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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
U.S. AIR FORCE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON FORCE RECONSTITUTION
21 OCTOBER 2003
Introduction
Chairman
Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, distinguished
Committee members, it is both my honor and
privilege to sit with my Service counterparts
to testify before you this afternoon on such a
serious and important matter.
Successful reconstitution and resetting
of
America
's armed forces is critical to the success
of current stabilization operations in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
and this nation's continued ability to
project military power in support of the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
Background
In
terms of Air Force readiness, Congressional
attention, particularly from this Committee,
paved the way for the substantive increases we
saw in our ability to prosecute this
nation's National Security Strategy over the
past few years.
The renewed emphasis on such programs
as spare parts, depot maintenance, and
munitions stockpiles laid the foundation for
readiness and mission capable rates that our
Air Force has not seen in some time.
At the same time, your Committee's
increases to our flying hour, training, and
general Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
funding made it possible for our force to
remain the most proficient Air Force in the
world. In
short, because of the improvements that
Congress supported over the past few years,
the Taliban and the Ba'athist regime of
Saddam Hussein picked the worst possible time
to confront the
United States
. They
met a joint force composed of the best airmen
and the best equipment the world had ever
seen. For
your support in making that happen, your Air
Force thanks you.
Our
Objective
We
can look back as far as the Continental Army
and trace
America
's record on resetting and reconstituting
the force at the conclusion of major combat
operations.
Previously, significant cuts in
manpower and materiel following our conflicts
have been precursors to periods of
unpreparedness that require prolonged and
costly build-ups.
Ultimately, these periods limited our
nation's ability to deter or dissuade our
adversaries and resulted needlessly in the
loss of American lives in combat.
Today,
we are in a different situation.
September 11th 2001
was the opening volley in the ongoing Global
War on Terrorism.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) are but two
highly successful campaigns in this war - a
war which will ultimately make the people of
this great Republic and the peoples of all
peace-loving nations safer.
To accomplish this goal, successful
reconstitution and resetting of
America
's armed forces is critical.
But it is important first to frame the
task ahead.
First,
we are still engaged with very dangerous
enemies throughout the globe.
We must replenish our stocks, our
people, and our ability to project power
around the world.
Being prepared to deliver precise
effects anywhere at anytime as part of a joint
and/or coalition force is a top priority.
Second, we must rapidly incorporate our
lessons learned and implement those changes to
maintain our combat edge.
As we remain engaged, our current
opponents, as well as would-be adversaries,
are watching and learning from the new
America
way of war.
The Air Force must ensure that we
capitalize on our successes and our lessons
from these recent conflicts.
Third, stabilization operations and our
ability to capitalize on our successes in OEF
and OIF require significant assets and a
robust American presence.
After opening thirty-eight new or
expanded bases in support of OEF and OIF and
shifting our focus and forces, we must ensure
that our enduring presence is equipped to meet
the challenges of their new environments.
As a framework, the Air
Force's objectives for resetting and
reconstituting the force fall into three broad
categories.
Our requirements will:
-
Restore our equipment to combat
effective state required to fight in the
future;
-
Incorporate lessons learned by
enhancing existing platforms or
integrating technologies that proved
valuable; and
-
Equip USAF forces currently engaged
in stability operations with the tools
necessary to accomplish the mission.
Restore/Reset
for the Future
To
achieve the mission of defending the
United States
and protecting its interests through aerospace
power, the Air Force has a vision of Global
Vigilance, Reach, and Power.
This vision and our ability to defeat
our adversaries in the future depends on our
ability to reset and reconstitute.
Replacing precision weapons kits (laser
and GPS-guided bomb kits), conventional
ammunition expenditures (rockets, small arms,
fuzes, etc), and
older weapons used in OIF and OEF
(expended Mavericks replaced with newer
version with Electro-Optical Guidance
Capability/changing cluster bomb units to Wind
Corrected Munitions Dispensers) are a few
examples funded by Iraqi Freedom Funds/FY03
Supplemental.
Incorporating
Lessons Learned
The
Air Force has learned some valuable lessons
with regard to tactics, training, and
equipment during OIF and OEF.
Rapidly incorporating these lessons
into the force will make current operations
much more effective and will provide
real-world experience for improving our future
force. Supplemental
funding for Global Hawk enhancements, the
integration of Advanced Sensor Pods, Special
Tactics Combat Controller equipment, and
further implementation of the highly
successful Blue Force Tracking system are
examples of quick assimilation of new
warfighting lessons.
Current
Operations - the New Reality
As
previously mentioned, we opened thirty-eight
new bases in support of OIF and OEF.
These bases were not only used to
execute Air Force missions, but were the home
to joint forces and numerous coalition
activities.
These bases required everything from
Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources sets
for housing, workspace, hangars, and shop
space to fuel bladders, pallets, Aircraft
Refueling Vehicles and aircraft ground
equipment.
The ongoing stabilization operations in
support of the Coalition Provisional Authority
require our forward presence in Iraq and thus
will require civil engineering equipment, air
conditioners, medical equipment, hand tools,
and even heavy construction equipment.
All of this was, or is in the process
of being transported forward and consumed.
When these items are taken out of home
unit stocks it affects the combat capability
of that unit.
It is this impact that the Air Force is
attempting to mitigate.
In the future, operational necessities
will probably not include all of these bases
and materiel requirements.
At some point, select bases will be put
in WRM or caretaker status.
The Air Force, as it has done at
numerous bases thus far, will re-evaluate the
equipment that should be left at the base in
case of future contingencies and the materiel
that can be moved to active bases.
The
Road Ahead
While
7.3 of our 10 Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF)
worth of capabilities are globally engaged,
resetting the force is an Air Force
imperative.
For efforts in this area to be
successful, we must focus on reconstituting
capabilities, not just commodities.
Beyond just equipment, Air Force
warfighting capabilities depend on training
and a sustainable battle rhythm for the entire
force. Synchronizing these aspects with the
equipment reconstitution will ensure our
combat readiness.
Currently,
the Air Force plans to return to pre-OIF AEF
rotational cycles by March 2004.
At that point, we expect our fighter
and bomber force will be ready to resume
normal rotations and we will have completed
the repositioning of our war reserve stocks.
By March, we also expect that most
equipment and consumables within Unit Type
Codes will be reconstituted.
However, even with our aggressive
efforts to reset certain low density/high
demand capabilities, our Expeditionary Combat
Support, Intelligence Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance assets, and Security Forces,
will not meet the March goal due to sustained
combat operations and training backlogs.
-
With
our goal of ensuring combat readiness, it
is important to understand the magnitude
of successfully reconstituting the force
in terms of cost and time.
For each of our services it is
imperative that we examine four specific
questions this Committee has asked:What is
the cost/time to repair equipment at the
unit and depot level of maintenance?
-
What is the cost to procure new equipment
to replace that equipment damaged beyond
repair or used beyond economical repair?
-
Are the resources adequate in FY 2003 and
2004 to accomplish this task?
-
If
there are unfunded requirements, how will
these shortfalls impact future readiness
levels?
Equipment
Repair
Currently,
we are conducting unit-level inspections of
aircraft returning from overseas in order to
determine whether the asset can be
reconstituted locally or sent to depot. This
will be the first step in defining the total
cost and time to repair equipment at the unit
and depot level.
The
time that equipment is unavailable to the
warfighter and the repair cost varies widely
depending on the type of equipment and the
extent of damage.
For instance, if we find reasons to
remove the T56-15 engines on our C-130s, it
may take 90 days within the Continental US or
as much as 140 days if the aircraft is
deployed.
Another illustration of the wide ranges
of repair times is our MH-53 helicopter.
In this case, if we determine that an
aircraft is undamaged, the reconstitution
period is only 30 days.
If the aircraft requires phase
maintenance, reconstitution maintenance, and
an operational check-out that period could
reach from 90 to 160 days.
Actual
costs to repair the equipment is similarly
difficult to determine and will be dependent
on the extent of work that needs to be done.
Without knowing the level of
inspections required to fully determine a
problem, the amount of spare parts required to
fix the problems, or the flying hours required
for maintenance check-outs, we cannot
ascertain the actual costs at this time.
Maintaining
combat effectiveness while completing these
inspections and repairs is a top priority.
To do so, the Air Force plans to use
any and all sources of repair to reconstitute
critical assets and the location of the work
will be dependent on mission need and the type
of work being performed.
Currently, the Air Force does not
foresee any repairs that will significantly
impact warfighting unit downtimes.
In
terms of depot-level work following OEF and
OIF, our major commands have not reported any
significant effects on workflow.
These conflicts did not cause us to
defer large numbers of Programmed Depot
Maintenance on our airframes or equipment.
Thus far, we have not found any
fleet-wide issues that would complicate depot
budgeting or scheduling programs.
Although the final picture cannot be
ascertained until all OIF-deployed aircraft
and equipment have been inspected, we believe
that the depots have the capacity to handle
all reconstitution activities.
Currently, the Air Force does not see
headroom as a limiting factor nor do we
foresee problems complying with the 50/50
requirements.
Past decisions to properly capitalize
our depots brought us the ability to
accomplish these tasks and meet the
warfighter's needs.
Combined with today's smart decisions
on critical sources of repair, the Air Force
sees no reason why we cannot resume top
readiness rates quickly.
Procurement
The
Air Force projects total procurement costs for
OIF and OEF reconstitution at approximately
$1.2B. We
have submitted requests through the Iraqi
Freedom Funds/FY03 Supplemental and in the
FY04 Supplemental to replace equipment damaged
beyond or consumed beyond economical repair,
replenish expended stockpiles, and to upgrade
some equipment as we replace them.
Operations and Maintenance in FY04
Given
our current level of operations in support of
OIF, we believe we will need $1.1B in O&M
to reconstitute our forces and reset our
weapon system fleets.
As submitted, DOD's FY 2004
Supplemental request is sufficient to address
known reconstitution issues.
Specifically, we have requested funding
for crucial programs such as:
Risk and the Impact of
Shortfalls
However,
we must acknowledge that there are some
elements of risk, both in Operations and
Maintenance and in Procurement activities
during this period of reconstitution.
The Air Force will have to evaluate
this risk during the execution year.
In
terms of Procurement, the Air Force will have
to accept manageable risk in some
reconstitution efforts until they can be
addressed in our annual budget request.
Although manageable, until
our reconstitution efforts are complete, our
ability to maintain acceptable mission capable
rates and to support future operations could
be impacted.
However
difficult these choices, it
is important to pause and state here that in
all cases, readiness
will be our top priority during this period.
With
respect to the Flying Hour Program, as always,
we will fly the program and our most critical
items will be funded.
Conclusion
The
Air Force, along with each of the members of
this joint team, is proud of our operational
successes over the past two years.
When our President and this nation
called on
October 7th, 2001-
we were ready.
Thirty
days later our joint team allowed Coalition
and
Northern
Alliance
troops to enter
Kabul
.
On
19
March 2003
, the
President once again called on the military
and again we were ready.
Within twenty-one days, this joint team
had effectively broken coherent resistance in
Baghdad
and collapsed the regime's control.
Five days later, the joint and
Coalition team captured the last major Iraqi
city, unseating a despotic government and
liberating approximately twenty-five million
Iraqis.
The
readiness that made the Air Force contribution
possible was the result of the hard work of
the thousands of airmen and civilians of our
Total Force.
Additionally, our success was a tribute
to this Committee's leadership and its
support at such a critical time in our
nation's history.
Together, we can focus on resetting and
reconstituting our forces for maximum
operational effect against future foes; strive
to integrate our combat lessons learned; and
never forget we are still engaged in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
. We
owe
America
's sons and daughters the right tools to
accomplish the mission.
With your help, your Air Force, and the
rest of this joint team, is ready to make it
happen.
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