	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION		
	ACCIDENT INVESTIC	GAI	TION REPORT
1.	OCCURRED DATE: 16-JUN-2006 TIME: 0830 HOURS		STRUCTURAL DAMAGE CRANE OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
2.	OPERATOR: Remington Oil and Gas Corporation REPRESENTATIVE: Amy Fell TELEPHONE: (337) 593-9420 CONTRACTOR: ROWAN DRILLING REPRESENTATIVE: Jessie Rockett TELEPHONE: (832) 462-7507		DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE X OTHER Crane Incident
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	б.	OPERATION:
4.	Robert Fruge LEASE: G22688 AREA: EI LATITUDE: BLOCK: 391 LONGITUDE:		PRODUCTION X DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL
5.	PLATFORM: RIG NAME: ROWAN GORILLA II		<pre>PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. OTHER</pre>
	ACTIVITY: X EXPLORATION(POE) DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD) TYPE: HISTORIC INJURY REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	8.	CAUSE: X EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER
	Other Injury	9.	WATER DEPTH: 398 FT.
	POLLUTION FIRE	10.	DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 123 MI.
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND	11.	WIND DIRECTION: SSE SPEED: 15 M.P.H.
	SURFACE DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	12.	CURRENT DIRECTION: ESE SPEED: 5 M.P.H.
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <- \$25K	13.	SEA STATE: 3 FT.

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At approximately 0830 hours on June 16, 2006, a 90 bbl well test tank was dropped into the OCS waters due to a crane failure. The 90 bbl test tank was being lifted from the work boat M/V Southern River to the drilling rig Rowan Gorilla II by the drilling rig bow LeTourneau PCM-350 SS crane. The lift was approximately 65 feet above the M/V Southern River when the crane fast line cable parted dropping the tank. The tank struck the starboard aft quarter of the workboat then landed into the water. The tank floated away from the workboat and rig in a northeasterly direction for approximately 250 yards and sank. There were no injuries and no hydrocarbon pollution associated with this incident. The 90 bbl test tank, fast line ball and hook, and a section of cable were dropped as a result of the fast line cable being severed due to an inoperable crane limit switch.. For further clarification, it should be noted that the fast line ball did not make contact with the crane boom sheave. The fast line cable was severed as a result of a combination of the crane limit switch counter weight can being pulled into the crane boom sheave and the failure of the crane limit switch. The counter weight can was apparently lifted into the crane boom sheave by either a burr on the fast line cable or due to excessive tar build up on the counter weight can. The crane limit switch failed due to excessive corrosion on the limit switch wiring.

NOTE: The crane limit switch is a crane saver similar to an anti-two-block device which is designed to shut down a crane prior to allowing the fast line ball to make contact with the crane boom sheave.

The counter weight can is a weighted device that holds the limit switch in position below the crane boom sheave. The counter weight can is holed to allow through passage of the fast line cable.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Crane limit switch failure due to corrosion on the limit switch wiring.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The counter weight can was pulled into the boom sheave by either a burr on the fast line cable or excessive tar build up on the can.

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

90 bbl well test tank Fast line ball and crane hook Fast line cable NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Failed limit switch Fast line cable parted 90 bbl well test tank Fast line ball and crane hook dropped overboard.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

Remington Oil & Gas recommendations are to: Install a safety collar on the fast line to prevent cable wedging into the boom sheave; and install a safety switch on the fast line drum to monitor the number of wraps collecting on the drum. The Lafayette District concurs with the recommendations made by Remington and makes no further recommendations to Remington, Rowan, or the Office of Safety Management.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

19-JUN-2006

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION Johnny Serrette / Ron Ashford / PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Elliott Smith

APPROVED DATE: 03-AUG-2006

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