The Taiwan Relations Act and the Referendum Issue in Taiwan: A Conundrum for the United States

 

By John F. Copper*

 

     The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) passed into law by Congress in 1979 and holding referendums in Taiwan, which President Chen Shui-bian has recently called for, when juxtaposed together creates a dilemma for U.S. foreign policymakers. Furthermore, the situation is a serious one.

 

     It is my opinion, and one shared by many scholars in the field, that the TRA commits the United States to defend Taiwan against any military threat. It states that enactment of this law was "necessary": 1. to make it clear that to try determine Taiwan's future by force (including boycotts or embargoes) is a threat to the security of the Western Pacific area and of "grave concern" to the United States; 2. to provide Taiwan with arms; 3. to maintain the (America's) capacity to resist any effort to change Taiwan's social or economic system.

 

     Reading these three provisions, especially together, and knowing Taiwan has only one enemy and faces a threat from only one country (China), one must conclude that the TRA has committed the U.S. to defend Taiwan against any action the armed forces of the People's Republic of China might take against the island, especially an armed attack, and for whatever reason.

 

     Even if one does not accept this "legal" argument or prefers a more pragmatic interpretation of the "Taiwan issue," it is imperative to note that public opinion in the United States is very favorable toward Taiwan and not favorable toward China and that this is reflected very much in the view of Congress toward Taiwan. Thus, as a practical matter the U.S. will defend Taiwan.

 

     The United States, in fact, acted to do so in 1996 when Taiwan held its first direct presidential election and China conducted missile tests near Taiwan's shore to intimidate the electorate and influence the results of the election. President Clinton ordered U.S. aircraft carries to the area and a face-off between U.S. and Chinese forces followed. According to many observers this was a crisis that threatened to escalate into war.

 

     The reasons stated for the U.S. willingness to defend Taiwan at that time, were the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act and the fact that Taiwan has long been a faithful ally of the United States. In addition, Taiwan had become a democracy under U.S. aegis.

 

     It is likewise important to note that has been (since the 1950s), U.S. policy that the "Taiwan issue" must be resolved peacefully. That idea was written in the TRA. This policy has been repeated a multitude of times.

 

     America, then, and probably under any circumstance, will defend Taiwan.

 

      On the other side of the equation, China regards Taiwan as its territory and its government has pledged to bring about China's reunification, meaning getting Taiwan back. In view of the "Taiwan issue" connecting intimately to the virulent nationalism and irredentism that has grown in China of late, this is a very serious matter. Even if the government wanted to ignore Taiwan it cannot and still remain in power, according to many analysts.

 

     It is clearly not in the interest of the United States to evoke political instability in China or undermine its leadership. Openly contradicting China's stance on the Taiwan issue would do that. This is the reason for the U.S. policy of one China.

 

     The gravity of the matter of President Chen Shui-bian several months ago proposing the use of a referendum must be seen in this context. Taiwan is a "nexus" state, or one that could trigger a war between two major powers, the U.S. and China and the United States does not want that.

 

     In designing a U.S. response some other important facts that relate to President Chen's call for a referendum need to be noted.

 

One, the word for referendum in Chinese, gong tou, includes the concept of plebiscite, or deciding the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. (There is no specific word for plebiscite in Chinese.)

 

Two, President Chen broached the referendum issue in the context of an upcoming election and when opinion polls indicated that the opposition "blue team"--the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and the People First Party (PFP)-would win the election over President Chen and his "green bloc"-his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). President Chen patently made the proposal to improve his prospects of winning the presidential election in March.

 

President Chen denies this. But the referendums are to be held the same day as the election. Moreover, the two questions to be resolved are not matters of domestic policy but rather relate to the question of Taiwan's relationship with China.

 

The two questions are: 1. Should Taiwan acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons if China continues to increase the number of its missiles in the area of China adjacent to Taiwan, and 2. should the government engage in negotiations with China to establish a "peace and stability" framework for cross-strait interactions.

 

The matter of acquiring anti-missile weapons is an issue between the U.S. and Taiwan and probably will not be effected by public opinion. In any event, Taiwan has and is currently in the process of acquiring anti-missile weapons. The second question, likewise is not a matter that the electorate of Taiwan can resolve.

 

     The opposition subsequently agreed to write a referendum law, there being provision for referendums in the Constitution (but there existed no law to define their use). Also opinion polls showing the public wanted it.

 

Indeed a referendum law was needed to bring about needed political reform, which had not been accomplished in the milieu of severe political gridlock in the wake of Chen Shui-bian winning the presidential election in March 2000.

 

However, problems arose immediately after the Referendum Law was passed. It contains a provision for what some call a "defensive referendum" (though the Referendum Law does not include such words). According to the law (a rather vague sentence) it can be invoked in an emergency or crisis.

 

President Chen has declared that he interprets China's buildup of missiles and other military forces across the Taiwan Strait to constitute such a situation and intends to put this to the voters coinciding with the March 20, 2004 presidential election. Since, as noted above, the voters cannot decide this matter, it seems to be an effort to win votes.

 

     President Chen indicated obliquely, and so did his supporters, that the referendum could be used to decide the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty (making it a plebiscite also).

 

President Chen has also called for writing a new Constitution. To be sure Taiwan's Constitution is in many ways anachronistic, having been written when the Nationalist government ruled China. It needs to be replaced or amended to fit Taiwan's current situation and to resolve systemic matters, such as whether Taiwan should have a presidential system of government or not, which may be too fundamental to handle by referendum.

 

     But the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty is at stake because the Constitution refers to the Republic of China and assumes that Taiwan is a part of China. President Chen would like to change Taiwan's national title, or at least is on record saying this. (He has also said otherwise.) He certainly does not consider Taiwan to be a part of China.

 

     His call for penning a new constitution during the campaign period, like the proposing referendums, seems clearly politically motivated.

 

     All of this creates a serious predicament for the United States.

 

     The United States has long favored democracies in the conduct of its foreign policy and has been instrumental in the democratization of Taiwan. America has been Taiwan's mentor and more in this process, even threatening the government of Taiwan if it did not democratize. The TRA, incidentally, in my opinion, when it demanded progress in human rights in Taiwan (since in the U.S. view the human rights condition of nations is improved by democratization) called for it.

 

     Democracy also, in the U.S. view, gives a nation the right to choose its future. That means Taiwan should possess the right to decide whether it unifies with China or become legally separate from China.

 

However, at the core of U.S. China/Taiwan policy is the principle of one China. It is, of course, obvious that there is not just one China, but rather two, in the sense that both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (or Taiwan, if there were to be a name change) possess sovereignty. But the more important point is that the one China idea, even if untrue, has been essential to preventing the Beijing-Taipei conflict escalating, a conflict which would likely draw the United States into a face-off with China or worse.

 

     Thus America has a difficult decision to make.

 

     Arguably the U.S. has good reasons to oppose the referendum in Taiwan if it means making an attempt to decide the sovereignty issue.

 

Why? First of all it desirable, perhaps imperative (a view known clearly to Taiwan) that the United States wants to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This is even more so now given America's problems and commitments elsewhere. In December, President Bush stated this emphatically in the context of the referendum imbroglio.

 

Second, supporting President Chen's referendum proposal, in the present situation (meaning doing it now), would be tantamount to helping one political party or bloc in Taiwan during an election campaign. Taiwan's national identity, or whether it is legally a part of China or not, is an issue that divides Taiwan along political party lines.

 

     In fact, the media in Taiwan has frequently reported that the U.S. favors the Chen administration over the opposition. The United States government should not comment on this or confirm or deny it, but rather take a neutral stance.

 

     There is good reason for this. The Chen government is lauded in many quarters in the United States for its many contributions to Taiwan's democratization. When it was in opposition it promoted a two party system and helped the process of democratization in many other ways. In power it has been responsible for the consolidation of Taiwan's democracy and it has made sincere efforts to get rid of corruption and much more. One can certainly argue that the KMT was in power too long and President Chen and his party were a good alternative and that the change of parties helped further democracy.

 

     But President Chen and his party also have their warts. The DPP, before the election in 2001, called on the youth to emulate individuals who have struggled in their lifetimes. One of the models suggested was Adolf Hitler. President Chen appointed as a human rights advisor an individual convicted of attempted murder in New York. President Chen got his son a position in the military that judging from his test score should not have had. The Chen administration and the DPP have blatantly practiced ethnic (or sub-ethnic) discrimination in government hiring and much more and have fanned the flames of ethnic enmity during election campaigns to their advantage at the polls.

 

Most of all, however, the U.S. stance on the referendum should be guided by the possibility of it provoking tension between Taiwan and China and that tension being used by one side in Taiwan to their advantage in the coming election campaign, while flouting American policy (one China) and the fact that the U.S. is preoccupied with serious problems elsewhere, such as Iraq, and that North Korea has become a serious matter of late and that China has been helpful in dealing with North Korea and its nuclear intimidation and its threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

 

     The United States is obligated to protect Taiwan. But it should not allow one side in a partisan environment (an election campaign) to take advantage of the TRA and to possibly start a conflict, knowing that the United States will come to Taiwan's rescue no matter what. The TRA was written to preserve peace and stability in East Asia.

 

     Allowing the TRA to be misinterpreted and misused would certainly encourage politicians in Taiwan to place the "American card" again and again. If it doesn't lead to conflict this time, it might eventually.

 

     Finally, the U.S. wants to maintain a peaceful relationship with China. China has cooperated with the U.S. and in recent months and has helped America resolve some serious global problems. This should be acknowledged. On the other hand, it may be China is a challenge to the United States and the two nations are competitions and perhaps even enemies. Even so, the state of U.S.-China relations and whether a conflict occurs between the U.S. and China should not be for Taiwan to decide.

 John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee.