

R&D and Long-Term Competitiveness: Manufacturing's Central Role in a Knowledge-Based Economy

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Abstract

The "Internet Revolution" has induced an unbalanced perspective on future economic growth strategies. Because information technology (IT) largely constitutes an infrastructure upon which other economic activity is based, its economic role is to facilitate the productivity of investment in a wide range of products and services that meet final demand. Other economies around the world can and are investing in the same infrastructure, so the efficiency advantages now being realized by the U.S. economy will be fleeting unless U.S. R&D efforts produce a new and broad range of innovative products and services. Today's Federal research and development (R&D) is heavily concentrated in biomedical research, and thereby is not providing a sufficiently broad technology base for achieving the range of new products and services needed to sustain high long-term rates of economic growth.

A deep and diverse technology-based manufacturing sector must be a core objective of a revised R&D strategy. U.S. manufacturing contributes \$1.5 trillion to GDP, employs 20 million workers, accounts for more than 70 percent of industrial R&D, and constitutes the main source of technology for the much larger service sector. While knowledge-based services are the largest source of economic growth for the U.S. economy, their long-term performance is highly dependent on synergies with a domestic manufacturing sector. These synergies will be even more important in the future because services are increasingly exposed to foreign competition.

Knowledge-based services can be supplied from anywhere in the world—as long as these foreign sources can rapidly access and assimilate the necessary technology components. This caveat is the critical point for growth policy. Hardware and software components are most efficiently supplied to services by a manufacturing sector that is geographically close and institutionally integrated with the service applications. Virtually all U.S. productivity growth in recent years appears to have resulted from the development and use of these high-tech components.

Unfortunately, only about a third of U.S. manufacturing is high-tech by conventional definitions. Some of the remaining industries develop technology internally, but most purchase their technology from the high-tech sector. Because a technology acquisition strategy can be more easily imitated by foreign competitors, traditional industries are much more susceptible to exchange rate variations, global economic cycles, and secular shifts in foreign competition.

Policy debates have raged for decades over the nature and magnitude of underinvestment in manufacturing R&D. The need to resolve the relevant policy issues has increased, as industry is funding less of the long-term, high-risk research that creates the technology platforms supporting new industries and future economic growth. With the exception of biomedical research, the policy response has been no increase in real-dollar Federal funding of non-defense R&D over the past eight years.

This report presents a conceptual framework and available data to demonstrate that policy must enable a larger and more diversified R&D investment strategy. Such a strategy must target the full range of public and private technology assets constituting a national innovation system, which has characteristics making imitation by foreign competitors difficult. Only through such a strategy can sustained competitive advantage be achieved.

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Executive Summary

Broad enthusiasm for information technology (IT) in general and the Internet in particular has overshadowed the critical role that a technologically advanced manufacturing sector plays in stimulating technological change and thereby generating economic growth. While IT is essential for a modern economy, manufactured products and their underlying technologies drive IT. Moreover, most IT is infrastructural in nature, which means that it facilitates other economic activity. Ultimately, a technology-based economy still needs steady and broad flows of new products and services to remain internationally competitive.

Manufacturing is the technological center of the U.S. economy and, if properly supported, will continue to drive long-term economic growth:

- The 17 percent of GDP contributed by manufacturing amounts to approximately \$1.5 trillion in profits and in wages and salaries for 20 million workers.
- Industry conducts 75 percent of all U.S. R&D and the manufacturing sector accounts for more than 70 percent of this performance. Thus, manufacturing supplies much of the economy's technology, including information technology.
- The service sector more efficiently assimilates and uses technology from sources in close geographical proximity—namely, from domestic manufacturing firms.
- Similarly, co-development of technologies by manufacturing and service firms, especially through partnering (virtual integration), is aided by proximity and access to the same technical infrastructure.

Overall economic growth requires a diverse and competitive manufacturing sector. In this regard, technology-related policies need to be continually examined and adjusted to provide an environment in which private-sector incentives to invest in technology are strong. Technology-related policies include intellectual property protection, several categories of regulation, fiscal and tax incentives, workforce development, trade facilitation, and R&D funding.

This report focuses on the critical and often controversial issue of Federal R&D funding. Unfortunately, current R&D policies are not based on accurate models of industrial innovation. What limited policy assessments are attempted do not have access to adequate data so that, even with appropriate models, useful analysis is limited.

Barriers to Attaining Long-Term Competitive Advantage. A major reason for inadequate R&D policies is the complexity of modern manufacturing technology. Most important technologies today are essentially systems of components that must work together in a highly efficient manner. The components themselves are often based on scientific knowledge from several disciplines. Industry has found the development of

such technological systems increasingly challenging, especially in the face of significantly greater global R&D capability. As a result, several barriers to attaining long-term competitive advantage have emerged, including

- (1) An increased segmentation of R&D is occurring across industries making up the various supply chains of the manufacturing sector, with the result that private sector R&D is less coordinated and fails to capture economies of scale and scope.
- (2) Private sector investment is pushed forward in the R&D life cycle, with the result that traditional funding gaps found in the early phases of R&D are magnified.
- (3) Private sector underinvestment in a range of critical technical infrastructure has increased.

Two major policy implications result. First, the *amount* of U.S. R&D is too low in most industries and is too concentrated geographically to spawn enough economic clusters to achieve high long-term national growth rates and thereby maintain corporate profit growth and consistently raise real incomes. Second, regardless of the amount of R&D, the reduction in Federal funding is driving a shift in the *composition* of most areas of R&D toward more applied, short-term investments and away from the longer-term, higher-risk research that fosters sustained growth.

Specifically, Federal funding is skewed toward biomedical research. The resulting shortfall in the amount and composition of investment in the technology infrastructure for future high-tech industries is accentuated by an educational system that provides too few scientists and engineers each year compared to the needs of a broad, technology-based economy. In sum, the national innovation system is not as broad and deep as it should be.

A number of trends explain why the amount and composition of manufacturing R&D are appropriate concerns:

- (1) The United States has experienced manufacturing trade deficits for almost two decades. These deficits have grown in recent years, with 1999's deficit reaching \$267 billion. Some of the recent expansion of the trade deficit can be explained by the fact that the U.S. business cycle has been out of phase with most other economies. However, the persistent nature of these deficits points to a long-term competitive problem at the sector level.
- (2) Although different definitions exist of what is loosely referred to as the high-tech sector of the economy, they all represent a small portion of GDP—only 7–10 percent. The manufacturing industries falling into this category constitute at most about one-third of total manufacturing sector output. The implication is that the rest of the manufacturing sector is highly vulnerable to foreign competition (as the trend in trade balances shows) and the broader economy (mainly services) is highly dependent on access to external (outside the industry) sources of technology.
- (3) Although manufacturing productivity has been greatly increased by information technology in general and communication networks in particular, such process enhancing infrastructure is spreading rapidly. The continued worldwide diffusion of the Internet over the next decade will significantly equalize global wages and prices. As this process becomes widespread, the development and utilization of

technology to create new products and services will become ever more important for competitive advantage among nations.

(4) Economists and financial analysts have focused on the inability to hold on to intellectual property as the main reason for underinvestment in R&D. However, the complexity of modern R&D and the industrial and market systems that it drives create additional barriers. In fact, as described in the main body of this report, seven different sources of underinvestment in R&D can be identified.

The Need for a Broader and Deeper R&D Establishment. Success in the global marketplace depends on cost, quality (superior performance), and timing (first to market). Technology drives all three factors and therefore the process that produces it (R&D) is a key strategy and policy instrument. Thus, a competitive manufacturing sector requires a broad and deep technological base, which currently does not exist for manufacturing as a whole, in spite of considerable contentment with the excellent economic performance of the 1995-2000 period.

Maintaining an adequate technology base requires investment in different amounts and types of R&D over a *technology's life cycle* by multiple levels in high-tech *supply chains*. This R&D is essential both to develop new technology and to assimilate it from sources external to individual companies.

The technology life cycle is critical because the increasing global competition in R&D is shortening windows of opportunity, while at the same time the complexity of new technologies demands long lead times for development. A key policy construct is the fact that private R&D investment and investment in technical infrastructure interact in an iterative manner over a life cycle, so government R&D policy must be reasonably dynamic to be effective.

Virtual supply chain integration is important because synergies made possible by an integrated domestic information infrastructure at all stages in the economic process (R&D, production, and marketing) theoretically allow the value added by a domestic supply chain to be greater than the sum of the individual levels. Unfortunately, achieving virtual integration is proving to be difficult because of technological complexity and the public good character of IT infrastructure. Vertical disintegration (specialization) also is distributing R&D across companies and industries, which is accentuating a trend toward more focused applied R&D by individual firms. The result is less long-term, high-risk technology research and major institutional barriers to attaining potential R&D synergies through research collaboration.

Unfortunately, the needed policy responses to these underinvestment phenomena are not being made. During the 1980s, Federal support for applied research was deemphasized in favor of basic research. A weak revival in the 1990s of a willingness to support generic/pre-competitive applied research hardly compares with the support of multiple technologies in past decades that served as the technological base for many of the industries driving U.S. economic growth today. Apart from biomedical research, few areas with minimum threshold levels of funding can be found.

Policy Implications. Underinvestment in the amount of R&D could be addressed to a significant degree with tax incentives. However, the R&D composition problem requires

a different policy response. Federal funding programs must remove underinvestment by industry in long-term, high-risk generic or fundamental technologies and thereby enable the much larger private-sector investments in applied R&D that lead to multiple commercial applications. These programs must be timed to coincide with the emergence of a new technology life cycle and directed to industries in the relevant supply chains that will ultimately conduct the applied R&D to achieve commercialization. Similarly, Federal programs must be designed and implemented to provide industry with a range of infratechnologies that provide the basis for the technical infrastructure (standards, for example) needed to execute R&D, production, and market penetration strategies.

The examples of Federal R&D funding given in this report show that the critical issues are the timing and the type of government funding for new technology research relative to the industry's changing capacity or willingness to undertake the required research. In such a policy model, risk reduction in the early phases of R&D coupled with the availability of efficiency-increasing infratechnologies will enable industry to apply conventional R&D decision-making processes to a broader set of technology options. Industry takes over an increasingly larger portion of total research funding as the technology's life cycle evolves.

To correct the currently skewed pattern of Federal research funding, R&D policy must apply a portfolio management approach based on a rigorous analysis of the range of technologies likely to drive future economic growth and the multiple types of underinvestment that exist in today's technology-based markets. The objective should be significantly more diversified major commitments to long-term research and greater sensitivity to the complexity of technology-based economic growth—in particular, the interactions between private and public elements of emerging technologies. To do this requires new foci for policy analysis, especially a greater awareness of the importance of the technology life cycle, the integration of high-tech supply chains, and the ways by which industries, if not entire supply chains, cluster geographically.

Funding the development and transfer of appropriate portions of technology infrastructure in a timely fashion will both stimulate and leverage much larger flows of private sector R&D investment. Therefore, the Federal role in R&D investment is to fund the gaps, that is, to supply the public good elements of the typical industrial technology. These gaps vary across technologies and over time, so their identification, characterization, and matching with appropriate policy responses require constant collaborative planning with industry.

The industrial revolution was successful to a relatively greater extent in the United States because of substantial investment in economic infrastructure (roads, bridges, canals, railroads, telephone networks). This infrastructure allowed regional specialization based on natural or acquired comparative advantage because companies could efficiently access national markets and thereby capture economies of scale. Today, investment in technical infrastructure and the broad competition it spawns is having the same effect on global markets. Domestic industries are specializing at particular levels in a supply chain, while clustering geographically to take advantage of supporting infrastructure. The resulting value added occurs in that nation's economy at the expense of similar industries elsewhere. Thus, intense competition is underway among the world's economy's to be

the source of value added at each level of every supply chain, including the high-tech portions.

Clearly, superior long-term rates of economic growth depend on emphasizing the high value added, technology-based portions of supply chains. Achieving this objective will require significantly larger amounts of R&D investment than are currently being made. Moreover, a shift in the composition of publicly funded R&D is necessary to provide the technology base for the range of emerging technologies needed by a large, diversified economy.

In expanding and diversifying R&D investment, economic growth policy, of which R&D policy is a subset, must be based on a strategy skewed toward those assets that are relatively immobile internationally. Skilled labor is one asset that clearly does not migrate easily. Less obvious are a range of technology infrastructure assets—in particular, generic technologies and infratechnologies. These assets and the institutions that provide them constitute a national innovation system, which is difficult to imitate if continually nurtured and refurbished. Technology assets spillover to a degree but are nevertheless embodied in people and institutional structures, both public and private. The more closely integrated such innovation systems are, the more productively these assets are utilized.

The technology infrastructure produced by a domestic system of universities, research collaborations, and government laboratories tends to be more rapidly and effectively utilized by localized clusters of public and private institutions, which respond to technology life cycles and leverage the high value added potential of industrial supply chains. These multiple sources of technology-based economic growth and the associated underinvestment phenomena are complex and therefore the appropriate policy analysis will be complex as well. To oversimplify the relevant issues and solutions will ensure poor R&D policy.

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Introduction


The term "competitiveness" simply represents the internationalization of domestic economic growth objectives, which have always existed. However, the globalization of markets makes this concept increasingly important. A number of economic and institutional factors influence competitive advantage and hence long-term growth prospects, and the collective effect of these factors is to determine the locations in the global marketplace where investment funds flow and therefore where value added occurs. The value added resulting from various investments within an economy consists largely of wages/salaries and profits—the two primary sources of income and hence the standard of living.

The attention given by financial markets, policy makers, and the public to investment in information-based services and the underlying infrastructure, particularly the Internet, has accentuated a trend over the past two decades to relegate manufacturing to a secondary role in economic growth strategies. After all, private services account for 64 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and government services another 13 percent.

However, manufacturing is critical to an advanced economy's long-term growth and will continue to be so into the foreseeable future. The U.S. manufacturing sector now accounts for only 17 percent of GDP, but this percentage still translates into a \$1.5 trillion contribution to GDP and 20 million jobs.

Especially important is the fact that the service sector acquires most of its technology from manufacturing firms, as indicated in Figure 1 by the much higher share of R&D performed by the manufacturing sector. While one could assert that the acquisition of the ever increasing amounts of technology needed by services could just as easily be accomplished through imports, the substantial dependency of services on manufacturing firms for technology makes the myriad communications and market transactions between the two sectors extremely important.

Recent studies show that the efficiency of such interactions still declines with geographical distance, in spite of the globalization of markets.¹ Moreover, the argument that services are a better long-term economic growth strategy because they are immune to import competition is also suspect. Services are increasingly provided by foreign sources, most recently including developing nations. For example, according to Mexico's



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Science Foundation

National Institute for Economic Geographic and Statistics. about 50,000 Mexican workers are employed in technologybased service exports to the United States. These exports range from data processing to assembling surgical packets for appendectomies and are projected to increase rapidly in the future.² Programming jobs are increasingly exported and even customer service jobs are now being moved to other countries.³

Perhaps most important, the so-called New Economy is largely an infrastructuredriven economic transformation. The underlying infrastructure technologies facilitate entirely new economic growth trajectories based on new product, process, and service technologies. However, these three categories of innovation do not automatically happen just because new infrastructure appears. The Internet is greatly increasing the efficiency of intra-company operations, alliances, and marketplace transactions, but the virtual marketplace does not guarantee a flow of new domestically produced products and services.

Economic growth policy therefore needs to be equally concerned with investment in new products and production processes, which can benefit from the IT revolution. After

¹ For example, a recent National Bureau of Economic Research study found that "technological knowledge is to a substantial degree local, not global, as the benefits from foreign [R&D] spillover are declining with distance". See Keller [2000].

² "First Came Assembly: Now, Services Roar," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2000, p. 1.

³ For example, Amazon.Com Inc. recently outsourced customer-service jobs to India.

the initial assimilation of IT to increase operation and transaction efficiency, economic gains will be realized more slowly and they will be distributed on a global basis. Economic growth policy must therefore reemphasize technological innovation in hardware and software as major building blocks of future economic growth.

This report presents a conceptual framework for identifying policy issues affecting economic growth in a technology-based economy with a focus on the manufacturing sector. This framework is then supported by an analysis of trends in R&D—the single most important category of investment for an industrialized nation.

A Different View of the New Economy

Analyses of technology's long-term economic impacts indicate a strong cyclical pattern in which waves of innovation occur. These technology waves have appeared a number of times in the past century. Typically, as the economic boom that follows a burst of innovation proceeds, complacency progressively sets in. The resulting technological obsolescence eventually causes a series of economic crises until a new set of technology trajectories appears. The current IT transformation is a perfect example. Several decades of slow productivity advances with sluggish growth in output resulted in inflation and declining real incomes. Huge investments in IT and other technologies (particularly biotechnology) appear to be the long-term answer to this economic crisis.

However, as with past technology waves, the global distribution of the economic rewards is uncertain. Given that all industrialized nations have relatively small high-tech sectors (including the United States), each of these nations is vulnerable to economic decline during the reshuffling that occurs as the new technologies emerge.⁴ A major reason is the turbulence that accompanies the initial impacts of the technology. In particular, overestimates of the technology's short-term benefits, the requirements for assimilation, and the new sources of continued innovation all combine to reshuffle competitive positions and put a domestic economy's growth trajectory at risk.

To sustain and broaden the initial gains in innovation and productivity, four policy questions need to be answered about the future potential of what has been labeled the "New Economy":

- (1) Is the U.S. economy truly high-tech?
- (2) Is information technology the only important growth trajectory?
- (3) Are current R&D investment patterns adequate for sustained growth?
- (4) What are the sources of R&D investment?

The trends leading to these questions imply broad and sweeping economic change. However, the effects of IT are primarily in the areas of market transaction efficiencies and corporate processes and operations. The major impacts are creation of a few new

⁴ Many different definitions exist for the "high-tech" sector of an economy, which is unfortunate for policy analysis purposes. The definition of "the high-tech sector" used here includes both manufacturing and service industries grouped into four major categories: high-tech manufacturing (IT-related plus industrial electronics), communication services, software and computer-related services, and pharmaceuticals. See Tassey [1999b, p. 5] for more detail.

industries, restructuring of many established industries, and shifts in types of jobs and work location.

Such structural impacts are obviously critically important. These same categories of impacts resulted from the Industrial Revolution in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when major investments in new infrastructure integrated largely isolated regional markets into national ones. New communications technologies greatly increased the flow and timing of information and standardization facilitated the emergence of factories. For the first time, geographically dispersed factories produced components, which were integrated into more complex products at yet another location.

This restructuring of the economic system caused major changes in job content and location. The period was characterized by a distinct lack of pricing power in the key technology-driven markets, which spawned a survival-of-the-fittest corporate environment.⁵ The same process is underway today, as technological competence is spreading globally. The significant difference is that the price wars of today's global markets are the result of new national economies whose acquisition and development of technology is eroding market shares of established industrial economies, including the United States. The persistent trade deficit is the proof alone.

Like the Industrial Revolution, the advent of new product technologies in today's economy is proceeding largely on a separate track from the evolution of the underlying infrastructure. Independent advances in science give rise to new technologies, but do so decades later. The message for policy makers today is that the current economic transformation, like the one a century earlier, is largely infrastructure-based. This new infrastructure is pervasive and profound in its potential impact, but it does not guarantee a flow of new innovative products and services—at least in a particular economy.

Realizing benefits from any growth strategy is neither easy nor quick. The frequently used term "productivity paradox" referred to the fact that investments by U.S. industry in information technology in the 1980s and early 1990s initially had minimal impact on domestic productivity growth. Three reasons for this pattern have become evident:

- (1) IT investments, while growing rapidly in the 1990s, started from such a small level that only in the last five years has the installed base reached a size sufficient to measurably affect national productivity growth.⁶
- (2) A transition from an R&D strategy focusing on the development and use of stand alone computers to an increasing emphasis on R&D at the systems level, particularly based on linking computers through communication networks, has greatly increased the productivity impacts of IT.⁷
- (3) Radical technological changes are not easily absorbed and utilized. Major changes in the organization of work, industry structure, and supporting infrastructure had to occur. These changes took place slowly and, by the late 1990s, both

⁵ In fact, both transformations were similar at the broad macroeconomic level, being characterized by productivity gains, strong economy, low-inflation environment, and stable interest rates.

⁶ Oliner and Sichel [2000].

⁷ McAfee [2000, p. 11].

productivity and output growth began to accelerate to levels not seen for several decades.

However, the composition of GDP growth still does not reflect the desired broadbased gains in economic welfare—the ultimate objective of economic growth policy. The two major components of GDP are profits (payments to owners of capital) and wages and salaries (payments to owners of labor). Profit growth increased substantially in the 1990s, but real compensation has grown more slowly. Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show that over the past decade (1989–1999) real compensation per worker in the United States grew at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent. The European Union countries averaged 1.1 percent during this period. In the last three years for which data are available (1996–1998), the growth rate of U.S real compensation per worker has accelerated, averaging 2.4 percent. A major portion of this uptick has been due to very tight labor markets, so it remains to be seen if the higher growth rates of the last few years can be maintained.

More generally, while much of the economic growth in the past decade has been due to efficiency gains from investments in IT infrastructure, a significant portion has resulted from an increase in private debt to record levels (150 percent of GDP). The expected stimulation of inflation from this accumulation of debt was delayed in part by cyclical effects, one-time productivity increases and a strong dollar, the latter being due in part to the stock market bubble and the dollar's role as a reserve currency. These conditions are unstable and cannot be expected to maintain their current levels of impact. The policy message is that economic growth strategies need to be reexamined.

This report argues that higher growth rates cannot be sustained by just riding the information highway. The evolving IT infrastructure has the capacity to leverage a diverse range of final consumption services, as well as many types of manufactured goods. However, industrial products (hardware and software) are essential components of IT-based infrastructure and ITbased services in general. The implied synergies are real. Therefore, technologically advanced economies are limiting their long-term growth potential if policies allow investment to be channeled into just a few sectors. Diversification not only has the advantage of stabilizing long-term growth, but its synergistic effect raises the rates of growth of all sectors.

A better label for the current economic transformation is the Knowledge Economy. This term encompasses the trends in both IT infrastructure *and* emerging product and service technologies, which leads policy analysis to the needed broader view of technology-based growth. Clearly, companies in all sectors reflect the transformation to knowledge-based economic activity.⁸ However, the policy question—application of knowledge to what categories of economic activity—has yet to be answered.

⁸ Blair and Kochan [2000, pp. 1–2] point out that in 1978 the book value of physical assets (property, plant, and equipment) owned by publicly traded non-financial corporations was 83 percent of a company's capitalization (the value of outstanding bonds and common stock). In 1998, 69 percent of the average company's value was in the form of intangible (knowledge) assets (so-called "goodwill"), as opposed to 17 percent 20 years earlier.

The Changing Environment for High-Tech Manufacturing

Many analysts of future economic growth trends argue that the U.S. economy can and will become almost totally reliant on services (implying an equal reliance on imports for manufactured goods). However, the synergies between manufacturing and services are

What is a Manufacturing Firm?

What constitutes a manufacturing firm is becoming increasingly blurred. Cisco Systems is the largest "manufacturing" firm in terms of market capitalization, but it does little manufacturing internally and the majority of its products arrive at the customer without ever having been seen or touched by a Cisco employee (Ansley [2000]). Yet, this company has great influence over the R&D network in the supply chain of which it is a part. Other large high-tech manufacturing firms are no longer classified as such in government databases because a majority of their revenues comes from services. IBM is a prominent example.

For the purposes of this report, manufacturing is viewed broadly to include hardware and software systems. The main rationale is to distinguish R&D policies for hardware and software and the systems they comprise from services, especially information infrastructure services like the Internet. Within today's technologies, hardware and software are increasingly integrated at both the component and system levels. The resulting systems are then used to provide various services. The new North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) partially recognizes this reality by distinguishing to a degree between software products and software services. significant and defeat this argument. Much of the output of manufacturing industries is consumed as stand alone products, but increasingly such output is integrated into systems of products that provide services as the final form of consumption (communications, operations management, financial management, wholesale and retail trade, etc.). The integration of hardware and software into service systems requires synergies among multiple levels in the relevant chain of supplier industries. Such supply chain occurs integration still more efficiently within а single economy because of efficiencies from access to common labor pools, technical infrastructures, and markets.⁹ However, a number of policy concerns emanate from the complexity of this economic structure.

The IT–Manufacturing Interface. One major concern is the almost singular focus on the Internet as a future growth strategy. While massive in its potential impact, the Internet does not appear to be more important than previous revolutionary technologies that have also led to widespread changes in patterns of living and working. For example, the mass-produced and hence affordable automobile led to the suburbs, shopping malls, etc. The telephone greatly affected business behavior and location and, combined with the radio, had an enormous effect on information production and distribution (exactly what is being

⁹ The term "supply chain" refers to the vertically integrated set of industries that adds value beginning with raw materials and eventually produces a final product or service. Each level (industry) in a supply chain adds value until final demand is met and the sum of the value added by each level is the supply chain's contribution to GDP. An example of a first level in a supply chain would be silicon and other semiconductor materials. These materials are used to manufacture semiconductor devices, which are combined to form electronic components and equipment such as computers. The latter are further combined to form "systems," such as an automated factory that manufactures a product (computer) or a telecommunications network that provides a service.

attributed to the Internet). While extremely important, none of these technologies were close to sufficient to drive economic growth by themselves. Moreover, each of the technologies cited above, including the Internet, constitute infrastructure. Their economic role is to facilitate private sector investments in a wide range of other technologies, which collectively make sustained economic growth possible.

Moreover, the focus on the Internet ignores the immense impact of IT on manufacturing and hence the potential of advanced manufacturing to make major sustained contributions to economic growth. In particular, significant increases in manufacturing productivity are being driven by IT-based integration of internal corporate activity and business interactions among companies in a supply chain. IT also enables substantial increases in the productivity of manufacturing processes. These processes are capital intensive, which means that considerable physical capital is invested per worker. In fact, to these ends manufacturing appears to be spending more intensively on IT than high-tech services.¹⁰

Such capital-intensive industry structures characterized by massive investment in ITbased technologies offer the potential for substantial increases in labor productivity. Moreover, higher capital-to-labor ratios are resulting in a declining portion of total costs for labor in most areas of advanced manufacturing.¹¹ Providing labor has the requisite skills to perform the demanding operations in complex manufacturing environments, the resulting high levels of labor productivity result in relatively high pay.¹²

Technology infrastructures that facilitate (1) the financing of investments in advanced manufacturing technologies, (2) their integration into production systems, and (3) the provision of skilled labor to effectively use both the equipment and associated software are difficult to construct and maintain. Economies with efficient R&D networks, venture capital markets, integrated supply chains (virtual or actual), and education and training facilities have competitive advantages that are not easily established or imitated.

The Technology Life Cycle. A second policy concern should be the impacts of timing on R&D decision making. As the market for a product technology expands and it is integrated into larger systems technologies, its design becomes progressively more stable. Successive improvements in both design and process technologies increase total market

¹⁰ For example, the International Data Corporation predicts that the manufacturing sector's spending on web development infrastructure will reach \$24 billion by 2002, while spending by comparably sized financial services will be \$17 billion. See Clampet [1999].

¹¹ For example, the amount of equipment required per worker in a liquid crystal display plant is about \$1 million. In a software company, the equipment required can be as little as \$10,000 per worker. Fingleton [1999]. Such increases in the capital-labor ratio are labor saving, which is particularly attractive in tight labor markets.


¹² Manufacturing sector salaries and wages are currently higher than those in the service sector. However, as discussed later in this report, capital deepening raises measured labor productivity but this "increase" is not due to an intrinsic improvement in labor skills. Corporate managers recognize this and do not raise wages and salaries proportionately. Long-term growth in payments to labor depends on increases in skill levels and the consequent contribution to multifactor productivity.

value and a subset of firms that have participated in this market come to dominate. Eventually, opportunities to apply the underlying or generic technology decline, design volatility decreases and the product's structure takes on a commodity character (the personal computer is an example). Competition shifts to efficiency in production processes and hence to price and service as increasingly important determinants of market performance.

Over such a life cycle, this evolutionary pattern of technology-based competition increasingly favors less advanced and low-cost economies. They can acquire the maturing product technology and combine it with cheap labor and incremental improvements in process technology. Even within industries viewed as high-tech, this pattern occurs. Certain classes of semiconductors, computers, and many types of software are excellent examples of maturing phases of life cycle patterns and the resulting competitive convergence.

Sustained economic growth not only requires constant attention to competitive factors over a life cycle, it demands advance planning for access to the next generation technology. This transition between two generic technology life cycles presents a different set of competitive threats.¹³ The greater the differences between two generations of a technology, the greater the risk to individual companies and even entire industries.

Most traumatic is the situation in which a radically new technology appears that performs the marketplace function of the existing or defender technology more efficiently. Such transitions typically demand multidisciplinary research skills for the



new technology life cycle, which existing firms do not fully possess. Hence, they assign higher technical and market risk values to the prospective research program, with the result that necessary research programs are postponed.

A company evaluating the risk of investing in a new technology faces a projected performance curve, such as curve 2 in Figure 2, that initially will be below the performance of the defender technology represented by curve 1. The risk of lower technical performance, possibly for some

¹³ A generic or fundamental technology is the basis for specific applications targeted at particular markets. A generic technology could be represented by a conceptual model or a laboratory prototype. Considerable applied R&D is required to create market applications from the generic technology, but without subsequent advances in the generic technology, innovations will be accidental and limited. See Tassey [1997, Chap. 7].

time, adds to the risk associated with the dynamics of the marketplace. And, these dynamics further compound the innovator's risk because the defender technology seldom gives up without a fight. For example, in the face of a challenge from flat-panel displays, manufacturers of cathode-ray tubes continue to reduce costs and improve picture quality, thereby constantly raising the hurdle for the invading technology (curve 1 shifts upward).

Two key policy issues based on this technology life cycle concept follow. First, w*ithin* a life cycle, the amount and speed of technological advance achieved by a domestic industry over a technology's economic life is critical, because such gains in performance determine the realized economic return. Innovating industries with high R&D-sales ratios will usually do well, especially over the first part of the life cycle. However, slow migration of R&D capabilities over latter portions of the cycle (which can cover extended periods of time) often allow foreign competitors to take significant market share and thereby establish the ability to be innovators in the next generation of the technology.¹⁴

Second, transitioning *across* technology life cycles is an even more difficult issue for the policy process to address. A number of high-tech companies (for example, Intel) manage transitions among successive product life cycles quite effectively. However, the transition between two generic technology life cycles, especially to a radically new generic technology, is seldom achieved by the majority, if any, of firms applying the defender technology. Most of these companies lose out to new industries—either domestic or foreign.¹⁵

As technology life cycles compress, R&D at the company level no longer can exist in isolation of a supporting network. Corporations increasingly require access to R&D conducted by other firms in their supply chains and to the broader technology infrastructure provided by a national innovation system. If domestic R&D resources are not available, U.S. companies do not hesitate to form research partnerships with foreign companies, outsource R&D overseas, or directly invest in foreign research facilities. These research relationships often lead to follow-on foreign manufacturing relationships. Thus, the value added by the domestic R&D network has important implications for the breadth and depth of national competitiveness and hence the potential for domestic economic growth.


Major R&D policy issues therefore include the role of government in facilitating efficiency within life cycles and the critical transitions between cycles. Government can rationalize funding years, even decades, of basic research. At some point, enough knowledge is accumulated to allow judgements of risk associated with potential market applications of a new technology based on the underlying science. In an oversimplified

¹⁴ The video cassette recorder (VCR) is one of the best known examples, but there are many others. A major type of semiconductor manufacturing equipment called a stepper was invented in the United States, but market share is now almost totally Japanese. Oxide ceramics, which every modern commercial wireless communication and detection system incorporates, was discovered in the United States, but Japanese industry today clearly dominates commercial markets. See Tassey [1999b, pp. 29–31] for additional examples.

¹⁵ The transitions from vacuum tubes to semiconductors and from cathode-ray tubes to solid-state (flatpanel) displays are two examples.

model, applied technology research should be more or less automatically initiated and a new technology life cycle started.

In reality, however, a major problem for R&D policy arises at this transition from basic research to technology research. Here, for the first time, market risk assessments must be added to estimates of technical risk. Combining technical and market risk complicates corporate R&D policy decisions way beyond what is involved in allocating government funds for basic research.



This situation is depicted in Figure 3, which indicates that technology research, with its ultimate objective of applications, market encounters an initial major increase in technical risk, RR'. Such a jump occurs because the scientific principles presented must now be proven capable of conversion into specific technological forms with specific performance attributes that meet specific market needs. This additional risk (RR') occurring in the

early phases of technology research can and does act as a substantial barrier to private investment in R&D.

Understanding the evolution of and the interaction between technical and market risk and the consequent impacts on private-sector investment must be a key element of R&D policy analysis. However, current R&D policy does not fully recognize this large discontinuity in the total risk reduction process. If it did not occur, the gradual slope of the curve in Figure 3 would support proponents of no government support for R&D beyond basic science. However, the substantial jump in total risk caused by the divergence between market-derived technical requirements on the one hand and research requirements, time discounting, and corporate strategy mismatches on the other can and does lead to substantial underinvestment.

Moreover, consideration of the discontinuity aside, the slope of the risk reduction curve varies depending on a number of R&D efficiency factors. An important one is the availability to domestic firms of a range of infratechnologies, which provide research tools, scientific and engineering data, and the basis for numerous standards that collectively constitute the technical infrastructure of a high-tech industry. Such technical infrastructure has a strong public good character resulting in under investment by industry. 16

In summary, technology life cycles have a number of distinct characteristics that have implications for R&D policy:

- Major scientific breakthroughs, followed by clusters of key technological innovations, set off major long-term economic expansions.
- The time between invention, innovation (first commercial use), and major economic impact (widespread market penetration) can be long, spanning several decades. However, the market transition to a new technology life cycle requires preparation and can take place in other parts of the domestic or world economy before firms using the old technology realize that change has occurred.
- Such cycle transitions are difficult because firms need complementary economic assets (skilled labor, capital, and technical infrastructure) to successfully develop and market new technologies. These assets may not be available and vary significantly from one life cycle to the next, which makes their assimilation difficult.

Supply Chain Integration. A third major concern should be the changing structure of U.S. manufacturing industries and the implications for both R&D and technology utilization. Faced with rapid technological change, growing global competition, and accelerating quality improvement expectations, corporations have found managing diverse product and service lines of business increasingly difficult and subject to sub-par performance. Moreover, with external communications and data transfer costs decreasing, much of the rationale for vertical integration has eroded.¹⁷ To concentrate on core competencies, companies are spinning off lines of business. Many of these businesses become separate domestic entities or move to foreign locations.

Each level in a supply chain is therefore now in play in that the combination of more focused corporate strategies and greater foreign competition increases the volatility of shifts in global market shares. Loss of market share in some industries is inevitable and, in fact, not a concern—if these losses occur in lower value added industries. However, if hollowing out of supply chains occurs in higher valued added industries, the constraints on economic growth are more serious.

One response to the potential for excessive hollowing out is the huge investment in IT-based infrastructure, which seeks to optimize performance for an entire supply chain based on a management system that coordinates the initiation and revision of plans and schedules across institutionally separate supply chain functions. The presumption is that supply chains can be made significantly more efficient through domestic market integration, thereby retaining the higher value added industries within the domestic economy.

¹⁶ Tassey [1997, Chap. 8].

¹⁷ Besanko, Dranove, and Shanely [1996].

However, such integration has turned out to be very difficult to accomplish. Focusing on a core competence and the implied increased dependency on a larger number of external suppliers and customers is not only requiring new forms of organization for the modern corporation but also supporting infrastructures that leverage modern information/production technologies. The technical infrastructure required to efficiently achieve supply chain integration is as complex as the economic activity it seeks to support.

Companies have tended to try proprietary solutions to integration first, often as extensions of market strategies but just as frequently because an adequate infrastructure for industry-wide integration is not available. The automotive supply chain is a good example. Multiple proprietary systems exist for the transfer of both product design and operations data among firms in the several levels of this supply chain. In spite of industry efforts to standardize on a single infrastructure, little progress has been made. A study of the movement of product design data among levels in the automotive supply chain estimated the costs from inadequate interoperability to be at least \$1 billion per year.¹⁸ Because other manufacturing supply chains (such as aerospace) have similar massive product data transfer requirements, the cost to the entire manufacturing sector from the lack of interoperability standards clearly is much larger. Similar problems exist for the transfer of data relating to overall business transactions between companies. One industry group estimated that \$82.5 billion was spent on integration tasks of all types in 1998, so the leverage from increased efficiency would seem to be great.¹⁹

Supply chains differ across sectors, with the impact of integration depending on the competitive structures of the markets involved and the types of relationships among companies, including the availability of key infrastructures. Many of the crosscutting infratechnologies that become the basis for standardized elements of the supply chain infrastructure have a public good character and will therefore receive inadequate private investment. Examples of critical infrastructure include

- standards for reliable and secure communication of sensitive information across companies;
- standardization of interfaces (middleware) among proprietary information systems;
- standardization of data formats to enable transmission and interpretation among firms;
- efficient methods for updating standards to accommodate the introduction of new technologies.

In summary, the importance of supply chain integration derives from the trend towards corporate strategies based on core competencies and hence an increased need for greater infrastructure support for efficient marketplace exchanges and effective integration of overall business activity. The public

¹⁸ Brunnermeier and Martin [1999].

¹⁹ Enterprise Integration Council [2000].

good character of the R&D that produces the infratechnologies serving as the bases for a wide range of interface standards results in substantial underinvestment by industry.

A second major issue with respect to supply chain integration is the effect of vertical disintegration on hardware and software R&D investment. The trend in corporate specialization is causing a segmentation of private sector R&D. Large, previously integrated companies now expect firms at upstream levels in their supply chain to conduct more R&D.²⁰ Vertical disintegration is occurring at individual levels in supply chains, as well. Companies are increasingly specializing in one of the major categories of manufacturing activity: product design, component manufacturing, or system integration (assembly).²¹ The consequences are shorter time horizons and reduced capturing of economies of scale and scope.

In response, users and suppliers license technology from each other and participate in joint R&D ventures, partnerships, and research consortia. Manufacturing firms are also increasingly subcontracting R&D to universities and other firms. Access to external sources of R&D reduces cycle times and improves the overall productivity of company R&D investment.

Many R&D collaborations involve manufacturing and service companies, as well as manufacturing firms from adjacent industries in a supply chain. The frequency of collaborative research is certainly higher within a single economy due to geographic proximity, cultural similarities, and the availability of a supportive government research infrastructure (national labs, funding, intellectual property rights, etc.) available to all participants. The Industrial Research Institute annual survey indicates that "R&D is becoming more externally collaborative".²²

Such synergies can be difficult to achieve, but participation in domestic R&D networks will be preferred if the supporting infrastructure is adequate.

The Increasing Complexity of Manufacturing R&D Policy. Trends in the timing and importance of R&D coupled with changes in industry structure and behavior are greatly increasing the complexity of R&D policy. However, policy has not dealt particularly well with these trends. The development, market transaction, and transfer/assimilation stages all can suffer breakdowns due to complexity of the technology and/or the market and infrastructure systems that attempt to deliver it. With respect to the first of these areas, R&D policy suffers from a number of problems, some of which have been identified in

²⁰ More generally, vertical integration has declined as a framework for corporate strategy for three reasons: (1) such a structure forges artificial customer relationships reducing price competition, (2) buying components from affiliated divisions of the same company precludes optimization by the customer of multi-component systems, and (3) in a global marketplace of intense competition, corporate managers are having increasing difficulty managing multiple technologies and associated markets.

²¹ For example, 90 percent of the firms responding to the Bear Stearns' 3rd Annual Electronics and Supply-Chain Survey (mid 2000) said they plan to increase the use of electronics manufacturing services over the next 12 months.

²² Industrial Research Institute [2000, pp. 11-13].

preceding sections. To overcome them, the R&D process must be modeled more accurately and better data collected.

Using biotechnology as an example, Table 1 lists multiple areas of science (column 1) that have had to advance before a larger set of generic product and process technologies could evolve. These generic technologies (columns 3 and 4) have evolved over the past 25 years and are just now beginning to yield significant numbers of proprietary market applications (column 5). As described earlier, generic technologies have characteristics of public goods. Industry therefore frequently underinvests in the early phases of a technology's life cycle where proof of concept and laboratory prototypes are essential outcomes with substantial pre-competitive characteristics. Industry will not commit the much larger amounts of funds required for proprietary applied research and development until this generic technology base is in place.

Table 1 also shows the other category of industrial technology with significant public good content—infratechnology (column 2). Infratechnologies are a varied set of technical tools that perform a wide range of characterization, measurement, integration, and other infrastructure functions.

Table 1 Interdependency of Public–Private Technology Assets: Biotechnology					
Science Base	Infratechnologies	Generic Tec Product	Process	Commercial Products	
 molecular and cellular biology microbiology/virology immunology neuroscience physiology genomics proteomics 	 biospectroscopy combinatorial chemistry DNA chemistry, sequencing, and profiling protein structure modeling/analysis techniques nucleic acid diagnostics gene expression analysis fluorescence bioinformatics mass spectrometry magnetic resonance spectrometry electrophoresis 	 biomaterials bioelectronics gene testing gene therapy gene delivery systems gene expression systems antisense apoptosis antiangiogenesis stem-cell functional genomics pharmacogenomics biosensors tissue engineering 	 recombinant DNA/genetic engineering fermentation nucleic acid amplification gene transfer transgenic animals cell culture separation technologies immunoassays monoclonal antibodies cell encapsulation implantable delivery systems DNA arrays/chips 	 protease inhibitors hormone restorations DNA probes neuroactive steroids neuro- transmitter inhibitors vaccines coagulation inhibitors inflammation inhibitors 	
Public	Public — Private	Private —	Public —	Private	

These functions include:

- measurement and test methods
- artifacts such as standard reference materials that allow these methods to be used efficiently
- scientific and engineering databases

- process models
- the technical basis for both physical and functional interfaces between components of systems technologies (such as factory automation and communications systems).

These technical tools are ubiquitous in the technology-based economic growth process. They affect the efficiency of R&D, production, and marketing. Because individual infratechnologies typically have a focused application and hence impact (e.g., measurement and test methods are applied to specific steps in a production process), their economic importance has been overlooked. However, the complexity of technology-based economic activity and the demands by users of technology for greater accuracy and higher quality have reached levels that require a large number of diverse research-intensive infratechnologies—even within single industries. The resulting aggregate economic impact of these infrastructure technologies is substantial.²³

The pervasive and substantial aggregate impact of measurement infratechnologies in high-tech industries is indicated by a study of the semiconductor industry's investment in measurement equipment. This industry invested about \$2.5 billion in measurement equipment in 1996, triple the amount spent in 1990. This expenditure is expected to continue growing at least 15 percent per year, reaching about \$5 billion in 2001.²⁴ Thus, the cost of not having the required infratechnologies and associated standards in place to support this investment is substantial.

The range and technical sophistication of infratechnologies support a varied and complex standards infrastructure. Infratechnologies are a necessary basis for standardization at all levels in the modern manufacturing process: individual equipment, the process systems level, and the customer/supplier interface. In service industries, infratechnologies help define output, interoperability, security protocols, and intellectual property.²⁵

Infratechnologies also include the various techniques, methods, and procedures that are necessary to implement the firm's product and process strategies. Methods such as total quality management can be differentiated upon implementation within a firm. However, they must be traceable to a set of generic underlying principles if customers are to accept claims of product quality. Hence, they have an infrastructure or public good character.

Competitive Trends in Manufacturing

The above trends imply that the correct focus for economic growth policy and hence R&D policy is increasingly the supply chain of related industries. Vertical disintegration (specialization) is distributing R&D across companies and linked industries. This R&D

²³ For summaries of microeconomic studies of infratechnologies and associated methodologies, see Link and Scott [1998] and Tassey [1997, 1999].


²⁴ Finan [1998]. The estimate does not include the labor and overhead required to implement this measurement infrastructure.

²⁵ Tassey [1997, Chap. 9].

network drives the value added in the domestic economy and hence should be the policy focus.

The emergence of R&D networks as part of a national innovation system is becoming increasingly evident within the U.S. manufacturing sector. This sector has significantly improved its performance over the past 15 years. Advances in productivity have been accomplished through massive investments in automation and information technology, reorganization of workflow, and restructuring of relationships with vendors and customers. This progress has led economists, policy analysts, and some industry managers to declare manufacturing to be healthy, prosperous, and therefore not in need of government assistance. Unfortunately, the transformation process is far from complete and a number of factors cast doubt on the extent to which long-term competitiveness can be achieved.

Many economic analyses have been undertaken over this period to explain the relationships between R&D investment, the resulting technology and subsequent innovation and productivity growth, and finally output or GDP growth. While virtually all analysts now agree that technology is the single most important driver of long-term




economic growth at the national level, much less agreement exists with respect to how technology affects competitive position and hence growth at the industry level In particular, major over time. strategic issues are in dispute such the optimal proportions of as technology developed within an industry and acquired from external sources. As discussed shortly, U.S manufacturing industries exhibit a dispersion wide of these proportions.

All manufacturing industries face increased global competition, but only a minority of industries can be said to be capable of competing long-term in global markets. Federal Reserve Board data provide one indicator of this difference in competitiveness. Figure 4 shows the distinctly different growth rates in high-tech and non-high-tech manufacturing.²⁶ The much higher growth rates of technology-based industries in turn pull investment in further growth. Figure 5 shows the same substantial difference in rates of capacity growth as Figure 4 does for output growth. However, these huge differentials in rates of growth in output and investment in recent years must be qualified by the fact that the manufacturing industries included in the Fed's definition of high-tech accounted for only 8.1 percent of industrial production in 1998.


²⁶ Federal Reserve Board (<u>http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/Revisions/19991130/g17.pdf</u>). The Federal Reserve definition of "high-tech" includes computers, communications equipment, and semiconductors.

In addition to higher growth rates in output and investment, R&D-intensive manufacturing industries have produced trade surpluses, while the rest of the



manufacturing sector has experienced negative trade balances. This significant difference in competitiveness is indicated in Figure 6. The Census Bureau's Advanced Technology **Products** trade balance has remained modestly positive over the past decade.²⁷ However, this surplus has been overwhelmed by the huge deficit in trade for all manufactured products. The trade surplus in advanced technology products was \$19 billion in 1999, while all manufactured goods had a deficit of \$270 billion.²⁸

Some of the reasons for this persistent trade deficit are well known by now. Other economies are increasingly able to absorb moderate amounts of technology, specialize in specific product categories, and, with lower labor costs, produce at lower overall cost and at least comparable quality. In recent decades, foreign industries have begun to develop their own technology. In particular, process technologies are increasingly improved by foreign competitors to the point of being equal or superior to those in U.S. industries.



Increased R&D in other nations includes investment in technical infrastructure to support private domestic investment. This evolution of national innovation systems has provided additional incentives to shift U.S. R&D to foreign locations. Whereas traditional direct foreign investment strategies in production and marketing shift lower value added economic portions of supply chains overseas, shifting R&D investment accentuates the trend toward more high value added economic activity abroad.

²⁷ Census' definition of "high-tech" includes about 500 of some 22,000 commodity classification codes used in reporting merchandise trade. Note that this definition is based on "product fields" classified as technology-based, as opposed to "industries" which is used in most other definitions.

²⁸ Data from the International Trade Administration, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights, Table 3. See <u>http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H99t03.txt</u>.

While low and moderate technology-based domestic industries lose market shares to foreign competitors, technologically advanced industries continue to maintain a trade surplus. Unfortunately, as Figure 6 indicates, this high-tech trade and the resulting surplus are way too small.

Productivity Growth and R&D Policy Analysis

Economic research has consistently shown that technological change accounts for the majority of long-term productivity growth. Most recently, Oliner and Sichel [2000] estimate that for the period 1995–99, the combination of innovation and capital deepening (acquisition of technology through capital investment) has accounted for two-thirds of productivity growth.

Given productivity's central role, sustained increases in economic welfare (the standard of living) will depend closely on its rate of growth. The U.S. manufacturing sector experienced a substantial decline in productivity relative to much of the rest of the world in the 1960s and '70s. The 1980s and '90s have witnessed a recovery but the pattern has been decidedly uneven, with technologically advanced industries substantially outperforming the rest of the sector. The fact that this skewing of performance in favor of relatively few U.S. manufacturing industries is typical of most industrialized nations does not lessen the imperative for restructuring economic growth policies to broaden and deepen technology investment.

Much of the acceleration in IT investment in the 15 years from 1980 to 1995 suffered from the productivity paradox. This term refers to the fact that the expected productivity gains from individual IT investments such as computers, software, and telecommunications equipment did not show up in national productivity statistics. These potential gains were thwarted by the substantial difficulties encountered in integrating individual components into efficient and hence productive systems.


System-level productivity has only recently begun to improve enough to drive aggregate productivity at a faster rate. After increasing 1.6 percent per year from 1990 to 1995, labor productivity (output per hour) increased at an annual rate of 2.6 percent from 1995 to 1999. This recent acceleration in labor productivity growth has elicited glowing commentary on the U.S. economy from many economists and policy analysts.

However, several cautions are in order. First, several studies have indicated that the sources of productivity growth are limited to the durable goods portion of manufacturing, in particular, IT equipment. The most skewed view comes from Robert Gordon [1999]. He concludes that, once changes in statistical adjustments for inflation and business cycle effects are accounted for, all productivity growth is derived from the 1.2 percent of the economy devoted to the production of computers. The implication is that the remainder of the nonfarm private business economy has had no significant structural acceleration in productivity growth, including the remainder of manufacturing.²⁹

²⁹ Gordon's analysis concludes that the non-computer portion of manufacturing has actually experienced slower productivity growth in the late 1990s compared to the generally acknowledged slow-growth period of 1972–1995.

A somewhat broader view is taken by a Federal Reserve Board study. This analysis estimates that the one percentage point increase in the productivity growth rate in the last half of the 1990s resulted about equally from increased investment in IT (computers, software, and communications equipment) and innovation in the actual design and production of computers (including components such as semiconductors).³⁰ Other studies have reached the even broader conclusion that, while the IT manufacturing sector's rapid productivity growth has been a significant contributor to the economy's overall growth rate, IT has added value primarily through capital deepening in the non-IT portion of manufacturing. That is, these studies concluded that IT products, rather than IT producers, are driving productivity increases.³¹ Of course, this market distribution of benefits from IT is dominating productivity trends in the service sector. The most important point is that in all these studies the IT portion of the manufacturing sector is the original source of the technology that ultimately drives productivity gains elsewhere.

Second, virtually the entire debate over the sources of productivity growth has been based on analyses of trends in labor productivity. However, labor constitutes just one input to economic activity. Consequently, the relationship of labor to overall productivity growth can be skewed for some time by the magnitude and nature of investments in other inputs, particularly capital and the amount and type of technology embodied in this capital (plus so-called disembodied technological change). Thus, a more comprehensive and accurate measure of productivity relates output to the two major inputs, capital and



labor.

Figure 7 shows the trend in the more comprehensive measure. multifactor productivity (MFP), along with trends in average labor productivity (ALP) and real compensation, for the past 50 years.³² Real hourly compensation has tracked the comprehensive and more hence accurate measure of productivity, MFP, over the past 25 years, rather than tracking ALP. This is because companies obviously have to pay for all

inputs, not just labor, and it is the relationship of output to the weighted average of these inputs that determines true productivity and therefore ultimately profits.

³⁰ Oliner and Sichel [2000].

³¹ McAfee [2000, pp. 4–5].

³² The main reason ALP is used so frequently is its availability. It is released on a quarterly basis a few months after the end of the quarter, whereas MFP is made available approximately 18 months after the fact.

Corporate managers tend to pay for each input in accordance with that input's true marginal productivity. In this regard, they understand that investment in IT has been largely responsible for measured increases in the productivity of labor, so payments to labor cannot be expected to increase more than labor's actual contribution to productivity growth. The faster growth rate of the profits component of GDP over most of the past decade compared to the salaries and wages component is the result of the true relationships of these inputs with productivity.

Implications of R&D Investment Trends for Policy Analysis

Because most technology results from formal R&D investment spending by the private sector, both the amount and composition of this R&D are important policy variables. Policy debates have raged for decades over the nature and magnitude of alleged underinvestment in R&D by industry, with no consensus emerging. The need to resolve the relevant policy issues has increased, as the national R&D enterprise is changing in significant ways. Four major changes are


- (1) The increasing emphasis by companies on short-term payoffs from investments of all types, including R&D.
- (2) The wider distribution of the sources of R&D across the typical industrial supply chain.
- (3) A relentless increase in the complexity of industrial R&D, particularly its greater multidisciplinary character and the growing importance of the technology integration phase of R&D.
- (4) A relative decline in Federal funding of civilian R&D, which raises the importance of *both* the amount and composition of industry R&D funding.

These changes argue for an expansion of R&D policy analysis to include an emphasis on corporate investment strategy within and across technology life cycles and in the context of various positions in supply chains. In particular, a distinction needs to be made between the factors affecting the amount of R&D investment and the composition of this investment.

Amount of R&D. The most frequently discussed technology policy issue is the *amount* of R&D conducted in the U.S. economy. A commonly used indicator of this policy variable is R&D intensity (R&D-to-sales ratio). This indicator is important because current sales are driven by past R&D and therefore current R&D spending is a predictor of future sales growth. By comparing current R&D to current sales, one gets a rough assessment of the adequacy of new investments in technology for a company's or industry's competitive position in the current and possibly the next technology life cycle.

Figure 8 indicates that most of U.S. manufacturing is not R&D-intensive. In fact, only a few industries have R&D intensity ratios that would seem to predict long-term global competitiveness. That is, relatively few industries have the high ratios (in the 8–12)

percent range) that seem to be required for sustained world class innovation. Most important, these industries together account only for 7-10 percent of GDP.³³



The policy implication is that the remaining 90+ percent of the economy, including those industries that are moderately R&D intensive, is vulnerable to varying degrees to the increasing R&D intensity from a broad array of industries in other countries. Industries with moderate to low R&D intensities must rely on supplied technology by other industries-domestic or foreign. In a closed economy (no foreign trade), suppliers of

technology would obviously be domestic and would not fear cheaper and higher quality imports. However, the increasing ability of foreign industries to acquire or develop modest amounts of technology allows them to compete very effectively with their U.S. counterparts.

Due to downsizing in the face of growing import competition, especially in less technology intensive areas, U.S. manufacturers' sales grew very slowly in the 1980s. The resulting increased proportion of this sector's sales from R&D-intensive industries raised the overall R&D-to-sales ratio for the entire manufacturing sector in the first half of the 1980s from approximately 2.5 percent to 3.0 percent, as indicated in Figure 8. However, manufacturing R&D grew more slowly over the next decade and the R&D-to-sales ratio remained flat from 1985–1995. In the 1996–2000 period, both R&D spending and sales accelerated with R&D spending growing slightly faster, resulting in the ratio increasing to 3.3 percent.

Thus, downsizing and restructuring by many manufacturing firms and even entire industries have resulted in a manufacturing sector that is smaller relative to the overall economy but on average more competitive. However, a 3.3 percent R&D-to-sales ratio is not adequate to guarantee long-term competitiveness for manufacturing in a global economy that is rapidly expanding its R&D capability. The wide dispersion in R&D intensities among manufacturing industries (Figure 8) implies that not all manufacturing firms or even entire industries have adapted to the demands of global, technology-

³³ Both industry and government definitions of the "high-tech" sector result in a share of GDP within this range.

based competition.³⁴ Future improvement in real growth rates for this sector will have to come from sustained real growth in R&D sufficient to further increase R&D intensity.³⁵

Research has shown that a minimum amount of R&D must be conducted by companies just to maintain the capability to absorb technology effectively from external sources.³⁶ However, considerably more R&D than this minimum is required for sustained competitiveness in advanced economies. In fact, larger, more advanced economies emphasize the innovation objective of R&D (as opposed to technology absorption objective) as the primary strategy for maintaining high rates of economic growth³⁷.

To some degree, decreased R&D investment in one industry can be made up by increased expenditures in other industries in a supply chain, as long as these industries are tightly clustered. However, research has shown that significant portions of knowledge spillovers from R&D are localized and that technology-intensive industries need to be more clustered geographically than other industries, thereby making attainment of an integrated R&D capability difficult.³⁸

These limitations on R&D spillovers are accentuated by the fact that the performance of R&D is concentrated geographically. The six states with the highest levels of R&D expenditures—California, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Texas (in decreasing order of magnitude)—account for approximately one-half of the entire national expenditure. The top ten states—adding, in descending order, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Washington, and Maryland—account for nearly two-thirds of the national effort.³⁹ The implication is that much of the U.S. economy on a geographical basis has weak R&D networks, which means the advantages of regional clustering within supply chains supported by a robust technical infrastructure are not being realized.

³⁴ Economic studies have consistently shown a strong relationship between R&D investment and both productivity and output growth (see OECD [2000], Boskin and Lau [2000], Oliner and Sichel [2000], and Cameron [1998]). The work of Griliches [1988] suggests an elasticity of output from R&D of between 0.05 and 0.1 with a social rate of return to R&D of between 20 and 50 percent. Recent research (Cameron [1999]) has indicated significant variation across industries in the effect of R&D on multifactor productivity growth. However, no evidence has been produced to indicate diminishing returns from increased R&D across the range of R&D intensities found in manufacturing industries. Thus, no support exists for the argument that some industries need less R&D than others. In fact, available data such as that presented in Figures 4, 5,and 6 support the proposition that low and moderate R&D-intensive industries (technology adsorption strategy) do not have a bright future.

³⁵ Jones and Williams [2000, 1998] estimate that "optimal R&D investment is at least four times larger than actual investment".

³⁶ See Cohen and Levinthal [1989].

³⁷ Griffith *et al.* [1998].

³⁸ Keller [2000], Porter [2000], Audretsch and Feldman [1996], Acs et al. [1994], Feldman [1994], Jaffe et al. [1993], and Rosenberg [1982].

³⁹ Bennof and Payson [2000]. California's R&D effort exceeded, by more than a factor of three, the next-highest state, Michigan, with \$14.7 billion in R&D expenditures for 1997 (the last year for which data are available). After Michigan, R&D levels for the top ten declined relatively smoothly to \$7.4 billion for Maryland. The 20 highest-ranking states in R&D expenditure accounted for about 86 percent of the U.S. total, while the lowest 20 states accounted for only 4 percent.

The difficulties in achieving acceptable R&D intensities and establishing effective R&D networks are increasing as R&D across supply chains becomes increasingly dispersed. The greater complexity of modern R&D and its increased dispersion is creating a need for a more diverse technical infrastructure to support the necessary private R&D investment. To this end, analyzing R&D expenditures at just one level (industry) in a supply chain will be increasingly inadequate for assessing economic growth potential, as will a singular focus on private or public R&D. Instead, a policy objective must be efficient R&D networks supported by public and private investment to maintain competitive positions in multiple linked industries.

However, the ever advancing complexity of technology and the greater risks associated with long lead times means that almost any distribution of private sector R&D over a supply chain is likely to be inadequate with respect to essential investment in next generation and especially next wave technologies. The latter are the basis for new industries and major international shifts in competitive position. Inadequate investment therefore also reflects a problem with the composition of R&D.

Composition of R&D. As the National Science Board points out, "...any discussion of the nation's R&D must always be careful to distinguish between where the money comes from originally and where the R&D is actually performed".⁴⁰ However, the source of funds, as opposed to the performer, controls the composition of the R&D. In this regard, "most of the nation's R&D is paid for by private industry, which provided 65.9 percent (\$149.7 billion) of total R&D funding in 1998. Nearly all of these funds (98 percent) were used by industry itself in the performance of its own R&D and most of these funds (70 percent) were for the development of products and services rather than for research."⁴¹

In addition to this current skewing of the composition of industry-funded R&D toward specific market objectives, considerable anecdotal evidence points to a shift in composition toward short-term development projects. R&D Magazine summarized its survey (conducted jointly with Battelle) of industry's projected R&D spending plans for 2000 by stating "Gone...is industrial support of basic industry R&D, replaced mostly with support of high-tech development".⁴² To some extent, U.S. industry has recognized the long-term implications of this trend and has increased its funding of basic research, primarily in universities. However, such shifts in funding are overwhelmed by the corporate strategic mandate to make R&D pay off in shorter periods of time. Overall, the *composition* of U.S. private-sector R&D is shifting toward shorter-term objectives, at the expense of next-generation research.

Case studies conducted in the mid-1990s indicate that long-term, high-risk corporate research has been declining for some time.⁴³ More recent data on trends in U.S. corporate

⁴⁰ National Science Board [2000, p. 2-7]

⁴¹ National Science Board [2000, p. 2-9].

⁴² Studt and Duga [2000].

⁴³ See, for example, Corcoran [1994], Duga [1994], and Geppert [1994].

R&D spending are available through surveys by the Center for Innovation Management Studies (CIMS) at Lehigh University in conjunction with the Industrial Research Institute (IRI).⁴⁴ The IRI/CIMS survey is reasonably comprehensive (the most recent one covering 77 manufacturing firms, which accounted for \$41.9 billion or 28 percent of all U.S. industrial R&D spending in 1998). The survey found that 2.8 percent of these funds was allocated to basic research, which is considerably less than what the broader NSF survey found (5.0 percent in 1997). In either case, however, the amount allocated by industry to basic research (including manufacturing) is small.

The IRI/CIMS data provide an additional unique breakdown of company R&D spending between corporate (central research) and segment (line-of-business R&D) spending. In the sample of 77 firms, an average of 25.8 percent was funded by central corporate research (acknowledged as long-term, higher-risk research) and 67.8 percent was funded by segments/divisions (shorter-term, commercialization-oriented research).⁴⁵ More significant, the IRI/CIMS database provides trend data for a smaller sample of 23 firms.⁴⁶ For the 1993–1998 period, the average amount spent on corporate or central research declined from 21.2 percent to 17.1 percent of total R&D expenditures. Table 2 provides similar breakdowns (last column) for some individual companies, which show a

Table 2 Fraction of Corporate R&D in Central Research Laboratories Selected Companies, 1998						
Company-Funded R&D as Percent of Sales						
<u>Company</u>	Total Company	<u>Central Lab</u>	<u>Ratio</u>			
Nokia	12.2%	1.2%	10.0%			
Rockwell	5.0	0.5	10.0			
General Electric	3.2	0.4	13.0			
Hughes	2.0	0.3	14.0			
United Technologies	5.1	0.3	6.5			
Raytheon	3.0	0.1	2.8			
Source: HRL Laboratories and company data (GE's sales do not include its GECS affiliate)						

⁴⁴ Bean, Russo, and Whiteley [2000].


⁴⁵ The remaining R&D funds came from the Federal Government (5.2 percent) and outside contract work (1.1 percent).

⁴⁶ However, Bean, Russo, and Whiteley [2000] found this sample to be representative of the entire IRI membership (136 firms), at least with respect to the trend in R&D intensity.

lower average allocation to central research of 9.4 percent.⁴⁷

The decline in funding of long-term, high-risk technology research is not limited to industry. Federal shares of the funding for all three major components of R&D tracked by NSF (basic research, applied research, and development) have declined steadily over the past 30 years. During the 1980s, Federal support for applied research was intentionally de-emphasized in favor of increased funding of basic research. Even with somewhat of a renewed willingness to fund generic/pre-competitive applied research in the 1990s, Federal funding in 1998 for applied research was only 70.8 percent of that for basic research, as reported to NSF by research performers.⁴⁸

Figure 9 shows the overall national trends, at least to the extent possible with public data. Applied research, which contains the critical generic/pre-competitive technology research expenditures, has grown the slowest of the three major phases of R&D during the 1990s by a substantial margin. This research represents the transition between scientific research, which has no market objective, and technology development, which is highly market focused. In the early portion of applied research, market risk enters the



calculation for the first time and technical risk takes on new meaning for corporate R&D managers.⁴⁹ At this point in the R&D life cycle, time-to-market and technical risk are so high that the investment criteria typically applied to the majority of corporate R&D are not used.

The term generic/precompetitive applied research exemplifies the huge problem faced by policy analysis due to an inadequate taxonomy for R&D. The term applied

research is too broad to provide needed insights into funding trends for the truly breakthrough technologies that drive much of economic growth. Companies divide their R&D between a central research facility and their lines of business. Under current NSF definitions, both units will often conduct what is classified as applied research. However, central or corporate research is typically more long-term, more exploratory, and more discontinuous relative to existing corporate market strategies. Hence, such generic or

⁴⁷ The content of corporate central labs' research portfolios can shift over time with changes in corporate strategy. Considerable anecdotal evidence points to a secular shift toward less risky and shorter-term research within central laboratories.

⁴⁸ National Science Board [2000, p. 2-31]. Note that each phase of national R&D requires more funds than the previous one. For example, in 1998 the United States spent \$37.9 billion on basic research, \$51.2 billion on applied research, and \$138.1 billion on development.

⁴⁹ See Figure 3 and associated discussion.

fundamental research is overall much more risky. Companies do not even use the same project selection and evaluation criteria for the two areas of research. The policy significance is huge, as underinvestment phenomena are quite different in the two cases.⁵⁰

As discussed in the following sections, the Federal role in funding the generic or fundamental phase of technology research (with the exception of biomedical research) has declined in the past two decades. Such research ends with proof of concept, frequently embodied in a conceptual model or *laboratory* prototype, and typically brings new technologies to the levels of technical and market risk addressable by conventional corporate R&D investment criteria. This milestone is still a long way from the generally agreed endpoint for applied research, which is a *commercial* prototype.

Making a distinction between generic technology research and applied technology research is critical for both corporate strategy and government R&D policy. By the time applied research is initiated, broad technology and market strategies have been determined to a significant extent by earlier exploratory or pioneering research. As described here and in earlier reports, research aimed at new technology platforms is subject to substantial underinvestment by industry.⁵¹

An important characteristic of generic technology research for policy purposes is its discontinuous character (radically different from the existing corporate R&D portfolio). This characteristic makes the potential market applications highly uncertain for corporate managers. From 11 case studies of radical innovation efforts within major corporations, a team from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute concluded that "the life cycle of a discontinuous innovation project is profoundly different from a continuous improvement project". The 11 projects studied exhibited several of the categories of market failure described in the next section. In eight of the 11 case studies, the researchers found that government was a major source of funds.⁵²

The previous discussion of R&D composition focuses on R&D objectives. Another set of issues with policy implications arises with respect to the R&D process. In particular, the multidisciplinary character of industrial R&D and technology integration are both steadily increasing in importance. Multidisciplinary R&D makes maintenance of minimum threshold levels of science and engineering skills increasingly difficult for individual firms, resulting in increased efforts to partner with private and public institutions or simply not conducting the research.

The systems nature of many emerging technologies has made technology integration a critical part of the R&D process. Studies have shown that differences in the technology integration process are more important than disparities in project management methods, leadership qualities, and organizational structure in explaining variations in R&D productivity. Data indicate that a company's ability to choose technology components

⁵⁰ See Tassey [1997, 1999].

⁵¹ Tassey [1999b].

⁵² Rice *et al* [1998].

wisely and effectively and integrate them has explained variations in time to market and product quality of a factor of two or three.⁵³

The types of compositional R&D market failures identified above significantly reduce the long-term competitive prospects for U.S. industries. In particular, studies have shown




Figure 10

that longer-term, more radical (discontinuous) R&D and subsequent innovations have a disproportionately greater impact on economic growth. Based on a survey of hightech companies in several countries, Figure 10 shows the differential impacts of incremental radical and innovations. Incremental innovations (extensions of existing generic product technologies) accounted for a large majority (86 percent) of all product launches, but just 62 percent of sales and only

39 percent of profits. In contrast, major or discontinuous innovations (radical in the sense they were based on new-to-the-firm generic technologies) were few in number as might be expected (14 percent of all product launches), but accounted for 38 percent of sales and 61 percent of profits.

These critical attributes of different types of industrial R&D have been obscured because the traditional policy model treats technology as a homogeneous entity or "black box". Under such a model, basic science is largely a pure public good and therefore funded by government to a significant extent, while the derived technology and its applications (the black boxes) are mainly the province of the private sector with the implication of no role for government.

This simplistic model is contradicted by the fact that the R&D process eventually producing the black boxes consists of a series of phases creating progressively more applied knowledge. This latter ideology persists in spite of many case studies of emerging technologies (some discussed below) showing a critical role for government based on characteristics of the earlier phases of technology research that lead to private sector underinvestment. Moreover, the development of black boxes (hardware and software) and their integration into larger technology systems requires an array of infratechnologies, which also have large public good content and therefore suffer from private sector underinvestment.

⁵³ Iansiti and West [1997].

Policy Rationales for Government R&D Support

Evidence has been provided that U.S. industry systematically underinvests in the type of research that, although long-term and high-risk, ultimately provides the highest rates of return and, in fact, is necessary for long-term economic growth at the national level. These findings challenge traditional economic theory says that rational behavior should result in an allocation of resources across the spectrum of R&D investment opportunities such that not only is survival ensured but long-run rates of return are maximized. However, barriers or market failures occur that change private sector rate-of-return calculations causing systematic underinvestment. Economists have explained underinvestment in R&D largely by the concept of spillovers, which refers to the tendency of knowledge either to directly leak or spillover from the originating source or to be incompletely compensated for in marketplace transactions.

While this phenomenon is an important characteristic of technology-based markets, in reality, such economic activity is much more complicated and suffers from additional barriers not so commonly identified or understood. Specifically, the following seven sources of *market failure* (underinvestment) repeatedly occur:⁵⁴

- (1) *Technical Complexity:* The need for multiple disciplines to be combined within one organizational structure to conduct exploratory R&D is increasingly beyond the capabilities of individual firms;
- (2) *Time:* The negative effect on investment decisions due to excessive discounting is particularly severe for long-term, high-risk technology research;
- (3) *Capital Intensity:* Estimates of risk climb dramatically as the projected cost of a research project increases relative to a firm's total R&D portfolio;
- (4) *Economies of Scope:* Market and hence R&D strategies are more focused than the potential scope of markets enabled by an emerging technology, thereby reducing investment incentives;
- (5) *Spillovers:* Leakage or spillover of technical knowledge to companies that did not contribute to a research project is typically greater the earlier in the R&D cycle an investment is contemplated;
- (6) *Infratechnologies and Standards:* Technical tools, methods and techniques, science and engineering data bases, and the technical basis for standards have a public good character and low visibility; they are therefore subject to persistent underinvestment over most of the technology life cycle;
- (7) *Market Segmentation:* Emergence of sophisticated users demanding customized performance attributes reduces the capture of economies of scale in industrial R&D.

Any one of these seven sources of underinvestment can have serious negative impacts on private-sector R&D investment. Moreover, the severity of their impacts can vary over technology life cycles and among levels in supply chains. For example, excessive

⁵⁴ See Tassey [1997, 1999b] for detailed discussions of these market failure categories.

discounting of potential future profits from investment in innovation varies over the business cycle. Discounting also tends to be too high for longer-term, higher-risk generic technology research.

A long-held postulate of economic theory is that people attempt to maximize their well being using all available information and always act with their long-term self-interest in mind. Some policy viewpoints note that corporations react the same way, and that therefore government has little or no role to play. Recent advances in behavioral economics, however, have begun to explain why individuals react irrationally and these same findings apply to corporations.⁵⁵ Like individuals, corporate managers hate losses more than they enjoy gains. Long-term strategic planning and subsequent implementation of long-term research programs take resources away from the pursuit of short-term objectives (including avoidance of losses). While the cost of delaying long-term programs for short periods of time is insignificant, these time segments add up and the corporation eventually finds itself at the beginning of a new technology life cycle without the technological capability to compete.

More generally, R&D policy must recognize that for long-term, high-risk, technology research, which is discontinuous or radical relative to conventional R&D, industry uses

- different investment criteria compared to what is used for the majority of industrial R&D investment;
- different institutional mechanisms for making these investment decisions;
- different institutional mechanisms for conducting this type of technology research.

To respond to the seven categories of market failure, government R&D policy must be based on a range of analytical elements supported by matching data. Analysis of each source requires analytical and data collection capabilities that are currently highly inadequate. Improvements are therefore needed to efficiently design and implement R&D funding programs.

Federal Funding of Industrial R&D


Corporate strategists, economists, and policy analysts unanimously agree that technology is the main driver of long-term economic growth. Yet, as pointed out in earlier sections, the high-tech portion of the U.S. and other economies is quite small. The implication is that considerable vulnerability exists as more and more foreign industries attain the capacity to compete in moderate and low R&D-intensive products and services. Because the manufacturing sector conducts over 70 percent of industrial R&D, it is affected disproportionately by changes in Federal policies toward R&D funding.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Leading economists in this field include Matthew Rabin, University of California at Berkeley and Richard Thaler, University of Chicago.

⁵⁶ In addition to funding, increasing the amount of R&D conducted is constrained by an inadequate supply of scientists and engineers. The percentage of engineers in the labor force has remained constant over the last 25 years for which data are available (Romer [2000]). In 1997, the number of scientists and

R&D Funding Trends. U.S. R&D spending has increased at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent in real terms over the past 25 years. However, this growth has succeeded in raising only a small fraction of U.S. industries to the high R&D intensities that seem necessary to sustain competitive positions in expanding technology-based global markets.

Most, but not all, agree that some degree and type of underinvestment in technology research occurs. However, almost no analysis has been undertaken to provide techniques for matching underinvestment phenomena with alternative policy response mechanisms.



Moreover, public subsidies for R&D (tax incentives, direct funding, or government laboratory research) have been largely based on rationales that are often noneconomic, leaving the economic growth impacts as an ineffective trickle-down effect.

In spite of these inadequacies, the Federal Government was the main provider of the Nation's R&D funds until the last two decades—accounting for 54

percent in 1953 and as much as 67 percent at its peak share in 1964. The Federal share first fell below 50 percent in 1979 and then stabilized in the 40–45 percent range in the 1980s. The rapid increase in industry funding of R&D during the 1990s coupled with the general restrictions on Federal spending progressively reduced the Federal share to an all-time low of 29.5 percent in 1998, as shown in Figure 11. The relative decline does not mean Federal funding of R&D has fallen in absolute terms. Between 1980 and 1998, Federal R&D expenditures grew from \$30.0 billion to \$66.9 billion, which amounts to a small, real growth rate of 1.0 percent per year.⁵⁷

This persistent trend raises two critical policy issues: (1) how will the substitution of private for government funding affect the *amount* of R&D funding over time, and (2) how will this shift affect the *composition* of R&D?

In the five years from 1994 to 1998, industry funding of R&D grew in real terms by 8.9 percent per year, allowing many to conclude that no policy issues exist. However, in the previous ten years (1985 to 1994), industry R&D funding grew at an annual real rate of 2.8 percent.⁵⁸ One factor explaining the difference in growth rates in these two periods is the business cycle. Companies fund most of their R&D with internal funds, so R&D

engineers engaged in R&D constituted 0.8 percent of the labor force, which is about the same as the previous peak in the late 1960s (National Science Board, Appendix Table 3–25 and Romer [2000]).

⁵⁷ National Science Board [2000, pp. 2-9].

⁵⁸ National Science Board [2000, p. 2-21].

tends to go up when cash flow is high and decline when it is low. Given the long-term nature of much R&D and the need to develop new technologies within increasingly short time frames, the amount of R&D funding and its stability over time should be a long-term policy concern.

However, the composition of R&D is probably the more significant dimension of the declining share of Federal R&D funding. Some of the elements of an industrial technology are shared among companies—voluntarily or involuntarily for reasons discussed earlier. The two major shared elements are the technology base of an industry (the generic or fundamental technology) and infratechnologies (techniques, methods, databases, etc., many of which become industry standards). Because these elements are shared, they take on the character of public goods, which imply underinvestment by private sources of funding.

The more radical and generic the technology, the more difficult it is for companies to (1) hold on to the intellectual property (spillovers occur), (2) diversify into the entire range of new markets created by the technology (economies of scope are not captured), (3) access the required multidisciplinary research capabilities (modern technologies are complex), and (4) rationalize undertaking the required long-term research (high corporate discount rates lower the present value of projected future earnings).

Public-Private Investment: Generic Technology. Criticisms of linear models of innovation (basic science, generic technology, innovations—in that order) are justified. Feedback loops are regular occurrences in which marketplace experiences feed back into product or process design. Moreover, important innovations do occur and then the underlying science is developed to explain how the technology works. For example, packet switching—the basis for computer networks including the Internet—evolved to a significant degree ahead of theory.⁵⁹ Similarly, Pasteur invented the vaccine and in the process discovered some new principles of microbiology.

However, it is hard to imagine apoptosis, antisense, monoclonal antibodies, or other generic biotechnologies being developed through experimentation rather than derived from previous advances in microbiology. In fact, the greatest difference between traditional pharmaceutical research and biotechnology research is that the former was largely trial and error, whereas the latter is based on fundamental science and a set of generic technologies that evolved from this science. The former may prove the existence of a nonlinear model of innovation, but it is far less efficient than the more linear evolution of biotechnology research.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ In particular, packet switching for routing messages through the ARPANET advanced empirically beyond theory. See National Research Council [1999, p. 8]. Parallel processing is another example of an innovation that did not follow the simple linear model. Demand in the 1980s for increased computing power and the widespread availability of microprocessors led to commercialization, which preceded a good theoretical understanding of how multiple processors can work efficiently together, and spurred advances in that theory. See Office of Technology Assessment [1995, p. 24].

⁶⁰ By some analysts' estimates, the pharmaceutical industry today develops drugs for 500-600 "drug targets". However, within just a few years the ability of biotechnology to isolate and focus on specific intercellular and intracellular mechanisms will expand the number of drug targets by an order of magnitude to 8,000 to 10,000.

The increasing dependency of innovation on basic science and derived generic technologies is seen in the changing relationship between patents and research. From 1987/88 to 1993/94, the linkage between industrial technology (represented by patents) and science (represented by the citation of scientific papers in patents) tripled and has more than doubled again since then. These studies also reveal that U.S. patents preferentially cite the highest quality research (indicated by research papers with the highest overall citation frequency). Finally, the institutional origins of the papers cited in the patents were dominated by public sector organizations. The analysis showed that 73 percent of the papers cited in U.S. patents were authored in public sector institutions, such as universities and government laboratories.⁶¹ Thus, for major new technologies, the science base increasingly must be in place before significant and sustained rates of applications can take place. That is, an evolutionary pattern (i.e., a *linearity*) exists in major technology life cycles.⁶²

Part of the difficulty in attaining a consensus model of innovation arises from the increasing dominance of systems technologies. Advances in component technologies within systems create demand for advances in the remaining components to allow the system technology to advance. Moreover, initial advances in some components cross-fertilize advances in other components. These phenomena have been referred to as a "chain link" model of innovation.⁶³ Such models not only embody interactive relationships among stages in the development and commercialization of technology, but also include complementary roles for several distinctly different technologies. Here, the pattern of technological progress is ascribed more to a mating of complementary technology assets, independent of any evolutionary process.

Unfortunately, such derived demand for advances in component technologies within a broader system technology has been confused with the relationship between the generic technology base underlying each component. For example, a National Research Council report states that "...development of magnetic core memory for computers did not flow directly from advances in materials research (although it certainly drew upon such research), but from the need to develop a memory system with short enough access times and high enough reliability to support real-time computing".⁶⁴ Such a statement reflects confusion between the derived demand for a technology and the science and generic technology base (the results of materials research) that enables a specific technology's development (magnetic core memory) in response to that demand.

Equally important for R&D policy is the fact that the advancement of basic science sufficient to allow technology development to begin does not guarantee immediate or even eventual commitment of private sector funds (see Figure 3). Several decades of large-scale funding of molecular biology research by NIH were required before private investment kicked in and spawned a biotechnology industry. A recent analysis of U.S. patent citations in biotechnology found that more than 70 percent of them were to papers


⁶¹ Narin, Hamilton, and Olivastro [1997] and Hicks et al [2000].

⁶² See Tassey [1997, pp. 63–67; 1999b, p. 21].

⁶³ Klein and Rosenberg [1986].

⁶⁴ National Research Council [1999, p. 146].

originating solely at public research institutions.⁶⁵ And, 20 years after the first biotechnology company went public, NIH still provides research funding to dozens of the more than 300 biotechnology companies. These companies now have "140 products approved and on the market...[and] a pipeline heading for the FDA that could double that number in the next 18 months".⁶⁶



The tremendous growth in health care productivity being made possible by a radically new technology also is creating a new industry with substantial economic growth potential. This phenomenon is occurring in the United States and not in a competing economy because the U.S. Government funded both the science base and the subsequent early phases of technology research, allowing U.S. industry and U.S. capital markets to reach positive investment decisions ahead of the rest of the world.

Yet, according to the conservative paradigm, NIH should not have funded anything beyond basic science to avoid being accused of picking winners and losers and thereby thwarting private sector resource allocation. In reality, the NIH example is a case study in government response to the entire set of R&D market failures that beset the development of any radically new technology.

More generally, U.S. R&D policy has condoned government funding of generic technology or more radical infratechnology research only when some non-market objective (such as health care) is available as a driver. This philosophy is apparent in the current distribution of Federal R&D funding, as shown in Figure 12. Health has received continually larger shares of the non-defense R&D budget and the result has been U.S. leadership in biotechnology. Other emerging technologies are receiving nothing resembling that level of support.⁶⁷ One might argue that the spillovers are much greater in areas such as health care and national defense and therefore justify larger government R&D programs. However, DARPA funding of computer-related and network communications technology research provides clear examples of government R&D programs across a range of emerging technologies would greatly leverage economic growth.

⁶⁵ McMillan, Narin and Deeds [2000].

⁶⁶ Alan Carr, Chase Hambrecht & Quist, quoted in "What Next for Biotechs?" Barron's, March 20, 2000.

⁶⁷ One partial exception may be nanotechnology, for which annual research budgets of about \$500 million have recently been proposed.

In the past, non-market motivations (primarily national defense) allowed Federal funding of major new technologies at threshold levels, which subsequently drove economic growth for decades. The fields of computing and communications provide a number of compelling examples of how government funding played a critical role in advancing generic technologies and achieving minimum thresholds of R&D capability necessary to stimulate takeoff in private sector investment. Federal funding for electrical engineering in areas such as semiconductors and communications technologies (major components of computing technologies) has fluctuated between \$800 million and \$1 billion since the 1970s. Funding for computer science increased from \$10 million in 1960 to approximately \$1 billion in 1995. These amounts have represented a major fraction of all research funding in the field of computing.⁶⁸

The majority of this funding went to industry and university researchers. Not only did the government-sponsored research advance key areas of the underlying science and technology, but it also fostered a broad and deep R&D capability that leveraged followon private investment by industry. An extremely important aspect of this support is the extension of Federal funding beyond basic scientific research to generic technology and even experimental deployment. For example, before 1970, the Federal government sponsored individual researchers who developed the underlying network technologies, such as queuing theory, packet switching, and routing. During the 1970s, experimental networks, notably the ARPANET, were constructed. These networks were primarily research tools, not service providers. Most were federally funded because, with a few exceptions, industry had not realized the potential of the technology.⁶⁹

During the 1980s, networks were widely deployed, initially to support scientific research. The National Science Foundation (NSF) was the major supporter of networking, primarily through the NSFNET, which evolved into the Internet. At this point in networking technology's evolution, industry began to see the enormous economic potential. Companies such as IBM, Digital Equipment Corp., and Compuserve established proprietary networks. These networks were rapidly utilized worldwide for email, file transfers, and electronic funds transfers.

However, as often happens in the evolution of a major new technology, companies with a large share of the initial proprietary applications displayed little interest in the even greater potential of the generic technology. To be broadly successful and thereby have large economic impact, systems technologies such as the Internet have to be based on open architectures. This requirement presented a negative investment incentive to firms with substantial commitments to proprietary networks. Moreover, telephone telecommunications companies, whose lines carried the packet-switched information, resisted computer networks, including the Internet, because the nature of voice communications networks is strikingly different from the evolving computer networks.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ National Research Council [1999, p. 2].

⁶⁹ National Research Council [1999, p. 169].

⁷⁰ For example, voice traffic is handled by a continuous connection (a circuit) for the duration of the transmission, while computers communicate in bursts. Unless a number of these bursts or "calls" can be combined on a single transmission path (seldom the case in complex, high-capacity transmission systems), line and switching capacity is wasted. National Research Council [1999, p. 172].

Similarly, IBM pioneered the concept of relational databases but did not pursue commercialization of the technology because of its potential to compete with established IBM products. NSF-sponsored research at UC-Berkeley allowed continued exploration of this concept and brought the technology to the point that it could be commercialized by several start-up companies and then by more established suppliers, including IBM. This pattern was also evident in the development of reduced instruction set computing (RISC). Though the concept was originally developed at IBM, RISC was not commercialized until DARPA funded additional research at UC-Berkeley and Stanford University as part of its Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit (VSLI) Program in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁷¹

Other examples of critical government funding of generic technology research include expert systems, speech recognition, and image processing. Industry began to invest in these and other areas of artificial intelligence (AI) in the 1960s but scaled back when the long time periods required for commercialization became apparent. Continued Federal investments advanced the generic technologies over a decade or more until conventional industry R&D criteria could rationalize investments in applied R&D. Now, private investment is driving the commercialization of many AI technologies.

When defense R&D dominated Federal funding, DARPA determined the Federal portfolio of generic technology research. In the late 1980s, the growing importance of a broad range of technologies for domestic economic growth led Congress to establish a civilian counterpart to DARPA—NIST's Advanced Technology Program (ATP)—to fund the gaps in private sector funding of generic technology research. Due in part to protracted ideological debates over Federal roles in funding technology research, the ability of ATP to function at a meaningful level has been significantly diminished.

Public-Private Investment: Infratechnology. Infratechnologies are a ubiquitous set of technical tools, which are increasingly important to the productivity of technology-based economic activity. As is the case with generic technology, infratechnology is a quasipublic good, so both industry and government invest in R&D to develop this category of technical infrastructure. As evidenced earlier in the example of biotechnology (Table 1), these infratechnologies—either directly or through incorporation in industry standards—are pervasive in terms of their economic impacts. They leverage the productivity of R&D, enhance quality and process control, and facilitate efficient marketplace transactions for complex, technology-based products and services.⁷²

Economies of scope are more pronounced in infratechnology research than is the case for much generic technology research. This fact justifies government conduct of a significant portion of infratechnology research, whereas most generic technology research can be co-funded by government and conducted by industry (as in the ATP model). NIST's Measurement and Standards Laboratories (MSL) provide a wide range of infratechnologies to industry to leverage the productivity of industry's R&D investment. This technology infrastructure ultimately affects all three stages of economic activity: R&D, production, and market development.

⁷¹ National Research Council [1999, p. 9].

⁷² Tassey [1997, Chap. 8].


Microeconomic studies undertaken over the past decade have documented high social rates of return (SRR) for government investments in infratechnologies in support of manufacturing R&D. A majority of the 25 projects studied yielded SRR estimates that exceed an approximate hurdle rate of between 25 and 50 percent (by substantial amounts in many cases). Some recent assessments of NIST infratechnology research programs are summarized in Table 3. As indicated by the wide range of net present value (NPV) estimates, some infratechnologies are localized in their economic impact, yielding NPVs that are relatively small. However, many such infratechnologies and associated standards are needed by a single industry. Thus, the aggregate NPV is quite high. Yet, because of their frequent localized effect and the systems nature and general complexity of most technology, this pervasive form of technical infrastructure is relatively invisible to policymakers.

Table 3 Economic Impacts of Federal Infratechnology Investments: NIST/MSL Research Projects			
<i>Semiconductors:</i> software for design automation (Gallaher and Martin [1999])	Software model	 Increase R&D efficiency Increase productivity 	SRR: 76% BCR: 23 NPV: \$17M
<i>Pharmaceuticals:</i> cholesterol measurement (Leech [2000])	 Measurement	 Increase	SRR: 154%
	method Standard reference	productivity Reduce	BCR: 4.5
	materials	transaction costs	NPV: \$6.2M
<i>Photonics:</i> laser and fiberoptic	Calibrations	 Increase	SRR: 43%–136%
power and energy calibration		productivity Reduce	BCR: 3–11
(Marx, Scott and Fry [2000])		transaction costs	NPV: \$48M
<i>Chemicals:</i> SRMs for sulfur in fossil fuels (Martin, Gallaher, and O'Conner [2000])	 Measurement	 Increase	SRR: 1,056%
	method Standard reference	productivity Reduce	BCR: 113
	materials	transaction costs	NPV: \$409M

SRR=Social Rate of Return, BCR=Benefit-Cost Ratio and NPV=Net Present Value. All NPVs stated in 1998 dollars for comparison purposes

As is the case with generic technology, Federal support for infratechnology research has been inadequate—leading to gaps between need and availability to industry. The Measurement and Standards Laboratories (MSL) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provide industry with a wide range of infratechnologies. However, Figure 13 reflects the fact that the budget for NIST/MSL has grown at annual rate of only 2.8 percent in real terms over the past 30 years (1970-99), compared with an average annual real growth rate of 10.3 percent for industry-funded R&D. The markedly

different growth rates have resulted in the NIST laboratory research budget declining by a factor of two relative to industry R&D spending during this period.⁷³



Funding the Gaps. The above examples of Federal R&D funding reinforce the point made earlier that the critical policy issues are timing and the type of government funding for public good elements of technology research. These elements leverage the development of new technologies as a complement industry's capacity to or willingness to undertake the required research. This is not picking winners and losers. As long as federally funded

research is viewed as a set of options on further research and the results of each option are reviewed by all stakeholders before deciding to continue, industry's conventional R&D decision making process should kick in at the appropriate point in the R&D cycle. This process will either reject the projected technology trajectory or take over an increasingly large portion of total research funding.⁷⁴ Case studies cited here and elsewhere have shown this pattern to be the case many times over.

In addition to advancing the elements of an industrial technology with a public good character, Federal research funds also help create a broader and deeper research capacity in industry and the supporting technical infrastructure. NIH funding virtually created a biotechnology research infrastructure in universities and industry, while being a major technical resource itself. ARPA and NSF funded academic research in all areas of computer network technology. ARPA managers worked closely with the researchers they supported and convened many meetings for information sharing and planning.⁷⁵ The resulting broader and deeper R&D establishment permitted more diverse and rapid market applications, once significant private investment kicked in.

One policy lesson is that much of NIH's support of biotechnology and DARPA's support of computer-related technologies and communications networking technology preceded private investment. Additional support then augmented the evolution of the technology base where private investment was too narrow in scope or too resistant to the

⁷³ As an additional perspective, one corporate R&D establishment, General Electric, employs 9,100 people. NIST—charged with providing technology infrastructure support to the entire U.S. economy employees 3,000.


⁷⁴ See Tassey [1999b, pp. 40–42] and Tassey [1997] for detailed discussions of alternative R&D funding strategies and policy research processes.

⁷⁵ National Research Council [1999, p. 171].

more radical versions of the underlying technology. The result was world technological leadership, the creation of new industries, and substantial economic growth.⁷⁶

Unfortunately, such levels and persistence of Federal investment are not being made across a broad portfolio of technologies. During the 1980s, Federal support for applied research was de-emphasized in favor of basic research. A weak revival in the 1990s of a willingness to support generic/pre-competitive applied research hardly compares with the support of multiple technologies in past decades that served as the technological base for many of the industries driving U.S. economic growth today.

A second policy lesson is that funding for generic technology and infratechnology research is small relative to the subsequent investments by industry in applied R&D, as indicated in Figure 14. At the same time, the public good character of this research creates formidable barriers to private sector investment. Fortunately, the relatively small cost allows government to fund a broad portfolio of research in emerging technologies



and infratechnology research. The key requirements for successful government research programs are the targeting of the right technology elements at the appropriate phases in the respective technology life cycles.⁷⁷

Of course, even with ample Federal funding, the complete model of industrial innovation reveals numerous pitfalls along the path to global competitiveness. The United States has become the world leader in biotechnology not

only because of sustained Federal research funding but also because of a risk-taking culture supported by a deep venture capital infrastructure. Yet, over its 25-year history, the biotechnology industry has experienced a number of peaks and valleys of investor enthusiasm. These violent capital market cycles have caused R&D cycles to lengthen and

⁷⁶ Obviously, private funding increasingly takes over from government funding and becomes dominant as the R&D life cycle progresses. Without such a pattern, little commercial technology would be developed. The appropriate combinations in the right time frames are the key policy variable. For example, Lerner [1996] has shown that SBIR awards are more effective in regions with substantial venture capital availability. However, 40 percent of these awards have gone to two states (California and Massachusetts), once again emphasizing the skewing of R&D in the U.S. economy in response to a geographically limited innovation infrastructure.

⁷⁷ California seems to have bought into this policy lesson. In December 2000, the state announced that it has committed \$300 million over four years and companies in that state have committed more than twice that amount to develop new generic technologies that will allow replication of the Silicon Valley model (clustering of high-tech firms driven by a new technology, associated infrastructure, and other synergies). See http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/08/technology/08RESE.html.

many biotechnology companies to license their technology at unfavorable terms or even sell out to large domestic or foreign pharmaceutical firms at unattractive terms to investors.

An example is monoclonal antibodies (MABs). This technology platform with many potential therapeutic applications was first developed in the mid-1980s and was heralded as the magic bullet for treating cancer and possibly other diseases. However, first generation MABs were not particularly effective for several reasons and investors quickly lost interest. Many companies in this area were acquired or went out of business. However, sustained funding by NIH and a trickle of venture capital allowed research to continue. A decade later, second generation MABs and even newer hybrid technologies have appeared that use MABs as targeting devices for other therapeutic agents, and investor enthusiasm has returned.

Another area of biotechnology with a similar pattern is antisense technology, which blocks the formation within the cell of unwanted proteins. In the early 1990s, antisense was a hot technology, but degradation and toxicity problems caused difficulties for the first generation drug candidates. By the mid-1990s, hardly anyone was interested. Now, many of the earlier problems appear to have been solved and the technology is coming back into favor again.

The R&D policy message is that when the time to commercialization is relatively short, perhaps a year or two, risk is relatively easily estimated and incorporated into R&D decision making. For longer phases of the R&D cycle, estimated risk accelerates and inconsistent intra-company and capital market support results. Federal research funding for basic science and the generic technology is obviously critical to sustain the innovation patterns that appear frequently in emerging technologies. In addition, the timely availability of infratechnologies is also extremely important. Such technical infrastructure can significantly improve the efficiency of the R&D process and thereby attain critical reductions in R&D cycle times and cost.

This conclusion does not mean that Federal R&D funding alone is a sufficient longterm economic growth strategy. In fact, this report has emphasized the critical concept of a national innovation capacity, which includes education and financial infrastructures and the dominance in dollar terms of private R&D funding. However, current Federal levels of R&D funding are not adequate to provide a future technology base sufficient to ensure a significant long-term contribution to economic growth by a range of technologies, many of them in the manufacturing category. Moreover, the current portfolio of emerging technologies is not sufficiently diversified to capture the synergies of supply chain integration with the rapidly expanding IT-based service sector.

As the Council on Competitiveness recently stated, "Government leaders at all levels should adopt the principle that the United States must be in the lead or among the leaders in every major field of research".⁷⁸ This statement should be taken seriously. The arguments and data presented in this report depict a need for a much broader and deeper R&D agenda, which is also more systematically implemented.

⁷⁸ Council on Competitiveness [forthcoming].

Conclusion

A number of changes in the economic environment of the United States have emerged over the past two decades, which demand attention. These changes have greatly influenced three long-term trends:

- (1) A skewed distribution of R&D funding in the U.S. economy, with only a fraction of manufacturing industries warranting the label of "R&D intensive";
- (2) A shift in the composition of industry-funded R&D toward more specific product and process objectives;
- (3) An overall reduction in Federal funding of long-term, high-risk technology research that provides technology platforms and trajectories as the basis for new industries.

Within the Federal R&D portfolio, substantial funding is currently available for only one emerging technology—biotechnology. Sustained economic growth in a large and diversified economy such as the United States will require not only more R&D but the provision of considerably more long-term funding for a range of emerging technologies. Many of these technologies are and will be for the foreseeable future classified in the manufacturing area. The needed funding for emerging manufacturing technologies may not have to reach that provided for biomedical research, but certainly a major expansion over today's levels is required.

In response, economic growth policy needs greater public and private R&D investment as part of a broader National investment strategy emphasizing incentives that entice investment in the most productive and immobile determinants of economic growth. Technology meets these requirements, even though technical knowledge spills over and thus is relatively easily acquired by users other than the originator. The mitigating policy variable is R&D capability. States regularly bid against one another to attract production activity, but R&D capability is seldom similarly in play. This is because private R&D assets are closely tied to public research and other infrastructure. They are therefore relatively immobile domestically and even more so internationally.

In other words, technology and the public and private institutions that support its development and use are interdependent components of a national innovation system. This system is not easily imitated due to the complexity of the actors, institutions, and ultimately market applications that produce the economic benefits. One dimension of this complexity is diversification of an economy's technology base and its myriad applications. Diversification of technology development across manufacturing and service industries yields three critical advantages: more growth opportunities, more stable growth trajectories, and greater synergies among economic sectors.

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