THE ARAB PERCEPTION AND CONSENSUS PROBLEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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INTRODUCTION

> Although Islam is not in power in any Arab state, it has effectively replaced socialism, secularism, and Arab nationalism as the dominant form of opposition to all regimes.
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> --Ziad Asali[1]

> Throughout the Muslim world, there is widespread bitterness against America, even among pragmatic and well-educated businessmen and professionals, who may sincerely deplore recent atrocities, condemn them as evil, and feel sympathy with the victims, but who still resent the way Western powers have behaved in their countries. This atmosphere is highly conducive to extremism.
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> --Karen Armstrong[2]

In the West we have witnessed the democratization and modernization of our societies and the accompanying forces of secularization throughout the last century, especially during the more recent decades. For example, America has witnessed courtroom battles further separating the state from religion such as the outlawing of prayer in public schools. We have observed the growing importance of individual rights, the triumph of a woman's rights over those of her unborn child, and a call for the "celebration of diversity." As the influence of traditional Christian religious values has thus declined, America has continued to become more modern, prosperous and increasingly secular. However, this deterioration of values is viewed by the Arab and Islamic world as evidence of western decadence and

corruption. Their view of our world is overshadowed by this important-to-understand, religiously based perception.

Religion is often an overlooked factor in the study of international relations. As a social science discipline, international relations was founded upon a tradition of seeking rational explanations for the behaviors of mankind in a nation-state setting, which meant that religion became a less-important factor with the evolution of modernization and its effects upon interstate relations. Yet in the Arab and Islamic world, religion has remained a major focal point and is presently the major legitimate force opposing the secular, autocratic (and often corrupt) governments of the region. Thus, one cannot discuss relations between the Arab world and the West without understanding the crucial role of religious perceptions.

It is the purpose of this paper to first, identify common perceptions of the West held by Arabs that came about due to what I consider a lack of information and misperception. Second, I want to elaborate on how the breakdown of consensus among Arabs/Islamists foretells a dangerous future for the Middle East. The lack of consensus means that there are two major groups competing for power—governments and Islamists—and the Islamists are further divided into two general categories of radicals and revivalists/reformists. The continuation of deteriorating conditions could bring about the overthrow of governments and victory for the radicals if democratic reforms are not enacted. I will also discuss the ramifications of Islamic political thought within this setting. Finally, I want to identify US policy options that may help to bring about reform in the region in an effort to unite Islamic forces behind the revivalists toward a

common good that satisfies US interests and brings about the best possible future for Arabs.

THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM

The perception problem in the Middle East became a serious matter of public interest in the West during the aftermath of al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (hereafter "9/11") "when cameramen caught crowds celebrating in Gaza or people expressing satisfaction in Cairo and other cities in the region over the demise of the WTC."[3] Although these scenes likely reflected a minority, they shocked much of the world outside the Middle East and particularly in the United States. Were they representative of Arab views? Do the Arabs hate America, and if so, why?

The Arab-Israeli dispute is the primary source of Arab irritation against the United States. Indeed, a 2001 poll of Saudis, Kuwaitis, Emirates, Egyptians, and Lebanese Arabs concluded that 60 percent of the Arab public in those states claimed the Palestinian conflict as the "single most important issue" of personal concern.[4] Moreover, Hilal Khashan's study of Levant Arabs indicated that the Palestinian question concerns the entire Arab, and even the Islamic, world.[5] Furthermore, Arab news sources put an anti-American slant on the historical passage of the UN resolution calling for the partition of Palestine. They portray US pressure from President Truman as the major factor; the President did indeed pressure Greece and Liberia to vote for partition.[6] What is ignored is the equal or greater role of the Soviet Union in obtaining passage of the partition vote. Lewis describes the significant influence of the Soviets in procuring a majority of votes, and that they gave *de-jure* recognition after the

vote, whereas the US limited itself to *de-facto* recognition of the Jewish state. Such arm-twisting helped to carry the resolution by a mere three votes since a two-thirds majority was required to pass in the General Assembly. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the first to supply Israel with arms through its Czech lackey; and later, other Europeans, especially the French, continued to supply Israel with weapons (including help with nuclear weapons development, according to Cohen[7]). It was not until after 1967 that the US supplied weapons to Israel.[8] Despite this, the *Arab News* claims that "America thus doomed the people of Palestine to a life of destitution, exile and suffering. It deflected their history from its preordained course, robbed them of their patrimony and reduced their sense of nationhood to a fragment."[9] These are powerful words of condemnation pointed at the United States instead of others who played the larger role in early Israel-Palestine history.

Arabs believe the United States, as a superpower, imminently capable of pressuring the Israelis to grant Palestine statehood and to end its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. During the past two years, well over 1800 Palestinians have died at the hands of the Israeli military and over 600 Jews have fallen victim to suicide bombings and other attacks by radical, militant Palestinians.[10] The Saudi Foreign Minister expressed this concern when, during a *New York Times* interview, he appeared "angrily frustrated" about President Bush's failure to do more. Bush's perceived lack of effort "makes a sane man go mad" according to the Minister. The Saudis are reportedly bracing for a "furious gathering storm" among their populace over the Palestinian plight.[11] Moreover, an Arab businessman reported that during a telephonic conference between United States and Arab business leaders, he expressed

frustration over American views, stating that "all they want to know about is Israel and its security. What about the Palestinians and their security? We will not compromise on what is a legitimate issue."[12]

Animosity is especially manifest among Palestinians, as evidenced by the number identifying themselves as supporters of radical Islamic groups. Only 15 percent supported such groups during December 2000, but 18 months later (April 2002), over 26 percent supported groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Brigades, which are opposed to peace negotiations brokered by the United States.[13] Furthermore, though the Egyptian government signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1978, it now "encourages the Egyptian press to be hostile towards Israel."[14] The Egyptian government is the largest Arab recipient of US aid and is thus working directly against US interests with such a policy. Lastly, Islamic states gathered in Malaysia in April 2002 and voted on a resolution which declared that Palestinian resistance to Israel could not be viewed as terrorism, including suicide bombers who act within Israel's borders. Some 57 Muslim states attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting and a majority voted contrarily to United States views in its conduct of the war against terrorism.[15] Hendawi concludes that suicide bombers are now portrayed as the "ultimate Palestinian heroes" and "gone is the optimism of the mid-1990s when peace seemed a realistic proposition."[16]

The Arab media is a leading source of misperceptions among the Arab populace. In an *al-Jazeera* talk-show that aired 10 July 2001 (before the WTC/Pentagon attacks), bin-Laden was portrayed as an Arab hero who stood up to the West. The talk-

show host declared that "bin-Laden has made the greatest power in history shudder at the sound of his name, while the . . . heavyweights [other Arab leaders] arouse only America's pity and ridicule." On the same program, a viewer from Jordan who called in stated that "anyone who attacks bin-Laden and accuses him of terrorism stands with the enemies of our nation."[17] *Al-Jazeera* claims a viewership of over 35 million Arabs and is thus the most influential television station in the Middle East, a region where most people claim to get their news from television. The *New York Times* reports that *Al-Jazeera* broadcasts a mix of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionsim, and that its independent "reporters see themselves as anti-imperialists . . . convinced that the rulers of the Arab world have given in to American might."[18]

Misperceptions also abounded after 9/11 when many in the Arab world did not believe bin-Laden was responsible for the attacks. For example, a regional Arab opinion poll concluded that 31 percent of respondents blamed Israel for the attacks on the US while only 27 percent blamed bin-Laden.[19] Even more shocking, a (non-Arab) Pakistani poll reported that 71 percent of respondents agreed that 4000 Jewish workers had not gone to work in the twin towers the morning of 11 September because they had been warned by Mossad (Israeli Secret Service) agents who were responsible for the attacks. Though the rumor was traced back to Hezbollah news sources in Lebanon, it was carried throughout the region on state-run and private news channels as well as leading newspapers.[20] Interestingly, even the Syrian Defense Minister professed this belief at a Damascus meeting where he was hosting a delegation of western military officers from the British Royal College of Defence Studies.[21]

As America went after the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Arab news channels reported it as a war against Islam, especially after President Bush called the War on Terror a "crusade," invoking memories of Christian Crusaders retaking the Holy Land from Arabs during the 11th and 12th centuries.[22] Bush's "axis of evil" speech strengthened this view because two-thirds of the axis (Iran and Iraq) is Muslim, and the terrorist organizations he named during the speech were all Muslim.[23] Palestinians were particularly opposed to intervention in Afghanistan. A Bir Zeit University poll found 76 percent opposed to joining the US-led coalition and an even greater number, 89 percent, believed the United States was not justified in attacking Afghanistan. Additionally, 64 percent felt that the attacks actually violated Islamic law.[24] As an interesting insight, Kuwaiti liberal parliamentarian Ahmad al-Rubei has said that because of media reports, "the Arab person is waking up and going to sleep every day with the different and exaggerated analyses that are not based on realities but rather on wishes and prefabricated positions. Every news item in any US newspaper is being treated as a complete truth, every US statement is taken as part of the official policy, and every analysis, though very imaginative, is taken very seriously."[25]

Indeed, US government declarations regarding Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power are especially worrisome to the Arab populace. Pressure has mounted since UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002) required a return of weapons inspectors and threatened Iraq with "serious consequences" if they were not allowed to return. The inspectors, which had been in place during the aftermath of the Gulf War to

search out Weapons of Mass Destruction, had subsequently been forced out of the country by Saddam in 1998, and none of the enforcement mechanisms of earlier Security Council resolutions were invoked as punishment. Inspectors are now back due to the new resolution; however, the Iraqi regime's weapons declaration, mandated by 1441, has left many questions unanswered. Recently, inspectors uncovered undeclared chemical artillery rockets as well as documents related to uranium enrichment indicating potential violations of the new resolution.[26] Thus, the pressure to oust Saddam builds as of this writing and war is a distinct possibility in the near future.

Most Arab states are reluctant to support American efforts to oust the Iraqi leader without UN approval. Moreover, key members of the Security Council, namely veto-wielding members France, Russia, and China, along with several non-permanent members, are at least initially reluctant to approve the use of force against Saddam and prefer continued inspections, especially since the items found to date are "short of a 'smoking gun,'" according to these and other potential allies.[27] This means that the United States has not yet done enough to convince allies of the need for war at this time; and interestingly, Bush has declared America will fight without UN approval in a reduced coalition if necessary.[28] This does not bode well for obtaining Arab support against Saddam unless more is done to persuade allies to vote for a Security Council war resolution.

Such reluctance is expressed in various ways throughout the region. In the United Arab Emirates, typically considered pro-US, women in a university political science class have said that "any war against Iraq would be a war against them." Despite their

disdain for Saddam, they believe "conflict will breed more extremism" and are "no longer sure whether America is friend or foe."[29] In believing that the war could create more bin-Laden types, these students demonstrate a sense of increasing frustration among the Gulf populace toward United States policies in the region. Even Egypt has been reluctant to grant use of its Cairo airport as a transit point for military supplies that may be used against Iraq. An aide to President Mubarak stated that Egypt cannot allow use of its airfields without UN authorization for war due to the "extreme sensitivity" of public opinion.[30] Recent polls back this finding (69 percent of Egyptians hold an unfavorable view of the US) and in West-friendly Jordan, 75 percent have expressed an unfavorable view of America.[31]

Also worrisome is the attitude of typically pro-Arab intellectuals and businessmen. Mohammed Ali Musfir, a US-educated professor in Qatar, said "Americans are very blind with their power, and they do not read our culture."[32] Furthermore, while discussing the impending war against Iraq, Ghassan al-Sulaiman—a Saudi businessman who has a vacation home in California and is also US-educated—said "five years ago I never would have imagined the US acting like this, like a bully . . . and if people like me feel this way, then you have to imagine how other Arabs are feeling."[33] Such attitudes are likely prevalent, and if so, the US should reconsider the way it is handling the situation.

Of greater concern is a recent report of the Washington-based Middle East Institute (MEI), whose top leadership visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia—key American allies in the region—to assess the mood. They report that Arabs in those countries perceive the US as being driven by the

> Six C's—cowboys, colonialism, conspiracy, Coca-Cola, cowardice, and clientitus. The client is Israel. The cowardice is the perception that we are a schoolyard bully. Coca-Cola is the symbol of an alien consumer society; conspiracy is based on unrealistic expectations of US capabilities; colonialism is premised on a US drive to control oil; and cowboys is drawn form a Hollywood style perception that the [Bush] Administration shoots from the hip. The reality is that when Arabs think of the United States they think of Israel.[34]

MEI ascertains that these perceptions will be "magnified tenfold if the United States invades Iraq," and though neither country is expected to abandon the United States, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the "long-term consequences of America's standing in the region" and for their positions as supporters of the United States. War is likely to fuel "an incredible impulse to turn to Islam and fundamentalism and away from moderate institutions and democracy," and Arabs fear that Americans fail to recognize this fact. Equally disturbing is news from Arab political analysts reporting greater antagonism towards the US than at any time in recent memory, and that such perceptions are driven by stereotypes which bear little resemblance to reality or the intent of US policy.[35]

In sum, Washington should give heed to Arab opinions in the region, especially when moderate and typically pro-western forces begin to speak out against planned US actions, and efforts to undo the stereotypes and false Hollywood images should also be considered. Graham Fuller relates the following synopsis of the problem:

> The US tendency to disregard popular Muslim concerns as Washington cooperates with oppressive and insecure regimes fosters an environment in which acts of terrorism become thinkable and, worse, even gratifying in the eyes

> of the majority. The vast bulk of Muslims, of course, will go no further than to cheer on those who lash out. But such an environment is perhaps the most dangerous of all, because it legitimizes and encourages not the tolerant and liberalizing [revivalist] Islamists and peacemakers, but the negativistic hard-liners and [radical] rejectionists.[36]

THE CONSENSUS ISSUE

During the same timeframe that the West has become modern and more secular, the Arab world has faced two major crises, according to Bernard Lewis. The first is *"economic and social: the difficulties arising from economic deprivation and, still more, economic dislocation, and their social consequences* [a phenomenon widely reported in the press]. The other is *political and social—the breakdown of consensus, of that generally accepted set of rules and principles by which a polity works and without which a society cannot function* [italics added for emphasis]."[37] The crises have elevated the legitimacy of Islam as the "dominant form of opposition" against ruling regimes, but it is a *disjointed opposition lacking the consensus* required to remove and replace governments.[38] As evidence of a consensus problem, Ziad Asali indicates that neither the "regimes" nor the "Islamist opposition . . . represents a majority, since a large middle-ground is occupied by politically marginalized or impoverished sectors of society," but they are the "two major internal forces" that shape the "political dynamics" of the region.[39]

Islamic opposition is also disjointed in two ways: first, it focuses its fury upon the West and in particular, the United States and not just upon its own governments. Western colonial powers were blamed, not only due to their perceived role as harbingers of immoral principles, but also because they were viewed as the muscle behind the ruling Arab elite, none of which had been

elected by their peoples and most of which had become corrupt and autocratic. Moreover, passing blame to the West was encouraged by the Arab regimes through their monopoly on education and the media, which were used to vilify the West and make it the scapegoat for all problems endemic to the state. Governments sought to deflect blame from themselves, and thus pointed to the West or the plight of the Palestinians as the real cause of suffering and the lack of development in the region. Thus, blaming the West for its own ills is a major occupation of Arab society, and it contributes to Arab perception of the United States. Secondly, the Islamic opposition is again divided into two loose groupings which I prefer to label as the extremists or *radicals* and the reformists or *revivalists* (thus avoiding the generic term fundamentalist), which again is evidence of a lack of consensus, making it difficult to generate a united front against government corruption.

Islamic Radicals

Osama bin-Laden is the champion Islamic radical of the present. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), the USS Cole attack (2000), and the US embassy bombings in Africa (1998) were all attributed to bin-Laden's al-Qaida terrorists who are attempting to remove US influence from the Middle East so that they might then conquer the corrupt regimes of the region and replace them with Islamic government.[40] According to a RAND study, their rationale for wanting to replace Arab leaders ties back to rejection by those very regimes that had supported them during their time as Mujahedeen warriors in Afghanistan. After beating the Soviets, the core al-Qaida veterans expected to be welcomed home as heroes; but instead, Middle Eastern governments became

suspicious of their religious fervor. The arrival of American troops to fight the Gulf War and the continued repression of Islam by the American-backed regimes provided ample grounds for their desire to renew their fight against a new enemy: the US.[41] Kepel adds that they had been "completely divorced from the social realities of the world around them, locked as they were into a sectarian religious logic." Moreover, their efforts in the early nineties to "export jihad" into Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt were thwarted with western assistance; western aid which came to them during the Mujahedeen era had evaporated. Though they had beaten a Soviet "evil empire," they were now viewed as "terrorists and fanatic criminals" themselves.[42] Even among Middle Easterners, according to a *Wall Street Journal* source, "few people endorse bin Laden's goals or his methods;" still, this Arab also believes that "bin Laden constitutes the only so far effective acknowledgement of discontent. The United States misses the boat because it is identified with support of Israel and discredited regimes."[43] In other words, many in the Muslim world view bin-Laden as a Robin Hood of sorts, brave enough to stand up to the United States and wage war against the West in his desire to restore the Islamic Caliphate and rid the Muslim world of western and particularly American influence.

Islamic Revivalists (Reformists)

So, what about the revivalists? Interestingly, early 20th century Islamic reformist movements sought to mix western and Islamic thinking to create Islamic democracies. Leading Islamic scholars of the era believed there was a "natural affinity of Islam with science and reason," which justified the mixing of secular and Islamic traditions, and that "reason [w]as given by God to

protect humankind from either excess or adulteration of religion."[44] Though early experiments for reform went astray, Many Muslim scholars among the intelligentsia continue to call for moderation and government reform. Unfortunately, they are most often ignored by the media or jailed by the government, and their small numbers and lack of recognition have left them with little influence.[45]

As stated earlier, the lack of consensus results from a number of fault lines in the Arab world: Arab governments versus society, Islamic radicals versus revivalists, "Arab street" tensions split between the dislike of their own governments and disdain for the West. One must also mention the artificial borders that resulted from colonialism and split the Arab nation into a number of states creating further tensions between governments. With so many fault lines, it was easy for the West to destabilize the Arab/Islamic nation during the colonial period. I will try to address these fault lines by reviewing the historical pattern of Islamic government, how it was modified by western influence, and how the introduction of democratic principles led to revivalist thought, which has the potential of providing an alternative future for the region.

Islamic Government in Theory

Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth century Arab philosopher, laid the foundation of Arab political thought with his description and theory of the rise and fall of states. Interestingly, he began his theory by highlighting the inherent evil nature of man and his need for a ruler to keep himself under control. Khaldun notes: "people need someone to exercise a restraining influence and keep them apart, for aggressiveness and injustice are in the animal

nature of man."[46] Thus, a ruler is needed, someone who in Khaldun's words has "royal authority . . . the person who exercises a restraining influence, therefore, must be one of themselves. He must dominate them and have power and authority over them, so that no one of them will be able to attack another. This is the meaning of royal authority."[47]

Khaldun's theory divides his world into two groups: the sedentary, city dwellers who live more prosperous lives and entrust the defense of their lives and property to a royal authority; and the Bedouin, who depend on the land and their animals for survival and are more independent and take care of their own needs. Because the Bedouin live in the desert and rule themselves, they need a special type of restraint in order to maintain a peaceful society. Khaldun calls this "group feeling"—*asabiya* in Arabic. He also states that only blood ties can produce this feeling, ties of kinship and tribalism. Due to the earlier mentioned natural injustice of man, *asabiya* is required to overcome aggression. The leaders among the Bedouin are greatly honored, and this respect for them generates obedience and order among the group. Because this self-restraint is inherent among the Bedouin, it makes them a more religious and worthy society than the sedentary who are coerced to obey their governors. Khaldun then relates the cycle behind his theory. As the Bedouin rise in strength and conquer sedentary societies, they eventually become sedentary themselves because of their removal from the harsh Bedouin lifestyle and the loss of *asabiya* brought about by the mixing of blood lines. Eventually, their generation falls and is conquered by another outside, more noble and worthy Bedouin force. And so repeats this cycle of Arab history.[48]

Khaldun's theory provides interesting insight into the nature of Middle Eastern governments. As is easily observed, most tend to be authoritarian. Even in states like modern Egypt which has the semblance of democracy, the authority of Mubarak prevails.[49] In the early stages of governmental development Khaldun recorded the importance of royal authority in civilized developed regions. These authorities were totalitarian in nature. Among the Bedouin tribes outside the developed regions, rulers led without the need for a popular vote. As the Bedouin conquered the more civilized societies, they ruled in the same way a tribal leader would rule: with domination. This tradition influences the nature of authoritarian governments in the Middle East today. Additionally, one must consider why the royal authority was overthrown in Khaldun's theory. He basically states that the new Bedouin conquerors were "more worthy." Because of their closer ties to *asabiya*, they were closer to their culture and religion, and in that respect deserved to be followed. They deserved to be the new rulers replacing those corrupted by the luxuries of sedentary life.

Such a cycle of renewal has been followed throughout Middle Eastern history. According to Dekmejian, at least eight cycles of declines followed by Islamist responses can be documented since the Umayyad decline in the eighth century.[50] Extremists in the Middle East today justify their actions through this constant need for self renewal. Most existing governments are corrupt and are not fulfilling the peoples' needs, so the "more worthy" extremists have a right, like the Bedouin of old, to attempt to overthrow them. The reformers, revivalists, see this same need, but seek reform in a more peaceful way. There are also theoretical

differences that separate the ideologies of the extremists from the revivalists.

In early Islam, Hiro suggests the Caliphate suppressed independent thinking because it would lead to opposition which would in-turn lead to chaos. Order needed to be maintained at all costs.[51] This contributed to the development of authoritarianism and slowed the technological advancement of the Arab/Turkish/ Persian world which had competed with and maintained an edge over Christian Europe until 1683, when the Ottomans failed to capture Vienna.[52] This turning point was followed by the rise of European colonial empires, including the loss of the Balkans and Tartarstan in the late eighteenth century and an even bitterer blow in 1798 when Napoleon conquered Egypt.[53]

For the Ottomans, these losses drove them to the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century which introduced western legal codes, the founding of military schools, creation of a Constitution and parliament, and other western style reforms aimed at helping them compete with the West. At the same time, they were seeking the secularization of Muslim society.[54] Still, the Ottoman Empire continued to decline and experience the loss of more and more territory to the West. Finally, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) decided it was time to change direction. In 1878 he suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, and worked to undo earlier secular reforms. "He repudiated Islamic modernism and turned to traditional Islamic values and thought."[55] Although his reforms failed to save the empire, they lengthened the path toward modern Islamic reform, a path which had already been started by the Salifiyah movement beginning in the seventeenth century.

Even before the Tanzimat reforms, Arabs were dissatisfied with Turkish rule. The Salifiyah movement was dedicated to the "puritanical reform" of Islam. It arose in various regions from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries: the Wahabbi movement in the Arabian Peninsula, the Shawkani movement of Yemen, the Sanusi movement in Libya, and the Mahdi movement in the Sudan.[56] Each movement became the ideological basis for religious reform and a challenge to Ottoman power.

Interestingly, some of the leading theoreticians of these early movements were not extremist in their views, but were more revivalist in nature. Rifa'a al-Tahtawi encouraged the adoption of European scientific ideas. He viewed modern scientific thought as compatible with Islam, and the lack of Islamic progress in this realm contributed to its weakness vis-à-vis the West.[57] Al-Tahtawi also developed a theory of politics. He saw a need for legislative, judicial and executive functions of government, but believed they must be "restrained by higher laws. The 'ruled' must be allowed to acquire freedom and public benefits, and their civil rights should be upheld. The ruler should consult both the ulama and scientific specialists in the course of governing. Furthermore, he should be influenced by public opinion."[58] Al-Tahtawi did see a danger, however, and "warned that, in France, people believed that national welfare and human progress could take the place of religion."[59] Thus, it was still important to maintain an emphasis on morality and faith.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's ideas were similar to those of al-Tahtawi. He noted too that science and the Quran were not in disagreement. He also had political views and played a fundamental role in formulating the Islamic response to domestic

development and western imperialism. Al-Afghani blamed the state of Islamic society on the corruption of Islamic leaders who had "allowed superstition and ignorance to replace reason and enlightenment."[60] He also placed emphasis on the need for morality and faith. He stated that "whenever the cause for progress weakens, the result is backwardness and decadence, and whenever the reason for the fall is eliminated, the result is progress." [61] Al-Afghani even went so far as to assert that the Europeans emerged from backwardness with the religious reformation of Martin Luther.[62] It is therefore logical that a religious reformation of Islam would correct the misfortunes of the past and bring about a return of Islamic glory. It is interesting to note that, according to Hiro, al-Afghani proposed a parliamentary system of government which he saw as being in line with Islamic precepts.[63]

Al-Afghani was later involved in condemning the Shah of Iran for giving a tobacco concession to the British. One of al-Afghani's followers, Imam Mirza Hassan Shirazi, decreed that the faithful should stop smoking until the Shah had withdrawn the tobacco concession. This was the first open challenge to an authoritarian regime in the Middle East, and public opinion actually led to the Shah's withdrawal of the concession. In other words, the weight of the majority overruled the monarch. The Shah's authority was no longer divine.

Twentieth century philosophers built upon the ideas of the earlier theorists, but evolved primarily into two schools of thought. Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928) in Egypt, initiated the first school which called for more radical measures to bring about a return of Islamic government.

He saw only two choices for the Arab world: to follow the path of the West and succumb to its lifestyle and system, or to choose the path of Islam, which meant a return to Islamic principles, civilization and culture, rule by a Caliph, who by definition is both a political and religious leader, and unification of the Arab peoples. Abd al-Qadir Awdah, a leading theoretician of the Brotherhood, clarified the arguments of al-Banna. He stated that Islam is not just a religion but a system and a state. Every order in the Quran and Sunnah requires Islamic rule and an Islamic state. "Religion cannot exist without the state, nor can the state be sound without religion."[64] Still, in a more moderate tone, he also stated that the Caliph should be chosen by the community and may only rule so long as he does what God commands. If he deviates, then the community may depose him and instate another. Thus, Islamic government is not a "dictatorship, because it is limited by the Quran as a constitution."[65]

Others (al-Mubarak, an-Nubhani) also supported the radical argument. In many instances the Hadith calls for Islamic rule, and the Prophet Muhammad himself established an Islamic state. Without a Caliph today, Islam is in a state of backwardness and degradation, remote from the teachings of Islam according to the radicals. All Muslims are sinners until they establish the Islamic state and unite all of (or at least Arab) Islam. Interestingly, this state should be established by militant means, just as the Prophet first established it, in order for its establishment to come to pass, according to an-Nubhani. Khaldun's theory outlining the necessity for renewal could be used as justification for the use of force. After all, the Bedouin were "more worthy" and deserved to conquer the sedentary. Perhaps an-Nubhani saw himself as a

modern Bedouin with the more worthy cause. This school of thought provides the rationale for bin-Laden's actions: living a simple lifestyle in Afhgan caves instead of using his wealth to live comfortably in an effort to claim *asabiya* and appeal to the modern Arab masses. Still, even an-Nubhani's thinking allows for an election of a council of ministers and admits the Caliph is not meant to be a dictator or saint.[66]

Jadaane closes with a revivalist argument that more closely resembles the earlier philosophies of al-Afghani and al-Tahtawi, as outlined by Professor Abd al-Hamid Mutawalli (Egypt, 1977). Islam is not a state, but contains a general basis for a ruling system in the state. The Quran does not outline an actual form of government, and the Caliphate is not a principle of government; it is merely one form that is not considered possible in our time. The Quran does, however, give general guidelines for a government system. Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah and Muhammad Amarah (1973) agree with Mutawalli. "Questions of government are left by God's authority to man and his commitment to public good."[67] The state is national in nature and should be committed to Sharia, but legislation in the state is left to the community of men. There needs to be a separation of religious and civil life, and the community should choose its head of state according to its own circumstances.

This idea leads away from Arab nationalism and supports more democratic ideals. Elections are prescribed as the best way to ensure stability. The main emphasis behind this school of thought is that the Quran laid out guidelines for a government system and God delegated man to work out the details. This alternative then, according to Jadaane, should be more acceptable

to Muslims because it avoids the "extremes of temporal radicalism," as proposed in the first school calling for a return to a Caliph-led state, and it "saves Islam from slipping into the labyrinth of adventurous experiments."[68] He concludes with criticism directed towards the radicals: the "shortcut preferred by our ideal desires may not be the best way to reach 'the cursed tree' and climb it."[69] Such revivalist reforms based upon Islam have greater promise of ensuring stability and improving conditions in the Middle East. They allow for the participation of the community in the governmental decisionmaking process, and this is the best way to alleviate the frustrations of the masses.

Let us now turn our discussion to western colonialism and how it interfered with traditional Islamic development and alienated the Arabs against the West. This alienation has made it more difficult for western-style democracy to flourish in the region, but still, the West influenced the various sub-regions and contributed to the development of states currently existing on the Middle Eastern map. Also, by introducing the concept of democracy, many Islamic reformers have found parallels in Islamic concepts from the Quran mentioned in the next section of this paper.

Colonialism in the Middle East and the Introduction to Democracy

Westernization in the Middle East began during the time of the earlier mentioned Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century which coincided with the subjugation of regions lost by the Ottomans. Over time, most of North Africa was conquered by the French. The Italians conquered Libya after a twenty-year effort in the early twentieth century. The British ended up in control of

Egypt in 1880, and after World War I and the final collapse of Ottoman Turkey, they split control over the North Arabian Peninsula and the adjoining Levant with the French. With the Russians, the British divided spheres of influence in Iran as well. Coastal regions, Yemen and Oman, as well as the small Gulf Sheikdoms also fell under British influence. Only the Central Arabian Peninsula remained independent where the state of Saudi Arabia emerged.

Western domination continued in most of the Middle East until well after the Second World War. Colonial policy generally skewed development within the region. Owen asserts that the West worked to "divide and rule." For example, the French created an Alawi mini-state in Syria and carved out Lebanon as a separate Maronite state. Furthermore, trade was regulated to the benefit of the colonizing state, and contracts and concessions went to foreign colonials rather than Arab nationals. No central banks were established, and tariffs were forbidden.[70] Yet, colonization accelerated social change in the region. Job creation moved people from old village communities to the cities and introduced them to political activity.[71] Arab national leaders became important political actors as states became more centralized. At first, the king or leader could be coerced to support the colonial position and provide continuity and a method of dismissing popularly elected governments trying to achieve greater autonomy through nationalist movements. Over time, however, these same leaders could also become aware of their growing power and lead the nationalist movements themselves. Such was the case of King Hussein of Jordan. Others were overthrown because of their close alliance with the colonists and did not survive long after

independence, as in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Iraq.[72] Independence came gradually to the region, but economic and political dependence continued for some time (and still exists in some regions).

In the 1950s Nasser led a revolt in Egypt which eventually turned into a Pan-Arab movement with a goal to reunify the lost Arab supra-state. His socialist ideologies promised improvement in providing the basic necessities of life, eradication of the injustices of imperialism, and establishing a "sound democratic society."[73] Interestingly, Nasser's movement was not Islamist in nature (nor was it a democracy) and in fact sought a secular socialist path, considering Islam only as a part of Egypt's heritage. Yet, his military success in obtaining control of the Suez Canal was perceived as an Arab victory over western colonialism. He was revered throughout the Arab world for his ideals even though Islam was not central to his ideology. Other socialist regimes also came to power during this period—the Baath in Syria and Iraq, the FLN in Algeria—and competing with Nasser, they also sought an Arab union. Within Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood eventually rose up against Nasser because of his secularism. The Brotherhood's dissent led to increased government control over mosques, religious schools, and public utilities. As the government became more and more centralized, it was viewed as more and more responsible for the problems of society, and Islamic organizations like the Brotherhood gained popular support. The same thing occurred in other secular states, and populations viewed their leaders as replacements to the western colonial powers who had borrowed and adopted western ways.[74]

This culminated in the growth of Islamist movements in the 1970s and 80s which continues to this day.

What is most interesting about the end of colonialism is that nearly all the regimes that arose to replace western masters turned out to be authoritarian. Just as Khaldun's theory predicted, a new "royal authority" would arise to replace the corruption of the turned-sedentary predecessor. Unfortunately, most of the replacement royal authorities—current Middle Eastern rulers—are also corrupt. Evidence of this is revealed in Khashan's survey which also provides government satisfaction ratings. Well over 90 percent of the Levant Arabs are either "unhappy" or "very unhappy" with their governments. Moreover, when asked whether "the ruling elite . . . work for the best interest[s] of the people," 62 percent "strongly disagree" and a further 26 percent "disagree," which means a total of 88 percent of respondents don't really trust their governments. Sixty-eight percent call for government reform, and 23 percent expressed a desire to actually overthrow their governments.[75] Esposito maintains that the autocratic governments are less interested in establishing political legitimacy than in perpetuating authoritarian rule.[76] Lacking legitimacy, they have been challenged by the only legitimate force left in Muslim society: Islam. This is why there is so much power behind the Islamist movements. This power led to the Iranian revolution in 1979, but it was taken over by extremist clerics who have also turned out to be authoritarian, repressive rulers. Unfortunately, many Islamists believe their current rulers use western-style governments to suppress them and continue to fail to provide for their needs. In reality, it is a loyal police force and military that keeps the so called "western front" intact. But

the revivalists know better. They understand that the Middle Eastern regimes are neither democratic nor western in nature, but have simply used outdated bureaucratic authoritarian forms of government which have since been abandoned in the West. It is the revivalist philosophy which offers the most hope for reform in the name of Islam.

The Quran contains the concepts of *shura* (consultation), *ijma* (consensus), and *Maslah* (public interest).[77] A traditional Arab tribal leader was not customarily given license to rule arbitrarily; he would normally consult with the *majlis* (tribal council). In theory, this meant the ruler was held accountable by the tribal council, and in fact, selection of a new tribal leader was subject to this council's approval. His position was not necessarily hereditary. This suggests that a democratic-like system of restraint was in place among the Bedouin because the tribal leader was to use consultation of the *majlis* to reach consensus in the name of the public good.[78]

It must be noted that democracy does not necessarily mean the "accountability of elected officials by means of regular elections where all citizens can vote. This [typical western form] can be termed 'electoralism.'"[79] A conference held at the US Institute of Peace considered the topic of Democracy and Islam, and noted that electoralism requires a highly developed and educated society and a political culture that supports tolerance and compromise. These values may not exist throughout the Middle East and thus make electoral, western-style democracy very difficult to achieve. Yet, there is a demand for greater participation in politics with the rising discontent attributed to poor socioeconomic performance, and as noted above, this

demand is justified in the precepts of the Quran. Perhaps public dissatisfaction will lead to "hybrid regimes" in the Middle East, which conferees defined as a mixture of democratic institutions and practices with some persisting patterns of authoritarianism.[80]

A modern example of a hybrid regime is Jordan. The late King Hussein established a policy of "inclusion."[81] This meant that the Islamic movement was brought in and allowed to participate in the government rather than being repressed as it has been elsewhere. This inclusion forced the King to walk a fine line during the Gulf War because of popular support for Saddam Hussein and his stand against the West, even though the King likely preferred to support the coalition against Iraq. By not intervening nor dissolving parliament during this crisis, he added a great amount of credibility to his regime. In fact, during the 1993 elections the Islamists lost a share of the seats they had originally gained in the first elections of a few years earlier. Still, Ambassador Odeh of Jordan claims that the Islamists play an important opposition role in the government and that their concerns have been "effectively channeled to a democratic political institution."[82] He further states

> In the Arab world, it's wrong to judge democracy by western criteria. Comparing western democracy with Islamic democracy is like comparing silver with gold. In the Arab world, I believe, a synthetic version of democracy will emerge, a democracy that fits in our culture.[83]

More recently, Bahrain has also initiated democratic reforms along the lines of a hybrid regime, still under the monarch who has now declared himself a King. He has recently released political prisoners and held parliamentary elections in which he allowed men and women, Shia and Sunni to vote. The new King

has even emptied the prisons of political detainees and meets regularly with a leading Shia cleric and major opposition figure who had been jailed by his father.[84]

It is interesting to note that other regimes that have prevented democratic reform, such as Algeria, have a lot more problems than Jordan or Bahrain. In Algeria, Islamists sought reform through the ballot box but were stopped by the military, fearing an authoritarian Islamist takeover. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had arisen in the 1980s in opposition to the single party government organization, FLN. It organized using Islamic institutions, schools, and mosques, and during the 1991 elections, when finally allowed to run nationally, FIS won 47 percent of the vote. Second round runoff elections scheduled for January 1992 were canceled by the military. Robin Wright asserts that FIS was not to be feared. Even though the party would have dominated the parliament, the president would have had two years with veto power to counter any attempts to radically change the constitution. This would have allowed ample time to develop compromise positions between the opposing groups.[85] It is also interesting to note that in the first local elections held in 1990, FIS had a million more votes than in the 1991 parliamentary elections.[86] Perhaps they, like the Brotherhood in Jordan, would have lost some of their support, once in power, and ceased to be such a threat to the FLN. It is too bad that we will never know what the outcome might have been. Instead, civil war erupted between the Islamists and the government, and now Islam is seen as the most cohesive and pro-democratic force in Algeria.[87]

To sum up, western colonization alienated the Middle East against the West and its governmental forms, but most of this

alienation is due to the misuse of those forms by current, illegitimate regimes. The call for reform is not so much alienation against the West as it is alienation against the authoritarian regimes currently in power in most Middle Eastern states. Many of these governments profess democracy, but run unopposed in their elections under a system of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In Algeria, this is best highlighted by the ruling regime that allowed democratic reform, but then balked when it saw results requiring it to share power with the Islamic opposition. Quranic interpretation shows that democratic principles and Islam are compatible. Modern revivalists realizing this will call for democratic reforms to rescue their societies from corruption. Such corruption has arisen from sedentary regimes that have maintained power far too long.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The overall aim of US policy should focus upon the creation of peaceful transition opportunities to move Arab governments toward Islamic revivalist reforms. All other foreign policy goals should support this effort. Revivalists offer the best means of bringing legitimacy to government, of creating greater consensus, and it is they who are most likely to overcome past perceived injustices and work with the West towards democratic and economic reform. To get there, I feel that the US must first turn up the pressure on corrupt Arab regimes in an effort to nudge them towards inclusion. Such efforts must remain consistent with US values, and governments showing such tendencies should be rewarded. Examples include Jordan and Bahrain as described herein, as well as Kuwait, Morocco, and Qatar. This push will also go a long way toward eradicating the "hypocrite factor" that

has plagued the US due to its past support of corrupt, authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes. When Islamists see that the US no longer accepts corrupt governments at face value, they will more likely be accepting of US engagement in the region.[88]

Interestingly, much of the current debate regarding Iraq is focused on what type of post-war government will be established to replace Saddam. Fouad Ajami has said that "A new war [against Iraq] should come with the promise that the United States is now on the side of reform. . . . America has not known or trusted the middle classes and the professionals in these lands. Rather, it has settled for relationships of convenience with the autocracies in the saddle."[89] Iraq then, could serve as the catalyst for governmental reform in the Middle East. A new democratic government in Iraq will send a message to others in the region that the US is withdrawing its support from those that refuse to restructure their governments.

Second, going hand-in-hand with friendly pressure towards revivalist-style democratization is encouragement for economic reform. In a region prone to high birth rates and young populations, the need for job creation is extreme, and the lack of economic stratification has led to social problems (urban migration; unemployment; unequal distribution of food, land, capital, etc.) and severely deteriorating economic conditions. Economic incentives offered by the US and other western states should encourage economic and simultaneous democratic reform.

Third, the US must increase pressure on the Palestinians and the Israelis to move the Peace Process forward. This is a most essential element due to its role as the biggest problem area vis-à-vis perceptions of the US. Moreover, impending changes in Iraq

could provide a catalyst for reform among the Palestinians. After all, Saddam's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War cleared the way for the Madrid Conference and the eventual Oslo Peace Process. So the overthrow of Saddam this time around could also provide such an impetus. Doran suggests that the road to peace in Palestine may actually run through a Baghdad administration that cooperates with the US.[90] More importantly, solving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute would eliminate a major scapegoat Arab governments have long used to justify the lack of democratic and economic reforms. In addition, among Arabs, the Palestinians are the most educated, contain the best semblance of a middle class, and are thus the most ripe for democratic reform. Pressuring the Palestinian authority towards reform will not only create avenues for peace with Israel, but allow them to serve as an example of democratic/economic success to other Arabs.

Finally, the US must work in other ways to sell the image of America as a value-laden society that is not corrupt as portrayed in Hollywood stereotypes. By engaging the Islamic religious authorities to condemn terror and suicide as violations of Islam—convincing them of the need to "delegitimize the proposition that violence and conspiracy are to be used against any 'enemy' of Islam,"[91]—and by focusing an education campaign on values, Muslims might be convinced that the West (particularly the United States) is closer-aligned to their religious values than is realized on the "Arab street." Discourse is particularly important to this endeavor, which is "about promoting a respectful, popular dialogue toward a more cooperative future. Traditional foreign policy approaches must now be supplemented by a global engagement that reflects the revolutionary changes of the

information revolution."[92] Increasing Arab awareness of religious as well as other human-rights oriented western values could help to improve understanding between Arabs and the United States. We need to convince them that we still deserve the label "people of the book."[93] The short-lived Pentagon "Office of Strategic Influence" was set up for such a mission vis-à-vis the Middle East,[94] and we need to undertake such an effort regardless of the fate of that office. At the same time, the US must also engage the international community to ensure its support in dealing with this critical region. The case of Iraq is of particular concern, because removing Saddam unilaterally, or with only limited international support, will make it much more difficult to cooperatively rebuild the government in Baghdad and "win the peace." Dialogue is crucial to this endeavor, and as mentioned before, Iraq could serve as a catalyst for reform throughout the entire region.

Conclusion

In the West, secularization has long preceded political reform. In the Middle East, secular reform led to socialist movements and authoritarian regimes that are now discredited and labeled corrupt western forms. A return to Islam is sought as a way to end government corruption. This return can take two paths: one is radical violence that most likely will simply replace one form of authoritarian corruption with another, as occurred in Iran; or the other is a revivalist path, one that allows a compromise between current regimes and Islamic movements with a more democratically-oriented solution. Islam is the only legitimate force capable of initiating the needed reform. But, it must come from democratic principles, reformist philosophy, and not from radicals who will only add to the turmoil. Peaceful transitions to

democracy like that now occurring in Jordan and Bahrain are much more likely to bring long term stability to the region than repression and revolution such as in the Iranian or Algerian cases.

There is hope for the future, but that hope lies in the ability of Middle Eastern governments to share power with Islamic revivalist movements and not simply suppress them in order to continue the royal authority of a corrupt, sedentary regime, simply buying time until eventual overthrow, only to repeat Khaldun's cycle and lead nowhere. In the West we can increase that hope by supporting democratic movements and not prejudging the outcome of perceived Islamic threats, and by discontinuing our support of corrupt, authoritarian regimes that no longer have the support of their people. In this way, we might be able to help the movements along and mediate between the revivalists and the regimes in their struggle to allocate power and develop Islamic versions of democracy.

NOTES

[1] Dr Ziad Asali (President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee), "Arab-American Perceptions of US Policy toward the Middle East, *Middle East Policy* IX (June 2002): 34.

[2] Karen Armstrong, "Ghosts of Our Past," *Modern Maturity* (January/ February 2002): 45.

[3] Nejla Sammakia, "The Role of the Media After September 11," Paper presented at the International Meeting on Global Trends and Human Rights, Geneva, 10-12 January 2002, 6.

[4] Joseph Farah, "Just What is Arab PR?" *Jerusalem Post*, 10 August 2001, 14.

[5] Khashan's 1999 survey included Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and Palestinians. Forty-five percent of those surveyed claimed the Palestinian question concerned the "Arab world" and 40 percent also claimed it as an "Islamic world" concern. See Hilal Khashan, "Arab Attitudes Toward Israel and Peace," *Policy Focus #40* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 4,19.

[6] Fawaz Turki, "Follies of American Exceptionalism," *Arab News*. Online at www.arabnews.com.

[7] Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1998), 49-66.

[8] Bernard Lewis, "The Revolt of Islam," *The New Yorker* (November 2001). Online at www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/011119fa_FACT2. Accessed on 3 October 2002.

[9] Turki.

[10] Death stats reported by Hamza Hendawi, "Ordinary Arabs Join Ranks of Militants as their Governments Pursue Path of Negotiations," *Associated Press Cairo*, 28 September 2002.

[11] As reported by Tony Blankley, "Arabian Storm Rising," *Washington Times*, 14 November 2001, 19.

[12] James Dorsey, "US Publicity Efforts in Terror War Fall on Deaf Ears in Muslim Nations," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 November 2001.

[13] Kathy Kiely, "Extremist Voices Drown Out All Others in Mideast," *USA Today*, 5 April 2002, 1.

[14] "Once We Started Fighting Israel We Lost Democracy," MEMRI #104, 20 June 2000. Online at http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 October 2002.

[15] "Death Wish," *Washington Post*, 4 April 2002, 16.

[16] Hendawi.

[17] "Terror in America Retrospective: A bin-Laden Special on Al-Jazeera Two Months Before September 11," MEMRI #319, 21 December 2001. Online at http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 October 2002.

[18] Fouad Ajami, "What the Muslim World is Watching," *New York Times Magazine*, 18 November 2001.

[19] Published in An Nahar, a Lebanese newspaper. See Ariel O'Sullivan, "Syrian Defense Minister Blames WTC Attacks on Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, 19 October 2001, 1A.

[20] Among Pakistani respondents, 13 percent considered the story a rumor and another 16 percent thought it was baseless. Michael Dobbs, "Myths Over Attacks on US Swirl Through Islamic World," *Washington Post*, 12 October 2001, A22.

[21] O'Sullivan, 1A.

[22] Sammakia, 7.

[23] Riad Abdelkarim, "PR Alone won't win Arab, Muslim Hearts and Minds," *Arab News*, 6 February 2002. Online at www.arabnews.com. Accessed on 24 April 2002.

[24] Lamia Lahoud, "Palestinians Demonstrate Against US Attacks," *Jerusalem Post*, 14 October 2002, 3.

[25] Ahmad al-Rubei, writer for *Asharq al-Awsat*, a London daily Arabic language newspaper, 14 January 2003. Reprinted in *GulfWire E-Newsletters*, 23 January 2003.

[26] Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "US Hastens to Assess Pair of Iraq Findings," *Washington Post*, 17 January 2003, 1.

[27] See Julia Preston, "Short of a 'Smoking Gun," Allies Ask Why the Rush?" *New York Times*, 22 January 2003; and Bill Nichols, "Bush Lacks Votes in UN, Diplomats Say," *USA Today*, 23 January 2003, 4.

[28] Michael R. Gordon, "Fighting Solo if Necessary," *New York Times*, 23 January 2003, 1. President Bush reaffirmed this view during his State of the Union Address, stating that "the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others." Still, he also mentioned that the Secretary of State is scheduled to meet with UN Security Council officials to share intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs, a move that is hoped to sway allies. President quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "Bush Says Hussein is Giving Aid to Terror," *New York Times*, 29 January 2003, 1. See also Glenn Kessler and Karen DeYoung, "Powell to Brief UN Panel on Weapons Data," *Washington Post*, 29 January 2003, 1.

[29] Jane Perlez, "In Search for Democracy, US is Rejected as a Guide," *New York Times*, 28 September 2002.

[30] Jane Perlez, "Arab Leaders Glumly Brace for Inevitable War," *New York Times*, 8 October 2002.

[31] December 2003 survey by the Pew Research Center reported in Evan Osnos, "Moderate Arabs Shudder, Denounce US as Gulf Bully," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 January 2003.

[32] Quoted in Osnos.

[33] Qouted in Osnos.

[34] Visit took place during December 2002. See Edward S. Walker, "Gloomy Mood in Egypt and Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Institute*

Perspective, 22 January 2003.Reprinted by *Gulfwire E-Newsletters*, 23 January 2003, 1.

[35] Ibid, 1-2.

[36] Graham E. Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (March/April 2002): 56.

[37] Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1995), 385.

[38] Asali, 34.

[39] Ibid, 34.

[40] Bin-Laden claims that he fights the US for "the removal of the man-made laws that America has forced on its agents in the [Middle East] area so that this [Arab] nation could be ruled by the Book [Quran] that has been sent down by its Creator, Allah." Moreover, he said that "America will never dream of safety, until safety becomes a reality for us living in Palestine. . . . America won't be able to leave this ordeal unless it leaves the Arabian Peninsula, and it stops its involvement in Palestine, and in all the Islamic world. See Osama bin-Laden, interview with Tayseer Allouni, Kabul correspondent for Al Jazeera, 21 October 2001. Online at www.muslimthai.com/jehad-online/ article.php?a=252. Accessed on 23 January 2003.

[41] Brian Michael Jenkins, *Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 3-4.

[42] Giles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 300-301.

[43] James M. Dorsey, "US Publicity Efforts in Terror War Fall on Deaf Ears in Muslim Nations," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 November 2001.

[44] Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1838-1897) is a major Islamic scholar considered by many to be the father of Islamic modernist thought. His ideas (as well of those of his student, Muhammad Abdu) are outlined in Roy R. Andersen, et al, *Politics and Change in the Middle East* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 160-161.

[45] Support for this view can be found in "On the Struggle Against Corruption in the Arab Regimes," The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) # 411, 14 August 2002. Online at http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 October 2002.

[46] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 47.

[47] Ibid, 47.

[48] Ibid, 91-122.

[49] Mubarak ran unopposed in Egyptian elections. Voters had the choice of voting yes or no for him, and everyone knew he would win. See Christopher Dickey, "Step Forward. Now Inch Back." *Newsweek*, 11 October 1993, 40.

[50] R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 9-12.

[51] Dilip Hiro *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 45.

[52] Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 16-17.

[53] Ibid, 21-31.

[54] Hiro, 46-47.

[55] Ibid, 49.

[56] Tereq and Jacqeline Ismael, *Government and Politics in Islam* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), 25-26.

[57] Ibid, 26-27, 30. Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was an Egyptian Imam who served as a Muslim missionary to France. He read many Western political works while in France and was influenced by the works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu.

[58] Ibid, 34.

[59] Ibid, 30.

[60] Ibid, 28.

[61] As quoted in Ismael, 31.

[62] Ibid, 31.

[63] Hiro, 50.

[64] Fahmi Jadaane, "Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Writings," in G. Luciani, ed., *The Arab State*, 258.

[65] Ibid, 259.

[66] Ibid, 267-272.

[67] Ibid, 277.

[68] Ibid, 282.

[69] Ibid, 283.

[70] Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 17-19.

[71] Ibid,19.

[72] Ibid, 20-21.

[73] John L.Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 127.

[74] Ibid, 128-130.

[75] Khashan, 16-17.

[76] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15.

[77] See Hiro, 45, and Mehdi Noorbaksh, "The Middle East, Islam and the United States: The Special Case of Iran," *Middle East Policy*, Vol II No 3, 86, for further discussion of these principles in relation to democracy.

[78] Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy (*New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 90.

[79] Timothy D. Sisk, *Islam and Democracy* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 19992), 8.

[80] Ibid, 8-9.

[81] Ibid, 45.

[82] Ibid, 47.

[83] Ibid, 47.

[84] Yaroslov Trofimov, "Bahrain's Bold Rebuff to its Islamic Rebels: Democracy and Rights," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 October 2001, A1.

[85] Sisk, 39.

[86] Ibid, 38.

[87] Ibid, 41.

[88] In a recent speech to the Jeddah Economic Forum, the Jordanian Prime Minister encouraged Arab governments to build open and democratic civil societies. See "Arabs Must Become More Democratic to be Competitive: Jordan PM," *AFP*, 19 January 2003. This is the type of thinking that should be encouraged and rewarded by US policymakers.

[89] Fouad Ajami, "Iraq and the Arabs Future," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (January/February 2003): 5-6.

[90] Michael Scott Doran, "Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy" *Foreign Affairs* 82 (January/February 2003): 22. It might also be said that cutting Saddam's support to Palestinian suicide bombers would aid in calming relations between the Palestinians and Israelis.

[91] Richard C. Hottelet, "How to Dissolve Terror at the Roots: Education," *Christian Science Monitor* 10 January 2003, 11.

[92] Jamie Frederic Metzl, "For a Digital Marshall Plan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 28 March 2001, 9.

[93] This term is used in the Quran and names both Jews and Christians as "people of the book"—referring to the Old Testament, which is also scripture to Muslims.

[94] See "From Uncle Ben's to Uncle Sam," *The Economist*, 23 February 2002.