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# Defense Issues, NATO Response to Terrorism

January 2008

## MIDDLE EAST PEACE: A HALF CENTURY OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT

[http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle\\_east\\_north\\_africa/me\\_peace.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle_east_north_africa/me_peace.html)

### **Bush Pledges Support to Israelis, Palestinians Working for Peace** United States seeks progress toward Palestinian state in 2008



President Bush arrives January 9 in Tel Aviv, Israel, on the first leg of visits to leaders in the region. (© AP Images)

By David McKeeby  
USINFO Staff Writer  
10 January 2008

Washington -- After separate meetings with Palestinian and Israeli leaders January 9 and January 10, President Bush said he is increasingly confident that what might have been unlikely even a year ago is not only possible, but necessary: the creation of a Palestinian state by the end of 2008. "Is it possible for the Israelis and the Palestinians to work out their differences?" Bush asked J

anuary 10 in the West Bank city of Ramallah. "My answer is, absolutely, it's possible. Not only is it possible, it's necessary. And I'm looking forward to helping." Bush urged both sides January 10 to continue intensive diplomatic engagement to build on the momentum of the November 2007 Annapolis Conference, where Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert joined Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to restart talks with the goal of concluding a peace agreement and setting the stage for a Palestinian state by the end of 2008. "I am confident that with proper help, the state of Palestine will emerge. And I'm confident that when it emerges it will be a major step toward peace," Bush said.



Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, right, greets President Bush in Ramallah January 10. (© AP Images)

<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2008&m=January&x=20080110131455idybeekcm0.5591394>

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## GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

### **BUSH ADMINISTRATION PROMISES "SPRINT TO THE FINISH" IN 2008; Mideast peace, Iraq, nuclear proliferation among top diplomatic priorities. By David McKeeby, *USINFO* Staff Writer. U.S. Department of State. 31 December 2007**

Washington — "I'm going to work hard to the finish," President Bush told White House reporters at an October 17 press conference. "I'm going to sprint to the finish line."

In a series of recent interviews, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice mapped out the foreign policy road ahead for 2008, the Bush administration's final year in office.

In a series of recent interviews, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discusses several U.S. foreign policy priorities for 2008, the Bush administration's final year in office. These include keeping up momentum in the Mideast peace process, continuing support for democracy in Lebanon, building on the surge in Iraq, halting controversial nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, promoting stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, resolving the status of Kosovo and addressing Russia's concerns over a proposed missile defense system based in Europe.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=December&x=20071228172303idybeekcm0.1853296>

### **PAKISTAN SHOULD MOVE FORWARD WITH DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, U.S. SAYS (Officials urging calm, democratic progress following Bhutto assassination.) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarks. By David McKeeby, *USINFO* Staff Writer. U.S. Department of State. 28 December 2007**

Washington -- The United States is reaching out to political leaders across Pakistan in the wake of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's assassination, urging them to move forward with the democratic process.

"She was a champion for democracy," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said of Bhutto after signing a condolence book at the Pakistan Embassy in Washington. "In my conversations with her, her commitment and her dedication came through very clearly, and most especially her love for her people and for her country."

"The way to honor her memory is to continue the democratic process in Pakistan so that the democracy that she so hoped for can emerge," Rice continued.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2007\\_12/alia/a7122801.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2007_12/alia/a7122801.htm)

## CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

**NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.** Mary Beth Dunham Nikitin. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. November 21, 2007. 08AD288

This report summarizes what is known about North Korea's nuclear weapons program such as its weapons-usable fissile material and warheads estimates. The report also assesses the current developments in verifying dismantlement as agreed in the Six-Party Talks. Additionally, the report confirms that there is much uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear weapons production capabilities and its delivery systems.

[http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34256\\_20071121.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34256_20071121.pdf) [pdf format, 17 pages]

**PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES.** Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated November 14, 2007. 08AD272

Pakistan has approximately 60 nuclear warheads, maintains its fissile material production, and continues to add to its weapons production. Both the U.S. and Pakistani officials declare that Pakistan has taken a number of steps to prevent proliferation of nuclear technologies such as strengthening its export laws, improving personnel security, and cooperating with international nuclear security programs. However, some observers fear there may be a radical takeover or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf> [pdf format, 14 pages]

**DEFENSE CONTRACTING IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS.** Valerie Bailey Grasso. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Updated November 15, 2007. 08AD291

This report examines logistical support contracts in Iraq primarily those administered by the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP manages civilian contractors who support DOD during times of war and other military operations.

The 110th Congress has introduced several bills that will ensure proper accountability and oversight of LOGCAP. This report covers four broad areas: (1) contract administration; (2) contract costs; (3) transparency; and (4) the acquisition workforce.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33834.pdf> [pdf format, 34 pages]

**U.S. ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN.** Richard F. Grimmett. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. November 8, 2007. 08AD243

This report reviews U.S. arms sales to Pakistan. It provides background regarding recent major weapons transactions between the U.S. and Pakistan, and gives the rationale for these sales. It also reviews the current laws that govern U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan, including the authorities that could





curtail or terminate existing or prospective sales.

This report will be updated as warranted.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22757.pdf> [pdf format, 4 pages]

**IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW. Steven A. Hildreth. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. November 8, 2007. 08AD270**

“Iran is acknowledged to have an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles. But there remains considerable uncertainty and disagreement over specifics. This short report seeks to provide an overview of the reported or suspected range of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated.”

[http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22758\\_20071108.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22758_20071108.pdf) [pdf format, 5 pages]



## THE U.S. AND NATO

**AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES SECURITY ISSUES ON EVE OF NATO MINISTERIAL. USINFO Webchat transcript, 2007-12-05**

U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Victoria Nuland participated in a December 5 USINFO Webchat on key security issues on the eve of the NATO Ministerial in Brussels.

<http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=2CAD9245-D49C-4F37-B177-571F9350FF47>

## THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

### AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

#### **A CHANCE TO REIN IN NORTH KOREA. By Nicholas Eberstadt. AEI Online. January 9, 2008**



The December 19, 2007, presidential election in South Korea presages a sea change in that key U.S. ally's policies toward North Korea. The resounding defeat of the candidates who favored more of Seoul's all-carrot, no-stick approach to Kim Jong Il presents Washington with a horizon of new possibilities for reining in Asia's most troublesome dictator. The question now is whether the Bush foreign policy team will be adept enough to seize this opportunity.

(...)

South Korea, in short, is ready for a new and more critical approach to engagement with North Korea--and this is just what president-elect Lee Myung-bak has promised. Lee is no Cold Warrior: he styles himself as a pragmatist who judges by results. Since his election, he has signaled that restoring the health of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and achieving a genuine denuclearization of the North Korean regime are to be top foreign policy priorities. He has also served notice to Pyongyang that it can no longer count on Seoul for a "see-no-evil" spin on events in the North--much less unconditional handouts.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27336/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27336/pub_detail.asp)

#### **BOOM AND BUST. By Christopher Griffin. AEI ARTICLES. *Armed Forces Journal* Publication Date: January 1, 2008**

A mock defense of Taiwan's bustling Suao Bay naval base in May, conducted as a part of the Han Kuang, or "Chinese Glory," live-fire military exercises, presented a snapshot of Taiwan's evolving military. New capabilities were on display, but the failures of antiquated weapons stole the show. Civilian officials in the viewing stand demanded explanations, a far cry from the island's long history of military domination under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Taiwan's progress was apparent, but so was the array of challenges in military strategy, procurement and personnel reform if the island is going to be able to defend itself in the future.

These challenges are rooted in the transformation of Taiwan's military strategy since 2000, when Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) beat the long-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) to become president of the Republic of China (ROC). Chen inherited an army-centric military that had been designed over nearly 50 years of KMT rule to focus on the defense of the island's physical territory. Chen feared this focus would turn Taiwan's densely populated cities into urban combat zones if conflict with China ever came, and instead decided to pursue "decisive offshore operations" that would employ air and naval power to carry the fight into the Taiwan Strait and, if necessary, to the mainland. The immediate obstacle for Chen's strategy was Washington's reluctance to sell Taipei the types of advanced weapons systems necessary for such a defensive strategy after the U.S. promised to reduce its sales to Taiwan in a 1982 Sino-American joint communiqué.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27333/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27333/pub_detail.asp)

**IS IRAQI KURDISTAN A GOOD ALLY? By Michael Rubin. MIDDLE EASTERN OUTLOOK No.1, January 2008. AEI Online. January 7, 2008**



On a strictly emotional level, U.S. support for Iraqi Kurdistan makes sense. In the wake of World War I, the Kurds missed their opportunity for statehood when other peoples gained their independence. Today, they remain the largest ethnic group without a country. They have suffered greatly at the hands of others. But while Iraqi Kurdistan has come far, the unreliability of its leadership makes any long-term U.S.-Kurdish alliance unwise. Rather than become a beacon for democracy, the current Iraqi Kurdish leadership appears intent on replicating more autocratic models. Rather than become a regional Nelson Mandela, Iraqi Kurdish president Masud Barzani now charts a course to become a new Yasser Arafat. Despite lofty rhetoric about its suitability as an ally, Iraqi Kurdistan's actions suggest that it is far from trustworthy.

Iraqi Kurdistan has been, perhaps, the greatest beneficiary of Iraq's liberation. Today, Iraqi Kurds enjoy the country's highest living standard, level of foreign investment, and security. International isolation has ended. European air carriers bring travelers and even tourists from Munich and Vienna directly to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Multinational troops enjoy rest and relaxation in Duhok hotels and Dokan resorts. Oil executives from the United States and Europe jostle for Kurdish attention. Peter Galbraith, a Clinton-era ambassador retained by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to lobby on their behalf, even suggests constructing a U.S. military base in the region.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27327/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27327/pub_detail.asp)

**TURKEY'S TERROR PROBLEM IS OURS. By Michael Rubin. ON THE ISSUES. AEI Online. Publication Date: January 4, 2008**



It has been nearly two months since the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) sparked an international crisis with a major attack inside Turkey, and it has been more than six weeks since President Bush promised Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Washington would aid Turkey's fight against terrorism. Heady talk of intelligence sharing and cooperation followed and, indeed, may have been a factor in this weekend's Turkish air strikes on PKK targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. (...)

Turkey has been a poor ally in recent years, but fighting terror requires alliances to trump politics.

The desired political solution seems to be Iraqi Kurdish action to close down the safe haven on Iraqi soil in exchange for a general amnesty law in Turkey to forgive most PKK members and perhaps allow other Kurdish language broadcasting and constitutional reforms as well. (...)

This need not mean solely a military solution either. Rather, U.S. officials should threaten isolation and a cessation of all financial assistance until Barzani ceases his safe haven.

Confronted with such demands since 2003, Barzani has always begged for more time, only to let his promises lag when the diplomatic spotlight passed.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27316/pub\\_detail. asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27316/pub_detail. asp)

**PUTIN'S COLD WAR. By Leon Aron. AEI ARTICLES. Published in the Wall Street Journal. December 26, 2007**

Last Saturday Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, chief of Russia's General Staff, issued an ominous warning. Were the U.S. to launch a rocket from the missile defense system it plans to deploy in Poland to intercept Iranian rockets, it might accidentally trigger a retaliatory attack by Russian nuclear ballistic missiles.

This was only the most recent of a series of provocative and disturbing messages from Moscow. In fact, at no time since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 has the direction of Russian policy been as troubling as it is today.

What accounts for this change? And where will it lead?

At no time since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 has the direction of Russian policy been as troubling as it is today.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27278/pub\\_detail. asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27278/pub_detail. asp)

**OUR FRIENDS IN BAGHDAD. By Frederick W. Kagan. AEI ARTICLES. Published in the Wall Street Journal. December 21, 2007**

Will the United States remain committed to supporting its friends and opposing its enemies in the Muslim world?

This question has been asked for decades by people from Indonesia to Morocco and throughout the Middle East. And there is no clear answer. American engagement in the Muslim world has been fitful and incoherent, leaving our friends and our opponents believing that we are at best unreliable. In the past, supporting our friends has been taken to mean Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the case of the last three, it has meant helping more or less authoritarian governments retain power in exchange for their help in stabilizing the region.

Unfortunately, opposition to the war in Iraq and partisan politics prevent a reasoned discussion of America's interests in the Muslim world.

But today, new democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq--democracies the U.S. made possible--struggle to survive against attacks from our common enemies. Both are reaching out to the U.S. and asking for a commitment of our support.

This is an epochal moment: The U.S. has a chance to break away from failed policies of the past and throw itself behind two new constitutional democracies that occupy critical geostrategic positions in the most dangerous part of the world. Will we seize this moment or let it pass?

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27267/pub\\_detail. asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all, pubID. 27267/pub_detail. asp)

## ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

**ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Vol. 37.No.10. ACA. December 2007.**

- **HOW DOES IT STACK UP? THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION AT 10. Peter Herby and Eve La Haye**

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, most often referred to as the Ottawa Convention, is built on a few simple ideas: civilians should not be killed or maimed by weapons that strike blindly and senselessly, either during or after conflicts; wars should end when the fighting stops; and postconflict communities should be free to rebuild without risking lives and livelihoods to do so.



- **BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR SECURITY. Kenneth N. Luongo and Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Naeem Salik**

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's decision last month to declare a national emergency and suspend the constitution has ratcheted up concerns about the safety and security of that country's nuclear arsenal. Pakistani officials have categorically rejected speculation that their grip on its nuclear assets is loose, with Musharraf stating that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "total custodial controls." Concerns remain, however, including in Western governments, that political volatility could erode the security situation.

- **IS THERE ANY FIZZ LEFT IN THE FISSBAN? PROSPECTS FOR A FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY. Ambassador Paul Meyer**

The pursuit of a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for nuclear weapons has been one of the longest-running post-World War II enterprises of the international community and unfortunately probably among the most futile to date. It is a sobering fact for the disciples of multilateral diplomacy that 2007 marks the 50th anniversary of UN General Assembly Resolution 1148, which explicitly called for "the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes."

[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\\_12/](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/)

**CFE TREATY REGIME REMAINS VITAL TO EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES. ACA Statement. December 12, 2007**

(Washington, D.C.): The nonpartisan Arms Control Association (ACA) is disappointed today that Russia followed through on its threat to suspend implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. ACA calls on all other states-parties to continue adhering to the accord and for Russia to renew its participation as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, ACA urges all 30 CFE states-parties, including Russia, to take the necessary actions to bring into force a 1999 updated version of the treaty, which would help ensure that dividing lines do not again descend across Europe.

[http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20071210\\_CFE\\_Suspension.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20071210_CFE_Suspension.asp)



## BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

**TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org. December 27, 2007.**

Bruce Riedel, a former defense and intelligence official who helped make South Asia policy in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, says he believes Benazir Bhutto's assassination "was almost certainly the work of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda's Pakistani allies." He says, "Their objective is to destabilize the Pakistani state, to break up the secular political parties, to break up the army so that Pakistan becomes a politically failing state in which the Islamists in time can come to power much as they have in other failing states." He says the United States should press the government of President Pervez Musharraf to go ahead with the parliamentary elections—perhaps after a brief pause. "The only way that Pakistan is going to be able to fight terrorism effectively is to have a legitimate democratically elected secular government that can rally the Pakistani people to engage al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist movements," he says.

[http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2007/1227\\_pakistan\\_riedel.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2007/1227_pakistan_riedel.aspx)

**APRES-SURGE: THE NEXT IRAQ DEBATES. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Brookings Institution, Published in The New Republic. December 31, 2007.**


It took a while, but we appear to have finally reached a national consensus that General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have made progress in Iraq. They have improved security and forged deals among local political leaders in the north, west, and even much of the center of the country (including important parts of Baghdad). This, in turn, has made it possible to start to revive local economies in some of those same areas.

But the progress has been uneven. The national economy remains stagnant, with stubbornly high unemployment. Iraq's central government is still locked in the deadening grip of Shia warlords uninterested in compromising with Iraq's other ethnic and sectarian groups or, for the most part, even with one another. And the southern half of the country is deteriorating even as the northern half improves.

[http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1231\\_iraq\\_pollack.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/1231_iraq_pollack.aspx)

## CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

**THE PATTERNS IN VIOLENCE AND CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 2007: THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC PATIENCE. Anthony H. Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy. CSIS Report. January 8, 2008**



The attached report summarizes the trends in Iraqi violence and casualties in graphics and map form. It reflects major progress during the course of 2007. At the same time, it shows that levels of violence remain high, and that many risks remain.



The report contrasts US data with that provided by the Iraqi government. It is important to note that the Coalition counts tend to define violence and casualties in much more narrow ways than the Iraqi government. This is reflected in data used in the December quarterly report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, and in data provide more recently by a senior Iraqi official.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080108\\_iraqbaghdadcasualties.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080108_iraqbaghdadcasualties.pdf)

### **BREAKING THE STALEMATE IN KENYA. Joel D. Barkan. CSIS. January 8, 2008**



The historical origins of the violence that has engulfed Kenya since the discredited election of December 27 run deep, and it will take more than a recount of the vote and/or the formation of a government of national unity to resolve the crisis. Although nearly 9 million Kenyans went to the polls in what was to be the crowning event of the country's two-decade struggle for democratic rule, the ingredients for post-election violence were clear. Public opinion polls conducted before the election indicated that the race between incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and his principal challenger, Raila Odinga, was too close to call. Outbreaks of violence had occurred in the run-up to previous elections

in 1992 and 1997. Many Kenyans, especially the leaders of civil society, worried that unless the Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) conducted the December elections in a manner that was scrupulously "free and fair" and regarded as legitimate by all candidates, the losers would not accept the verdict, and violence would ensue.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080108\\_kenya\\_crisis.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/080108_kenya_crisis.pdf)

### **KEEPING AN EYE ON AN UNRULY NEIGHBOR: CHINESE VIEWS OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND STABILITY IN NORTH KOREA. Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation; John S. Park, U.S. Institute of Peace. A Joint Report By: Center for Strategic and International Studies & U.S. Institute of Peace. January 3, 2008**

Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea.

There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, or retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests.

[http://www.usip.org/pubs/working\\_papers/wp6\\_china\\_northkorea.pdf](http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp6_china_northkorea.pdf)



**THE SECURITY IMPACT OF THE BHUTTO ASSASSINATION. By Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. CSIS. December 27, 2007**




Political stability is only one of the unanswered questions growing out of the Bhutto assassination. The assassination of Bhutto or any other leading Pakistani opposition leader, would push Pakistan to the edge of civil conflict if there was any suspicion that Musharraf had any role in it such an action or that the Musharraf government knew of plans for an attempt and did not provide the maximum possible security.

Much will depend on whether some Islamist extremist movement announces that it committed the attack, but even then a substantial number of Pakistanis will still see the Musharraf government as being at least indirectly involved, and there would be a flood of destabilizing conspiracy theories. The question is just how bad this will be?

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071227\\_cordesman\\_commentary.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071227_cordesman_commentary.pdf)

**PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS. Kathleen Hicks and Eric Ridge. CSIS. December 21, 2007**



Since the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed a high priority on institutionalizing capabilities-based planning (CBP). In an era of uncertainty, such an approach is helpful for optimizing forces across a broad range of mission sets and within fiscal constraints. The conduct of stability operations is a mission area with particular promise for the application of capabilities-based planning. This monograph proposes a capabilities-based framework to generate capability packages for future stability operations. The study was conducted from March 2007 through August 2007 and included a scenario-based workshop to test the validity and utility of CBP-derived capability packages. This report delineates CSIS's findings and recommendations on the project.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071221\\_hicksplanstabops.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071221_hicksplanstabops.pdf)

**PROGRESS IN IRAQ: THE DECEMBER REPORT ON MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ. Anthony H. Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy. Report. CSIS. December 20, 2007**



The attached report provides a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in the latest Department of Defense report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. It sees valid reporting of many areas of progress, but also clear warnings that major risks and problems remain.

In summary, one can argue the level of progress over the last year, and the situation in Iraq is certainly free of risk. There are, however, strong indicators that the glass has gone from one that was mostly empty to one that is at least half full. The latest Department of Defense report on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq documents much of this

progress, although it scarcely describes a stable or secure Iraq and it indicates that the Iraq War still presents a high risk of failure.

The report is not a strategy or plan for the future, and it continues to present events in a favorable light – although a detailed reading of the text reveals a steady growth in depth and objectivity. The report does, however, provide a definition of victory that seems increasingly achievable: “The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror.”

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071220\\_progress\\_in\\_iraq.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071220_progress_in_iraq.pdf)

### **DOLLARS AND BULLETS: THE ROLE OF US AID IN A STRATEGY FOR IRAQ. Anthony H. Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy. CSIS. December 17, 2007**



The US is now caught in the dilemma of partial success. Failure in Iraq is easy to deal with; it means quick withdrawal. Full and rapid success is easy to plan for and it is easy to create programs and budgets that reinforce what already exists. Al Qa’ida’s reversals of the last eight months, however, have created a very different situation.

The attached paper suggests that US aid must be a critical part of any US effort to build on the success achieved to date, and to deal with the problems that remain. Specifically, it makes four major suggestions: Aid must be tailored to act as a major incentive for security and

political accommodation.

All aid efforts must be integrated into a cohesive plan, program, and budget and clearly tied to the Joint Campaign Plan.

US aid will be needed for at least 3-5 years to come, and well into the next Administration. Plans are needed that provide consistent efforts over time.

Current aid efforts lack transparency and meaningful measures of effectiveness, and are not explained or justified in terms credible enough to win lasting support from the Congress, American people, and outside analysts and media. Sustaining the necessary effort requires both transparency and depth.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071217\\_iraq\\_aid\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071217_iraq_aid_strategy.pdf)

### **US AIRPOWER IN IRAQ (OIF) AND AFGHANISTAN (OEF): 2004-2007. Anthony H. Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy. CSIS Report. December 13, 2007**

The report analyses the dramatic increase in US Air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071213\\_oif-oef\\_airpower.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071213_oif-oef_airpower.pdf)

**ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR RUSSIA TO 2017. Andrew C. Kuchins. Report. CSIS. December 13, 2007**

Russia today is a hybrid regime that might best be termed "illiberal internationalism." From being a weakly institutionalized, fragile, and in many ways distorted proto-democracy in the 1990s, Russia under Vladimir Putin has moved back in the direction of a highly centralized authoritarianism, which has characterized the state for most of its 1,000-year history. But it is an authoritarian state where the consent of the governed is essential. Given the experience of the 1990s and the Kremlin's propaganda emphasizing this period as one of chaos, economic collapse, and international humiliation, the Russian people have no great enthusiasm for democracy and remain politically apathetic in light of the extraordinary economic recovery and improvement in lifestyles for so many over the last eight years. The emergent, highly centralized government, combined with a weak and submissive society, is the hallmark of traditional Russian paternalism.



That Russia is a hybrid regime should not surprise us only 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The vexing question is how sustainable is this system, and if it is not, how will it develop. There are many different views on this question, some of them reflected in this report. The report, based on analysis by Andrew Kuchins and members of his Russia 2017 Working Group, examines the significant drivers of Russia's future—economic, political, demographic, and geostrategic—and then offers some possible scenarios for that future through 2017.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia\\_2017-web.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia_2017-web.pdf)

**INTEGRATING 21ST CENTURY DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE. J. Stephen Morrison and Kathleen Hicks (project directors); Contributors: Stewart Patrick, James Schear, Mark Wong. CSIS. December 12, 2007**



In early 2007, CSIS launched an expert task force to examine the growing involvement of the Department of Defense as a direct provider of “non-traditional” security assistance, concentrated in counterterrorism, capacity building, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The task force set out to shed light on what drives this trend, including the new global threat environment; assess what was happening at the same time in the diplomatic and developmental realms; evaluate DOD performance in conducting its expanded missions; and consider the impact of the Pentagon’s enlarged role on broader U.S. national security, foreign policy and development

interests. From the outset, the task force sought to generate concrete, practical recommendations to Congress and the White House on reforms and legislation that will create a better and more sustainable balance between military and civilian tools.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071211\\_integratinglowres.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071211_integratinglowres.pdf)

**THE P-5 AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. Yury Belobrov, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Li Chang-he, Thomas R. Pickering, Guillaume Schlumberge; Contributors: Robert J. Einhorn. Report. CSIS. December 10, 2007**

This report assesses the contribution the UN Security Council's permanent five (P-5) members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—can make to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and it identifies areas where their concerted efforts could be especially useful. Many of its conclusions may also apply to the threats posed by other so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), chemical weapons and biological weapons. But because the P-5 countries, as the only Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states, bear special responsibilities in the nuclear area, and because nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves in terms of their destructiveness and their political and security implications, the report deals mainly with the role of the P-5 in addressing nuclear threats.

The report was prepared by a working group of nongovernmental experts (all of whom previously served in government) from each of the P-5 countries. The working group met three times between November 2006 and July 2007. While several government officials from the P-5 countries participated in the group's discussions as observers, the views expressed in the report are those of the working group members—that is, the views of nongovernmental experts—and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any of the P-5 governments.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071210-einhorn-the\\_p-5-web.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071210-einhorn-the_p-5-web.pdf)

**CRITICAL QUESTIONS: TURKISH AIRSTRIKES IN NORTHERN IRAQ. Samuel Brannen. CSIS. December 19, 2007**


The Turkish offensive has been a long time coming in the eyes of the Turkish public, who were outraged by an uptick this autumn in violence by the terrorist group, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), based in northern Iraq. Despite claims by U.S. officials on and off the record, the United States almost certainly approved the December 16 Turkish airstrikes into northern Iraq against PKK targets. Three-hundred Turkish troops were also moved across the border this week, mainly as a show of force, and have since been recalled. The United States may deny authorization of any strikes to avoid further inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment in Iraq's government and population, but the reality is that the U.S. military is in the awkward position of guaranteeing and controlling Iraq's territorial sovereignty. Turkey has, since July 2003, demonstrated that it will not enter Iraq without U.S. approval, unless in hot pursuit of terrorists who have carried out an attack on Turkish territory. Following the terms of an agreement reached during a November 5 visit to the White House by Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the United States is providing its NATO ally with real-time targeting information on the PKK inside Iraq from an intelligence center in Ankara (according to the November 18 Washington Post), and conceivably, the United States is also authorizing limited incursions. A series of high-level military channels of communication have been established between the Turkish General Staff and their U.S. counterparts, including Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq General David Petraeus and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071219\\_cq\\_brannen\\_turkey.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/071219_cq_brannen_turkey.pdf)



## COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY

### **AL-QA'IDA'S FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ: A FIRST LOOK AT THE SINJAR RECORDS. Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.**



On December 4, 2007 Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the reputed Emir of al-Qa'ida's Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), claimed that his organization was almost purely Iraqi, containing only 200 foreign fighters. Twelve days later, on December 16, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Sunnis in Iraq to unite behind the ISI. Both statements are part of al-Qa'ida's ongoing struggle to appeal to Iraqis, many of whom resent the ISI's foreign leadership and its desire to impose strict Islamic law.

In November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. The data compiled and analyzed in this report is drawn from these personnel records, which was collected by al - Qa'ida's Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter's country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter's recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq. The records were captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in a raid near Sinjar, along Iraq's Syrian border.

<http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf>

## COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

### **AMERICA'S PRIORITIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR; Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan Michael D. Huckabee. From *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008**

(...) A more successful U.S. foreign policy needs to better explain Islamic jihadism to the American people. Given how Americans have thrived on diversity -- religious, ethnic, racial - it takes an enormous leap of imagination to understand what Islamic terrorists are about, that they really do want to kill every last one of us and destroy civilization as we know it. If they are willing to kill their own children by letting them detonate suicide bombs, then they will also be willing to kill our children for their misguided cause. The Bush administration has never adequately explained the theology and ideology behind Islamic terrorism or convinced us of its ruthless fanaticism. The first rule of war is "know your enemy," and most Americans do not know theirs. To grasp the magnitude of the threat, we first have to understand what makes Islamic terrorists tick. Very few Americans are familiar with the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian radical executed in 1966, or the Muslim Brotherhood, whose call to active jihad influenced Osama bin Laden and the rise of al Qaeda. Qutb raged against the decadence and sin he saw around him and sought to restore the "pure" Islam of the seventh century through a theocratic caliphate without national borders. He saw nothing decadent or sinful in murdering in order to achieve that end. America's culture of life stands in stark contrast to the jihadists' culture of death.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87112/michael-d-huckabee/america-s-priorities-in-the-war-on-terror.html>



**WASHINGTON'S EASTERN SUNSET: THE DECLINE OF U.S. POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA. Shaplen, Jason; Laney, James. *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 86, No. 6, November-December 2007 AA07443**

Summary: Shaplen, a former policy adviser at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and Laney, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, see danger emerging in Northeast Asia. "Three powerful, nationalist states [China, Japan, and South Korea] with a history of hostility between them are simultaneously awakening from a period of quiescence and jockeying for power," they write. The United States needs to change its policies in this transition -- it should help build a security regime among six Northeast Asian countries, create a bilateral security arrangement with China, and participate in multilateral Asian forums as vigorously as China does. The U.S. should also negotiate free-trade agreements throughout East Asia, Southeast Asia, even India. "If it does not move quickly, it will find its stature in Northeast Asia greatly diminished at precisely the time when the region takes its place at the center of the world stage," the authors write. Currently available online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86606/jason-t-shaplen-james-laney/washington-s-eastern-sunset.html?mode=print>

## FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (FPIF)

**ASSESSING THE "SURGE"; IRAQ OUTLOOK 2008. Erik Leaver. FPIF. January 9, 2008**

January 10th marks the one year anniversary of Bush's "surge" strategy. Many analysts are now claiming the "surge" is a success, but with no end in sight to the war, the year of the "surge" really is a tale of two Iraqs. Coming off a very deadly end to 2006, the first half of 2007 brought some of the highest levels of violence and displacement since the war began. But by the middle of the year, the level of violence reportedly began to drop, with December being the second least violent for U.S. troops since 2003. But the current calm has been crafted on a foundation that can topple at any moment, leaving its "success" in doubt. <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4882>

## HERITAGE FOUNDATION

**NORTH KOREA: CLOUDS BLOCK THE SUNSHINE AT THE SIX-PARTY TALKS. Bruce Klingner. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1771 January 10, 2008**



North Korea's failure to meet yet another negotiating deadline raises more doubts about its commitment to get rid of its nuclear weapons. Other events of recent weeks raise disturbing new questions about U.S. policy toward North Korea. The Six-Party Talks have reached an impasse due to conflicting interpretations over the level of detail Pyongyang must provide on its nuclear weapons programs, a shortfall brought on by U.S. acquiescence to vague negotiating text. The most recent joint statement called on North Korea to desist, disable, declare, and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. It appears that Pyongyang has added deny, deceive, and delay to the mix. And it appears that U.S.

negotiators, in an attempt to shield the talks, concealed the fact that North Korea made an inadequate declaration.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm\\_1771.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm_1771.pdf)

**THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP: AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE SECURITY, FREEDOM, AND PEACE. James Phillips. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1770 January 9, 2008**

President George W. Bush arrives in Israel today to begin an eight-day trip through the Middle East, a volatile region roiled by persistent Arab-Israeli tensions, the war in Iraq, the rise of Iran, and continued instability in Lebanon. President Bush will weigh in on all these issues and highlight his own freedom agenda for the Middle East in a series of private meetings and public appearances in Israel, the West Bank, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The President should remind Middle Eastern leaders about the common challenge they face from Islamic extremists--many of whom receive extensive support from Iran--and that such extremists threaten progress toward greater freedom in the Middle East. He should give reassurances that they can count on the U.S. as a reliable ally and press them for greater cooperation to contain Iran and combat the Islamic radicals whom Iran exploits to destabilize Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan, and other countries in the region.



[http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/upload/wm\\_1770.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/upload/wm_1770.pdf)

**A NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTION: IMPLEMENT VISA WAIVER REFORM BY END OF 2008. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. WebMemo #1765 December 31, 2007**



In December, nine member states of the European Union joined the "Schengen area," a visa-free travel zone. The Schengen agreement comprises efforts to systematically reduce border restrictions across Europe. By finally permitting free travel between states formerly divided by the Iron Curtain, these states are seeking to put the last legacy of the Cold War behind them.

The United States is undergoing its own effort to put the Cold War in the past. Today, nations in Western Europe enjoy the privilege of visa-free vacation travel to the United States. In 2007, Congress passed legislation to reform and expand the Visa Waiver Program, which provides visitors from participating countries up to 90 days of visa-free travel for tourism or business. It is now up to the Departments of State and Homeland Security to implement the new program. If the job is done right, more tourists will be able to spend New Year's Eve 2009 just as easily in New York or Las Vegas as in Paris or London.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/wm\\_1765.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/wm_1765.pdf)

**IRAN'S DANGEROUS NUKE GAME: WHY ISRAEL MIGHT RUSH TO STRIKE. Peter Brookes. Heritage Foundation. January 3, 2008**

Iran turned up the heat this week on still-simmering concerns about its atomic aspirations. It crowed that its 1,000-megawatt Bushehr nuclear-power plant would be "online" as early as this spring, putting in place another important building block of its nuclear program.

That sort of news can't help but rattle the steadiest of nerves, no matter what the (narrowly focused) US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear-weapons program said about the current state of affairs.

<http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed010308a.cfm?RenderforPrint=1>

**HOMELAND SECURITY: FIVE NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTIONS FOR CONGRESS. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. WebMemo #1763 December 31, 2007**

The task of homeland security is to help keep America safe, free, and prosperous. Congress plays an important role in achieving these goals. By any measure, 2007 was not the best year for homeland security in Congress. Its landmark legislation for the year, the "Improving America's Security by Implementing Unfinished Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007," did anything but what its title promised, adding numerous unnecessary mandates that were never mentioned by the Commission. At the same time, Congress left unfixed homeland security faults that have lingered for years. Congress can do better in the new year by sticking to five New Year's resolutions that fix the errors it introduced in 2007 and address long-time oversights.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/wm\\_1763.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/wm_1763.pdf)

**PAKISTAN: BHUTTO ASSASSINATION UNDERSCORES NEED FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. Lisa Curtis. WebMemo #1761 December 28, 2007**

The assassination of two-time Pakistani Prime Minister and leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Benazir Bhutto is a devastating loss for this pivotal Muslim nation, which finds itself at the center of the ideological battle against global extremism. Bhutto's supporters—who have started to riot in Pakistan's major cities—will direct most of their anger at Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who they view as stifling democracy in Pakistan and helping to create the conditions that led to her assassination. The United States should convince Musharraf to reach out to both PPP leaders and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz (PML/N) in an effort to preserve stability in Pakistan and unite the mainstream political forces and military leadership against al-Qaeda-backed extremists seeking to destabilize the country.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1761.cfm?renderforprint=1>

**THE PENTAGON'S ROBOTS: ARMING THE FUTURE. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Andrew Gudgel. Backgrounder #2093. December 19, 2007**

Robots have stepped out of the science fiction pages and onto the battlefield. Thousands are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, supporting military operations on land, at sea, and in the air. Some robots cost as little as several thousand dollars each. Controlled remotely by

soldiers, sailors, and airmen, they perform tasks such as disarming roadside bombs, scouting dangerous territory, and patrolling the sky.



As technology advances, robots will become increasingly autonomous of human supervision, providing new cutting-edge national security applications that could give the U.S. military significant competitive advantages. Robots on the battlefield will not bring an age of "bloodless" push-button warfare nor provide "silver-bullet" solutions to every combat challenge, but they can offer U.S. forces tactical advantages for outfighting both conventional (regular armed forces) and unconventional (e.g., terrorists and insurgents) enemies.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/bg\\_2093.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/bg_2093.pdf)

### **TROJAN DRAGONS: CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL CYBER WARRIORS. John J. Tkacik, Jr. WebMemo #1735. December 12, 2007**



This week, The New York Times reported that in a series of "sophisticated attempts" against the U.S. nuclear weapons lab at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Chinese hackers were able to "remove data." The story illustrates an alarming fact: China's cyber spies are now a part of America's computer network, literally. It is time for U.S. authorities to be open with the American people about the escalating threat posed by China to America's science and technology secrets.

U.S. Strategic Command Chief General James E. Cartwright told Congress in March 2007 that "America is under widespread attack in cyberspace." During fiscal year 2007, the Department of Homeland Security received 37,000 reports of attempted breaches on government and private systems, which included 12,986 direct assaults on federal agencies and more than 80,000 attempted attacks on Department of Defense computer network systems. Some of these attacks "reduced the U.S. military's operational capabilities." As for China's part in this trend, one American cyber security firm that focuses on "a centralised group of activity based from China" now says that "in the last three months, the attacks [from China] have almost tripled."

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm\\_1735.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm_1735.pdf)

## INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

### **CYPRUS: REVERSING THE DRIFT TO PARTITION. ICG. 10 JANUARY 2008.**

All concerned, including the UN, should make a new effort in 2008 for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, which is blocking a more dynamic EU foreign policy and poisoning its important relations with Turkey. The Greek Cypriot presidential election in February ends a voting cycle in the region and may offer a chance for the divided island's Greek and Turkish communities to re-engage in meaningful negotiations. Restarting UN-mediated talks is in the best interests of all Cypriots, would improve EU effectiveness and enhance Turkey's convergence with Europe. Leaving the problem unsolved is no longer a comfortable status quo.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5255&l=1&m=1>

**KOSOVO COUNTDOWN: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSITION. ICG Europe Report N°188 6 December 2007**

Kosovo's transition to the status of conditional, or supervised, independence has been greatly complicated by Russia's firm support of Serbia's refusal to accept that it has lost its one-time province. Recognition of conditional independence has broad international, and certainly European Union (EU) and American, support. Under threat of Moscow's veto, the Security Council will not revoke its Resolution 1244 of 1999 that acknowledged Serbian sovereignty while setting up the UN Mission (UNMIK) to prepare Kosovo for self-government pending a political settlement on its future status. Nor will the Council be allowed to approve the plan for a conditionally independent Kosovo devised by the Secretary-General's special representative, Martti Ahtisaari, earlier this year and authorise the EU-led missions meant to implement that plan.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5201&l=1>

See more:

**KEY ISSUES: KOSOVO FINAL STATUS. ICG.**

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3225&l=1>

**SOUTH KOREA'S ELECTION: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM PRESIDENT LEE. Asia Briefing N°73. ICG. 21 December 2007**

On 19 December 2007, South Koreans elected Lee Myung-bak as their president. Barring sensational developments in a scandal investigation that still dogs him, Lee, the candidate of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP or "Hannaradang") will be inaugurated on 25 February 2008 to replace Roh Moo-hyun, who is limited by the constitution to a single five-year term. A former top executive of the Hyundai conglomerate, he has pledged to be an "economic president who will revive the economy with his practical business experience". Although he has ideological differences with his liberal predecessor, he is unlikely to make dramatic changes in foreign or security policy.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5240&l=1>

**INSIDE GAZA: THE CHALLENGE OF CLANS AND FAMILIES. Middle East Report N°71. ICG. 20 December 2007**

Throughout Gaza's history, its powerful clans and families have played a part whose importance has fluctuated with the nature of central authority but never disappeared. As the Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually collapsed under the weight of almost a decade of renewed confrontation with Israel, they, along with political movements and militias, filled the void. Today they are one of the most significant obstacles Hamas faces in trying to consolidate its authority and reinstate stability in the territory it seized control of in June 2007. Although they probably lack the unity or motivation to become a consistent and effective opposition, either on their own or in alliance with Fatah, they could become more effective should popular dissatisfaction with the situation in Gaza grow. There are some, as yet inconclusive, indications that Hamas understands this and is moderating its approach in an attempt to reach an accommodation.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5234&l=1>



**GEORGIA: SLIDING TOWARDS AUTHORITARIANISM? Europe Report N°189. ICG. 19 December 2007**

The government's repressive and disproportionate response to peaceful protests in November 2007 shocked Western capitals, which had viewed Georgia as a beacon of democracy in a region of illiberal regimes. Since the Rose Revolution, however, President Mikheil Saakashvili's administration has become increasingly intolerant of dissent as it has sought to reform inefficient post-Soviet institutions, stimulate a deeply dysfunctional economy, regain the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and deal with its meddling Russian neighbour. In an attempt to restore his democratic credentials, Saakashvili has called an early presidential election for 5 January 2008, which he is expected to win, but a free and fair election will not be enough to repair the damage. The West should press the government to abandon its increasingly authoritarian behaviour, engage in a genuine dialogue with political opponents and make the ongoing reform process transparent and accountable.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5233&l=1>

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)**

**JFQ ISSUE # 48-LEGAL FOCUS. NDU. January 2008**

The January, 2008 issue focuses on the rule of law in warfare and U.S. Northern Command.

[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/i48.htm](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i48.htm)



**THE EUROPEAN UNION: MEASURING COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION. David T. Armitage, Jr. Strategic Forum #229. NDU. November 2007**



The United States and European Union (EU) are natural partners in the global war on terror, but cooperation, although absolutely necessary, is inherently difficult. Primary responsibility for most European counterterrorism policies remains with the separate governments of the 27 EU countries, which has presented coordination problems both within the EU and between the United States and European Union. Asymmetries in capacities and perceived vulnerabilities affect how different member states address counterterrorism. Institutional dynamics—not only among the various EU institutions but also between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—

influence the degree of cooperation as well.

<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF229/SF229.pdf>




## RAND

**REMUNERATION AND ITS MOTIVATION OF UK MILITARY PERSONNEL. By: Hans Pung, Samir Puri, Tom Ling, Michael Hallsworth, Laurence Smallman. RAND. January 2008**

A military force is nothing if not the sum of the people serving under its banner. Recruitment and retention are important policy concerns for the UK Ministry of Defence. RAND was commissioned to study the attitudes of military personnel towards their remuneration package highlights and determine the extent to which it motivates them to join and stay in the Armed Forces.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/2008/RAND\\_RB9308.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB9308.pdf)

**COMBAT PAIR: THE EVOLUTION OF AIR FORCE-NAVY INTEGRATION IN STRIKE WARFARE. By: Benjamin S. Lambeth. RAND Monograph. December 27, 2007**

This report documents the exceptional cross-service harmony that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have steadily developed in their conduct of integrated strike operations since the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. That close harmony contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed throughout most of the Cold War, when the two services maintained separate and unique operating mindsets and lacked any significant interoperability features. The most influential factor accounting for this gradual trend toward integration was the nation's ten-year experience with Operations Northern and Southern Watch, in which both Air Force land-based fighters and Navy carrier-based fighters jointly enforced the

United Nations-imposed no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq that were first put into effect after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. That steady-state aerial policing function proved to be a real-world operations laboratory for the two services, and it ended up being the main crucible in which their eventual merger of operational practices was forged. The results were finally showcased by the all but seamless Air Force and Navy performance in their joint conduct of integrated aerial strike operations in the largely air-centric war in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. They were further dramatized by the similarly near-seamless air-warfare performance of the two services during the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom that ensued a year later. These real-world experiences suggest that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. naval aviation should now consider each other natural allies in the roles and resources arena, since they did not compete but rather mutually supported and reinforced one another in the achievement of joint strike-warfare goals.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG655.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG655.pdf)

**DEVELOPING ROBUST BORDER SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES TO PROTECT AGAINST DIVERSE AND ADAPTIVE THREATS. ADDENDUM. By: Brian A. Jackson. December 17, 2007**

Document submitted on December 17, 2007 as an addendum to testimony before the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation on November 15, 2007.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND\\_CT294.1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.1.pdf)

**SECURING AMERICA'S PASSENGER-RAIL SYSTEMS. By: Jeremy M. Wilson, Brian A. Jackson, Mel Eisman, Paul Steinberg, K. Jack Riley. RAND. December 11, 2007**




U.S. communities depend on reliable, safe, and secure rail systems. Each weekday, more than 12 million passengers take to U.S. railways. Recent attacks on passenger-rail systems around the world highlight the vulnerability of rail travel and the importance of rail security for these passengers. The use of passenger rail and the frequency with which terrorists target it call for a commitment to analyzing and improving rail security in the United States. This book explains a framework for security planners and policymakers to use to guide cost-effective rail-security planning, specifically for the risk of terrorism. Risk is a function of threat (presence of terrorists with intent, weapons, and capability to attack), vulnerability (likelihood of damage at a target, given an attack), and consequences (nature and scale of damages if an attack succeeds). While effective security solutions may address all three components of risk, this book focuses on addressing vulnerabilities and limiting consequences, since these are the two components of risk most within the realm of rail-security personnel. The analysis is based on a notional rail system that characterizes rail systems typically found in the United States. The methodology presented is useful for planning rail-security options.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG705.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG705.pdf)

**STEALING THE SWORD: LIMITING TERRORIST USE OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. James Bonomo, Giacomo Bergamo, David R. Frelinger, John Gordon IV, and Brian A. Jackson. Homeland Security Program, RAND Corporation. Web posted November 14, 2007. 08AD256**

This paper examines the “technical competition between terrorist groups and security organizations—the balance between the potential use by terrorists of advanced conventional weapons and the responses available to deter or counter them.” The report also identifies weapons that require greater attention by the U.S. and outlines actions that could mitigate the use of these weapons. [Note: Contains copyrighted material.]


[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\\_MG510.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG510.pdf) [pdf format, 156 pages]



**SMALL ARMS SURVEY**

**SMALL ARMS, ARMED VIOLENCE, AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA: THE NIGER DELTA IN PERSPECTIVE. Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner. Small Arms Survey. Occasional Paper No. 20. December 2007.**

This report is based on field research that was carried out by the Small Arms Survey and our Nigerian partners from September 2006 to April 2007. Consequently, the analysis presented here reflects the situation in Nigeria during this period. While the report does address some key events that took place after April 2007—the inauguration of the new president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua; the initiation of peace talks in the Niger Delta; and the release of




Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari from prison—these events are covered in far less detail. The findings in the report and the trends identified in terms of small arms proliferation, growing insecurity, and the important role of armed groups in security and politics continued to hold true through October 2007.

[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o\\_papers\\_pdf/2007-op20-Nigeria.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2007-op20-Nigeria.pdf)

**A PARAMILITARY REVOLUTION: THE POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES. By Jago Salmon. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 2007. December 2007**

Unlike the early 1990s the PDF is no longer a praetorian force for the NCP. PDF concentrations remain operational in areas of active conflict, such as Darfur, but in most other regions they are inactive reserve forces.



The PDF remains a threat to the CPA, however, not as an active spoiler or military danger but as a physical legacy of the disastrous policies of the Islamist regime during the 1990s. Today, as a reserve force to the SAF, the regular battalions of the PDF can be relied on to follow the orders of Khartoum. But the PDF’s involvement in the widespread distribution of weapons and military training to tribal militias, its mobilization of a militant Islamism opposed to Western involvement in national affairs, and its parastatal relationship that bridges the divide between the state and the NCP are all problems that must be addressed.

[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan\\_pdf/SWP%2010%20PDF.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%2010%20PDF.pdf)

**STANLEY FOUNDATION**

**ARAB MEDIA AND US POLICY: A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RESET. Marwan M. Kraidy. Stanley Foundation. January 2008**



During the past decade, numerous polls have underscored that the reputation of the United States in the Middle East has steadily deteriorated. This persistently negative image poses a formidable challenge to the ability of the United States to engage the Arab region, casting a cloud of suspicion over US political, economic, and cultural initiatives. As a result, over the last few years, several studies, commissions, reports, and assessments have attempted to diagnose the crisis and to issue recommendations on how to remedy the situation. The lack of an international communication strategy, insufficient funds for public diplomacy, and an inadequate public diplomacy structure

have been identified as problems. Though these are important issues, US policymakers should create an alternative to the “global war on terror” as a framework for global engagement, acquire expert knowledge about the Arab media environment, pay more attention to how economic governance issues affect perceptions of the United States, and consider the pitfalls of the misunderstood “branding” label. Above all, an understanding should emerge that the US reputation crisis cannot be resolved by communication alone, but

ought to rest on smarter policies. A revised grand strategy should rest on a new multilateralism based on engagement with multiple state and nonstate actors and new, bold initiatives.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/PAB08Kraidy.pdf>

### **OIL AND SECURITY. Clifford Singer. Stanley Foundation. January 2008**



This brief examines the current role of oil in US defense strategy, US national security strategy, and overall domestic and global economic activity. Using analysis of both the global and domestic economy over the past several decades, I show that the time has already passed when oil was strategically important enough to require individual industrialized nations to be prepared to intervene militarily in oil-producing regions. The idea that high oil prices are a strategic problem is a myth. The problem is not that we cannot afford current oil prices but that their unpredictability interferes with forward planning.

Nevertheless, there is a deep-seated perception that oil-producing regions retain a special strategic importance, with strong effects on US defense planning and strategy. The questions addressed here are how US military, political, and economic strategy can be reconfigured when the strategic role of oil becomes better understood. The high costs of occupation of Iraq illustrate why US intervention in Mideast conflicts is not a useful substitute for a sensible energy policy.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/PAB08Singer.pdf>

### **LOCKDOWN, CLEANOUT, FISSBAN; 48th Strategy for Peace Conference. December 2007**



In October 2007 a group of academics, policy advocates, and government officials gathered for the Stanley Foundation’s annual Strategy for Peace Conference to discuss options for securing, consolidating, and eliminating fissile materials.

Today more than 2,300 stockpiled tons of separated highly enriched uranium and plutonium pose a significant proliferation risk, and that risk could grow if plans for an expansion in civilian nuclear energy materialize. Since 2005 more than 20 nonnuclear countries have expressed interest in installing nuclear reactors, and along with them,

possibly adding uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants. Current efforts to restrict the expansion of such sensitive technologies—already inadequate—are competing with efforts to diversify and find new energy resources. New measures are needed.

The group discussed not only the risks but also potential solutions or mitigations to them. Given that, globally, states will vary in the priority they place on reducing risks, for example, it is essential for the international community to craft measures and initiatives for the physical protection of existing stocks, and to maintain current physical protection criteria such as those defined by the IAEA, as well as to devise norms for the cessation of weapons-usable fissile material production that are widely acceptable and enforceable.



For another, as there is no international mechanism to track the effective adherence to obligations on physical protection of materials and facilities and states are likely to oppose such mechanisms, a compromise between state sovereignty and international security is needed.

This brief paper discusses these and related fissile material issues and offers a set of conclusions and recommendations for policymakers.

[http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pdb/SPC07PDB\\_Lockdown.pdf](http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pdb/SPC07PDB_Lockdown.pdf)

**A REAL-WORLD APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION; 48th Strategy for Peace Conference. December 2007**



The struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the difficulties of helping other nations to become democratic and led many to conclude that the United States does not belong in that business. Americans are beginning to question whether they want to be leaders of the free world, or even agents of freedom’s spread. The premise of the discussion at the Strategy for Peace Conference was that the proper response to recent woes is to redirect democracy promotion rather than abandon it. If we don’t want to simply leave the global future of democracy to fate, what will be the most fruitful approaches? How can we balance concerns about democracy with other foreign policy and national security imperatives—giving both our values and interests due consideration? What are the constraints and possibilities for an outside power such as the United States to leverage political and social change in other countries? These questions must be addressed urgently as the basis for effective US democracy promotion efforts.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pdb/SPC07DemocracyPDB.pdf>

**THE UN’S EXPANDED ROLE IN IRAQ: WHY NOW? Policy Memo. Stanley Foundation. December 2007**



In August 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1770 extending the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The resolution also gave the organization an expanded political role in the country.

Even with Resolution 1770, US requests for greater UN assistance, and the current improvements in the security situation in Iraq, key questions remain regarding the UN’s expanded role. Namely, is this the right time for the UN to expand its political role? And on the flip side, what is the “downside” for the organization, Iraq, and the international community

if it does not choose to take advantage of even a short-term improvement in the security situation?

The Stanley Foundation convened a policy salon dinner with a group of 14 experts to discuss these questions and possible ways forward. This Stanley Foundation policy memo summarizes the discussion outcomes and recommendations for how Iraq, the UN, the US,

and the international community can better move forward to address the ongoing threats to Iraq's stability and security.

[http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/other/UN\\_Policy\\_Salon\\_Iraq\\_Memo\\_-\\_mas.pdf](http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/other/UN_Policy_Salon_Iraq_Memo_-_mas.pdf)

## STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE


### **COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY. Dr. Steven Metz, Ralph Wipfli. Colloquium Brief. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. January 10, 2008**

Participants at the seminar developed these key insights: ? Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it. ? The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach. ? Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important, if not more so. ? Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.



<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB846.pdf>

### **THE INTERAGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE: ALIGNING AND INTEGRATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ROLES IN STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) OPERATIONS. Edited by Jay W. Boggs, Colonel (USA, Ret) Joseph R. Cerami. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. January 08, 2008**




Alert me when similar studies are published For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands

kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB828.pdf>



**JORDANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST STABILITY. Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. December 28, 2007**




Alert me when similar studies are published The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In this monograph, the author highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways that the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries. Although Jordan is not a large country, it is an important geographical crossroads within the Middle East and has been deeply involved in many of the most important events in the region's modern history. In recent years, the importance of the U.S.-Jordanian

relationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged as a vital U.S. ally in the efforts to stabilize Iraq and also resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region. Amman's traditional role in helping to train friendly Arab military, police, and intelligence forces to its own high standards is a particularly helpful way in which Jordan can enhance efforts to achieve regional security. The United States needs to support efforts to continue and expand this role. Additionally, Jordan maintains a key interest in Palestinian/Israeli issues and has made ongoing efforts to play a constructive role in this setting. Helping Jordan survive, prosper, and modernize correspondingly has become an urgent priority for the United States in its quest for a secure Middle East.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB838.pdf>

**OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO ESTABLISHING A DEMOCRATIC STATE IN AFGHANISTAN. Colonel Dennis O. Young. Student (Carlisle) Papers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. December 27, 2007**




After the Taliban regime was driven out of Afghanistan in late 2001, the United States and other members of the international community undertook efforts to establish and stabilize a liberal democratic form of government in that country. Such an undertaking is a monumental task, fraught with many obstacles and challenges. This paper looks at several of the obstacles to democracy in Afghanistan, to include the absence of a democratic history and tradition, an endemic culture of corruption, a pervasive narcotics trade and drug trafficking problem, tribalism and ethnic divides among the population, and finally the lack of support or assistance from neighboring Pakistan. The author proposes five

possible strategies and adjustments to current efforts by the international community, led by the United States and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). If these strategies are adopted, the environment in Afghanistan will be more secure, the government more stable, and liberal democracy will have a much greater chance of taking hold and flourishing. Afghanistan and this region of the world will also be less likely to harbor terrorist operations and organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban to threaten the democratic nations of the world.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB818.pdf>


**SUSTAINING THE PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR. Dr. T. David Mason. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. December 27, 2007**

Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. For a small subset of nations civil war is a chronic condition: about half of the civil war nations have had at least two and as many as six conflicts. This book presents an analytical framework that has been used to identify a set of factors that make civil war more or less likely to recur in a nation where a civil war has recently terminated. The outcome of the previous civil war--whether it ended in a government victory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement--as well as the duration and deadliness of the conflict affect the durability of the peace after civil war. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. What can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?



<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB819.pdf>

**FORCE AND RESTRAINT IN STRATEGIC DETERRENCE: A GAME-THEORIST'S PERSPECTIVE. Dr. Roger B. Myerson. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. December 05, 2007**



A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international

restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB823.pdf>

**RUSSIAN SECURITY STRATEGY UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN: RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES. Dr. R. Craig Nation, Mr. Dmitri Trenin. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. December 05, 2007**

The authors illustrate the degree to which great power rivalry in Eurasia has become a major security issue and source of growing Russo-American tensions. Dr. R. Craig Nation lays out some of the fundamental macro-strategic issues of this rivalry and U.S. goals in Eurasia, as well as the consequences of Russian resistance to Western and American pressures. Mr. Dmitri Trenin emphasizes the growing intensity of Russian threat perceptions.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB829.pdf>



## UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

**NEGOTIATING WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. John W. Limbert. USIP. Special Report No. 199. January 2008**

Both Iranian and American sides come to the negotiating table burdened with years of accumulated grievances and suspicions. Their recent history has led both sides to assume the worst about the other and to see it as infinitely devious, hostile, and duplicitous. Yet, while talking to Iran may sometimes be difficult and unpleasant, it is also worth doing and may help both sides to find common interests lurking behind walls of hostility and distrust.

To enhance the prospects of a fruitful encounter, American officials should pay attention to a variety of traits that their Iranian counterparts are likely to demonstrate. Although some of these characteristics might make productive negotiation difficult, American negotiators should remain patient and focused on the issues under discussion.

Iranian negotiators may base their arguments on an abstract ideal of "justice" instead of defined legal obligations. This distrust of legalistic argument springs from the belief held by many Iranians that the great powers have long manipulated international law and the international system to take advantage of weaker countries. The American negotiator should, therefore, look for unambiguous, mutually agreeable criteria that both define ideals of justice and avoid legal jargon.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr199.pdf>

**MEDIA AND CONFLICT: AFGHANISTAN AS A RELATIVE SUCCESS STORY. YI Bajraktari and Christina Parajon. USIP Special Report No. 198. January 2008**

The development of media in post-Taliban Afghanistan has been relatively successful (compared with both the Taliban regime and other countries subject to international intervention) in establishing free and responsible expression despite the lack of electricity, harsh terrain, absence of viable media outlets during the Taliban regime, and a conservative religious society that subordinates women. However, Afghanistan's media development remains incomplete. Since it still faces many challenges, the international community must continue to assist and support it.

Three main processes contributed to Afghanistan's initial media success: the proliferation of local media, especially radio; the government's increased capacity to communicate; and international media that filled gaps that otherwise might have become problematic. This three-pronged approach in Afghanistan may provide useful lessons for other societies emerging from conflict.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr198.pdf>

**CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. Merriam Mashatt, Major General Daniel Long, and James Crum. USIP Special Report No. 197. January 2008**

Infrastructure development is the foundation of a sustainable economy and a means to achieving broader nation-building goals. Providing basic services is critical to security, governance, economic development, and social well-being.

(...)

In conflict-sensitive environments, the condition of infrastructure is often a barometer of whether a society will slip further into violence or make a peaceful transition out of the conflict cycle. The rapid restoration of essential services, such as water, sanitation, and electricity, assists in the perception of a return to normalcy and contributes to the peace process.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr197.pdf>



**PEACEWATCH Vol. XIII, No. 4. USIP December 2007**

The new December 2007 edition of PeaceWatch highlights a USIP-catalyzed peacebuilding conference in Mahmoudiya, Iraq; Institute representation at the Clinton Global Initiative; USIP's activities in Nepal; insights into Northeast Asian politics with John Park; an Institute-sponsored conference in Minnesota on building bridges with the Muslim world, and more.



**Featured Stories:**

- Iraq Reconciliation Conference
- New York: A Think and Do Session
- Minneapolis: Humanizing the Face of Muslim Youth
- Burma: Still, The Witch Hunt Is There
- Nepal: Remarkable Commitment
- Perspectives on Great Power Diplomacy in Northeast Asia

<http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2007/december07.pdf>

**BEHIND THE NUMBERS: ASSESSING INDICES OF PEACE, CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY. Sarah Bessell. USIPeace Briefing, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted November 9, 2007. 08AD216**

The Institute hosted a panel “to quantify aspects of countries' peacefulness, conflict, and instability: the Failed States Index, the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, and the Global Peace Index. The panel examined the meaning, methodologies, and utility for policymakers and researchers of these and other indices.” This paper summarizes the discussions.

[http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2007/1108\\_peace\\_indices.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/1108_peace_indices.html) [html format, various pagings]



**SOME ASSEMBLY REQUIRED: SUDAN'S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT. Timothy Carney. Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace. Web posted November 9, 2007. 08AD266**

The Institute developed a “project to identify lessons learned from the negotiations of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from 2002 to 2005 and its implementation since then.” To accomplish this, ninety open-ended interviews with government officials, international and local NGO’s, and private individuals were conducted. This paper presents the results of these interviews and summarizes the lessons learned.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr194.pdf> [pdf, 16 pages]



**THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY**

**APOCALYPTIC POLITICS: ON THE RATIONALITY OF IRANIAN POLICY. Mehdi Khalaji. Policy Focus #79. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. January 2008**



The Iranian regime has given the West ample cause for worry about its intentions and general mindset in recent years. Over and above tensions stemming from terrorism, nuclear activity, and other issues, statements from Iranian leaders since President Ahmadinezhad's election have led many to conclude that the regime may be guided by an apocalyptic vision that would welcome chaos as a way to hasten the reappearance of the "Hidden Imam." Can the president and Supreme Leader be treated as rational actors on issues as fraught with peril as nuclear proliferation? In this Policy Focus -- the third entry in the Institute's "Agenda: Iran" series -- Qom-trained theologian and Iran expert Mehdi Khalaji examines

the complexities of attitudes about the Hidden Imam, both in Shia tradition and among Iran's current leaders. He highlights the spread of superstitious religious practices, as well as the influence of anti-rationalist trends rooted in Mahshad, Iran's holiest city. He also explores whether religious factors have a strong influence on the regime's decisionmaking. Iran's leaders have displayed an often bewildering vacillation between "end of days" thinking and self-preservation -- understanding these seemingly contradictory tendencies is crucial to formulating more effective policies aimed at curbing Iran's ambitions in the nuclear arena and elsewhere.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus79.pdf>

**RAISING THE COSTS FOR TEHRAN. By Michael Jacobson. PolicyWatch #1324. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. January 3, 2008**

In the wake of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, questions are being raised as to whether sanctions and financial pressure remain a viable approach to changing Tehran's decisionmaking on its nuclear program. As evidence of this strategy's demise, critics point to the foundering attempts to negotiate a third round of UN sanctions against Iran -- sanctions that appeared imminent before the NIE's publication. While additional punitive measures by the UN are important and necessary, better enforcement of the various sanctions regimes already in place could have an equally significant impact.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2700>



**THE PALESTINIANS: BETWEEN STATE FAILURE AND CIVIL WAR. Michael Eisenstadt . Policy Focus #78. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. December 2007**



Despite functioning as a de facto state since its creation in 1994, the Palestinian Authority has long been crippled by "the four Fs": fawda (chaos), fitna (strife), falatan (lawlessness), and fassad (corruption). These conditions -- the hallmarks of state failure -- continue to define life in the PA-controlled West Bank and show signs of returning in Hamas-controlled Gaza. How did this state of affairs come to pass? And what can the Palestinians, Israel, and the international community do to avert the worst-case scenarios of outright collapse or civil war?

In this Policy Focus, Michael Eisenstadt diagnoses the many longstanding ails that have kept the PA from governing effectively. The Palestinians face numerous obstacles to meaningful reform and stability, including economic stagnation, unsustainable population growth, a self-defeating strategy of armed struggle, and Yasser Arafat's enduring legacy of corruption and unaccountability. These problems have been exacerbated by -- and, in many cases, have given rise to -- external obstacles such as Israeli security restrictions, international sanctions against Hamas, and continued interference from Iran and Syria. Failure to formulate a comprehensive, multilateral plan for overcoming these obstacles could have untold implications for the Palestinians, the regional security equation, and overall U.S. interests in the Middle East.  
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus78ForWeb.pdf>

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