STATEMENT OF
WILLIAM CHARLES BAILEY

AVIONICS TECHNICIAN (AVIATION WARFARE)
NAVAL STRIKE AND AIR
WARFARE CENTER

26 FEBRUARY 1999

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a welcome opportunity to be here, and to participate in what I believe to be unquestionably vital discussions of national interest.

All too often military readiness is reduced to "quantitative" variables; analyzed with statistical and mathematical methods, manipulated into charts, tables, and graphs; and then packaged to persuade some decision. As a deductive process, quantification is indeed influential. Obviously, my testimony today offers the subcommittee very little substance in this perspective -- or at least that you have not already heard many times. This is not to imply that I have nothing to contribute, but rather, that it is important to distinguishing the frame of analysis by which key issues are to be discussed. My contention is rather straightforward, as will be my comments, that real military readiness is just as much an evolution of its subjective elements (i.e, opinions, attitudes and perceptions) as it is anything else.

I have been a sailor now in the United States Navy for over 16 years. After finishing boot camp, my assignments have all been within the Naval Aviation community. In July, 1998 I reported to NSAWC, Fallon. Although I am not directly involved in the training effort there, my tasking is to evaluate the impact of daily maintenance as it relates to aircrew training and aircraft availability. In itself this is not unique to military maintenance, but it is significant at NSAWC since all of our aircraft maintenance is a product of outsourcing.

Previously, I was assigned to COMNAVAIRLANT, Norfolk, as an Aviation Maintenance Management Team (AMMT) evaluator. The Team’s purpose was to establish, evaluate and improve all aspects of readiness in quality of maintenance facilities, programs, and personnel. This necessitated extensive travel, both ashore and afloat, to inspect over 155 squadron (O level) and aircraft intermediate maintenance (I level) organizations that operate under cognizance of COMNAVAIRLANT. Further, as an avionics technical expert, I ensured that CNO directed change was implemented free of any overriding or narrow focus of internal organizational, political, or localized bias. Major projects included (a) initial East coast regionalization of calibration facilities, assets, and personnel and (b) the forced integration of NAVAIR and NAVSEA electronic micro-miniature (2M) repair/certification programs.

I have been asked by Admiral Beard to share my personal perspectives on readiness, personnel, and retention with this committee. I intend to do so from a broad perspective, by providing what I think are real-time indicators, with an honestly frank insider’s view to relate military readiness to an investment in America’s human capital. I think that you will find what I have to say describes a poignant picture, but in the end, it is also an accurate description of emerging character of the Navy’s senior enlisted ranks. Next, I provide a rationale as to why these indicators demand everyone’s attention. By design, my comments are limited to quality of life and do not directly address other issues -- such as modernization, equipment and parts availability, base closures, or the overall force draw down. I do not wish to suggest that these are not as important, but rather, that others are eminently more qualified than I to speak on them.

In the past 5 years, a noticeable change has occurred in the attitude, thinking, and behavior of many of my fellow Chief, Senior, and Master Chief Petty Officers (e.g., E7, E8, and E9). Further, I believe it reflects an unwelcome rise of disparity between internal values held by individual CPOs, and those values "espoused" as guiding the Navy, our armed forces, and the nation. In other words, human capital -- a most precious military resource -- is being underutilized. Value dissonance generates an organizational environment in which people simply go through the motions, and begin to overprotect their interest by avoiding the traditional emotional, mental, and physical commitment that has stood as a trademark of our military. I think we can agree, this trend is counterproductive if we are to sustain the quality career force essential to maintain our military readiness.

Value dissonance is not easily quantified. It often remains a faceless organizational entity that hides just out of sight. People sense that something is not quite right, . . . but they just can’t put their finger on what it is. My observation suggests we, as Chief Petty Officers, are confronting this demon right now. This is the dilemma that I bring to you -- either my concern is more closely aligned to "chicken little," and there is no fear of the sky falling; or else the "emperor" is indeed walking naked down the street, and we don’t want to see royal nakedness for what it truly is.

What collaborative evidence is there to either justify or refute such a claim? Obviously, personal experience leads me to believe it is worthwhile to reinforce your desire for continuation of your vital initiatives in addressing quality of life. It is an issue near in mind and heart to all those serving in America’s armed forces. Consider the following indicators in relation to senior enlisted personnel of the Navy:

- First, CPOs are far more prone today than a few years ago, to express deep regret and bitterness in choosing a Navy career. Even as they retire, the sacrifices they made no longer seem worthwhile. Their vocal discontent is unsettling for those shipmates remaining on active duty.

- Second, retention and accession are experiencing major impacts. First, many CPOs prematurely leave the Navy. Although in some cases this is in the Navy’s interest, it always creates a shortage of skills, competencies, and knowledge. Perhaps more frustrating, are those who "retired on active duty." They still report for duty everyday, but infect others by their "I don’t care" attitude that becomes difficult to deal with in terms of readiness.

- Third, there is a real reluctance to change the way we do business. A growing frustration is noticed in CPO perceptions that they lack the empowerment to implement much needed innovation, improvement, and change. The concern is for improving professional quality of life, as it relates to mutual trust, respect, and commitment as it exists in a chain of command.

- Fourth, education does not seem to be valued in the senior enlisted ranks. Those acquiring advanced degrees, perceive no advantage, and opt to discontinue military service. As knowledge assets, the Navy takes a loss and the private sector gets the gain.

No doubt, I have over simplified the complexity in identifying these indicators. Still, each interacts and relates in numerous ways to impact the overall readiness of the Navy.

These represent powerful incentives for reasonable qualities of life to be extended to all soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. We need to encourage their continuous dedication in service of our armed forces. Society has leaped head long into the information and technology age, and our military can no longer continue to operate as in the past. Change now takes place at speeds unheard of just a few years ago. The old premise of military success -- brute force in quantity application -- is now challenged at every level. Perhaps most noticeable, is a sweeping change in our need for productivity. Every individual needs to use all their skills, intelligence, and knowledge to allow us to accomplish more with less. This is the new rule of survival, and it applies equally as well to government as it does the private sector.

Today’s military volunteers are getting smarter, they are better educated, and able to meet the military’s need. Although they often might not know exactly what they are looking for in terms of career, they do know what they are unwilling to put up with! Only if the military offers a competitive prospect for their quality of life will we recruit, retain, and capitalize on their talents and dedication.

My thought has been about change, and how I perceive it is unfolding in the armed forces -- a complex human system. Ever since David slew Goliath, the secret has been out of the bag: smarter warriors have a better chance of outwitting and outfighting those who are bigger and stronger. American history provides ample evidence that this is a truism, and it applies even today.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, may I offer my thanks to you and this Committee for the privilege you have extended in hearing my concerns.