I am pleased to appear
before this distinguished Committee to
testify on the re-authorization of the
Export Administration Act.
I'm sure that no one
is more aware than the members of this
Committee that we now face a new situation
in the world after September 11.
We have learned, in the most
painful way, that our oceans and borders
no longer protect us from violent attack,
and that we must do more to protect
ourselves.
It is with this new
situation in mind that I urge the
Committee to examine the bill now pending
before the House, HR 2581.
The most important thing about the
bill is that it was conceived, drafted,
debated and reported in a bygone period of
history - the days before September 11.
In light of the new threats before
us, the assumptions behind the bill have
become outdated.
What were those assumptions?
They were that the world was such a
peaceful place that the United States
could safely let its companies make a
little more money on exports even if it
meant lowering the barriers to the spread
of weapons of mass destruction.
We should now be able to see that
this assumption was wrong.
Our priorities should be exactly
the opposite of those reflected by this
bill.
Unlike our present law,
this bill does not try to strike a balance
between national security and freedom of
trade.
Instead, it is a one-sided list of
provisions advocated by commercial
interests that have long opposed any form
of export control.
If the bill passes, it would
essentially dismantle the system of export
control that the United States has built
up over the past half-century.
Whatever one may have thought of
this bill before September 11, it is now
clear that we cannot afford to take such a
dangerous step.
Instead of weakening export
controls, we should be strengthening them.
Combating
terrorism and arms proliferation
To show how outdated
this bill has become, I would like to draw
the Committee's attention to what the
U.S. Customs Service is doing.
Customs has set up a new program
called "Shield America," specifically
to respond to the attacks of September 11.
Customs has drawn up a list of
approximately one hundred dangerous items,
and is now sending its agents out to visit
American exporters to warn them about
selling them.
The items are the ones that would
make it easier for terrorists and
terrorist-supporting nations to build
weapons of mass destruction.
The Washington Post ran a
news story about this important effort on
December 11, 2001.
I would like to submit the article
for the record.
Why should the Committee
take note of this effort?
Because the bill now before the
House would decontrol the very items that
Customs is warning our exporters to keep
away from terrorists and
terrorist-supporting states.
These
items include:
-
high-precision
electronic triggers, used to detonate
nuclear weapons,
-
specialized
steel alloys, used to make nuclear
weapon fuel and missile components,
-
glass
and carbon fibers, used to make parts
for long-range missiles,
-
corrosion-resistant
valves, used to make nuclear weapon
material,
-
specialized
reactor vessels, used to make chemical
weapon agents.
All of these
technologies have been identified by
experts in our government as essential to
control in order to combat terrorism and
the spread of mass destruction weapons.
I have attached to my
testimony an appendix that describes a
number of the items on the Customs list
and the reasons why each of them would be
decontrolled under the pending bill. The items all fit the bill's definition of "mass market
status."
The bill says essentially that if
an item is available in quantity in the
United States, it should be free for
export.
The bill gives the
Secretary of Commerce the power to
decontrol such items acting on his own.
The bill says that the Secretary of
Commerce shall determine that an
item has mass market status if it meets
the criteria in Section 211, which these
items do.
The items would then be
decontrolled automatically.
The only way to retain
control is for the President himself to
make a special finding within 30 days, in
which he would set aside the Commerce
Department's decision.
This is an authority that he is not
allowed to delegate.
In effect, the bill sets up a
powerful new machine at the Commerce
Department for decontrolling exports.
Once that machine gets moving, it
is going to chop big holes in the existing
control list unless the President can find
some hours in his schedule in which to
undo the Commerce Department's work.
Do we really want the President of
the United States to put aside his concern
about Osama bin Laden, or about the
economy, and spend his time thinking about
triggered spark gaps and corrosion
resistant valves?
There is obviously
something wrong with this picture.
What is wrong is that the world has
changed, and this bill does not reflect
that fact.
It is manifestly absurd to
decontrol the same technologies that our
Customs Service is now warning our
exporters not to sell to terrorists.
Many of the items on the
Customs list are controlled to combat
terrorism.
In light of the attacks on
September 11, Congress should not
authorize the Commerce Department to
decontrol any item that could help
terrorists or terrorist-supporting
nations.
It would be best simply
to delete the mass market provision
because it is outdated.
If it remains in the bill, however,
it should be amended so as not to apply to
any item now on the control list where a
reason for control is anti-terrorism.
The mass market
provision should also be amended to
require the concurrence of the CIA and the
Secretaries of Defense and State before
any item could be deleted from the control
list.
The Secretary of Commerce should
not be allowed to delete items
unilaterally.
The House Committee on
International Relations, in its report,
found that "State and Defense must have
equal status with the Secretary of
Commerce in determining which items are to
be controlled on the National Security
Control List."
Under the bill's present
language, these departments do not have
that status. An amendment is needed to give it to them.
The "foreign
availability" language in Section 211
suffers from the same problems as the mass
market language.
Many of the sensitive items on the
Customs Service list would also have
"foreign availability status" because
they are manufactured and sold by foreign
companies.
In fact, the definition of foreign
availability in the bill is so sweeping
that it covers virtually anything that a
controlled country can manage to buy from
any supplier in the world.
If Iran or Pakistan or Syria can
buy a nuclear weapon component or a
missile component or a piece of sensitive
equipment from China, Russia or North
Korea, then this bill says that our
industry must be free to sell the same
thing.
When
one reads Section 211 carefully, it would
seem that even guidance sets or rocket
engines would have "foreign availability
status" because they are available from
North Korea.
Under the bill's criteria, North
Korean rocket components:
-
Are
"available to controlled countries
from sources outside the United
States;"
-
"Can
be acquired at a price that is not
excessive;"
-
Are
"available in sufficient quantity so
that the requirement of a license or
other authorization with respect to
the export of such item is or would be
ineffective."
Today, Egypt, Iran,
Syria and Pakistan are importing North
Korean rocket components in "sufficient
quantities" without any trouble.
Requiring a U.S. license for their
sale would obviously be "ineffective."
Under the literal terms of the
bill, they appear to have "foreign
availability status."
Any bill that decontrols rocket
components is obviously flawed.
This foreign
availability language too should be
deleted.
However, if it is left in the bill,
it should be amended to forbid the
decontrol of any item now controlled for
anti-terrorism purposes.
This language should also be
amended to require the concurrence of the
CIA and the Secretaries of Defense and
State before any item is deleted.
As stated above, the national
security agencies deserve equal status in
determining what is controlled or
decontrolled because of foreign
availability.
There is also the fact
that the great majority of the items now
on the control list are controlled by our
allies under multilateral regimes.
If the Secretary of Commerce begins
to decontrol these items unilaterally, it
will destroy U.S. credibility on export
controls.
It may destroy the regimes as well,
given the fact that the United States has
always been the leader in setting up the
regimes and preserving them.
Thus, the mass market
and foreign availability language, if left
in the bill, should also be amended to
forbid the decontrol of any item that is
now controlled by a multilateral regime,
unless the regime members first agree that
the item should be dropped.
The
role of the intelligence agencies
One of the lessons of
September 11 is that we need to make
better use of intelligence information.
A good place to start is with
export controls. Not only is our intelligence community the first line of
defense against terrorists, it is also the
place to look for evidence showing that a
particular end-user or a particular
country is linked to weapons of mass
destruction, or that a particular export
presents a high risk of diversion.
For these reasons, it is time for
Congress to make the Central Intelligence
Agency a full participant in the export
control process.
Instead of simply
providing information to other agencies,
which those agencies may or may not take
into account, the CIA should take an
official position - meaning that it
should cast a vote - on each export
license application that is reviewed.
If the CIA believes that an export
should not occur, the dispute resolution
procedures should take the CIA's
position into account. The quality of
export control could only be improved by
having the views of our intelligence
community incorporated formally into the
decision-making process.
To increase the CIA's
participation, Sections 401 and 402 of the
bill should be amended to require
explicitly that all license applications
be referred to the CIA, that CIA
participate on the same basis as the
Departments of Defense and State in
classification decisions, and that the CIA
have a vote in the dispute resolution
process. In like fashion, Section 211 should be amended to require the
concurrence of the CIA before any item is
decontrolled under the mass market or
foreign availability provisions.
The
role of the national security agencies
This bill essentially
turns the Secretary of Commerce into the
czar of export controls.
In addition to deciding what will
be controlled, the Commerce Department
will chair the most important export
control committee and will use its
administrative preeminence to determine
the outcome of licensing decisions.
This is exactly the
opposite of the way things should be.
The national security agencies
house the experts who understand how
dual-use equipment operates and what the
risks are if such equipment is diverted
for military purposes.
They also know which countries and
companies in the world are most likely to
divert it.
In order to bring the maximum
amount of government expertise to bear
upon export control decisions, the
qualified personnel at the national
security agencies must be able to decide
what is controlled and who is allowed to
buy it.
Let us not forget that
the Commerce Department is burdened by a
conflict of interests - it must promote
exports as well as regulate them.
The promotion function has always
dominated, and has always caused the
Commerce Department to champion the
exporters' point of view.
It is vitally important to insure
that the national security agencies
continue to have a strong voice in export
control decisions, and that national
security will not take a back seat to
trade interests.
Under Section 202 of
this bill, the Secretary of Defense would
lose his existing power to put an item on
the National Security Control List.
Only the Secretary of Commerce
would have that power.
The Secretary of Defense has the
right to concur with the Secretary of
Commerce's action, but that could only
allow the Pentagon to keep an item off
the list that the Commerce Department
wants to put on it.
Since Commerce has always wanted to
control as few items as possible, this is
a meaningless concession.
This section should be amended to
give the Secretary of Defense the same
authority to designate items for inclusion
on the National Security Control List that
exists under present law.
The amendment should
also preserve the authority of the
Secretary of Defense, which exists under
present law, to develop and maintain a
list of militarily critical technologies.
HR 2581 does not provide for such a
list. It would be a great mistake to get rid of this list, which is
one of main foundations upon which our
export controls now rest.
It is hard to see why the Secretary
of Defense should not have the power to
decide which exports should be controlled
to protect our national security.
Congress should also
ensure that no license application is
approved unless all the national security
agencies concur.
It makes no sense to allow cases to
be escalated to the political level where
the judgments of national security experts
can be reversed by political
considerations. If a national security agency takes a stand in opposition to
an export application at the expert level,
the case should end there.
Under Section 402 of the
bill, the Commerce Department is set up as
the final arbiter of interagency disputes. If a national security agency objects to an export license
application, the case is referred to an
interagency committee set up by the
Commerce Department.
The chair of the committee, which
the Commerce Department appoints, can then
simply decide to grant the license,
regardless of what any national security
agencies thinks.
Even if a majority, or indeed
all of the national security
agencies object to the export, the chair
of the committee can still approve it
under the language of this bill.
The Commerce Department can simply
override objections by any other agency
and approve the export on its own.
Unless Congress is
willing to see the national security
agencies excluded from export control,
this section must be amended.
First, a national security agency,
such as the Department of Defense, should
be put in charge of setting up and
chairing the committee.
There is no reason to give this
function to the Commerce Department, which
has the least expertise in the subject
matter.
Second, the section should
specifically say that each reviewing
agency shall have a seat on the committee
and a vote on license applications.
Third, no export should be approved
except by unanimous vote of the reviewing
departments and agencies.
If a national security agency
cannot be persuaded to change its mind
during the process of committee debate,
and remains convinced that the export is
too dangerous to be approved, the export
should be denied.
In addition to amending
Section 402, Congress should amend Section
401, which gives the Secretary of Commerce
sole authority to set up the procedures
for interagency review of license
applications.
Because these procedures affect all
the participating agencies equally, all
the agencies should have a voice in
setting them up.
The CIA and the Secretaries of
Defense and State should all be given the
explicit right to concur in the
procedures.
There are also two other
provisions that need to be amended in
order to give the national security
agencies a proper role in export control.
The first is Section 201(c).
It authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce to establish a database to help
exporters identify end-users of concern.
The Commerce Department, however,
has been notoriously reluctant to identify
end-users in the past.
The State Department, by contrast,
did an admirable job of identifying Indian
and Pakistani end-users of concern after
the nuclear weapon tests in 1998.
In doing so, State had to overcome
fierce opposition from Commerce, which
opposed the whole idea.
This section should therefore be
amended to put the creation of the
database in hands of the State Department,
which is much more likely to carry out
Congress' intent.
The other provision is
Section 214, which creates a new Office of
Technology Evaluation.
It would gather information about
the defense industrial base, technological
developments, and national security.
The information would be used to
make decisions relating to mass market and
foreign availability.
The bill now places this office in
the Department of Commerce, which has no
background in these matters.
Instead, this section should be
amended to place the new office in the
Department of Defense, where our
government's expertise resides.
Keeping
faith with the rest of the world
After September 11, the
United States is more dependent than ever
on foreign countries.
We must rely on them to help keep
dangerous technologies away from
terrorists and the nations that support
them.
But how can we ask other countries
to be more careful of what they sell if,
at the same time, we are weakening our own
export controls?
President Bush just
returned from a trip to China, where he
urged China to be more careful of its
missile exports.
The United States is also asking
Russia to stop exporting missile and
nuclear technology to Iran, and I myself
have visited ten countries in the former
East Bloc over the past two years to help
them strengthen their export control
systems.
In light of all this,
how can the United States now tell the
rest of the world that export controls
aren't so important after all - that,
in fact, they should be relaxed?
We should be sending the opposite
message. If we really want to protect our security, we would toss this
bill in the wastebasket and start over.
We would draft a new set of
controls to protect us against the new
threats we face.
Until we do that, other countries
won't take us seriously, and dangerous
technology will continue to flow to
countries and groups that want to destroy
us.
APPENDIX
TO TESTIMONY OF GARY MILHOLLIN BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
FEBRUARY 28, 2002
Sensitive items now
controlled for export that have mass
market status, and therefore would be
decontrolled under Section 211 of H.R.
2581
Nuclear
weapon triggers
For at least twenty
years, the United States has controlled
for export the high-precision electronic
switches needed to detonate nuclear
weapons.
These are key components in a
nuclear weapon's firing circuit and are
popularly known as nuclear weapon
"triggers."
In 1998, Iraq tried to provide
itself with a supply of these switches
under the guise of medical equipment.
Iraq is allowed to import medical
equipment despite the U.N. embargo, so
Iraq bought a half dozen machines -
called "lithotripters" - to rid its
citizens of kidney stones.
The lithotripter pulverizes kidney
stones inside the body - without
surgery.
But each machine must be triggered
by the same high-precision switch that
triggers a nuclear weapon.
Iraq tried to buy 120 extra
switches as "spare parts."
Iraq ordered the
machines and switches from Siemens, in
Germany, which sold the machines but
passed the "spare parts" order to
Thomson CSF in France.
Siemens reported that Iraq got one
switch with each machine and two more as
spares, but to get any additional
switches, Iraq would have to turn in a
used switch for each new one and allow the
United Nations to inspect the use of the
machines.
The switches were controlled for
export because they are on the control
list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an
international regime to which France,
Germany and the United States belong.
These switches, however,
would have "mass market status" under
H.R. 2581, and would be decontrolled for
export by the United States. The switches meet all the criteria listed in Section 211 of
the bill, and the bill says that the
Secretary of Commerce shall remove
them from the control list if they meet the
criteria. They meet the criteria as follows:
-
They
are "available for sale in a large
volume to multiple purchasers,"
because they are used in radar, lasers
and rockets as well as lithotripter
machines and are advertised on the
Internet by manufacturers in a number of
different countries;
-
They
are "widely distributed through normal
commercial channels," because they are
sold by the thousands each year,
including the hundreds sent to hospitals
to keep lithotripter machines running;
-
They
are "conducive to shipment and
delivery by generally accepted
commercial means of transport,"
because they are small and easy to
handle;
-
They
"may be used for their normal intended
purpose without substantial and
specialized service provided by the
manufacturer," because they need only
to be connected into an electrical
circuit by attaching the appropriate
wires.
Any bill that decontrols
nuclear weapon triggers must be seen as
seriously flawed.
Glass and carbon fibers
Glass and carbon fibers
are used widely in ballistic and cruise
missiles.
They go into solid rocket motor
cases, interstages, wings, inlets, nozzles,
heat shields, nosetips, structural members,
and frames.
Composites reinforced by carbon or
glass fibers also form the high-speed rotors
of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium
for nuclear weapons.
In addition to these
military applications, however, the fibers
are used in skis, tennis racquets, boats and
golf clubs, and are produced in a number of
countries.
This availability would give the
fibers "mass market status" under the
bill, despite the fact that they have been
controlled for export since January 1981.
-
They
are "available for sale in a large
volume to multiple purchasers,"
because they are advertised on the
Internet and can be ordered in large
quantities by anyone;
-
They
are "widely distributed through normal
commercial channels," because they are
shipped in large quantities to
manufacturers of sporting goods;
-
They
are "conducive to shipment and
delivery by generally accepted
commercial means of transport,"
because they do not require special
handling except for refrigeration in
some cases;
-
They
"may be used for their normal intended
purpose without substantial and
specialized service provided by the
manufacturer," because they can be
incorporated in manufacturing processes
in the form received.
In 1988, a California
rocket scientist was arrested in Baltimore
as he tried to illegally load 420 pounds of
carbon fibers on a military transport plane
bound for Cairo.
The material was intended for the
ballistic missile that Egypt was developing
with Argentina and Iraq.
The scientist was sentenced in June
1989 to 46 months in prison.
It would be a big surprise to the
world if the United States now decontrolled
this material.
Maraging steel
Maraging steel is a
high‑strength steel used to make solid
rocket motor cases, propellant tanks, and
interstages for missiles.
Like carbon fiber, it is used to make
centrifuge rotors for
enriching uranium for nuclear
weapons.
In 1986, a Pakistani-born Canadian
businessman tried to smuggle 25 tons of this
steel out of the United States to
Pakistan's nuclear weapon program.
He was sentenced to prison as a
result.
Maraging steel has been controlled
for export since January 1981.
This steel is produced by
companies in France, Japan, Russia, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States and
it meets all the criteria for "mass market
status."
Several steel companies list maraging
steel on the Internet and can produce
maraging steel in multi-ton quantities. Over the telephone, two American companies and one British
company explained to my staff how to order
25 ton quantities with delivery in less than
a month.
Maraging steel is bundled and shipped
much like stainless steel, which it closely
resembles.
Corrosion resistant
valves
These special valves are
essential components in plants that enrich
uranium to nuclear weapon grade.
Both Iraq and Iran are hoping to
build such plants, and will need these
valves in great numbers.
The valves resist the corrosive gas
used in the enrichment process.
These same valves are also
used in the chemical, petrochemical, oil and
gas, fossil power, pulp and paper, and
cryogenic industries.
Their size can range from very large
gate valves down to tiny globe valves used
in instrument and control lines.
They are manufactured by companies in
Australia, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States.
Smaller corrosion resistant valves
have been controlled for export since
October 1994, and larger valves have been
controlled since October 1981.
These valves fit all of
the criteria for "mass market status."
They are advertised on the Internet
and are widely available to American buyers. A quick survey this week by my organization revealed that
dozens of companies make them and sell them
in the hundreds per year.
They would therefore be decontrolled
under Section 211, to the great delight of
Iraq and Iran.
Other sensitive items
that would be decontrolled
The items above are only
four of the sensitive technologies that meet
the "mass market" definition of the
bill. There
also are many others, some of which are
listed below.
All of these items are now controlled
for anti-terrorism as well as
non-proliferation purposes.
Gyroscopes
Gyroscopes are sensitive
pieces of electromechanical or electro-optical
equipment that measure rotation about one or
more sensitive axis.
Gyros are used in a missile's
guidance set or integrated flight
instrumentation system to sense changes in
accelerometer orientation.
Designs may use two, three, or four
gyros. They usually are mounted
perpendicular to each other in order to
provide angular measurement information
about all three axes.
They can be mounted in a floating
ball, or affixed to a block which is in turn
affixed to the missile airframe in a
strapdown configuration.
Gyros are also used in integrated
flight instrumentation systems,
gyrostabilizers, automatic pilots, and in
navigational equipment. Military applications include artillery, tanks, ships, and
aircraft.
Gyroscopes are produced by companies
in Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Israel, Italy, Japan, North Korea, Russia,
South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
the United States.
Hot isostatic presses
Isostatic presses are used
to infuse carbon into a porous carbon
preform of a rocket nozzle or reentry
vehicle nose tip under great pressure.
This process, referred to as
densification, fills up and virtually
eliminates voids in the preform and thereby
increases the density and strength of the
treated object.
Hot isostatic presses are produced by
companies in France, Germany, Russia, and
the United States.
Vacuum induction
furnaces
Vacuum or controlled
environment induction furnaces are used to
heat or melt metal.
The furnaces create a vacuum because
the metals inside would oxidize if they were
exposed to the air.
The furnaces are typically closed
cylindrical vessels with a number of ports
and feedthroughs to provide access for
vacuum piping, inert gas piping, electrical
feeds, coolant piping, and instrumentation
lines.
Vacuum furnaces can melt uranium and
plutonium which can then be cast to make key
parts of nuclear explosive devices.
These furnaces also may be used to
heat-treat maraging steel for use in the
rotor assemblies of gas centrifuges for
uranium enrichment.
Vacuum furnaces are made by companies
in Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United
States.
Oscilloscopes
No other instrument has
been more important to the development of
nuclear weapons than the oscilloscope. Oscilloscopes are electronic measuring instruments that
record an electrical signal as a function of
time and usually plot the information on a
screen.
Because they can record events
occurring in a hundredth of a millionth, or
even a billionth of a second, oscilloscopes
can log the brief events at the heart of an
atomic bomb before it flies apart.
They are also widely used in
designing and testing the timing, firing,
and safing circuits for nuclear explosive
devices, the testing and development of high-speed
electronics such as computers, radar and
communications equipment, and can be used to
help make guidance, control and tracking
systems for missiles. Oscilloscopes are made by companies in Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Fermenters
In the typical biological
weapon production process, an organism is
grown in a fermenter in a type of media
favorable to the organism's growth.
A 20-liter fermenter combined with a
filling port can be obtained from a home
brewing supplier for under $50.
These suppliers can also be a source
of larger capacity fermenters.
There are numerous types
of fermentation vessels available. A
standard fermenter consists of a cylindrical
metal vessel (usually stainless steel) and
either a cone‑shaped or a sloping
bottom to facilitate emptying.
The fermenter also has a number of
ports for adding or removing material. Most are equipped for agitation with baffle plates fitted
inside the fermentation tank and an
impeller.
Fermenters are available from
suppliers in Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, the Czech republic, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia,
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Accelerometers
Accelerometers are
sensitive pieces of electromechanical
equipment used in measuring acceleration,
which is the rate of change of speed in a
given direction.
Missile accuracy is directly
dependent on the quality of the missile's
accelerometers and gyroscopes; missiles that
fly for a long time without external updates
require high quality accelerometers.
Information from the accelerometer,
along with information on time, local
gravity and orientation, allows vehicle
speed, heading, and position to be
determined by the guidance set or integrated
flight instrumentation systems.
Typically,
three accelerometers mounted perpendicular
to each other provide all the acceleration
measurement information necessary for
inertial navigation.
Combined with gyroscopes, they make
up the missile's inertial measurement
unit. Depending
upon mission requirements, some unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles
require only one or two accelerometers.
Accelerometers are made by companies
in China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy,
Japan, North Korea, Norway, Russia, South
Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Flow forming machines
Flow-forming machines are
used in manufacturing to make parts to
precision dimensions.
They can produce rocket motor cases,
end domes and nozzles, as well as numerous
parts for the aerospace industry, including
commercial aircraft parts, tactical missile
components, and liners for shaped charges. Flow forming machines are produced by companies in Germany,
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Centrifugal separators
Centrifugal separators
utilize the force generated by rotating an
object about a central vertical or
horizontal axis.
The separator consists of a cylinder,
a tangential inlet near the top, and an
outlet for large suspended solids at the
bottom. The incoming agent-laden growth media is imparted with a
rotating motion on entrance to the cylinder.
The vortex, so formed, develops a
force that throws the heavier suspended
solid radially toward the wall.
The force in a separator can approach
600 times the force of gravity, forcing
separation of particles one micron or
greater in diameter.
In a typical biological
agent production process, an organism is
grown in a fermenter in a type of media
favorable to the organism's growth.
The agent is then separated from the
growth media or from other grown cells using
a centrifugal separator.
Centrifugal separators are available
from companies in Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Detonators and
Multipoint Initiation Systems
These systems are needed
to provide the precise explosive timing
required to generate the implosion needed to
start the nuclear chain reaction in
implosive-type nuclear explosive devices.
They can also be used in military
ordnance, including missile systems and
directed detonation warheads.
These detonators utilize a
small electrical conductor (bridge, bridge
wire, or foil) that explosively vaporizes
when a fast, high-current electrical pulse
is passed through it.
The exploding conductor then starts a
chemical detonation in a contacting high-explosive
material such as PETN (pentaerythritol
tetranitrate).
In slapper detonators, the explosive
vaporization of the electrical conductor
drives a "flyer" or "slapper" across
a gap, and the impact of the slapper on an
explosive starts a chemical detonation.
Detonators are manufactured by
companies in France and the United States.