STATEMENT OF 
Richard W. Murphy
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

before
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON TERRORISM

23 May 2002

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the subject of "The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations." I welcome the interest which your Subcommittee has shown in scheduling this hearing and look forward to our discussion. I consider the U.S.-Saudi relationship to be an important one for the advancement of U.S. interests in the region and have always been interested in how it could be improved.

I have been engaged with Saudi Arabia in several different capacities ever since my assignment as political officer in the American Embassy to Saudi Arabia (1963-66). My later service as Country Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs (1967-68), as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (1981-83) and as Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia (1983-89) kept me in close contact with the complicated issues defining Saudi-American relations. I have visited that country frequently since joining the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

What I would like to do is begin with a brief historical review of U.S. policy, discuss commonly held views about Saudi Arabia and then offer some recommendations.

When I was in government service, "vital U.S. national interests in the Middle East," referred to the security of Israel and access to the energy sources of the Gulf. To support that first interest, successive U.S. administrations have worked to advance the Middle East peace process recognizing that Israeli security could only be sustained when a general peace was established between it and the Arab World. We sought to develop the closest possible relations with key Arab countries and move them toward peaceful acceptance. 

As for the Gulf region, we stated that it was not in our interest to have any single country dominate the Gulf and its energy sources. We worked to assure the flow of oil at acceptable prices. This proved to be a complicated task since other foreign policy concerns frequently clashed with the principle of assuring the free movement of oil from the Gulf into the international market. For example, we led the campaign to impose United Nations sanctions on Iraq and have maintained our own sanctions on Iran. 

Current charges against Saudi Arabia  

Rarely, if ever, has the Saudi American relationship been the target of such sustained and strident criticism. 

It is asserted that:  

1.   Dissidence is widespread within Saudi Arabia; the regime is tottering and undeserving of U.S. support given the levels of corruption and human rights abuse.                                                                                        

2.   Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to cooperate with the United States militarily and such support is unnecessary for a campaign to topple Saddam Hussein.  

3.   Saudi oil is not that important to the United States. For energy security we should develop alternative sources.

4.   Saudi Arabia, or at least rich Saudis including members of the sizable Royal Family, fund terrorism including al Qaeda, Palestinian radical movements and suicide bombings of Israelis.  In addition, Saudi Arabia does not cooperate in tracking and stopping the funding of terrorism.

5.   Wahhabism is a fountainhead of international terrorism.

6.      Crown Prince Abdullah's peace initiative is a meaningless cynical attempt to ingratiate Saudi Arabia to the United States. 

I assume the Committee has heard these charges and perhaps more. I find them inaccurate and misleading.

1. Dissidence 

Yes it exists. It showed itself in 1979 when a group of Islamic radicals, including Saudis, seized control of the Great Mosque in Mecca. They asserted they did so to confront a regime that they considered corrupt and impious.

Eleven years later, as Operation Desert Shield was underway introducing 500,000 American troops and many other foreign forces to the Kingdom, preachers in some Saudi mosques inveighed against the presence of those non-Muslims. This led to the jailing of a few of those preachers when they refused to stop their criticism. 

Apparently, neither the American nor the Saudi authorities realized how widespread anti-Western and, particularly, anti-American feelings had become after Desert Storm. In 1990, the Saudi leadership rejected Usama bin Laden's proposal to bring a few thousand fighters from the Afghanistan war against the Soviets to expel Iraq without the help of other forces. His anger built as Washington continued to maintain approximately 5,000 military personnel in the country after the war. There were warning signs such as the bombing of the U.S. military advisory office in Riyadh in 1995, and the al-Khobar barracks in 1996.  The events of 9/11, and the revelation that Usama bin Laden had gathered so substantial a following in Saudi Arabia, came as a shock to both our governments. 

Critics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship charge that America has supported a corrupt, tyrannical and failing regime against its own people. It is important to note that the Royal Family does try to maintain open channels of communication with its citizens. The mechanism for this has been the system of the Majlis, where local and provincial authorities, the latter being members of the Royal Family, meet with the general public at least weekly. At these sessions the officials receive petitions for redress, often against government decisions. This system retains its vitality although, admittedly, it works best as a way to address individual grievances and not to hold debates on national policy. In the mid-nineties, the King created a Majlis ashShura, or Consultative Council, to broaden popular participation in government councils. That membership is by nomination and brings together prominent citizens, none of them from the Royal Family, who are responsible for reviewing and amending draft government regulations before they are made official. It is a consultative, not legislative, authority and without budget powers. It does have the right to question cabinet members on the operations of their departments.

The Saudi leadership knows better than anyone that its future can only be assured if it maintains the loyalty of its citizens.

2. Military cooperation with Saudi Arabia 

In its effort to bolster Gulf security, Washington has for decades supported Saudi Arabia against external aggression. In 1980, just after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, the President sent American AWACs to provide early warning of any Iranian attempt to attack the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Those planes remained on station for several years, until the Saudi government had purchased its own AWACs and trained its personnel. In 1990-91, Washington asked for and received full Saudi support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm which forced Iraq out of Kuwait.

There had been even earlier cooperation. Military training began in the early years of the Cold War. In 1963-64, we helped when Saudi Arabia came under pressure from the United Arab Republic for its support of the Yemeni royalists. And there has been Saudi support since Desert Storm for the operation of "Southern Watch" over Iraq and since last September for operations in Afghanistan. In this connection, it is useful to correct the allegation of non-cooperation by Saudi Arabia during the Afghanistan campaign. Riyadh did ban the use of Saudi territory as a base for planes engaged in bombing Afghanistan as it had done earlier in the case of Iraq. However, the Saudis did provide access to the command and control facility at Prince Sultan Air Base. The Pentagon found this facility invaluable to its air campaign, along with the thousands of overflight clearances provided by the Kingdom.

Saudi support will be important to any future activity in Iraq.  The need for Saudi support will depend on the plans developed by the National Command Authority.  But Saudi backing can be given in a number of ways that can ease or hinder American operations. The kingdom can give or deny overflight clearances, logistical support, etc.  In addition, other Gulf States will find it difficult to assist the United States if Saudi Arabia does not endorse such efforts.  We should be wary of those who say Saudi support is unnecessary.  Tacit support, at a minimum, will be very important.

3. Oil Policy

Gulf oil producers currently supply about 30% of our imported oil and Saudi Arabia about 10% of our total consumption. Saudi Arabia has recently reiterated its pledge not to use oil as a political weapon. The only occasion it did so was in 1973-74, during a six month boycott of the domestic U.S. market.  Its action on that occasion was in reaction to the widely publicized American air lift of arms to Israel and in response to an Arab World demand that every Arab country makes some sort of protest.

Saudi oil exports make up the overwhelming percentage of its Gross National Product. With its vast reserves, estimated at 25% of proven world reserves, it can produce oil at the current level of production for another century. 

Saudi policy makers believe, for Saudi Arabia's own self-interest, that their wisest policy is to maintain predictable prices of oil, avoiding spikes which stimulate research on alternative energies and which inevitably collapse, upsetting rational plans for the country's development. They also are investing heavily in developing an excess production capacity which they have used to meet global shortfalls. That excess is currently about two million barrels per day. There is no other country with that excess production capacity.

Today, the question is often posed whether we should decrease our reliance on Saudi oil and Arab oil in general. Alternative foreign sources are being urged in places such as Russia and the Central Asian states. These have important reserves but the consensus among oil experts is that by the next decade the world will need all the oil from all possible producers. Thus it is not a question of other sources replacing Saudi and Arab oil, but of supplementing it. And Gulf oil has the advantage in terms of ease of transport and of lower production costs; even though it's cost advantage has shrunk in recent years.

4. Saudi support of terrorism 

Riyadh was a generous benefactor of the Afghan mujahideen through the 1980s, matching the U.S. contribution dollar for dollar. It maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban government until just after 9/11 although it had withdrawn its Ambassador in 1998 after the Taliban had refused to turn over Usama bin Laden. Throughout the nineties, Riyadh failed to install controls over contributions to the Taliban and probably to al Qaeda through Saudi charitable foundations, some of whose donors may have been unaware of the purposes to which their donations were being put. These donors very likely included not just rich private Saudis, but members of the Royal Family.

Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks and the publication of evidence that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens; the Saudi Foreign Minister visited Washington. He then dispatched representatives of the Saudi Ministry of Finance and Central Bank to meet with U.S. Treasury officials. The delegations focused on how to monitor the flow of money through charitable foundations to ensure that it did not go to groups or individuals supporting terrorism. 

Since those initial conversations with Saudi officials, U.S. Treasury teams have made several visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries identified as hosting organizations under suspicion of funding terrorism. I understand that the Saudis have been cooperative and have supported our efforts to close down two charitable organizations operating internationally. Secretary O'Neil has applauded the Saudi efforts to establish effective controls. 

As we have learned from our own experience tracking the flow of money is not easy. For example, it took seven years of investigation of the Texas based Holy Land Foundation before the FBI moved to close it down on evidence that it had funneled money to Hamas.

Recently, the Kingdom has been accused of funding Palestinian suicide bombers. The fact remains that from the beginning of the intifada in 2000, the Saudi government encouraged its citizens to contribute to the families of the "victims" of the conflict. The government has made no distinction between helping those families whose sons and daughters had been suicide bombers and those who had been killed or injured in other actions. They have noted that the families were ignorant of the intentions of their relative to be a suicide bomber. Saudi religious authorities have condemned suicide bombers and the killing of innocent civilians.

5. Wahhabi practice and the Saudi world view 

This is not the occasion to present anything more than a brief reference to Wahhabi practice and how it affects Saudi attitudes towards the outside world.  They are an instinctively inward looking people. The heartland of the country, the Nejd province, where the Royal Family originated, was never colonized.  In the eighteenth century, the Saud family leadership entered into a pact with a prominent religious leader, Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab. His followers who are termed "Wahhabis" advocate a strict, literal interpretation of the Koran and the earliest traditions of Islam. 

Their pact is most simply described as a mutual support agreement. The Sauds exercise political leadership and the followers of Abdul Wahhab provide spiritual guidance. This agreement has persisted to this day with the leading Saudi religious family, Al ash-Sheikh, who are the descendants of Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, dominating the clergy while the House of Saud maintains political control. Each legitimizes the other.   

With the conquest in the late 1920's of what is today Saudi Arabia, the Royal Family became responsible for the governance of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina.  It takes that responsibility seriously and today the King's official title is "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques." The political leadership is wedded to its role as promoter of the Wahhabi practice of Islam and leads a highly evangelistic clergy. It spends massively on propagation of the faith abroad, a point I will turn to in my recommendations.

6. Middle East Peace and Saudi Arabia 

The Saudi's well publicized support for the Palestinians has been termed cynical on the grounds that it could have helped settle the Palestinian refugees and advocated a peace initiative such as that launched by Crown Prince Abdullah in February years ago. The fact remains that the "Palestinian Cause" is the single issue on which the Arab World agrees. Most Arab states for years have seen Israel as a state foisted on the region by Western imperialism seeking to dominate the Arab World. Ever since 1974, the Arab countries agreed to support the then Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. Today they support the Palestine Authority and its goal of establishing a viable independent state of Palestine. 

Crown Prince Abdullah, in company with most other Arab leaders, has made plain that restarting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations after 18 months of the intifada is an absolute priority and has publicly spoken against any campaign to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. The need for Saudi assistance is debatable, as suggested earlier, but the Administration is clearly on the right course in working hard and persuasively to bring the intifada to an end and restart negotiations. 

Some Arab countries have come to terms with the reality of Israel's existence more quickly than others. The Saudi instinct over the years has been to keep its distance from the negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbors. However, it is little remembered that then Crown Prince Fahd did publish a peace plan in 1981 two years after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. I recall my own conversations about the Fahd plan with members of Congress in 1981-82 and how quickly they dismissed it.

Abdullah's peace initiative last February was important because of its simplicity. It proposed normal relations between the Arab World and Israel in return for the land occupied in 1967. There were grounds for concern that his initiative would be adulterated by amendments and "clarifications" at the Arab Summit in Beirut on March 27-28, but it survived in its essence.

Some Israelis scoffed at the summit communiqué. However, more now see Abdullah's initiative at least as the beginning point for a return to negotiations. A normal relationship with the Arab World has been the Israeli vision ever since 1948.

Recommendations

What should we now press Saudi Arabia to do?

Let me suggest that we prioritize our policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Washington should reserve the bulk of its efforts to change Saudi foreign policy rather than its domestic policy, as some are advocating.

Since 9/11, a chorus of "experts" has been urging that Saudi domestic reform, particularly in the realm of education and religion, become America's primary foreign policy goal. They are arguing that we should demand that Saudi Arabia change its education curriculum. I believe, for at least three reasons, such an approach would be counterproductive. 

First, it is too far a reach for any outsider to fundamentally alter the school curriculum of another country, particularly in a case such as Saudi Arabia where the influence of the religious on education is so strong. 

Second, the Saudis themselves recognize the problems inherent in their own system and are demanding change. Even before 9/11, visitors to Saudi Arabia routinely heard complaints from their Saudi counterparts about the quality of primary and secondary education. Their children are graduating with college degrees and are completely unqualified for most jobs in a modern economy. Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is said to be upwards of 30%. Complaints by Saudi nationals are reportedly leading the government to review and to reform the curriculum.

The third reason we should proceed cautiously on the domestic front is that the Crown Prince himself recognizes the need for change. Statements such as the one he made at the summit meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council last December showed he is well aware of the need for reforms. He shows every indication that he is trying to move his country forward and win back power from the more radical elements of the religious establishment. We should support him in his efforts. Our direct intervention would undermine a true force for change in Saudi Arabia.  In the domestic realm, our goal should be to support and encourage change, but there is no need to proceed with a heavy hand.

In the international area, we have more latitude and we should do everything possible to make clear that Saudi money should not end up in schools and mosques that preach hate, intolerance and anti-Americanism. We must insist on continuing and expanding Saudi cooperation in monitoring where the money of its donors to charitable foundations ends up. This is not a question of challenging the precept of Islam to be charitable. It is a political issue. Money funneled to al-Qaeda is as antithetical to the Saudi government and to Islam, as it is to the American government. 

On the other hand, Washington should take care not to appear to be trying to stop the spread of Wahhabi practices. The Saudi conviction that this is the best practice of Islam is not one for the non-Muslim to challenge. 

We can do something about the quality of the religious schools, or madrassas, funded by Saudi Arabia in poor countries such as Afghanistan and in regions such as the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.  In those areas the national Ministries of Education have few official schools and little funding to improve the education offered. Today these madrassas offer the only education to local children and that consists of rote memorization of the Koran and the traditions handed down from the first century of Islam. Teachers that are exiled from Egypt and Jordan because they are too radical often turn up at schools in East Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan and elsewhere. Foreign aid should be directed toward the whole spectrum of education, from strengthening education ministries to teacher training to curriculum development. Foreign assistance to those Ministries would be welcome and help provide over the longer term a more rounded education. Decision-makers should consider the full range of bilateral and multilateral avenues to make this happen.

To those who say that the day of the House of Saud is past I say don't be so sure. So far it has maintained the loyalty of its people. If it cannot maintain that loyalty, the Royal Family will not last. In any case, it is not evident that a different leadership would better serve our interests or those of the Saudi citizenry. Any sensible observer should first consider who would be the likely replacements for the Royal Family. Today, they would probably come from the ranks of the religious extremists. 

As we try to shape the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship we should not forget the fact that the Saudi leadership and its relationship with the United States was also a target, and perhaps the real target, of Usama bin Laden's followers on 9/11. They want us off the Peninsula. They assume that the House of Saud would soon thereafter collapse because they believe it survives only thanks to American support. It would be ironic, to say the least, for us to help them reach their goal through any misjudgment of our own.