Extreme Wind/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis Rev 00B, ICN 00 000-00C-WHS0-00100-000-00B October 2004 1. PURPOSE The purpose of this analysis is to calculate extreme wind and tornado probabilities using current design information for surface facilities and transporters to support the License Application and to provide responses to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Agreement PRE.03.02 (Pannell 2001). This analysis . ** establishes the design basis wind speeds of extreme wind and tornadoes and corresponding missile spectrums. This analysis uses site-specific wind data collected fiom 1998 through 2002 for calculating the design basis extreme wind speed and missile strike probabilities on structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety (ITS). For this analysis, the following tasks are performed: \. . Establish the design basis wind speeds for the extreme wind and tornado and the. . corresponding missile spectrum for the repository. Pedorm a tornado and tornado missile screening analysis, based on, probabilities and missile to exclude tornado missiles as for certain ITS SSCs. Establish the extreme wind or tornado missile spectrum for design bases of ITS SSCs that are not excluded as credible hazards by the screening analysis. . Establish the minimum thickness of concrete or steel missile baniers as design bases to prevent an impact effect on. by the design-basis missile spectrum. The results of these tasks are presented in Section 9. This analysis'presents the for tornado missile baniers that a tornado missile impact effect on This analysis supports the development of risk-informed, basis in accordance with 10 CFR Part 63 and incorporates NRC precedents established for the regulation of nuclear power plants. This analysis supersedes Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis (BSC 2004a) and is based on preliminary design information. Hazards fiom extreme winds and tornadoes were determined to be applicable to the repository site during the preclosure period in Monitored Geologic Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis (BSC 2004b). 2. QUALITY ASSURANCE This analysis is subject to the Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2004, Section 2.2.2) and is developed in accordance with AP-3.12Q, Design Calculations and Analyses. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis 3. USE OF SOFTWARE 3.1 SOFTWARE APPROVED FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE WORK None used. 3.2 COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE USED Microsoft Excel 97 SR-2, a commercially available spreadsheet software package, was used to calculate mathematical expressions and operations, standard in Excel, to derive mathematical results and is exempt from the requirements of LP-SI.11 Q-BSC, Software Management. 4. INPUTS 4.1 TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND PARAMETERS 4.1.1 Extreme Winds Data of the observed maximum daily 3-s gust wind speed for the 5-year period of 1998 through 2002 was collected at the 60-m meteorological tower, Site 1, located approximately I krn south of the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility, in compliance with Section B of Regulatory Guide 1.23. The data is documented in Basic Wind Speed Estimate (BSC 2004~). The Site 1 location represents terrain exposure similar to that of the planned surface facility area on the western side of Midway Valley as reported in Technical Work Plan foc Meteorological Monitoring and Data Analysis (BSC 2003, Addendum A). Wind speed was calculated using data collected at 10 m fiom the ground level (BSC 2004~). 4.1.2 Tornadoes Tornado related technical information was obtained from: Data compiled fiom the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration @eng 2004a to 2004d) on tornado occurrences in the Great Basin area of Nevada, and portions of Utah, Arizona, and California, fiom January 1, 1950, to September 30,2003 0 NUREGKR-4461, Tornado Clima~ology of rhe Contiguous United States (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986) Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants. 4.1.3 Tornado Missile Impact Parameter (Y) The parameter is defined as the probability of tornado A range of Y values is obtained from NUREGICR-4710, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Analysis of a Combustion Engineering 2-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor, Case Study (Crarnond et al. 1987, Appendix G). Only the generic methodology on calculating the tornado missile strike probability is used in this analysis. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tomado~ornado Missile Hazard Analysis 4.1.4 Tornado Missile Spectrum The tornado missile spectrum is obtained from NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safeq Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4). 4.2 CRITERIA Event freqpency Category 2 screening criteria of 2E-6 per year is used for probability screening in this analy&s. This is based on: 10 CFR 63.2, which states, "Other event sequences that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occuning before permanent closure are referred to as Category 2 event sequences." This probability is expressed as 1 E-4. Stating the frequency-screening threshold requires knowledge of the duration of the period before permanent closure. For this analysis, the frequency-screening threshold is set to 2E-6 per year, which allows emplacement and other handling operations to last up to 50 years before permanent closure; that is, dividing 1E-4 by 50 years resulting in 2E-6 per year (Williams 2003, Section 2.0 of enclosure). 5.1 The number of tornado missiles used in this analysis is assumed to be . the same number used in the tornado missile impact analysis for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant (Crarnond et al. 1987, Appendix G). Rationale: The number is conservative because there are more objects, such as - . and areas at a nuclear power plant site than there are at the repository site, and there are no at the repository site. More objects than currently assumed could become potential when the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) is in operation and when a dry transfer facility (DTF, including the Remediation Facilitv as part of the DTF) or some other building is under construction. Objects could be . - and other . 'l'he assumed number of is conservative and represents most objects, including materials of construction. . . This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.3 and 7.2. 5.2 The travel speed of the waste package transporter is assumed to be , . Rationale: This assumption is based on an average of an operator. . . The maximum travel speed. for the waste package transporter is as reported in Emplacement and Retrieval System Description Document (BSC 2004d, Section 3.1 .3.l .2). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.6.1. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado~Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis The maximum number of trips is an estimated trips per year for the waste package transporter to travel from the DTF to the subsurface. Rationale: This assumption is based on an estimated waste packages containing DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and ' waste packages containing commercial SNF, as reported in Initial Radionuclide Inventories (BSC 2004e, Table 17). The ratio of the total ." waste package inventory to the commercial SNF waste package inventory is 1.497; (=[7,472+3,7 12117,472). The maximum number of waste packages loaded with commercial SNF in any single year is 365.5 (CRWMS M&O 2000, ~ttachment' III). Therefore, the total maximum loading in any single year for both commercial SNF and DOE high-level radioactive waste (HLW) is about waste packages; [=365.5 (1.497)]. The assumed trips and one trip per one waste package are conservative. I This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.6.1,6.6 and 7.4. The travel speed of the site-specific cask transporter is approximately Rationale: This assumption is based on Design Evolution Study-Aging Options (McDaniel2002, Section 3.2.1). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.6.2. The number of trips for the site-specific cask transporter to travel to the waste aging area from the DTF or back is estimated to be Rationale: This assumption is based on loading a maximum of 3,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) for aging for a particular year, as reported in Project Functional and Operational Requirements (Curry 2004, Table A-2) and loading dTHM per waste package (McDanie12002, Section 3.2.1.4), thus dividing 3,000 by resulting in The 3000 MTHM is not all for aging, however, it is the most conservative value used for determining the number of trips. This results in a total of trips going and trips returning for a total of , trips. The trips apply to a site-specific cask transporter traveling fiom the CHF or Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) to the waste aging area and back .- are bounding. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.6.2 and 7.5. 5.6 A normalized mean missile impact parameter (Y) value of Per unit target area per tornado point strike frequency is assumed for large structures at the repository site. Rationale: This assumption is based on a normalized value for large structures in the NRC tornado intensity Regions I and I1 (Crarnond et al. 1987, Table 4-la). This value is representative and conservative for buildings in NRC Region III. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.1. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis 5.7 A normalized mean value of' per unit target area per tornado point strike frequency is assumed for small targets of approximately 100 to 1000 A* in size, such as transporters. Rationale: This assumption is based on a normalized value for high exposure targets with a weighting factor of 1.0 (Crarnond et al. 1987, Table 4-lb). This value is representative and conservative. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.2. 5.8 The dimensions of the DTF (including the Remediation Facility as part of the DTF) are assumed to be the same as the building.dimensions shown in Attachment A, Figures A-1 and' A-2. Rationale: This assumption is based on a preliminary DTF design. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.1 to calculate the target area of the DTF for tornado missile strike. 5.9 Two DTFs are assumed to be located at approximately the s ~ e location as are the DTFs shown in Attachment A, Figure A-3. Rationale: This assumption is based on a preliminary DTF design. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.1 to calculate the target area of the DTF for tornado missile strike. This as&nption is also used in Sections 6.4.6.1 and 5.10 to . determine the travel distances for different transporters. 5.10 The maximum travel distance of a waste package transporter fiom the exit vestibule of the DTF 2 ,to the North Portal is estimated to be Rationale: This assumption is based on scaling the longest distance fiom DTF 2 to the North Portal (Attachment A, Figure A-3). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.6.1. 5.1 1 The maximum travel distance of a site-specific cask transporter from the exit vestibule of DTF 2 to the furthest aging pad (AGP), which has . rows, is estimated to be Rationale: This assumption is based on scaling the longest distance fiom a DTF to the waste AGP area (Attachment A, Figure A-7). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.6.2. October 2004 Extreme Wind~Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis 5.12 The DTF is assumed to have five surfaces, consisting of four sides and a roof, for the tornado missile target area calculation. Any , structures on the top of the roof, for housing maintenance equipment, are not included in the target area calculations. Rationale: This assumption is based on the fact that a missile can not The same assumption is used for calculating the target areas of other large .." structures, such as the CHF, DTF (including Remediation Facility), and FHF, excluding , and protected surfaces. I I This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1 -1. 5.13 The site-specific cask is used to transport SNF to and fiom the DTF and Aging Facility as reported in SNF Aging System Description Document (BSC 2004f, Section 4.2.3.3). Dimensions of an site-specific cask are assumed to be and based on a HI-STAR type cask reported in ~ a i k Receipt and Return System Description Document (BSC 2004g, Table 4-7). The HI-STAR type cask is the representative of the site-specific cask and is the information available for use at the time of this analysis. Rationale: The size of the site-specific cask is used for the target surface calculation because no information is available for the size of the site-specific cask transporter. A bounding transporter size is used for tornado missile screening (Section 7.6). I This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.2. 5.14 For the tornado missile target area calculation, the transportation cask buffer area a (TCBA) is an with the assumed dimensions of r Rationale: These dimensions conservatively bound the , as shown in Facility Location Calculation (BSC 2004h Sheet No. 6). ~ h k estimated to be approximately to account for the of site rail transfer cart (SRTC). The conservatively bounds the of approximately as shown in Navy Event Drop Heights (Cogema 2004, p. 21). The consists of (1) fiom the base of the cask to the top of the trench, that being (2) of the cask, that being , and (3) of the difference in the of the cask and the impact limiter, that being ,. (Cogema 2004, p. 8). The enclosed structure assumption is based on the SRTC remaining stationary while being staged on the TCBA. Assuming that the TCBA is always at full capacity, the envelope of SRTCs is treated as a tornado missile target area. The is also used in the surface area calculat~on for the railroad car staging (RCS) area and the truck staging (TSG) area. The ground of the structure is excluded fiom target area calculations because tornado missiles can not This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.4. October 2004 Extreme WindlTornadolTornado Missile Hazard Analysis The dimensions of the RCS area (Attachment A, Figure A-3, Area 33A) are estimated to be Rationale: These dimensions are based on the graphic scale in Attachment A, Figure A-3, which shows that the , of the tracks is approximately and the is about section, which corresponds to I -.- - The Light is assumed to be (Assumption 5.14). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.5. Dimensions of the TSG area (Attachment A, Figure A-3, Area 33B) are estimated to be Rationale: These dimensions are based on the graphic scale of Area 33B in Attachment A, Figure A-3. The is assumed to be (Assumption 5.14). This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.6. Dimensions of the CHF are assumed to be the same as those shown in Attachment A, Figures A-4 and A-5. Rationale: This assumption is based on a preliminary design. This assumption is used in Section 6.4.4.1.2 to calculate thaarget area of the CHF. The surface target area of an AGP is calculated by assuming that horizontal aging modules (HAMS) and vertical site-specific casks are enclosed by a box with five sides; the,bottom side of the box is excluded because it is touching the ground. Rationale: This approach is conservative as opposed to calculating the surface area for each cylindrical HAM and site-specific cask. The detailed calculation is provided in Section 6.4.4.1.3. 6. ANALYSIS The hazard analyses presented in this report focus on: a The basis for selecting the design basis wind speeds for extreme wind and tornado a The calculations of tornado missile probability screening a The basis for selecting the missile spectrum for designing ITS SSCs The basis for establishing minimum thickness of concrete or steel missile baniers to prevent effects of impact on ITS SSCs by the design-basis missile spectrum. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.1 EXTREME WINDS The typical method to show design compliance for SSCs that have to withstand the effects of extreme winds is provided in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Sections 2.3.1 and 3.3.1). The 100- year return period fastest mile of wind, including vertical velocity distribution and gust factor, should be used based on American National Standards Institute (ANSI) design load standards ." considering local corrections (NRC 1987, Sections 2.3.1 and 3.3.1). After the issuance of NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Sections 2.3.1 and 3.3. I), the building industry adopted a 3-s gust to calculate wind loads, no longer using the fastest mile speed, in accordance with the present standard on design loads, Section C6.5.4 of ASCE 7-98, used by the National Weather Service in its reporting practices. .Figure 6-1 of ASCE 7-98 contains a map of basic wind speed values for the United States and identifies special wind regions to be examined for unusual wind conditions; one region includes the Yucca Mountain area. The default value for much of the continental United States is 90 mph. Data of the observed maximum daily 3-s gust wind speed for the 5-year period of 1998 through 2002 (BSC 2004c) was collected at the Yucca Mountain 60-m meteorological tower, Site 1, located approximately 1 krn south of the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility. This location represents terrain exposure similar to that of the planned surface facility area on the western side of Midway Valley (BSC 2003, Addendum A). Data for the 5-year period was collected and analyzed in accordance with the quality assurance program (BSC 2004c, Section 4). The estimated basic wind speed of a 3-s gust, the standard deviation, and the upper 90 percent confidence interval speed for the 50- and 100-year return ' periods are presented in Table 1 (BSC 2004~). This analysis was performed to determine whether estimates of extreme wind speeds using onsite data exceed default values. Table 1. Maximum Estimated Wind Speeds Near Yucca Mountain, Nevada ~ecurrence ' , Interval years 50 100 Design Basis Extreme Wind Speed-A design basis wind speed of 90 mph is used for SSCs (ASCE 7-98, Figure 6-1 and Section 6.5.4.1). Special Wind Regions in mountainous areas, including the Yucca Mountain area, are identified in Figure 6-1 of ASCE 7-98. The 90-mph wind speed is conservative and envelops the 80.5 mph, shown in Table 1, calculated as the standard deviation value for a 100-year return period. This analysis provides the rationale for selecting the design basis extreme wind speed and supersedes previous analyses. Basic Wind Speed mph 66.3 68.9 October 2004 Source: BSC 2004c Basic Wind . Speed rnls 29.6 30.8 Upper 90% Confidence Interval "'Ph 72.0 75.2 Standard : Deviation rnls 1.52 1.68 Three Standard Deviations mPh 76.4 80.1 Upper 90% Confidence Interval rnls 32.2 33.6 Extreme Wind/T'~mado~omado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.2 TORNADO 6.2.1. Tornado Data The intensity of a tornado is normally measured by the Fujita Scale shown in Table 2. The Fujita Scale rates the intensity of a tornado based on the damage caused, not by its size. Meteorologists often classify FO and F1 tornadoes as weak tornadoes, F2 and F3 tornadoes as strong tornadoes, and F4 and F5 tornadoes as violent tornadoes. Light object missiles are generated by F2 tornadoes, while progressively larger missiles are generated by F3, F4, and F5 tornadoes. Very heavy missiles, such as cars, require an F4 or F5 tornado. Table 2. The Fujita Scale of,Tornado Intensity Level of Damage Chimneys damaged; tree branches broken off; shallow-rooted trees pushed over; sign boards damaged. Wind Speed (mph) 40 to 72 , F-Scale Number FO F 1 Roof surfaces peeled off; mobile homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos pushed off road. 1 Intensity , Descriptor Gale Tornado Significant 1 113101.7 , Moderate Tornado 73 to 112 Tornado F3 Roofs tom off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars pushed over; large trees snapped or uprooted; light object missiles generated. Roofs and some walls tom off well constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy cars l i e d off the ground and thrown. Well-constructed houses leveled; weak foundation structures relocated; cars thrown and large missiles generated. Strong frame houses lifted off foundation and carried considerable distance to disintegrate; trees debarked; automobile-sized projectiles hurtle through the air in excess of 100 yards; other incredible phenomena expected. Not provided. Severe Tornado ' F6 Source: 'Fast Facts about Tornadoes" (NOAA 2002). 158 to 206 The Yucca Mountain region lies in the south-central part of the Basin and Range Physiographic Province and is within the northernmost subprovince, commonly referred to as the Great Basin, ' that encompasses nearly all of Nevada, as well as adjacent parts of. Utah, Arizona, and California, as reported in the Yucca Mountain Site Description (Simmons 2004, Figure 2-1). Inconceivable Tornado Table 3 lists the counties enveloped by the Great Basin. Data about tornado occurrences in the counties within the Great Basin area of Nevada, and portions of Utah, Arizona, and California, from January I, 1950, to September 30,2003, were compiled from Deng (2004a to 2004d). 319 to 379 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis Table 3. List of Counties in the Great Basin I I I California Modoc, Lassen, Plumas, Sierra, Nevada, Placer, El Dorado, Alpine, Arnador, Mono; Inyo, San Bernardino State Arizona Counties Mohave I Utah I Box Elder, Tooele, Juab, Millard, Beaver, Iron, Washington Nevada Sources: Deng 2004a to 2004d Washoe, Hurnboldt. Elko, Storey, Pershing, Lander, Eureka, White Pine, Douglas. Lyon, Mineral, Esrneralda, Nye, Lincoln, Carson City, Clark, Churchill Table 4 shows the results o'f the compiled data with 84 tornadoes rated FO, 27 tornadoes rated Fly two tornadoes rated F2, and zero tornadoes rated F3. Twenty-seven tornadoes were unclassified. There were no F2 or F3 tornadoes reported in the State of Nevada @eng 2004~). Table 4. Tornado Occurrences In the Great Basin Area of Nevada, and In Portions of Utah, Arizona,.and California, from January 1, 1950, to September 30, 2003 Nevada ' I 11 1 48 ( 1 0 ( 0 1 o( 69 State Arizona California Utah I 7 1 1 5 1 4 1 O I O 1 26 Unclassified 1 8 Sources: Deng 2004a to 2004d Total Three of the FO tornadoes reported closest, to Yucca Mountain were in Nye County. The first tornado occurred 29 mi south-south-east of Yucca Mountain on July 16, 1987, the second tornado occurred 12 mi south-south-west of Yucca Mountain on July 7, 1991, and the third tornado occurred 69 mi north-north-west of Yucca Mountain on August 6,1992. FO 6 15 The NRC issued guidance on tornado strike and intensity probabilities in NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986), based on 30 years of data contained in the National Severe Storms Forecast Center tornado database fi-om the period of January 1, 1954, to December 3 1, 1983. The report contains tornado characteristics, including the number of occurrences, frequencies of occurrence, and average dimensions for the contiguous United States, as well as 5-degree and I-degree latitude and longitude boxes. 27 . October 2004 F1 7 6 84 27 2 F2 0 2 0 140 F3 0 0 Total 14 31 Extreme Wind~Tomado~ornado Missile Hazard Analvsis No high-intensity tornado has occurred at the repository site. Table 5 provides the Fujita Scale and a summary of reported tornadoes pertaining to the repository site (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). Table 5 indicates no recorded tornadoes for the 1-degree latitude and longitude box containing the repository site for the 30-year reporting period. Twenty-five tornadoes were reported for the 5-degree latitude and longitude box that contains the repository site and part of California. Seventeen of the 25 tornadoes are classified by intensity with the worst case being " three F2 tornadoes. The number of unclassified tornadoes is included in the total used to . determine point strike probabilities. Table 5. Number of ~ornadoes From 1954 to 1983 ~ertainin~ to the ~epositoty Site I NOTE: 'Unclassified refers to tornadoes that were observed but with insufficient data to pemit classification by Fujita Scale. Source: NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). Description 1-degree latitude. and longitude box 5-degree latitude and longitude box State of Nevada Table 3-2 of DOE-STD-1020-2002 provides recommendations for selecting wind speeds .corresponding to straight winds and tornadoes for DOE facilities, such as the Nevada Test Site, that are contiguous to the repository site. Based on Table 3-2 of DOE-STD-1020-2002, no tornado is specified for the Nevada Test Site in any structure, system, or component (SSC) performance category group, which provides additional assurance that a tornado is not a concern' for the repository site. 6.2.2 Tornado Design Basis Wind Speed FO 0 8 6 The only tornadoes reported close to Yucca Mountain during the 12-year period were three FO tornadoes in Nye County (Section 6.2.1). An FO tornado corresponds to the highest wind speed of 72 mph (Section 6.2.1, Table 2). Although historically no high intensity tornado has occurred at the repository site, a conservative approach is used for the selection of a design basis tornado wind speed as described in the following paragraphs. The maximum tornado wind speed for a given probability of occurrence is determined in NUREGXR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986) as follows: Fl 0 6 3 . . . where, P, = the probability of tornado occurrence per year for intensity i PS = tornado point strike probability per year PI = tornado intensity probability. 000-00C-WHSO-00100-000-00B 17 of48 October 2004 w F2 0 3 0 F3 0 0 0 F4 0 0 0 F5 0 . . 0 . 0 F6, ' 0 ' 0 0 Unclassified* 0 8 11 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis A Weibull probability distribution was developed to correlate the tornado wind speed and PI for the eastern and western regions of the United States (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). This guidance provides an approach for the repository to use the intensity distribution of reported tornadoes west of the Rocky Mountains, resulting in a higher proportion of severe tornadoes than have been observed near the repository. I If IE-6 per year is used as P,,,, for the repository, then the PI value correlates to a maximum tornado wind speed. as determined using the Weibull distribution for the western United States. Using this approach with Ps, the maximum tornado wind speed is shown to be 189 mph (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986, Figure 33), based on the upper 90 percent confidence level of the point strike probability for the 5-degree box. Using the same approach, Table 6 lists the wind speeds provided for 1E-5, 1E-6, and 1E-7 per year probabilities of occurrence for the 5-degree box as determined by NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986, Figures 30 to 34). Table 6 shows the nominal or expected values and the value associated with the upper end of the 90 percent confidence interval for strike probabilities (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986, Figures 30, 33, and 34). Statistically, this latter value is interpreted as the maximum value in a range that has a 90 percent chance of containing * the true strike probability based on the threshold limit for credibility of 1E-6 per year and on the information provided in Table 6. I Table 6. Tornado Wind Speed (rnph) for 5-Degree,Box Containing Yucca Mountain, Nevada . . . Strike Probability of Occurrence per Year (P,=) 1 E-5 1 E-6 1 E-7 Nominal Wind Speed' mph NP 131 NP Upper 90% Wind Speed* 151 189 189 mnh NOTE: Wind speed is the sum of the translational and rotational components. NP = Not provided. Source: NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986. Figures 30 to 34). I , , The maximum wind speed value corresponding to. IE-6 per year selected is 189 mph. Although 1E-6 per year is used as the probability screening criteria for missiles (Section 4.2), in terms of selecting the maximum wind speed of 189 mph, as shown in Table 6, the wind speed corresponding to 1E-6 is greater than the wind speed corresponding to 2E-6, based on the value of 15 1 mph at 1 E-5. Thus the selection of I 89 mph is more conservative. I 6i2.3 Design Basis Tornado Wind Speed and Pressure Drop The design basis tornado wind speed for the repository site is selected as 189 mph (Section 6.2.2, Table 6), corresponding with a frequency of occurrence of 1E-6 per year (Section 6.2.2). For a 1 189-mph wind speed, the corresponding pressure drop is 0.81 Ib per in.' and the rate of pressure drop is 0.3 lb per in.2 per second, which are calculated using Equations 2 and 3. October 2004 Extreme WjndlTornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis The maximum pressure drop (pounds-force per square-inch) values are calculated frpm the total and translation speeds as (ANSVANS-2.3-1983, Table 3.3-1, Footnote): where, Vt = V - T = tangential wind speed at the edge of the vortex; speed of the funnel moving across the ground, mph V = maximum wind speed; 189 mph fiom Section 6.2.2, Table 6 T = maximum translational speed. The 189 mph wind speed (Section 6.2.2, Table 6) represents the sum of translational and rotational components. Component speed, however, was not evaluated in NLTREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986, p. 53), therefore the value of the translational speed was estimated Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.76, which gives the values of V &d T for the tornado Regions I, I1 and 111. The average of the ratio of maximum tornado wind speed to the corresponding translational speed given in Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.76. Using this ratio, the estimated translation speed for a tornado speed of 189 mph is 38 mph (56 Ws). &plying Equation 2 to these wind speeds yields an estimated pressure drop of 0.81 psi as ~follows: Vt= 189-38= 151 mph AP = 3.546 x low5 V; = 3.546 x lo-' x (151)~ = 0.81 psi The rate of pressure drop @si/s) is calculated using Equation 3, as follows (ANSVANS-2.3-1983, Section 3.3): where, AP= pressure drop (psi) T = maximum translational speed (Ws) R = radius of a tornado. Using the standard tornado vortex size of 150 A given in Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.76, because no tornado vortex size kgiven in NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986), the corresponding rate of pressure drop of 0.3 psi/s is calculated as: . October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.3 TORNADO MISSILE SCREENING METHODOLOGY Tornado missile screening uses the methodology in NUREG/CR-47 10 (Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G), which is based on the point strike probabilities of the tornado and tornado missiles. Details of the screening calculations are provided in Section 6.3.1. 6.3.1 Tornado Missile Impact Probability (Pmi) Pmi, the annual probability of a tornado missile impacting a given target on the repository site, is calculated by Equation 4: pmi = (PSI (Pm) (Eq. 4) where, P, = tornado point strike probability per year P, = fi-equency of tornado missiles striking a particular target, given a tornado strike at the repository site. The approach for calculating P, is taken from NUREGKR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). The approach for calculating P, is from NUREGICR-47 10 (Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G). Calculations are presented in the following sections. 6.3.2 Tornado Point Strike Probability (Pa NUREGKR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986) provides a formula to calculate the tornado wind, not missile, point strike probability, as: ps = At 1 [(A,) W,)] (Eq. 5) where, Ps . = the annual tornado wind point strike probability of any intensity A, = the total area affected by tornadoes A, = the area of the region, such as the region covered in the 5-degree box N, = the number of years in the period of record for which the tornado area was determined. , , N, is 30 years corresponding to 1954 to 1983 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). The parameter At is the product of the number of tornado events and a measure -of the area affected by each tornado, termed the event area (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). The event area is an expected area or an average area. The expected area is calculat'ed fiom a distribution, typically a lognormal distribution, resulting in a mean or expected value that is a large event area. The average area is an arithmetic average of observed or estimated areas of actual occurrences October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis and, therefore, is computed fiom a small sample. When the form of the distribution is known, the. expected value is a better estimate of the true mean than is' the arithmetic average. When the number of reported tornadoes becomes too small, however, the expected values may also be in error even when the form of distribution is correct., Based on the small number of tornadoes reported for the repository site (Section 6.2.1), the average area is the better choice for calculating the tornado strike probability. The 5-degree. box centered on latitude 37.5" north and longitude 117.5" west contains the repository site (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). The 5-degree box provides a P, value of 5.59E-7 per year, based on an average tornado area ( ~ k s d e l l and Andrews 1986, Appendix D, p. D-13). , This P, value is used as the tornado strike probability for the repository site and is considered . . appropriate for a risk-informed screening of tomado missiles (Section 6.5). I.. , 6.3.3 Tornado Missile Strike ~ r e ~ u e n t y ' ( ~ 3 The methodology for calculating P, for structures and components .(Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G) has been used by some nuclear power utilities, such as Calvert Cliffs, Oc.onee, and St. Lucie, to calculate the missile strike probabilities in probabilistic risk assessments. Based on NUREGICR-47 1 0 (Cramond et al. 1 987, Appendix G), the P, is defined as: where, P, = frequency of tornado missile striking a particular target at the repository site given a tornado strike A = the exposed surface area of the targets in question in # Nm = the number of candidate missiles Y = the missile impact parameter, defined 'as the frequency of impact per number of missiles per unit target area per tornado point strike frequency. The Y values are normalized based on the following (Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G): 0 Size of targets 0 Relative Fujita Scale distribution in the region surrounding the site 0 Type and location of missiles a Arrangement of buildings and location of missile targets. The Y values were normalized for the previously listed variables using data fiom two nuclear power plants (Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G) for NRC tornado intensity Regions I and I1 (Regulatory Guide 1.76). When normalizing data for the two plants, the relative Fujita Scale distribution between Regions 1 and I1 does not have a significant affect on the Y values. The repository is in Region 111, thus Y values derived for Regions I and I1 are conservative for application to the repository site. Extreme Wind/Tomado/T'omado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.4 MISSILE IMPACT PROBABILITY (Pmi) CALCULATIONS FOR THE REPOSITORY SITE Missile impact probability calculations, using methodology in NUREGICR-4710 (Cramond et al. 1987, Appendix G), are discussed in Sections 6.4.1 to 6.4.7. 6.4.1 Y Value for Large Structures Large structures refer to buildings in that would be exposed to tornado missiles. NUREGICR-47 10 (Cramond et al. 1987, Table 4-1 a) provides a normalized mean Y value of 1.23E-10 impact-missile-unit target area tornado point strike frequency for large structures (Assumption 5.6). This normalized mean value is used for buildings. 6.4.2 Y Value for Small Targets Small targets refer to equipment in that would be exposed to a tornado missile. Three normalized mean Y values for different degrees of exposure have been derived 'for small targets of approximately 100 to 1000 A' in size (Cfarnond et al. 1987, Table 4-lb), as follows: High exposure: per missile per ft2 of target area per tornado point strike frequency. Medium exposure: per missile per ft2 of target area per tornado point strike frequency. Low exposure: per missile per ft2 of target area per tornado point strike frequency. Exposure is .defined as the exposure area of the targets relative to the population and location of the missiles, normally based on a site survey and judgement. NUREGICR-4710 (Cramond et al. 1987, p. G-37) uses weighting factors of 0.1 for high, 0.4 for medium, and 0.5 for low exposures. The weighted sum of high, medium, and low exposures is 2.84E-10. For the purposes of this analysis, a conservative high exposure value of 2.42E-9 with a weighting factor of 1.0 is used (Assumption 5;7). 6.4.3 Number of Missiles (N,) A detailed survey and a walkdown of areas surrounding the site determine the number of candidate missiles that could to SSCs. Because such data are not currently available, the following distribution of missjles is based upon engineering judgement and representative information from NUREGICR-4710 (Cramond et al. 1987, p. G-37): Probability Weifitinq Number of Missiles (N,) October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis A probabilistic risk assessment for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant used a weighted average (Crarnond et al. 1987, p. G-37), as follows: = (0.2)(5000) + (0.6)(25,000) + (0.2)(60,000) = 28,000 Because the types and numbers of objects sur&unding the repository site cannot be determined at this time, the largest number of I missiles with a probability of is used. This is conservative because there are more missiles surrounding eastern nuclear power plant sites than are expected at the repository site (Assumption 5.1). 6.4.4 Target Areas A target area for missile impact is defined as the total structure or component. of the 6.4.4.1 Large Structures Large structures are buildings that house located in an at the repository , site that would be exposed to a tornado missile. Only structures that or SNF or HLW are considered, which consist of the AGPs, c I ~ , DTF, TCBA, RCS area, and TSG'area. 6.4.4.1.1 DTF Target Area For calculating the target area of a DTF (Remediation Facility is part of DTF), only the operations are housed are considered. These sections form a six- . .. . , .. sided large box with a roof, ground floor, and four sides. In the target area calculations, however, the ; is not included because missiles cannot (Assumption 5.12). The entrance vestibule, of the transport cask receiving side of the DTF, is fiom the missile strike probability calculation, because waste forms are to a missile strike (i.e., shipping casks are intact and no SNF transfer operations are performed in the area). The area of the wall on the transport cask receiving side is included in target area calculations, because the area within the DTF adjacent to the exit vestibule .is used for housing open transport casks. Using the dimensions shown in Attachment A, Figures A-l and A-2 (Assumption 5.8), target area calculations for the DTF (including Remediation Facility) are as follows: Target area of one DTF = 2 (Length x Height) + 2 (Height x Width) + (Length x Width) = 2 (492 x 100) + 2 (1 00 x 442) + (492 x 442) = 98,400 + 88,400 + 21 7,464 = 404,264 f12. Wall thicknesses are not considered ,for target area calculations because they have negligible effect on thetotal surface area; wall thicknesses are not given in Attachment A, Figure A-I. October 2004 Extreme Wind/TornadoK'ornado Missile Hazard Analysis I 6.4.4.1.2 CHF Target Area Canister operations areas of the CHF are enclosed by concrete walls, shown between column lines C and D and between column lines 2 and 8 in Attachment A, Figure A-4. These areas are protected by the concrete walls of other rooms surrounding the canister operations areas. The only exceptions are the roof and the inside concrete walls in the entrance and exit vestibules . '' that are connected to the main building concrete walls. The roof is not protected, as shown in Attachment A, Figure A-5, Section B. Other rooms where canisters are handled are Rooms 101 1 and 1042 (Attachment A, Figure A-4). Roofs and concrete walls protect these rooms (Attachment A, Figure A-4 and Figure A-6, Section H). t . Thus, the missile strike calculation considers only the roof and the inside concrete walls of the entrance and the exit vestibules (Attachment A, Figure A-4, shown between column lines C and D and between column lines 2 and 8). The entrance and the exit vestibules rue steel structures and are treated separately for a tornado missile strike (Section 6.7 and 6.8). I The CHF target area is calculated, excluding the ground concrete slab floor, as follows: I (A) CHF Dimensions (Attachment A: Figure A-4, .Assumption 5.1 7) I (Al) Roof Dimensions: Length = 309 A Width = 64 A Surface Area = Length x Width = (309)(64) = 19,776 ft2 (A2) Concrete Walls Inside the Entrance and Exit Vestibules Dimensions: Width = 64 A Height = 64 A Surface k e a = 2(Width x Height) = 2(64)(64) = 8,192 A* I (B) Total CHF surface Area I Wall thicknesses are not considered for target area calculations because they have negligible effect on the total surface area; wall thicknesses are not given in Attachment A, Figure A-4. I 6.4.4.1.3 Aging Pad Target Area The AGP design uses HAMS and site-specific casks for horizontal and vertical aging (BSC 2004f, Sections 3.1 .I .3 and 3.1.2.1). To calculate the tomado.missile target surface area, HAMS and site-specific casks are assumed to be enclosed by a five-sided box (Assumption 5.18). The target surface area calculation is as follows: October 2004 Extreme WindlTomado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis Dimensions of the five-sided box: There are five rows of AGPs with each pad consiskg of 20 horizontal HAMS and 80 vertical site-specific casks (BSC 2004f, Section 3.1.2.1). It is assumed that these HAMS and site-specific casks in each row are enclosed by a box structure (Assumption 5.18). The dimensions of the box are (Attachment A, Figure A-7): Length: 800 A Width: 750 A Height: 20 A 7 in. (= 20.58 A) (Chopra 2003, Table 1.2-1) Surface area of the box: Based on the previous dimensions, the surface area of one box is: = 2(Length x Height) + 2(Height x Width) + (Length x Width) = 2 (800 x 20.58) + 2 (20.58 x 750) + (800 x 750) = 32,928 + 30,870 + 600,000 = 663,798 A2 Total surface area of the entire Aging Facility: The maximum possible design capacity of the Aging Facility for calculation purposes, (BSC 2004f, Section 3.1.1.3), can be accommodated by a total of eight box structures (Attachment A, Figure A-7). Thus, the total surface area of the entire Aging Facility is approximately: Surface area = 5-31 E6 ft2 (= 663,798 x 8) = 5,310,384 z 5.3 lE6 f12 A single row of AGPs near the CHF and DTF (Attachment A, Figure A-7) is included in the box structure with four rows for target area calculation, which results in a negligible difference between the total surface area of a single row versus the total surface area of four rows. 6.4.4.1.4 Transportation Cask Buffer Area Target Area Dimensions of the TCBA (BSC 2004h, Sheet No. 6) are approximately 610 ft by 140 A with a height of 20 ft (Assumption 5.14). Thus, ~ a r ~ e t Area = 2 (Length x Height) + 2 (I%ight x width)+ (Length x Width) =2(61Ox20)+2(2Ox 1'40)+(610x 140)= 115,400ft2 6.4.4.1.5 Railroad Car Staging Target Area Dimensions of the RCS area are approximately 900 A by 100 A with a height of20 A (Assumption 5.1 5). Thus, Target Area = 2 (Length x Height) + 2 (Height x Width) + (Length x Width) = 2 (900x 20) + 2 (20 x 100) + (900 x 100) = 130,000 ft2 October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis ~ 6.4.4.1.6 Truck Staging Target Area Dimensions of the TSG area are 200 A by 100 A (Assumption 5.16) with a height of 20 A (Assumption 5.1 5). Thus, Target Area = 2 (Length x Height) + 2 (Height x Width) + (Length x Width) = 2 (200 x 20) + 2 (20 x 100) + (200 x 100) = 32,000 ft2 I 6.4.4.1.7 Transportation Cask ReceiptJReturn Facility I A target area calculation is not performed for the surface area of the TCRRF because the TCRRF is already for a tornado missile strike (Section 6.5.1) by calculations for larger ITS structures, such as the CHF and DTF (Sections 6.4.4.1.2 and 6.4.4.1.1). I 6.4.4.2 Small Targets -- --- Small targets refer to equipment located in that contains that could be ' exposed to a tornado missile. Equipment that - . . SNF or HLW is not considered in this analysis regardless of its size, whereas the waste package transporter and site-specific cask transporter are considered because the waste package transporter cames SNF or HLW from the DTF to the subsurface and the site-specific cask transporter carries SNF or HLW from the DTF to the waste aging area. I Target areas of these transporters are calculated as follows: I (A) Waste Package Transporter The waste package transporter is treated as a box that contains a waste package based on dimensions from Emplacement and Retrieval General Arrangement Waste Package Transporter (BSC 2004i). Five sides of the box with the exception of the bottom are considered .for the surface area calculation; the bottom side of the waste package transporter sits on a railway and - . by a tornado missile. Thus, Surface Area = 2(Length x Height) + 2(Height x Width) + (Length x Width) = 2(21.917 x 14.917) + 2(l4.917 x 7.344) + (21.917 x 7.344) = 2(326.94) + 2(109.55) + 160.9 = 653.88+219.10+160.9= 1 , 0 3 4 ~ ~ (B) Site-specific Cask Transporter Surface Area = Cylindrical Area + Top and Bottom Areas of Cylinder = n(Diameter x Height) + 2n(Radius) = n(8 x 16.94) + 21r(4l2 = 526 ft2 (Assumption 5.13) October 2004 Extreme Wind/TornadofTomado Missile Hazard Analysis Cask on an SRTC Transportation casks sitting on SRTCs can be staged in the TCBA. Because casks are exposed to an open area, they are vulnerable to a tornado missile strike. The TCBA is screened in as a structure for missile strike (Section 6.5.3). If a cask meets the required minimum penetration thickness, however, as discussed in Section 6.9, then the contents inside a cask can be protected fiom missile strike. P, Values for tbe Repository Site Using the values of Y, N,, and'target areas for large structures and small targets presented in the previous sections, the P, values can be calculated using Equation 6 (Section 6.3.3). Table 7 provides a summary of P, results in the unit of frequency of tornado missiles striking a particular target per tornado point strike frequency; values are rounded. Table 7. Calculated P, Values for the M.onitored Geologic Repository Site NOTES: a P, value is defined and calculated by Equation 6 (Section 6.3.3). P, value is for 40 AGPs and is greater than 1.0 because of a large target area. P, value is for one DTF. AGP = aging pad; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DTF = dry transfer facility; RCS = railroad car staging area; TCBA = transportation cask buffer area; TSG = truck staging area. Large Structures 6.4.6 Equipment Exposure Factor (PeXpt) AGP CHF DTF RCS TCBA TSG The equipment exposure factor is the fraction of a year when equipment is exposed to a potential tornado strike. The equipment exposure time is based on the of equipment loaded with - - I During this time in the equipment is to getting hit by a tornado missile if a tornado were to strike the repository site at that time. October 2004 A (f?) , . - I Small Targets Nm Sitespecific Cask Transporter Waste Package Transporter ( Y -I ~ r n ~ - - - - - Extreme Wind/Tomado~omado Missile Hazard Analysis The exposure factor is calculated as follows: PeVt = (no. of days / trip) (no. of trips 1 year) (year / 365 days). (Eq. 7) The travel time is expressed as number of days per trip in Equation 7. If the travel time is expressed as hours or minutes, then conversion between days, hours, and minutes is required. 6.4.6.1 Waste Package Transporter Distance that a waste package transporter travels between I Dexp = (Assumptions 5.9 and 5.1 0) Waste package transporter travel speed, svt = (Assumption 5.2) Waste package transporter travel time per trip = Dexp 1 STt = per trip Total number of trips = per year (Assumption 5.3) Equipment Exposure Factor (Equation 5) Pexpt = I Site-specific Cask Transporter Distance that an site-specific cask transporter travels between a DTF building to waste aging area, Dexp = per trip (Assumption 5.1 1) Site-specific cask transporter travel speed, SMSCT = - . (Assumption 5.4) Site-specific cask transporter travel time per trip = , - - - Dexp / SMSCT = ,,--- per trip Total number of trips = per year (Assumption 5.5) Equipment Exposure Factor (Equation 7), Pexpt = ! October 2004 Extreme WindlTomadoflornado Missile Hazard Analysis The site-specific cask transporter makes two trips, one fiom a DTF to the aging area and one fiom the aging area back to a DTF after the aging process is completed. Some trips are made by site-specific cask transporters traveling fiom the CHF or FHF to the Aging Facility. Calculations of Pexpt are not made for the CHF and FHF, because the previously calculated Pexpt value of the DTF bounds the values of Pexpt for the CHF and FMF. 6.4.6.3 Loading a Dual-purpose Canister Into a HAM For a brief time, dual-purpose canisters are to an to a tornado missile strike while the dual-purpose canister is being 7 and loaded into a HAM. The probability of a . during this operation is calculated as follows to determine whether the probability of exposure can be screened out: (A) Operation Time The total operation time is and consists of the following operations (Migliore 2004, Table 1): 0 Transfer canister into HAM: 0 Replace cask top cover and ram access cover: (B) Exposure Factor (PeXpJ P,,, is calculated using Equation 7. Pexpt = (no. of days 1 trip) (no. of trips I year) (year 1 365 days) The total number of trips per year is based on Assumption 5.5, and there is one HAM loading or unloading operation per trip. Because HAM operation is only percent of . . the total aging operation, the number of trips for HAM operation is Thus, converting hours to minutes, pexpt = i 6.4.7 Tornado Missile Impact Probability (Pmi) The missile impact probability (Pmi) can be calculated for by multiplying P, by P, per Equation 4 (Section 6.3.1). Pmi is the annual probability of a tornado missile 4 " .- . 6.4.7.1 Large Structures . , P i values are calculated for laree structures using P, values (Section 6.4.5, Table 7) and the P, value. The P, value of: - - of a tornado strike for any point in the 5-degree box based on NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986, Section 6.3.2). Pmi results shown in Table 8 indicate that for large structures, with the exception of the AGPs, the Pmi values are less than " The probability of a tornado missile striking any of these structures, however, is the October 2004 Extreme WindlTomadoEornado Missile Hazard Analysis Thus, the collective Pmi value is for all large structures, including the probability for a tornado missile impact on The value oj is used for tornado missile screening compared to the screening criteria of 2E-6 (Sections 4.2 and 6.5) Table 8. Pd Values for Large Structures I STRUCTURE I PS 1 pm P ~ I I 6.4.7.2 Small Targets AGP CHF DTF RCS TCBA TSG The missile impact probability can be calculated for small targets or equipment by multiplying P, by P, and P,,,, equipment exposure probability (Equation 8): Ph values for small targets are calculated using P, values (Section 6.4.5, Table 7) and the P, NOTES: P,,i value is for one DTF. staging area. AGP = aging pad; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DTF = dry transfer facility; RCS = railroad car staging area; TCBA = transportation cask buffer area; TSG = truck ,A,.- (Section 6.3.2), along with the PeXpt values (Section 6.4.6). Table 9 shows that for small targets, the Pmi values are less than the threshold screening value of 2E-6 per year. - - ' . - - - Table 9. Pd Values for Small Targets I Small Targets Dual-purpose Canister (HAM operation) Site-specific Cask Transporter NOTE: HAM = horizontal aging monitor. PI I I Waste Package Transporter October 2004 - - - I P, Pcxpt P ~ I I Extreme WindlTornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis I 6.5 TORNADO MISSILE SCREENING BASED ON IMPACT PROBABILITY Tornado missile impact probability screening treats a tornado strike as an initiating event and treats the generation of a missile and a missile strike on an SSC as part of an event sequence. The joint probability of a tornado strike and a missile striking an SSC gives an annual probability of an event sequence. The screening criterion of per year (Section 4.2) is used to determine . the credibility of a missile striking an SSC. The probabilities of a missile generation and a missile striking a given target area are combined in the parameter Y. The Y value used in calculating the missile strike probability is norinalized, using parameters related to Y collected at nuclear sites in the eastern United States (Cramondet al. 1987, Appendix G). The final normalized Y values are to the Fujita Scale distribution (Crarnond et al. 1987, p. G-35) and are because the contribution of large Fujita Scale tornadoes, meaning those greater than an tornado, for the 5-degree box (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). 6.5.1 Large Structures Pfi values are less than ler year for large structures containing (Section 6.4.7.1, Table 8), with the exception of AGPs where large numbers of HAMS and site-specific casks are used for aging 40,000 MTHM of SNF. If each structure is treated - from the missile strike, then each structure, with the exception of AGPs, is screened out of credible tornado missile strikes. The probability of a tornado missile striking a large structure, however, is the sum of the probabilities of all the large structures, resulting in a collective probability of - per year, including the probability value for (Section 6.4.7.1). The FHF and TCRRF building are large ITS structures. Independent analyses for the FI-IF and TCRRF are not performed because target area calculations for larger ITS structures, such as the CHF, DTF, and FHF have screened in these facilities for a tornado missile strike, which include the FHF and TCRRF. Collectively, ITS structures are of a credible tornado missile strike. ITS structures a tornado missile strike from missiles (Section 8) and waste packages inside an ITS structure from missiles. 6.5.2 Small Targets Small targets, such as the dual-purpose canister (HAM operation), site-specific cask transporter, and waste package transporter are screened out of credible tornado missile strikes, based on results showing that' Pmi values are less than per year for transporters containing SNF or. HLW (Section 6.4.7.2, Table 9). Each transporter is treated because transporters are always transient. When the strike probabilities for three targets are summed, the overall probability is less than per year, therefore no summation of the strike probabilities is necessary as provided for structures.. As a result, waste packages are of credible tornado missile strikes. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.5.3 Transportation Cask Buffer Area, and the Railroad Car Staging and Truck Staging Areas The RCS area, TCBA, and TSG area are treated as structures (Assumption 5.14) and are, therefore, . . of a tornado missile strike. l'ransportation casks in these areas a tornado missile strike. Impact limiters of a cask f7om a tornado missile strike; therefore, each type of transportation cask that its structure is not vulnerable to the assigned missile spectrum. specification on the metallic structure of a cask to tornado missiles is provided in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3, II.1.b) (Section 6.9). Section 6.9 provides a sample calculation on the of the cask outer steel shell using the formula in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3, Il.1 .b). 6.6 TORNADO WIND SCREENING The probability of strike from tornado wind (P*) for small targets such as the waste package transporter and site-specific cask transporter, considering their exposure factor (P,,,) as discussed'in Section 6.4.6,' can be calculated as shown in Table 10 (using the conservative P, value of 4.22E-6/year, Section 7.3). The results in Table 10 show that the waste package transporter and site-specific cask transporter out from a tornado wind strike at any wind speed because the P, values are below the screening criteria of. /year. Table 10. Tornado Wind Strike Probability for Transporteri 6.7 TRANSPORTATION CASK RESIDENCE TIME AT THE CHF, DTF, OR FHF ENTRANCE - Site-specific Cask Transporter Waste Package Transporter The structures at the entrance vestibules of the CHF, DTF, and FHF, where the transportation cask is received, are made of steel (Attachment A, Figures A-2, A-4, A-8, and A-9). When the transportation cask arrives at the entrance, the cask with the SNF canister ' missile strike unless the to provide a missile barrier or unless the transportation cask is designed to (Section 6.9). In the event that a given transportation cask is to be able to withstand tornado missiles, it is subject to a time onsite before it is moved inside the of a cask preparation area. The allowable time onsite is calculated as the allowable Using the probability screening criteria of per year, a allowable residence time of the cask at the entrance vestibule can be calculated. This residence time is the time limit'required to ensure that a tornado missile with a probability of per year a transportation cask. p s 000-00C-WHSO-00 100-000-00B 32 of 48 October 2004 - pex,, pt, - - Extreine Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile ~azard Analysis Using Equation 8, the maximum allowable Pcxpt is calculated as: where, using'the bounding value of waste package transporter (Table ,16) per year; conservative (Section 7.3) thus, I.. Pcxpt = : Because PeXpt is more than , a single transportation cask vhile still meeting the screening criteria of , per year, meaning that a single cask . of tornado missile considerations. . - A maximum of . casks is processed each year; therefore, the ; or: for each cask is calculated as: No. of hr I cask = P,,, I (no. of casks / year)(year I - where, No. of casks = maximum number of casks to be processed per year = conservative (Assumption I thus, No. of hr 1 cask = . / cask. The maximum allowable residence time per cask is , during which a transportation cask by a tornado missile with a probability of -xr year, If the number of casks to be processed is . , then the residence time is - .; 'if the cask demonstrates an ability to - a tornado missile strike, then the residence time 6.8 WASTE PACKAGE TRANSPORTER RESIDENCE TIME AT THE DTF OR AT THE CHF OR FHF EXIT VESTIBULES Structures at the CHF, DTF, and FHF exit vestibules are made , the transporter residence time, however, because the SNF or canisters are already loaded into a sealed waste package and are transported to the subsurface after the waste package has been loaded onto a transporter. Thus, for the tornado missile strike, the waste package transporter time fraction (P,,J applies in the (Section 6.4.6). October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado~ornado Missile Hazard Analysis 6.9 TRANSPORTATION CASK STEEL PENETRATION THICKNESS The penetration thickness from a tornado missile.for the transportation cask outer shell can be calculated using Equation 10, the Stanford Equation reported in U.S. Reactor Containment Technology, A Compilation of Current 'Practice in Analysis, Design, Construction, Test, and Operation (Cottrell and Savolainen ,1965, Section 6.6.2), which is referenced in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3, II.1.b). Using Equation 10, as follows, is more conservative than using the Ballistic Research Laboratory formula in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section III. 1 .b): where, E = critical kinetic energy required for penetration in A-lb D = missile diameter in in. S = ultimate tensile strength of target; cask steel in psi T = thickness of target steel in in. ' W = 8D; conservatively chosen (Cottrell and Savolainen 1965, Section 6.6.2). I The kinetic energy of a missile is calculated as: I where, g = gravitational constant = 32.2 ftk2 w = weight of missile in Ib v = velocity of missile in Ws. The missile penetration energy E is equated to the missile kinetic energy, E,,,, in Equation 10. The minimum thickness T, required to prevent penetration is obtained by solving Equation 10 for T. Given the type of Spectrum I1 missiles shown in Table 11 and the values for the associated parameters previously listed, a sample calculation on the penetration thickness of the steel can be performed using Equation 10. October 2004 Extreme Wind/TornadoiTomado Missile Hazard Analysis Table 11. Spectrum II Missiles NOTE: D = missile diameter in in. Source: NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4). associated with Tornado Region Ill. Horizontal Velocity (mls) - - I The results for a representative ultimate tensile strength of steel of 70,000 psi are shown in Table 12 (Mazurowski 2000, Table 2-7). The highest value of penetration thickness is 0.6 i n for a wood plank. Calculations will be performed for each type .of transportation cask to demonstrate that their structure meets or exceeds the minimum penetration thickness; a calculation is not performed for an automobile missile because it is not more penetrating than Dimensions (m) - - - - Missile A. Wood Plank B. 6-in. Schedule 40 Pipe C. 1-in. Steel Rod D. Utility Pole . E. 12-in. Schedule 40 Pipe F. Automobile small missiles. Mass (kg) I Table 12. ~ene'tration Thickness of Steel for Tornado Missiles 7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Parameters that can influence the outcome of the tornado missile probability screening are: Penetration 1hicknessb (in.) - - I - Missile impact parameter (Y) Number of missiles (N,) Tornado point strike probability (P,) NOTES: 'Spectrum Ii missiles, mass, diameter, and velocity per Table 10. b~alculated from Equations 10 and 11. Using the smallest thickness as the equivalent diameter, which is conservative from a penetrationenergy point of view. ~ l s s i l e ~ A. Wood Plank B. 6-in. Schedule 40 Pipe C. 1-in. Steel Rod D. Utility Pole E. 12-in. Schedule 40 Pipe October 2004 Diameter (in.) . Weight (kg) Velocity his) Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis Transporter travel distance and speed Bounding transporter size Exposure time fraction and missile strike target area. I Sensitivity evaluations on each parameter are presented in Sections 7.1 to 7.7. 7.1 MISSILE IMPACT PARAMETER 0 A high exposure value of per missile per A* of target area per tornado point strike fieauency with a weighting factor of is used to calculate the missile impact probability for targets (Section 6.4.2). Using weighting factors other than for high exposure and applying Y values for medium and low exposures would result in a Y value of (Section 6.4.2), which is almost than the value of used in the impact probability calculations. Thus, the value of' - is very , for calculating the missile impact probability for targets and no further change in Y value is considered. I 7.2 NUMBER OF MISSILES The number of missiles for a nuclear power plant is generally estimated fiom the number of the site. The sources of missiles include such as those for open areas for Because major buildings, such as the DTF and CHF, do not &rrently exist, the number of missiles that could be generated by a tornado is During the construction phase, when the FHF is completed and in operation, and a DTF or any other building is under construction, there could be (Assumption 5.1) that could become potential missiles. An estimatec missiles is based on NUREGICR-47 10 (Crarnond et al. 1987, Appendix G), which was used in the tornado missile impact analysis for the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and is believed to be conservative (Assumption 5.1). If the number of missiles is , then the Pmi value increases by a factor of , This still results in the of tornado impact for large structures and equipment because there is enough margin in the Pmi values as shown in Tables 8 and 9. I 7.3 TORNADO POINT STRIKE PROBABILITY Two values of tornado point strike probability (P,) are presented in NUREG/CR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986). The value of per year is based on the tornado expected area and is used to determine the maximum tornado wind speed. The value of per year is based on the tornado average area and is used for tornado missile probability screening. For maximum . wind speed determination, it is more use the expected area value. For missile probadility screening (Section 6.3.2), the tornado average area is used because no ' ' - tornadoes have been reported in the repository vicinity. Extreme Wind/Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis The P, value of per year, corresponding to the tornado expected area (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986), is used to calculate the resulting missile impact probability (Pi) (Section 6.3.3, Equation 6) presented in Table 13. No structure, except for the is screened out of a tornado missile strike when a tom value of per year is used (Table 13), which corresponds to the tornado expected area. Collectively, the probability that a structure is struck by a missile is the sum of the probabilities shown in Table 13 (i.e., per year), which screens in the AGPs, CHF, two DTFs, RCS area, TCBA, and TSG area for a tornado missile strike. targets are of the tornado missile strike when a P, value of year is used. Table 13; Pd Values Using the Tornado Strike Probability (P,) Value of 4.22E-61year Large AGP 1 CHF I DTF 1 RCS I TCBA 1 TSG 1 NOTES: AGP = aging pad; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DTF = dry transfer facility; RCS = railroad car staging area; TCBA = transportation cask buffer area; TSG = truck staging area. Structures Small Targets 7.4 WASTE PACKAGE TRANSPORTER TRAVEL DISTANCE AND SPEED Sensitivity analysis is performed to determine the distance for the waste package transporter to meet the probability screening criteria of by varying the ,of the waste package transporter. First, a maximum allowable P,,, value using Equation 9 (Section 6.7) is calculated as: Pexp = PA/ [Pm) Pd1 (Eq- 12) where, P~ = P, = using the bounding value of waste package transporter (Section 7.6) P, =. 'year; conservative (Section 7.3) thus, Pexpt = . . . . . - This means that a single, exposed waste package transporter is to a missile strike. are expected, however, because of the large number of trips per year. P,,, can be expressed as: Waste Package Transporter Dualpurpose Canister PeXpt = [(DeXp 1 SVt ) per trip] (number of trips) / [365 (24)] Site-specific Cask Transporter October 2004 Extreme WindrI"I'rnado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis where, thus, D,, = travel distance per trip in mi SVt = travel speed in mph D,, = P,,,, (S,J [365 (24)] 1 (number of trips). Table 14 shows the results of the i for a waste package transporter for a range of to meet a probability screening criteria of Pmi of per year for a maximum number of ( trips per year (Assumption 5.3), using Equations 12 and 13. ,.. , I Table 14. Travel Speed and Distance Range for,a Waste Package Transporter . to Meet a Probability Screening Criteria of 2E-6 per year For a normal travel for the waste package transporter, the travel can be increased to . For a the waste package transporter is of ' tornado missile considerations within about of the North Portal. Even at a and with a bounding size for the waste package transporter (Section 7.6), the allowable travel the baseline (Assumption 5.1 0). 7.5 SITE-SPECIFIC CASK TRANSPORTER TRAVEL DISTANCE AM) SPEED Speed (mph) Table 15 shows the travel ( of a site-specific cask transporter for a range of travel B to meet a probability screening criteria of Pmi of 2er year for a maximum number of trips per year (Assumption 5.9, using the same approach as in Section 7.4. Table 15. Travel Speed and Distance Range for an Site-specific Cask Transporter to Meet a Probability Screening Criteria of 2E-6 per year Distance (mi) Distance (ft) October 2004 Speed (mph) Distance (mi) Distance (ft) Extreme Winmornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis Results for a normal travel ; for a site-specific cask transporter (Assumption 5.4) and a bounding size for a site-s~ecific cask transporter (Section 7.6) show that the allowable travel (Assumption 5.1 1) for meeting the . probability screening criteria of per year. 7.6 BOUNDING TRANSPORTER SIZE the sizes of the site-specific cask trans~orter and waste package transporter from the dimensions shown in Section 6.4.4.2 to , conservatively bounds the sizes used in Section 6.4.4.2 for calculating surface areas. he-bounding surface area is: Bounding Surface Area = 2(Length x Height) + 2(Height x Width) + (Length x Width) - -1 - The P, and P~ values, using the bounding surface areas presented in Table 16, become: Table 16. Bounding P, Values for Small Targets i Table 16 shows that the Pmi values in Table 17 are the screening value of 2E-6 per year, using the ,conservative value for P, and the bounding surface areas for the site-specific cask transporter and . waste package transporter. The transporters are screened out of tornado missile strikes. SMALL TARGET Site-specific Cask Transporter Table 17. Bounding P,,,iValues for Small Targets I - - SMALL TARGET I P' I Pm I P"I T - t A Site-specific Cask Transporter Waste Package Transporter Nm I Y fJm I - -- I 7.7 EXPOSURE TIME FRACTION AND MISSILE STRIKE TARGET AREA Using Equation 6 (Section 6.3.3) and Equation 9 (Section 6.7), the correlation between the exposure time fraction (P,) and the missile strike target area (A) can be established as: where, October 2004 Extreme Wind/TomadoTTomado Missile ~azard Analysis I Substitute the values of Pmi, N,, Y, and P, in Equation 14 resulting in, Using Equation 15, a range of "Pexpt" and "A" values is calculated. I The P,,, value of I corresponds to a stationary target with the following screening criteria applied to large structures: If the target area is less than the minimum target area (Table 17) for any exposure time fraction, then the target is screened out from a missile strike. I 0 If the target area is more than the minimum area shown, then the target is screened in for a missile strike. For the stationary target (i.e., the exposure time fraction is I), any target area that is greater than is screened in for a missile strike and any target area that is less than is screened out for missile strike. Table 18 is based on a conservative P, value of year and the Y value for small targets, which is also conservative. I Table 18. Exposure Time Fraction Versus Target Area October 2004 EXPOSURE TIME FRACTION (P,Xpt) 1 EXPOSURE HOURS PER CALENDAR YEAR 8760 MINIMUM TARGET AREA FOR MISSILE STRIKE (f?) 3.26E+03 Extreme WinmornadoTTornado Missile Hazard Analysis 8. TORNADO MISSILE SPECTRUM FOR THE REPOSITORY SITE STRUCTURE, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENT DESIGN The results of the screening process (Sections 6 and 7) indicate that are not screened out of a tornado missile strike when the strike probability of the three structures (one CKF and two DTFs) is summed, even when the tornado average area is used. Thus, tornado missiles need to be specified for designing at the repository site. This section provides the tornado missile spectrum and the basis'for their selection. The typical method used for demonstrating compliance with the design of structures to withstand the effects of a tornado generated missile is provided in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.1.4). NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4) requires that postulated missiles include at least three objects: A massive high kinetic energy missile that deforms on impact A rigid missile to test penetration resistance 1 0 A small rigid missile of a size sufficient to just pass through any openings in protective barriers. NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4) identifies two missile spectra that satisfy this requirement: t Spectrum 1 missiles include a I I The impact speed required is of the maximum horizontal wind speed of the design basis tornado. The first two missiles aie assumed to impact at The last missile is assumed to . impinge upon in the most damaging directions. Spectrum 11 missiles to Spectrum I missiles. Spectrum II missiles and their associated horizontal speeds are provided in Section 6.9, Table 11. Vertical velocities of of the postulated horizontal velocities are used in both spectra except for the small missile in Spectrum I or Missile C in Spectrum I1 (Section 6.9, Table 11). These missiles should have the same velocity in each direction. Missiles A, B, C, and E in Spectrum 11 are considered at each elevation; Missiles D and F are considered at elevations up to I of the facility structures (Section 6.9, Table 11). NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4) does not provide clear definition of the 1/2-mi radius requirement. It is interpreted as the exclusion area of 112-mi radius, meaning that if a utility pole or a 1,810 kg automobile, or both, as missiles, are within the 112-mi radius of a facility, then they can be lifted up and can strike the facility up to 30 A from the ground. If a site can maintain an exclusion area with a radius of , within which there are no . , then Missiles D and F are deemed unlikely to strike the during the occurrence of a design basis tornado. October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis Vehicles heavier than exclusion area are excluded as credible missiles for the design basis tornado. No credit is taken for a missile exclusion area, because concurrent construction is planned that involves miscellaneous cars, pickup trucks, skip loaders, and other large and small construction equipment, along with frequent operations of rail and truck delivering transportation casks. Although some items are screened out as credible missiles, because of heavy mass, it is impossible to screen out all possibilities. Thus, design requirements for include Spectrum 11 Missiles A, B, C, D, E, and F (Section 6.9, Table 11). Operations include staging areas for rail and truck transportation cask carriers and theTCBA, therefore it is expected thal transportation casks could be exposed to a tornado missile strike. Thus, an analysis will be performed for each type of transportation cask to demonstrate that the cask structure is not vulnerable to the assigned missile spectnun. thickness of the cask metallic structure to provide sufficient protection against a tornado missile can be calculated using the formula provided in NUREG-3800 (IWC 1987, Section 3.5.3, I1.l.b) (Section 6.9). of concrete or steel should be provided to prevent penetrations and, in the case of concrete, prevent spalling or scabbing from a missile impact. The minimum concrete barrier thickness values shown in Table 19 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3). Table 19. Minimum Acceptable Barrier Thickness Requirements for Local Damage Prediction Against Tornado Generated Missiles -- Region Ill Concrete Strength 1 Wall Thickness 1 Roof Thickness I I I I Source: NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987. Section 3.5.3). (psi) 9. CONCLUSIONS ' Based on the analyses presented in Sections 6,7, and 8, it is concluded that: (in.) 9.1 he/ speed is - corresponding to a 100-year return, 3-s gust wind based on Section 6.5.4.1 and Figure 6-1 of ASCE 7-98. This is and envelops the calculated wind speed of 80.5 mph (BSC 2004c) using historical data collected during 1998 through 2002. (in.) 9.2 The for the repository site is , corresponding to a frequency of occurrence of lod per year. This wind speed is based on ~ e ~ u l a t o r ~ ' Guide 1.76 for nuclear reactors and updated data in NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986) for' a )-degree latitude and longitude box containing the repository site. October 2004 Extreme Wind!Tomado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis For the , the corresponding pressure drop is and the rate of pressure drop is (Section 6.2.3). The speed of and the speed of mpn are consmered in the design of' Tornado missiles are not screened out for based on a risk-informed application of tornado missile impact probability calculatjons using the point strike parameter values that correspond to the 5-degree box in NUREGICR-4461 (Ramsdell .and Andrews 1986). This conclusion is based on a collective probability for' (Section 6.5.1). As a result, _ must be designed to withstand the missile spectrum as specified in Section 8. Tornado missiles are termittent use of transporters based on a risk-informed application of tornado missile impact probability calculations using the point strike parameter values that correspond to: (1) the 5-degree box for the repository site in NUREG/CR-4461 (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986), and (2) a tornado point strike probability based on either the tornado expected area or the tornado average area. As a result, waste packages inside of equipment are of credible tornado missile strikes. Tornado missile Spectrum Il should be used for designing (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4). Spectrum I1 missiles, instead of Spectrum I missiles, are selected because the National Bureau of Standards determined them to be representative of construction site missiles (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.1.4). Because concurrent operations and construction for surface and subsurface facilities occur during the preclosure veriod, Spectrum II missiles are selected as being the appropriate design basis. for ' tornado missile barriers are based upon Spectrum II missiles (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3). The should provide wall and roof thicknesses that the minimum tmcmesses 01 concrete missile barriers (Section 8, Table 19), or of effect by a Spectrum I1 design-basis missile on an Missile barrier thicknesses (Section 8, Table 19) are a design basis for Spectrum Il missiles (Conclusion 9.5) because the for Spectrum 11 missiles (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3) are based on for Tornado Region I, which are than those for Tornado Region III (Section 6.9, Table 11). Waste packages and other waste forms within , from Spectrum I1 missiles; assessment of the impact effect of a design-basis tornado missile as an initiator of a radiological event sequence, Because the staging areas of the RCS, TCBA, and TSG are for a tornado missile strike, transvortation casks must be a tornado missile strike. The , of a cask to provide a tornado missile strike can be calculated using the formula provided in NUREG-0800 (NRC 1987, Section 3.5.3.11.1 .b). October 2004 Extreme Wind/Tornado/Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis 9.8 Based upon the results of sensitivity and bounding analyses (Sections 6 and 7), future screening calculations of parameters related to building sizes, transporter sizes, and travel speeds are not required unless future design changes are made that represent a significant departure fiom the conservative assumptions of this calculation. The rationale is that, for a tornado missile strike, each has been regardless of its size and transporters have been within the bounding values of size and travel speed. 9.9 Tornado missile screening for targets on site can be performed using the information provided in Table 18 (Section 7.7). For an exposure time fraction, if the target area is target area, then the target can be fiom a missile strike; if the target area is area shown, then the target is for a missile strike (Section 7.7, Table 18). 9.10 targets such as the site-specific cask transporter and waste package transporter are I fiom tornado wind strike. The results presented in this analysis indicate that the outputs are reasonable compared to the identified inputs and that the results are suitable for their intended use. 10. REFERENCES 10.1 DOCUMENTS CITED BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2003. Technical Work Plan for: Meteorological Monitoring and Data Analysis. TWP-MGR-MM-000001 REV 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: DOC.20030328.0005. BSC '2004a. Extreme Wind/Tornado/?ornado Missile Hazard Analysis. 000-00C-WHSO-00 1 00- 000-00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: ENG.20040503.0038. BSC 2004b. 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TIC: 2717. 000-00C-WHSO-00100-000-00B 48 of 48 October 2004 Extreme WinmoniadofTornado Missile Haqrd ~ n a l ~ s i s Figure A- 1 Fi@re A-2 Figure A-3 Figure A-4 Figure A-5 Figure A-6 Figure A-7 Figure A-8 Figure A-9 ATTACHMENT A - FIGURES Dry Transfer Facility #1 Remediation Facility General Arrangement Ground Floor Key Plan Dry Transfer Facility # 1 Remediation Facility General Arrangement , Section D General Site Plan Canister Handling Facility General Arrangement Floor Plan Canister Handling Facility General Arrangement Sections A and B Canister Handling Facility General Arrangement Sections H and J Aging Site Plan Fuel Handling Facility General Arrangement Ground Floor Plan Fuel Handling Facility General Arrangement Section B October 2004 Extreme WindlTomado/Tomado Missile Hazard Analysis INTENTIONALLY LEFT. BLANK October 2004