR. CORBO: Yes, sir. We have shipped approximately 20,000, 3000 systems. MR. PAYAN: This is worldwide? MR. CORBO: Yes; we market our products worldwide. MR. PAYAN: As far as Safetran Corporation and all its types of crossing control devices that it manufactures, where does the GCP-3000 range as far as available technology? MR. CORBO: The 3000 is our current top of the line crossing control device. It utilizes microprocessor technology, and to this point in time, it is the most technologically advanced product we have offered for sale for crossing control. MR. PAYAN: Mr. Sharkey provided a brief operational description. Could you provide us some additional description of the crossing predictor of the GCP-3000? MR. CORBO: As was mentioned by Mr. Sharkey, the key defining factor of our system is that we transmit any "C" signal down the rails or we utilize the rails as a circuit. In order for this process to work, we depend on a constant current transmitter. The result of transmitting this current into the rail or into the track circuit gives you a generated voltage. The receiver of the 3000 monitors this voltage. In terms of when a train enters the bounds of the circuit, which is the defined by determination shunts which Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the received voltage is going to change in a downward direction. This is because of the both mechanical and electrical characteristics of the train's axle. It actually shorts out some of the rail or the circuit load. It causes a reduction in voltage. The processor of the 3000 monitors both the amplitude of this voltage and also the rate of change of this voltage. The amplitude is representative of distance from the crossing, and the rate of change of this voltage is represented in the velocity of train. When both of these factors are taken into account and when the train is a programmed amount of time from the crossing, we will extinguish our relay drive output which is normally then translated to operating the warning system. MR. PAYAN: Once the microprocessor calculates the speed of the train and makes a prediction of when to activate the crossing, does it continue to monitor the approaching train? MR. CORBO: Yes. The actual processing for or train detection process is a continuing operation that occurs actually regardless of the presence of a train or if the train is, in fact, moving. So, it is continuous. MR. PAYAN: What is the microprocessor? How does it handle a train that stops on the approach? MR. CORBO: The 3000 system has what we call a time-out feature. Assuming that the warning system has been initiated, when the processor determines that the train has stopped, it will, after a calculated time, will start a time-out process. At the end of this time-out process, we will resupply the relay output from the system, which would then cause the warning system to clear. MR. PAYAN: Basically de-activating the crossing? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. PAYAN: Does it restart if the train moves again? MR. CORBO: It would restart assuming the movement is toward the crossing. MR. PAYAN: It knows the difference if the train is moving towards the crossing or away? MR. CORBO: Yes. We actually utilize the, if you will, whether the rate it changes upward or downward to determine the direction of movement. MR. PAYAN: Can you tell us what the data recorder module is and what it is used for? MR. CORBO: The 3000 that I inspected from McKnight Road contained an 80,015 data recorder. This device is manufactured primarily for assistance to maintenance or field forces. MR. PAYAN: Can you describe how the data recorder interface assembly fits into that? MR. CORBO: The data recorder interface, which is the 80025, allows the data recorder to monitor up to 16 digital inputs external to the 3000. Commonly, these monitor the contacts of the relays. MR. PAYAN: Where is that data stored? MR. CORBO: The data is stored in memory on the 80,015 card itself. MR. PAYAN: How often and when is the data recorded or how is it time stamped? MR. CORBO: There are really two types of data that are recorded. There is the external data and the internal data. Essentially, to answer your first question, how often, it is recorded when there is a message initiated. So, it is, again, a continuous monitoring process. Time stamp wise, all data that is recorded is time and date stamped. As I believe mentioned earlier, we record to the last full second. So in other words, if a recording came in, in that one second, plus .3 seconds more than that, we would record it to that one second mark. MR. PAYAN: I would like to kind of clarify: For the microprocessor, the GCP-3000's clock, and the recorder clock, is it possible for the time that events happened and the times that are recorded to be different? Does the recorder module have a clock of its own? MR. CORBO: The recorder module actually has it own clock and handles the time and date stamp activity. That is something, as Mr. Sharkey mentioned, that you adjust to the particular time. MR. PAYAN: Is it possible for the recorder to record 26 seconds of warning time and the computer to provide a shorter warning time? MR. CORBO: I don't quite understand what you are asking. Because warning time is a message fed from the GCP, there is no action taken on that message by the data recorder other than to assign a time and date stamp. It just records the information which it is fed. MR. PAYAN: The recorder is just told to record? MR. CORBO: Right. The recorder is essentially a monitoring device. It does not actively process any of the information which is fed to it other than assigned a time and date. MR. PAYAN: Are there any measures that Safetran uses to measure the reliability of these units, the GCP-3000, any standard measure? MR. CORBO: Pretty much the industry required standard, if you will in other words, what our customers ask of us when they are utilizing one of our products is mean time between failure. MR. PAYAN: Could you explain what that means? MR. CORBO: That is pretty much the number of hours or the amount of time that a system would be expected to operate before a failure occurs. MR. PAYAN: Do you know what mean time between failure is for the 3000? MR. CORBO: Based on 1998 numbers, it is better than 60,000 hours. MR. PAYAN: Post-accident, Safetran was asked to verify the set up at McKnight Road. Could you tell us what you checked and the results of those tests? MR. CORBO: Yes. April 15th actually was the day we were on site to look at the unit. We inspected the plans to see if the system programming made sense based on what we could see, and no exceptions were noted in that respect. Then we went about actually looking at some of the parameters of the 3000 which was in operation at the time, and again, no exceptions were noted. Then actually, a key part of it which, of course, as you know, ducking between the rain drops, that taking over the course of the whole day, we also watched several train movements, and the system performed as designed. MR. PAYAN: Following the field test, you also factory tested the unit. Could you describe what the analysis of that or what the outcome of those tests were? MR. CORBO: The outcome was that the system performed as designed, and we took no exceptions. MR. PAYAN: As far as the recorder module and each circuit board, were any exceptions taken? MR. CORBO: None. MR. PAYAN: Mr. Jacky has some additional questions for you. MR. JACKY: Good morning, Mr. Corbo. MR. CORBO: Good morning. MR. JACKY: I would like to ask you a couple of questions, first of all, in regards to how the GCP or the Grade Crossing Predictor determines what the train's speed is and get a little more detail into that. If you will, as the train is coming down the track, my understanding is that at some point some distance from the actual grade crossing, there is a shunt. Then when the train's axles actually cross through that shunt, the predictor starts, seems to change the amplitude of the voltage that is on the current or on the rails and also the rate of change of the current or voltage that is on the circuit. How long in time does it take for the Grade Crossing Predictor to determine what the train speed is? MR. CORBO: Are you looking for it takes an action after that or just that process by itself? MR. JACKY: Just that process by itself at this point. MR. CORBO: Generally, up to four seconds from the time it first detects motion or movement. MR. JACKY: In terms of physically, the train, is it considered to be the absolute front axles of the train that are actually causing this or is it just the entire length of the train or as the greater portions of the train enter, pass the shunt I should say, that actually provides the change in the amplitude of the voltage? MR. CORBO: Effectively, we are looking at the front axle of the train. There is generally no further calculation other than the front axle. MR. JACKY: Once the Grade Crossing Predictor determines what the speed of the train is, how long does it take then for the predictor to act upon that speed? MR. CORBO: It depends upon the distance from the crossing and what the speed is. It could, for a high speed train for the particular location, react within the same four second time frame. If it were a train, for example, running approximately one third speed for that particular area, it would wait a significant amount of time until the train was actually the programmed time from the crossing. MR. JACKY: In this case, let's focus for a second on this train or a train that would going the same approximate speed, approximately 79 miles an hour. MR. CORBO: Okay. MR. JACKY: The distance that the originating shunt would be north of that signal would be -- that distance would be based upon what factors then? MR. CORBO: The desired operation time of the warning system plus what we call a system reaction time, which is generally four seconds for the 3000, and then an area which I cannot determine based on this location would involve clearance time additional seconds for traffic to clear across; for example, a double track crossing or width. So, you would add up those total number of seconds, and then based on district speed, put your termination shunt at that particular point. MR. JACKY: Then you mentioned it takes the Grade Crossing Predictor approximately or up to four seconds to determine the train's speed. Are those four seconds added into the programmed warning time that is entered into the keypad of the GCP? MR. CORBO: No. The programmed warning time that the user puts into system via the keypad actually reflects the amount of time that you want the warning system to operate or the flashers to operate. MR. JACKY: I guess I don't understand that. If I am programming in 30 seconds into the keypad, are you saying then that it would take 30 seconds of activation or for gate activation or -- MR. CORBO: If 30 seconds were programmed into the 3000, you would get, assuming you had adequate physical distance for your high speed train moves, you would get 30 seconds of operation from the warning system or at least our output would extinguish 30 seconds prior to the train's arrival. MR. JACKY: The 30 seconds of operation would not necessarily mean, or the start of that operation would mean the start of the GCP working as opposed to the start, say, of the relay being open to move the lights and the bells on a crossing? MR. CORBO: Right. The time programmed in reflects the period of time that our relay output is extinguished. MR. JACKY: One more question just so I have it certain: Would that mean that the train would have entered past the shunts approximately 34 seconds prior to hitting the signal or the grade crossing, or would it mean 30 seconds from the time that the -- it would be 30 seconds from the time that the train first passed those shunts? MR. CORBO: Again, the shunt only establishes our circuit limits, the termination shunt. Our system initiates operation or removes relay drive when the train is a programmed number of seconds from the crossing. That distance from how far he is into the circuit or gone past the termination shunt varies according to, obviously, the speed of the train and how long that the approach limit actually is. MR. JACKY: How often is the amplitude of the voltage and the rate of change in the amplitude sampled? Is that actually sampled or is it constantly monitored by the grade crossings system? MR. CORBO: It is a sampling process. MR. JACKY: Do you know what the sampling rate is? MR. CORBO: I believe it is 16 times a second. MR. JACKY: I would like to put up the print-out from the signal event recorder if possible, and I would like for you to go through, if you will, and show us on the print-out for the -- MR. CORBO: Give me a second to practice with the pointer here. I can't see too much. Can anybody in the back see it? (Audience responds.) MR. CORBO: I will talk about it. MR. JACKY: We have one over here that we could probably provide to you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Out of curiosity, what happened to the one from yesterday? (Audience responds.) MR. CORBO: That, at least I can see it. MR. JACKY: Mr. Sharkey walked us through what the different signal changes and things like that are. What I would like to direct your attention to are the warning time and also the different speeds that are placed upon there. What I would like to do is get a sense of, or if you could please, explain to us how the Grade Crossing Predictor determines the speeds that are -- where they are listed on there and how the Grade Crossing Predictor determines those speeds. MR. CORBO: I think the best thing is to refer to my earlier statement that this is really meant as a maintenance tool, and the specific area where that is of importance is with our speed read-outs. That is a relative number, and our design is just to give maintenance personnel a relative idea. For example, for this area (indicating), this would be considered a fast train. Can we expand this out a little bit and look at the rest of the page, please? You will notice at that time top here, we have a slower train, probably a freight, in this neighborhood, but it is a train relatively running 30 miles per hour. That is the general goal of the information. The three speeds that we do provide are detected speed, which is the first speed. That is an instant or snapshot read-out taken out of our continuing process. The middle speed is the average speed of the train, which is more of a continuous average calculation from the time the system predicts or starts the warning system until he arrives at the island. Then the last is the island speed which is, again, a snapshot speed. As Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the information that we are really interested in or we could get from this gives you a general or rough idea that the train is accelerating or decelerating. Then you could translate that over to the warning time, which is a precise measurement which is from the time we extinguish relay drive until the time the island drops or the train reaches the island circuit. MR. JACKY: So then in your opinion, would there be any basis for comparing the speeds that are listed there, those average speeds, against the speed that may have been recorded by an event recorder on a locomotive? MR. CORBO: I would say I really can't answer that because I am not aware of the other types of recorders. I just know ours gives you a relative idea, but it was not really intended to be a precise, down to feet per second accuracy for speed. MR. JACKY: You would not be surprised then if those speeds were to be different from another source measuring a locomotive speed? MR. CORBO: No, other than I will say this: This is relatively accurate; okay? I think I showed the one that we are talking about, the bottom train. Go to the right, please. Okay. This tells us or tells me that the train in question was moving certainly faster or around 70 miles an hour. You know, beyond that, I am not willing to say, but I do know that is different than a train moving 50 or 40. MR. JACKY: Conversely then, the warning time there, is that considered to be a relative time also or a relative measurement also or would that be more exact? MR. CORBO: That is, our warning time is an exact measurement, which is from the time we extinguish our relay output until the island is extinguished or the train, in other words, reaches the island. That reflects that amount of time, 26 seconds in this case. MR. JACKY: Thank you. My next question is -- Mr. Payan asked you a couple of questions about recording the information, and just for clarification: To your knowledge is there any or what is the recording delay from the time that, or is there any recording delay on the Grade Crossing Predictor computer or recording module? MR. CORBO: What are you looking for? MR. JACKY: Just in that the time? Let me back up. The times that are stamped within the recorder are the times, I believe you testified that those are the times that are the information is recorded on the recorder? MR. CORBO: Right; received by. MR. JACKY: Would you expect there to be any difference in the time that it is received by from the time that the change is monitored or noticed by the GCP? MR. CORBO: I am not sure I quite understand how to answer that question because the way the recorder works -- could we put that back up, please? This on the right side here (indicating) is what we call the message section, okay. In fact, in this case, its message has a T-1 train move. Those items or the entries in the right portion of the recorder screen here reflect messages fed to the data recorder from the predictor or from the processor of the 3000, and they are logged in when they are received. In fact, there is an interrogation process that continually occurs between the 3000's processor and the data recorder. MR. JACKY: If I have a, in a signal entered a 30 second warning time into the Grade Crossing Predictor, would you expect at any time or any situation to actually see on the print-out a 30 second warning or will that always be less than the programmed warning time? MR. CORBO: Help me here. Of all the 3000s I have walked up to or what? MR. JACKY: No. I would say in any general case, would you expect -- if I typed in a 30 second warning time into any one of the processors, would there be a condition where the warning time, as it is computed, will actually be 30 seconds exactly or will it, because of time delays and the time it takes to sense the speed of the train, will that warning time always be less than 30 seconds? MR. CORBO: It really depends on train operations as Mr. Sharkey was discussing this morning. If you have a location where the trains typically run at a constant speed and do not change speeds at least during the inbound portion of the approach, I would expect to see a very large number of 30 second warning times. On the other hand, if this is a location that has train variances due to, for example, signals where trains run on yellows and then catch a green so they change speeds, that would cause a variation in the times. Then of course, if you have the presence of switches or switching trains -- locals, if you will -- that will give you a great variation in the times that I would expect to see. MR. JACKY: I have no further questions, but Mr. Raby has a question. MR. RABY: Good morning, Mr. Carbo. MR. CORBO: Good morning, sir. MR. RABY: Just one question: Earlier Chairman Black asked Mr. Sharkey about the description of the voltage of the system. I believe I heard 12 volt, a battery, and the only AC in the system was in the charger that kept the battery charged. You indicated a few minutes ago that it is an AC signal going up to that shunt; correct? MR. CORBO: Correct; the actual signal that 3000s transmitter produces is an AC signal. MR. RABY: I am still having trouble understanding this timing sequence. If you have to meet a standard, the FRA says 20 second minimum warning time for the motorist before the train enters that crossing, and you determine that, that point is the edge of the roadway of the crossing, not the island circuit which is some 60 feet from the center of the roadway of the crossing towards the direction the trains come from, and if you program 30 seconds into this computer box, why don't you get 30 seconds on the print-out? Why doesn't event recorder give you 30 seconds? Why doesn't the system give you 30 seconds so the event recorder can record 30 seconds? MR. CORBO: I had hoped I had kind of answered that with Mr. Jacky in terms of it is really dependent on the types of movements the trains are making as to whether or not you get the precise or programmed time. MR. RABY: The regulation says you must give 20 seconds of time. It doesn't say depending upon the operation of the trains. That is what I thought this co-processor, this computer system, the constant warning, that is what it did. That was the advantage of it, that it will always give whatever timing you program into it. That is what this computer is supposed to do. The old system that didn't have the constant warning. Then the speed of the train, they had to set the time to compute to the highest speed of the train so that when the highest speed train came through, they met the 20 second regulation, and when a slow train came through, it may be on for a minute. MR. CORBO: Right. MR. RABY: I thought that was the advantage of the constant warning system, that it would not require then the motoring public to get impatient, go around gates and things, that they would always have a 20 second minimum wait time regardless of the speed of train. You are telling me or at least I am understanding and what I am hearing is yes, but still we get a variation. I don't see why a computer cannot compute the speed of the train and determine when to start that 20 second or whatever is computed or been set up for this, but I will use the 20 seconds to keep a standard here for a baseline. That computer only has to say, Okay, I looked at the train; it is running 50 miles an hour, so I know where I need to start that 20 second time sequence so at the end of 20 seconds, the nose of that train or the front axle of that train is at the edge of that crossing. So, if that motoring public is at least sitting there, he never has to wait more than 20 seconds for a train, whether it is doing 30 miles an hour, 50 miles an hour, of 79 miles an hour. That is the way I understand it. If I am wrong, please correct me. MR. CORBO: You are correct except the proviso with certainly Safetran's equipment, we will provide a constant warning time with a constant speed train. So, the train has to be moving at the same speed for essentially the entire inbound portion to the street in order to get a constant or, if you will, consistent warning operation. MR. RABY: I understand that. I was being very basic in saying the 20 seconds and making assumptions the most simple situations. Then if the train does decelerate in that time frame, of course, they will have more than 20 seconds. If they accelerate in that time frame -- excuse me, not time frame, but in that space beyond that or the calibration where the equipment calibrates the speed, detects the speed, then if he accelerates as in I think was found in Fox River Grove, then the time signal was less than the amount. Barring that, and I assume that is why then things like -- in order to meet the 20 second minimum, there are variances in the length of vehicles, the speed of vehicles, the width of the crossing of more than one track, and that is why 30 seconds was put in here, so that this crossing and this railroad could always meet that minimum standard of 20 seconds because of the variables there. The time line should be the same. I guess that is where I am having trouble understanding why that computer, once it determines the speed and even though it monitors the speed on through until it hits the island circuit, it doesn't, if I understand correctly, it doesn't -- any information it receives after that initial computation is made, it doesn't reflect the timing sequence. It didn't go in and say, Wait a minute; I am in the middle of a timing sequence. The lights came on, but you know, I am going to wait eight seconds before I start the gate down because I have got some new information that came to me after I made that initial assessment of speed out there. MR. CORBO: The best thing I can tell you is the 3000 itself has one control output, and that is extinguished when we indicate the train is an amount of time away from the crossing. After that process has taken place, there is nothing else the system can do. It is not capable of doing anything different. MR. RABY: That is kind of what I understand. In other words, to simplify it, once the timing, once it starts the light circuit on and that timing sequence begins, whatever it is, 30 seconds, 26 seconds, or whatever it is, then that is it. That clock ticks its off, starts ticking off, and in four seconds, it says, Okay, gates start down. Then gate itself knows the physical features of the gate takes eight seconds, but it doesn't do that. It starts, and that is the end of it until the island circuit says the train has passed, and you can shut everything off now. MR. CORBO: What are you looking for? MR. RABY: Why the print-out says 26 seconds when you programmed in 30 seconds, where is that four seconds? What happened to the four seconds? MR. CORBO: Actually, I can explain that for at least under the one train move. This is, again, assuming that the train in question was constant speed. The approaches for McKnight Road I believe are 3,460 feet, at least that is the information I am aware of. That translates out to approximately 30 seconds of time at 79 miles per hour. When you subtract the up to four second reaction time that the 3000 takes to calculate that it does, in fact, have an inbound train, you end up with 30 minus four which is 26. So relatively speaking, I believe this acted correctly or as designed. MR. RABY: In looking at the exhibit, the print-out exhibit, the recorder print-out, does that four seconds you are talking, about how does that equate in the other train movements that are recorded there? MR. CORBO: I am not sure what -- MR. RABY: In other words, in the accident train, the recorder says it had the signal warning time activated for 26 seconds. If you take your four seconds as you just stated, your four second computation time the computer would take, that would equal 30 seconds. Would that be the same if you move up the scale there? CHAIRMAN BLACK: That is not the accident train. It is further down. MR. RABY: The 26 second is the accident train. If you go up to the next T-1 above that, it says you have 25 seconds signal time, and you had approach speed 69 miles an hour, 25 and 4 is 29. So, that is one second off. Let's go up to the next one where it says 33 seconds of warning time for T-1. The train was running 34 miles an hour, and we have three seconds more than the warning, than the programmed warning. MR. CORBO: It is difficult to speculate here because no one was around. What I do know in the case of the 33 second warning time or what appears to be the case is that train possibly decelerated through the approach, but again, that is speculating since we were not there. MR. RABY: Is that 33 seconds based on when the train arrives at the island crossing signal shunt point? MR. CORBO: Our time measurement is from when we extinguish relay drive, which starts the warning system, until the island extinguishes or drops out. MR. RABY: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you. MR. PAYAN: No further questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Would the parties mind if we, because of a witness' scheduling issue, we need to go on with this. The first questioner up is Mr. Marshall of Melco. EXAMINATION BY MELCO TRANSFER, INC. MR. MARSHALL: I am going to go back Mr. Sharkey a little bit here. Maybe I had some confusion; I don't know. During his statement, first off, he said those gates were put in, in 1968 originally; during a conversation or a questioning of Mr. Lauby, that he made a mistake when they asked whether or not extra recording stuff could be put on the gate; he said no because the wiring was from the original install and would not habitate the building. My question at this point to Mr. Corbo is: Do his systems work efficiently with wires that are 31 years old? MR. CORBO: I guess the only way I can answer that question is the 3000 is dependent upon good electrical connections between its location in the house and the rail in order for it to operate as designed. We have no evidence that it was not operating as designed, so we can assume, at least in this case, that the wiring was good. MR. MARSHALL: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Amtrak? MR. BULLOCK: We have no additional questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you. The CNIC? MR. ED HARRIS: We have no additional questions as well. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Railroad? MR. BLACKMORE: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway? MR. UMBS: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. STEAD: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: I have one question. Mr. Corbo, how long is the data stored on the data recorder module? MR. CORBO: It really depends on conditions, but I guess what you are asking is how long does the memory last, and the 80,015 is battery backed up and relatively will hold memory for longer than one year. MR. WALPERT: What happens at the end of the year period? Is it over-ridden? MR. CORBO: Well, the way I took your question is to how long is the data stored. MR. WALPERT: Yes. MR. CORBO: Over-writing has to do with filling the memory space, which is really a different issue. MR. WALPERT: Let's look at each one separately. MR. CORBO: Okay. MR. WALPERT: The first issue, how long it is stored, is one year. When does the over-write of the data come into effect? MR. CORBO: The 80,015 has a 3000 event sized memory, so when you have filled up the 3000 events, you will then begin to over-write over the oldest event in memory. That really depends on the location as to how frequently that occurs. MR. WALPERT: Can you explain to me why the location would affect it? MR. CORBO: It has to do with the number of events that take place in a given time. MR. WALPERT: Thank you. MR. CORBO: You're welcome. CHAIRMAN BLACK: United Transportation Union? MR. DWYER: We have no questions, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to say we share Mr. Raby's concern about the variation in warning time, particularly in view of the fact that on that slide, there seems to be a constant rate of deceleration between both trains. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Okay; noted. EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY BOARD OF INQUIRY CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler? MR. SWEEDLER: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Harris? MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: No questions. MR. DUNN: I have no questions. MR. LAUBY: I have got some questions. I want to go over a couple of things. Would you tell us how long has the GCP-3000 been in service. MR. CORBO: I guess probably since 1988 or 1989 when we started shipping significant numbers of them. MR. LAUBY: Can you give us a thumbnail sketch of what type of problems you experienced in introducing this in the railroad industry and putting it in the field, what type of problems you had to overcome? MR. CORBO: Actually, I cannot really because that was not my area, to introduce the system. So, I am really not the person to consult with. MR. LAUBY: Do you know if there were field problems in developing it, putting it in the field, and getting it to work? MR. CORBO: Again, I am really not in a position to answer that. MR. LAUBY: I want to talk just for a second about this timing issue. I am trying to get the timing issue straight in my own mind. I am going to make a couple of statements, and if you could, tell me yes or no if that is the way it works. My understanding is on this particular train, the limitation and the time is due to the distance to the shunt, the 3,460 feet. Is that a limitation on the warning time that you would get? MR. CORBO: It, for general circumstances, limits you to the maximum amount you can get, yes. MR. LAUBY: If the distance to this shunt was extended beyond 3,460 feet, if it was out at, let's say, 6,000 feet just for the sake of discussion, what type of warning time would your system give for a train coming at 79 miles per hour? MR. CORBO: Then I would expect to see much closer to the programmed time. MR. LAUBY: The 30 second? MR. CORBO: Right. MR. LAUBY: You mentioned that to go 3,460 feet, it takes a train going 79 miles per hour how long to go that distance? MR. CORBO: Approximately 30 seconds. MR. LAUBY: Approximately 30 seconds? So when the train actually enters this area, it is already time to turn the gates and lights on, is that correct, based on the system if you were programmed for 30 seconds? MR. CORBO: Yes, correct. MR. LAUBY: Why can't the system do that? MR. CORBO: Because we have this built in what we call reaction time which is as long as four seconds. The reason that we have that is to ensure that we do, in fact, have an inbound train movement. In other words, you need to make a calculation of the speed of the train, and you want to deal with it over a, if you will, several second period to make sure you are not responding to momentary stimulus. So, this is our way of doing two things. It gives you a little better precision or consistency in the warning time observed, and also, it gives you a benefit making the system what we call noise immune so you get a smaller number of false activations due to outside stimulus. MR. LAUBY: As a train traveling 79 miles an hour enters the shunt, the first thing your system does is to detect the speed? MR. CORBO: Right. MR. LAUBY: It does this over a period of four seconds? MR. CORBO: Uh-huh. MR. LAUBY: If the system is set up to give 30 seconds warning time and now 4 seconds of that 30 seconds is gone, how does the system react to that? MR. CORBO: Well, at the end of the -- when the system has adequately determined that it had an inbound train at the maximum speed, it will then extinguish the output. MR. LAUBY: It immediately takes action to turn the equipment on? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: What about a train going, let's say, 60 miles an hour? MR. CORBO: Okay. MR. LAUBY: What would it do then? MR. CORBO: Again, it takes four seconds to accurately register that you have an inbound train, and then now since the train is moving 60 and we are dealing with which our 6,000 or 3,400 example, the system will now wait although it is monitoring the inbound movement, it will wait until the amplitude of the voltage is sufficient to indicate that the train is now 30 seconds out at 60 miles per hour. MR. LAUBY: So, it still used the first four seconds to determine the speed of the train; is that correct? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: Then it waits until the appropriate time the energize the gates and lights so that there is a full 30 seconds; is that correct? MR. CORBO: Right, except I don't really like the term wait. It is actually continuing the calculation. It is just that the train is not, in fact, 30 seconds out. MR. LAUBY: There is no need to drop the gates immediately at that point? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: Let's take one more example. Let's take 40 miles an hour, which is approximately half the speed, half the maximum speed. So, at 40 miles an hour, we still have a constant 34,060 feet distance to the shunt, and at this speed, we have 60 seconds rather than 30 seconds, 60 seconds from the time the train enters the area of the shunt until it gets to the crossing. Would you just step through and tell me a train coming at constant speed of 40 miles an hour, how would your system would react? MR. CORBO: How about we take it from the standpoint of viewing it on the keypad like you were standing there watching the operation of the system. When the train enters the approach limits or -- MR. LAUBY: Again, we are 60 seconds from the crossing. MR. CORBO: Right. When the train enters the approach limits or the EZ value, which Mr. Sharkey mentioned is one hundred when there are no trains occupying the circuit, it would begin to decrease slowly at first downward. The next thing that would take place is there would be what we have. A motion LED would extinguish on the transceiver card. That would tell you, what that tells you as a maintenance person is, We are, in fact, we are seeing an inbound train, and you are assuming at this point that it is not yet 30 seconds from the crossing because the warning system has not been initiated. MR. LAUBY: Let me clarify this a little bit to compare it better to what I have in my head. If the train is coming at 40 miles an hour and it goes over that shunt or 60 seconds from the crossing, during the first four seconds that, that shunt, that it passes that shunt, after that four seconds, does your system know that train is traveling 40 miles an hour? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: It will continue to monitor the speed of that train as it continues down the track? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: My impression is it will wait. From when it knows its point at 40 miles an hour, it will continue monitoring, but 26 seconds after it has the speed, it will trigger the gates and lights? MR. CORBO: Correct, assuming a constant speed too. MR. LAUBY: That would leave 30 seconds from the time the gates and lights start until that train enters the circuit, is that correct, or enters the crossing? MR. CORBO: Technically, right, although we actually, as I said, we measure to the island, not the -- MR. LAUBY: To the island circuit then, which is just 60 feet shy of the -- MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: So, there may be a couple of seconds either way depending on that island circuit. This system is fairly accurate based on a constant speed entering the circuit; is that a correct statement? MR. CORBO: Correct. MR. LAUBY: How accurate would you say it is? These are perfect trans that travel at a given speed with no variation, no acceleration, no deceleration. MR. CORBO: That is a hard one. I don't know that -- we don't certainly publish a specification, but just to offer a guess, I would say three to four seconds variance would be not unusual. MR. LAUBY: Three to four seconds? My lest question: This methodology that you use to determine speed where you put an AC signal on the rails, send it out, it gets shunted by the locomotive, and it comes back, you look at variation in voltages, and this is a constant current AC signal that goes out. You look at variations of voltages, and you look at variations in amplitude to determine the location; right? How did you end up with this system? Why do you use this system? MR. CORBO: Actually, this was a research process initiated by the Southern Pacific Railroad with Stanford Research Institute around 1959 or 1960. They instituted the research into what became this process, how, using the constant current transmitter transmitting voltage down the rail and detecting the train's axle, shunting that voltage. After about, I believe it was around two years of research, they developed the basic methodology of how you would build a predictor, if you will. Then the Southern Pacific Railroad wanted to use these devices, so they offered to a contract to various manufacturers for bid -- would you build this for us? One of Safetran's predecessor companies, Mark Ward Industries, was the successful bidder on that contract. So, they produced the first version of a predictor around 1962 or thereabouts. MR. LAUBY: So this technology has been around for a long time; is that correct? MR. CORBO: The basic track interface technology, correct. MR. LAUBY: Does this technology have advantages over other competing technologies as far this methodology you use to determine speed? MR. CORBO: I guess I am not really sure about competing technologies. MR. LAUBY: What other methods are there to determine speed that you know are out there? MR. CORBO: Well -- MR. LAUBY: Is this a -- MR. CORBO: I guess we are going quite hypothetical here, away from, you know, the normal process. Industry standard-wise, we have been doing this for 35 years, and I really can't speak to are there better ways to do it. MR. LAUBY: In your consideration, is this industry standard this methdology? MR. CORBO: What? MR. LAUBY: This method of determining train speed, is this the industry standard for the railroad industry? MR. CORBO: More or less, right. MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much. MR. CORBO: You're welcome. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I have a couple of questions here. Is the same technology that is used in the control circuits for the signals the same signals on roads? MR. CORBO: On a general basis no. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am not talking about the speed sending. I am talking about using the tracks as a couple a wires on a ground. MR. CORBO: That was true. Most of the signal systems today transmit a voltage down the rails as well as the crossing control systems. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Do you think back in 1958 or 1959, that was one of the reasons the Stanford looked at using the track circuitry for this process? MR. CORBO: Since they already knew how to do it, I think the main interest, certainly on EZPs part, was to eliminate the use of insulated joints which, at this time, were used to separate track circuits. So by going to the method of an AC signal, you now could differentiate by other means other than having a physical insulated joint in the track circuit or to define the track circuit. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Tell me, if you could, how many variables -- we have been talking about the timing, and I think we probably confused everybody on how this system works, at least me. What are the variables that you mentioned? Speed and rate of change of speed, the system variable in producing a time is what I am looking for, an ultimate warning time. You mentioned speed and rate of change of speed, acceleration, deceleration. What producers are there that might produce a higher or lower time? MR. CORBO: The track circuit parameters themselves, ballast conditions if you will, and also the length of the track circuit, which is one of those parameters. CHAIRMAN BLACK: When you say ballast and such, what you are really saying is there are the environmental conditions that would describe the electrical properties of the track circuit; in other word, humidity, moisture in the ground, temperature, all that sort of thing. MR. CORBO: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Do you have any idea, for instance, how much those environmental variabilities are limited plus or minus? MR. CORBO: No; that is not really anything I can tie a quantity to. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Does this one index that is mentioned, this device is, I guess -- would that one hundred index vary with these others, the temperature, moisture? What happens if it rains? What happens to your index if it rains. MR. CORBO: There would be some variation in that index if there was rain, for example. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Without beating a dead horse, what I am trying to get around to is something Byrd was talking about. This is not a precise science, and this system is not capable of doing that because there are too many variables. MR. CORBO: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It is designed, as I understand, to make sure you get more than 20 seconds? MR. CORBO: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I went through the docket here. It is not in the books, but there is a bunch of other print-outs apparently from this crossing. Here is a 44 second warning time. I see a variance in speed here of about ten miles per hour worth of variance in speed. It appears that it was slowing significantly during the time period. There are some constant speeds. Here is one that produced 29 seconds. It looks to be about an average uniform speed of 35 miles per hour through the system. So, they are all over the place. I guess what I am trying to get across or find out is this has to do with variables over and above what is set in the computer that the railroad or no one else has any control over. MR. CORBO: Correct. Can I say one thing also? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Sure. MR. CORBO: In my time that I have spent at McKnight Road, they do have variable speed trains because of this siding track there and the types of movements. So one would tend to expect to see some variations as you are pointing out. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I spent some time waiting to talk to the state's attorney out there a few weeks ago, and I sat and watched train and switching movements. There is a passing track there, a side track there and all kinds of strange maneuvers do occur in this area. By the way, they are reflected in the print-outs that are in the docket. Given the variables in this and since apparently no one has looked at this very closely since 1959 or 1960, as I recall, a few things have changed since 1959 or 1960 technology-wise. They changed in 1988 when you first produced this device. I am wondering if the railroad or signal manufacturers have considered looking at video imaging technology or has your industry or your company considered going to laser radar? MR. CORBO: I can't really speak to the precise items that our group is looking at, but yes, we are looking at different items. CHAIRMAN BLACK: One more question: Basically, this is set up, this 30 second wheel setting or digital setting -- I guess that it is, in this situation, it is a wheel -- they are really never going to get that 30 seconds at this location. 26, 27, 28, depending on these variables, is the most they are going to get out of this system, or is 26 the most they are ever going to get for a high speed train? MR. CORBO: Okay. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I should have put that parameter in. MR. CORBO: Right. I would guess 26 to 27 would be the most you would expect to see for a speed limit move at that location. CHAIRMAN BLACK: A point that I would have to make to clarify that, having had some of these crossings in my jurisdiction, is that is not necessarily bad. We used to run around 28 or so on constant warning crossings before this technology came around. If you allow the time to be too long, you encourage gate running. Obviously, if it is too short, there are some reaction time problems. So, that is not necessarily a bad thing, to have 26 seconds I guess is what I am saying. It depends on what you choose it to be. If they want it to be predictably 30 seconds, for instance, they are going to have to link it to the track circuit. MR. CORBO: Correct. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Any further redirect or any further questions that this discussion has stimulated from the parties? It was a good discussion and a good witness. Thank you very much. Anybody else? (No response.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: I appreciate your candor. I think you have tried to answer. This is not an easy area here, and I guess I always knew it was from listening to railroad signal engineers try to explain them to me back in my last life. Fortunately, I had a good electrical engineer who was my signal engineer, and he translated it for me. Thank you very much. MR. CORBO: Thank you for inviting me. (Witness excused.) MR. DUNN: We were scheduled for lunch, but the witness has leave, so I would like to continue. CHAIRMAN BLACK: This is the fire chief? MR. DUNN: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: We don't want to keep him away any more than necessary. MR. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board at 12:50 calls Chief Michael Harshbarger. SWORN TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL HARSHBARGER MR. DUNN: Chief Harshbarger, for the record, would you please state your full name and spell it for us. MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes, sir. My name is Michael L. Harshbarger. It is spelled H-a-r-s-h-b-a-r-g-e-r. MR. DUNN: What is your occupation? MR. HARSHBARGER: I have a dual occupation. I am privately in business for myself, and I am, secondly, a paid on-call Fire Chief for the Bourbonnais Fire Protection District in Bourbonnais, Illinois. MR. DUNN: Were you involved in the accident that occurred in Bourbonnais, Illinois on March 15, 1999? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes, sir. MR. DUNN: At this time, I will turn the questioning over to the Technical Panel, Mr. Richard Downs. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. DOWNS: Thank very, Mr. Dunn. Good afternoon, Chief. Thanks very much for appearing at our hearing here. I appreciate you taking the time out of your busy schedule. Would you please tell us about professional background and role as Chief of the Department in Bourbonnais. MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. I am currently a 29 year member of the Bourbonnais Fire Protection District. I began there in 1969 as a fire fighter. I advanced through the ranks as an engineer. I was later promoted to lieutenant. Approximately in the early part of 1980, I was promoted to captain. I became Assistant Chief in 1989. I got the job of Chief in 1995. MR. DOWNS: Following that, could you please give us a quick summary of the Bourbonnais Fire Department operations and equipment. MR. HARSHBARGER: Bourbonnais Fire has a fleet consisting of three engines, all of which carry water in varying amounts, between eight hundred and one thousand gallons, and all of which have pumps on them capable of pumping 1,000 to 1,500 gallons per minute. Additionally, we have a rescue squad truck which also carries water and some foam equipment and rescue equipment. We also have two tank vehicles, one of which carries 3,450 gallons of water, the other which carries 2,000 gallons of water; and we operate two advanced life sport ambulances and your brush fire cutter. MR. DOWNS: Do you have any aerial ladder trucks, platform trucks, or anything like that? MR. HARSHBARGER: No. We were presently considering the purchase of such a unit, but at this time, we do not have it. MR. DOWNS: Can you give us a quick summary, please, of your manpower and staffing? MR. HARSHBARGER: Staffing consists of 45 paid on-call fire fighters. All of them are certified at some level as a fire fighter two or three or above that. Some of them are certified at substantially higher levels of training. MR. DOWNS: When you said "paid on-call," does that mean each fire fighter will get paid for a specific response, or do they get a minimum wage, so to speak, a token reimbursement per the week? Exactly how does that work? MR. HARSHBARGER: They are paid a reimbursement for each call that they actually attend. MR. DOWNS: Essentially, we have a volunteer operation, and a small remuneration is provided to allow for, to receive calls. Would that be fair? MR. HARSHBARGER: That would be correct. There are no career fire fighters on the department. MR. DOWNS: What are the typical types of calls that your community, that you respond to in your community? MR. HARSHBARGER: We respond to approximately 1,800 calls on an annual basis. Of the 1,800, something in the neighborhood of 1,400 are ambulance calls. The remaining four hundred are what we call fire calls, but in fact may be odor investigations, alarm activations. Automobile accidents are a substantial number of those. So in actual terms of fires, we are probably in the area of 50 to 60 a year. MR. DOWNS: They might be typically your small structure fire type of event rather than a large plant or something? Your community does not have any real significant chemical operations, things of that sort? MR. HARSHABARGER: That is correct. There are no chemical or petrochemical operations in our district at all. MR. DOWNS: If you could, please touch a little bit on your departmental training. You mentioned the fire fighter one and two level training. Can you go a little bit into the amount of time it takes to train a typical fire fighter? MR. HARSHBARGER: When a new hire is brought on board with the fire department, they are immediately put into a school scheduling, which is an Illinois State Fire Marshal conducted course. The completion of that course after approximately 12 weeks of both classroom and practical training will certify them at what is known as a fire fighter two level, which is a basic level. It teaches them basic fire fighting skills, and they then are required to become trained as an emergency medical technician at the basic level. After they have attained both these certifications, they are then removed or proposed to be removed from the probationary status and become a regular line fire fighter. While they are on probationary status, they are typically kept under the wing of more seasoned fire fighters in an effort to prevent them from being injured while they gain some experience. The probationary period will vary, but typically, it will last at least a year. After they have been removed from that status, typically, they also are encouraged to go on to achieve higher levels of education of fire fighters. MR. DOWNS: Maybe you can touch a bit on the emergency drills that are conducted periodically. MR. HARSHBARGER: We have a county-wide Fire Chiefs Association that has existed for something in excess of 30 years. We have, for the last 15 or so of those 30 years, had at least an annual disaster drill that is county-wide and involves all of the fire departments and, of late, the ESDA agencies, police agencies, and the hospitals. The original reason for beginning those disaster drills is that the two hospitals which are located in Kankakee, in the nearby community and County Seat of Kankakee County, are required by the Illinois Department of Public Health, in order to retain their certification as trauma centers, to have a readiness drill on an annual basis to prove that they can reliably receive patients in some kind or any kind of a multi-casualty incident. So, that was the reason we began them and soon realized that they were a powerful training tool for us and for our fire fighters. So, we have consistently on an absolute annual basis for the last ten years had at least one a year. MR. DOWNS: Have you had a recent event simulation with a railroad scenario involved by chance? MR. HARSHBARGER: In 1997, we had a scenario that posed a freight train versus school bus accident at the south edge of the City of Kankakee. We had about 25 students from a local college who were posing as patients. Those patients were triaged on site and then transported to each of the two hospitals. As I recall, we included, to add a little extra flavor to that particular drill, a tornado in the process of that. MR. DOWNS: To top it all off, right? During our initial discussions on the scene, you described to me what is called your box alarm system. Perhaps you could, for our listeners, elaborate a little bit on that. MR. HARSHBARGER: Our box alarm system was borne out the mass casualty incident scenario that we drill for. Its purpose is so that an incident commander, when faced with the need for additional resources, simply has to refer to either his memory, which many times he can do, or to the small cue card that he usually would carry with him and ask the County Dispatch Center to call out a box alarm or a higher level, a 2-11 through as much as a 5-11, to elevate the urgency of the alarm so that he doesn't have to go down the list and call this community for this and the other community for the other thing. It is a prescribed lay-out sheet with numbers. An example would be in our fire protection district, there are boxcars, approximately five. One of them is for engine companies and fire fighting equipment. That is the one that is called 60-100. There is another which calls for tankers. There is yet another which calls for ambulances and rescue equipment. The district is gridded off in groups so that each segment is numbered. Those segments will, based on those numbers, cause a different level of response depending upon the alarm called for so that if, in the instance, this Amtrak accident, when we called for ambulance box 60-900, the dispatch center at Kankakee County was able to open a book and knew immediately which agencies they were to page and what ambulances those agencies were to send. MR. DOWNS: In the Amtrak incident, was the box alarm system that was called out, was that the highest level that could have been called out for your system? MR. HARSHBARGER: We initially called it at the box level, and prior to my arrival, based on the information I received from the police who were on the scene, I elevated to 5-11 level, which yes, is the highest level. MR. DOWNS: We will get into that in a little bit more detail as we go along. You mentioned the incident command system in Kankakee County. Perhaps you could give us a brief overview of that. MR. HARSHBARGER: We in Kankakee County use the incident command system that is petty much in place across the country. It is a system in which an incident commander immediately takes charge of the overall incident and then delegates authorities for the various sectors that he may need based upon the magnitude of the incident. In a large incident such as this, there were needs for staging for triage, for transportation, for medical, for fire suppression, et cetera. In a small incident, we use this on every incident. A one-car automobile accident will still use the same system, and they are just simply are not the need for as many sectors. MR. DOWNS: In other words, it is a way of managing your resources and your responsibilities at the scene in terms of perhaps having to call out your mutual aid and other resources? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. It is an incident management system. MR. DOWNS: Let's move now to the event itself. On the day of the event, can you please tell us what had transpired during the initial response -- approximately what time were you called out; what time you arrived, and give us a quick overview of the initial moments of the dispatch? MR. HARSHBARGER: The initial call was paged, I believe, at 9:47 p.m. I was at an ambulance call approximately two miles from the scene. Two of the Bourbonnais police department patrolmen were at approximately the same distance, but were in their cars on regular patrol and proceeded directly to the scene. They, incidentally, monitor our dispatch frequencies and answer each fire or ambulance call to attempt to give (a), give us information prior to our arrival; and (b) to help to mitigate whatever the incident may be. Patrolman Dave Berkler (phonetic) was the first arriving officer on the scene, and I was listening by my own radios in my vehicle while I was on the way to the scene to information that he was giving the dispatch center in terms of what he was seeing and what was there, the size of it so to speak. MR. DOWNS: You arrived at the scene moments thereafter, and you are proceeded to take control as incident center commander? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. MR. DOWNS: Could you please describe for our viewers here, our listeners here, what you initially saw. Again, feel free to refer to any of our exhibits. I believe our exhibits we were calling out were 2A, 2B, and 2C. MR. HARSHBARGER: That is right, and if we could put up Exhibit 2B on the screen. The roadway in the lower left-hand corner of the picture, you can see the back of the rescue truck. The rescue truck is heading north along the roadway that we approached on, so our view -- it is going to be a bit difficult to see -- our view was, let me try the other one. My view as I approached was of the front end of this locomotive (indicating) and the sleeper car over the back of it, and basically, from the position I parked, the piling of the wreckage over the top of it. There was fire present in this general vicinity upon my arrival, and there were people exiting the back of the diner car and the back of this car (indicating) and this one and walking down the road toward me and toward the police officers. My first impression was an enormous mass of people. It was still quite dark as we arrived there and cold. The temperature was in the lower 20s. A large number of people were in various states of undress because they had been asleep or preparing for bed. Nearly none of them had coats on. Several of them had no shoes. Some of them were in night clothes and this nature of thing. Most of them were helping injured passengers down the road toward the police cars, and the police officers were putting as many injured as they could in their police cars which were, at that point in time, located down here approximately where this rescue truck is. Of course, it was not yet on the scene. The two police cars had four or five victims in them at that time, and our first arriving ambulance received the young lady whose foot was amputated. I believe it was a food service Amtrak employee who was carrying her down the road. So, they were put into the first arriving ambulance and hustled out of there immediately. MR. DOWNS: The balance of your equipment had not arrived immediately as I understand it. It was a few minutes before all the equipment could muster up and get transported over to the scene; is that correct? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. MR. DOWNS: That takes about, what, ten minutes? Would that be your estimation? MR. HARSHBARGER: As much as ten minutes, yes. Some of the equipment was on the scene at about that time, and then of course, some were strung along a few minutes after that. MR. DOWNS: You were essentially dealing in the dark. In trying to deal with a situation like this, it is very difficult to assess first off. Is that a fair assessment? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes, very much so. MR. DOWNS: Did you find any other persons, perhaps good Samaritans, who had been assisting in this particular effort when you arrived? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. On my arrival, there were approximately 35 workers from the adjacent steel plant who had heard the sound of the crash and who had cut through the chain link fence that is along side the site. If we could change to Exhibit 2B, we would be able to see that better. MR. DOWNS: That was 2B. MR. HARSHBARGER: Sorry, 2A. This is the crossing area. This is the road we are talking about here (indicating). There is about a six foot high chain link fence that is continuous along this entire area, and finally, a gate down to the left side off the picture about two or three hundred feet. The steel workers came out of these buildings and cut the fence here (indicating) in two or three locations and brought ladders, flashlights, and things of that nature and entered the fires and assisted a number of the injured out of the fires. Some of them were on top of the cars as well, and at, incidentally, at great personal risk because none of them had any protective clothing on beyond what their regular work clothes were. There were four of those steel workers who were directly inside the dinning car assisting with those people who were trapped in there with a substantial amount of fire impinging on the of the car. So the bystander participation was instrumental in saving several lives I am quite sure. MR. DOWNS: You felt their participation was particularly valuable in the incipient moments of the first response before the formal fire brigade arrived? MR. HARSHBARGER: No question about it. MR. DOWNS: I believe you were stating before that you called out mutual aid that was almost instantaneous when you first arrived. MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. Actually, the mutual aid, the boxes were called. The ambulance box was the first that we called. Patrolman Berkler, prior to my having heard that, had called for what we call an engine box, which would be the fire fighting equipment. I echoed that again when I heard that, so there were actually two calls for fire fighting equipment and, subsequently, a call for tankers because we knew that there would not be water readily available to that site. We figured, at least at the outset, we would have to bring tank water. MR. DOWNS: Do you remember approximately how many total mutual aid companies arrived? Was it a county response, multiple counties that were down there? MR. HARSHBARGER: It was multiple counties. It was every agency in Kankakee County; most agencies in Iroquois County, the county immediately to the south; and then most agencies as well in Will County; some stretched into Cook County into the southern suburbs of the City of Chicago. MR. DOWNS: Roughly, the manpower count all total from all those responders? MR. HARSHBARGER: I believe 54 agencies and 360 fire fighters. MR. DOWNS: In your experience and your history of dealing with fires, would you describe this more or less as kind of a once in a lifetime event, something that you would never really expect to encounter? MR. HARSHBARGER: Very definitely. MR. DOWNS: Let's get into a little bit of detail on the fire. You mentioned when first arrived on the scene, you saw the fire approximate to the locomotive itself. The locomotive was on fire. Had the sleeper car to the rear of that become involved at that time? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes, it had. However, our immediate size of it, or my immediate size of it didn't indicate to me quite the magnitude of the fire that was taking place there. Could we go back to 2B again, please. The sleeper car, the one we nicknamed Ben because of the shape of it, was not generally involved in the fire on this side, and we were not able to see this side very well, nor could we see from the opposite side the amount of fire there was. The color of the flames and the color of the smoke indicated it was a petroleum fed fire. We were sure that it was the diesel fuel from the locomotive that was the root of that. However, the fire was not much on the outside of the locomotive at that point. It apparently was contained within the body of the locomotive, and it was somewhat a chimney effect back through the length of it, so that it was creating more of a blow torch type of thing through this area toward the sleeper car. That area is where, of course, we discovered the majority of the fatalities was through the center section. MR. DOWNS: Would it be fair to say that the fire started out relatively small and built up over the course of time? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes, I believe it did. MR. DOWNS: Let's get back to water resources. What were your difficulties in that regard? MR. HARSHBARGER: We have a hydrant from our crossing that we saw on the previous slide exactly half had a mile south, but back on the east side of the track. So, the initial incoming engine from Bourbonnais stopped and dropped a five inch feeder line at that hydrant. It crossed the tracks and come on north up this road to a position just behind where this truck is parked now and stopped there. They had dropped the last of the two thousand feet of hose they had on the truck about six hundred feet from where they were stopped there. Another engine company from the Village of Bradley, which was on the mutual aid box, picked up at that point and laid in the remaining six hundred feet and made the connection. As I said, we called for tankers and the tanker box early on because we knew this would take a period of time to establish a reliable water supply. So, the tanker came in behind the engine and fed both the engine and this rescue truck which had the foam on it while we were in the process of establishing the water supply from the hydrant, but it was 2,600 feet to the hydrant. MR. DOWNS: That takes a while to get that five inch line established. Meanwhile, you used the tankers to feed your pumpers to fight the fire? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. MR. DOWNS: You mentioned foam, fire fighting foam. Again, is that something that is normally used for, say, a petroleum based fire? Perhaps you could elaborate a little bit on that. MR. HARSHBARGER: We carry in our rescue truck 20 gallons of foam concentrate to deal primarily with highway accidents that might be a petrochemical-related issue, but because we have no petrochemical issues in our district, nor for that matter are there any pretty much county-wide. We don't carry large quantities of foam, nor do we have a basically foam tank type engine ourselves nor, again, has any other agency in our county any device that has a large quantity of foam on it. MR. DOWNS: At some point, you did call out mutual aid for foam equipment? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. We called from two special foam engines from two chemical plants that are located within our mutual aid box alarm system and are about a 35 minute trip away. MR. DOWNS: That is because you ran out of foam in fighting the initial attack and you simply ran out of the resources and you had to rely upon the larger volume? MR. HARSHBARGER: That is correct. The thing we experienced was that because the fire was primarily contained within the locomotive, we were not able to effectively use the foam on it at that point. We were using high pressure fog which would knock the fire down, but of course, would not extinguish it. As major quantities of the diesel fuel leaked out on to the ground and outside the body of the locomotive, we began to have a much larger volume of fire outside. It was then that the foam was much more effective because we could blanket the surface of the fire. MR. DOWNS: Could you please tell us about some of the difficulties encountered at the scene regarding, say, the logistics, establishment of the command post, the marshalling of the mutual, and anything else that you want to bring up that made this fire particularly stubborn to put out. MR. HARSHBARGER: The magnitude of the incident and the number of injured as well as the number of non-injured but involved people very much over-taxed our capability to communicate with each other by radio. We have known for sometime that we had a radio communication system deficiency county-wide and have been attempting to address that; but due to constraints, capital constraints, I have not been able to get it done thus far although this incident has prompted some more movement and it would appear that we are going to be able to address that. Communications was the single greatest difficulty we faced because the single radio frequencies and the inability to talk on an inter-agency basis caused us to have to use runners and notes back and forth many of the times. MR. DOWNS: Sounds like it was not a very efficient way to do things with the fire ground scattered in this large area. MR. HARSHBARGER: It was not. An example of that was we had fire fighting crews and rescue crews inside the sleeper car with the three people, four people who were trapped in that car for quite a long period of time. They were unable to communicate with me by radio their need for fire screens inside the car because of the fire that was passing through the sleeper car and impinging on the wall of the dining car. Finally, well into the incident, perhaps 40 or more minutes into the incident, was the first time I was able to hear communication from any of the fire fighters inside the car because of the mass amount of radio traffic that was going on. MR. DOWNS: You mentioned the county is attempting to do something about it. Does that mean the funding is going to be procured and perhaps you are going to get a better radio system? MR. HARSHBARGER: It looks favorable. Congressman Jerry Weller has sponsored some legislation that is presently in committee in the Congress that would afford substantial funding for fire departments for capital expenditures of that nature and would afford us some resources to enhance or virtually replace our radio communications system. MR. DOWNS: Let's move for a moment to the passenger accounting. Did you have any difficulties when you arrived on the scene with regard to determining just how many people were on the train? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. We had a major problem with that because there was not very good information in terms of the number of potential passengers. We were told at some point that there could be as many as four hundred. Then we got conflicts to that effect, that it was more like two hundred. It bandied back and forth. The largest part of the problem that, that posed was one of determining how much more we would need in terms of resources for emergency medical services and transportation. The passenger manifest finally made it to me within the first hour, but later in the first hour of the incident, where we were able to get a relatively accurate number for the number of people that were on the train. Again, it was not accurate at that time, but it was much closer. MR. DOWNS: You feel that is a critical piece of information, that list or that accounting, for the needs of the emergency responders? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. That was probably the greatest frustration because when we did get the manifest, and even on into the hours of the following morning, the numbers were not completely conclusive. One of other problems that we had is a situation whereby a person traveling with an infant under the age of a year would not be on the manifest at all because they didn't have a ticket. The other thing we found is that apparently the names listed on the manifest were in the name of the person who purchased the tickets, so we would see the situation where the same name might appear five or six times. So obviously, we could not have had that many people with the same name. So, we didn't know whether we were looking for male, female, young, old, infant, or what we were faced with. So, that was a substantial frustration, yes. MR. DOWNS: The next thing I would like to touch on a little bit is: Has your county or your village had any training with Amtrak on emergency events? MR. HARSHBARGER: We have never had a specific training exercise with Amtrak, but have now got one set up that will occur in November and will encompass about a four hour classroom presentation and then an eight hour practical presentation on an actual train. That is going to take place in Kankakee. We have invited every agency which was called by mutual aid to the March 15th incident and invited them to reach out amongst their other neighboring agencies and bring as many people as they possibly can because we feel there is a great deal we didn't know about the equipment that would be very valuable to not only us -- hopefully, we will never have to deal with this again -- but other agencies and members of other agencies very possibly might have to do that. MR. DOWNS: Lastly, in closing, are there any lessons learned that you would like to pass on to other organizations and agencies regarding this particular event? MR. HARSHBARGER: The greatest lesson learned here was that training pays off. No level of training could possibly have prepared us or our neighboring agencies for the magnitude of this incident. However, the training that we did have certainly gave us a way of understanding and directing what needed to be done a great deal better than we certainly would have been prepared had we not trained at all. So, training and more training is always the key. We always have people moving out of the service and new people coming in, so repetitive training, while it is not necessarily popular, is a very important factor. The other lesson I suppose that sticks out most strongly in my mind is how valuable the incident management system is and how absolutely impossible a large-scale incident would be to handle without using the simple format of the incident management system. MR. DOWNS: Very good, Chief; thank you very much. That concludes my questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Amtrak? EXAMINATION BY AMTRAK MR. BULLOCK: Hello, Chief Harshbarger. MR. HARSHBARGER: Good afternoon. MR. BULLOCK: I would just like to, on behalf of Amtrak, express my appreciation once again to you and to the citizens of Bourbonnais, the emergency responders, and all of the citizens in Kankakee County that were, in our mind, so tremendous in helping us with this. It took us about two hours to get down there from Chicago, and from the moment we got there, we were tremendously impressed by not only the competence that the accident was being handled with, but also the care and compassion that you all had for our employees and for our customers on the train, and we deeply appreciate that. I would like to know, Chief, when the first time was that you actually made contact. I know I met you about ten minutes after I arrived at the scene, but that was not until almost 12:30, 12:40 a.m. When was the first time you actually made contact with somebody from Amtrak at the scene? MR. HARSHBARGER: I can only guess, but I would say something in neighborhood of 10:30. MR. BULLOCK: Was that somebody who was on the train? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. MR. BULLOCK: That was somebody who was on the train? MR. HARSHBARGER: It was someone who handed me paper work, and they represented it to be from the conductor. He did not identify himself as being the conductor. MR. BULLOCK: Was that the reservation manifest? Is that what that was? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. MR. BULLOCK: At any time before I got there, had anyone made the one eight hundred number available to you of our national operations center? MR. HARSHBARGER: No. MR. BULLOCK: I don't have any other questions. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad. MR. ED HARRIS: No questions other than to second Mr. Bullock's comments on the Chief's efforts at the tragedy itself and on the outlying communities as well too. Thanks again. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Federal Railroad Administration? MR. BLACKMORE: I have no questions, and I would also like to third what Mr. Bullock said. I was on the scene shortly after that. I am very impressed with the way the response was handled. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions, thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. STEAD: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: How were you contacted by -- you mentioned you were contacted by the conductor. How were you contacted? MR. HARSHBARGER: I was in an incident command center on the roadway that we indicated a while ago, and the individual came up to the incident command center and identified himself as being from Amtrak and handed me a manifest. MR. WALPERT: Thank you that is all I have. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The United Transportation Union? MR. DWYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We too would like to extend our thanks to the Chief and his people, and we have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Marshall with Melco? MR. MARSHALL: I have no questions, and I would like to commend all the people that were in the effort of putting out the fire and doing all the efforts of making everything as good as they could after this disaster. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. SWEEDLER: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for a job well done. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: No questions. I also want to thank the captain for his tremendous work on the scene. MR. DUNN: I have a couple of questions, Chief. When you arrived on the scene, did any of the what I am going to call witnesses come up to you and say they had seen what happened? Did anyone? MR. HARSHBARGER: No. MR. DUNN: No one did? MR. HARSHBARGER: No. MR. DUNN: Did you know before the accident what the role of the NTSB was? Did you know who we were? MR. HARSHBARGER: Beyond newspaper information from other transportation accidents, no, not really. MR. DUNN: That is why I want to thank you personally. I know you were in charge of the situation, and I met you and explained to you what we do and your cooperation in accepting it as far as we are the lead agency in the investigation. Normally, that doesn't happen. It usually takes boxing gloves, but your cooperation, I really appreciate, and of course, the community and how everybody was treated and the way they worked out there. Thank you. Those are all the questions I have. MR. HARSHBARGER: Thank you. MR. LAUBY: I have just one or two questions, Chief. This is biggest incident you have ever been to; is that accurate? MR. HARSHBARGER: Absolutely. MR. LAUBY: Is there any way to adequately prepare for something like this? MR. HARSHBARGER: No, I don't really think so. No one can be one hundred percent prepared for something of that magnitude no matter how large an organization they are. I go back to a comment that I believe I heard made which drew a comparison between this incident and the drills that we have done many times in the past. When you do a drill and you transport a would be victim and you bandage them all up and they have rubber wounds that have been stuck to them and they see theatrical blood on them, it makes it really appear very real, but nothing can compare to looking at someone who really is injured, sometimes mortally injured. The toll that takes on a human being and the rescuer is immense, but again, training, training, and training is the key to being able to cope with whatever might come your way. MR. LAUBY: Thank you for your good work, Chief. Those are all the questions I have. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I, too, come from local government, and I think one of the things that I have had a chance to observe since I have come to the Board is when looking at incidents that literally happen all over the United States, one of the things that makes me feel really good is to find that everywhere we go, we almost invariably find that people like the Chief here are out there all over the United States, volunteer fire departments full time, part time, whatever. It is amazing to me. One comes to mind, a train accident in rural Texas, that fire on the overpass down there. They had a plan. They had an incident command process, and they did an excellent job. Fortunately, it was not a passenger train, but they did an excellent job of coping with it. Devine, Texas I am told did an excellent job of coping with that. We never know when we might need your services when we are driving down I-57. So, thank you very much. Anything else? MR. DOWNS: One last thing. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Anyone else or anybody direct? FURTHER EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. DOWNS: Just for the record, Chief, the fire was reported initially about 9:47. About how long did it take to put the fire out? MR. HARSHBARGER: The fire was finally extinguished about an hour and 25 minutes into the incident. MR. DOWNS: Your forces were on the scene until how long in the morning? MR. HARSHBARGER: Approximately three p.m. on Tuesday afternoon. We left and, of course, went back a number of times over that period of time. I might add, incidentally, the representative from the Coroner's office arrived on the scene a short time after ten o'clock Monday night and didn't leave the scene at all until after 11 p.m. Tuesday night. MR. DOWNS: It was a marathon effort by all. MR. HARSHBARGER: It certainly was. MR. DOWNS: Thank you again, Chief. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I just was passed along one more question to you. Have you ever been to another accident at this site, this crossing? MR. HARSHBARGER: Yes. I was at a grade crossing accident at that crossing. In fact, I think it was the immediately previous fatal accident that occurred there. It was an automobile which was likewise eastbound and went around the crossing gates and was struck by a northbound Amtrak. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, Chief. Anything else you would like say to us? MR. HARSHBARGER: I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you for your kind words on behalf of my community. I promise I will take those kind words back and share them with all those very deserving people. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Maybe we will get a few of these reporters to send them back by another channel. (Witness excused.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Due to the failure of the Chairman to observe that we started without the court reporter a while ago, we have been delayed a little further. That is my fault. Nobody told me either. If I am going to be senile, I am going to have get nonsenile accomplices up here. Let's break until about 2:45 p.m. Thank you. (Recess from 1:32 p.m. to 2:47 p.m.) A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Dunn, will you proceed. MR. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Lee Bullock please. SWORN TESTIMONY OF LEE BULLOCK AND MARK MEANA MR. DUNN: Mr. Bullock, for the record, will you please state your full name and spell it for us. MR. BULLOCK: Lee Bullock, L-e-e B-u-l-l-o-c-k. MR. DUNN: Who is -- MR. BULLOCK: This is Mark Meana, Director of Safety for Amtrak East here with me. MR. DUNN: Would you spell your full name for us Mr. Meana. MR. MEANA: M-e-a-n-a. MR. DUNN: Mr. Bullock, who are you employed by? MR. BULLOCK: I am employed by Amtrak. MR. DUNN: What is your position? MR. BULLOCK: I am President of Amtrak Intercity, which is the business unit that has the long distance trains, and we are headquartered in Chicago. MR. DUNN: At this time, I will turn the questioning over to the Technical Panel, Mr. Richard Downs. MR. DOWNS: Thank you, Mr. Dunn. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. DOWNS: Good afternoon, Mr. Bullock. MR. BULLOCK: Hello, Rick. MR. DOWNS: Would you please tell us about your professional background and your role as President of Amtrak Intercity. MR. BULLOCK: Sure. I have been with Amtrak since 1973. I actually started on board the trains on the East Coast. Since that I time, I have had a variety of positions with Amtrak, including positions at Amtrak's headquarters in our National Operations Center and several line management operating positions at a number of locations throughout the Amtrak system. Prior to coming to Chicago, I was Vice-President of Customer Service responsible for operations and delivery of customer service at Amtrak West. Then I came to Amtrak Intercity, the business unit, as I indicated earlier, that is headquartered in Chicago is responsible for the operation of Amtrak's long distance trains. I came here in 1996, first as Vice-President of Customer Service and Operations. Then in 1998, I became President of the business unit. MR. DOWNS: Maybe you can elaborate for us a little bit the difference between Amtrak Intercity and other business units. MR. BULLOCK: Yes. Approximately five years ago, Amtrak changed its organizational structure, and Amtrak, the entire company is now composed of three business units. We have the northeast corridor. Of course, we own much of the railroad between Washington and Boston and on the West Coast where we have a lot of very active state partners in California and Washington particularly. We have Amtrak West, and that is a business unit on the West Coast. The rest of the country is Amtrak Intercity, and it is really the long distance network. So, our business unit is an organizational structure. The headquarters for Amtrak is still in Washington, D.C. MR. DOWNS: These trains basically are your long haul passenger trains and most all of them are reserved type trains? MR. BULLOCK: That is right; that is correct. MR. DOWNS: This morning, we heard testimony about how important it is for the local emergency responders to be properly presented with an accurate and correct accounting of the reserved passengers on trains. With that all said and done, tell us about the mechanism that Amtrak has in place now to perform that. MR. BULLOCK: Right now, Amtrak operates, as you indicated, with both reserved and unreserved trains throughout the national system. The train that was involved in the collision at Bourbonnais, Illinois, the City of New Orleans, is an all-reserved train, an overnight all-reserved train. Because it is an overnight all-reserved train, there is a manifest produced by Amtrak's reservations system. Our reservations system is called Arrow, and that system actually produces a passenger name, record manifest for all the people who have reservations on the train. We have traditionally at Amtrak used that as our manifest document even during accidents. I believe that -- going back to the accident at Saraland (phonetic) -- the recommendation from the NTSB, I think that was R-94007, is where the NTSB first put focus on this issue of the proper accounting of the human beings, the passengers and the employees, on the train. When that issue came up, that recommendation came out, we turned at that point to start using the ticket pouch on the train. The conductor's ticket pouch is under his personal care. We have the manifest that says who is supposed to get on the train, but we have a lot of people who make reservations who actually don't get on the train. So, what the conductor does is he takes tickets from everyone. So, the on-train manifest, our record of who is on that train is really carried today in the ticket pouches. It is a manual system in the ticket pouch. Because of the things that, and I think it stems back to the recommendation from the Saraland accident and the things that we have learned, the reservation manifest by itself is really not adequate for a proper accounting of the human beings on a train. As we have learned the profound importance of being able to properly account for everyone on the train, we now look at that ticket pouch as our main resource document. As a matter of fact, it is part of our go team which went to the site at Bourbonnais. Within, I would say, 15 minutes after we arrived at the scene, we had recovered the ticket pouch and immediately started putting together our passenger name record to see who exactly was on the train. So, it is still very much a manual system. We still do manual ticket lift on the train. The conductor literally takes people's tickets and punches them just like conductors did 30 or 40 years ago. It is exactly the same kind of system that was used 30 or 40 years. So, we are still using that same manual system. We have made a lot of policy changes and continue to make policy changes at Amtrak to improve that system so we can do a better job. It certainly was not perfect at Bourbonnais, and I understand that. I also had the misfortune to go to a lot of other Amtrak derailments, and I also know that in this particular case, we did the level best job we have ever done, the best job that we have ever done in accounting for everybody. We had the number of ticketed passengers identified within 30 minutes after arrival, so we knew the exact number of ticketed passengers in 30 minutes. That was after our arrival at the scene. MR. DOWNS: That raised a good point though in that being that Bourbonnais is proximate to Chicago, it was somewhat convenient to arrive so to speak. Let's say it had happened as in Kingman, Arizona. You had a case where Amtrak is three or four hours away. Does that present a problems in that regard too? MR. BULLOCK: It certainly does raise more difficult questions. There was an obvious advantage because we could get to Bourbonnais quickly. There is no question about that. Something else we have also learned because of these accidents is part of our emergency response procedures now. Our National Operations Center, which is there 24 hours a day, part of our protocol at this point is to get a hold of the railroad wherever we have an accident, to get a hold of the railroad and ask the railroad to get for us the name and the position of the incident commander at the scene and get the information to that individual, whoever that individual is, to give that person our eight hundred number. For example, in the case of the incident at Bourbonnais, Chief Harshbarger actually ended up getting a copy of the manifest that happened to be on the train, but we can generate that manifest today by e-mail, by fax, by a number of ways of communication. By using that eight hundred number and getting in quick contact with the incident commander, we can let the incident commander know in a moment the count of the passengers who were reserved on there. So, we know in a moment the number of passengers, the count of the passengers who were reserved on the train. That is a whole different matter, of course, an accounting for every human being who is actually on the train and what their disposition is. MR. DOWNS: Let's divert for a moment to Amtrak's training program. Is it part of the training program where crew members are given instructions to the effect that they know that fire departments and emergency responders will be needing this information promptly and that they know they need to seek out and relay this as best they can? Then to follow up to that, if I may, what if the conductor incapacitated or those key crew members where you cannot physically find the pouch? MR. BULLOCK: What was your first question? MR. DOWNS: The training. MR. BULLOCK: The training, it actually is a part of our what we call prepare training, and that prepare course continues to evolve as we learn better and more about how to deal more effectively with these kinds of situations, but yes, it is very much a part of what the obligation of the crew is. In the case of Bourbonnais, for example, we went where the conductor's office is located on the train and recovered it. We didn't get it from the conductor. We got it from the location where he was. MR. DOWNS: If the conductor and such or even that car that is, for example, where the materials are physically kept, suppose that car is totally inaccessible. Then you have no, under your current procedure, you have no way of getting that information short of regenerating it from your home office. MR. BULLOCK: That is absolutely right. That is why we have to, and we will talk here in a moment, we have to go beyond where we are today; there is no question. That is what our intention is. In the event we were unable to find the ticket pouch, what our plan would be at that point, what our plan is at that point is to, once again, rely upon the reservation manifest which is, once again, available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week through the contact number. We can make it available, and our contact with the incident commander is always through the railroads we work with. MR. DOWNS: Perhaps we can go into now briefly as to what Amtrak has prepared or planned for future technologies in this regard. MR. BULLOCK: Having lived through some of these accidents, this is becoming more and more of an issue. Our awareness has grown in how much we need to address this issue. We knew of the need and have been working for a couple of years on an automatic system, an automated system, an electronic system, a computerized system, if you will, on how we are going to account for passengers on the train. When the Congress actually gave us our capital funding -- some of you heard of this, it was called the TRA; it was the capital funding for Amtrak for two years which we very badly needed that gave us access to funds -- one of the first things out of that fund for capital investments that we made is we made an investment of $24 million and contracted with Motorola actually here in Chicagoland to put together an automated system. What it is, it is a hand-held device. It is very simple. It is hand-held device that the conductor will take with him. It will scan the tickets, and it will scan into the hand-held device the passenger name, record of the person's name, and then it can print a receipt or it can print a receipt check. Then that information can then be -- there is a computer on board, a central processing unit that is on board the train, and that will be loaded, the information from the hand-held device is loaded into that computer. Then it can be transmitted and hooked into our national reservations system. So, we won't even have to get the information directly from the train. We will have it available from a number of locations as soon as the information gets transmitted from the train. It is our expectation that the design and implementation of this scheduled for 2000. So, our plan is to, by the end of 2000, have this implemented throughout the Amtrak system. MR. DOWNS: I believe you submitted an exhibit demonstrating and describing your device. MR. BULLOCK: Yes, we have. We have an exhibit. Actually, we brought the hand-held device with us. Mark has it right here. MR. DOWNS: I believe that is Exhibit 5A. MR. BULLOCK: I think that is what it is. That is right. It is 14 ounces. It is shock resistant. It has enormous an amount of capabilities, and this is where you scan in the tickets (demonstrating). This will also be connected. The conductor will also have a printer that he will be able to attach to his belt that will print out the seat check or the receipt so he will have a printed receipt to give people. He doesn't have to hand write everything like we require them to do today. MR. DOWNS: This will somewhat replace the old ticket punch of days gone by. MR. BULLOCK: Yes. This is a wonderful device certainly in terms of being able to properly account for all the human beings who are on the train, but also is designed as a fare collection device to make our fare collection system more efficient and closer to at least the 20th century if not the 21st century. MR. DOWNS: That would work in conjunction with the current reservations system as kind of a cross-check plus an enlargement or enlightenment of that technology? MR. BULLOCK: Yes; they will be tied together. MR. DOWNS: To make sure I understand correctly, each ticket-taker or conductor or whatever, when a person boards the train, let's say in an unreserved situation -- there are many passengers who will board your train, space providing, of course, en route -- they will be able to enter the information on the spot, update the database such that, God forbid, five minutes later something happens. We will have a complete and accurate accounting as best as can be reasonably put together; is that correct? MR. BULLOCK: That is right; that is correct. MR. DOWNS: In closing, is there anything else you would like to present? Were there any lessens learned as a result of this particular incident that you would like to pass on? MR. BULLOCK: Yes. There is a couple of things I would like to mention. First of all, I would like to again extend Amtrak's deepest sympathy for all of the people who suffered in this incident, especially those who suffered losses. We know it has been a hard healing process, and goodness knows, in catastrophic circumstances, one never does everything right; but we feel that the vast majority of the people who were at Bourbonnais, the passengers, our employees, know that if we didn't do everything right, they knew that our hearts and our minds were in the right place when we got there. I guess one of the lessons learned for me out of this and something I wanted to mention in this hearing, and it, once again, reinforces the importance of having a proper accounting of all the human beings on the train, and that is the assistance we got from the NTSB. The family assistance folks were a tremendous resource for us, and there were times when I certainly felt overwhelmed. I know the coroner there felt overwhelmed. Having those folks there to guide us, they knew how to get the mobile morgue in and get it in quickly; being able to answer questions, the legitimate questions people had about survivors and the condition of the survivors -- all of those things were incredibly important. The support that they helped guide us through was absolutely critical to our being able to deal effectively. I think we did the best we have ever done as a company in this circumstance with regard to dealing with our customers and with our employees, but a large part of that was due to the family assistance of the people from the NTSB who were there to address the official responsibility certainly of looking into the cause of the accident. Also, I guess a lesson learned for me was the NTSB, in this case, was also a huge resource for us, to help us manage through this very difficult situation. So, I want to express Amtrak's thanks to the NTSB for that because it was extremely helpful. I guess the only other thing that I would mention is that because of the facts we learned at Bourbonnais and some of these other incidents, we have made some other interim policy changes that, as long as we have this manual system that we have on the train, there is no reason that we cannot have an accurate accounting, even with this manual system, of every human being on the train, and that is what we are going to do. We have an interim plan in place until we get the sophisticated system that we really badly need. We have interim plan in place that will allow us to, we will be able to account for every single person. It will be a requirement. It is the policy requirement of our company that you will, to ride the train, you will have to have a ticket with your name on it. If you do not have a ticket with your name on it, we will ask our conductor and support our conductors that they cannot, they will not allow people to ride on our trains without some form of transportation. The conductor will have the authority the issue a form of transportation which we are in the process of creating now, and that will be part of the ticket pouch. That way, we will the name, the origin and destination and the space on the train that, that individual is assigned, of all the people on the train. That is all of our employees, whether those employees were working employees or whether they are employees who are commuting from one point to another, if it is media folks, if it is railroad officials, it doesn't matter who it is, everyone must have some form of transportation. So, I suppose that is one area that was a lesson learned for us. MR. DOWNS: You say the new system will be in place in the year 2000, next year? MR. BULLOCK: Yes. I believe that the design, the first implementation will take place in the spring. Our intention is to time that with the beginning of the high speed trains, the Acello (phonetic) trains in the northeast corridor. That is where we will really cut our teeth on this system, and then we will spread it out from there. MR. DOWNS: How long before full implementation? MR. BULLOCK: By the end of the year, by the end of 2000 throughout the Amtrak system. MR. DOWNS: Thank you. That concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I appreciate those comments on behalf of NTSB for our family affairs group. I have had the unenviable position of being the first Board Member on the first accident after we instituted that program, which was a runway accident down here in Quincy, Illinois, not too far away. I also had the largest one since it occurred, which was the Korean Air Flight 801 on Guam. In Guam, we really got to do a favor for the locals because the team you mentioned, that we took with us, that deployed with us in Guam were really about the only help from the forensic pathology standpoint that there was on Guam. They had considerable military presence, but from the standpoint of having forensic and people accustomed to coping with that much carnage at one time, they were not really equipped, and we were pleased to able to render the service. Thank you very much. The Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? MR. ED HARRIS: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Railroad Administration? EXAMINATION BY THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION MR. BLACKMORE: I have just a couple. Do you have anyone that works for the local fire departments part time or full time in communities along the way? MR. BULLOCK: Absolutely. We do somewhere around 50 emergency response demonstrations a year, and I think we train. Mark, you can probably help with this. It is probably around a thousand I believe. MR. MEANA: That is correct. It is coordinated through our Manager of Emergency Preparedness. MR. BLACKMORE: Are they full time or part time? MR. BULLOCK: They are full-time people. MR. BLACKMORE: Have you taken any actions to promote this eight hundred number, the national response number at a higher level than you have done in the past? MR. BULLOCK: First of all, it is absolutely a part of our protocol. As I indicated earlier, it is part of our emergency response procedure, and it is built into our emergency response plan; that, that is part of it when we have an emergency, is it to get the names, the railroad, the incident commander, and then ask the railroad to get that name. So, that is an implemented part of our procedure. MR. BLACKMORE: I have no further questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions, thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. STEAD: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: I have a couple questions. Mr. Bullock, in regard to training, our operating abilities, specifically, are locomotive engineers and conductors trained in how to react in emergency situations? MR. BULLOCK: Yes. All of our employees are trained with what is called Prepare. We have a Prepare Course, and our intention would be to train everyone every two years with a Prepare Course. The Prepare Course kind of keeps shifting and changing and growing and getting better, but absolutely, the engineers and all the operating crews in the train and the conductors as well. In fact, we like to get as many of them trained as early as possible. So, yes, that is part of our training, and it is part of our continuing training we are going to be doing for the balance of this year and also in 2000. MR. WALPERT: Does part of that training include what an engineer, or for that matter, a conductor or anyone else on the locomotive cab would do in the event they were trapped on the locomotive cab or in the cab? MR. BULLOCK: I don't know if it specifically addresses what to do. I went through the Prepare training course myself, and I don't know that it specifically addresses that, but there are lots of things to learn there in terms of tools and what tools you can access, the things you should do, the things you should not do, how to respond to fire, when you should try to escape, when you should not try to escape. Those things are applicable whether you are in the cab or anyplace in the interior of the train. MR. WALPERT: That is all I have. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The United Transportation Union? EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION MR. DWYER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bullock, how will the training center in Delaware that you just opened play into this? MR. BULLOCK: Well, the training center is a, well, it is a beautiful facility. I wish I had it in Chicago. It is in Wilmington, Delaware as you have indicated. It is a tremendous resource for us, and of course, our long distance trains go all over the nation, so we will be doing a lot of the training on the East Coast with employees who are crew based in that area. So, where it makes sense for us to utilize that facility, we are absolutely going to do that and use the professional services of the trainers who are there. Also, we have a very active program putting together what we call train the trainer programs so that we have a wide network throughout the nation of people who are capable of teaching this class. We found that the people who are the most capable of teaching this class are very often the people who work on the trains themselves. Very often, it is conductors and engineers. Sometimes, it is on-board service staff. They have all shown a great ability to be trained as trainers, and they have more credibility actually very often than a management trainer does. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Melco, Mr. Marshall? MR. MARSHALL: I have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bullock, Mr. Meana, I am very pleased to hear about the new system that you are putting in to keep track of your customers. As Mr. Meana will tell you, we have had numerous discussions between Amtrak staff and Safety Board staff to try to come up with some type of a system that would be useful in this type of tragic situation. I was wondering if the system that is going to be implemented, the one you described, will cover all Amtrak trains or just Intercity, will it cover the northeast corridor and some of the California commuter service or some of the other commuter service? MR. BULLOCK: It is our intention that when it is fully implemented, it will cover all of our trains because it is also the way that we are going to do the ticket list. This is the way we are going to move in how we do the ticket list on all of the trains. MR. SWEEDLER: All this information will cover all passengers on all trains and be available, not only on the train, but from your center. Is that the center in Philadelphia or is it located in some other place? MR. BULLOCK: Actually Wilmington, Delaware. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Bullock. I appreciate it. MR. BULLOCK: I should point out that is except for commuter trains and the commuter operations that we run, but certainly for all our reserved trains, this is how it will be. MR. SWEEDLER: That is what I was getting at. It will cover the reserved trains -- MR. BULLOCK: Absolutely. MR. SWEEDLER: -- but not the commuter type? MR. BULLOCK: Not the commuter type trains, right. MR. SWEEDLER: Have you given thought about if there is anything that can be done for commuter type operations, or is that too mind boggling to try to -- MR. BULLOCK: I will tell you, right now, our focus is, with the manual system we have today, our focus is right now with the reserved long distance train because that is where those are subject to be in any remote location anywhere in the country. So, that is where our focus is right now. The next step is to take it to all the reserved service, and that is what we are concentrating on now. Since we plan to do the ticket lift with this hand-held computer, it is going to give us the ability, as long as we can sell the ticket so that the information there from an individual, then we will be able to filter it. We will have it in the computer. MR. SWEEDLER: You also mentioned that each person with a ticket, the name of the person would be on the ticket. I was thinking about what Chief Harshbarger was saying: The same name appeared four or five times, and that person may have purchased five tickets. You are saying that will not occur with this new system? MR. BULLOCK: It will not occur with the new system. As a matter of fact, we have already corrected that. We have changed our reservation system so there are individual names for groups. There are individual names. It is not just names, in other words, of the people who buy the tickets; it is the names of the people who are going to travel. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you, sir. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: No questions, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Investigator? MR. DUNN: I have one question: How is this system going to keep track of Amtrak employees that are dead-heading on the trains and do not have to buy a ticket? MR. BULLOCK: We will have to either have them have a ticket that is printed from the computer that is specifically designed, which we can do, that will be read into the computer; or we have a back-up system. Initially, if we don't have that day one, we have the back-up system that will have the names, all the names. We have the names of the employees on the train all the time, and we are making it a requirement. Now, we are making it a requirement if you are employee. In the past, it has not really been a requirement. If you wanted to get to work, you just come because you know people, and they let you ride. Actually, it is a benefit of working for a transportation company, that you can get back and forth to work, as your mode of getting back and forth to work. So it is a benefit, and we want people to use that benefit, but we need to, because of this very issue, require everybody even today to have some form of transportation. MR. DUNN: Those are all the questions I have. MR. LAUBY: Mr. Bullock, I have a couple of questions for you. First of all, so I understand, the new automated system will not fully be in place until the end of the year 2000; is that correct? MR. BULLOCK: That is right. MR. LAUBY: At that point, how many trains do you expect to have this on? MR. BULLOCK: All of the trains, all of the reserved trains in the system. MR. LAUBY: All the reserved trains will be equipped with this technology by the end of the year 2000? MR. BULLOCK: Yes. That would include all of the overnight long distance trains as well as, for example, the train like the Carolinian that runs. It doesn't run overnight. There are no sleepers on it. It runs from New York to Charlotte, North Carolina from 6 a.m. in the morning until 11 o'clock at night, and it would include it because that is an all reserved train. MR. LAUBY: Will this include trains like your Metroliner service on the northeast corridor? MR. BULLOCK: It will because the Metroliners are all reserved as will the new Acello service. With the new trains, that is to be all reserved. MR. LAUBY: These other procedures you put in place to make sure everybody on board has a ticket or some type of ticket voucher, how long have those procedures been put in place? MR. BULLOCK: They are actually not in place yet, Mr. Lauby. They are actually, they are written. The procedures are put together, and we have got the bulletin put together. I spent a lot of time working on this with a number of people at Amtrak. We want to get this right before we put it out, and it is going to into effect in conjunction with our timetable changes October 31st. MR. LAUBY: October 31st, everybody who is on the train will be accounted for? MR. BULLOCK: Everyone on overnight long distance reserved trains, that is right. MR. LAUBY: One final question about this technology: You mentioned you got this from Motorola; is that correct? MR. BULLOCK: That is who we ended up contracting with, that is right. MR. LAUBY: This technology, is this custom made for Amtrak or is this used anywhere else? It looks very much like one of those car rental set-ups I have seen before. Is this that type of technology or is this custom? MR. BULLOCK: My understanding is they have drawn on other things that they are doing, without question, but it obviously is custom-designed for this particular person. I know of no other time that this has -- I mean they are saying this is going to be state of the art. I think it is state of the art because nobody else has the system yet. So, it is custom designed for us. MR. LAUBY: Thank you very much, Mr. Bullock. That is all I have. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I have a couple here. Amtrak out here in that particular case, don't you call it a host system? You are hosted by the Illinois Central in this area? MR. BULLOCK: Yes. They are a host railroad, and we contract with them to operate our passenger trains over their property. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Do you do anything special? Let's take a hypothetical situation. Let's say you are thinking about starting to use Canadian National/Illinois Central for a train to Memphis or somewhere. Do you do anything about looking at their, from a risk management standpoint, about looking at trackage with regard to hazards associated with all the grade crossings along that route? MR. BULLOCK: I can give you an example. The Oklahoma service that we just started, we just re-instituted the Oklahoma service for the first time in 20 years between Fort Worth and Oklahoma City, and the freight carrier involved there is the B.N. Santa Fe. We had a lot of meetings with their engineering folks. We went down and rode. We looked at everything -- the grade crossings, the track conditions, everything, and looked at the speeds that were allowed for passenger trains on grade crossings. In this case, as a matter of fact, with changing grade crossing circuits, we will be able to operate at higher speeds, but not until the circuits are actually changed. So, yes, we do that kind of work. Also in terms of Oklahoma, I have a team of people down there who have done emergency response training, all of them, down that route. Since it is a new service and they have not had passenger trains there for years, it has been very well received by the communities down there. We think it is a real value to us, and it is also a real value to them. CHAIRMAN BLACK: How about looking at the character of the traffic on the crossings? The heavy vehicles, in other words, which might not be as big a concern to the freight train, but in the same sense, you look at them to see if track circuits are adequate to handle the speeds, would you look at the consequences, again, the hazards associated with a crossing like this one in Kankakee or Bourbonnais, that has four or five hundred truck trips per day on it? MR. BULLOCK: It is not our property. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It is your train though, isn't it? MR. BULLOCK: It is about absolutely our train, but it is not our property. On our property, for example, in the State of Michigan, where we own a hundred miles of railroad in Michigan -- that is the only place we own any really significant piece of railroad outside the Northeast corridor, and we have 87 grade crossings there -- with the help of the State of Michigan, all of those grade crossings are protected with gates. All the public crossings are protected with gates. What we do is we team up with the rail carrier and with the local authorities, the state folks, the local folks to work with them. We convey information that our employees provide to us about situations at grade crossings, but in terms of us actually controlling, we don't have control. We look to the property owner and the state officials to decide what kind of protection is really adequate for the crossings. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I think you might have missed the point of the question. I think if I were Amtrak, I think it is no accident -- pardon the pun -- that the Safety Board spends a lot of time looking at Amtrak accidents. Have you ever thought about that? We have. That is not on purpose. We are not just picking on you, but it turns out that the most severe grade crossing accidents are those that involve a heavy vehicle and a passenger train. In fact, we spend so much time with you, I am wondering if it has not occurred to Amtrak somewhere along the line that you might want to look at locations where these heavy trucks are in greater numbers like this one that had almost one hundred percent heavy trucks and maybe take a special look at that with the host railroad -- they are involved; they are partners in this thing with you, and they are certainly represented here today; I am sure they will be represented in the litigation associated with it -- just to prevent that in advance, not only from safety standpoint, but from a risk management standpoint. MR. BULLOCK: I do understand your point. It is very well taken, and absolutely, we have looked at that and we try to cooperate whenever we can to work with our host railroads or freight partners. As I said, we provide information to them. We try to help in any way that we can, and we are very active, not only in terms of engineering solutions, but in terms of education and in terms of supporting stronger enforcement. One thing we think is really great about the NTSB briefing is bringing this kind of thing out in the open with these issues about grade crossings. We feel strongly that enforcement needs to be a stronger part of how this country addresses issues because the places we have seen where local authorities have been very strict about the way they approach enforcing grade crossing safety and compliance with the proper driving behavior has had a wonderful effect on reducing accidents. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I seem to recall that in 1974 in Gwinnett County, Georgia. MR. BULLOCK: Is that right? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Yes, enforcement. Well, just for what it is worth, it struck me sometime ago, and I even gathered some statistics here, Amtrak is a small fraction of the total miles traveled on rail, less than five percent. The rest of it is freight trains. Yet, your over-involvement in these especially catastrophic type of crashes are almost always trucks from the physics of the thing. One of the reasons I suspect, in this accident and in others, is that speed has something to do with it. You are generally 40 to 50 percent faster than freight trains running in the area. I feel if I were you, I would want to know where I could expect trucks and maybe try to do something about those crossings. Do you have any else you would like to say on the subject? MR. BULLOCK: I do not; thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you and thank you for your remarks. We can go to the next one. Did anyone else have any secondary questions? (No response.) (Witnesses excused.) MR. DUNN: The National Transportation Safety Board calls Mr. John Blair. It is 3:35 p.m. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Dunn, proceed. SWORN TESTIMONY OF JOHN BLAIR MR. DUNN: Mr. Blair, for the record would you please state your full name and spell it. MR. BLAIR: John Blair, B-l-a-i-r. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. BLAIR: The Illinois Commerce Commission. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities with the Illinois State Commerce Commission? MR. BLAIR: I am employed as a Senior Railroad Safety Specialist, and my duties are to assist the Program Director in the implementation of the Commission's Rail and Highway Safety Program. MR. DUNN: Were you also involved in the investigation of the Amtrak accident in Bourbonnais, Illinois? MR. BLAIR: Yes. MR. DUNN: Thank you very much. I will turn the questioning over to Mr. Byrd Raby of the Technical Panel. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. RABY: Thank you, Mr. Dunn. Good evening, Mr. Blair. Would you describe the function of the Illinois Commerce Commission and what the responsibility and duties are. MR. BLAIR: In Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission has the statutory responsibility for rail and highway safety. MR. RABY: Would you expand upon that a little bit. What do the duties include? MR. BLAIR: The duties include administration of what is called our Grade Crossing Protection Fund. It is a motor fuel tax. Illinois motor fuel tax monies are used to make improvements at rail and highway crossings. It also involves the oversight of grade crossing safety from accident investigations; complaints, responding to complaints regarding the warning devices, crossing services, restricted view weeds and brush. It also includes, besides on the engineering side, on the education side, we have a state coordinator for Operation Lifesaver, who promotes rail and highway safety to the general public. MR. RABY: Do you have an inventory of about how many grade crossings in the State of Illinois you manage or oversee? MR. BLAIR: Yes. There are approximately 9,019 public at-grade crossings; approximately 2,100 public grade separations, rail and highway grade separations; and approximately 5,300 private grade crossings. MR. RABY: Of the nine thousand or so public crossings, would you know about how many are passive and protected? MR. BLAIR: Yes. The breakdown is there is approximately 2,300 which are quipped with automatic flashing light signals, and gates; approximately 2,600 which are equipped with automatic flashing light signals; and the remainder with passive crossbuck signs. MR. RABY: How do you determine which of these crossings gets what safety signals? MR. BLAIR: There are different degrees of improvements. The crossings, of course, with crossbucks, we are looking at upgrading those to flashers and gates crossings. With just flashers -- let's back up. The first thing we do is look at the crossing to see if there needs to be a crossing or not or whether it can be consolidated with other crossings in the area and improved; say, three out of five crossings and plus two crossings. In doing that, we look at the type of trains; the volume of the train movements, the vehicular volumes; the type of vehicles that use the crossings, whether it be large percentages of trucks or hazardous materials or school buses. We also look at other factors such as visibility in the crossing also come into play. So in our overall review, when we are programming a crossing for improvement, if it falls into the category of upgrading the warning system, if it has crossbuck treatment, we would generally upgrade it through automatic flashing light signals or gates. If it is has flashers, we do the same. Crossings that have automatic flashing light signals and gates that are existing, there is a large number of those in our state that have been installed for over 20 years, and some of them are reaching the end of their useful life. So also part of our program is to renew what is out there with the latest technology, which is flashing lights, signals, and gates and constant warning time circuitry. MR. RABY: How do you determine what level of protection is installed at these crossings? Do you use a formula or anything? MR. BLAIR: I think what I just described is, what we do is -- years ago, we had criteria that we used to install just flashing light signals. Mr. Sharkey from Illinois Central touched on it in his testimony today. A couple of years ago, we changed our criteria. Instead of needing certain warrants to have increased protection, we start out with the highest level of protection -- automatic flashing lights, signals, and constant warning time circuitry. You need warrants to install a lesser protection. An example of why we would go with something less than flashing light signals and gates, you may have industry track with five to ten mile an hour train movements that only occur twice a month, and those, under diagnostic review, may not work warrant a full set of flashing light signals and gates. MR. RABY: Does the make up of the train -- in other words, a passenger and freight -- figure into your determining what level of protection to provide at grade crossings? MR. BLAIR: Yes, they do. Historically, I think if you look at in Illinois, our program has given an emphasis on passenger crossings that are equipped or crossings that have passengers trains that operate over them, if you look at those crossings in which Amtrak operates over, there is approximately 922 crossings. Of those 922, 62 percent are equipped with gates. Now, 13 percent have just flashers, and 25 percent are equipped with crossbuck signs. If you look at all the crossings in the State with the Amtrak crossings included, the breakdown is about 26 percent that are equipped with gates and approximately 29 percent with flashing light signals and 45 percent with just crossbuck signs. So over the years, there has been emphasis placed on those crossings with passenger trains. MR. SWEEDLER: Those numbers you provided, are they for public crossings included or just for all crossings? MR. BLAIR: Yes. I am just speaking in regards to public grade crossings, not private. MR. SWEEDLER: Do you have any data on the private crossings, especially the ones that Amtrak would utilize? MR. BLAIR: I have data in regards to the number of crossings that there are. In Illinois, we do not have jurisdiction over private crossings. The state does not. MR. RABY: Are there any corridor improvement type safety programs being implemented or planned in Illinois? MR. BLAIR: Yes. Over the years, the corridor projects have been very successful because you can get more crossings improved in a shorter period of time. You can work the details out with one contract between the parties. As far as the actual installation, it is easier for the railroad to install ten systems, new systems, within one corridor than ten systems spread out all over the state. MR. RABY: How are highway grade crossing improvements funded? MR. BLAIR: In Illinois, they are funded in two ways: The state funds, which come from the motor fuel tax; and Federal funding. In Illinois, our Governor is a strong rail and highway safety advocate, and through his efforts, he has been able to increase our funding by over 50 percent. During the next five years, our funding has increased from 295 million up to 450 million. Of that 450 million, approximately 40 million is Federal funds. The rest of it is all state funding. MR. RABY: Do you maintain or collect any inventory on these crossings? MR. BLAIR: Yes. MR. RABY: Can you tell me some of the parameters that you do collect in this inventory and how you collect that information? MR. BLAIR: The inventory monitors different fields. The railroads furnish the information as far as the number of trains and the speed of trains. The records within the inventory that we maintain concern the ADT and the accidents. The number of accidents, we keep track of that per crossing. When there is a change in the warning devices, it is submitted to us through the railroad, but we follow up on that. Over the years, the inventory file, for whatever reason, some of the data has not been updated. About a year and a half ago, we initiated a project within the State to have contracted out through a consulting engineer to make on-site inspections at every at-grade crossing, at every public at-grade crossing and every public grade separated crossing to collect data. That is on-going now, and it should be completed over the next 18 months. That information will be used to update our inventory file which, in turn, will be provided to the FRA for their inventory file. MR. RABY: In your inventory, when you look at trucks, do the type of trucks and/or the volume of trucks have any particular special consideration when you are evaluating a crossing to upgrade or just a general diagnostic review, maybe, that you do of the crossing? MR. BLAIR: The answer is yes, they do make a difference when we are evaluating a crossing that is a candidate for improvement. That is one of the things we do take into consideration, is the volume of truck traffic. MR. RABY: How often, either through this inventory program or whatever oversight of the crossings, how often do you review each crossing in the state? MR. BLAIR: Well, as I said, right now, we have hired, in order to get the job done in a timely manner because we do have over nine thousand crossings in the state, we have contracted it out, and it should be dealt with in about 18 months. MR. RABY: After that program is complete, have you established a timetable to look at these crossings again or is it built into this program? MR. BLAIR: It is not built into this program. What I expect is we have got -- we are centrally located in Springfield, and we have also, through our Department of Transportation, we have nine district offices that are spread out through the state, and I expect between our resources and our highway, Department of Highway and our Department of Transportation resources, that we will maintain the database from that point forward in that manner. MR. RABY: On grade crossings, the IIC oversees them. Does it make any difference who owns the grade crossing? If it is a township or a city, county, or state-owned, do you still maintain oversight of the grade crossings? MR. BLAIR: That is correct. MR. RABY: Let's take about McKnight Road. In this case, who owns the crossing on McKnight Road in Bourbonnais? MR. BLAIR: Who maintains the approaches or who has jurisdiction for the roadway leading up to the crossing? MR. RABY: Yes. MR. BLAIR: I believe on the west side of the crossing, it is the Village of Bourbonnais; and on the east side of the crossing, it is the township -- I don't know if it is Bourbonnais township or not. I think it is. Under an agreement, it is my understanding that the village maintains the east side of the crossing also. MR. RABY: Even though there are two owners on each approach, one owner maintains both approaches? MR. BLAIR: That is correct. MR. RABY: What is the level of protection at the McKnight Road grade closing? MR. BLAIR: It is automatic flashing light signals and gates controlled by constant warning time circuitry. MR. RABY: Is that your highest level of protection that you have in the State of Illinois? MR. BLAIR: For an at-grade crossing, yes, it is. MR. RABY: What has the ICC done as far as any new devices or any sort of new technology? Have you participated in anything in that phase? MR. BLAIR: Yes. There are several demonstration projects that are in different stages in Illinois. One is the vehicle arrestor barrier project. We have three test sites that are located along the proposed high speed rail line between Chicago and Saint Louis. Those were placed in service this year, and they are being evaluated. We also have three sites which have been designated to evaluate photo enforcement type systems where they will detect if a motorist violates the warning system. They will take a picture of it and send it to the police. The state is also involved with a demonstration project concerning on-board warning systems. What they do is when you are near a crossing, and the warning device is activated, there is an alarm inside the car that warns the motorist. We have been involved with, after the Fox River Grove accident, we have been involved with the engineering of interconnect systems where traffic signals are interconnected with railroad systems. There is a study on-going now with the University of Illinois in Ramsey, Illinois with the industry and the Illinois Department of Transportation concerning enhancements, engineering enhancements that can be made to traffic signal systems. The last thing that we are involved with in the early stages is a proposed demonstration project along a high speed rail corridor in cooperation with the Union Pacific Railroad, the FRA, and the Association of American Railroads, and that is a communication-based train control system. MR. RABY: Thank you. Those are all the questions I have. I think Mr. Payan has some. MR. PAYAN: Good afternoon, Mr. Blair. You mentioned heavy trucks were a factor in determining whether the grade crossing requires improvements. How are heavy trucks addressed as far as operating requirements where there is heavy truck volume? MR. BLAIR: All crossings in Illinois are designed to accommodate the tractor trailer movement over a grade crossing. We have got a stopping and clearing visibility chart that is used to determine if there is enough time for a vehicle to stop near the crossing and proceed across, or as they approach the crossing, see the train and be able to brake in a safe manner before they reach the crossing. That chart is based on a tractor trailer. It is not based on a regular vehicle. So, that is considered our worst case scenario. As far as truck movements, the concern is state-wide. Many of our crossings are rural crossings, and those crossings are used by farm equipment which, during certain times of the year, there is a lot of movements of grain being hauled over the crossing. So, the concern is at every crossing in the state. MR. PAYAN: Does the ICC enforce their own regulations or do they use Federal regulations or accommodations? How does that work? MR. BLAIR: As far as within the Rail Safety Section, we have three track inspectors and two hazardous material inspectors, and they enforce the Federal track and Hazmat safety regulations. MR. PAYAN: Does the ICC get involved with the time requirements? Here on McKnight Road, you had a 26 second warning. Do they mandate change or require any different times? MR. BLAIR: Yes, we do. Any time there is a change in a warning system at a grade crossing in Illinois, the railroad is required to submit a request to our office before the change. Depending on what is being changed, if it is a simple as relocating a gate because of the track removal, then less documentation is needed than if it is a full or a new installation of warning devices being installed. One of the things we look at when the general outlines are provided to our office is the amount of warning time that is being proposed for the location. McKnight Road is a standard two track crossing where the MUTCD and FRA minimum of 20 seconds warning time applies. MR. PAYAN: Maybe you can clear up some of the discussion this morning. Does the ICC have a definition or a requirement for a constant warning device? Is it required to provide the same amount of time each time? MR. BLAIR: These warning systems are designed to do provide the minimum warning time. McKnight Road was designed to provide 20 seconds minimum warning time. That is what it was designed to provide for. Typically, when a crossing is engineered, there will be additional time allowed for equipment response which was talked about, the four seconds and also, five seconds of just buffer time or a fact or of safety. The nominal time, the average time we would expect to see for a crossing which is the standard design in Illinois, McKnight Road would be a standard 20 second minimum design. We would expect to see average times of around 25 seconds, but the warning time is not always going to be 25 seconds. It is going to be a couple of seconds more, maybe a second or two less, but at no time would we expect, if the system was working as designed, for a warning time to fall under the 20 second minimal warning time. With constant warning times, what the control circuitry does is if this was a D.C. track circuit where the starts or insulated joints are located approximately 3,400 feet out from the crossing, if you had a slow train, ten miles an hour, approaching the crossing, it would hit the start, and instead of getting 25 seconds warning time, you would get over 200 seconds plus the warning time. Historically, well, we know what happens when there are large amounts of warning time like that: A lot of the motorists get impatient, and they drive around the gates. They won't get hit by the ten mile an hour train, but it becomes a pattern, a condition for doing that. Then when there is a high speed train that comes through, they made make the wrong decision and get hit. So with constant warning time controlled circuitry, what that does is it reduces the variance in warning times. Instead of 25 seconds to 200 seconds, the variance now should be, on average, designed like this, probably 22 seconds up to 50 seconds. MR. PAYAN: Post-accident, were you at the scene following the accident March 15th? MR. BLAIR: I was on the scene. I arrived -- the accident occurred on Monday -- I arrived on Wednesday morning around seven a.m. MR. PAYAN: The Illinois Commerce Commission looked at the crossing. Were any exceptions taken during the operation of the equipment there? MR. BLAIR: I can answer that, but if I could back up to the last question. We received the call shortly after ten o'clock the date of the accident, and we had one of our rail and highway safety specialists within an hour's drive of the location. He was contacted and dispatched to the scene, and he arrived, I believe, around 11, 11:30. When I received the call, I received it from our emergency management, and they had indicated our operational EOC, Emergency Operations Center, had been opened up to help coordinate the emergency response to this incident. I was requested to come down to their command center, and I did that. That was operational until about five a.m. in the morning. We also had a rail safety specialist respond, and he was there at seven a.m. on Tuesday the 16th. Your question? MR. PAYAN: Were any exceptions taken by your field investigators as far as -- MR. BLAIR: There were two of us that were participating in the NTSB's Signal Group. As far as the operation of the system, there were no exceptions taken, no. MR. PAYAN: Those are all the questions I have at this time. Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Railway Administration? MR. BLACKMORE: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. STEAD: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers? EXAMINATION BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MR. WALPERT: Mr. Blair, can you tell me if the State of Illinois is testing or contemplating testing any kind of new equipment at crossings for protection? MR. BLAIR: I think I previously testified about five different projects. I can go over them again if you want me to. MR. WALPERT: No, that is not necessary. Are those testings proceeding where we will see results in the near future? MR. BLAIR: Yes, within the next 24 months. MR. WALPERT: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The United Transportation Union? EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION MR. DWYER: Mr. Blair, when you use your clarity and visibility chart for semitrailers, can you use that, is that related to just single bond trailer or is that related to trucks with triple bonds as well? MR. BLAIR: That is a good question. The chart is made up for a standard 65 foot tractor trailer I believe, 65 feet or so. MR. DWYER: Do you make any adjustments for double bonds? MR. BLAIR: Where the adjustments come in is if there are multiple tracks. Under a ream of guidelines, which is American Railroad Engineering and Maintenance, there are guidelines as far as recommended design warning times when the distance between the signal and the far track is greater than 35 feet. Under that criterion, one second was added for every additional ten feet beyond the 35 feet. MR. DWYER: Thank you, sir. Those are all the questions we have, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Melco? MR. MARSHALL: No, I don't have any. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Amtrak? EXAMINATION BY AMTRAK MR. BULLOCK: Mr. Blair, you mentioned there was an increase in funding. Is this part of the Illinois First Program, and what is that funding specifically? Is it funding that relates to the development of high speed rail in Illinois, and can you tell me if any of that includes money for grade crossing separation, actually grade separations? MR. BLAIR: Yes, it is Illinois First money. Portions of that money is set aside for high speed rail; as far as additional funds to incorporate separations, yes, sir, for rail highway crossing. MR. BULLOCK: That is the only question I had. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Canadian National/Illinois Central? MR. ED HARRIS: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. SWEEDLER: Mr. Blair, I was just wondering -- the truck involved in this tragedy, we have heard testimony and saw photographs where the steel rebar actually extended over the track and coming over the trailer both front and back -- in your view, would this vehicle have needed a special permit to use the roadways of Illinois? My implication is if it did need a special permit, there would have had to have been special arrangements to go across grade crossings. MR. BLAIR: I don't know. It appeared that the rebar was about seven feet, approximately seven feet longer than the trailer. Whether that would require a special permit, I don't know. MR. SWEEDLER: Do you know who in the state government would be able to assist us with that? MR. BLAIR: Yes; that is handled by our Department of Transportation? MR. SWEEDLER: Maybe we could make some inquiries in that department. If it did need a special permit, do you know of any regulations or rules concerning crossings and what types of arrangements would have to be made? Does your commission have any requirements? MR. BLAIR: I am not aware of any, sir. MR. SWEEDLER: Thank you, Mr. Blair. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Mr. Blair, has the ICC done any kind of study of accident rates along this particular corridor? MR. BLAIR: I didn't hear all of that. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Has your organization done any study of accident rates along this particular corridor? MR. BLAIR: I have got accident rates with me that show that the, I believe that the percentage of accidents per number of crossings is fairly close to our state-wide average. While we are on the subject of accidents, in Illinois, I think one thing to measure a program to see if you are doing the right things or not is to look at the accident history, not for one year, but to go back five or ten years. In the last ten years, there has been a linear decrease in collisions, rail highway collisions in Illinois. In 1989, there were 374. I will read these quickly: 1990, 317; in 1991, 291; 1992, 263; 1993, 272; 1994, 284; 1995, 262; 1996, 203; 1997, 1985; 1998, 168. If you take 1989, we only had 374, and compare it to last year's 168, it is about a 45 percent reduction. So, we are pleased with that. There is one other thing that you can look at as far as accidents. There is a document that is produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation. It is the annual report of railroad safety statistics. In the 1998 prepublished report, which has not been released but it is on the web, there is, in Chapter 8, page 6, there is a table that shows the number of incidents per hundred crossings, and in Illinois, it is 1.66. The national average is 1.87. So, we are below national average. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Out of those rates you quoted, did you look at the types of accidents that occurred in your state? MR. BLAIR: Regarding? MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: The types of vehicles involved or types of crossings which they occurred at. MR. BLAIR: We do that every year in our annual -- we prepare an annual report, and this year, it was part of our five year plan, and we break it down by those types of things, yes. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Do you notice any specific trends? MR. BLAIR: None that I am aware of, no. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: To kind of help you out on this, did you notice any over-involvement of any specific type of vehicle? MR. BLAIR: Regarding trucks versus -- MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Trucks, cars, buses, school buses. MR. BLAIR: I would say no. The one thing that you have to be careful on trucks is some of the accidents, when they are reported, they will show a truck, and it is not a tractor trailer truck, it is a pick-up truck. We had an incident a few weeks back that came in. It was an Amtrak accident, and it came in. It was a truck collision with an Amtrak train, and it ended up it was a pick-up truck. As far as overall trends, no, not that I am aware of. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Does your organization interact at all with Operation Lifesaver? MR. BLAIR: Yes, it does. We have the state coordinator who works out of our office, and our program was initiated, I believe, in 1976. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Are there any specific types of programs focused on this particular corridor the accident occurred in? MR. BLAIR: I don't know. I know that in 1998, there were two about 2,500 presentations that were given to various groups from fire, police, high schools, drivers eds, business groups, professional drivers which, would be motor carrier truck drivers, senior citizens. The Operation Lifesaver Program is very active in Illinois. One of the things they do, there is a video workshop type package that was sent out to all the companies in Illinois that own school buses or operate school buses, and they were also sent out to all the driver education teachers to do help inform them of the dangers of railroad crossings. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Is there special focus on commercial vehicles in this program? MR. BLAIR: Yes. Through presentations, I think last year there were 19 presentations that were given to various trucking groups. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: I want to follow up on a question the Chairman asked earlier to another witness. Does your organization keep any records on gate breakages along active crossings? MR. BLAIR: No. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: It does not? MR. BLAIR: It does not. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: You mentioned earlier about the study that is currently in progress I guess that the ICC is doing on, on-board warning devices. Would you tell us a little bit about the study and when it is going to be completed. MR. BLAIR: I believe it is a two-year study. I am not sure of the time frame, but it is just now in the process of being implemented. Again, what it does is there is a select group of drivers that is going to be used to observe before and after the demonstration project, and they will be given a device that will be equipped inside their vehicle which will activate a warning device. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: One last question: In your evaluation of programs along the various grade crossings, do you consider re-routing trucks at all? When you evaluate the safety effectiveness of various programs you have in place for grade crossing safety, is re-routing of trucks an issue at all? MR. BLAIR: Re-routing? MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Vehicle traffic, particular trucks, commercial vehicles. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Prohibiting trucks from certain crossings. MR. BLAIR: No. We re-route crossings when we do a consolidation through a corridor project. Where crossings are able to be closed, we re-route that traffic to adjacent crossings. As I indicated before, the warning systems that are designed now should accommodate truck driving. We have tractor trailers state-wide as far as with our agricultural businesses hauling grain, so we have to be concerned about them at all public crossings. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Thank you. MR. DUNN: Mr. Blair, I asked you if you could give me some information about McKnight Road, and that is: How many cars or trucks or whatever you can give me went across that crossing daily? MR. BLAIR: As far as the total count, we have got it up to 1,800 vehicles. The breakdown as far as autos versus trucks, we know a substantial number of those are trucks. I don't have a percentage, though, to give you. MR. DUNN: You say on average, daily, 1,800 vehicles, including cars and trucks, went across that crossing every day? MR. BLAIR: The traffic count is taken by our Department of Transportation highway people, and the most recent count they have shows 1,800 vehicles. That would include trucks. That is for McKnight Road. MR. DUNN: There is no way to get that figure, the percentage of cars versus trucks, to me? It doesn't have to be today, but is it possible to get that information? MR. BLAIR: Yes. I think probably the best way to do it is to have another count done for that purpose. MR. DUNN: I would appreciate that if you get it. MR. BLAIR: Yes. MR. DUNN: One last question, and I asked this before: What should an automobile driver or a truck driver do when he approaches a crossing and sees the flashing light signals? MR. BLAIR: In Illinois, by state law, once the lights start flashing, the motorist is required to stop. So, the truck driver or whatever motorist should stop. MR. DUNN: Could a police officer write a ticket like it would be a red light? MR. BLAIR: In Illinois, a law was passed a couple years ago which increases the fine for motorists who violate railroad warning devices from $75. It is now $500 or 50 hours of community service. MR. DUNN: I know you probably don't have this, but could you tell me if there were any written in the State of Illinois in 1999, traffic violations for going -- MR. BLAIR: I know they were written. I don't have the number. MR. DUNN: They were written? MR. BLAIR: Yes. MR. DUNN: It is it possible to send me that information along with the other, sir? MR. BLAIR: If we have got it, we will send it to you. I will go through our Operation Lifesaver. MR. DUNN: We appreciate it. Thank you. Those are all the questions I have. MR. LAUBY: Mr. Blair, a couple of questions: Early on, you talked about the first thing you do is you try to consolidate crossings, put them together and close some of those crossings. Is that correct? MR. BLAIR: The first thing we do is look at the whole area, and that is the one thing you look at. In other words, if you have a corridor with ten crossings in it and there are two that are located within close proximity to each other and they have relatively low vehicular counts, then they would be good candidate to close one and direct that traffic to the adjacent crossing and upgrade that. MR. LAUBY: Can you tell me how successful that approach has been with the Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. BLAIR: Illinois, over the years, has been very successful. I have worked for the Commission for 17 years, and I have been involved in several projects along the Amtrak line between Chicago and Saint Louis where crossings were closed and warning devices were installed. I can say that most of the easy closures in Illinois have already been taken care of just because of the program that we have had over the last four years. MR. LAUBY: Is the number of crossings that you have in Illinois decreasing? MR. BLAIR: Through abandonments? MR. LAUBY: Through closures. MR. BLAIR: It has increased through a combination of closures and railroad abandonments over the last -- MR. LAUBY: It has decreased? MR. BLAIR: Decreased. MR. LAUBY: I wanted to talk for a minute about McKnight Road. To your knowledge, have there been any changes to the grade crossing at McKnight Road as far as the type of signal equipment, gates, pavement markings, signage, anything? MR. BLAIR: Since when? MR. LAUBY: Since the accident. MR. BLAIR: The damaged gate was replaced on the west side of the crossing, and pavement markings were installed on both approaches. MR. LAUBY: Pavement markings have been installed since the accident; is that correct? MR. BLAIR: That is my understanding, yes. MR. LAUBY: Are there any other plans to do anything else at that crossing to improve safety? MR. BLAIR: I think we were going to wait until after this process has taken place, and then we will re-evaluate the warning system there. MR. LAUBY: Which process is that? MR. BLAIR: The NTSB. MR. LAUBY: The investigation or the hearing? MR. BLAIR: The investigation, right. MR. LAUBY: I would encourage you, if you have any ideas, not to wait. MR. BLAIR: I can say this: Other than experimental devices, the next option is total grade separation. On this particular line, there are still approximately 72 passive crossings, crossings with crossbucks, and to build a grade separation, it is probably around $3 million. So, one of the things we would consider is would public safety be better served by upgrading the warning systems at approximately 20 crossbuck crossings or building one grade separation. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Can I interrupt? MR. BLAIR: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You would actually consider spending $3 million to build grade separation there when there is already one connecting road to other existing crossings? MR. BLAIR: No. What I am saying is that is one of the things that -- the next level of protection is grade separation, so that is one of the things we have to look at. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You are aware there is a connection through to a another grade crossing from this one parallel to the railroad tracks? MR. BLAIR: It is not total grade separation. CHAIRMAN BLACK: No, but it is to another crossing. MR. BLAIR: That grade crossing is equipped with the same equipment. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It is still one less crossing. MR. BLAIR: It is one less crossing, but you are directing traffic to a system that is identical to the system that is at McKnight Road. So, if we were going to close the crossing, we would probably want to direct it to a grade separation. MR. LAUBY: Just two more questions: The pavement markings that were added to this crossing, could you tell me what type of pavement markings were added at McKnight Road? MR. BLAIR: I assume it is compliance with the MUTCD. MR. LAUBY: Which would be? MR. BLAIR: "X" with the "RR" on both sides in advance of the crossing or the stop bar next to the gate. MR. LAUBY: At McKnight, I am not positive, but I believe advance signs were already in place. MR. BLAIR: That is correct. MR. LAUBY: Basically, on based on your comments, the McKnight Road equipment is state of the art, and the next leap is to total grade separation; is that correct? MR. BLAIR: Based on today's? MR. LAUBY: Your program. MR. BLAIR: Not our program, based on current national standards and warning system standards. Four quadrant gates are still in the demonstration stage. There are no standards in the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices on four quadrant gates, and there are no standards in the ER or REBA concerning four quadrant gate systems. MR. LAUBY: What about barriers to prevent going around the gates? MR. BLAIR: Do you mean more arrestor barriers? MR. LAUBY: Median barriers. MR. BLAIR: Medians, as part of our interconnect improvement projects where warning times have exceeded 35 seconds, we are installing raised medians. At a crossing light McKnight Road, which is isolated, it would easy to circumvent the raised medians versus if it were in a more urban area. MR. LAUBY: That is not an option as far as you are concerned? MR. BLAIR: It is an option, but the effectiveness, we would have to evaluate. MR. LAUBY: Last question: With the benefit of your experience in the State of Illinois with grade crossings and solving problems at various levels and various locations, this particular crossing at McKnight, do you have any ideas, whether it is within Illinois Commerce Commission policy or not, do you have any ideas of what might be done at this crossing that has the significant truck traffic, steel truck traffic, do you have any ideas on what might be done to help prevent this type of accident from occurring again? MR. BLAIR: Well, like I said before, based on the current warning systems that are available today, the standard warning systems, if the crossing was going to be enhanced, I think the next level is to build a grade separation. I don't see how four quadrant gates will help prevent an accident that is used by high volumes of truck traffic. MR. LAUBY: I am going to ask one more question. Do you consider right now what we have at McKnight Road crossing in Bourbonnais, do you think that provides adequate protection knowing the amount of train traffic, the type of train traffic, the type of vehicle traffic? Do you think that is adequate or not? MR. BLAIR: I think if the motorist complies with current traffic laws, yes, it is. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Isn't that true of every crossing? MR. BLAIR: No. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So you have got crossings where, if you did everything you were supposed to, you could still get killed? MR. BLAIR: That is what interconnected crossings are about. There are crossings where motorists -- I should strike that. Even at interconnected crossings, motorists are not supposed to stop on the tracks, but typically, the difference is the motorist who drives around the gates does that deliberately. Whereas, some motorists get trapped on a crossing because they are stopped in traffic. They don't do it deliberately. They find themselves in that predicament. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler brought you have private crossings, a while ago, of the state. You don't have any idea how many private crossings there are in the State of Illinois? MR. BLAIR: Yes; there are about -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: Just yes or no: You do know? MR. BLAIR: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am sure there are some people who would like a break here, so I am trying to get through this in a hurry. You do know how many there are? MR. BLAIR: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You did tell us that. Are any of those crossings that are near a state route or a public road have a traffic signal like Fox River Grove? Fox River Grove was not an outside street. It was a not a private crossing, but do you have a crossing anywhere where there is a signal and a public road that is adjacent to a railroad grade crossing? MR. BLAIR: And the private crossing has traffic signals? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Right; the private road that crosses the railroad crossing has traffic signals and a state route. MR. BLAIR: And the private railroad crossing has warning devices? CHAIRMAN BLACK: It might or it might not. I am talking about the fact that you have a shopping center driveway across from the crossing or access to the steel mill. For instance, McKnight Road could very easily be a private road. It is a dead end road. MR. BLAIR: Not that I am aware of. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Would you be interested if that occurred? MR. BLAIR: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: So your inventory of private road crossings would capture that information? MR. BLAIR: In Illinois, a shopping center type crossing would be public crossings. Private crossings in Illinois are generally farm crossing. CHAIRMAN BLACK: This comes from an accident that we just got through with in Northern Indiana where a private crossing had a traffic signal at a state route and an interconnected signal system that the state bore no responsibility whatsoever even though they may have issued the permit for the traffic signal. I was curious. I wanted to making sure you were tracking that. It seems like you are. Do you, in considering your funding, I assume you have some sort of risk assessment process before you put money into a crossing some sort of a formula of volume or such. MR. BLAIR: We use formulas like that -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: Like a hazard index formula? MR. BLAIR: -- to help in the selection process. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Is one of the variables in that formula truck percent? MR. BLAIR: That is the U.S. DOT Accident Depiction Model, and the answer is yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You get that from the state DOT's traffic count inventory system, the percent trucks? MR. BLAIR: Right. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Does the State of Illinois do photo enforcement of railroad grade crossings or anything for that matter? MR. BLAIR: We have three demonstration projects right now that we are in the process of having the hardware installed, and they are two year pilot studies. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am really impressed by your statistical reduction. I notice you are in the top three states on total number of crossings nationwide; you, Texas, and, I guess, California. That is an admirable reduction. I believe that is it. Do any of the parties have any secondary questions? (No response.) (Witness excused.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you very much. MR. BLAIR: Thank you. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Let's be back at five o'clock. We have one panel left. (Recess from 4:39 p.m. to 4:58 p.m.) CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Dunn, proceed. MR. DUNN: The Chairman has informed me we are two hours late, but that is because we have had good witnesses. So, we are going to tonight and finish the program tomorrow. The National Transportation Safety Board calls Mr. Bruce George, Mr. Rudy Umbs, and Mr. Clayton Brown, and it is 5:04 p.m. SWORN TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON BROWN, BRUCE GEORGE, AND RUDOLPH UMBS MR. DUNN: I will get a little background information from each and then turn your over to our Technical Panel. Mr. George, for the record, would you please state and spell your full name. MR. GEORGE: My name is Bruce George, B-r-u-c-e, last name, G-e-o-r-g-e. MR. DUNN: Who are you employed by? MR. GEORGE: I am employed by the Federal Railway Administration. MR. DUNN: What are your duties and responsibilities? MR. GEORGE: I am the Division Chief for the Trespass and Crossing Safety Division. MR. DUNN: Mr. Umbs, for the record, would you please state and spell your full name. MR. UMBS: Rudolph M. Umbs, U-m-b-s. I am Chief of the Safety Design Division of the Federal Highway Administration. My office is responsible for the Railroad Grade Crossing Program for the Federal Highway Administration. Up until January of this year, my group also maintained the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. MR. DUNN: Mr. Brown, for the record, would you please state and spell your full name. MR. BROWN: My name is Clayton C. Brown, C-l-a-y-t-o-n, B-r-o-w-n. I am Assistant Vice-President of Corporate Operations for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation. MR. DUNN: Thank you very much. I will now turn the questioning over to the Technical Panel, and Mr. Ruben Payan. EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL MR. PAYAN: I would like to start with some questions for Mr. Bruce George. You mentioned you were a staff director for the grade crossing and trespassing managers? MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir. MR. PAYAN: Could you explain the duties and responsibilities of the managers? MR. GEORGE: Of the managers? MR. PAYAN: Yes. MR. GEORGE: Our crossing managers. MR. PAYAN: Yes. MR. GEORGE: Just for background, the Federal Railroad Administration added a Crossing Safety and Trespass Division manager in each of our eight regional offices in 1994. We never had regional presence for that program until then. Their functions are to promote crossing safety programs; coordinate programs; maintain contacts, for example, with the states, with the railroads, with local governments with the other modes -- the Federal Highway, Federal Transit, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. They offer good offices to public projects, engineers with the railroads and with the local and state governments. They work with police and local law enforcement and Operation Lifesaver Programs. They encourage inclusion of crossing safety issues in law enforcement programs. They promote corridor programs, contacts and good offices with the states and railroad such as consolidation of crossings, crossing closures. They participate in a Corridor Program if they are invited to. They promote public education and awareness programs; for example, Operation Lifesaver; Always Expect, the training program which is one of DOT's; the industry's Highways or Die Ways Program. We work with state Operation Lifesaver committees and the coordinators. They ensure that FRA people that are participating in those programs receive training and assist in their scheduling. They work on collision and complaint investigations, participate in such investigations' report preparation interviews, reviews of such reports. They make available data to users in local and state governments and with the railroads. They provide access to the national database for reports and statistics, histories of crossings, and they encourage updating of those files. In my mind, it is one the best things FRA has done in the many years I have been with the Agency in terms of promoting crossing safety nationwide. They have managed to keep crossing issues and trespass issues in mind peoples' minds, keep people aware of the program. They keep the pot stirred, if you will; we won't go away kind of thing. We are in the process now of adding eight additional assistant managers. We have been pleased with what eight managers have done in the five years they have been out there. Apparently, the Congress has been too because we have been given the authority to hire eight more. We are about halfway through that process, and it will be done at the end of this year. MR. PAYAN: How does FRA and FHWA delineate responsibility for railroad grade crossing safety? MR. GEORGE: How do we divide? MR. PAYAN: Yes. What does FRA cover? MR. GEORGE: The role of the Federal Railroad Administration in crossing programs is, you know, deaths at crossings and crossing collisions are the second leading cause of death in real operations, so it is a big program for us of high interest. We try to promote programs within the Federal Government, within the state, and within the local government, whether those are engineering programs, you know, promoting physical improvements at crossings; discouraging new crossings; consolidated existing crossings; or education programs; public awareness; enforcement programs. We provide some of the analytic tools and make them available to managers, whether it is within the Federal Government, the Federal Highway Administration for examine, or state government or railroads. We have the accident histories. We have the national inventory file. We conduct and encourage research and analysis. On innovation, we work with Federal Highways in that regard, whether that innovation deals with hardware or software or procedures. We work with the industry, the states, the counties, the cities, academia, current and potential suppliers that are willing to innovate. The Federal Railway Administration, of course, is a regulatory agency overseeing railroad safety. We will regulate where public benefit is assured and where universal voluntary compliance is not assured. For example, in 1995, we implemented inspection testing and maintenance rules for crossing warning devices. In 1997, I believe we had a requirement for alerting lights on the head end of locomotives. We try to ensure a supportive and positive organizational climate within the Department, within the administration. It really is a one DOT effort, and we work with Federal Highways in that regard. It is an inter-modal effort. It is not just Federal Highways. We work with Federal Transit and NTSA as well. It has been a successful effort over the last several years. Do you know what I mean? I think it has come out earlier that since the mid-1970s, the number of collisions is down by three quarters. In the last five years, the number of collisions and casualties at crossings is down 30 percent. However, it is still pretty sobering to look at numbers like 431 deaths last year in collisions like the Bourbonnais collision, and it just reminds us we are not done yet. MR. PAYAN: In the scope of your regulations, do you cover active warning devices, pavement markings, signage? MR. GEORGE: In the scope of our regulations? MR. PAYAN: Yes. MR. GEORGE: We cover active warning devices, the inspection, testing and maintenance of those devices. MR. PAYAN: Do you also cover advance warning signs, pavement markings, and signage? MR. GEORGE: No, sir. MR. PAYAN: Just the active warning devices? MR. GEORGE: Yes. MR. PAYAN: The issue of truck routing, does that part of it involve the in restrictions on truck routing regarding railroad crossings? MR. GEORGE: We have no authority in truck routing, but our regional managers will frequently meet with trucking firms and with local call highway authorities to discuss truck routing. MR. PAYAN: Has FRA identified any challenges as far as truck routing and passed them on to the proper authorities? MR. GEORGE: Challenges? MR. PAYAN: Hunt crossings, heavy truck volumes, challenges as far as trucks negotiating railroad crossings. MR. GEORGE: I would have to talk to our individual managers on that, but I am sure we have. MR. PAYAN: The FRA grade crossing closure initiative, can you touch briefly on the status of that program? MR. GEORGE: Yes. A goal was established by our previous administrator to close, just set as a national goal to see a reduction of 25 percent in the number of crossings nationwide. He set that goal in 1991. The current administration came in and heartedly endorsed that goal, and we have continued to promote that nationally and the regional managers as well. There are over 30,000 fewer crossings out there today than when the goal was established, about an 11 1/2 percent reduction in that time, so we are well underway, not going as quickly as we would like, but we are making progress. MR. PAYAN: Do you have any numbers for Bourbonnais or Illinois? MR. GEORGE: For Illinois? MR. PAYAN: Bourbonnais itself, the city of Bourbonnais? MR. GEORGE: No, I don't have any numbers for Bourbonnais. I do for Illinois. It will take me a minute to find them. It is the kind of thing you can never find quickly when you want it. I have the numbers since 1993. We show crossings reduced in Illinois by 2 1/2 percent in that time. Public crossing and private crossings were reduced by 5 percent. MR. PAYAN: Were any of those in Bourbonnais? MR. GEORGE: No, I don't know. MR. PAYAN: Those are all the questions I have. Mr. Raby has some for you. MR. RABY: If I may, Mr. George, I have a couple of questions here for Mr. Umbs, and then I have some joint questions between you and Mr. Umbs. MR. UMBS: Yes, sir? MR. RABY: Does the FHWA keep a record of truck accidents at highway grade crossings? MR. UMBS: That is maintained by the individual states through the FAR System. That is the Fatal Analysis Record System, and that system is maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, our sister agency. MR. RABY: Those are FARS records are fatal accidents? MR. UMBS: That is correct. MR. RABY: Are there any other forms of just accidents maintained that are non-fatal? MR. UMBS: Federal Rail maintains a system. I will let Bruce handle that. MR. GEORGE: The railroads are required by law to report all contact between nontrack vehicles and the user of a highway at a crossing as an accident report, and we do maintain a file of those. MR. RABY: Is this record in any way used for analysis or for funding for improving grade crossing safety? Does it have any effect on it? MR. GEORGE: Certainly, it is used for analysis. That is what it is for. MR. RABY: Now, I will ask some joint questions. Does FHWA and FRA work together to reduce the incident of grade crossing accidents, any joint programs? MR. UMBS: There is a number of them going on. Bruce is in our office, and we are in Bruce's office almost daily talking about different issues. We have at NTSA working on it. The big thing that we are doing right now as a result of the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the Indiana crash is we are working to come up with a technical working group to identify warrants for different types of crossings. That is what was done quite a bit, we were talking about quite a bit earlier this afternoon: How do you determine whether or not you put up a crossbuck, a signal, or a gate? That is what that group is going to be doing. That is a multiple disciplinary group. We have contracted with the Institute of Transportation Engineers to be our facilitator, and we are getting going on that. We will have our initial meeting in October. That is one of the major activities that we are doing right now. MR. GEORGE: We have worked with Federal Highways and Federal Highways with us on some of our regulatory issues. There are some most recently published, just on the 2nd of September, revisions of the CDL requirements, and FRA was involved in that with the Office of Motor Carriers. We have our current, the bills submitted by both Federal Highway and Federal Rail appropriations bills this year have identical language where crossings are concerned. We do coordinate on things like that. The Office of Safety and FRA work very closely with the Office of Motor Carriers on highway safety and Federal Highway construction. MR. UMBS: I have couple of other items if I may. MR. RABY: Sure. MR. UMBS: We are looking at post-maintenance guidelines for vertical alignment; meaning humped crossings. That was an issue where low-boy trucks are getting hung up on crossings, and it is a major issue. We are working with FRA and AER and others to develop guidelines. The Federal Highway Administration moved forward a sign and guidance through the MUTCD working with Federal Rail to identify the high profile crossings so we have a national uniform sign. I believe that was a recommendation of the Board. We also are looking at the Long Island Railroad for advanced ITS train communication systems, and I believe that will be discussed tomorrow morning. Also, with the legislation, we worked very, very closely with Bruce and his staff on legislation. In the last T-20, ISTEA, and then in T-21, we worked out different formulas and different funding mechanisms to enhance railroad grade crossing safety. MR. GEORGE: Federal Highways will be coming out with some proposed changes to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices later this year or early in the new year. We have worked very closely with them on developing those proposals. They are just proposals at this point, but we are going to be addressing the issues like terminology definitions, four quadrant gates; inventory number signs, one eight hundred number signs, high speed train signs, no train horn signs, no signal signs, and look for train signs, things like that, and we are working very closely together on those. MR. RABY: For the audience or for the record, would each of you state your department's involvement in the Operation Lifesaver program. I think it is pretty well known, but for the record, a short -- MR. UMBS: That is a great organization, and I think, well, they have done a lot, a tremendous amount to move the education, engineering, and enforcement on railroad grade crossings. The organization was started in 1972 and moved along in Idaho and then moved nationally. It was the Board's recommendation. Senator Kay Hutchison recommended that it go national, and it, in fact, did. In 1986, it was incorporated. Then the Federal Highway Administration began funding it at $300,000 a year. This past authorization with T-21, it is now at a half million dollars. We work closely with them. We participate in their technical boards and are able to provide input with the Operation Lifesaver, and they have just done a marvelous job in educating the public and the drivers. MR. GEORGE: The Federal Railroad Administration was instrumental when AER and Amtrak and RPI got together in 1986 to establish Operation Lifesaver Incorporated. The OL Program that existed before that was a national program. We made our first grant to Operation Lifesaver, Incorporated in 1988, a $69,000 grant, and we have subsequently granted them an additional $3.3 million over the years, the least three years at $600,000 per year. We also serve on their Program Development Council which oversees the direction of the programs and provides advice to the management. You know, they just have an infrastructure that is not to be equaled with some 200 trainers nationwide, 3,000 trained certified volunteers making presentations. That is a resource that we like to draw on and they do make available to us when it is necessary to get the word out on some issue. MR. RABY: I think, I don't know, but I believe possibly the reduction that Illinois has had in their grade crossing accidents, I really believe Operation Lifesaver had a lot to do with that. I would be remiss if I didn't mention the fact that Mr. Sweedler's shop at the NTSB has one of his staff that is very dedicated and spends a lots of time, and I know supports the Operation Lifesaver. When flashing lights come on at active crossings, what does it mean to the Federal Highway? MR. UMBS: I am going to refer to the Motor Vehicle Code. MR. RABY: That was my next question. What does it say? MR. UMBS: The Motor Vehicle Code, which is developed by an independent volunteer organization. Originally, it was at Northwestern University and has subsequently moved to Alexandria, Virginia. It is a not for profit organization. It is the Uniform Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, and it publishes this document. It also has this document on its web site. So, if anybody wants to do that, it does have it on its web site. The Uniform Vehicle Codes states that (reading) Wherever a person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing under any circumstances stated in this section, the driver of such vehicle shall stop within 50 feet and not less than 15 feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until it is safe to do so. (Reading) The foregoing requirements shall apply when a clearly visible electronic or mechanical signal device gives warning of an immediate approach of a railroad train; two, grade crossing is lowered or when a human flagger gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a railroad train; (Reading) Three, a railroad train approaching from within 1,500 feet of a highway crossing emits a signal audible from such a distance, and such a railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness of such crossing, is an immediate hazard. (Reading) Four, an approaching railroad train is plainly visible, and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing. It closes with (reading) No person shall drive a vehicle through, around, or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad grade crossing while such gate or barrier is closed or is being opened or closed. That is in their paragraph 11-701, Obedience to Signal Indicating Approach of Train; that is Obedience to Signal Indicating Approach of Train. The role of the Federal Highway Administration is to develop the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, to develop and to maintain it. Any changes to this Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, which include the pavement, approach pavement marking, the signals, the gates, the configuration, is to be laid out in here. Any changes to this has to go through Federal rule-making, and that is where we are right now: We are revising the entire manual. It has been a multi-year effort. We are coming close to completion. The railroad grade crossing issue will be out by December, so a notice of proposed rule-making will be out for that section. In here, it basically says what the device is, not what the driver should do. This is a guidance to a traffic engineer or a highway agency as to what they need to do to provide for guidance and regulation of the driver. So, the manual doesn't tell the driver what to do, but does tell the organization what the meaning of, what the devices should look like should they install them. So, it is not a driver's manual. MR. RABY: Do you know if all states have adopted that manual or the meanings in the manual. MR. UMBS: The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is the national standard and guidelines for all traffic control devices on public roads. The Federal manual sets forth these basic guidance and standards. Then each state is required, under the Federal Regulations of 23 -- the Code of Federal Regulations 23, Highways, requires that each state shall adopt that manual for use on the Federal aid projects. So, all states, to my knowledge, have adopted, officially adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices or have developed their own quite similar to it. They may exceed the standards, but they are not to go less than the standards set forth in the manual. MR. RABY: I am filling in today a little bit for a colleague of mine, Ron Webber (phonetic), and meal meeting with him prior to coming here, we had the law for Illinois that states what the vehicle should do when the lights come on. In essence, it says come on and stop and stay stopped until the light goes off. We checked in the State of Virginia, and Virginia says when you come to a flashing light, you stop and if it is clear, you can continue on. They sort of treat it like a flashing red light at a traffic control. So, I guess question is: Is Virginia, for example, following the Uniform Vehicle Code, or is that some variation they may have added to it? If they have, are you aware of possibly other states that may have variances? MR. UMBS: The model Uniform Vehicle Code is a model. The states do not have to follow it, and I don't believe any follow it to the letter. They all have adapted parts of the Uniform Vehicle Code. So, the Uniform Vehicle Code is really outside of the area of the Federal Highway Administration because that involves the driver and NTSA, which is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. They are responsible for the driver and the rules of the road in that area and work very closely with Anne Cutlow (phonetic) as we do. So, each state has a right to adopt their own laws through their legislation, and we know that state laws do change or traffic laws do change are from state to state as to what you can do and what you cannot do. What you can do in one state may be legal and in another state may not be. That is why we have 50 sovereign states. So, that is an issue that goes through the state's legislature, and it becomes state law. It is not a Federal law. MR. GEORGE: If I may interject something? I mentioned that the two appropriation bills for Federal Rails and Federal Highway had some identical language as to the crossings. One of those provisions, if it passes, will direct the Federal Railroad Administration to write model legislation for consideration by state legislators establishing more uniform state laws regarding crossings. MR. RABY: That has been expressed to me that there is some concern that we are such a mobile society and that people travel so much that they can get confused what they do in different states in railroad crossings, for example. MR. GEORGE: I think that is exactly where we are coming from in asking for that direction from the Congress. MR. RABY: A little bit about enforcement at grade crossings: If you know, are there any restrictions or does the railroad ever enforce grade crossing signal violations? MR. GEORGE: Do the railroads? MR. RABY: The railroad police. MR. GEORGE: Yes, they do. There is not a lot of railroad police out there. That is the problem there. On those railroads that have a substantial police force or police force enough to do that, especially the ones with a uniformed force, they will do that. MR. RABY: They have that authority? MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir. MR. RABY: Are there any incentives or programs to beef up enforcement in general, not only for the safety of the railroad, but even local police or state police? Has the Federal Government entered into any kind of program or incentives to increase enforcement at grade crossings for violations? MR. GEORGE: Under the Presence Program, the Department of Justice is trying to encourage the fielding of over a hundred thousand more police officers. At least one railroad in the country has applied for a grant under that program and received it. They have three officers they are going to use for -- well, their justification was crossing safety and trespass prevention. We are promoting that concept at other railroads. I don't know if any others that have taken advantage of it yet. MR. RABY: I guess the question comes up a lot of times about how come we don't use the highway traffic signal type of signal at grade crossings. Therefore, the traveling public only has only has to get used to one type of signal to understand how to adhere. Could you briefly go over that for the record for us and how the MUTCD, what it says about using highway grade crossings. MR. UMBS: The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices covers the railroad grade crossing signals, the configuration, the timing; and it also covers traffic signals at intersections which includes also again the timing, the visibility, the shape, the size, and color. Over the years, there has been discussed on railroad grade crossings and the use of traffic signals versus to replace the common railroad grade crossing signals. There have been studies. A few studies have been done; nothing that I know that has been conclusive. The study that was done in Tennessee a few years ago, about ten years ago, basically said there was not much difference between railroad grade crossings and traffic signals. They had installed some traffic signals, and people were responding basically the same to each. One of the things with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, maybe we are conservative, but we like to stay with what the public is used to unless we find that is something significantly an enhancement to highway safety. There has been some discussion over time, and right now, the manual is under review and the docket is open for comment on the use of traffic signals at railroad grade crossings. I personally have not seen any movement, words from the public or industry, to use traffic signals in place of railroad grade crossings. Basically, one of the things we believe at the railroad grade crossings -- based on existing research and based on what has happened over the years, a dramatic decrease in the number of railroad grade crossing fatalities -- is, as Bruce said, to stay with what the public is used to and then also use the traffic signals at intersections. We could go with traffic signals, but we have a massive program now on running red lights. We are not for running red lights. We don't have a program for running red lights. We have a program to prevent the running of red lights. It is a major problem in the United States. We have spent millions of dollars. We have a massive campaign to educate the public, educate the engineers, and enforcement on the use of proper signal timing, proper use of traffic signals, and also what you are supposed to do when you come up to a traffic signal: If the light is read red, it means red, it means stop. That is our slogan, Red means stop. To take a device now, which we are just trying to get the public to stop running red lights, and to put them on a railroad grade crossing, I don't know if they are going to respect that any more than they do. They know they are running red lights. They run red lights, and that is a massive program right know that are trying to address. MR. RABY: Does any of your research or data give any thought to why people go around gates at grade crossings? MR. GEORGE: The Federal Railroad Administration just initiated an effort now on the human factors, accident causation study to look into that. We are just getting started on it. MR. UMBS: For the red lights, we did do some work in that area. We did focus groups, and we found out that when you run red lights, it is always the other person. The people in our focus groups were confident they never ran red lights. So, we had to have a program for the people who run red lights that won't identify themselves. It appears that people are, in our public awareness campaigns, we show that people are impatient, and how people were impatient. Their minds were someplace else. They didn't want to wait. They knew the traffic signal was going to be three minutes, and they didn't want to wait three minutes for the traffic signal. So, they just run it. We are trying to convey upon the public the importance of not running reds lights: Not only do they put themselves in danger, but they put the other drivers and pedestrians in danger too. So, it is a complicated issue, and it will be interesting to look at what was done and what FRA is going to do. I remember a few years ago when I was in Michigan -- I was the safety engineer for our division office there -- we had met with the railroad all day, with the state and the railroad on coming up with great traffic, some sort of a signal that would keep people from running the signal and going around the gates. We had strobe lights and all sorts of things that we worked very, had a long great conversation. After the meeting, we were all leaving. A train came through, we were the third car back. A car two cars behind us pulled out, drove around us, and then drove around the gate. I don't know what you could do in that situation, but that is something that stuck with me for many, many, years -- that is over 20 years ago -- stuck with we over the years. We have to, as traffic engineers, do the best we can and make the most realistic signal timing, both for traffic control devices and railroad grade crossings and realistic traffic for all traffic control devices. MR. GEORGE: One of the things they have come up with in monitoring crossings, in video monitoring, we have seen there is a number of that sort of violation. That is where we concerned the concept of using channelization, lane channelization size to keep people from changing lanes and going over the opposing side track. They have done it in North Carolina very successfully, and in the State of Washington, they have a crossing now that we are monitoring, and the success is very high. MR. RABY: When it comes to educating the public about grade crossings, do you feel that the states cover this well enough in their vehicle drivers' manuals and possible the example in the testing they do for new drivers? Even in the CDL manual, does the CDL manual address grade crossing safety? MR. GEORGE: Let me speak to the drivers' manual, and I will let Rudy talk about the CDL. About three years ago, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration undertook a major effort to rewrite portions of the driver's manual, and the portion dealing with crossings was included in that. That language has been made available as a sample, you know, as a model. I know at least one a state has adopted it, and others usually pick those things up in pieces. If they don't adopt it directly, the fact that it has been issued causes them to rethink and review their own, and they will sometimes make changes that are favorable, but we will see how that goes. MR. RABY: Rudy, do you know if the CDL manual puts much credence in it or spends much time covering this issue in their manual when drivers upgrade to a CDL driver's license? MR. UMBS: The CDL area is handled in another office of the Office Highway Safety, Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety in the Federal Highway Administration. I understand they will be testifying before the Board in New Orleans. I would prefer to leave it to those experts to handle the CDL issues. MR. RABY: This was a general question because Chairman Black had already indicated earlier that we were not going to discuss the individual driver CDL situation. Maybe you could comment on this, Rudy: Is there any rule-making in progress or just been adopted regarding grade crossing laws and CDL driver's license? MR. UMBS: Yes, there has. If I could find it, would you mind doing in this in order of my stuff. In the Federal Register September 2nd, there was a final rule issued by the Federal Highway Administration on of commercial driver disqualification provisions. This will go into effect October 4th. This is a very significant piece of rule-making. It will have economic and it will have safety effects on the trucking and railroad industries. It virtually can take somebody's commercial motor vehicles license away. It can disqualify a driver for 30 days, 60 days, and finally 120 days. They could possibly lose their license totally. The longest would be the second conviction for rail grade crossing violations with a commercial motor vehicle within three years will result in a disqualification of 120 days. Third within that time period would be one year. This is significant. One of the things that it, one of the violations -- I believe there are six violations that can get you, can get a commercial motor vehicle driver a penalty. One is by parking on, by stopping on the tracks. Regardless of the situation, they are not allowed to stop on the tracks. This was brought home down in Fort Lauderdale a few years ago when a tanker truck was stopped on the track and an Amtrak train ran into the gasoline tanker truck. That was in a work zone. That resulted some changes to the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices talking about how you should handle railroad grade crossings and how you should handle trucks. It is very important that we in the engineering office provide the best technology we can and the best procedures we can. So, you are supposed to stop on a track and you are not supposed to run, you are not supposed to violate a traffic control device at a railroad grade crossing. Those are two of the six. Again, this is on our Internet line, and we can enter this also into the record. MR. GEORGE: Just a clarification, and I agree this is significant rule-making because there is no other CDL violation that results in a disqualification on the first offense, and this one will. Secondly, what it says is if the driver violates a law dealing with the crossing. So, there has to be a law in existence. This new regulation is really a penalty schedule. It is not law in terms of if the driver, as Rudy said, if the driver stops on a crossing, there has to be a law on the books in the state that stopping on a crossing is against the law first. This rule does not make it a violation to stop on the crossing. It just says if you violate a state law about stopping on a crossing, you can lose your license. You will lose your license. MR. RABY: That is a big step, I think, in the right direction. Rumble strips at railroad tracks, has any research or any thought been given to the use of rumble strips at the approach of railroad tracks? MR. UMBS: We have, right now, the Federal Highway Administration has a major program on reducing the number and severity for off the road crashes. About a third of the fatalities, 13,000 to 15,000 of the fatalities, are single vehicles running off the road. What we want to do is keep the driver on the road in different ways. One of them is through rumble strips, both the center line and edge line. Right now, there is a number of states that are using it as a standard practice to install rumble strips on the edge line and center line. The next step is also to use rumble strips on the approach of railroad grade crossings as you do for approach to toll roads or toll plazas in advance of a stop sign. In normally a rural area, you want to alert the driver to something unusual. You could do that. When we discussed this within headquarters, we felt that it would have to go all the way across the road. It could not just be half of the roadway because we felt if it was just approach half of the roadway, people would actually drive over to the other side to avoid the rumble strips. We find that to be true on a number of things. I remember people would drive on the other side of really ruff crossings: Boy, this is a really rough crossing. So, you would see an awful lot of people go to the other side. So, we would want to have it go all the way across. That could be an effective approach. There would be nothing to stop a highway agency now from installing them. MR. RABY: Lastly, your opinion, practices seem to be very popular. We like to Europe and see what they are doing at grade crossings. I wonder if Federal Highways or the Federal Railroad Administration has taken a look at any of the grade crossing safety programs that are used in Europe or any other foreign countries. MR. UMBS: I am going to let Bruce handle that because he just got back from a European trip to look at that. MR. GEORGE: I didn't just get back. It has been two years. Fred Small from the Federal Highway Administration and myself and Dr. Steve Roop (phonetic) from the Texas Transportation Institute went to Europe two years ago in September and met with rail and traffic authorities in five different countries in two weeks. It was a bit hectic. I could answer specific questions I guess, but generally they have problems not unlike our own. The trip did dispel some what I call myths or at least my perceptions of the things going on in Europe. Everybody comes back and tells us they have four quadrant gates everywhere, and that is not the case. There was one country we were in had two I think, and they said they were not putting in any more either. Other countries, a couple of the others, one thing they do is a lot of their roads are narrower than ours, and with a single gate they are able to close the whole road. So, that amounts to the same thing. There is a lot of four quadrant gates, but nowhere near the numbers I had been led to believe before I had flown there. I think, in my mind, it proves the concept or it certainly doesn't disprove the fact that it is a good idea if gates are not doing the conventional job, the conventional gates are not doing the job, I think four quadrant gates should be in the traffic engineer's tool box as a consideration. There was nothing I saw in Europe that would make me feel any different about that. They are using different techniques for train detection on the approach, and I think that is more meat for the discussion tomorrow. We are going to be looking at some of the same techniques they are using in Europe in this country within the next year in some testing out at the test center in Colorado. Their grade separation programs, they have some construction techniques where they manage to put in some major structures while the railroad continues to operate which were impressive and we did see. I have heard that kind of technique is being considered here as well. They do a lot of signing. The legal side of the question is very different in Europe. The driver is almost automatically culpable if he gets hit by a train in Europe. That may change as the railroads privatize; I don't know. MR. RABY: Ruben has a couple of questions. MR. PAYAN: Before we go to Mr. Brown, I would like to ask Rudy one quick question that I asked Mr. George. Does the Federal Highway Administration have any restrictions or does it play a role on truck routing regarding railroad crossings? MR. UMBS: Not to my knowledge. MR. PAYAN: Mr. Raby? MR. RABY: Mr. Brown, you have been sitting there all rested I assume and ready to go. A little orientation if we could: How many states does Amtrak operate in? MR. BROWN: Amtrak operates in 45 of the 48 states in the Continental United States. MR. RABY: About how many trains do you operate? MR. BROWN: In total? MR. RABY: Total. MR. BROWN: Five hundred. MR. RABY: Do you have any idea how many grade crossings you cross over with these trains? MR. BROWN: Thousands. MR. RABY: How about in Illinois particularly? Would you happen to have a number for that? MR. BROWN: I do not right now. MR. RABY: Let me back up a minute. I think it was established earlier that you operate mostly over host railways. MR. BROWN: That is correct. We operate approximately 21,600 route miles off Amtrak or over other carriers, which represents approximately 98 percent of our total route miles. MR. RABY: Member Black asked a couple of my questions during the last Amtrak thing, but I was going to ask you to go over a scenario when you initiate a new route over a host line and how you address the safety of your operation over that line. MR. BROWN: Certainly. If we were to initiate a new service -- a good example Mr. Bullock mentioned earlier in his testimony would be our new service into Oklahoma -- we would do joint investigations with the railroad of record, the home railroad. We would actually make trips and do an engineering assessment of the track standards and the maintenance levels of that railroad and then make, along with the funding agency -- in this case, it is a jointly funded service with the states -- we would then negotiate a contract and develop an operating plan that would determine the type of operation, how we would operate, and under what conditions. Clearly, whenever we are on a host railroad's property, we operate according to their operating rules and special instructions within the uniform applicable codes, general coding in those cases. Based on the level of utility or the maintenance level of that route that the home railroad maintains, we act accordingly; we operate accordingly. MR. RABY: After you do that initial assessment, how often do you do reassessments or reviews? MR. BROWN: With some regularity; with pretty good frequency. We have a corporate policy to try to -- actually, it is a goal -- we try to use our track geometry vehicle that we own, which is a high-tech vehicle that gives all kind of track geometry read-outs and conditions on vertical and lateral truss and ride quality and things of that nature. We try to make a trip over each of our routes every two years. We have had a lot attention recently, as you can imagine, with the northeast corridor with the introduction of the high speed service, so we are a little bit behind. That is what we try to do on a regular basis with our vehicle. Naturally interspersed throughout, constantly, operating and engineering managers of Amtrak on various SBUs make frequent trips over the different routes, make analyses, and we are in constant contact with the host carriers. We generally do these things in concert with them. So, there is a constant dialogue regarding track conditions, ride quality, passenger comfort, those kinds of things. MR. RABY: In regard to grade crossing accidents, do you have any statistics on Amtrak and grade crossing accidents? MR. BROWN: Yes; I can give you some something. MR. RABY: Would you, please. Does this include deaths and injuries? MR. BROWN: Yes. The facts I have here are part of the FRA's annual emergency manual. So, what I am giving you is from the FRA statistics. They are statistics we report to the FRA, and they are a matter of record. What would like? MR. RABY: How many grade crossing accidents in the last two years or for 1998, 1997? MR. BROWN: In 1997, and I am speaking for just Amtrak and this is nationally, Amtrak incurred 176 incidents in 1997. We had 170 grade crossing incidents in 1998, and the first six months of 1999, we have had 79 incidents. MR. RABY: You have the injuries? MR. BROWN: Yes, sir. In 1997, of the 176 incidents, we incurred, we didn't incur, but there were 53 fatalities and a total of 140 injuries. Now, understand that the large majority of those fatalities and injuries were to persons or people who were pedestrians or to the occupants of vehicles that were struck at a grade crossing. Very few were employees, and to the best of my recollection, the incident at Bourbonnais is the first time Amtrak has sustained customer fatalities as a result of a grade crossing accident. In 1998, of the 170 incidents involving Amtrak, there were 50 fatalities and 124 injuries; and the first six months of 1999, as I said, there were 79 incidents which included 24 fatalities and 8 injuries. MR. RABY: In your records, do you make a break-out between heavy trucks and other vehicles? MR. BROWN: We do have a number of statistics on the number of times we have derailed and whether or not those were heavy vehicles. I do not have figures here for the -- because of the way we report and the way the FRA programs sorts and retains the data, I was not able to easily retrieve it, but for example, in 1997, we had, of the number of grade crossing incidents, we had four derailments. Of those four derailments, four included tractor trailers with a weight over 26,000 pounds. In 1998, there were four derailments as a result of these accidents, two of which involved tractor trailers at that weight definition. In the first six months of 1999, we have had one incident that resulted in a derailment, and it also involved a tractor trailer of over 26,000 pounds. So in the last two and a half years, the number of derailments at grade crossings, seven of the nine incidents involved heavy vehicles. MR. RABY: Seven out of nine? MR. BROWN: Yes, sir. MR. GEORGE: May I offer that the FRA database on accidents does break out cars, trucks, trucks with trailers, pick-up trucks, vans, buses, school buses, motorcycles, other motor vehicles pedestrians, and other. MR. BROWN: I am not sure. George, does that include the weight though? MR. GEORGE: No, that does not include the weight. MR. BROWN: Many of the incidents do not involve a heavy vehicle or a tractor trailer. MR. RABY: We spoke earlier about Operation Lifesaver. Does Amtrak participate in Operation Lifesaver? MR. BROWN: Very much so. As was earlier stated, we were one of the three agencies in the actual incorporation of Operation Red Flag. We had employees on various councils. We have membership, for example, in the Program Development Council. As far as our education and our involvement, over 200 Amtrak employees or presenters, if you will, have received extensive training on public speaking and delivery of our process. Within the last 18 months, over 500 presentations and 60 displays have been involved with Amtrak participation, which gives us over 360,000 people contacted in these last 18 months with just Amtrak involvement. Within the State of Illinois, we have five full-time presenters. So far this year, to date, we have made 34 presentations with over 3,000 people contacted. MR. RABY: My last question, I guess, is: With all this research and in your experience, what does Amtrak see that could be done to reduce the number of, I am going to be general, Amtrak accidents, and I will also be specific, at grade crossings? MR. BROWN: We feel very strongly that the answer, the real solution is much more activity and involvement in enforcement of existing regulations and laws and creation of new laws. As a corporation, we laud and fully support the activity that the FHWA is undertaking, and we support the rule-making that hopefully is going to be enforceable on October 4th, and we fully support that. We would like to see more stringent application and more stringent laws. Though we laud the work that is being done, we would like to see more stringent penalty involved to the operators of these commercial vehicles. We also would like to see not just civil penalties, but criminal processes, prosecution as well for repeated violators of the law. MR. RABY: Thank you. Ruben? MR. PAYAN: Mr. Brown, just one question: Does Amtrak have any program to identify possible high risk crossings using reports of close calls of the locomotive engineers? MR. BROWN: We do get reports of close calls, but we do not have a program that specifically identifies those crossings. MR. PAYAN: Do you follow up on any of those reports? MR. BROWN: We do. MR. PAYAN: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Federal Highway Administration? MR. UMBS: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Illinois Commerce Commission? MR. STEAD: We have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: The Brotherhood? MR. WALPERT: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: United Transportation Union? EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION MR. DWYER: Mr. George, I understand that you said that this year or last year, Operation Lifesaver received $600,000 from the Federal Railroad Administration. MR. GEORGE: That is correct. MR. DWYER: That is in addition to 500,000 that came with T-21? MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir. MR. DWYER: Are there any links between the T-21 and state involvement in Operation Lifesaver? MR. GEORGE: Are there any links between T-21 and state involvement? MR. DWYER: Yes. For instance, if the State of Illinois were to qualify for Federal funding, which they do, is there anything that would require them also to participate in Operation Lifesaver to receive those funds? MR. GEORGE: No, not to my knowledge. MR. DWYER: Has the Federal Highway Administration or the Federal Railroad Administration or the Secretary of Transportation or the administrators given any thought to that linkage? MR. GEORGE: I don't know that we have given it any thought. I consider Illinois to be a reasonably good partner for OL, but I should not speak for OL either. I do know they are active, and I would just observe that it would take legislation to make that kind of linkage. Congress lays down the rules be which those funds are distributed. MR. DWYER: My point is that some states such as Illinois are exemplary in their involvement, and other states take no interest. MR. GEORGE: It does. MR. DWYER: These things don't happen just in Illinois. They happen nationally. This issue, in your own words, is going to have to be addressed by stiffer enforcement and education and a part of enforcement. So, I would ask that you give that some thought. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Melco, Mr. Marshall? MR. MARSHALL: I don't have any questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Amtrak? MR. BULLOCK: I have no questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad? EXAMINATION BY CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD MR. ED HARRIS: Just one question for Mr. Umbs: You have testified that or you have shared your frustrations in regard to having motorists stop at stop lights or failure to stop at stop lights. This question does not pertain to McKnight Road. The passive signal indication or the passive crossbuck sign that is installed at many public crossings at every railroad across the nation, what does that mean to the Federal Highway Administration as far as what does it tell the motorist to do? MR. UMBS: Again, the Federal Highway Administration sets the regulations for what the crossbuck should look like, that there is a crossbuck, and it is up to the individual states to make their laws for their roads. With the exception of the 55 mile per hour speed limit, the Federal Government is basically out of the setting of what the rules of the road are. We encourage the Uniform Vehicle Code, and we put in the signs and markings. Our job is to provide the signs and markings and traffic control devices for the roadway and to have a national uniform standard. The meaning is that of the states. The states pass those laws. There is no Federal law that is titled that. MR. ED HARRIS: I apologize for that confusion. In your opinion, do you think it would be appropriate to install stops signs in addition to those crossbuck indications? MR. UMBS: The Federal Highway Administration, in response to T-21, put in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices giving the local agencies to the install stop signs without an engineering study. That is in the manual right now, and you can do that. Earlier, I mentioned the technical working group which Bruce is on and Fred Small and a member of my staff is on, and as a result of the NTSB's passive crossing study they came up with, we are going to be developing warrants for stop signs, gates, signals, and that is what we are looking at right now. That is a good question. Do we put them up all over? Do we put stop signs? Do we require everybody to stop at a crossing? That is now the option of the local agencies. If they want to, they may do that right now. MR. GEORGE: May I offer something? MR. ED HARRIS: Yes; we would love to hear it. MR. GEORGE: I don't think stop signs are a panacea. I don't think they should go everywhere, but I think they are under-utilized where highway rail crossings are concerned. I think there should be a lot more of them out there than they are now. The before and after studies that have been done, two studies, have shown a 35 percent reduction in collisions when the signs are properly used; and it is a relatively inexpensive thing to do. I just think there ought to be more of them out there. MR. ED HARRIS: Not particularly in this state, if I may add just to that, because I think the important thing we need to address here is railroad and crossing safety throughout the United States. One of the issues that I had and one of the reasons that I had to ask this question is because I did personally go to state agencies to asks this very question, and I did not get the kind of response I thought I would; not this state, but other states that we operate in. MR. GEORGE: You need enforcement. You should not put a sign up, any sign, a stop sign or any other, unless the local law enforcement officials will enforce it. I would not ask that they give anything extraordinary to this stop sign over any other, but at least as much authority, time, effort, if they see a violation, that they will pursue it. I am not saying they should sit out there and watch for it unless they do that at other stop signs. MR. ED HARRIS: Thank you. MR. UMBS: If I could just respond a little to that? Bruce was so correct in saying when properly used, and that is why we are looking at taking that passive grade crossing study very seriously at the Department of Transportation. We want to come up with warrants. We find the stop sign is becoming as common as tulips in spring sometimes where every intersection in the subdivision has a stop sign. As a traffic engineer, I sometimes sit and watch cars go by. Very few people do that. I just watch cars go by. I noticed very few of them actually come to a complete and legal stop in accordance with the requirements of the State of Virginia. So when we do put them in, we mean business. That is the important thing. That is why the red light running program is concentrating on engineering: Is it warranted or not, yes or no? Enforcement, if it is warranted, then let's enforce it. Then let's tell everybody we are going to go out there, with the red light running program, we are going to out there at railroad grade crossing, and you run that stop sign, we are going to give you a ticket for sure. We will even put cameras. I mean the next thing is to put up cameras. We do that now within our red light running program, and they have shown to be very effective. MR. GEORGE: Federal Highway and Federal Rail issued a joint memorandum actually about five years ago I think, or four years, on the things we felt should be considered in putting up a stop sign and the things that would contra-indicated for the utility of the stop sign. The reason it was issued was to promote additional stop signs out there. MR. UMBS: Theoretically, if a driver one runs a stop sign at a rail crossing, the results are disastrous if that is indeed the case, and that is the point I am trying to make. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I have been trying to overcome the temptation to comment on this, having been involved in that for 25 or 26 years. Bruce, would you like to ask yourself a question? MR. GEORGE: Why don't enlighten me as to what that question would be? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Why don't you say the Federal Railway Administration has no questions. You are up is what I am saying. MR. GEORGE: Does the spokesman have a question? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Did you appoint somebody? MR. GEORGE: No. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I'm sorry. MR. BLACKMORE: No questions. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Sweedler? MR. SWEEDLER: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Claude? EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: I have a couple of questions. The first two is for Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown you mentioned earlier that you do participate in the Operation Lifesaver Program. I was wondering, to the best of your knowledge, is any of this participation targeted to the commercial operators. MR. BROWN: Yes. We are active in presenting -- actually, we have some on-going activities, educational activities, in connection with Operation Lifesaver such as Trucker on the Train, and we also meet with trucking associations, which would include heavy vehicle operators as specific markets, as specific customers. We even have developed a video called An Engineer's Story that specifically target those kinds of markets. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Does Amtrak compile any date to on gate breakage at active crossings? MR. BROWN: We do on our property, on property that we own and maintain. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Is that data available to the public? MR. BROWN: Yes. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Can it be made available to us? MR. BROWN: Yes, it can. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: We would appreciate it for the record. My two questions are for Mr. George and Mr. Umbs: Are there any specific programs within U.S. DOT that specifically address problems at grade crossings for commercial vehicles? You mentioned broad oversight programs in your target areas, but are you specific planning anything primarily for targeting commercial vehicles or commercial operators? MR. GEORGE: Two or three things come to mind. We are working with Operation Lifesaver. We have agreed in principle with them that we need a new film for targeting commercial vehicles. That is something that will be forthcoming, I think, in the next several months. We have just put out a work with ATA, and actually, I think NTSB was involved or at least reviewed putting out that trucker safety alert. I noticed a copy of on your table out in the ante room there. We are looking at, the Federal Railroad Administration, and keeping Federal Highways apprised of what we are looking at, developing and gathering data on high profile crossings, hump crossings. There have been some serious collisions brought about by vehicles that were high centered on crossings which has gotten our attention, and we have started to gather data on those crossings one at a time and quickly came to the conclusion we could not afford to do that, sending out surveyors at each crossing. We worked with the Corps of Engineers last year and used a helicopter to survey 179 mile corridor in North Carolina using a laser infrared scanning device that can determine the elevation -- of any elevation, but in this case, we were flying the rail corridor -- to within two centimeters within the inch 60 feet either side of the right of way. We are using that data working with the University of West Virginia to develop a model, a computer model that will help us identify crossings that have the potential to hang up a vehicle. Of course, at some point here in the not too distant future, we have to start to gather data on vehicles. This is a case where it takes two to tango, and there is no standard out there for vehicles. We are not looking for a standard, but we want to look for a system of classifications where if we can come up with four to six different classes of crossings and then the same for vehicles, then you could say if you are driving a Class C vehicle, don't try to go across a class four crossing or a five crossing. We will see how it works out, but we are trying to gather data at this point for the analytic part of the effort. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Is this data going to be entered the database at this point in time, or are you just looking at it -- MR. GEORGE: Right now, we are just trying to get it, but yes, that would be the long range intent, would be to put something in the database. Of course, just last year, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices was augmented with a sign which identifies, an advance warning sign that identifies a high profile crossing. That information we have made provision for in the inventory, so there will be a flag in there that says this crossing is equipped with a high profile crossing sign. I trust a traffic engineer would not put that sign up unless the crossing was a high profile crossing. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: We had a lot of testimony this afternoon on active warning devices. Right now, there is quite a few devices that are used out there on active crossings. I am wondering does U.S. DOT have some kind of program to try to make these devices more consistent nationwide. MR. GEORGE: More consistent nationwide? I think the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices lays out the standards for what those devices will look like. That is pretty consistent. Do you mean in terms of this effort that Rudy was talking about, this joint effort, this technical working group that is going to be looking at warrants -- maybe that is the kind of thing -- so that a given situation will warrant a certain kind of warning device? MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Yes or either possibly funding to try to upgrade some of the active crossings such as the type of devices being used more consistently. MR. GEORGE: That really is a statement on how they use those Federal funds right now. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: You are saying you provide the guidelines, but you are not getting involved in making decisions on the type of funding that would that available for upgrading crossings. MR. UMBS: If I could give a little background on the Federal funding for railroad grade crossings? It started as program in 1973 under the Highway Safety Act. Prior to that time, Federal funds could be used for railroad grade crossings, but there was a state decision and they could or they could not use Federal funds for railroad grade crossings. Then the law came in 1973, and there was a requirement that they would receive a certain amount of dollars specifically for railroad grade crossings, both on the Federal aid system under Section 203 and under Section 230, which was off the Federal aid system. So, that was a first major activity that really push at the Federal level the uniformity of railroad grade crossings. We then worked with the states and local agencies to use those funds in the most effective manner and in setting up a survey. A survey was first required of railroad grade crossing survey was first required in 1973, and it is still required now. So, we have the funding available. Then along came 1991, ISTEA, that provided that 10 percent of the funding must be set aside for safety improvements: Half for railroad grade crossings; for high hazard locations. That went on until T-21, and T-21 now, has a funding issue where they have to spend a given amount of money. That money is based on the number of miles they have and the number of railroad crossings. I think Bruce was very instrumental in helping that where the funding level for railroad grade crossings is high to the number -- your funding is high to the number of crossings. So, Hawaii didn't get a big chunk of money like they used to. They only have one railroad grade crossing. So, there is funding available, and the states are required to set aside this money specifically for railroad grade crossings. Half must be spent on protective devices, and the other half may be spent on other railroad grade crossing activity such as structures. MR. GEORGE: It is about $155 million a year. MR. UMBS: They are allowed to, not only with $155 million, they are also able to spend regular Federal aid money for that plus optional safety money may be sent on that. That optional safety money is growing considerably. So, there is plenty of money available. MR. CLAUDE HARRIS: Thank you. MR. DUNN: I have a couple of questions. First of all, I have put this report together, there is a couple of things I have to ask you or one of the Federal people. What is T-21? What does that mean? MR. GEORGE: The Efficiency Act of the of 21st Century; it is six year funding bill that was passed just few years ago. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Funding highways in America? MR. GEORGE: Yes. MR. DUNN: How about ISTEA? MR. UMBS: We will give you that exactly. MR. DUNN: That is fine as long as I have it sent to me at some time because I am asking for some other stuff. MR. GEORGE: Intermodal Surface Transportation and Efficiency Act; we will get you that. MR. DUNN: Thank you. Amtrak gave us some good statistics, and if you could tell me the same thing or get it to me for 1997, the total number of accidents in the United States, crossing accidents, do we have that available? MR. GEORGE: Yes, sir. That is available on the Net now. MR. DUNN: Can I get it on the record, or is it too much trouble to dig up? As long as it is sent to me -- 1997 incidents, fatalities, and injuries, and 1998, and half a year of 1999. MR. UMBS: Why don't you ask another question, and I will look for it. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Submit it for the record. MR. DUNN: Would you submit it for the record. MR. GEORGE: Certainly. MR. DUNN: That would be 1997, 1998, and half a year of 1999. My other question was or last question: We have seen how the decline in crossing accidents has gone down. How about number of people killed? Is that going down or is that staying status quo? MR. GEORGE: Since 1993, the number of deaths have gone down 31.2 percent. It was 626 in 1993, and 431 in 1998. It is down a good chunk in the first six months of this year, but I think the late reporting will probably bring it up some, so I hesitate to give you the number. MR. DUNN: For the record, also submit to me how it came down year by year, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996. MR. GEORGE: You can have this. MR. DUNN: Thank you. Those are all the questions I have. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Mr. Lauby, would you go ahead with your one question. MR. LAUBY: I do have one question for Mr. Rudy Umbs. It is response to your comments on stop signs, about how you have seen people totally ignore stop signs. I think we are all familiar with that. From my own point of view, I have seen people ignore grade crossings and grade crossbucks especially over and over where people will, when they do look, they are usually in the middle of the tracks and looking both ways to make sure nothing is coming. I do think stop signs are more universally understood than grade crossing signs. I have two teen-aged drivers, and I live in the Washington D.C. area, and I don't believe they have ever been across a grade crossing. I don't think they have ever seen a crossbuck because we don't have them in that area, and least not in the area they are exposed to. They do understand stop signs, and I think that is something that is very important that we need to look at. I have some questions for Mr. Brown about Amtrak and Amtrak's programs on grade crossings. I would like to ask you: How closely to you monitor what is going on at the grade crossings that Amtrak traverses. MR. BROWN: How closely do we? MR. LAUBY: Let me back up. Do you have somebody that is responsible at Amtrak to know how many crossings there are and where they are and what is going on at each crossing, are improvements being made or whatever? Do you have somebody responsible for that in Amtrak? MR. BROWN: Not particularly. That really is, that process is done by the host carrier. As far as crossing activity, crossing maintenance, that process would owned by our host carrier. On our property, we certainty do the same as Mr. Harris' people would on the CNIC. MR. LAUBY: You depend on the host carrier to make sure the crossings are safe? MR. BROWN: Basically, that is correct. MR. LAUBY: How do you handle close call reports, near-miss reports from your locomotive engineers? MR. BROWN: In the case of a train on a foreign railroad or on a host carrier, the employee would immediately report it to the train dispatcher and center. The appropriate train dispatcher would log that report with the host carrier. MR. LAUBY: Does Amtrak get involved at all in those reports? MR. BROWN: The host carrier would convey that to us, but it is not, to the best of my knowledge, it is not a formal structured procedure. MR. LAUBY: Does Amtrak any have any concerns about particular crossings where there might be a lot of industrial traffic? Are there any special crossings that come to your mind that Amtrak is especially concerned about? MR. BROWN: Not that I am aware of. MR. LAUBY: Do you know if Amtrak has ever made requests to state and local government or to a railroad to improve a crossing at a particular location? By that, I mean improve the protection. That is it. MR. BROWN: I know that we do on our own property or property that we are the operator of. We are in close coordination with state and local authorities. On the northeast corridor, for example, there are 11 grade crossings in Connecticut and Rhode Island that we are diligently to upgrade, and we work with the necessary authorities to eliminate those crossings and provide adequate protection. On the Michigan line, we are also active and involved with the states. MR. LAUBY: On the new lines, for example, in Oklahoma, you talked a little bit about some of the things that went on, and you talked about people being involved in it, especially the track maintenance and the ride quality, the track conditions, passenger comfort. When you do open a new line, do you negotiate at all with the railroads as far as improvements that need to be made on those lines as far as grade crossing safety? MR. BROWN: Let me put it this way: When we have a contract with a foreign carrier to operate a train, it is operating on an incentive based on our presence, the incremental of our being. If we are willing to operate at the level of maintenance and the level of utility in existence or that the carrier has in existence on that route, then we would just operate accordingly. If we saw a benefit and wanted to make increases for our own benefit for speeds -- and particularly, at speeds that we are crossing is a good example -- then we would bear the cost of the capital investment to change the warning devices and the circuitry to allow for a higher speed into and through the crossing. So, it would depend on the various parties, what are goals are, and what our needs are. So, it would vary by carrier and by location and by service. MR. LAUBY: One last question, and this has to do with not so much the Intercity operation, but some of the commuter operations, Amtrak's contract to operate some of the commuter lines. Do you do anything different on those commuter lines than you do on the Intercity, to your knowledge? MR. BROWN: It depends, again, on the nature of the contract. If we are just the operator, but do not do the track or signal maintenance, it would vary. For example, on the line between San Jose and San Francisco, we term it our Peninsula service, we both operate and maintain that railroad. So, we would maintain it at the direction of the joint commerce board, the local governing authorities. We would maintain it at the level that they require or that they want to run their service. MR. LAUBY: Just one final follow-up: As a condition of a contract, if you are awarded a contract to run a commuter operation, do you know if you have ever put any special requirements for grade crossing safety or grade crossing improvements as a condition of that contract? MR BROWN: That we actually instituted? MR. LAUBY: Yes. MR. BROWN: I don't know, but I can get the answer for you. My thought would be that the owner or regulator of that service would be the one to make that determine. We would build or maintain it to meet their requirements, but I will certainly, if you would like, I will look into that and answer that question. MR. LAUBY: Thank you. That would be fine if you would do that. That is all I have. Thanks. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Are you, Rudy, satisfied with the quality of the data that you are getting from the current NTSA data collection system, FARS, NAS, estimates? Do you think you can make judgments, for instance, on railroad grade crossings based on the quality of that data? MR. UMBS: At the national level, all we really are working with is the FARS data. From a national perspective, we can look at that data and get some general trends. It is for the individual states to set up their record systems so they can extract that. That is what we are working with, is the individual states. We have staff here in Illinois this week working with the Illinois Department of Transportation and our field office to improve the record system in Illinois. What we are looking to do is to help each of the individual states improve their record system. Certainly, by those individual states improving their record system, we too can have a better system. We are working with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation officials. We are funding a project there that is called TSYM (phonetic), transportation safety improvement. It will get you a TSYMs book. We changed it. It used to be CRISP (phonetic), and I used to know what CRISP was. Basically, what we are doing is we want to have a model system that each state doesn't have to re-invent their record systems. The record systems that were very popular in the 1970s for one reason or another have disappeared, and they are rebuilding them again. From a national standpoint, yes, I personally would like better data. It would help me as an engineer. Always, better data is better than less data, but we are working with the states. We want to improve the states. We have the Iowa model record system. So, we are working on two fronts -- the data collection and the data system management -- in order to provide better record systems at the state and local levels. CHAIRMAN BLACK: At the risk of testifying, the FAR system, you realize, of course, is really not a statistically significant sample in that you are looking at a special accident, the criteria for selection of which might have nothing to do with the severity of the accident or anything else. It might have to do with the ambulance service in the area or how quickly they respond, whether the fact that the person killed might have already had, as my father used to say, one foot in the grave and another on a banana peel. It really gives, I feel, like a deceptive -- it is not good data. The NAS, which they have chosen not to emphasize, of course, is a more representative sample. I think we have got an outstanding recommendation of that to NTSA. I don't know where it stands right now. Are you familiar with an NTSB recommendation that basically recommended increased emphasis on grade crossing procedures for truck, bus, CDL exams? MR. UMBS: Which number was that, sir? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Number? MR. UMBS: Yes. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I don't know. It was written in 1968. You are not going to find it, Rudy. That was a trick question. MR. UMBS: I used to handle the NTSB recommendations up until the restructuring of the Federal Highway Administration in January, but I am not familiar with that particular one. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Here is one from 1968 that says (reading) U.S. DOT Study, Short Range and Long Range Programs to Improve Railroad Grade Crossing Safety. That one is 1968 also. Here is one from 1971, (reading) FRA, FHLEA Consider Alternative Railroad Grade Crossing Signing and Protection. A reporter asked me the other day why it was that this was same the thing he had been reporting on for 20 years, the same causes, the same everything. The same signal equipment is still out there only with digital modifications to it. We are making some improvements in the statistics -- thank that properly to Operation Lifesaver primarily plus some other factors -- but the fact of the matter is here that this accident that brings us here today, what are you going to do about this, this sort of accident? The other thing that I will ask since the chairman isn't here, Federal Highway is giving away billions of dollars to the state. Yet, you seem to be not willing to make any prequalifications on that. If the states are not enforcing it, if the state and locals are not enforcing it, why shouldn't the Federal Highway or U.S. DOT have some compunction to say before we sign the next check, you demonstrate enforcement, not only of this, but of traffic signals and other areas? Do you get to decide that? MR. UMBS: We don't get to decide. Federal Highway Administration doesn't get to decide that. The money is set aside by Congress through a formula, and we are the dispensers of that money. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am just venting a little bit, Rudy, because here we have you are saying what needs to be done. You are counting on your partners, and congratulations. This is the first Federal panel I have ever seen to only mention the word partner once. Partnering is becoming the least common denominator. That is what it means. As we negotiate and whatever we can get a consensus on, whether it is good or not, we will do that. That is very disturbing, to see things like this, the death and devastation caused by a situation where we have been having problems like this for years and years. Here are all the recommendations, go back to the beginning at the Safety Board and we cannot seem to get going enough to do something about it. If you have got, any of you, Mr. Brown, or any of you have any ideas about how we can do this, I would like hear it them. What can we do? MR. UMBS: We have a number of new technologies that we have been talking with industry on. CHAIRMAN BLACK: We are going to hear about that tomorrow. MR. UMBS: This is lower tech. I am a lower tech guy. That is why I handle what I handle. The high-tech people are the people who think in the future and come up with those things. They are special, and I just try to do it with the here and the now with technology that is available today. We are looking at channelization at the crossings. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Let's stop right there. The gentleman from the Illinois Commerce Commission, who has a better system than a lot of states that I have seen, has a pretty profound reduction in incidents over the last few years, says it won't help and they could not consider it for this particular crossing. I, by the way, I used to be a practicing traffic engineer. The first thing I would do with this is an extruded curve down the middle for a couple of hundred feet, and I would deal with that intersection how I had to, and I could stop that problem. Yet, they are not even considering it. MR. UMBS: Like Bruce had mentioned North Carolina has had some success with that. We want to have a barrier in there or some sort of separation that doesn't create more of a safety than what is in there. So, we would not want to put a concrete barrier up. If you put a concrete barrier, then you have a -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: I am talking about an extruded curve, cheap and quick. MR. UMBS: Right, exactly. We have delineation. We have raised pavement markings. We have reflective paint. We have channelizing devices. The other thing that is proving to be quite successful is a new product at pedestrian crossings. When a pedestrian comes to a crossing, there are LED lights that are embedded in the pavement, and they flash. CHAIRMAN BLACK: We are getting off on it. We are talking about quick and cheap. MR. UMBS: It is quick and cheap. CHAIRMAN BLACK: LEDs and the pavement are difficult to maintain. I know about those. I am just saying that something needs to be done that can be done in a massive application with relatively little money and relatively little design. They are out there. You have already mentioned some of them in your testimony. I am just wondering what is it is going to take to get somebody to implement these, and I would think the states, as long as you don't offer them some incentive, maybe it could be positive incentive rather than negative incentive, but I needed your input on that. Just think about it. MR. GEORGE: I would like get on the record that it seems that at the two test locations, I think it is one of two now, North Carolina's project, but in Spokane as well, we are getting a 75 percent to 80 percent reduction in violations at crossings where you put in a channelization device. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you. That is something -- we have had them operating for 20 something years. I know we plow snow in the south. Actually, we do once or twice. MR. GEORGE: We do in Spokane. CHAIRMAN BLACK: It is relatively cheap to replace the things if they are just extruded curves in the first place. They are easy to mark. There are some ways it can be done, and I am testifying. Let me ask you something, Rudy. You and I are both one of the Indians. I guess you and I are both sort of ex officio, but we see each other there a couple times a year at the annual National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Does it bother you really that we say to a driver out in Pahira (phonetic) Georgia at the intersection of State Routes 142 and 155 that has four way stop and has a flashing beacon there, and we flash a red beacon, and it means to him or her there that they stop and then they go. If they flash again with a flashing light on a railroad crossing, and here, they are supposed to stop and wait before they move under the Uniform Vehicle Code. Is that a problem? MR. UMBS: For me personally? I don't have a problem. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You are a traffic engineer, Rudy. MR. UMBS: Right, and a safety engineer. For me, when I see a railroad grade crossing and I see those lights, I do everything but back up. I saw some fatals, and that is how I am in this, is witnessing those as a young child and saying why does somebody have so die at a crossing every year? CHAIRMAN BLACK: Is that a problem? MR. UMBS: Not to me; I don't see that as a problem. CHAIRMAN BLACK: You have read the book. We have someone who has immigrated to this country from Ireland and has not seen this before. They had read the manual, and the see that flashing light means stop then go in one place. It means stop and wait on the train in another place. I am just saying are we giving consistent signals to people. Maybe that is the reason we are having this difficulty. MR. UMBS: That could be, and that is why we need model legislation. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Exactly. The gate running is a separate issue. There, a person is going in harms way as a result of impatience, and that is a different issue that we have to physically restrain. I am just wondering if we are giving the right message to someone because lots of the crossings don't have gates, and there is only a flashing light there and the flashing is stop and go. I assure you people who are not traffic engineers, I have some problems with that. Indeed, there was evidence in the testimony from these witnesses, some of these witnesses, the truck drivers seem to feel that they could stop and then they could go if it was safe. I think that there is a difficulty. I am done. Any follow-up questions? It is the Chairman's discretion, I guess, to testify a little bit that way, but it gets awfully frustrating to us at the Safety Board to provide recommendation after recommendation. Basically, if you approached a crossing 25 or 30 years ago, it would look exactly the same as it does now. We have something that has not worked in the last 50 years. Yet, it is still there, and it is time to get creative. Yes, sir? MR. STEAD: Mr. Chairman, just to respond to your comment about the you use of median barriers, we have, just recently, attempted to experiment with those. It was a failed experiment because we offered to purchase and install the quicker, temporary median barriers for a community here in Scottville. At the mayor's request, we did that. They were in a couple, three weeks, maybe six weeks tops, and the City Council voted them out because they didn't like the look of them. CHAIRMAN BLACK: I used to have a Council too. MR. STEAD: The point being -- CHAIRMAN BLACK: Once they get sued a couple of times, it changes their minds. MR. STEAD: The point being is that we don't necessarily have the entire authority to issue the requirement to have them installed. We need some cooperation with the local highway agencies. CHAIRMAN BLACK: That is an excellent point, and I agree with that. It does take some underpinning to do this kind of thing. Thank you for that input. Anyone else? UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I have a couple of quick questions to Mr. Brown regarding Operation Lifesaver if I could very quickly. Mr. Brown, you indicated there were a number Operation Lifesaver presenters that have been trained on Amtrak. I think you said the number 200. Where do you get those employees who become Operation Lifesaver presenters? MR. BROWN: From different crafts. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: What percentage would govern the operating craft, the engineering and conductor? MR. BROWN: I really don't know. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Once they are trained and sent to the field, I assume to carry the message of safety at rail crossings, who are their audiences? MR. BROWN: Any number of audiences from trucking associations to schools to church groups to scouting troops, any organization that they can reach literally. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Would you happen to know specifically if any Operation Lifesaver presenter on Amtrak had spoken to Melco Transfer? MR. BROWN: I cannot answer that, but I can certainly investigate it and get back to you. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: Either before or after the accident? MR. BROWN: Yes, I can check that for you. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT: I would appreciate it. CHAIRMAN BLACK: Thank you, sir. We are adjourned until tomorrow morning at nine a.m. Thank you for your patience. (Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the proceedings were adjourned, to be reconvened the following day, Wednesday, September 15, 1999, at 9:00 a.m.) CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. ____________________________ October 4, 1999 Elizabeth Hudson Telson Executive Reporting Company, Inc. EXECUTIVE COURT REPORTERS, INC 301-565-0064