No. 99-5
In the Supreme Court of the United States 1 "On appeal from an order granting a
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we accept as true the
facts alleged in the complaint." McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc.,
95 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir.1996).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
ANTONIO J. MORRISON, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
APPENDIX TO THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(VOLUME 2)
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
DAVID W. OGDEN
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Deputy Solicitor General
BARBARA MCDOWELL
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
ALISA B. KLEIN
ANNE MURPHY
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 96-1814, 96-2316
CHRISTY BRZONKALA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
v.
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
AND STATE UNIVERSITY; ANTONIO J. MORRISON; JAMES LANDALE CRAWFORD,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
AND
CORNELL D. BROWN; WILLIAM E. LANDSIDLE,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMPTROLLER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, DEFENDANTS
LAW PROFESSORS; VIRGINIANS ALIGNED AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT; THE ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE; CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES; THE D.C. RAPE CRISIS CENTER; EQUAL
RIGHTS ADVOCATES; THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER SEX DISCRIMINATION
CLINIC; JEWISH WOMEN INTERNATIONAL; THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
COALITIONS; THE NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; THE NATIONAL
COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT; THE NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE;
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN; NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; THE PENNSYLVANIA
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INCORPORATED; VIRGINIA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR WOMEN; VIRGINIA NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INCORPORATED;
WOMEN EMPLOYED; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT; WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; INDEPENDENT
WOMEN'S FORUM; WOMEN'S FREEDOM NETWORK, AMICI CURIAE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
AND
CHRISTY BRZONKALA, PLAINTIFF
v.
ANTONIO J. MORRISON; JAMES LANDALE
CRAWFORD, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
AND
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE
UNIVERSITY; CORNELL D. BROWN; WILLIAM E. LANDSIDLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMPTROLLER
OF THE COMMOWEALTH, DEFENDANTS
LAW PROFESSORS; VIRGINIANS ALIGNED AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT; THE ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE;
CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES; THE D.C. RAPE CRISIS CENTER; EQUAL RIGHTS
ADVOCATES; THE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER SEX DISCRIMINATION CLINIC;
JEWISH WOMEN INTERNATIONAL; THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT COALITIONS;
THE NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; THE NATIONAL COALITION
AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT; THE NATIONAL NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN; NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; THE PENNSYLVANIA COALITION
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INCORPORATED; VIRGINIA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR WOMEN; VIRGINIA NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INCORPORATED;
WOMEN EMPLOYED; WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT; WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; INDEPENDENT
WOMEN'S FORUM; WOMEN'S FREEDOM NETWORK, AMICI CURIAE
[Argued: June 4, 1997]
[Decided: Dec. 23, 1997]
OPINION
Before: HALL, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from the gang rape of a freshman at the Virginia Polytechnic
Institute by two members of the college football team, and the school's
decision to impose only a nominal punishment on the rapists. The victim
alleges that these rapes were motivated by her assailants' discriminatory
animus toward women and sues them pursuant to the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994. She asserts that the university knew of the brutal attacks
she received and yet failed to take any meaningful action to punish her
offenders or protect her, but instead permitted a sexually hostile environment
to flourish; she sues the university under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972. The district court dismissed the case in its entirety. The court
held that the complaint failed to state a claim under Title IX and that
Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the Violence Against Women
Act. Because we believe that the complaint states a claim under Title IX
and that the Commerce Clause provides Congress with authority to enact the
Violence Against Women Act, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Christy Brzonkala entered Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("Virginia
Tech") as a freshman in the fall of 1994.1 On the evening of September
21, 1994, Brzonkala and another female student met two men who Brzonkala
knew only by their first names and their status as members of the Virginia
Tech football team. Within thirty minutes of first meeting Brzonkala, these
two men, later identified as Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, raped
her.
Brzonkala and her friend met Morrison and Crawford on the third floor of
the dormitory where Brzonkala lived. All four students talked for approximately
fifteen minutes in a student dormitory room. Brzonkala's friend and Crawford
then left the room.
Morrison immediately asked Brzonkala if she would have sexual intercourse
with him. She twice told Morrison "no," but Morrison was not deterred.
As Brzonkala got up to leave the room Morrison grabbed her, and threw her,
face-up, on a bed. He pushed her down by the shoulders and disrobed her.
Morrison turned off the lights, used his arms to pin down her elbows and
pressed his knees against her legs. Brzonkala struggled and attempted to
push Morrison off, but to no avail. Without using a condom, Morrison forcibly
raped her.
Before Brzonkala could recover, Crawford came into the room and exchanged
places with Morrison. Crawford also raped Brzonkala by holding down her
arms and using his knees to pin her legs open. He, too, used no condom.
When Crawford was finished, Morrison raped her for a third time, again holding
her down and again without a condom.
When Morrison had finished with Brzonkala, he warned her "You better
not have any fucking diseases." In the months following the rape, Morrison
announced publicly in the dormitory's dining room that he "like[d]
to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them."
Following the assault Brzonkala's behavior changed radically. She became
depressed and avoided contact with her classmates and residents of her dormitory.
She changed her appearance and cut off her long hair. She ceased attending
classes and eventually attempted suicide. She sought assistance from a Virginia
Tech psychiatrist, who treated her and prescribed anti-depressant medication.
Neither the psychiatrist nor any other Virginia Tech employee or official
made more than a cursory inquiry into the cause of Brzonkala's distress.
She later sought and received a retroactive withdrawal from Virginia Tech
for the 1994-95 academic year because of the trauma.
Approximately a month after Morrison and Crawford assaulted Brzonkala, she
confided in her roommate that she had been raped, but could not bring herself
to discuss the details. It was not until February 1995, however, that Brzonkala
was able to identify Morrison and Crawford as the two men who had raped
her. Two months later, she filed a complaint against them under Virginia
Tech's Sexual Assault Policy, which was published in the Virginia Tech "University
Policies for Student Life 1994-1995." These policies had been formally
released for dissemination to students on July 1, 1994, but had not been
widely distributed to students. After Brzonkala filed her complaint under
the Sexual Assault Policy she learned that another male student athlete
was overheard advising Crawford that he should have "killed the bitch."
Brzonkala did not pursue criminal charges against Morrison or Crawford,
believing that criminal prosecution was impossible because she had not preserved
any physical evidence of the rape. Virginia Tech did not report the rapes
to the police, and did not urge Brzonkala to reconsider her decision not
to do so. Rape of a female student by a male student is the only violent
felony that Virginia Tech authorities do not automatically report to the
university or town police.
Virginia Tech held a hearing in May 1995 on Brzonkala's complaint against
Morrison and Crawford. At the beginning of the hearing, which was taped
and lasted three hours, the presiding college official announced that the
charges were being brought under the school's Abusive Conduct Policy, which
included sexual assault. A number of persons, including Brzonkala, Morrison,
and Crawford testified. Morrison admitted that, despite the fact that Brzonkala
had twice told him "no," he had sexual intercourse with her in
the dormitory on September 21. Crawford, who denied that he had sexual contact
with Brzonkala (a denial corroborated by his suitemate, Cornell Brown),
confirmed that Morrison had engaged in sexual intercourse with Brzonkala.
The Virginia Tech judicial committee found insufficient evidence to take
action against Crawford, but found Morrison guilty of sexual assault. The
university immediately suspended Morrison for two semesters (one school
year), and informed Brzonkala of the sanction. Morrison appealed this sanction
to Cathryn T. Goree, Virginia Tech's Dean of Students. Morrison claimed
that the college denied him his due process rights and imposed an unduly
harsh and arbitrary sanction. Dean Goree reviewed Morrison's appeal letter,
the file, and tapes of the three-hour hearing. She rejected Morrison's appeal
and upheld the sanction of full suspension for the Fall 1995 and Spring
1996 semesters. Dean Goree informed Brzonkala of this decision in a letter
dated May 22, 1995. According to Virginia Tech's published rules, the decision
of Dean Goree as the appeals officer on this matter was final.
In the first week of July 1995, however, Dean Goree and another Virginia
Tech official, Donna Lisker, personally called on Brzonkala at her home
in Fairfax, Virginia, a four-hour drive from Virginia Tech. These officials
advised Brzonkala that Morrison had hired an attorney who had threatened
to sue the school on due process grounds, and that Virginia Tech thought
there might be merit to Morrison's "ex post facto" challenge that
he was charged under a Sexual Assault Policy that was not yet spelled out
in the Student Handbook.2 Dean Goree and Ms. Lisker told Brzonkala that
Virginia Tech was unwilling to defend the school's decision to suspend Morrison
for a year in court, and a re-hearing under the Abusive Conduct Policy that
pre-dated the Sexual Assault Policy was required. To induce Brzonkala to
participate in a second hearing, Dean Goree and Ms. Lisker assured her that
they believed her story, and that the second hearing was a mere technicality
to cure the school's error in bringing the first complaint under the Sexual
Assault Policy.
The Virginia Tech judicial committee scheduled the second hearing for late
July. This hearing turned out to be much more than a mere formality, however.
The second hearing lasted seven hours, more than twice as long as the first
hearing. Brzonkala was required to engage her own legal counsel at her own
expense. Moreover, the university belatedly informed her that student testimony
given at the first hearing would not be admissible at the second hearing
and that if she wanted the second judicial committee to consider this testimony
she would have to submit affidavits or produce the witnesses. Because she
received insufficient notice, it was impossible for Brzonkala to obtain
the necessary affidavits or live testimony from her student witnesses. In
contrast, the school provided Morrison with advance notice so that he had
ample time to procure the sworn affidavits or live testimony of his student
witnesses. Virginia Tech exacerbated this difficulty by refusing Brzonkala
or her attorney access to the tape recordings of the first hearing, while
granting Morrison and his attorney complete and early access to those tapes.
Finally, Virginia Tech officials prevented Brzonkala from mentioning Crawford
in her testimony because charges against him had been dismissed; as a result
she had to present a truncated and unnatural version of the facts.
Nevertheless, after the second hearing, the university judicial committee
found that Morrison had violated the Abusive Conduct Policy, and re-imposed
the same sanction: an immediate two semester suspension. On August 4, 1995,
the college again informed Brzonkala, in writing, that Morrison had been
found guilty and been suspended for a year.
Morrison again appealed. He argued due process violations, the existence
of new information, and the asserted harshness and arbitrariness of the
sanction imposed on him as grounds for reversal of the judicial committee's
decision. Senior Vice-President and Provost Peggy Meszaros overturned Morrison's
sanction on appeal. She found "that there was sufficient evidence to
support the decision that [Morrison] violated the University's Abusive Conduct
Policy and that no due process violation occurred in the handling of [Morrison's]
case." However, the Provost concluded that the sanction imposed on
Morrison-immediate suspension for one school year-was "excessive when
compared with other cases where there has been a finding of violation of
the Abusive Conduct Policy." Provost Meszaros did not elaborate on
the "other cases" to which she was referring. Instead of an immediate
one year suspension, the Provost imposed "deferred suspension until
[Morrison's] graduation from Virginia Tech." In addition, Morrison
was "required to attend a one-hour educational session with Rene Rios,
EO/AA Compliance Officer regarding acceptable standards under University
Student Policy."
Provost Meszaros informed Morrison of the decision to set aside his sanction
by letter on August 21, 1995. Although Brzonkala had been informed in writing
of the result at every other juncture in the disciplinary proceedings, Virginia
Tech did not notify her that it had set aside Morrison's suspension or that
he would be returning to campus in the Fall. Instead, on August 22, 1995,
Brzonkala learned from an article in The Washington Post that the university
had lifted Morrison's suspension and that he would return in the Fall 1995
semester. In fact, Morrison did return to Virginia Tech in the Fall of 1995-on
a full athletic scholarship.
Upon learning that the university had set aside Morrison's suspension and
was permitting him to return in the Fall, Brzonkala canceled her own plans
to return to Virginia Tech. She feared for her safety because of previous
threats and Virginia Tech's treatment of Morrison. She felt that Virginia
Tech's actions signaled to Morrison, as well as the student body as a whole,
that the school either did not believe her or did not view Morrison's conduct
as improper. She was also humiliated by the procedural biases of the second
hearing and by the decision to set aside the sanction against Morrison.
Brzonkala attended no university or college during the Fall 1995 term.
On November 30, 1995, Brzonkala was shocked to learn from another newspaper
article that the second Virginia Tech judicial committee did not find Morrison
guilty of sexual assault, but rather of the reduced charge of "using
abusive language." Despite the fact that the school had accused and
convicted Morrison of sexual assault at the initial hearing, despite Morrison's
testimony at that hearing that he had had sexual intercourse with Brzonkala
after she twice told him "no," and despite the fact that Dean
Goree and Donna Lisker had unambiguously stated that the second hearing
would also address the "sexual assault" charge against Morrison,
the administrators altered the charge. The university never notified either
Brzonkala or her attorney about the change, leaving her to learn about it
months after the fact from a newspaper article.
Brzonkala believes and so alleges that the procedural irregularities in,
as well as the ultimate outcome of, the second hearing were the result of
the involvement of Head Football Coach Frank Beamer, as part of a coordinated
university plan to allow Morrison to play football in 1995.
On December 27, 1995, Brzonkala initially filed suit against Morrison, Crawford,
and Virginia Tech; on March 1, 1996, she amended her complaint. She alleged
inter alia that Virginia Tech, in its handling of her rape claims and failure
to punish the rapists in any meaningful manner, violated Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). She
also alleged that Morrison and Crawford brutally gang raped her because
of gender animus in violation of Title III of the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) ("VAWA"). The United
States intervened to defend the constitutionality of VAWA.
On May 7, 1996 the district court dismissed the Title IX claims against
Virginia Tech for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772
(W.D. Va. 1996) ("Brzonkala I"). On July 26, 1996 the court dismissed
Brzonkala's VAWA claims against Morrison and Crawford, holding that although
she had stated a cause of action under VAWA, enactment of the statute exceeded
Congressional authority and was thus unconstitutional. See Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)
("Brzonkala II").
II.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides in relevant part:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
. . .
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Virginia Tech concedes that it is an "education program . . . receiving
Federal financial assistance." Hence, we need only determine whether
Brzonkala has stated a claim that she was "subjected to discrimination"
by Virginia Tech "on the basis of sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
The district court recognized that Brzonkala pled a Title IX claim on the
basis of two distinct legal theories: a hostile environment theory, that
Virginia Tech responded inadequately to a sexually hostile environment;
and a disparate treatment theory, that Virginia Tech discriminated against
Brzonkala because of her sex in its disciplinary proceedings.3 The district
court rejected both, holding that her complaint failed to state a Title
IX claim on which relief could be granted under either theory. See Brzonkala
I, 935 F. Supp. at 775-78. We now consider whether Brzonkala stated a claim
under either of these theories.
A.
We begin with the hostile environment claim.4 To assess Brzonkala's Title
IX hostile environment assertions we must address two issues: (1) what legal
standard to apply to a hostile environment claim under Title IX and (2)
whether Brzonkala's complaint satisfies that standard.
1.
Title IX unquestionably prohibits federally supported educational institutions
from practicing "discrimination" "on the basis of sex."
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Because of Title IX's "short historical
parentage," Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th
Cir. 1996), we have not previously faced a hostile environment claim under
Title IX. Therefore, in determining whether an educational institution's
handling of a known sexually hostile environment is actionable "discrimination"
under Title IX, we must look to the extensive jurisprudence developed in
the Title VII context. See Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Community
College, 31 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Title VII, and the judicial
interpretations of it, provide a persuasive body of standards to which we
may look in shaping the contours of a private right of action under Title
IX."); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("Title VII . . . is 'the most appropriate analogue when
defining Title IX's substantive standards. . . .'"); Lipsett v. University
of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Because Title VII prohibits
the identical conduct prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination"
Title VII is "the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's
substantive standards. . . .") (citation omitted); see also Franklin
v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037-38,
117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (holding Title IX provides a private cause of action
for damages arising from sexual harassment and relying on Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986),
a Title VII hostile environment case, to define "discrimination"
under Title IX); H.R. Rep. No. 554 (1971) reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2462, 2512 (explaining that Title IX meant to provide coverage similar to
Title VII for "those in education"); and the many cases adopting
Title VII analysis in a Title IX hostile environment context listed infra
at 21-22.5 The district court properly followed this approach and applied
Title VII standards to determine Virginia Tech's liability for a hostile
environment under Title IX. See Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 776-78.
Virginia Tech argues that this was error, relying solely upon Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S.
--, 117 S. Ct. 165, 136 L.Ed.2d 108 (1996). Rowinsky dealt with a hostile
environment claim by two female students against a school district for its
response to sexual harassment by certain male students. A divided panel
of the Fifth Circuit defined the question presented as "whether the
recipient of federal education funds can be found liable for sex discrimination
when the perpetrator is a party other than the grant recipient or its agents."
Id. at 1010. In answering this question, the court determined that the language
and legislative history of Title IX indicated that the statute "applies
only to the practices of the recipients themselves," not third parties.
Id. at 1013. The Rowinsky court reasoned that Title VII principles were
inapplicable because "[i]n an employment context, the actions of a
co-worker sometimes may be imputed to an employer through a theory of respondeat
superior," but a school may not be held responsible for the harassment
of one student by another. Id. at 1011 n.11. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
held that "[i]n the case of [Title IX] peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual harassment
claims differently based on sex. Thus, a school district might violate Title
IX if it treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment
of girls . . . ." Id. at 1016.
We have no trouble agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that Title IX "applies
only to the practices of the recipients themselves." Id. at 1013. However,
in this respect Title IX is no different from Title VII-the Rowinsky majority's
failure to recognize this results in a deeply flawed analysis. In framing
the question in terms of liability for the acts of third parties, Rowinsky
misstates what a plaintiff, under either Title VII or Title IX, hopes to
prove in a hostile environment claim. Under Title VII, a plaintiff cannot
recover because a fellow employee sexually harassed the plaintiff, but only
because an employer could have, but failed to, adequately remedy known harassment.
As we recently noted, "an employer is liable for a sexually hostile
work environment created by . . . [an] employee only if the employer knew
or should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action." Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88
F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Consequently, a defendant
employer is held responsible under Title VII for the employer's own actions,
its inadequate and tardy response, not the actions of fellow employees.6
Similarly, in a Title IX hostile environment action a plaintiff is not seeking
to hold the school responsible for the acts of third parties (in this case
fellow students). Rather, the plaintiff is seeking to hold the school responsible
for its own actions, i.e. that the school "knew or should have known
of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action."
Andrade, 88 F.3d at 261. Brzonkala is not attempting to hold Virginia Tech
responsible for the acts of Morrison and Crawford per se; instead she is
challenging Virginia Tech's handling of the hostile environment once she
notified college officials of the rapes. Therefore, the entire focus of
Rowinsky's analysis as to whether a school may be held responsible for the
acts of third parties under Title IX misses the point. Brzonkala does not
seek to make Virginia Tech liable for the acts of third parties. She seeks
only to hold the school liable for its own discriminatory actions in failing
to remedy a known hostile environment.
A defendant educational institution, like a defendant employer, is, of course,
liable for its own discriminatory actions: even the Rowinsky majority acknowledges
this. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012 (Title IX "prohibits discriminatory
acts" by educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance).
Responsibility for discriminatory acts includes liability for failure to
remedy a known sexually hostile environment. Accordingly, the district court
was correct in applying Title VII principles to define the contours of Brzonkala's
hostile environment claim. We now turn to that application.
2.
Under Title VII "to prevail on a 'hostile work environment' sexual
harassment claim, an employee must prove: (1) that he [or she] was harassed
'because of' his [or her] 'sex'; (2) that the harassment was unwelcome;
(3) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
abusive working environment; and (4) that some basis exists for imputing
liability to the employer." Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996). Similarly, under Title IX a plaintiff
asserting a hostile environment claim must show: "1) that she [or he]
belongs to a protected group; 2) that she [or he] was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of her [or his] education and create an abusive educational environment;
and 5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established."
Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir. 1996);
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Brown v. Hot,
Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1159, 116 S. Ct. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996) (same); Nicole M.
v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (N. D. Cal. 1997)
(same); see also Doe, 103 F.3d at 515 (holding that the elements of a "hostile
environment claim under Title VII equally apply under Title IX"); Oona,
R.S. v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Title VII
standards to Title IX hostile environment claim); Murray v. New York Univ.
College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-51 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Collier
v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213-14 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same);
Pinkney v. Robinson, 913 F. Supp. 25, 32 (D. D. C. 1996) (same); Bosley
v. Kearney R-1 School Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1021-22 (W. D. Mo. 1995)
(same); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 749-50
(E.D. Va. 1995) (same); Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 374
(D. Md. 1994) (same).
Virginia Tech concedes that Brzonkala has properly alleged the first three
elements-that she was a member of a protected class, that she was subject
to unwelcome harassment, and that this harassment was based on her sex.
Virginia Tech contends, however, that Brzonkala has not alleged that she
was subjected to a sufficiently abusive environment, or established that
Virginia Tech may be held liable for that environment. Accordingly, we address
these two elements.
a.
A Title IX plaintiff must allege sexual harassment "sufficiently severe
or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her education and create an
abusive educational environment." Kinman, 94 F.3d at 468. Virginia
Tech argues that because Brzonkala did not return to school she experienced
no hostile environment. The district court agreed, holding that:
[T]he hostile environment that Brzonkala alleged never occurred. Brzonkala
left [Virginia Tech] due to her concern of possible future reprisal in reaction
to her pressing charges. She did not allege that this future reprisal actually
occurred. Second, Brzonkala did not perceive that the environment was in
fact abusive, but only that it might become abusive in the future.
Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 778.
Brzonkala pled that she was violently gang raped, and rape "is 'not
only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most serious
nature' that is 'plainly sufficient to state a claim for 'hostile environment'
sexual harassment.'" Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011, 116 S. Ct. 569, 133 L.Ed.2d 493 (1995) (quoting
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S. Ct. at 2405-06); Brock v. United States,
64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Just as every murder is also a
battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination
based on the employee's sex."); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co.,
50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Meritor and recognizing sexual
assault as an extreme example of sexual harassment); Karen Mellencamp Davis,
Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional
Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 Ind. L.J. 1123, 1124
(1994) ("Rape and molestation provide drastic examples of the types
of sexual harassment students inflict on their peers.").
Moreover, "even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters
the conditions of the victim's employment and clearly creates an abusive
work environment for purposes of Title VII liability." Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67,
106 S. Ct. at 2405-06); see also King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533,
537 (7th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that "a single act [of discrimination]
can be enough" to state a hostile environment claim under Title VII).
Thus, the district court failed to recognize that the rapes themselves created
a hostile environment, and that Virginia Tech was aware of this environment
and never properly remedied it. Indeed, the university Provost's rationale
for overturning Morrison's immediate suspension for one school year-that
this punishment was "excessive when compared with other cases"-itself
evidences an environment hostile to complaints of sexual harassment and
a refusal to effectively remedy this hostile environment. Given the seriousness
of the harassment acts, the total inadequacy of Virginia Tech's redress,
and Brzonkala's reasonable fear of unchecked retaliation including possible
violence, Brzonkala did not have to return to the campus the next year and
personally experience a continued hostile environment. Brzonkala "should
not be punished for a hostile environment so severe that she was forced
out entirely by loss of her legal claim against those responsible for the
situation." Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1288, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth.,
890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A female employee need not subject
herself to an extended period of demeaning and degrading provocation before
being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title VII.").
b.
The remaining issue is whether "some basis for institutional liability
has been established." Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1232. "[A]n employer
is liable for a sexually hostile work environment created by . . . [an]
employee only if the employer knew or should have known of the illegal conduct
and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action." Andrade, 88
F.3d at 261. We must determine whether Brzonkala has alleged facts sufficient
to support an inference that Virginia Tech "knew or should have known
of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action."
Virginia Tech certainly knew about the rapes once Brzonkala informed the
school and initiated disciplinary proceedings against Morrison and Crawford.
The question, therefore, is whether Virginia Tech took prompt and adequate
remedial action once it was on notice of the rapes. See Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds,
900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). This inquiry is necessarily fact-based,
and whether a response is "prompt and adequate" will depend on
the specific allegations (and ultimately evidence) in each case. Id. at
106-07.
Brzonkala alleges that after she was brutally raped three times she ceased
attending classes, attempted suicide, and sought the aid of the school psychiatrist.
Despite Virginia Tech's awareness of these developments no university official,
including the psychiatrist, ever made more than a cursory inquiry into the
cause of her distress. Furthermore, she alleges that when she directly reported
the rapes to Virginia Tech authorities, the college neither provided a fair
hearing nor meted out appropriate punishment. During the first hearing her
attacker essentially admitted that he raped her after she twice told him
no. The first hearing resulted in a finding that Morrison had committed
sexual assault, and his suspension for one school year. This result was
upheld by an appeals officer, and under Virginia Tech's published rules
that decision was final and not subject to change.
Nevertheless, Virginia Tech voided the first hearing and reopened the case
against her admitted rapist, assertedly in violation of its own rules and
on the basis of a specious legal argument. The second hearing was procedurally
biased against Brzonkala in numerous ways, and unbeknownst to her, Morrison
was only charged with the lesser offense of using abusive language. Still,
Morrison was again found guilty, and suspended for the next school year.
On appeal a senior college official determined that there was sufficient
evidence that Morrison had violated the University's Abusive Conduct Policy,
and that Morrison's due process argument was meritless. Nonetheless, the
appeals officer decided that suspending Brzonkala's rapist for a school
year was "excessive when compared with other cases." The university
then overturned that suspension and permitted her attacker to return to
school with a full athletic scholarship.
Virginia Tech took this action without notifying Brzonkala, although she
had been informed of the university's actions in the case at every previous
juncture. This decision caused her to fear for her safety and to withdraw
from college altogether. As punishment for his admitted rape Morrison received
a "deferred suspension until [his] graduation from Virginia Tech"
and "a one-hour educational session."
In short, Brzonkala alleges that Virginia Tech permitted, indeed fostered,
an environment in which male student athletes could gang rape a female student
without any significant punishment to the male attackers, nor any real assistance
to the female victim. She alleges a legion of procedural irregularities
in the hearing process, Virginia Tech's disregard for its own rules of finality,
and its eventual decision to impose virtually no penalty for an admitted
rape. These facts, if proven, would allow a jury to find that Virginia Tech's
response to Brzonkala's gang rape was neither prompt nor adequate.
Virginia Tech argues that because it did levy some punishment against Morrison,
its response was adequate. A defendant need not "make the most effective
response possible" to sexual harassment. See Spicer v. Virginia Dept.
of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). This does not
mean, however, that any remedy, no matter how delayed or weak, will be adequate.
Rather, we have consistently held under Title VII that a defendant employer
is "liable for sexual harassment committed by its employees if no adequate
remedial action is taken." Id. Similar reasoning applies in the Title
IX context. In light of the seriousness of Brzonkala's allegations, the
long and winding disciplinary process, and the proverbial slap on the wrist
as punishment, we cannot conclude at this preliminary stage that Virginia
Tech's remedy was either prompt or adequate.
For all of these reasons, Brzonkala has alleged sufficient facts to state
a Title IX hostile environment claim against Virginia Tech.
B.
Brzonkala also alleges a Title IX disparate treatment claim, i.e., that
Virginia Tech discriminated against her on the basis of sex during the disciplinary
proceed- ings against Morrison and Crawford. In analyzing Brzonkala's claim,
Title VII again "provide[s] a persuasive body of standards to which
we may look in shaping the contours of a private right of action under Title
IX." Preston, 31 F.3d at 207.
Indeed, Virginia Tech does not even argue that Title VII principles are
inapplicable in analyzing Title IX disparate treatment claims.
Proof of discriminatory intent is necessary to state a disparate treatment
claim under Title VII. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977).
Absent some indication in the statute or regulations, Title IX similarly
requires proof of discriminatory intent to state a disparate treatment claim.
As such, we must examine Brzonkala's complaint to see if she has alleged
sufficient facts to infer such intent. See Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d
709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit dealt with allegations of a discriminatory
school disciplinary hearing, and described the type of evidence a plaintiff
must plead to establish the requisite intent:
[A]llegations of a procedurally or otherwise flawed [school disciplinary]
proceeding that has led to an adverse and erroneous outcome combined with
a conclusory allegation of gender discrimination is not sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss. The fatal gap is, again, the lack of a particularized
allegation relating to a causal connection between the flawed outcome and
gender bias. A plaintiff must thus also allege particular circumstances
suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous
finding. Allegations of a causal connection in the case of university disciplinary
cases can be of the kind that are found in the familiar setting of Title
VII cases. . . . Such allegations might include, inter alia, statements
by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university
officials, or patterns of decision-making that also tend to show the influence
of gender. Of course, some allegations, such as statements reflecting bias
by members of the tribunal, may suffice both to cast doubt on the accuracy
of the disciplinary adjudication and to relate the error to gender bias.
Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (citations omitted). In this case Brzonkala has alleged
a flawed proceeding and made a conclusory assertion that Virginia Tech discriminated
in favor of male football players. But she has not alleged any discriminatory
statements or treatment by Virginia Tech, or any systematic mistreatment
of women or rape victims.
Nevertheless, Brzonkala maintains that she has made sufficient allegations
of Virginia Tech's discriminatory intent. First, she argues that Virginia
Tech's policy of not automatically reporting rapes to the police shows a
discriminatory intent. Brzonkala does not allege, however, that the university
discouraged or hindered her (or other rape victims) from filing charges,
or that the university generally treats rape less seriously in its own disciplinary
proceedings. Nor does she state facts to support an inference that the university
created its non-reporting policy to discriminate against rape victims. Without
an allegation that Virginia Tech itself fails to punish rapists, or impedes
criminal investigations, or separate facts to establish that the policy
was a result of gender bias, the university has not discriminated against
rape victims, because these victims can always pursue criminal charges themselves.
In fact, because of the intensely personal nature of the crime, as well
as the present day difficulties inherent in pursuing rape charges, a victim
of rape may not always want to press charges or involve the police. See
Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 777.
Next, Brzonkala relies upon allegations that her access to evidence, like
that of the plaintiff in Yusuf, was hampered, as the factual basis for a
finding of discriminatory intent. It is true that in Yusuf the plaintiff
alleged numerous procedural difficulties. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 712-13. But,
in Yusuf the plaintiff also asserted that "males accused of sexual
harassment at Vassar are 'historically and systematically' and 'invariably
found guilty, regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof.'" Id. at
716. This sort of systematic discrimination, on top of the procedural irregularities,
sufficed to state a claim of disparate treatment. Here we have nothing but
"allegations of a procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding that
has led to an adverse and erroneous outcome combined with a conclusory allegation
of gender discrimination." Id. at 715. These allegations are "not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Id.; cf. Houck v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 10 F.3d 204, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1993)
( "[I]n the Title VII context, isolated incidents or random comparisons
demonstrating disparities in treatment may be insufficient to draw a prima
facie inference of discrimination without additional evidence that the alleged
phenomenon of inequality also exists with respect to the entire relevant
group of employees."); Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511-13
(4th Cir. 1993) (same).
Finally, Brzonkala contends that the woefully inadequate punishment meted
out against Morrison is in and of itself proof of sex discrimination. Again,
without more, this does not prove intentional gender discrimination against
Brzonkala. In sum, the district court correctly dismissed Brzonkala's Title
IX claim of disparate treatment.7
III.
We now turn to the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing
Brzonkala's claim that Morrison and Crawford violated Title III of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994). The district court held that Brzonkala alleged a valid VAWA claim,
but that VAWA was beyond congressional authority, and thus unconstitutional.
See Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 801. We agree with the district court
that Brzonkala stated a claim under VAWA. We conclude, however, that Congress
acted within its authority in enacting VAWA and hold that the district court
erred in ruling the statute unconstitutional.
A.
In September 1994, after four years of hearings, Congress enacted VAWA,
a comprehensive federal statute designed to address "the escalating
problem of violent crime against women." S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 37
(1993). Title III, the portion of the statute at issue in this case, establishes
the right upon which a civil claim can be brought:
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
The statute goes on to set forth the elements necessary to plead and prove
such a claim:
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection
(b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due,
at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in Section 16
of Title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal
charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed
in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United
States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described
in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 13981. Thus, to state a claim under § 13981(c) a plaintiff
victim must allege "a crime of violence motivated by gender."
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
Morrison and Crawford do not argue that Brzonkala's allegation of gang rape
fails to satisfy § 13981(d)(2)'s definition of a "crime of violence."
However, they do briefly assert that Brzonkala has failed to allege a "crime
of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (emphasis
added).
A "crime of violence motivated by gender" is defined as "a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."
42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1). Congress has indicated that "[p]roof
of 'gender motivation' under Title III" of VAWA is to "proceed
in the same ways proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other
civil rights laws. Judges and juries will determine 'motivation' from the
'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the event." S. Rep. No.
103-138, at 52; see also S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 50 (1991).
The statute does not outlaw "[r]andom acts of violence unrelated to
gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1). However, bias "can be proven
by circumstantial as well as indirect evidence." S. Rep. No. 103-138,
at 52. "Generally accepted guidelines for identifying hate crimes may
also be useful" in determining whether a crime is gender-motivated,
such as: "language used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack
(including mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous history of similar
incidents; absence of any other apparent motive (battery without robbery,
for example); common sense." Id. at 52 n.61.
With these standards in mind, we examine Brzonkala's complaint. Brzonkala
alleges that two virtual strangers, Morrison and Crawford, brutally raped
her three times within minutes after first meeting her. Although Brzonkala
does not allege mutilation or other severe injury, the brutal and unprotected
gang rape itself constitutes an attack of significant "severity."
Id. Moreover, Brzonkala alleges that the rapes were completely without "provocation."
Id. One of her assailants conceded during the college disciplinary hearing
that Brzonkala twice told him, "No" before he initially raped
her. Further, there is an absence of any "apparent motive" for
the rapes other than gender bias. Id. For example, no robbery or other theft
accompanied the rapes.
Finally, Brzonkala alleges that when Morrison had finished raping her for
the second time he told her, "You better not have any fucking diseases."
She also alleges that Morrison later announced to the college dining room,
"I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." Verbal
expression of bias by an attacker is certainly not mandatory to prove gender
bias, Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 785 ("The purpose of the statute
would be eviscerated if, to state a claim, a plaintiff had to allege, for
example, that the defendant raped her and stated, 'I hate women.' "),
but it is "helpful." See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 51. As the district
court noted, Morrison's "statement reflects that he has a history of
taking pleasure from having intercourse with women without their sober consent"
and that "[t]his statement indicates disrespect for women in general
and connects this gender disrespect to sexual intercourse." Brzonkala
II, 935 F. Supp. at 785. In addition, since Brzonkala alleged that Morrison
and Crawford engaged in a conspiracy to rape her, Morrison's comments are
also relevant in assessing Crawford's liability. See Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that in a civil conspiracy
"every conspirator is jointly and severally liable for all acts of
co-conspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy"); United States
v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824, 828 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that "acts
and statements in furtherance of the conspiracy may be attributed to"
a co-conspirator and citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47,
66 S. Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)); United States v. Chorman,
910 F.2d 102, 111 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
In sum, Brzonkala has clearly alleged violations of VAWA. Virtually all
of the earmarks of "hate crimes" are asserted here: an unprovoked,
severe attack, triggered by no other motive, and accompanied by language
clearly stating bias. The district court correctly concluded that Brzonkala
alleged a VAWA claim.
B.
The remaining issue before us is whether the district court correctly held
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting VAWA. Congress
itself directly addressed this question. On the basis of numerous specific
findings and a mountain of evidence, Congress stated that it was invoking
its authority "[p]ursuant to . . . section 8 of Article I of the Constitution"
to enact a new civil rights law to protect "victims of gender motivated
violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (emphasis added).8
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution empowers Congress to
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In assessing whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause, we note that every act of Congress is entitled to a "strong
presumption of validity and constitutionality," Barwick v. Celotex
Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 955 (4th Cir. 1984), and will be invalidated only "for
the most compelling constitutional reasons." Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 384, 109 S. Ct. 647, 661, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Supreme
Court has directed that "[g]iven the deference due 'the duly enacted
and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch
of our Government,'" a court is "not lightly [to] second-guess
such legislative judgments." Westside Comm. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 251, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2372, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (quoting
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319, 105
S. Ct. 3180, 3188, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985)). This is "particularly"
true when, as here, the legislative "judgments are based in part on
empirical determinations." Id. Deference to such judgments by the legislature
constitutes the "paradigm of judicial restraint." FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d
211 (1993).
Moreover, "[t]he task of a court that is asked to determine whether
a particular exercise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce
Clause is relatively narrow." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2360 (1981); see
also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634, 131
L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The history of the judicial
struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause . . . counsels great restraint
before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an
exercise of the national power."). Thus, a reviewing court need only
determine "whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated
activity" substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 557, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
With these directives in mind, we consider whether Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause in passing VAWA. The Supreme Court has
long held, and recently reiterated in Lopez, that there are "three
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate" under the
Commerce Clause:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
. . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. . . . Finally,
Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-559, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (citations omitted); United
States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, --
U.S. --, 118 S. Ct. 240, 139 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (rejecting a Lopez challenge
to Title II of VAWA and stating Lopez's three-part test).
Here, as in Lopez, "[t]he first two categories of authority may be
quickly disposed of:" VAWA "is not a regulation of the use of
the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the
interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce;
nor can [VAWA] be justified as a regulation [protecting] an instrumentality
of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce." Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. "Thus, if [VAWA] is to be sustained,
it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce." Id.
The Lopez Court applied the substantial effects test to the Gun Free School
Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm
in a school zone. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 ed. Supp. V) (amended 1994,
1996). In passing § 922(q), Congress attempted to supplant state criminal
laws with a federal statute that criminalized an activity that on its face
had "nothing to do with" commerce, without making any findings
demonstrating the activity affected interstate commerce or including a jurisdictional
element ensuring a case by case connection with interstate commerce. Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances,
the Supreme Court "would have [had] to pile inference upon inference"
to find a rational basis for concluding the statute "substantially
affect[ed] any sort of interstate commerce." Id. at 567, 115 S. Ct.
at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional.
Id.
In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous
findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez
Court could not, by "evaluat[ing] the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce." Lopez,
514 U.S. at 563, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores,
-- U.S. --, -- - --, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997)
(recognizing the importance of Congressional findings in determining the
"appropriateness of [Congress's] remedial measures"). In doing
so, we recognize that discerning a rational basis "is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question," Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557
n.2, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 273, 85 S. Ct. 348, 366, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (Black,
J., concurring)), and "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that
a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so." Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311, 101 S.
Ct. at 2391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). But a "court must defer"
to congressional findings when there is "a rational basis for such
a finding." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S. Ct. at 2360. Indeed, "[t]he
Supreme Court has without fail given effect to such congressional findings."
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 310-11 (2d ed. 1988). Accordingly,
we first examine the congressional findings made in connection with VAWA.
See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
a Lopez challenge to the "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act" and beginning and ending our analysis by relying totally upon
Congress's "detailed findings" on the interstate commerce effects).
1.
The Congressional findings and testimony that support the passage of VAWA
pursuant to the Commerce Clause are detailed and extensive.9 Congress carefully
documented the enormity of the problem caused by violence against women.
For example, Congress found that:
* "Violence is the leading cause of injury to women ages 15-44. . .
." S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
* "[F]or the past 4 years [prior to 1993], the U.S. Surgeons General
have warned that family violence-not heart attacks or cancer or strokes-poses
the single largest threat of injury to adult women in this country."
Id. at 41- 42 (footnote omitted).
* "An estimated 4 million American women are battered each year by
their husbands or partners. Approximately 95% of all domestic violence victims
are women." H.R.Rep. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
* "Three out of four American women will be victims of violent crimes
sometime during their life." Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
* "Since 1988, the rate of incidence of rape has risen four and a half
times as fast as the total crime rate. There were 109,062 reported rapes
in the United States in 1992-one every five minutes. The actual number of
rapes committed is approximately double that figure. . . ." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
The committee reports similarly found that "the cost to society"
resulting from violence against women "is staggering." S. Rep.
No. 101-545, at 33 (1990). Domestic violence alone is estimated to cost
employers "at least $3 billion-not million, but billion-dollars a year"
due to absenteeism in the workplace. Id. Furthermore, "estimates suggest
that we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice,
and other social costs of domestic violence." S. Rep. No. 103-138,
at 41. Moreover, "[i]t is not a simple matter of adding up the medical
costs, or law enforcement costs, but of adding up all of those expenses
plus the costs of lost careers, decreased productivity, foregone educational
opportunities, and long-term health problems." S. Rep. No. 101-545,
at 33.
These monetary figures were accompanied by other evidence establishing that
violence against women has a substantial impact on interstate commerce:
Over 1 million women in the United States seek medical assistance each year
for injuries sustained by their husbands or other partners. As many as 20
percent of hospital emergency room cases are related to wife battering.
But the costs do not end there: woman abuse "has a devastating social
and economic effect on the family and the community." . . . It takes
its toll in homelessness: one study reports that as many as 50 percent of
homeless women and children are fleeing domestic violence. It takes its
toll in employee absenteeism and sick time for women who either cannot leave
their homes or are afraid to show the physical effects of the violence.
S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37. Fear of violence "takes a substantial toll
on the lives of all women, in lost work, social, and even leisure opportunities."
S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991).
Thus, based upon an exhaustive and meticulous investigation of the problem,
Congress found that:
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting
with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce . . . by diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1839, 1853.10
In concluding that "[t]here is no doubt that Congress has the power
to create the Title III remedy under" the Commerce Clause, Congress
noted that:
[g]ender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement,
reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national
economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from full
participation in the national economy. For example, studies report that
almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit
in the aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based violence affects
the economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain areas or
at certain hours that pose a significant risk of such violence. . . . For
example, women often refuse higher paying night jobs in service/retail industries
because of the fear of attack. Those fears are justified: the No. 1 reason
why women die on the job is homicide and the highest concentration of those
women is in service/retail industries . . . . 42 percent of deaths on the
job of women are homicides; only 12 percent of the deaths of men on the
job are homicides.
S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 54 & n.70 (footnotes omitted).
Our task is simply to discern whether Congress had "a rational basis"
for concluding that the regulated activity-here violence against women-substantially
"affected interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-559, 115
S. Ct. at 1629-30.11 After four years of hear-ings and consideration of
voluminous testimonial, sta-tistical, and documentary evidence, Congress
made an unequivocal and persuasive finding that violence against women substantially
affects interstate commerce. Even the district court recognized that "[a]
reasonable inference from the congressional findings is that violence against
women has a major effect on the national economy." Brzonkala II, 935
F. Supp. at 792. Accordingly, whatever one's doubts as to whether Title
III of VAWA represents a good policy decision, Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F.
Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997), we can only conclude that Congress' findings
are grounded in a rational basis. We note that every court to consider the
question except the court below, has so held. See Crisonino v. New York
City Housing Auth., No. 96 Civ. 9742(HB) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997); Anisimov
v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1194;
Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp.
608 (D. Conn. 1996).
In fact, in United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995), we recently
relied exclusively on less extensive Congressional findings to uphold Section
401(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). Id. at 1111, 1112. In Leshuk the
defendant was convicted of possessing and cultivating marijuana in violation
of § 841(a)(1), and raised a Lopez challenge to the statute. Id. at
1107-08. We held that Lopez did not require the invalidation of § 841(a)(1)
because the "intrastate drug activities" that it regulated "are
clearly tied to interstate commerce." 65 F.3d at 1112. We based our
conclusion wholly on Congress's "detailed findings that intrastate
manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances, as a
class of activities, have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate
drug trafficking and that effective control of the interstate problems requires
the regulation of both intrastate and interstate activities." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Without further ado we "relied upon these
findings" to hold the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to enact
this statute. Id.
Similarly, earlier this year, in Hoffman v. Hunt we reviewed "the congressional
reports" to uphold the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act (FACE), determining
that those reports made "clear" that "several aspects of
interstate commerce are directly and substantially affected by the regulated
conduct." 126 F.3d 575, 586-88 (4th Cir. 1997). Because Congress had
made these persuasive findings we concluded that we did not need to "'pile
inference upon inference' to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34). The congressional
findings setting forth VAWA's substantial effect on interstate commerce
are far more detailed and complete than those we found sufficient to establish
a rational basis for the statutes challenged in Leshuk and Hoffman, and
we thus have no hesitation similarly upholding VAWA. When a court finds
"that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them,
have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to
the protection of commerce, [its] investigation is at an end." United
States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303, 85 S. Ct. 377, 383, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964)).12
2.
Contrary to the district court's holding, and the arguments of Morrison
and Crawford, nothing in Lopez requires a different result.
In noting that § 922(q) "plow[ed] thoroughly new ground and represent[ed]
a sharp break with the longstanding pattern of federal firearms legislation,"
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S. Ct. at 1632, the Lopez Court clearly indicated
that in finding this statute unconstitutional it was enunciating a "limited
holding." Id. at 568, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Although the Court refused to make an "additional expansion" to
Congress's Commerce power to uphold § 922(q), and clarified that a
regulated activity must "substantially affect interstate commerce,"
it did not overrule a single Commerce Clause precedent, signal a decrease
in congressional power under the Commerce Clause, or abandon the "rational
basis" test. Id. at 557-69, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-34; see also United
States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Lopez did
not alter our approach to determining whether a particular statute falls
within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority."); United
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (The Lopez Court "reaffirmed
rather than overturned the previous half century of Commerce Clause precedent"),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 46-47, 136 L.Ed.2d 12 (1996).
In fact, in describing the history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Lopez forthrightly affirmed the modern expansive view of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause, and eschewed the more restrictive view of "commerce"
based on formalistic distinctions between "direct" and "indirect"
effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 555, 115 S. Ct. at 1627- 28. The
Court noted that "modern-era precedents . . . confirm that this power
is subject to outer limits," i.e. it cannot "be extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote"
as to "obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government." Id. at 555-59,
115 S. Ct. at 1628-29. But the Court expressly followed decades of "modern-era
precedents" recognizing that a court's only role in considering a Commerce
Clause challenge is "to decide whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce."
Id. at 557, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80, 101 S.
Ct. at 2360-62; Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56, 91 S. Ct.
1357, 1362, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971)); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
299-301, 85 S. Ct. 377, 381-82, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964); and Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-253, 85 S. Ct. at 354-55; see also Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 574, 115 S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Lopez does not "call
in question" prior commerce clause "principles").13
Morrison and Crawford's reliance on Lopez falters not only because they
ignore the limited nature of the Lopez holding but also because VAWA differs
from § 922(q) in several important respects. In order to uphold VAWA,
we need not "pile inference upon inference" as the Government
asked the Court to do in Lopez. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
Because Congress made no findings to support § 922(q) the Government
was forced to argue that guns in schools affected commerce based upon several
tenuous, multi-layered theories. See id. at 564, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; Terry,
101 F.3d at 1418 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, 115 S. Ct. at 1632) (For
example, "gun possession near schools threatens the educational environment,
which hampers the educational process, which creates a 'less productive
citizenry' which adversely affects 'the Nation's economic well-being' and
which in the end adversely affects interstate commerce."). VAWA, by
contrast, regulates behavior-gender-based violent crime against women-which
Congress has found substantially and gravely affects interstate commerce
on the basis of abundant evidence. Cf. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 S. Ct.
at 1362 (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge because "credit transactions,
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate
commerce"). To connect VAWA with interstate commerce, a court need
not make any inferences-Congress itself has clearly established and documented
that gender based violence against women substantially affects interstate
commerce.
Additionally, unlike § 922(q), VAWA does not invade areas of traditional
state control. The Lopez Court noted that "[u]nder our federal system,
the 'States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law.' . . . When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal
by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal
and state criminal jurisdiction.'" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct.
at 1631 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S. Ct. 1710,
1720-21, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396,
411-12, 93 S. Ct. 1007, 1015-16, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973)). Title III of VAWA
is not a criminal statute and it displaces no state criminal law. Cf. id.
(noting that statute in Lopez "displace[s] state policy choices"
and "overrides legitimate state . . . laws"). Nothing in Title
III prevents a victim of gender-based violence from bringing state criminal
charges or pursuing state tort remedies, or affects how the state treats
those claims.
In fact, far from displacing state law, Congress carefully designed VAWA
to harmonize with state law and protect areas of state concern. Thus, VAWA
references state criminal laws in defining a "crime of violence."
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2) (defining "crime of violence"
as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against
the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16
of Title 18. . . .") (emphasis added). Moreover, Congress expressly
limited the reach of VAWA in further deference to traditional areas of state
expertise such as divorce or child custody proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. §
13981(e) (4) (VAWA does not confer "jurisdiction over any State law
claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution
of marital property, or child custody decree."). In sum, VAWA acts
to supplement, rather than supplant, state criminal, civil, and family law
controlling gender violence. The States are still free to "experiment[
] to devise various solutions" to the problems of gender-based violence
against women. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). 14
In addition, unlike the statute invalidated in Lopez, VAWA does not occupy
a legal territory where "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."
Id. at 581-83, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Instead, VAWA
legislates in an area-civil rights-that has been a federal responsibility
since shortly after the Civil War. Furthermore, federal action is particularly
appropriate when, as here, there is persuasive evidence that the States
have not successfully protected the rights of a class of citizens. In passing
VAWA Congress made extensive and convincing findings that state law had
failed to successfully address gender-motivated violence against women.
Congress concluded that:
Other State remedies have proven inadequate to protect women against violent
crimes motivated by gender animus. Women often face barriers of law, of
practice, and of prejudice not suffered by other victims of discrimination.
Traditional State law sources of protection have proved to be difficult
avenues of redress for some of the most serious crimes against women. Study
after study has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women
are often treated less seriously than crimes affecting men. [C]ollectively,
these reports provide overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates the
court system and that women are most often its victims.
S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 49 (footnotes omitted).15 In VAWA, Congress has
passed a civil rights law, a quintessential area of federal expertise, in
response to "existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice
system." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853.
Nonetheless, Morrison and Crawford argue that Lopez requires a different
result. They note that § 922(q) had "nothing to do with 'commerce'"
and was not "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,"
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1631, and assert that VAWA similarly
regulates a non-economic activity and is therefore beyond Congress's Commerce
Clause authority. This argument, however, misreads both Lopez and VAWA.
First, as Morrison and Crawford concede, Lopez clearly does not hold that
a statute must regulate economic activity to pass muster under the Commerce
Clause. Such a holding could not be squared with past Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
or Lopez itself. Lopez quoted Wickard v. Filburn's famous statement that
"[e]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 63 S. Ct. 82, 89, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942) (emphasis
added), quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556, 115 S. Ct. at 1628. Similarly,
the Lopez Court relied on Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct.
348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 and Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294, 85 S. Ct. at 379. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-563, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-32. These cases involved
the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994)), not an
"economic" regulation but a civil rights statute, which like VAWA
prohibits acts motivated by bias that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.16
Furthermore, the actual basis of the Lopez holding, which Morrison and Crawford
attempt to ignore, undermines their argument as to the importance of "economic
activity." The Lopez Court did not strike down § 922(q) because
it regulated non-economic activity. The Court invalidated § 922(q)
because neither Congress nor the Government convinced the Court that there
was a rational basis for concluding that possession of a gun in a school
zone substantially affected interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-67,
115 S. Ct. at 1631-33. Here, however, there clearly is a rational basis
for concluding that gender-based violence against women does precisely this.
Even if the regulated activity itself had to have an economic nexus, VAWA,
unlike § 922(q), regulates an activity that is "an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63,
115 S. Ct. at 1631. As recounted above, Congress recognized the enormous
impact that violence against women has on women in the workplace, and as
such, VAWA, along with Title VII, can be seen as a part of a larger regulatory
effort to eliminate gender-based violence as a barrier to job opportunities.
Congress found that "current law provides a civil rights remedy for
gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for crimes of violence
motivated by gender committed on the street or in the home." H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853.
VAWA was meant to fill that gap.
Morrison and Crawford's reliance on the fact that VAWA, like § 922(q),
does not have a jurisdictional restriction is unpersuasive for similar reasons.
Lopez does not require that a statute contain a jurisdictional limit in
order to pass Commerce Clause scrutiny. See Olin Corp., 107 F.3d at 1510;
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
-- U.S. --, 118 S. Ct. 46, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997); Terry, 101 F.3d at 1418;
Wall, 92 F.3d at 1449 n. 11; Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685. "If a jurisdictional
element were critical to a statute's constitutionality, the Court in Lopez
would not have gone on to examine the Government's proffered rationales
for the constitutionality of the gun possession statute." Terry, 101
F.3d at 1418.
The core teaching of Lopez is simply that Congress must ensure that legislation
enacted pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority reaches only activities
that "substantially affect interstate commerce." A jurisdictional
element or Congressional findings assist a court in determining whether
a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. But neither
is necessary for constitutional validity. See Wright, 117 F.3d at 1269 (Congress
need not "place a jurisdictional element" in a statute or make
"legislative findings connecting the regulated activity to interstate
commerce."). Although Congressional findings are not required, here
we do have abundant legislative findings evidencing that Congress did indeed
ensure that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce.
As noted above, we recently relied on far less detailed Congressional findings
to uphold a statute that did not regulate economic activities and had no
jurisdictional element. Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1111-12.
Finally, our holding that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that
violence against women has a substantial effect on interstate commerce does
not mean, as Morrison and Crawford contend, that acting pursuant to the
Commerce Clause Congress can reach any activity, including divorces, child-support,
and "diet and exercise habits." This argument ignores the years
of hearings on the need for VAWA and the reams of congressional findings
made in support of VAWA. It belittles the seriousness of the national problem
that discriminatory violence against women presents. It overlooks VAWA's
explicit deference to State expertise: the statute's express restriction
to gender-motivated violent crimes is defined in part in reference to state
law, and it prohibits jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody
matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4).
Most importantly, this argument disregards the ineludible fact that our
role is simply to determine if Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that a regulated activity "substantially affect[s] interstate commerce."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. After four years of hearings
and extensive legislative findings, Congress has adjudged that violence
against women substantially affects interstate commerce. It is "abundantly
clear that our job in this case is not to second-guess the legislative judgment
of Congress that" violence against women "substantially affects
interstate commerce, but rather to ensure that Congress had a rational basis
for that conclusion." Bishop, 66 F.3d at 577. In light of Congress'
findings, well supported by testimony and data, we hold that Congress had
such a rational basis in enacting VAWA.
We note that it is apparent that Congress took great care to detail its
findings and support its conclusion that VAWA was within its commerce authority.
The breadth of the record itself manifests that Congress understood its
duty to act only within its enumerated powers in this case, and took that
duty seriously. As the Supreme Court explained in Polish Nat'l Alliance
v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650, 64 S. Ct. 1196, 1200, 88 L.Ed. 1509 (1944):
[Whether] the conduct of an enterprise affects commerce among the States
is a matter of practical judgment, not to be determined by abstract notions.
The exercise of this practical judgment the Constitution entrusts primarily
and very largely to the Congress, subject to the latter's control by the
electorate. Great power was thus given to the Congress: the power of legislation
and thereby the power of passing judgment upon the needs of a complex society.
Strictly confined though far-reaching power was given to this Court: that
of determining whether the Congress has exceeded limits allowable in reason
for the judgment which it has exercised.
See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(It is Congress' and the President's "obligation to preserve and protect
the Constitution in maintaining the federal balance . . . in the first and
primary instance."). In following our "[s]trictly confined"
duty in this case, we must conclude that Congress has in no way "exceeded
limits allowable in reason for the judgment which it has exercised."
Polish Nat'l Alliance, 322 U.S. at 650, 64 S. Ct. at 1200. Congress acted
within its Commerce Clause authority in enacting VAWA.17
IV.
To summarize, we hold that Brzonkala's complaint states a claim under Title
IX against Virginia Tech, and under the Violence Against Women Act against
Morrison and Crawford. Further, we hold that the Commerce Clause provides
Congress with authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act. Accordingly,
the judgments of the district court dismissing both the Title IX and Violence
Against Women Act claims are reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
No. 96-1814-REVERSED AND REMANDED.
No. 96-2316-REVERSED AND REMANDED.
2 Brzonkala's complaint alleges that the Attorney General, who represented
Virginia Tech, knew, or should have known, that Morrison's due process claim
was meritless under Virginia law because of Abrams v. Mary Washington College,
No. CH93-193, slip op. at 4 (Cir. Ct. City of Fredricksburg, April 27, 1994).
The state court in Abrams rejected an almost identical claim that a student's
due process rights were violated when he was charged and tried under a sexual
assault policy that was adopted after the incident. Id. at 4.
3 Brzonkala also pled a claim of disparate impact based upon Virginia Tech's
policy of not automatically reporting allegations of rape to the police.
Brzonkala does not press this theory on appeal. We deem it waived.
4 Virginia Tech makes a truncated argument, without reference to the complaint
or any authority, that Brzonkala has not pled a hostile environment claim
with sufficient specificity. The district court "glean [ed] from [Brzonkala's]
complaint an allegation that [Virginia Tech] had a hand in permitting a
hostile school environment based on Brzonkala's gender." Brzonkala
I, 935 F. Supp. at 778. We agree that Brzonkala has properly pled a hostile
environment claim. All that Brzonkala was required to plead was "'a
short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
. . . Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that 'all pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice,' we have no doubt that petitioners'
complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice
of its basis." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S. Ct. 99,
103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted).
5 But see Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that most other courts apply Title VII principles
to Title IX cases but refusing to apply Title VII's "knew or should
have known" standard to a Title IX claim).
6 After oral argument in this case, the Eleventh Circuit followed Rowinsky,
see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997),
but the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the Rowinsky rationale. See Oona v.
McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997). As explained above, we, like the
Ninth Circuit, "have difficulty squaring Rowinsky's reasoning with
the Supreme Court's in Franklin" and our own circuit precedent, e.g.,
Preston, 31 F.3d at 207, and Andrade, 88 F.3d at 261. See Oona, 122 F.3d
at 1210.
7 Virginia Tech also argues that Brzonkala lacks standing to pursue injunctive
relief in her Title IX claim because she has left school and does not plan
to return. The record before us does not support Virginia Tech's claim that
Brzonkala will never again attend Virginia Tech. All that the complaint
alleges is that Brzonkala did not return to Virginia Tech in the Fall of
1995. Without a factual basis for believing that Brzonkala will not re-register
at Virginia Tech, we will not dismiss for mootness her claims for injunctive
relief.
8 Congress also expressly stated that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorized enactment of VAWA. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a). In view of
our holding that VAWA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, we need not reach the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
also provided authorization for VAWA.
9 Most of Congress's copious findings do not appear in the statute itself,
but in applying rational basis review courts also consider congressional
committee findings. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; Preseault
v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17, 110 S. Ct. 914, 924-25, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (citing
House Report in discussion of congressional findings regarding effect on
interstate commerce of federal "rails-to-trails" statute); Hodel,
452 U.S. at 277-80, 101 S. Ct. at 2360-62 (relying on committee reports
to uphold Congress's power to enact the Surface Mining Act); Hoffman v.
Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 586 (4th Cir. 1997) (relying upon a House Report to
uphold FACE).
10 House Conference Report 103-711, containing the express finding that
"crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce," was drafted by the House and Senate
Conference Committees on VAWA, and was passed along with VAWA by the House
on August 21, 1994 and by the Senate on August 24, 1994. See Violence Against
Women § 5:42 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1997). Indeed, the findings
in Report 103-711 were part of the original text of VAWA and were removed
to the conference report only to avoid cluttering the U.S.Code with "'congressional
findings' that had no force of law." Id. § 5:40. VAWA, of course,
was enacted before Lopez, when the necessity of expressly finding that regulated
activity had a "substantial effect" upon commerce (rather than
just an "effect") was not altogether clear. Thus, it is particularly
telling that in passing VAWA Congress found that gender-based violence against
women does "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
11 We and the ten other circuits to consider the matter have all applied
the rational basis test to post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges. See Hoffman,
126 F.3d 575, 583-88 (stating and applying rational basis test); United
States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States
v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 118
S. Ct. 111, 139 L.Ed.2d 64 (1997) (same); United States v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d
1475, 1482 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C.
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1264, 117 S. Ct. 2431, 138 L.Ed.2d 193
(1997) (same); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)
(same); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 992, 136 L.Ed.2d 873 (1997) (same); United
States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --
U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 753, 136 L.Ed.2d 690 (1997) (same); United States v.
Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Dinwiddie,
76 F.3d 913, 920 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 613,
136 L.Ed.2d 538 (1996) (same).
12 Indeed, post-Lopez, numerous courts have reiterated that such deference
to congressional findings is required; "court[s] must defer to a congressional
finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there
is any rational basis for such a finding." Terry, 101 F.3d at 1416;
Proyect, 101 F.3d at 12-13 (same); United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974,
979 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1110, 117 S. Ct. 1119,
137 L.Ed.2d 319 (1997); Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1004 (same); United States
v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569, 577 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1066, 116 S. Ct.
750, 133 L.Ed.2d 698 (1996) (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21
(11th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Knutson, 113 F.3d at 29-31 (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) solely on the basis of "congressional findings"
and noting that Lopez "made clear that federal Commerce Clause legislation
continues to merit a high degree of judicial deference"); United States
v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(d) on the basis of "explicit Congressional findings").
13 Thus, it is unsurprising that "courts have resisted urgings to extend
Lopez beyond § 922(q)." United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1448
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 690, 136 L.Ed.2d 613
(1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which prohibits inter alia intrastate
illegal gambling activities). Indeed, post-Lopez innumerable federal statutes
have been challenged on Commerce Clause grounds but not a single one has
been invalidated by a federal appellate court. See, e.g., Hoffman, 126 F.3d
575, 582-88 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 248, which prohibits interference
with access to reproductive health clinics); United States v. Soderna, 82
F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 507,
136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996) (same); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 919-21 (same); Terry,
101 F.3d at 1415-18 (same); Wilson, 73 F.3d at 679-88 (same); Cheffer, 55
F.3d at 1519-21 (same); Wright, 117 F.3d at 1268-1271 (upholding 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o), which prohibits intrastate possession of machine gun, and
noting that every circuit to consider the question had so held); United
States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1), which prohibits use and carrying of a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and noting "all of the circuits
that have considered the question" had upheld the statute in the face
of a Lopez challenge); Olin Corp., 107 F.3d at 1509-10 (upholding CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695,
700-1 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, (1997) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §
860(a), the Drug Free School-Zones Act); United States v. Hawkins, 104 F.3d
437, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 118 S. Ct. 126,
139 L.Ed.2d 76 (1997) (same); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11
(4th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits possession
of a firearm by a felon, and noting ten other circuits that had upheld its
constitutionality under Lopez); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1335-37
(2d Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 373-75 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1140, 117 S. Ct. 1012, 136 L.Ed.2d 889
(1997) (upholding congressional authority to prohibit intrastate possession
or sale of narcotics); Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1111-12 (same); Bramble, 103 F.3d
at 1479-82 (upholding the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668); United
States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 343-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), which prohibits juvenile possession of a handgun);
United States v. Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 144- 46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
-- U.S. --, 117 S. Ct. 272, 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996) (upholding the Indian
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
14 In fact, State Attorneys General from forty-one states supported the
passage of VAWA. They told Congress: "Our experience as attorneys general
strengthens our belief that the problem of violence against women is a national
one, requiring federal attention, federal leadership, and federal funds."
See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 34-36 (1993) (Letter from State Attorneys General).
15 The studies referred to in the above quotation were largely State-sponsored,
including the following: Administrative Office of the California Courts
Judicial Counsel, Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the Courts
(1990); Colorado Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts,
Gender & Justice in the Colorado Courts (1990); Connecticut Task Force
on Gender Justice and the Courts (1991); Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias
Study Commission, Report (1990); Supreme Court of Georgia, Gender and Justice
in the Courts (1991); Illinois Task Force, Gender Bias in the Courts (1990);
Maryland Special Joint Committee, Gender Bias in the Courts (1989); Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts
(1989); Michigan Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Issues in the Courts,
Final Report (1989); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness
in the Courts, Final Report (1989); Nevada Supreme Court Gender Bias Task
Force, Justice For Women (1989); New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force, Women
in the Courts (1984); New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, Report
(1986); Rhode Island Supreme Court Committee on Women in the Courts (1987);
Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report to the Utah Judicial Council
(1990); Vermont Supreme Court and Vermont Bar Association, Gender and Justice:
Report of the Vermont Task Force on Gender Bias in the Legal System (1991);
Washington State Task Force, Gender and Justice in the Courts (1989); Wisconsin
Equal Justice Task Force, Final Report (1991). See S. Rep. No. 103-138,
at 49 n.52.
16 Thus, we follow our sister circuits and hold that Lopez does not narrow
Congress's Commerce Clause authority solely "to the regulation of commercial
actors, and not private individuals who interfere with commercial activities
in interstate commerce. To the contrary, the Court . . . [has upheld] statutes
which penalize behavior substantially affecting interstate commerce without
regard to the actor's commercial or private status." Cheffer, 55 F.3d
at 1520 n. 6; see also Knutson, 113 F.3d at 30 (same); United States v.
Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1258, 117
S. Ct. 2425, 138 L.Ed.2d 188 (1997) (same); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 920-21
(same); Terry, 101 F.3d at 1417 (same); Wilson, 73 F.3d at 684-85 (same).
As Chief Judge Posner recently noted, the fact that a law was not explicitly
meant "to increase the gross national product by removing a barrier
to free trade, but rather to protect personal safety and property rights,
is irrelevant [because] . . . Congress can regulate interstate commerce
for any lawful motive." Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1374 (citing Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 256-57, 85 S. Ct. at 356-58). The Supreme Court itself
has recognized, "[a]n enterprise surely can have a detrimental influence
on interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking
motives." National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,
258, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994).
17 Once a court has decided that a Congressional act is within the commerce
power the only remaining question is whether "the means chosen by"
Congress are "reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S. Ct. at 2360 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 262, 85 S. Ct. at 360). No party contests this point, and we
hold that VAWA's civil remedy is well within appropriate congressional means.
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Fully aware of the importance of the matter before us today, I would unhesitatingly
affirm the judgment below on the essential reasoning set forth by the district
court. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 935 F.Supp.
779 (W.D. Va. 1996). Judge Kiser's lengthy opinion is an excellent legal
analysis of the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act under
Article I, § 8, cl.3 of the Constitution. That analysis is thorough,
scholarly, and, most important, abidingly faithful to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d
626 (1995). The district court's analysis describes in detail the Supreme
Court's new analytical framework for addressing Commerce Clause challenges,
and meticulously and dispassionately applies the principles and reasoning
from Lopez in addressing the challenge to the legislation at issue in this
case. Compare Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 1997 WL 578787 (4th Cir. 1997)
(same).
The district court's careful opinion brings into sharp relief not only the
analytical superficiality of the majority's opinion, but also the majority's
manifest misreading of the Supreme Court's historically significant Lopez
decision and, therefore, its fundamental misunderstanding of the import
of that decision and its implications for the Violence Against Women Act.
Among the more profound of its errors, the majority, in complete disregard
of Lopez, does not include even a single sentence-not one-of the "independent
evaluation" of the effect on interstate commerce of the Violence Against
Women Act required under that decision. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562, 115
S. Ct. at 1631. Ignoring entirely the overarching change in Commerce Clause
analysis wrought by Lopez, the majority merely recites several statements
from House and Senate committees on the general problem of violence against
women and the effect of that violence on the national economy, together
with a sentence from a House Report stating that violence against women
substantially affects interstate commerce (incidentally, never mentioning
that the Senate, as opposed to the House, did not conclude that such violence
substantially affects interstate commerce) and then simply states, without
more, that the Act is constitutional.
The majority thus reaches its conclusion that the Violence Against Women
Act is a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power through application
of a principle of absolute judicial deference to a committee finding-precisely
what the Supreme Court held in Lopez was no longer appropriate in the review
of Commerce Clause challenges to federally enacted statutes, even for findings
by the full Congress. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n. 2, 115 S. Ct.
at 1629 n. 2 ("[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so. [W]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately
a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by this Court." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The majority's elevation of a committee's finding not merely to preeminence
among the constitutionally relevant considerations, but to a position as
dispositive of the constitutional inquiry, is not at all inadvertent; to
the contrary, it is quite intentional. In fact, trumpeting a misplaced reliance
on United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995), the majority is
at pains throughout its opinion to emphasize that it rests its conclusion
entirely on the "finding" in the House Report, which it ascribes
to the Congress as a whole and then accepts wholly and uncritically:
After four years of hearings and consideration of voluminous testimonial,
statistical, and documentary evidence, Congress made an unequivocal and
persuasive finding that violence against women substantially affects interstate
commerce. . . . Accordingly, whatever one's doubts as to whether VAWA represents
a good policy decision, we can only conclude that Congress' findings are
grounded in a rational basis.
Ante at 968 (emphasis added; citation omitted); see also id. at 966 (describing
Leshuk as "rejecting a Lopez challenge to the 'Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act' and beginning and ending our analysis by relying
totally upon Congress's 'detailed findings' on the interstate commerce effects"
(emphasis
added)); id. at 968 (again comparing majority's conclusion with that in
Leshuk and characterizing Leshuk as a case where, "[w]ithout further
ado we 'relied upon the[ ] [congressional] findings' to hold the Commerce
Clause authorized Congress to enact this statute" (quoting Leshuk,
65 F.3d at 1112; emphasis added)); id. at 973 ("Although Congressional
findings are not required, here we do have abundant legislative findings
evidencing that Congress did indeed ensure that the regulated activity substantially
affected interstate commerce. As noted above, we relied exclusively on far
less detailed Congressional findings to uphold a statute that did not regulate
economic activity and had no jurisdictional element." (Emphasis added;
citation to Leshuk omitted)).
The majority's wholesale deference to a committee finding would at least
be understandable if that committee had made extensive findings deserving
of deference. However, the majority ultimately sustains the constitutionality
of the Act literally on the basis of a single sentence appearing in that
committee report, which sentence is, itself, entirely conclusory.
After properly concluding that it cannot rely upon Congress' Section 5 findings
in support of its Commerce Clause analysis,1 and after recognizing that
the bulk of its recited findings bear only on "the enormity of the
problem" of domestic violence against women, not on that problem's
effect on interstate commerce, see ante at 966-68, the majority is left
with but a single conclusory sentence in the Report of one House to which
to defer in sustaining VAWA under Article I. See ante at 967 ("crimes
of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce. . . .").2 This lone conclusory sentence constitutes the entirety
of the "mountain of evidence," ante at 964, the "reams,"
id. at 973, the "voluminous," id. at 965, the "copious,"
id. at 966 n. 9, the "detailed," id. at 966, the "unequivocal,"
id. at 968, the "abundant," id. at 973, and the "persuasive,"
id. at 968, congressional findings upon which the majority upholds VAWA.
This one sentence is the basis upon which the majority concludes that "it
is apparent that Congress took great care to detail its findings and support
its conclusions that VAWA was within its commerce authority." Id. at
973.
It should go without saying that this one sentence is functionally no different
from a complete absence of express congressional findings. See Lopez, 514
U.S. at 562, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. This single conclusory sentence no better
"enables [the court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce,"
id. at 563, 115 S. Ct. at 1632, than would have no statement at all. Rather
than the "paradigm of judicial restraint" as the majority asserts,
ante at 965 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314,
113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)), deference to this kind of
"finding" is judicial activism merely parading as restraint.
Related to its reflexive acceptance of the committee's conclusory finding
as to the effect on interstate commerce of domestic violence against women,
the majority, of necessity, includes scarcely even a reference to the majority
opinion in Lopez in reaching its conclusion that the Violence Against Women
Act is constitutional. Only after concluding that the Act is constitutional
does the majority perfunctorily address the bulk of the Court's most significant
pronouncements on the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., ante at 969 (noting, after
holding Act constitutional on the basis of the Committee findings alone,
that "nothing in Lopez requires a different result"). Thus, the
majority upholds the Violence Against Women Act without so much as a mention
of the economic or noneconomic character of the legislation-much less the
quite different constitutional analysis required depending upon which type
of statute is at issue;3 the presence or absence of a jurisdictional element
that would ensure case-by-case that the necessary effect on interstate commerce
exists; or the consequences of its holding for the "first principles"
of divided powers, which the Supreme Court believed so important in the
constitutional equation that it began and ended its opinion with a full
discussion of them, compare Br. for Intervenor-Appellant United States at
19 (noting that principles of federalism were of "a critical concern
to the Court in Lopez"). Consistent with the majority's view of Lopez
as a fact-specific case of little significance, these pivotal considerations
are, and plainly so, consigned to afterthought.
The majority opinion is, it should come as no surprise, categorically inconsistent
with our court's recent carefully written and analyzed opinion in Hoffman
v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 586-88, wherein we upheld the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"). Indeed, the majority must
resort to mischaracterization of that opinion in order to avoid the evident
inconsistency with its own opinion. The majority states, in transparent
legerdemain, that the court in Hoffman reviewed the congressional reports
"to uphold" the Freedom of Access to Clinics Act. Ante at 968;
see also id. (stating that "similarly" to Leshuk, Hoffman relied
wholly on Congress' findings). However, in Hoffman we did not review the
congressional reports to uphold the Act; we merely reviewed them, together
with the other factors from Lopez, particularly the close and direct connection
of the regulated conduct with an economic activity, in upholding the Act.
The difference is obvious. Indeed, this is precisely the significance of
Lopez. After Lopez, it is clear that the courts are to undertake an independent
review of the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce, not simply to rubber-stamp Congress' findings as to that relationship,
as the majority does.
Similarly, the majority states that "[b]ecause Congress had made these
persuasive findings we concluded [in Hoffman] that we did not need to 'pile
inference upon inference' to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
Ante at 968. Again, however, we did not reason in this way at all. We did
not say that we did not need to pile inference upon inference because Congress
had made the findings; rather, and quite differently, we said that the piling
of inferences was unnecessary because our own independent determination
had revealed that there existed a real and substantial connection between
the conduct regulated under FACE and interstate commerce. Again, the difference
between Hoffman and the majority opinion, and, more importantly, between
the majority opinion and Lopez, is obvious.
Finally, in powerful irony, at the same time that the majority decides the
Commerce Clause challenge to VAWA with barely a mention of the analysis
carefully laid out by the Supreme Court in Lopez, the majority does not
include even a single sentence of discussion of the district court's exhaustive
analysis that it summarily reverses-an analysis which actually is, in contrast
to the majority's opinion, scrupulously faithful not only to Supreme Court
precedent, but to our Circuit precedent as well.
In short, the majority opinion reads, as intended, as if Lopez were never
decided, holding for our Circuit, explicitly on the authority of Judge Kravitch's
opinion in United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 1997),
and implicitly on the reasoning advocated by the dissenting Justices in
Lopez, that "'Lopez did not alter our approach to determining whether
a particular statute falls within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority.'" Ante at 969. Indeed, as the majority tacitly acknowledges,
with understandable reluctance, it views Lopez, the most significant Commerce
Clause decision in more than half a century, as an aberration, a case limited
in its reach to section 922(q), of Title 18, of the United States Code.
See ante at 969 n. 13 ("[I]t is unsurprising that 'courts have resisted
urgings to extend Lopez beyond § 922(q).'" (citations omitted)).
I suspect that, even in its discretion, the Supreme Court would not allow
today's decision to stand, not only because of the decision's bold intransigence
in the face of the Court's recent decision, but also because the Commerce
Clause challenge to the instant statute pristinely presents the Court with
the logical next case in its considered revisitation of the Commerce Clause.
Because today's decision wholly ignores the Supreme Court's analysis in
Lopez and conflicts directly with our recent post-Lopez decision in Hoffman
v. Hunt, however, I have every hope that our own court will obviate the
need for such further review.
I respectfully dissent.
1 For its unexplained conclusion that violence
against women has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and therefore
is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power, the majority properly
does not rely on the findings Congress made to justify VAWA under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the majority distinguishes between
the findings made in support of Congress' exercise of its Section 5 power
and the findings made in support of Congress' exercise of its Commerce Clause
power, as does the Department of Justice. Compare Br. of Intervenor-Appellant
United States at 4, 6-8 (detailing congressional findings on the "Impact
on the National Economy and Interstate Commerce"), with id. at 9-16
(detailing congressional findings on the "Bias in State Judicial Systems");
compare also id. at 965-970 (arguing in reliance upon findings recited at
4-8 that VAWA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause), with id. at 961-965 (arguing in reliance upon findings recited
at 9-16 that VAWA is a valid exercise of Congress' power under Section 5).
It may be, as the Department of Justice contends, that congressional findings
that the civil rights of women are being violated bear on the question of
whether a statute impermissibly encroaches on traditional state functions.
See Br. for Intervenor-Appellant United States at 32 ("An exercise
of Commerce Clause power cannot plausibly be invalidated on the basis of
federalism concerns where the declared purpose of the statute, supported
by extensive legislative evidence, is to secure the civil rights the states
have failed to protect." (emphasis added)). But, as the Department
and the majority both recognize, it would be untenable to hold that such
findings even bear on, much less largely resolve, the threshold question
of whether violence against women has an effect on interstate commerce at
all.
2 The majority cites to only one other sentence from the four years of congressional
debate in support of its holding, and that sentence from a Senate committee
report does not even purport to find that gender-motivated violence substantially
affects interstate commerce (although the majority seems to presume that
it does). See id. at 967 ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based
crimes restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health
expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate
commerce and the national economy."). The sentence speaks more to the
effects of such violence on the economy in general than on interstate commerce,
in any event.
3 So far afield is the majority's reasoning from that of the Supreme Court
in Lopez, that the majority all but holds that the character of legislation
as "economic" or "noneconomic" is irrelevant under Lopez.
See ante at 972 ("The Lopez Court did not strike down § 922(q)
because it regulated non-economic activity. The Court invalidated §
922(q) because neither Congress nor the Government convinced the Court that
there was a rational basis for concluding that possession of a gun in a
school zone substantially affected interstate commerce." (citation
omitted)); id. ("Even if the regulated activity itself had to have
an economic nexus . . .").
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
W.D. VIRGINIA
ROANOKE DIVISION
Civil Action No. 95-1358-R
CHRISTY BRZONKALA, PLAINTIFF
v.
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC AND STATE UNIVERSITY,
ET AL., DEFENDANTS
July 26, 1996
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KISER, Chief Judge.
On March 1, 1996, Christy Brzonkala filed an amended complaint alleging
violations of Title IX of the Education Amendment Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1681, et seq., of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 ("VAWA"), and of various state laws. Brzonkala brought
claims against Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University ("VPI"),
William Landsidle in his capacity as Comptroller of the Commonwealth, and
three VPI football players, Antonio Morrison, James Crawford, and Cornell
Brown.
I dismissed the claims against VPI, William Landsidle, and Cornell Brown,
and now I will consider the claims against Morrison and Crawford. Only the
VAWA and some state law claims remain.
I. Alleged Facts
Brzonkala is an adult female who resides in Fairfax, Virginia. She attended
VPI where she was a "student athlete" and a prospect for the women's
softball team. Morrison and Crawford are adult males. They attend VPI where
they are members of the all-male football team. On the night of September
21, 1994 and the morning of the next day, Brzonkala was sexually assaulted
in a room on the third floor of her dormitory by two men whom she and Hope
Handley, another female student, had met less than a half-hour earlier and
whose identities she knew only by given names and by their status as football
team members. Brzonkala alleges that the two men forced her to have sexual
intercourse by threat and intimidation and through the use of Brzonkala's
"mental incapacity and physical helplessness." She alleges that
the two men's acts "were motivated wholly by discriminatory animus
toward her gender and were not random acts of violence." Brzonkala
reported that she was not inebriated at the time of the assaults. About
five months later, Brzonkala learned that the assailants were Morrison and
Crawford.
On September 21, Brzonkala, Handley, Morrison, and Crawford were in a room
on the third floor of Brzonkala's dormitory. Handley and Crawford left the
room following fifteen minutes of conversation, and Morrison immediately
requested intercourse with Brzonkala. Brzonkala audibly told Morrison "no"
twice. When Brzonkala rose to leave, Morrison forced her face-up onto a
bed, pushed her down by her shoulders, and disrobed her. Morrison pinned
her down by her elbows with his hands, pressed his knees against her legs,
and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse. Brzonkala attempted to
push Morrison off. Then, before Brzonkala could recover, Crawford came back
into the room, exchanged places with Morrison, and forced Brzonkala to submit
to vaginal intercourse by pinning down her arms and placing his knees against
her legs. Again before Brzonkala could recover, Morrison exchanged places
with Crawford and forced Brzonkala to submit to vaginal intercourse a third
time. Afterwards, Morrison said to Brzonkala, "You better not have
any fucking diseases." Neither Morrison nor Crawford used a condom.
In February 1995, Brzonkala recognized Morrison and Crawford as the two
men who forced her to submit to intercourse. Prior to this identification,
Morrison announced publicly in the dormitory's dining hall and in the presence
of VPI student Charlotte Wachter, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck
the shit out of them." At the end of April 1995, Brzonkala filed a
complaint against Morrison and Crawford under VPI's Sexual Assault Policy.
After Brzonkala filed her complaint, she learned that a VPI student overheard
an unidentified male VPI athlete advise Crawford that he should have "killed
the bitch."
In the first hearing, Morrison admitted the sexual contact and admitted
that Brzonkala told him "no" twice. Crawford confirmed that Morrison
had sexual conduct with Brzonkala and testified that Brzonkala was "really
drunk" when she arrived in the room. Crawford denied that he had sexual
contact with Brzonkala. The VPI judicial committee found Morrison guilty
of sexual assault and suspended him from school for two semesters. The committee
found insufficient evidence to take action against Crawford. In May 1995,
Morrison appealed the committee's sanction, and an appeals officer upheld
the sanction.
During a second hearing, the judicial committee found Morrison guilty of
abusive conduct and reimposed the sanction of an immediate two-year suspension.
Morrison appealed the result, and, without notice to Brzonkala, VPI set
aside the sanction against Morrison. Morrison returned to VPI for the Fall
1995 semester. Brzonkala learned through a November 30, 1995 newspaper article
that the judicial committee at the second hearing had actually found Morrison
guilty of a reduced charge of "using abusive language." Because
Morrison would be present on the VPI campus during the Fall 1995 semester,
Brzonkala feared for her personal safety and canceled her plan to return
to VPI for the Fall semester.
II. Statute
42 U.S.C. § 13981. Civil Rights
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section
8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect
the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote
public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing
a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of
this section).
(c) Cause of action
All persons (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection
(b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section--
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due,
at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means--
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16
of Title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal
charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed
in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United
States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described
in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection
(c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for
acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
be motivated by gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
(2) No prior criminal action
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution,
or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection
(c) of this section.
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions
brought pursuant to this part.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of Title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall
be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer
on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim
seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution
of marital property, or child custody decree.
III. Issues
Two issues are involved: (1) whether the complaint sufficiently states a
claim by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards, and, if so, (2) whether VAWA
is constitutional.
IV. Whether Brzonkala States a Claim
A. Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are generally disfavored and only granted when
it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.
S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). I may only test plaintiff's
complaint for any legal deficiency and must construe the factual allegations
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S.
232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d
485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 936, 112 S. Ct. 1475,
117 L.Ed.2d 619 (1992).
B. Analysis
The sticking point in determining if Brzonkala sufficiently stated a VAWA
claim is whether she has sufficiently alleged that the rape was "motivated
by gender." A crime "motivated by gender" is defined as a
crime "committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due,
at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." See 42
U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1).
Defendants argue that Brzonkala failed the liberal pleading standards of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
. . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.
No technical forms of pleading or motions are required." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(e)(1).
The legislative history behind VAWA sheds some light on the proof requirements
which, in turn, shed some light on the pleading requirements. "Proof
of 'gender-motivation' under [T]itle III should proceed in the same ways
proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other civil rights laws.
Judges and juries will determine 'motivation' from the 'totality of the
circumstances' surrounding the event." S. Rep. No. 197, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 50 (1991). "Bias, in short, can be proved by circumstantial
as well as indirect evidence." S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
52 (1993).
Generally accepted guidelines for identifying hate crimes may also be useful
in assessing whether the circumstances show gender-motivation. The following
characteristics are used to determine whether a crime is bias related: language
used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including mutilation);
the lack of provocation; previous history of similar incidents; absence
of any other apparent motive (battery without robbery, for example); common
sense. . . .
S. Rep. No. 197, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 n. 72. The statute in question
"requires subjective proof on a case-by-case basis that the criminal
was motivated by a bias against the victim's gender. Whether a particular
crime is, in fact, gender-motivated will be a question of fact for the court
or jury to decide. . . ." S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50.
In support of her VAWA claim, Brzonkala makes the conclusory statement that
Morrison and Crawford's actions "were motivated wholly by discriminatory
animus toward her gender and were not random acts of violence." Such
a conclusory statement is likely insufficient to state a claim. Cf. Simpson
v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1990). However, Brzonkala has alleged other
facts that support this conclusory statement.
Brzonkala alleges that she had met Morrison and Crawford less than a half-hour
before she was raped, that Morrison and Crawford participated in a gang
rape of Brzonkala, Morrison having sex with her one time before and one
time after Crawford had sex with her, that neither Morrison nor Crawford
used a condom, that, after raping her the second time, Morrison stated to
Brzonkala, "You better not have any fucking diseases," and finally
that, within about five months after the rapes, Morrison announced publicly
in the dormitory's dining hall and in the presence of at least one woman,
"I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them."
I need not decide whether the allegation of the rapes alone is sufficient
to state a claim. All rapes are not the same, and the characteristics of
the rapes here alleged, when compared to other rapes, indicate that gender
animus more likely played a part in these rapes than in some other types
of rape. First, the assault involved a gang rape. While any rape is egregious,
all other factors the same, gang rape generally is more egregious than one-on-one
rape. Where, as here, two men rape one woman, this indicates a conspiracy
of disrespect for that woman. Second, these rapes fall somewhere in between
stranger rape and date rape, and are probably closer to stranger rape. Again,
while any rape is egregious, stranger rape and rapes such as the one in
question generally are more egregious than date rape. Additionally, stranger
rape generally more likely than date rape involves gender animus. For example,
date rape could involve a misunderstanding and is often less violent than
stranger rape. By the facts alleged, the case at hand does not involve any
misunderstanding. Date rape could also involve a situation where a man's
sexual passion provokes the rape by decreasing the man's control. Here there
is no indication that sexual passion caused Morrison to initiate intercourse.
Finally, date rape could involve in part disrespect for the victim as a
person, not as a woman; in date rape the perpetrator knows the victim's
personality to some extent. In the case at hand, the facts indicate that
Morrison and Crawford had little if any knowledge of Brzonkala's personality.
Therefore, by process of elimination, an inference of gender animus is more
reasonable in this situation than in some other rapes.
In Morrison's case, two facts other than the characteristics of the rapes
point to gender animus. After having intercourse with Brzonkala for the
second time, Morrison stated, "You better not have any fucking diseases."
While the relevance of this to gender animus is questionable, this further
evidences the disrespect that Morrison had for Brzonkala, irrespective of
any knowledge of her personality. More importantly and more relevant to
gender animus, Morrison stated at a later date, in the presence of at least
one woman, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them."
Although Morrison did not state that he likes to rape women, his statement
reflects that he has a history of taking pleasure from having intercourse
with women without their sober consent. This statement indicates disrespect
for women in general and connects this gender disrespect to sexual intercourse,
and, at least, raises an issue to be pursued in discovery. Although the
statement is relevant without such an inference, the reasonable inference
that Brzonkala was intoxicated at the time of the rapes further links Morrison's
statement to the alleged rapes at issue. While Brzonkala alleges that she
"reported that she was not inebriated at the time of the assaults,"
she also alleges that Morrison raped her "through the use of [her]
mental incapacity." Crawford stated that Brzonkala was "really
drunk."
Congress obviously intended this statute to apply to rapes motivated by
gender bias. Morrison's actions outwardly evidence gender animus more than
many, if not most, situations of rape (at least before discovery has revealed
any other evidence of gender animus). The purpose of the statute would be
eviscerated if, to state a claim, a plaintiff had to allege, for example,
that the defendant raped her and stated, "I hate women." Defendants
indicate that plaintiffs must allege facts such as an ongoing series of
sexual assaults by the defendant. But, as plaintiff points out, she has
not had opportunity to take discovery to uncover any possible prior similar
assaults. Additionally, I question whether the alleged sexual assault plus
a statement indicating that Morrison enjoys having intercourse with women
against their sober consent is any less indicative of gender animus than
an allegation of a series of sexual assaults.
Therefore, at least against Morrison, Brzonkala has successfully stated
a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 13981. The characteristics of
the rape combined with Morrison's statements are sufficient at least to
meet the minimal federal pleading requirements. Whether Brzonkala can prove
the allegations in her complaint by a preponderance of the evidence is not
currently an issue before the Court. Deciding whether a claim is stated
against Crawford is unnecessary considering my decision on the constitutionality
of VAWA.
V. Whether VAWA (42 U.S.C. § 13981) Is Constitutional
If VAWA is constitutional, it must be based either on the Commerce Clause
or the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Commerce Clause
1. Commerce Power Generally
Article I of the U. S. Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate
commerce . . . among the several States. . . ." U. S. Const., art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Plaintiff 1 argues that VAWA is constitutional because
it addresses conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce. In
United States v. Lopez, [514] U. S. [549], 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d
626 (1995), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of former
18 U.S.C. § 922(q), the Gun-Free Zone Act of 1990, which forbade "'any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.'" Id.
at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (quoting former 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)
(1988 ed., Supp. V)). Specifically, the Court considered whether this act
was a permissible use of Congress's commerce power.
In answering this issue, the Court considered important that "the scope
of the interstate commerce power 'must be considered in the light of our
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.' "Id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-1629 (quoting NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37, 57 S. Ct. 615, 624,
81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)). The Court has "heeded that warning" and
has "undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding
that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce."
Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citing among other cases Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276-280, 101
S. Ct. 2352, 2360-2362, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)). The Supreme Court has not
"'declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce
as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities.'"
Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S. Ct. 2017,
2024 n. 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968)). "Rather, '[t]he Court has said
only that where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
that statute is of no consequence.'" Id. (quoting Wirtz, 392 U. S.
at 197 n. 27, 88 S. Ct. at 2024 n. 27).
Under its commerce power, Congress may regulate three broad categories of
activity. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress may regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Third, Congress
may regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. Id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-1630 (citations omitted). In
Lopez, the Court concluded that, in order to qualify for the third category,
the regulated activity must "substantially affect" interstate
commerce. Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
2. First Two Categories
As in Lopez, in the case at hand the first two categories can be easily
eliminated. VAWA is not "a regulation of the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation
of a commodity through the channels of commerce." Cf. Lopez, 514 U.
S. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. Also, VAWA is not a regulation by which Congress
has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing
in interstate commerce. Cf. id. Admittedly women often travel between states,
as do their abusers and assailants, but certainly more is required to qualify
for the commerce power. Therefore, if VAWA is a permissible exercise of
power under the Commerce Clause, it must qualify for the third category:
it must regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
3. Lopez's Analysis of Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
The effects-analysis of the majority decision in Lopez can be broken down
into four parts. First, the Court noted the relevance of the nature of the
regulated activity; the Court distinguished that case, dealing with the
regulation of intrastate possession of guns, from cases dealing with the
regulation of an intrastate activity which is economic in nature. Second,
the Court considered whether § 922(q) had any jurisdictional element
to ensure in individual cases that the firearm possession would affect interstate
commerce. Third, the Court considered the importance of legislative history.
And finally the Court considered the practical implications of accepting
the Government's argument that the economic impact of the regulated activity
had sufficient effects on interstate commerce to sustain the regulation.
a. Nature of Regulated Activity
In Lopez, the Court noted that Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 S.
Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), was perhaps the most far-reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity and that Wickard involved
economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone
does not. Lopez, 514 U. S. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-1631. In Wickard,
Roscoe Filburn operated a small farm in Ohio, on which he raised 23 acres
of wheat for the year involved. He would sow winter wheat in the fall, harvest
it in July, then sell some of it, feed some of it to his farm animals, and
keep the remainder for seeding future crops. Wickard, 317 U. S. at 114,
63 S. Ct. at 84. The Secretary of Agriculture assessed a penalty against
Filburn under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, because Filburn had
harvested about 12 more acres of wheat than the Act permitted. Id. at 114-
115, 63 S. Ct. at 84. The Court sustained the application of the Act to
this activity, stating that home-grown wheat "competes with wheat in
commerce," because "it supplies a need of the man who grew it
which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market."
Id. at 128, 63 S. Ct. at 91.
The Lopez Court differentiated § 922(q) from the statute in Wickard,
because
[s]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.
It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations
of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U. S. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-1631 (footnote omitted).
In effect, the Court separated the Commerce Clause analysis between situations
where regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature and situations
where the intrastate activity is not. After Lopez, cases such as Wickard,
where regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature, do not control
cases where regulated intrastate activity is not economic. At the least,
after Lopez, whether intrastate activity is economic in nature is a very
relevant consideration.
b. Individual Case Inquiry
In the next step in Lopez, the Court considered important that § 922(q)
did not contain a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce." Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Section 922(q) had no jurisdictional
element which limited "its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions"
that had "an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce."
Id.
c. Relevance of Legislative History
The Court noted that the Government conceded that no express congressional
findings were presented regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of
gun possession in a school zone and that "to the extent that congressional
findings would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here." Id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-1632. The Court,
however, also stated that such findings were not necessary. Id. at --, 115
S. Ct. at 1631 (citations omitted). The Court further noted that Congress
had made findings under an amended § 922(q). Id. at -- n. 4, 115 S.
Ct. at 1632 n. 4. At oral argument, the Government stated regarding the
congressional findings, "[W]e're not relying on them in the strict
sense of the word, but we think that at a very minimum they indicate that
reasons can be identified for why Congress wanted to regulate this particular
activity." Id. From this statement, the Court surmised that "[t]he
Government [did] not rely upon these subsequent findings as a substitute
for the absence of findings in the first instance." Id.
d. Practical Implications
The Court addressed the practical implications of accepting as sufficient
the Government's argued effects on commerce. Id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct.
at 1632-1634.
The Government argued that
possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and
that violent crime can be expected to affect the national economy in two
ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the
mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population.
Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to
areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. The Government
also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat
to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped
educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry.
That, in turn, would have an adverse effect on the Nation's economic well-being.
As a result, the Government argues that Congress could rationally have concluded
that § 922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
The Court observed that, if the regulation was constitutional based on these
effects, then Congress's power would be extended too far. Under the Government's
"costs of crime" reasoning, Congress could regulate "not
only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." Id.
The Court stated that, under the Government's "national productivity"
reasoning, Congress could regulate "any activity that [Congress] found
was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family
law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."
Id. The Court concluded, "Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate." Id. Under the "threat
to learning" reasoning, Congress could directly regulate family law
issues and education. Id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-1633.
4. Application of Lopez's Substantial Effects Analysis to the Case at Hand
Congressional findings in support of VAWA reveal that violence against women
is prevalent, and the Senate Report states that
[g]ender-based violent crimes meet the modest threshold required by the
Commerce Clause. Gender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes restricts
movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures,
and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and
the national economy. Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-
women-from full participation in the national economy. For example, studies
report that almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced
to quit in the aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of gender-based violence
affects the economy because it deters women from taking jobs in certain
areas or at certain hours that pose a significant risk of such violence.
S. Rep. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1993). Notably, the Lopez Court stated,
"'[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.'" Lopez,
514 U. S. at -- n. 2, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 n. 2 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 311, 101 S. Ct.
2389, 2391, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (Rhenquist, J., concurring)). "'Whether
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under
the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial
rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
Court.'" Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U. S. 241, 273, 85 S. Ct. 348, 366, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964)). This is particularly
true where, subsequent to the Senate's above finding, the "modest threshold
required by the Commerce Clause" has become less modest. The House
Conference found:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting
with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of
violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products.
H.R.Rep. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1994), U. S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1801, 1853.
The differences between Lopez and the case at hand are insignificant, and
the similarities are significant. Arguably the following three differences
between the case at hand and Lopez render Lopez's logic inapplicable to
the case at hand: (1) that VAWA is civil, and the Lopez statute was criminal,
(2) that there are legislative findings here but not in Lopez, and (3) that
fewer steps of causation exist between the VAWA regulated activity and commerce
than § 922(q)'s regulated activity and commerce. The similarities include
(1) the criminal nature of both statutes, (2) the non-commercial nature
of both statutes, (3) the lack of a jurisdictional requirement that some
effect on interstate commerce is involved in each case, (4) the remoteness
of any effect on commerce, and (5) the excessive congressional power that
would logically follow from permitting both statutes based on the Commerce
Clause.
a. Possible Differences
A close look at the possible differences reveals that they are insignificant
and that the possible differences often point to similarities instead of
differences. First, whereas no congressional findings were before the Lopez
Court connecting the relevant activity to interstate commerce, congressional
findings which support that violence against women affects interstate commerce
are currently before this Court. As the Lopez Court pointed out, however,
such findings are not necessary. Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citations
omitted). The Court only found the missing findings relevant in that the
findings would have enabled the Court "to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked
eye. . . ." Id. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. Having said that, the Court
noted that the amended § 922(q) included congressional findings regarding
the effects upon interstate and foreign commerce of firearm possession in
and around schools. Id. at -- n. 4, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n. 4. If the Court
felt that such findings were extremely important, i.e. that the Court did
not have a sufficient awareness of the effects absent the findings, then
the Court could have considered the added congressional findings even in
the face of the Government's statement that it was not relying on the added
findings "in the strict sense of the word," but that "at
a very minimum [the findings] indicate that reasons can be identified for
why Congress wanted to regulate this particular activity." Id. The
fact that an attorney made an ambiguous statement possibly indicating a
minimal reliance on congressional findings does not preclude a court from
considering these findings.
Regardless, even absent the express congressional findings, the Lopez Court
had a sufficient knowledge of interstate commercial effects to consider.
The commerce power is based on a reasonable effect on interstate commerce,
not on Congress's perceived effect on commerce. While the effects on commerce
in Lopez were not obvious because they were so tenuous, undoubtedly the
Court could fairly easily infer the effects in order to make a reasonable
determination whether these effects were substantially related to commerce.
Also, as listed in the appendix to Lopez, the Court had much authority to
consider regarding the issue. See id. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1665- 1671.
More importantly, the Government actually presented the commercial effects
in its argument, and the Court considered whether these sufficed.
In sum, the fact that the effects need not be inferred in the case at hand
is not a very important difference. Congress need not make findings, the
Lopez Court had access to Congress's added findings, the Lopez Court had
a reasonable appreciation of the effects via reasonable inferences, the
authority in the appendix, and the Government's argument, and the Lopez
Court thoroughly considered the effects presented. The fact that Congress's
findings were not stressed in the Government's argument is somewhat incidental,
and it appears that the Court mentioned this simply as one feather with
which to fill an already full pillow. While findings will often be helpful,
findings are not necessary for a determination of whether a rational relation
to interstate commerce exists.
Second, the statute at issue is civil, whereas Lopez involved a criminal
statute. This is technically a correct statement, however, VAWA is criminal
in nature. VAWA was designed to address problems in the state criminal justice
system, and, in attempting to supplement deficiencies in the state criminal
system, it creates a civil cause of action that seeks to vindicate a criminal
act. It provides a civil remedy for a "crime of violence," which
is defined in part as "an act or series of acts that would constitute
a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property
if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another."
42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A). A person liable under the act "shall
be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as a court may deem appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
Regardless, whether a statute based on the Commerce Clause is civil or criminal
is of limited relevance. With statutes regulating intrastate activities,
the primary concern is whether the activity is economic. Other than the
economic nature of the activity to be regulated, the focus is not on the
nature of the activity but on the related issue of the effects of the regulated
activity on interstate commerce.
Third, the steps of causation in the instant case are fewer than in Lopez.
At best, an analysis of the steps of causation is an inexact science; the
number of steps depends on how each step is defined, and a greater number
of steps does not always indicate greater remoteness. Certainly this should
not be the method for resolving Commerce Clause issues. In Lopez, the Government
argued and the Court considered two general chains of causation. First,
the possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime
which may affect the national economy through either increased nationwide
costs or a reduction in the willingness of individuals to travel to areas
within the country that are perceived to be unsafe. Second, guns pose a
substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning
environment, and a handicapped educational environment leads to a less productive
citizenry which affects the national economy.
While the problems inherent in a step of causation analysis are compounded
when comparing two different laws, comparing the steps in the case at hand
to Lopez is helpful. Compared with Lopez's first chain of causation, the
case at hand possibly involves one less step than the postulated effects
in Lopez. In the case at hand, the regulated activity is the violent crime,
whereas in Lopez the regulated activity was an act that could lead to a
violent crime. This distinction is not enough to apply the commerce power
in the case at hand. The step from possession of a firearm in schools to
the commission of a violent crime is a small step. Undoubtedly, often possession
of a firearm leads to violent crime. Also, no violent crime is necessary
to create an effect on commerce; the fear created solely by the possession
of the guns undoubtedly somewhat affects commerce. Finally, the individual
steps that each case has in common may be longer in the case at hand than
in Lopez.
Lopez's second chain of causation is similar to plaintiff's argument that
violent crimes against women affect the productivity of the nation by distracting
women and by removing women from the workplace. Similarly, guns at schools
affect the productivity of the nation by threatening the learning environment.
It is a fair inference that guns at schools are distracting and dissuade
many students from attending schools. This chain also involves one less
step. Guns affect learning, an effect which in turn affects job performance,
which in turn affects the national economy, which in turn affects interstate
commerce. In the case at hand, violence against women affects job performance,
which in turn affects the national economy, which in turn affects interstate
commerce. Again the one less step in the case at hand is unimportant. It
is far from clear that the distance from the first to the last step is greater
in the Lopez chain of causation than in the case at hand's chain.
The bottom line is that both Lopez and the case at hand involve regulated
activity that is too remote from interstate commerce. Any substantial distinction
between the lengths of the chains of causation in Lopez and the lengths
of the chains in the case at hand is inconsequential. As mentioned, the
steps of causation analysis is an inexact science, a formalistic framework
upon which no heavy reliance should be placed. In the end, the important
issue is the proximity of the regulated activity to commerce, not the number
of steps. The proximity between the regulated activity and commerce in the
case at hand is similar to the proximity in Lopez, and any distinction between
the two is based on insignificant differences and on differences which are
impossible to comprehend with reasonable certainty. Even accepting the step
analysis as helpful and accepting that the case at hand involves fewer steps
than the situation in Lopez, both situations involve regulated activity
which is too remote from interstate commerce.
b. Similarities (Other Than Those in the Possible Differences Section)
Unlike the differences, the similarities between Lopez and the case at hand
are real and significant. First, of major importance is that VAWA involves
intrastate activity which is not commercial or even economic in nature.
Any interstate nature of VAWA is insignificant. VAWA regulates local criminal
activity. It does not regulate the growth of crops, the shipment of goods,
or other similar economic activities. In line with Lopez, whether a statute
regulates intrastate activity which is economic in nature is a consideration.
See Lopez, 514 U. S. at -- - --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-1631. In Jane Doe v.
John Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D.Conn.1996), the only other opinion I am aware
of that addresses this issue to date, the court upheld the constitutionality
of VAWA under the Commerce Clause. The court compared the situation in Wickard
to VAWA. As mentioned, the Wickard Court upheld the application of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act to home-consumed wheat, stating, "It can hardly be denied
that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions." Wickard,
317 U. S. at 128, 63 S. Ct. at 91. Analyzing VAWA in light of Wickard, the
Doe court concluded:
Certainly the repetitive nationwide impact of women withholding, withdrawing
or limiting their participation in the workplace or marketplace in response
to or as a result of gender-based violence or the threat thereof, is of
such a nature to be as substantial an impact on interstate commerce as the
effect of excess "home grown" wheat harvesting which was found
to have been properly regulated by Congressional enactment.
Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614 (citation omitted). This analysis is contrary to
Lopez, which, as discussed, distinguished the Wickard case, in which the
regulated activity was economic in nature, from cases such as the case at
hand and Lopez, in which the regulated activity is in no way economic in
nature. Lopez teaches that cases in which the statute at issue regulates
intrastate activity which is economic in nature are analyzed differently
from cases involving non-economic intrastate activity. After Lopez, reliance
on Wickard to analyze the commerce power in a case involving a non-economic
intrastate activity is not tenable.2 In addition to Wickard, the other cases
upon which plaintiff relies heavily are all distinguishable as cases involving
economic activity. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 (listing
the following as cases involving congressional acts regulating intrastate
economic activity: Hodel, 452 U. S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)
(involving intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146,
91 S. Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (involving intrastate extortionate
credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377,
13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964) (involving restaurants utilizing substantial interstate
supplies); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U. S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13
L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (involving inns and hotels catering to interstate guests)).
Second, similar to § 922(q), VAWA does not have a jurisdictional requirement
limiting each individual case under VAWA to situations involving interstate
commerce. Although it is unclear whether such a jurisdictional requirement
is needed, indications exist that such a requirement may be necessary. Congress
has often placed such a requirement in legislation similar to VAWA. See
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 67 S. Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12 (1946)
(discussing the Mann Act, which made an offense the transportation in interstate
commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery,
or for any other immoral purpose). In United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336,
92 S. Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), respondent had been convicted for
possession of firearms under Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, which mandated punishment for any convict "who
receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce . .
. any firearm." Id. at 337, 92 S. Ct. at 517. There was no attempt
to show that respondent had possessed the firearms "in commerce or
affecting commerce," and the prosecution had proceeded on the assumption
that such connection to commerce was necessary only for the transport element
of the statute, not for possession. Id. at 338, 92 S. Ct. at 517-518. The
Court of Appeals reversed respondent's conviction, finding that if it accepted
the prosecution's interpretation of the statute, then there would be substantial
doubt as to the statute's constitutionality. Id. (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court affirmed, but for different reasons, applying the interstate
commerce requirement to receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm.
The Court reasoned that ambiguity in criminal statutes should be resolved
in favor of lenity, Id. at 347, 92 S. Ct. at 522, and that ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of not significantly changing the federal-state balance.
Id. at 349, 92 S. Ct. at 523.
Third, similar to the situation in Lopez, permitting VAWA as a constitutional
exercise of the commerce power would have the practical result of excessively
extending Congress's power and of inappropriately tipping the balance away
from the states. The Lopez Court placed much importance on the practical
implications of permitting § 922(q) under the Commerce Clause. The
practical implications in the case at hand are very similar.
A reasonable inference from the congressional findings is that violence
against women has its major effect on the national economy. Congress focused
on the effect on the national economy, and a reasonable inference, based
both on Congress's focus and common sense, is that the effects on interstate
travel are incidental. Showing that something affects the national economy
does not suffice to show that it has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Plaintiff uses "effects on the national economy" interchangeably
with "effects on interstate commerce." This is wrong. Undoubtedly
effects on the national economy in turn affect interstate commerce. Such
a chain of causation alone, however, is insufficient to bring an act within
the purview of the commerce power. If such a chain of causation sufficed,
Congress's power would extend to an unbounded extreme. Defendants point
out that facts show that insomnia costs the United States $15 billion a
year (citing 2 Nat'l Comm'n On Sleep Disorders Research, Wake Up America:
A National Sleep Alert (submitted to the U. S. Congress and the Secretary
of Health and Human Services), 125-133 (1994)). This is as much as the yearly
cost of domestic abuse. Other sources indicate that the cost of insomnia
is much higher. See 140 Cong. Rec. S. 14211-01, The Economics of Insomnia
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (stating that a source
indicates that the estimated annual economic cost of insomnia due to reduced
productivity, accidents, and medical problems is between $92.5 and $107.5
billion). Insomnia undoubtedly also has some effect on interstate travel
as insomniacs travel across state lines for treatment (e.g., to the nationally-renowned
Johns Hopkins Sleep Disorder Center in Maryland). Insomniacs buy medicine
which has traveled across state lines. Family law issues and most criminal
issues affect the national economy substantially and in turn have some effect
on interstate commerce. These too have interstate travel implications. However,
to extend Congress's power to these issues would unreasonably tip the balance
away from the states.
The fact that Congress limited VAWA, in stating that VAWA does not "confer
on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim
seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution
of marital property, or child custody decree," 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4),
is utterly insignificant to the practical implications of accepting the
regulated activity as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
It is the logic on which Congress based its commerce power that is important.
If the justification for VAWA under the Commerce Clause is constitutionally
acceptable, then certainly Congress would have power to regulate much activity
which should be left to state control. Similar to the situation in Lopez,
if I accepted plaintiff's argument, I would be "hard-pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."
Lopez, -- U. S. at --, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. In essence, if VAWA is a permissible
use of the commerce power because of the regulated activity's effect on
the national economy, which in turn affects interstate commerce, then it
would be inconsistent to deny the commerce power's extension into family
law, most criminal laws, and even insomnia.
The combination of the insignificance of the differences between the case
at hand and Lopez and the significance of the similarities leads to the
conclusion that Congress acted beyond its commerce power in enacting VAWA.
Any other conclusion would strain reason. As Justice Scalia recently stated
regarding the Supreme Court, "[W]e expect both ourselves and lower
courts to adhere to the 'rationale upon which the Court based the results
of its earlier decisions.'" United States v. Virginia, -- U. S. --,
--, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2305, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, -- U. S. --, -- - --, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1128-1129, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)). A reasonable adherence to Lopez reveals
that VAWA is not a proper use of the commerce power.
B. The Enforcement Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment states in part, "No state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U. S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. It also states, "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U. S. Const., amend. XIV, § 5.
1. Some Public Involvement Needed
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment regulates
only state action and that some state involvement is necessary. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11, 3 S. Ct. 18, 21, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883)
(stating that an "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject matter of the [Fourteenth A]mendment"); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U. S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.
S. 745, 755, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1176, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (opinion of Stevens,
J.) ("It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection Clause
itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one
acting under the color of its authority"); Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 352-355, 113 S. Ct. 753, 802-804, 122 L.Ed.2d
34 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves
an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal
judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials,
responsibility for conduct which they cannot fairly be blamed.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 936, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753, 73
L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Fourteenth Amendment states, "No state . .
. shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U. S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The legislative history behind the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that the
congressional framers were concerned with private encroachment on civil
rights. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 Mich. L. Rev. 1323, 1329-1330 (1952). However, by holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to private conduct with a certain connection to state
action, the Fourteenth Amendment can still reach some private conduct. But
Supreme Court precedent and, moreover, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
require that some state involvement is necessary, even though it may be
tangential.
Some authority indicates that Congress may address purely private conduct
via § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in spite of the fact that §
1 actions require state action. In Guest, while Justice Stevens' opinion
of the Court mandated some public involvement for Congress's use of the
power granted by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, six justices agreed
that no state action was necessary for Congress's use of § 5. 383 U.
S. at 762, 774-786, 86 S. Ct. at 1180, 1186-1193; see also, District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973)
(opinion of Brennan, J.) (stating first, "The Fourteenth Amendment
itself 'erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful,'" id. at 423-424, 93 S. Ct. at 606 (quoting Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. at 13, 68 S. Ct. at 842), then stating in a footnote,
"This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely
private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
424 n. 8, 93 S. Ct. at 606 n. 8 (emphasis added)). Although Congress has
certain discretion under § 5, the idea that Congress can address purely
private conduct under § 5 is contrary to both the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11, 3 S. Ct. 18, 21,
27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) (stating that § 5 permits Congress only to "adopt
appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State
laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectively null, void, and
innocuous"). The Court has stressed that, even in the face of conflicting
Supreme Court decisions, lower courts are not to assume that Supreme Court
precedent has been implicitly overruled, see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921-1922, 104 L.Ed.2d
526 (1989), and the Court has cited the Civil Rights Cases approvingly as
recently as 1982. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936, 102 S. Ct. at 2753.
2. Morgan
Even though state action was not at issue in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.
S. 641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the plaintiff relies primarily
on the sweeping language of Morgan in support of her position that the Fourteenth
Amendment reaches private conduct. In Morgan, the Court considered whether
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was constitutional under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 4(e) provided in relevant part that
no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in public or private
school in Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than
English shall be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read
or write English. Id. at 643, 86 S. Ct. at 1719. Appellees in the case challenged
§ 4(e) in that it prohibited the enforcement of the election laws of
New York, which required an ability to read and write English as a condition
of voting. Id. at 643-644, 86 S. Ct. at 1719-1720. Appellees attacked §
4(e) because it enabled many New York residents to vote who could not previously
vote under the New York law. Id. at 644-645, 86 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court
held that § 4(e) was a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress
by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, by force of the Supremacy
Clause, the New York English literacy requirement could not be enforced
to the extent that it was inconsistent with § 4(e). Id. at 646-647,
86 S. Ct. at 1721. The Court stated, "A construction of § 5 that
would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state
law precluded by Congress violated the [Fourteenth] Amendment, as a condition
of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional
resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment."
Id. at 648, 86 S. Ct. at 1722. The Court's task was not to determine "whether
the New York English literacy requirement as applied to deny the right to
vote to a person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a Puerto
Rico school violate[d] the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 649, 86
S. Ct. at 1722-1723. Instead, the Court's task was to determine whether
§ 4(e) was "as required by § 5, appropriate legislation to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 649-650, 86 S. Ct. at
1723.
The Court noted that § 5 has a broad scope. Id. at 650, 86 S. Ct. at
1723. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. (quoting M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). Therefore,
the test is (1) whether a statute "may be regarded as an enactment
to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, [(2)] whether it is 'plainly adapted
to that end' and [(3)] whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent
with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution.'" Id. at 651, 86 S.
Ct. at 1724 (quoting M'Culloch, 17 U. S., (4 Wheat.) at 421).
Regarding the first requirement, the Court stated, "There can be no
doubt that § 4(e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 652, 86 S. Ct. at 1724. Congress "explicitly
declared" that it enacted § 4(e) to secure rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and "§ 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for
the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment
by government." Id. Regarding the second requirement, the Court indicated
that § 4(e) "may be readily seen as 'plainly adapted'" to
furthering aims of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Section 4(e) in effect
"prohibit[s] New York from denying the right to vote to large segments
of its Puerto Rican community" and thus enhances the Puerto Rican community's
political power, which in turn "will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory
treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community."
Id. at 652, 86 S. Ct. at 1724. "Section 4(e) thereby enables the Puerto
Rican minority better to obtain 'perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws.'" Id. at 652-653, 86 S. Ct. at 1724-1725.
Therefore, Morgan involved state action (New York's statute) which caused
an infringement on Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The extent of Morgan's applicability to the case at hand is limited. In
Morgan, Congress's statute invalidated a state statute and thereby remedied
equal protection violations. 384 U. S. at 652-653, 86 S. Ct. at 1724-1725.
Reasonably Morgan is limited to situations where Congress acted against
state action which caused a denial of equal protection, and Morgan does
not permit Congress to act against purely private action incidentally giving
rise to state action which causes a denial of equal protection. However,
Morgan is distinguishable on other grounds as well, as will be discussed.
3. VAWA
VAWA has two general purposes. It was enacted to attack gender-motivated
crime against women and to supplement deficiencies in the state criminal
justice system. First, VAWA adds to state systems a remedy for the bias
element of gender-motivated violent crimes against women. VAWA "attacks
gender-motivated crimes that threaten women's equal rights," taking
"aim at gender discrimination prohibited under the [Thirteenth] Amendment."
S. Rep. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1991).3 "State and Federal
criminal laws do not adequately protect against the bias element of crimes
of violence motivated by gender." H.R. Rep. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 385 (1994), U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1801, 1853. The Senate
found,
[w]here a crime is shown to be motivated by gender bias, a different interest
is implicated; one not adequately addressed by State tort law alone. The
civil rights action provided by [T]itle III has the entirely different function
of providing a special societal judgment that crimes motivated by gender
bias are unacceptable because they violate the victims' civil rights. Title
III singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because of the unique
individual and societal harm it causes. For example, the supreme [sic] Court
has recognized that bias crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes,
inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community
unrest. Quoting Blackstone, "'it is but reasonable that among crimes
of different natures those should be most severely punished which are the
most destructive of the public safety and happiness.'"
S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
Second, purportedly VAWA "provides a 'necessary' remedy to fill the
gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws." S. Rep. No. 197
at 53. "In many States, rape survivors must overcome barriers of proof
and local prejudice that other crime victims need not hurdle; they bear
the burden of painful and prejudicial attacks on their credibility that
other crime victims do not shoulder; they may be forced to expose their
private life and intimate conduct to win a damage award unlike any other
civil litigant; and, finally, in some cases, they are barred from suit altogether
by tort immunity doctrines and marital exclusions." Id. at 53-54. State
and federal criminal laws do not "adequately provide victims of gender-motivated
crimes the opportunity to vindicate their interests; existing bias and discrimination
in the criminal justice system often deprives victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws and the redress to which
they are entitled." H.R. Rep. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1994),
U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1801, 1853. "Study after study has
concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated
less seriously than comparable crimes affecting men." Id. (footnote
omitted). The state criminal systems are inadequate at the police, the prosecution,
and the judicial levels. See Violence Against Women, Hearing Before the
House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 70-82
(1992) (statement and prepared statement of Margaret Rosenbaum, Assistant
State Attorney, Miami, Fla.); H.R. Rep. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28
(1993).
Congress has wide latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment. "Correctly
viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Morgan,
384 U.S. at 651, 86 S. Ct. at 1723-1724. Despite this broad power, Congress's
acts must have some reasonable possibility of addressing a legitimate equal
protection concern. Otherwise, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment
would be absolute. In Morgan, the Court found that Congress's statute "enable[d]
the Puerto Rican minority better to obtain 'perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws.'" 384 U. S. at 653, 86 S. Ct.
at 1724. Implicit in this finding is that, at the least, in order for Congress
to act under § 5, there must be some reasonable possibility that Congress's
act is a legitimate means for remedying a legitimate end (i.e., a legitimate
remedy for a legitimate equal protection concern). With respect to VAWA,
I will discuss (1) whether Congress's ends are legitimate and, if so, (2)
whether Congress's means are legitimate.
a. Whether Congress's Ends Are Legitimate
As stated, Congress had two ends in mind in drafting VAWA: (1) to remedy
private individuals' gender-based violence and (2) to remedy gender-based
deficiencies in the states' criminal justice systems.
i. To Remedy Private Individuals' Violence
First, regarding the purpose to create a cause of action against the criminal
discriminator, sufficient contacts to state action do not exist to give
rise to a legitimate equal protection concern. If state action were sufficiently
connected to a criminal's discriminating acts, a legitimate equal protection
concern would exist. However, no such sufficient connection exists.
"[T]he involvement of the State need [not] be either exclusive or direct.
In a variety of situations the Court has found state action of a nature
sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though
the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one
of several co-operative forces leading to the constitutional violation."
Guest, 383 U. S. at 755-756, 86 S. Ct. at 1177 (citations omitted). Conduct
allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right must be fairly attributable
to the state. Lugar, 457 U. S. at 937, 102 S. Ct. at 2753. Conduct causing
the deprivation of a federal right may be fairly attributable if (1) "the
deprivation [is] caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person
for whom the state is responsible" or if (2) "the party charged
with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor" (because, for example, "he is a state official, because
he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State"). Id.
(citations omitted).
A private individual's gender-based violent crime against a woman does not
qualify for either category. The deprivation caused by private individuals
who commit crimes against women due to gender is not caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible. Certainly
the state is not responsible in any relevant sense for individuals who commit
violent crimes against women. Even with the inadequate criminal remedy for
gender-motivated crimes against women, the states do not permit individuals
to commit violent gender-motivated acts against women. The state action
at issue (the inadequacies in the state criminal systems) does not cause,
or, in any significant manner, even contribute to, the deprivation caused
by the individual criminal. The private individual's decision to discriminate
by committing a gender-based violent act against a woman cannot be ascribed
to any governmental decision. Cf. id. at 938, 102 S. Ct. at 2754 (citing
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d
627 (1972)). Such acts are unlawful both under state criminal and state
tort laws, and, even if the states pursue their criminal laws against rape
and domestic abuse less vigorously than other laws, the Court has held that
if an act is unlawful, then it cannot be ascribed to any governmental decision.
See id. at 940, 102 S. Ct. at 2755 (to say that conduct is unlawful under
state law "is to say that the conduct of which petitioner complained
could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; rather, respondents
were acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State").
The private individual criminal is also not a person who may fairly be said
to be a state actor. The targets of VAWA are not state officials, but instead
are the individual criminals; these targets have not acted together with
or obtained significant aid from state officials; and the criminal conduct
is not otherwise chargeable to the state. No possibility exists that VAWA
defendants obtained significant aid from the state criminal justice systems'
deficiencies in the commission of the discriminatory violent crimes. A rapist
who rapes in part due to a woman's gender commits one act of discrimination,
and deficiencies in the state criminal system effect a separate act of discrimination.
Two separate acts of discrimination occur. The rapist does not rely on the
state in any real sense as an accomplice to his act of discrimination. The
state action related to VAWA is distinct from the discriminatory act of
the private individual.
In Guest, the prosecutor had alleged in part in an indictment that six private
individual defendants had conspired to
injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate Negro citizens of the United States
in the free exercise and enjoyment of: "The right to the equal utilization,
without discrimination upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the
vicinity of Athens, Georgia, owned, operated or managed by or on behalf
of the State of Georgia or any subdivision thereof."
383 U. S. at 753, 86 S. Ct. at 1175. The Court considered whether the cause
of action, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, had to be dismissed because
the indictment named no one alleged to have acted under the color of state
law, and because "[t]he Equal Protection Clause speaks to the State
or to those acting under the color of its authority." Id. at 754, 86
S. Ct. at 1176.
[T]he indictment in fact contain[ed] an express allegation of state involvement
sufficient at least to require the denial of a motion to dismiss. One of
the means of accomplishing the object of the conspiracy, according to the
indictment, was "By causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false
reports that such Negroes had committed criminal acts."
Id. at 756, 86 S. Ct. at 1177 (footnote omitted). Three members of an earlier
Court had expressed the view that a private businessman's invocation of
state police and judicial action to carry out his own policy of racial discrimination
was sufficient to create equal protection rights in those against whom the
racial discrimination was directed. Id. (citing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.
S. 226, 242-286, 84 S. Ct. 1814, 1823-1847, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964) (in Bell,
Maryland police had arrested black students, and a Maryland court had convicted
the students for participating in a sit-in. The students had appealed their
conviction to the Supreme Court)). From the facts alleged in the indictment
in Guest, it was possible that state officials engaged in no more than co-operative
private and state action similar to that in Bell, but it was also possible
that agents of the state actively participated in discrimination. Id. at
756-757, 86 S. Ct. at 1176-1177.
Unlike the statute involved in Guest, as exemplified by the possible extent
of complicity between the state and private actors in the facts of Guest,
there is no real possible complicity between the state criminal justice
system and private actors in VAWA actions. In fact, the congressional findings
do not mention such complicity. Theoretically there could be some complicity
in that both the state and the criminal may discriminate against the female
victim. The two acts of discrimination, however, are separate, and no indication
exists that the state inaction or inadequate action against the criminal
helps or encourages the criminal to commit his gender-based act of violence.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1947),
the Court considered the validity of state courts' enforcement of private
restrictive covenants having as their purpose the exclusion of blacks from
the ownership or occupancy of real property. Id. at 4, 68 S. Ct. at 838.
Blacks had occupied property subject to the restrictive covenants, and the
state courts enforced the restrictive covenants, requiring the blacks to
leave the property. Id. at 5-6, 68 S. Ct. at 838-839. The Supreme Court
held that the state courts' enforcement of the restrictive covenants was
sufficient state action.
It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported
by the full
panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties
in question without restraint. These are not cases, as has been suggested,
in which the States have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals
free to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases
in which the States have made available to such individuals the full coercive
power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color,
the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing
and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.
Id. at 19, 68 S. Ct. at 845.
The situation at hand differs from Shelley in two respects. First, the state
criminal systems' insufficient treatment of perpetrators of violence against
women is "merely abstaining from action" and lacks the active
intervention attributed to the state courts' actions in Shelley. It is the
state systems' inaction or inadequate action towards the violent criminals
which concerned Congress. Second, unlike in Shelley, with VAWA no possibility
exists that but for the state's inadequate action, the criminals would not
commit the discriminatory crimes.
In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d
185 (1978), the plaintiff had been evicted from her apartment, and the city
marshal had arranged for the plaintiff's possessions to be stored by Flagg
Brothers in its warehouse. Id. at 153, 98 S. Ct. at 1732. Plaintiff disputed
her moving and storage costs, and Flagg Brothers undertook to enforce its
warehousemen's lien which was created by New York Uniform Commercial Code
§ 7-210. Id. at 151 n. 1, 153, 98 S. Ct. at 1731 n. 1, 1732. The Second
Circuit found that because the state statute had created the lien which
permitted a private individual to, in effect, violate the due process clause,
there was sufficient state involvement to satisfy the state action requirement.
Id. at 154-155, 98 S. Ct. at 1732-1733. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating,
While as a factual matter any person with sufficient physical power may
deprive a person of his property, only a state or private person whose actions
"may be fairly treated as that of the state itself" . . . may
deprive him of "an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection."
Id. at 157, 98 S. Ct. at 1734 (citations omitted).
This Court . . . has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private
action converts that action into that of the State. . . . [Certain] cases
clearly rejected the notion that our prior cases permitted the imposition
of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private action by the simple device
of characterizing the State's inaction as "authorization" or "encouragement."
Id. at 164-165, 98 S. Ct. at 1737-1738 (citations omitted). The Court found
that there was a "total absence of overt official involvement,"
id. at 157, 98 S. Ct. at 1734 (citations omitted), in spite of the fact
that state officials had passed § 7-210. "It would intolerably
broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous cases, the notion of state
action under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of
a body of property law in a State, whether decisional or statutory, itself
amounted to 'state action' even though no state process or state officials
were ever involved in enforcing that body of law." Id. at 160 n. 10,
98 S. Ct. at 1735 n. 10.
VAWA is unlike Flagg Brothers in that VAWA involves active current decisions
by state actors and in that VAWA involves the method of enforcement of laws
as well as the bodies of laws themselves. However, more relevantly, similar
to Flagg Brothers, VAWA involves state inaction or inadequate action towards
the individual causing the deprivation, and VAWA involves no overt official
involvement. Following the logic of Flagg Brothers, this is not authorization
or encouragement of the deprivation.
In Lugar, the Court considered in part whether private individuals' use
of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures
constituted sufficient state action. Lugar, 457 U. S. at 942, 102 S. Ct.
at 2756. The Court held that such joint participation between private individuals
and the state sufficed to make the conduct fairly attributable to the state.
Id. Due to the private party's joint participation with the state officials,
the private party was a "state actor." Id. at 941-942, 102 S.
Ct. at 2756. This is different from VAWA which involves situations where
private individuals do not act together with or receive any significant
aid from the state in the commission of the violent act.
Therefore, remedying private individuals' gender-based crimes is not a legitimate
equal protection goal due to the fact that no sufficient state contacts
exist.
ii. To Remedy Deficiencies in State System
Some possibility exists that at least part of the states' differential treatment
of gender-based violent crimes against women is due to gender discrimination,
and so correcting the differential treatment arising out of gender discrimination
is a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern. Considering Congress's broad
discretion, a legitimate equal protection concern exists within state criminal
justice systems.
b. Whether Congress's Means Are Legitimate
As stated, Congress's purpose to remedy discrimination by private individuals
who commit gender-based violent crime against a woman is an illegitimate
Fourteenth Amendment end, and so addressing whether the means sufficiently
address this end is unnecessary. In contrast, the purpose to remedy deficiencies
in the state system is a legitimate end, but no reasonable possibility exists
that VAWA will help remedy this legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern.
The § 5 analysis scheme presented in Morgan focused on whether an act
of Congress remedies a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern. In Morgan
the Court found that Congress's act would remedy a legitimate equal protection
concern. Morgan, 384 U. S. at 652-653, 86 S. Ct. at 1724-25. At least a
reasonable possibility must exist that Congress's act remedies a legitimate
Fourteenth Amendment concern. While remedying the state criminal system's
deficiencies is a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern, VAWA does not
address this concern, because VAWA provides no remedy for the deficiencies.
It does not provide a remedy to the victim for the denial of the victim's
equal protection rights by either undoing or stopping the specific equal
protection violation or by compensating the victim for the violation, nor
does it provide a remedy against the Fourteenth Amendment violator.
Clearly VAWA does not undo or stop the violations in the states' criminal
justice systems. Also, it does not adequately compensate victims for the
denial of their equal protection rights. VAWA is tailored to remedy conduct
other than the conduct giving rise to the equal protection concern. VAWA
compensates victims for the violence directed against them because of their
gender, not for the states' denial of equal protection. If in a certain
case VAWA comes close to accurately remedying deficiencies in the states'
systems, it is purely by chance. To illustrate the problem, clear examples
exist whereby VAWA will not compensate victims for the states' denial of
women's equal protection rights. The statute is overbroad: many women who
do not suffer Fourteenth Amendment violations at the hands of the state
system would still have a VAWA claim. A woman in a state with fair rape
laws who is raped and whose rapist receives the maximum sentence may still
have a VAWA claim. That woman may receive compensation via VAWA despite
having suffered no denial of her equal protection rights. VAWA is also too
narrow: many women who suffer clear violations of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights would not have a VAWA remedy, because the crime was not based on
the woman's gender. These women would not receive any compensation despite
the fact that the states clearly denied them equal protection of the laws.
The aim of legislation to cure Fourteenth Amendment violations should be
at the entity which causes the violation. In this case that entity is the
states. VAWA does not address the states, which are the perpetrators of
the Fourteenth Amendment violation; it is wholly silent about the conduct
of the various states in their handling of rape and other violent crimes
against women. Consequently, VAWA does nothing to discourage the Fourteenth
Amendment violations which occur in the state criminal systems. Instead
of addressing the Fourteenth Amendment violation by the states' criminal
justice system, VAWA authorizes a cause of action against an individual
who did not contribute in any real sense to the unequal treatment in the
states' criminal justice systems. In Guest, the individuals subject to the
cause of action had allegedly involved the state to deprive blacks of equal
protection rights. The individuals and the state were possibly conspirators
to deprive equal protection. The cause of action at issue in Guest was a
remedy against possible Fourteenth Amendment violation perpetrators. Unlike
Guest, the private acts which VAWA targets are incidental to the Fourteenth
Amendment violation. Therefore, VAWA provides no remedy against the Fourteenth
Amendment violation perpetrator.
No reasonable possibility exists that, in enacting VAWA, Congress has enforced
the Fourteenth Amendment mandate that "[n]o state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U. S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. No reasonable possibility exists that
VAWA will remedy any legitimate Fourteenth Amendment concern.
VI. Conclusion
Without a doubt violence against women is a pervasive and troublesome aspect
of American life which needs thoughtful attention. But Congress is not invested
with the authority to cure all of the ills of mankind. Its authority to
act is limited by the Constitution, and the constitutional limits must be
respected if our federal system is to survive. Congress's reliance on the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to support its authority to
enact VAWA is misplaced. This is not to say that Congress is powerless to
address the problem of violence against women. A properly drafted statute
within the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court could certainly be crafted.
Although plaintiff states a claim under VAWA for purpose of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), VAWA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power, unjustified
under either the Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Consequently, defendants' motion to dismiss the VAWA claims with
prejudice is granted. I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state claims and dismiss these without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3).
The clerk will enter an appropriate order.
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion, the Violence
Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, claims against Antonio Morrison
and James Crawford are dismissed with prejudice. The state claims are dismissed
without prejudice. The case is dismissed. The Clerk is directed to remove
the case from the docket and to certify copies of this order and the accompanying
memorandum opinion to all counsel of record.
1 From this point on, "plaintiff"
may refer to Brzonkala's initial counsel, the Government, which intervened
on Brzonkala's behalf, amici, or some or all of the above.
2 The Doe court also based its holding partly on the conclusion that Lopez's
practical implications analysis was dicta. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613.
Counsel for defendants disagree, as do I. However, if this analysis was
in fact dicta, this would not help the position of the Doe court. If the
practical implications analysis was unimportant, this would only bolster
the importance of the nature of the regulated activity analysis and of the
individual case jurisdictional requirement analysis and would increase the
likelihood that, if intrastate activity is non-economic in nature and if
no requirement exists mandating a connection to commerce in each case, then
Congress cannot regulate the activity under the commerce power.
3 The fact that Congress based this in part on gender discrimination "prohibited
under the [Thirteenth] Amendment" illustrates the straw grasping in
which Congress engaged. The Thirteenth Amendment applies to racial, not
gender, discrimination.
APPENDIX D
Statutory provisions
42 U.S.C. 13981 provides:
Civil rights
(a) Purpose
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section
8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect
the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote
public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing
a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender.
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence
All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of
this section).
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection
(b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-4
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due,
at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come
within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16
of title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal
charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed
in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United
States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described
in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection
(c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for
acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
be motivated by gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
(2) No prior criminal action
Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution,
or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection
(c) of this section.
(3) Concurrent jurisdiction
The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions
brought pursuant to this part.
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of Title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall
be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer
on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim
seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution
of marital property, or child custody decree.
1 So in original. The word "means" probably should appear after
"(A)" below.